
ECONtribute
Discussion Paper No. 425

**Power to Whom: Authoritarian Preferences
and Minority Success**

Gönül Doğan

Louis Strang

August 2026

www.econtribute.de



**UNIVERSITÄT
ZU KÖLN**

Power to Whom: Authoritarian Preferences and Minority Success^{*}

Gönül Doğan^a and Louis Strang^a

^a *University of Cologne*

This version: July 28, 2026

Abstract

We propose a novel behavioural measure of authoritarian preferences and deploy it in a large German sample comparing East and West. We identify preference for three types of decision rules and discrimination when assigning decision power. Support for authoritarian decision rules is high with 73% of participants assigning positive weight to them. When assigning decision power within authoritarian rules, groups with a large number of minorities as well as minority members themselves face substantial discrimination, ranging between 12 to 33 percent lower decision weight allocated to them. East and West German participants do not significantly differ in their discrimination in decision power. Our main treatment variation exposes individuals to minority success stories; neither authoritarian rule support nor discrimination in decision power is significantly impacted by such positive information. Drawing on an extensive questionnaire, we identify attitudes toward decision power allocation within the society, and beliefs about immigrants' origin and religion as the strongest predictors of authoritarian behaviour.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Discrimination, Resource allocation, Political preferences, Social preferences, Online experiment

JEL-Classification: C91, H89, P00

^{*} We thank Arno Appfelstaedt, Thomas Dohmen, Bernd Irlenbusch, Johannes Münster as well as audiences at Cologne, M-BEES in Maastricht, ESA Europe in Helsinki, and GfeW in Cologne for numerous helpful comments and feedback. We thank Janna Büngen and Felia Mielsch for outstanding research assistance. We thank the Center für Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) of the University of Cologne for its financial support. This work was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/2– 390838866. Part of this research was conducted during Gönül Doğan's affiliation with the Institute for Applied Microeconomics at the University of Bonn.

1 Introduction

Western right-wing populist movements increasingly portray non-Western immigrants as a fundamental threat to national identity. The argument holds that such immigrants are too numerous and destined to become the dominant force in their host countries unless countermeasures are taken. For instance, German *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) politician Christina Baum invoked a “gradual genocide against the German people” when criticising immigration policies pursued by the Green Party (Ministerium des Inneren, für Digitalisierung und Kommunen Baden-Württemberg, 2023, p.59). Similar statements framing immigration as an existential threat to native populations have been made by politicians across Europe, for example in France by Marine Le Pen of *Rassemblement National* (RN) (Maad, 2019), in the Netherlands by Geert Wilders of the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) (Wilders, 2018), in Sweden by Jimmie Åkesson of the *Sverigedemokraterna* (SD) (Åkesson, 2024), and in Austria by Heinz Christian Strache, the then chairman of the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) (Bischofberger, 2019). An extreme manifestation of such rhetoric is the “great replacement” theory, which claims that Jewish elites are deliberately increasing Muslim immigration to transform European societies and displace native populations (Cosentino, 2020; Dennison and Kustov, 2025). The proposed remedy of these movements involves employing authoritarian measures, such as “remigration” of immigrants and their descendants. In major Western democracies, right-wing populist parties now constitute a significant political force, and their rhetoric is increasingly adopted by center-right parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020; Bayerlein, 2021; Kaltwasser et al., 2024).

Two mechanisms have been proposed as the drivers of populist support: economic insecurities and identity threat (see, e.g., Margalit, 2019; Tabellini, 2020; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva, 2023). This paper focuses on the latter, identity threat. Perceived threats to social identity are closely associated with support for status hierarchies within the society, a defining feature of right-wing authoritarianism (Osborne, Costello, et al., 2023) as well as a central tenet in populist discourse (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Previously, survey studies have documented a relationship between perceived decline in white working class men’s status in the society and their support for right-wing populist parties in major democracies (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gidron, 2022). In the U.S., based on panel surveys, Mutz (2018) found dominant group status threat, rather than personal economic considerations, to be the primary factor for switching parties in support for Trump in 2016. The experimental work of Craig and Richeson (2014, 2015) corroborates this result.

In this paper, we introduce the first behavioural and incentivised measure of authoritarian preferences, and document their prevalence in Germany using incentivised experiments conducted with a large online sample (N=1764) on Prolific. We hereby follow definitions of authoritarianism commonly employed in political science (see Linz, 2000; Marshall and Gurr, 2020, for foundational work) ranging

from democracy, where everyone may express their own political preferences, to autocracy with little to no room for the expression of such preferences. To test the impact of identity threat on authoritarian preferences, our main intervention introduces reminders of minority success signifying a potential threat to the dominant group’s status.

Germany constitutes a particularly compelling setting to address this research question. As in other Western countries, the right-wing populist party AfD has substantially increased its electoral support in Germany over the past decade, contemporaneous with the large influx of refugees in 2015 and the associated public debate. As of 2025, 19.2 percent of Germany’s inhabitants are immigrants, and the share with at least one parent who is not a German citizen reaches 30.4 percent (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025b). While the percentage of immigrants is lower in East German states (the former German Democratic Republic) compared to the West, concern over immigration (Carl, 2018) and support for populist parties (Arzheimer, 2024) are notably higher in the East.¹ The two regions also experienced differential exposure to authoritarian regimes from the end of World War II until German unification in 1990. To investigate potential regional heterogeneity in the relationship between identity threat and authoritarianism, we sample from all German federal states and compare East and West German participants.

In the experiment, participants can choose between two authoritarian and one democratic decision rule. The first authoritarian rule restricts decision-making power to one group among four (henceforth, one-group rule), and the second restricts decision-making power to one individual (henceforth, dictator rule). In contrast, we consider the rule that incorporates everyone’s preferences as the democratic rule. The chosen rule then applies to a fixed set of participants, the *reference sample*, who, based on this chosen rule, allocate a budget among themselves.

The reference sample comprises a total of 40 participants whose first names identify them either as being part of a minority (Muslim-sounding) or majority (ethnic German-sounding) in Germany. The sample is divided into four groups of ten participants each, varying in minority composition: zero, one, five, or nine members belong to the minority based on their first names. Prior to the main experiment, these participants allocated 1,200 euros among themselves under each decision rule.

Main experiment participants choose among the three decision rules by assigning realisation probabilities to each of them. We measure support for authoritarian decision making by the weight assigned to the one-group and dictator rule. Further-

¹ Further, East Germans hold stronger right-wing attitudes than West Germans (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2024). Vote shares for the AfD in the last three parliamentary elections (2017, 2021, 2025) have been 11.5, 8.2, and 17.3 percent in the West, and 21.6, 20.9, and 36.1 percent in the East, respectively. While most existing literature treats the assignment of different regimes to East and West Germany as an exogenous shock, Becker, Mergele, and Woessmann (2020) caution that regional disparities predating World War II may partly explain current differences.

more, in order to identify whether support for these rules is indeed driven by the desire to take away decision power from the minority, we elicit in a second step which group or individual should make the decision in the respective rule. Critically, the decision rule choice also has monetary consequences for the main experiment participants. They decide behind the veil of ignorance such that their payoff is matched to that of a randomly chosen reference sample member. Finally, participants make four allocation choices prior to the main task; they allocate 330 euros between themselves and the members of each of the four reference sample groups. In sum, we measure support for authoritarian rules and discrimination in both decision power and resource allocation.

To test the causal effect of immigrant success stories on authoritarian preferences, we vary the content of ten short news items participants read prior to the main task. In *MINORITY SUCCESS*, these news items feature individuals with a migration background who are either economically successful or have had significant societal impact. We contrast this with items in *BASELINE* containing similar content stripped of individual-specific information.

We have four main findings. First, there is substantial support for authoritarian decision rules: 73 percent of participants assign a positive implementation probability to them, and the overall weight allocated to the two authoritarian rules averages 43 percentage points. Second, within authoritarian rules, majority members—ethnic German names—are substantially favoured in decision power allocation. In the one-group rule, groups with five and nine minority members receive significantly lower decision power (23.0 and 22.0 percentage points, respectively, versus 27.4 and 27.7 for groups with zero or one minority member). In the dictator rule, minority members are on average assigned 0.9 percentage points lower decision power than majority members (1.92 versus 2.85 percentage points per person). Resource allocation shows similar patterns: participants keep on average 5 euros more when facing the group with nine minority members compared to the group with zero minorities, and among those who discriminate, minority members receive allocations that are 7.6 percent lower in the West and 12.3 percent lower in the East. Third, regarding regional differences, support for authoritarian rules does not significantly differ across East and West Germany but regional differences emerge when assigning decision power to groups in the one-group rule. Fourth, minority success stories have no significant impact on authoritarian rule support nor resource discrimination. However, contrary to our pre-registered predictions, when such information does have an effect, it reduces discrimination in decision power: in both regions, minorities are allocated significantly higher decision power in the dictator rule when participants read minority success stories. We rule out success stories per se as the driver of this effect in an additional treatment, *MAJORITY SUCCESS*, where ethnic German success stories do not significantly affect any outcome compared to *BASELINE*.

