Productivity and wage effects of firm-level collective agreements : evidence from Belgian linked panel data / Andrea Garnero (OECD, Université libre de Bruxelles (CEB and DULBEA) and IZA), François Rycx (Université libre de Bruxelles (CEB and DULBEA), Université catholique de Louvain (IRES) and IZA), Isabelle Terraz (Université de Strasbourg (BETA, OPEE)) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserGarnero, Andrea ; Rycx, François ; Terraz, Isabelle
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, May 2018
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11568
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Productivity and wage effects of firm-level collective agreements [0.29 mb]
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How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian linked employer-employee panel data, our findings show that firm agreements increase both wage costs and productivity (with respect to sectorlevel agreements). Relying on a recent approach developed by Bartolucci (2014), they also indicate that firm agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect only holds in manufacturing. In private sector services, the raw wage premium associated to firm agreements is entirely driven by compositional effects. Furthermore, estimates show that firm agreements lead to significantly more rent-sharing among firms operating in less competitive environments. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firmlevel agreements benefit to both employers and employees - through higher productivity and wages - without being very detrimental to firms' performance.