Titelaufnahme

Titel
The detrimental effect of job protection on employment: evidence from France / Pierre Cahuc (Sciences Po, IZA and CEPR), Franck Malherbet (ENSAE, CREST and IZA), Julien Prat (CREST-ENSAE, Ecole Polytechnique, CNRS and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCahuc, Pierre ; Malherbet, Franck ; Prat, Julien
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, May 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (51 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12384
URLVolltext
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-192413 
Zugänglichkeit
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
The detrimental effect of job protection on employment: evidence from France [0.64 mb]
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Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

According to French law, employers have to pay at least six months salary to employees whose seniority exceeds two years in case of unfair dismissal. We show, relying on data, that this regulation entails a hike in severance payments at two-year seniority which induces a significant rise in the job separation rate before the two-year threshold and a drop just after. The layoff costs and its procedural component are evaluated thanks to the estimation of a search and matching model which reproduces the shape of the job separation rate. We find that total layoff costs increase with seniority and are about four times higher than the expected severance payments at two years of seniority. Counterfactual exercises show that the fragility of low-seniority jobs implies that layoff costs reduce the average job duration and increase unemployment for a wide set of empirically relevant parameters.