Titelaufnahme

Titel
Behaviorally efficient remedies : an experiment / Christoph Engel/Lars Freund
VerfasserEngel, Christoph In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Freund, Lars In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, August 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (24 Seiten) : Diagramme
SeriePreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017,17
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-138960 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
Behaviorally efficient remedies [0.52 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only lead to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises. We find that there is indeed less trade if specific performance is not guaranteed, provided the preference for the traded commodity is sufficiently pronounced.