Training contracts, employee turnover / Mitchell Hoffman (University of Toronto and NBER), Stephen V. Burks (University of Minnesota, Morris and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserHoffman, Mitchell In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Burks, Stephen V. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, June 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (35 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10835
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-131330 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Training contracts, employee turnover [0.29 mb]
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Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. “Training contracts” that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we show that two training contracts significantly reduced post-training quitting, particularly when workers are approaching the end of their contracts. Simulating a structural model, we show that observed worker quit behavior exhibits aspects of optimization (for one of the two contracts), and that the contracts increased firm profits from training and reduced worker welfare relative to no contract.