Titelaufnahme

Titel
Tax morale and fairness in conflict : an experiment / Christoph Engel/Luigi Mittone/Azzurra Morreale
VerfasserEngel, Christoph ; Mittone, Luigi ; Morreale, Azzurra
ErschienenBonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, February 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2019/2
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-183725 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Tax morale and fairness in conflict [0.82 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes even absent enforcement is indeed pronounced. Yet voluntary compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.