Titelaufnahme

Titel
Does random selection of commissioners improve the quality of selected candidates? : an investigation in the Italian academia / Daniele Checchi (FBK-IRVAPP, University of Milan and IZA), Silvia De Poli (FBK-IRVAPP), Enrico Rettore (FBK-IRVAPP, IZA and University of Trento) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserChecchi, Daniele In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; De Poli, Silvia In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Rettore, Enrico In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10844
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-134971 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
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Volltexte
Does random selection of commissioners improve the quality of selected candidates? [0.47 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We study a reform occurred in Italy in 2008 in the formation of selection committees for qualifying as university professor. Prior to the reform members of the selection committees were elected by their peers, after the reform they have been randomly drawn. This policy was intended to increase the equality of opportunities of candidates via a reduction of the role played by connections to commissioners. Results show that the reform was ineffective in reducing the probability contribution of being an insider, but attenuated the impact of being connected to a commissioner without significantly raising the impact of scientific quality of candidates on the outcome of competitions. We also find that candidates internalised the changed environment and adapted their strategy of application.