Titelaufnahme

Titel
Incentivizing school attendance in the presence of parent-child information frictions / Damien de Walque (The World Bank), Christine Valente (University of Bristol and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserDe Walque, Damien ; Valente, Christine
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2018
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (61 Seiten)
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11637
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-161124 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Incentivizing school attendance in the presence of parent-child information frictions [0.49 mb]
Links
Nachweis
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an education conditional cash transfer program, when given to parents independently of any transfer, can have a substantial effect on school attendance. The effect is as large as 75 percent of the effect of a conditional cash transfer incentivizing parents, and not significantly different from it. In contrast, a conditional transfer program incentivizing children instead of parents is nearly twice as effective as an "information only" treatment providing the same information to parents about their child's attendance. Taken together, these results suggest that children have substantial agency in their schooling decisions. The paper replicates the findings from most evaluations of conditional cash transfers that gains in attendance achieved by incentivizing parents financially do not translate into gains in test scores. But it finds that both the information only treatment and the alternative intervention incentivizing children substantially improve math test scores.