Titelaufnahme

Titel
Job search requirements, effort provision and labor market outcomes / Patrick Arni (University of Bristol, IZA, CESifo, DEEP and CAFE), Amelie Schiprowski (IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserArni, Patrick In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Schiprowski, Amelie In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2018
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (53 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11765
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-164953 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
Job search requirements, effort provision and labor market outcomes [0.69 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

How effective are effort targets? This paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes. Based on largescale register data, we estimate the returns to required job search effort, instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency. Identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers. We find that the duration of un- and non- employment both decrease by 3% if the requirement increases by one monthly application. When instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency, an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4%. In line with theory, we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individuals voluntary effort. Finally, the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability, reducing the duration of re- employment spells by 0.3% per required application. We find a zero effect on re-employment wages.