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Titel
Why ist unemployment duration a sorting criterion in hiring? / Eva van Belle (Ghent University), Ralf Caers (KU Leuven), Marijke De Couck (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Valentina Di Stasio( University of Oxford), Stijn Baert (Ghent University, University of Antwerp, Université catholique de Louvain, IZA and IMISCOE) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserBelle, Eva van In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Eva van Belle ; Caers, Ralf In Wikipedia suchen nach Ralf Caers ; De Couck, Marijke In Wikipedia suchen nach Marijke De Couck ; Di Stasio, Valentina In Wikipedia suchen nach Valentina Di Stasio ; Baert, Stijn In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Stijn Baert
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, July 2017
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Umfang1 Online-Ressource (41 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10876
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-134656 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Why ist unemployment duration a sorting criterion in hiring? [1.03 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation. Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation.