Titelaufnahme

Titel
The effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection / Sebastian Butschek (University of Cologne), Jan Sauermann (Stockholm University and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserButschek, Sebastian ; Sauermann, Jan
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, April 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (30, vi Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12305
URLVolltext
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-187245 
Zugänglichkeit
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
The effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection [0.47 mb]
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Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

To estimate the causal effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection, we study a policy change that reduced dismissal costs for the employers of over a tenth of Sweden's workforce. Our difference-in-differences analysis of firms' hiring uses individual ability measures including estimated worker fixed effects and cognitive test scores. We find that the reform reduced minimum hire quality by 5% of a standard deviation, half of which we can attribute to firms' hiring becoming more selective. Our results help discriminate between existing theories, supporting the prediction that firms shift their hiring standards in response to changes in dismissal costs.