Of separate interest is whether certain participant characteristics predict authoritarian rule support and discrimination in decision power. Post-experiment, we elicit participants' background characteristics, social dominance orientation, select items from left- and right-wing authoritarianism scales, attitudes toward decision power allocation within government and large companies, beliefs about immigrants' origin and religion, and attitudes toward redistribution, immigration, and Muslims.

Among these measures, attitudes toward decision power allocation, that is which (ethnic) group should make political and economic decisions, and beliefs about immigrants' origin and religion are the strongest predictors of authoritarian rule support and discrimination in decision power, as measured by the largest reductions in the root-mean-square error based on a random forest algorithm. As a concrete example, participants who completely agree that only ethnic Germans should make important government decisions are significantly more likely than those who completely disagree i) to support authoritarian rules (56.2 percentage points versus 34.9), and ii) to discriminate groups with minorities in decision power allocation in the one-group rule (groups with zero and one minority members are assigned 60.2 percentage points versus 50.7) and in the dictator rule (the difference in decision power assigned to majority and minority members is 1.6 percentage points versus 0.4). While social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are good predictors of authoritarian rule support, attitudes toward Muslims stand out as one of the best predictors of discrimination in decision power. Other background characteristics—age, gender, education, employment, political orientation, and political party support—as well as treatment have little to no predictive power when evaluated jointly with all the aforementioned measures. This finding rules out interaction effects with these characteristics and treatment as predictors of behaviour. Finally, employing latent class analysis on our survey measures, four distinct classes emerge that diverge along ethnically exclusionary or inclusionary beliefs and attitudes. Testing whether these different types react differently to MINORITY SUCCESS, we see that, perhaps surprisingly, minority success stories' impact is confined to those with inclusionary attitudes and beliefs; their authoritarian rule support—the lowest among the classes in BASELINE—decreases even further.

This paper makes two main contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on authoritarianism by providing a novel incentivised measure of authoritarian rule support and discrimination in decision power. Previous authoritarianism measures employed in psychology and political science rely on survey questions. A canonical early measure is based on child-rearing values (e.g., Miller, Kinder, and Rosenstone, 1993; Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Vidigal, 2022). Commonly employed left- and right-wing authoritarianism constructs contain multiple questions regarding redistribution, national unity, the importance of traditional families, and the use of power to achieve societal goals (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt et al., 2010); see Osborne, Costello, et al. (2023) for a recent review. A typical finding in this literature is that authoritarianism correlates with prejudices toward outgroups

(e.g., Bizumic and Duckitt, 2018; Heller et al., 2020; Osborne, Satherley, et al., 2021).² A related construct is social dominance orientation (SDO), which measures attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., Ho et al., 2015). Previous research showed that SDO explains and predicts outgroup hostility across a wide range of countries and cultures (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, et al., 1994; Pratto, Liu, et al., 2000; Kteily, Sidanius, and Levin, 2011; Unzueta, Everly, and Gutiérrez, 2014). Evidence linking SDO to actual behaviour is more limited, and the findings are ambiguous. In a German police and civilian sample, Stelter et al. (2023) found no correlation between SDO and biases towards those perceived as “Arab” or “Muslim” in a first-person shooter experiment. In contrast, Swencionis, Pouget, and Goff (2021) documented a positive association between SDO and the use of force among White police officers in the U.S. In a French student sample, SDO predicted discrimination of minorities in hierarchical assignment decisions in an experimental office task (Michinov et al., 2005). SDO also predicted discrimination in minimal group paradigm studies (see, e.g., Amiot and Bourhis, 2005). Unlike previous work, we measure behaviour—rather than attitudes—with respect to authoritarian decision-making rules and decision-power allocation in the presence of outgroups. Our results show substantial support for authoritarian rules and discrimination in decision power. Among the social dominance orientation and authoritarianism constructs, right-wing authoritarianism is the only one that significantly correlates with all our main outcomes. Nonetheless, our survey items regarding who should have decision power in the government or society predicts behaviour better than these established measures.

