Why join a team? / David J. Cooper (Florida State University and University of East Anglia, School of Economics), Krista Saral (University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Webster University), Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCooper, David J. ; Saral, Krista Jabs ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, September 2019
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (68 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12587
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Why join a team? [2.18 mb]
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We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: pro-social preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of pro-social preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams.