The sequencing of gift exchange : a field trial / Jeffrey Carpenter (Middlebury College and IZA) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserCarpenter, Jeffrey P. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Jeffrey P. Carpenter
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, April 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (13 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10736
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-122319 Persistent Identifier (URN)
 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
The sequencing of gift exchange [0.48 mb]
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There is now an extensive literature on "gift exchange" showing that when principals and agents can trade "gifts" (rewards that should not emerge in a competitive equilibrium), exchange becomes more efficient. However, it is not obvious how gift exchange should be organized if the principals goal is to increase the performance of a reciprocal agent. Specifically, who should make the first gift, the principal or the agent? Although both orderings, by themselves, have been hypothesized and examined in theory and experiments, the literature is largely silent on the comparison. I report the results of a field experiment that compares the principal-first and agent-first orderings to each other and a gift-less control. Consistent with the previous experimental literature, I find that principal-first, gifts do increase agent performance. Unlike the literature, however, I find that agent-first, gifts are also effective. Comparing the two, I see that the agent-first ordering works best, is clearly cheaper to implement and differences appear on both the extensive and intensive margins.