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Titel
The short-term distributional effects of the German minimum wage reform / Marco Caliendo (University of Potsdam, IZA, DIW and IAB), Alexandra Fedorets (SOEP at DIW Berlin), Malte Preuss (Freie Universität Berlin), Carsten Schröder (SOEP at DIW and Freie Universität Berlin), Linda Wittbrodt (University of Potsdam) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCaliendo, Marco In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Fedorets, Alexandra In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Preuss, Malte In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Schröder, Carsten In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Wittbrodt, Linda
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, December 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (45 Seiten) : Diagramme, Karten
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11246
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-146074 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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The short-term distributional effects of the German minimum wage reform [1.71 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

This study quantifies the short-term distributional effects of the new statutory minimum wage in Germany. Using detailed survey data (German Socio-Economic Panel), we assess changes in the distributions of hourly wages, contractual and actual working hours, and monthly earnings. Our descriptive results indicate growth at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution in the post-reform year, but also considerable noncompliance among eligible employees. In a second step, we employ a difference-in-differences analysis and exploit regional variation in the "bite" of the intervention, measured by the share of employees in a geographical region with wages below the minimum wage prior to the reform. We document the reforms positive effect at the bottom of the wage distribution. However, we find a negative effect of the reform on contractual hours worked, which explains why there is no effect on monthly earnings. Given that actual hours worked decrease less than contractual hours, our evidence suggests an increase in unpaid overtime.