External monitors and score manipulation in Italian schools : symptomatic treatment or cure? / Marco Bertoni (University of Padova and IZA), Giorgio Brunello (University of Padova and IZA), Marco Alberto De Benedetto (University of Messina), Maria De Paola (University of Calabria and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserBertoni, Marco ; Brunello, Giorgio ; De Benedetto, Marco Alberto ; De Paola, Maria
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, September 2019
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (60 Seiten)
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12591
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
External monitors and score manipulation in Italian schools [1.25 mb]
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We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.