When it comes to the drivers of authoritarianism, recent work points to both economic and social insecurities. In representative samples from the U.K. and Ireland, Hartman et al. (2021) showed that resentments against immigrants were associated with right-wing authoritarianism and this relationship was stronger when there was a perceived existential threat (Covid-19). Similarly, Engler and Weisstanner (2021) reported that the perceived threat of social decline was associated with stronger support for the radical right based on longitudinal survey data from 14 OECD countries. We add to this work by investigating whether identity threat contributes to authoritarian behaviour.

We also contribute to the literature on the effects of information provision on economic and political behaviour (see, e.g., Fuster and Zafar, 2023; Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart, 2023). While a large body of work examined how information provision, including media coverage, shapes attitudes and behavioural intentions toward immigrants and minorities (see, e.g., Valentino, 1999; Wojcieszak and Garrett, 2018; Erhard, Heiberger, and Windzio, 2022; Madrigal and Soroka, 2023; Rueß, Schneider, and Vogler, 2025), evidence on behaviour remains limited. Neg-

² Bizumic and Duckitt (2018) validated their very short authoritarianism scale in Australia, U.K. and the U.S. and showed its relationship with outgroup hostility. Similarly, Heller et al. (2020) validated the ultra short authoritarianism scale in Germany. Osborne, Satherley, et al. (2021) studied the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and prejudice in New Zealand using longitudinal data.

ative news, such as those depicting the socio-economic costs of immigration, increased discrimination of minorities in experiments in Italy (Conzo et al., 2021). In Switzerland, newspaper coverage of non-native crimes increased support for the minaret ban (Couttenier et al., 2024). Anti-immigrant media coverage and political rhetoric closely tracked increases in online searches for reporting suspected unauthorised immigrants in the U.S. (Krupenkin, Hill, and Rothschild, 2024). Similarly, Frey (2020) documented sharp increases in anti-refugee violence in Germany following the highly media-salient event of 2015 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne. In contrast, Walentek et al. (2025) reported no aggregate effect of negative media frames related to welfare and security on donations to refugee charities in their experiments conducted in seven European countries. The consequences of neutral or positive reporting received less attention in the literature. Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018) found no significant effect of exposure to factual information about U.S. refugee resettlement commitments on inclusionary behaviour. In Israel, Arab doctors' contributions during the Covid-19 pandemic led to reduced discrimination against them (Zussman, 2023). Humanitarian framing in immigrant media coverage increased the probability of donating to refugee charities (Walentek et al., 2025). Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata (2022) observed that, in Japan, providing participants with information on the potential benefits of immigration causes modest positive short-term effects on the likelihood of signing a pro-migration petition. We supplement these results by documenting limited mitigating effects of positive news about minorities (with a migration background) on discriminatory behaviour in a sample with considerable negative attitudes towards and beliefs about immigrants.

The closest study to our work is Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023), who tested belief correction as well as an anecdotal hard-working immigrant story intervention on attitudes towards immigration and redistribution in six countries including Germany. While providing actual statistics related to the rate of immigrants and their origin improved belief accuracy in their study, it did not affect attitudes towards immigration and redistribution. This is in contrast to the positive shifts in attitudes towards immigration observed in Dylong and Uebelmesser (2024), who also tested belief correction interventions in Germany. More pertinent to our minority success treatment, in Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023), the hard-working immigrant story slightly shifted these attitudes in a positive direction. We add to this line of work by testing the impact of minority success stories depicting real persons on a novel behavioural measure of authoritarianism and discrimination in decision power of minorities.

2 Experimental Design

2.1 Experiment

In natural settings, attitudes towards minorities and preferences for authoritarian decision-making rules are influenced by manifold reasons. It is thus very difficult to identify the specific causal impact of a power threat through the presence of successful members of the minority on a majority's attitudes towards this minority. We therefore use the controlled environment of an experiment to investigate how the presence of minority members' success stories in the media affect distributional preferences as well as support for authoritarian decision-making rules by members of the majority. Our experiment is conducted with a German sample. Within the experiment, we define a member of the majority as someone with an ethnic German-sounding name. In contrast, someone with a Muslim-sounding name is defined as being part of the minority.

