Motivated memory in dictator games / Charlotte Saucet (University of Lyon), Marie Claire Villeval (University of Lyon and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserSaucet, Charlotte ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, December 2018
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12058
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Motivated memory in dictator games [2.05 mb]
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

The memory people have of their past behavior is one of the main sources of information about themselves. To study whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters, we designed an experiment in which participants play binary dictator games and then have to recall the amounts allocated to the receivers. We find evidence of motivated memory through selective recalls: dictators remember more their altruistic than their selfish choices. A causal effect of the responsibility of decisions is identified, as the recall asymmetry disappears when options are selected randomly by the computer program. Incentivizing memory accuracy increases the percentage of dictators' correct recalls only when they behaved altruistically. In contrast, there is no clear evidence of motivated memory through biased, i.e., overly optimistic recalls: dictators recall selectively but they do not bias strategically the direction and magnitude of these recalls.