Whistle-blower protection : theory and experimental evidence / Lydia Mechtenberg (University of Hamburg), Gerd Muehlheusser (University of Hamburg, IZA and CESifo), Andreas Roider (University of Regensburg, CEPR, IZA and CESifo) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserMechtenberg, Lydia In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Mühlheußer, Gerd In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Roider, Andreas In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2017
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten, 12 Seiten, 9 Seiten, 1 Seite) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10607
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-116146 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Whistle-blower protection [0.67 mb]
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Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable ("belief-based") protection indeed leads to more reports, both truthful and fraudulent. Fraudulent claims dilute prosecutors incentives to investigate, and thereby hamper deterrence. These effects are ameliorated under more stringent ("fact-based") protection.