The experiment consists of four parts. In Part I, participants read ten short news articles. In Parts II and III, they are then matched to four groups, each consisting of ten people. These groups differ in their composition of minority and majority members. Participants make two types of decisions: In Part II, they, for each group, distribute a budget between themselves and its ten members. In Part III, they state their preference for three decision-making rules that determine the allocation of another budget to the members of all four groups simultaneously. Part IV, the final part presented in [Section 2.2](#), comprises an extensive questionnaire that elicits, among other things, decision power attitudes, social dominance orientation, right and left-wing authoritarianism as well as attitudes towards and beliefs about immigrants.

Part I (news articles and treatments). Participants begin the experiment by reading ten news-like articles. The articles' content varies between treatments. In *MINORITY SUCCESS*, each article provides information about one minority individual living in Germany who either founded a successful company such as *Qiagen* (biotechnology) or *ResearchGate* (academic networking), or made important societal contributions such as becoming the first woman in Europe to transplant an artificial heart. The name and the birth place of the person or that of their parents are also mentioned. We posit that outstanding achievements or financial success of minorities constitute a threat to the majority participants' own status or position in society. Then, being reminded or informed of such achievements and success would sway some participants towards more authoritarian responses.

In *BASELINE*, articles have a similar content but without individual and origin identifiers. This treatment thus controls for the effect of reading about an industry or a successful firm. [Table 1](#) provides an example article from *MINORITY SUCCESS* and its corresponding benchmark in *BASELINE*.³ All articles are based on real persons and firms, and were written by the experimenters to ensure similar structures

³ The table also presents a third condition, *MAJORITY SUCCESS*, which is discussed in [Section 3.2](#).

Table 1. Examples of articles

MINORITY SUCCESS

Ijad Madisch was born in Wolfsburg in 1980 as the son of Syrian immigrants. He studied at Hannover Medical School (MHH) and subsequently worked as a postdoctoral researcher in virology at Harvard Medical School. In 2008, he founded ResearchGate in Berlin and has served as the company's Chief Executive Officer ever since. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

BASELINE

Each year, the number of scientific publications increases. Most scientific papers are published in fee-based academic journals. ResearchGate was founded in Berlin in 2008. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

MAJORITY SUCCESS


Sören Hofmayer studied at Hannover Medical School (MHH) from 2002 to 2008 and subsequently worked at the Institute of Virology and the Department of Immunology and Rheumatology at MHH. In 2008, he founded ResearchGate in Berlin and has served as the company's Chief Strategy Officer ever since. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

Notes: This tables presents English translations of the articles covering the foundation of *ResearchGate* for MINORITY SUCCESS, BASELINE, and MAJORITY SUCCESS.

and to have matching pairs of articles between treatments. A complete overview of all articles can be found in [Appendix C](#). To incentivise participants to read the articles attentively, they have to answer a question after each article. We pay them a bonus of 0.10 euros for each correct answer.

After reading the ten articles and answering the questions, participants are matched with 40 participants of the *reference sample* for the next two parts of the experiment. The reference sample is fixed, that is, each of the main experiment participants face the same individuals from the reference sample. We explain the reference sample in more detail in [Section 2.3](#).

Part II (distributional choices). In the second part, participants make four decisions that elicit their redistributive preferences towards individuals in groups that vary in their minority-majority composition. In each decision, they allocate 330 euros between ten members of a group in the reference sample and themselves. When facing each group, they see the first names of the group members. While the group size is constant, its composition varies across groups: Group-0 consists of ten members from the majority and zero from the minority; Group-1 consists of one minority member, Group-5 of five minority members, and Group-9 of nine



Notes. The figure illustrates the elicitation of participants' preferences over the three decision-making rules; democratic rule, one-group rule, and dictator rule. Participants allocate 100 probability points applied to the *reference sample*: first, among the four groups (should the one-group rule be chosen), and then among the 40 individuals (should the dictator rule be chosen). Subsequently, they allocate 100 probability points among the three decision rules. The computer subsequently randomly draws one of the three rules based on the allocated probabilities and, for the respective rule, a specific group or individual of the *reference sample*. The bottom row of the figure illustrates which party makes the decision about the budget allocation if the respective rule is chosen. Purple indicates members of the majority (German-sounding name) and green indicates members of the minority (Muslim-sounding name).

