Titelaufnahme

Titel
The political cost of being soft on crime : evidence from a natural experiment / Francesco Drago (University of Messina, CEPR, CSEF and IZA), Roberto Galbiati (CNRS and Sciences Po), Francesco Sobbrio (LUISS "G. Carli") ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserDrago, Francesco In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Galbiati, Roberto In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Sobbrio, Francesco In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (52 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10858
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-134841 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
The political cost of being soft on crime [0.71 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

We provide evidence about voters response to crime control policies. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the Italian 2006 collective pardon releasing about one third of the prison population. The pardon created idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across released individuals and municipalities. We show that municipalities where resident pardoned individuals have a higher incentive to recidivate experienced higher recidivism. Moreover, in these municipalities: i) newspapers were more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals; ii) voters held worse beliefs on the incumbent governments ability to control crime and iii) with respect to the previous elections, the incumbent national government experienced a worse electoral performance in the April 2008 national elections relative to the opposition coalition. Overall, our findings indicate that voters keep incumbent politicians accountable by conditioning their vote on the observed effects of their policies.