Titelaufnahme

Titel
Learning management through matching: a field experiment using mechanism design / Girum Abebe (Policy Studies Institute), Marcel Fafchamps (Stanford University and IZA), Michael Koelle (University of Oxford), Simon Quinn (University of Oxford) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAbebe, Girum ; Fafchamps, Marcel ; Koelle, Michael ; Quinn, Simon
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (44 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12572
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-198076 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
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Learning management through matching: a field experiment using mechanism design [1.44 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We place young professionals into established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. We match individuals to firms using a deferred-acceptance algorithm, and show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern characteristics. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, and show that some assignment mechanisms can substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the potential for matching algorithms to improve the design of field experiments.