Figure 1. Elicitation of preferences over decision-making rules in Part III

minority members. Each group consists of five males and five females. The order of the groups and the display of names within each group are randomized across participants.

Part III (decision rules). After making the allocation decisions, the participants proceed with Part III where we measure preferences for democratic and autocratic decision rules. Here, we elicit participants' preferences for three different decision-making rules: democratic rule, one-group rule, and dictator rule. The elected rule finally determines the allocation of a budget of 1200 euros across the 40 members of the reference sample.

Previously, each of the 40 members of the reference sample allocated the budget among themselves under each of the three potential rules separately. The consequences of the three rules are as follows: Under the democratic rule, each member receives the average money allocated to them by all of the 40 members. Under the one-group rule, each member receives the average money allocated to them by the (ten) members of one of the four groups. Under the dictator rule, each member receives the money allocated to them by one of the 40 members.

The participants in the main experiment indicate which of the three rules shall be implemented. We elicit these preferences in a two-stage procedure, which is illus-

trated in [Figure 1](#). In the first stage, participants allocate 100 points across the three rules, where one point corresponds to a one-percent probability that the respective rule will be chosen as payoff-relevant. In the second stage, participants again allocate 100 points to the four groups, should the one-group rule be chosen; and allocate 100 points among all 40 members should the dictator rule be chosen. In the experiment, the order of the two stages is reversed. This allows us to meaningfully elicit preferences for groups and individuals within the authoritarian rules even for those who may have a strong dispreference for these rules. Thus, participants first state their group and dictator preferences, and then decision-rule preferences.

Finally, as we expect discrimination against individual minority members as well as against groups they are part of, we make discrimination costly. Participants decide behind the veil of ignorance: if selected for payment, the participant is randomly matched to one of the 40 members of the reference sample and receive the same payoff as her matched partner.

2.2 Questionnaire

After the main experiment, participants answer a questionnaire that elicits their emotional responses to the articles, their background characteristics, social dominance and authoritarianism traits, decision power attitudes as well as attitudes towards immigration, and beliefs about immigrants' origin and religion. All questions are in [Appendix E](#).

Emotions. In the first block of questions, we elicit the emotional response to the articles in Part I of the experiment with the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire (DEQ) by C. Harmon-Jones, Bastian, and E. Harmon-Jones (2016). The questionnaire measures anger, disgust, fear, anxiety, sadness, relaxation, and happiness with different subscales.⁴ We ask participants to indicate how much they felt each of the emotions while reading the articles at the beginning of the experiment.

Demographics. We next collect demographic characteristics of the participants comprising age, gender, marital status, education, employment status, and income. We also ask about their current state of residence, whether they and their parents were born in Germany, their religious affiliation, and how important religion is in their life from a scale from not at all important (1) to very important (10). We elicit political orientation from a scale between left (1) and right (10), whether they voted in the last general election, the party they voted for, and the party they would vote for next Sunday.

Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. We employed the short measure of social dominance orientation validated by Ho et al. (2015), which distinguishes between dominance and non-egalitarianism subcomponents. Authoritarianism is measured via three distinct measures. The first one is the child-rearing scale first used in the 1992 American National Election Study by Miller, Kinder,

⁴We drop the questions related to the 'desire' emotion; we do not expect this emotion to be of relevance in this context, and these questions may be confusing.

and Rosenstone (1993) and widely popularized since (e.g., Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Vidigal, 2022). Left-wing authoritarianism is based on select items from Costello et al. (2022). Right-wing authoritarianism is based on select items from Altemeyer (1998).

Decision power and immigration attitudes, beliefs about immigrant origin and religion, and attitudes towards redistribution. We construct a novel measure of decision power attitudes. For political power attitudes, we ask participants how much they agree with the statement that important political decisions in Germany should be made by individuals in a certain category. We vary the categories as (ethnic) German, West-European, European, Christian, those born in Germany, or anyone living in Germany for a long time. For instance, participants had to indicate how much they agree with the statement "In Germany, important political decisions should only be made by people of (ethnic) German origin."⁵ For economic power, we repeat the questions regarding who should lead large German companies. The only difference is now, the egalitarian option states anyone, without the qualifier 'living in Germany for a long time'. Finally, for execution of state power, we ask participants how much they agree that the government should make decisions that primarily take into account the needs of any of the above mentioned groups where we modify the egalitarian option as anyone living in Germany.

