Titelaufnahme

Titel
Contract structure, time preference, and technology adoption / Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney and IZA), Joeri Smits (Harvard Kennedy School and Yale University), Qigang Sun (Yale University) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserChowdhury, Shyamal K. ; Smits, Joeri ; Sun, Qigang
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2020
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (63 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 13590
URLVolltext
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-863776 
Zugänglichkeit
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Contract structure, time preference, and technology adoption [1.08 mb]
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Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

Do constraints to technology adoption vary by behavioral traits? We randomize 150 villages in Bangladesh into being offered standard microcredit, loans with a grace period, the choice between those two contracts, and control. No discernible average effects are detected on the adoption of mechanized irrigation, hybrid seeds, and chemical fertilizers. However, credit access enhances technology adoption among present-biased farmers, whose output and profits increase. These effects are driven by the standard contract and choice villages, as present-biased farmers select out of the grace period contract. This suggests offering commitment and screening applicants on present bias to enhance agricultural technology adoption.

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