Titelaufnahme

Titel
What do student jobs on graduate CVs signal to employers? / Eva Van Belle (NCCR, Ghent University and Université de Neuchâtel), Ralf Caers (KU Leuven and University of Seychelles), Laure Cuypers (Ghent University), Marijke De Couck (Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Odisee University College), Brecht Neyt (Ghent University), Hannah Van Borm (Ghent University), Stijn Baert (Ghent University, Research Foundation-Flanders, University of Antwerp, Université catholique de Louvain, IZA and IMISCOE) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserVan Belle, Eva ; Caers, Ralf ; Cuypers, Laure ; Couck, Marijke de ; Neyt, Brecht ; Van Borm, Hannah ; Baert, Stijn
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (37 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12431
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-194225 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
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What do student jobs on graduate CVs signal to employers? [1.13 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

Due to the prevalence and important consequences of student work, the topic has seen an increased interest in the literature. However, to date the focus has been solely on measuring the effect of student employment on later labour market outcomes, relying on signalling theory to explain the observed effects. In the current study, we go beyond measuring the effect of student work and we examine for the first time what exactly is being signalled by student employment. We do this by means of a vignette experiment in which we ask 242 human resource professionals to evaluate a set of five fictitious profiles. Whereas all types of student work signal a better work attitude, a larger social network, a greater sense of responsibility, an increased motivation, and more maturity, only student employment in line with a job candidate's field of study is a signal of increased human capital and increased trainability.