Motivational goal bracketing : an experiment / Alexander K. Koch (Aarhus University and IZA), Julia Nafziger (Aarhus University) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserKoch, Alexander K. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Nafziger, Julia In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (60 Seiten, 8 ungezählte Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10955
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-137149 Persistent Identifier (URN)
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Motivational goal bracketing [0.74 mb]
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We study in an online, real-effort experiment how the bracketing of non-binding goals affects performance in a work-leisure self-control problem. We externally induce the goal bracket - daily goals or a weekly goal - and within that bracket let subjects set goals for how much they want to work over a one-week period. Our theoretical model predicts (i) that weekly goals create incentives to compensate for a lower than desired performance today with the promise to work harder tomorrow, whereas daily goals exclude such excuses; (ii) that subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and work harder than those with weekly goals. Our data support these predictions. Surprisingly, however, when goals are combined with an externally enforced commitment that requires subjects to spend less than a minute each day on the task to get started working, performance deteriorates because of high dropout rates from the task.