Titelaufnahme

Titel
Investment in education under disappointment aversion / Dan Anderberg/Claudia Cerrone
VerfasserAnderberg, Dan In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Cerrone, Claudia In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, November 2016
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Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (8 Seiten)
SeriePreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2016,16
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-115282 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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 Das Dokument ist frei verfügbar.
Volltexte
Investment in education under disappointment aversion [0.56 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

This paper develops a model of risky investment in education under disappointment aversion, modelled as loss aversion around one's endogenous expectation. The model shows that disappointment aversion reduces the optimal investment in education for lower ability people and increases it for higher ability people, thereby magnifying the investment gap between them generated by the riskiness of education. Policies aimed at in uencing students' expectations can reduce early dropout.