Decisions on extending group membership: evidence from a public good experiment / Christian Grund (RWTH Aachen University and IZA), Christine Harbring (RWTH Aachen University and IZA), Kirsten Thommes (Paderborn University), Katja Rebecca Tilkes (RWTH Aachen University)
VerfasserGrund, Christian ; Harbring, Christine ; Thommes, Kirsten ; Tilkes, Katja Rebecca
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, July 2019
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12513
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Decisions on extending group membership: evidence from a public good experiment [0.42 mb]
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We experimentally analyze whether the opportunity to receive a permanent contract motivates temporary group members in a public good setting and how this affects the other group members. We compare an exogenous and an endogenous decision mechanism to extend the temporary agents group membership. The exogenous mechanism to extend the contract is modeled by a random draw. In the endogenous setting, one other group member decides about the temporary agents future group membership. Our results reveal that both the decision to extend a contract and the decision mechanism itself affect not only the temporary group members effort but also the efforts of the permanent group members and, ultimately, also cooperation within the group after the decision has been made.