Titelaufnahme

Titel
Measuring indirect effects of unfair employer behavior on worker productivity: a field experiment / Matthias Heinz (University of Cologne and CEPR), Sabrina Jeworrek (Halle Institute for Economic Research and Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg), Vanessa Mertins (University of Vechta), Heiner Schumacher (KU Leuven), Matthias Sutter (MPI for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne, CESifo and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserHeinz, Matthias In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Jeworrek, Sabrina In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Mertins, Vanessa In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Schumacher, Heiner In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Sutter, Matthias In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (56 Seiten) : Illustrationen, Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11128
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-142717 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
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Volltexte
Measuring indirect effects of unfair employer behavior on worker productivity: a field experiment [1.35 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers' competence, but rather related to the workers' perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employers unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers.