Measuring physicians' response to incentives : evidence on hours worked and multitasking / Bruce Shearer (Université Laval, CRREP, CIRANO and IZA), Nibene Habib Somé (University of Western Ontario), Bernard Fortin (Université Laval, CRREP, CIRANO and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserShearer, Bruce S. ; Somé, Nibene Habib ; Fortin, Bernard
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, May 2018
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (51 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11565
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Measuring physicians' response to incentives [0.38 mb]
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We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using matched administrative and time-use data on specialists from Québec (Canada). These physicians were paid feefor- service contracts and supplied a number of different services. Our sample covers a period during which the Québec government changed the prices paid for clinical services. We apply these data to a multitasking model of physician labour supply, measuring two distinct responses. The first is the labour-supply response of physicians to broad-based fee increases. The second is the response to changes in the relative prices of individual services. Our results confirm that physicians respond to incentives in predictable ways. The ownprice substitution effects of a relative price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but are overridden when prices are increased for individual services. They are more prominent in the presence of broad-based fee increases. In such cases, the income effect empirically dominates the substitution effect, which leads physicians to reduce their supply of clinical services.