Titelaufnahme

Titel
Credence goods markets and the informational value of new media : a natural field experiment / Rudolf Kerschbamer (University of Innsbruck), Daniel Neururer (University of Innsbruck), Matthias Sutter (MPI for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne, University of Innsbruck and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserKerschbamer, Rudolf ; Neururer, Daniel ; Sutter, Matthias
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, February 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12184
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-183105 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Credence goods markets and the informational value of new media [0.55 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

Credence goods markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries between consumers and expert sellers. As a consequence, consumers are often exploited and market efficiency is threatened. However, in the digital age, it has become easy and cheap for consumers to self-diagnose their needs using specialized webpages or to access other consumers reviews on social media platforms in search for trustworthy sellers. We present a natural field experiment that examines the causal effect of information acquisition from new media on the level of sellers price charges for computer repairs. We find that even a correct self-diagnosis of a consumer about the appropriate repair does not reduce prices, and that an incorrect diagnosis more than doubles them. Internet ratings of repair shops are a good predictor of prices. However, the predictive valued of reviews depends on whether they are judged as reliable or not. For reviews recommended by the platform Yelp we find that good ratings are associated with lower prices and bad ratings with higher prices, while non-recommended reviews have a clearly misleading effect, because nonrecommended positive ratings increase the price.