Titelaufnahme

Titel
Embezzlement and guilt aversion / Giuseppe Attanasi (University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis), Claire Rimbaud (University of Lyon), Marie Claire Villeval (University of Lyon) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAttanasi, Giuseppe ; Rimbaud, Claire ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2018
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (60 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11956
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-172552 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Embezzlement and guilt aversion [0.64 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.