Voting in hiring committees : which "almost" rule is optimal? / Eyal Baharad (Bar-Ilan University), Leif Danziger (Ben-Gurion University and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserBaharad, Eyal In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Danziger, Leif In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, January 2018
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten, 6 ungezählte Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11287
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-147709 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Voting in hiring committees [0.55 mb]
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We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.