Long-run consequences of health insurance promotion : evidence from a field experiment in Ghana / Patrick Opoku Asuming (University of Ghana), Hyuncheol Bryant Kim (Cornell University and IZA), Armand Sim (Cornell University) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAsuming, Patrick Opoku ; Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant ; Sim, Armand
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, October 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (49 Seiten) : Diagramme, 1 Karte
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 11117
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Long-run consequences of health insurance promotion [2.19 mb]
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We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. Our interventions, especially the subsidy, promote enrollment and healthcare service utilization in the short and long runs. We also find short-run health status improvements, which disappear in the long run. We find suggestive evidence on decreased investment in disease prevention and selection that may help explain this pattern of health status changes.