Titelaufnahme

Titel
The intergenerational causal effect of tax evasion : evidence from the commuter tax allowance in Austria / Wolfgang Frimmel (Johannes Kepler University Linz and CD-Lab Aging, Health and the Labor Market), Martin Halla (CD-Lab Aging, Health and the Labor Market, University of Innsbruck and IZA), Jörg Paetzold (University of Salzburg) ; IZA, Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserFrimmel, Wolfgang In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Wolfgang Frimmel ; Halla, Martin In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Martin Halla ; Paetzold, Jörg In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Jörg Paetzold
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen In Wikipedia suchen nach Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, January 2017
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (36, A6 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 10529
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-110783 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Volltexte
The intergenerational causal effect of tax evasion [0.82 mb]
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Zusammenfassung

Does tax evasion run in the family? To answer this question, we study the case of the commuter tax allowance in Austria. This allowance is designed as a step function of the distance between the residence and the workplace, creating sharp discontinuities at each bracket threshold. The distance to these brackets is a strong determinant of compliance since it corresponds to the probability of detection. The match of different administrative data sources allows us to observe actual compliance behavior at the individual level across two generations. To identify the intergenerational causal effect in tax evasion behavior, we use the paternal distance-to-bracket as an instrumental variable for paternal compliance. We find that paternal noncompliance increases childrens non-compliance by about 20 percent.