Titelaufnahme

Titel
Benefit generosity and injury duration : quasi-experimental evidence from regression kinks / Benjamin Hansen (University of Oregon, NBER and IZA), Tuan Nguyen (University of Oregon), Glen R. Waddell (University of Oregon and IZA) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserHansen, Benjamin In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Benjamin Hansen ; Nguyen, Tuan In Wikipedia suchen nach Tuan Nguyen ; Waddell, Glen R. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Glen R. Waddell
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2017
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10621
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-116287 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
Benefit generosity and injury duration [0.65 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

In this paper, we investigate the effect of benefit generosity on claim duration and temporary benefits paid among temporary disability claims for workers' compensation. While previous studies have focused on natural experiments created by one-time large changes in minimum or maximum weekly benefits, we exploit variation around a kink in benefit generosity inherent in all workers' compensation systems in the United States. Using administrative data on the universe of injured workers in Oregon, we also find that more-generous benefits leads to longer injuries, but with implied elasticities that are smaller than the average elasticity from previous difference-in-difference studies. Our preferred estimates suggest that a 10-percent increase in benefit generosity leads to a 2- to 4-percent increase in injury duration. We derive similar duration-benefit elasticities when studying changes in benefits paid at the kink. We also introduce the first evidence that moregenerous benefits encourage subsequent claim filing.