Titelaufnahme

Titel
Betting the house: how assets influence marriage selection, marital stability, and child investments / Jeanne Lafortune (Ponticia Universidad Catolica de Chile and IZA), Corinne Low (University of Pennsylvania) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserLafortune, Jeanne In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Low, Corinne In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11176
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-144256 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
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Betting the house: how assets influence marriage selection, marital stability, and child investments [0.66 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Marriage used to be practically universal, but now persists as an institution for only some groups, while others choose non-marital fertility. This paper posits that if one role of marriage is to insure one partner's investment in children, then home-ownership can be seen as providing the necessary "collateral" for this contract. As easier divorce and paternity enforcement outside of marriage have reduced the relative strength of the marital contract, the division of assets, particularly the family home, post-separation has remained unique to marriage. We provide a model where husbands can "ante up" the marital home to elicit more optimal child investments, whose costs are born mostly by the mother, by reducing the chance of divorce while providing consumption insurance to their partner. This, in turn, increases the value of marriage for those able to access this collateralized version of the contract. The model predicts that individuals able to buy a home at the time of marriage will invest more in children and have greater labor specialization, while policy changes that eroded marriages relative commitment value would have heterogenous effects by assetholding, both of which appear to hold in US data.