Titelaufnahme

Titel
Monetary and social incentives in multi- tasking: the ranking substitution effect / Matthias Stefan (University of Innsbruck), Jürgen Huber (University of Innsbruck), Michael Kirchler (University of Innsbruck), Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne and IZA), Markus Walzl (University of Innsbruck) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserStefan, Matthias ; Huber, Jürgen ; Kirchler, Michael ; Sutter, Matthias ; Walzl, Markus
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2020
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (27, 18 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 13345
URLVolltext
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-841043 
Zugänglichkeit
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Monetary and social incentives in multi- tasking: the ranking substitution effect [2.43 mb]
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Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.

Nutzungshinweis
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