Titelaufnahme

Titel
Monopsony power and guest worker programs / Eric M. Gibbons (The Ohio State University at Marion), Allie Greenman (University of Nevada, Reno), Peter Norlander (Loyola University Chicago), Todd Sørensen (University of Nevada, Reno and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserGibbons, Eric M. ; Greenman, Allie ; Norlander, Peter ; Sørensen, Todd A.
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, January 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (49, 8, 25 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12096
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-179776 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Monopsony power and guest worker programs [3.06 mb]
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Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

Guest workers on visas in the United States may be unable to quit bad employers due to barriers to mobility and a lack of labor market competition. Using H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B program data, we calculate the concentration of employers in geographically defined labor markets within occupations. We find that many guest workers face moderately or highly concentrated labor markets, based on federal merger scrutiny guidelines, and that concentration generally decreases wages. For example, moving from a market with an HHI of zero to a market comprised of two employers lowers H-1B worker wages approximately 10 percent, and a pure monopsony (one employer) reduces wages by 13 percent. A simulation shows that wages under pure monopsony could be 47 percent lower, suggesting that employers do not use the extent of their monopsony power. Enforcing wage regulations and decreasing barriers to mobility may better address issues of exploitation than antitrust scrutiny.