The final part of the questionnaire concerns themes on redistribution and immigration. Using questions from Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023), we elicit beliefs about the origin and religion of immigrants, attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, and beliefs about immigrants' economic behaviour.

2.3 Reference sample

All participants of the main experiment make decisions that involve the 40 members of the *reference sample* whose first names are presented. To construct the reference sample, we conducted a pre-experiment at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). We recruited participants via orsee (Greiner, 2015) based on their first names, either ethnic German (e.g., Lara or Dennis) or of Muslim migrant-background (e.g., Gülsah or Emre). The procedure of the experiment is as follows: At the beginning of the session, we form four groups of ten ensuring five female and five male participants per group. The four groups have zero, one, five, and nine members with a Muslim-sounding name. We refer to them as Group-0, Group-1, Group-5, and Group-9, respectively. Participants then allocate a budget of 1200 euros among all 40 participants three times, once for each of the three decision rules described above. They are informed that their decision is implemented with some probability based on a random draw and based on the decisions of later participants of the experiment. Their allocation decisions are implemented for payment should

⁵ The closest German phrase for 'ethnic German' is 'of German origin', which is what we used in the instructions. In here, we use the intended English meaning rather than the literal back-translation from German. Hence the parenthesis.

Part III be chosen in the main experiment. Reference sample participants also go through the main experiment as well as the questionnaire. Here, we do not analyze that data.

2.4 Data Collection

The main experiments were conducted in two waves via *Bilendi*. The first wave was run in June and August 2023: We initially collected a representative sample of the German population with respect to age, gender, and federal state, and afterwards expanded the East German sample to enable a comparison of East and West Germany. The first wave comprised BASELINE and MINORITY SUCCESS treatments in both regions. The second wave was conducted in April 2025, and served two purposes; to increase the statistical power of our analysis when comparing both treatments and regions, and second, to test a new treatment, MAJORITY SUCCESS, which is introduced and discussed in [Section 3.2](#). [Table 2](#) summarizes gender, age, and state composition per treatment.

The experiment was conducted in oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016) and the median participant took 39 minutes for completion. In addition to a base payment, participants' choices were incentivised in two parts. First, every participant received an additional payment of 0.10 euros for each correct answer in Part I. Second, for each wave and treatment, one participant was randomly selected for additional payment based on their choices in the main task of the experiment. For this participant, their resource allocation for one of the four groups in Part II was implemented with a 90% probability. With 10% probability, their choice in Part III was implemented. Overall, participants received an average additional payment of 1.03 euros. We pre-registered our study and hypotheses for the first wave in the AEA RCT Registry with the unique identification number "AEARCTR-0011551". After the first wave, we determined the number of observations of the second wave via power calculations, and updated the pre-registration accordingly prior to the second wave's data collection. The study was approved by the Ethics board of the University of Cologne with number "230027LS".

3 Results

Before we turn into our main analysis, we first note the effect of reading immigrant success stories on reported emotions. Pooling both regions and waves, MINORITY SUCCESS is significantly positively associated with happiness and relaxation, and significantly negatively associated with anger, anxiety, disgust, and fear (two-tailed t-test p-values < 0.038). In so far as the change in emotions can be attributed to the news items participants read, and contrary to what a threat response predicts, immigrant success stories have a general positive impact on emotions. The distribution of reported emotions by treatment is presented in [Figure B.1](#) in the Appendix. Next,

Table 2. Age, gender, and federal state per treatment in the pooled data

(Within category %)		BASELINE	MINORITY SUCCESS	MAJORITY SUCCESS
<i>Gender</i>				
	Male	50.5	49.7	42.1
	Female	49.5	50.0	57.9
	Other		0.3	
<i>Age</i>				
	18-24	5.9	5.6	6.1
	25-34	18.8	18.5	16.8
	35-44	21.0	18.8	19.7
	45-54	13.6	18.7	18.4
	55-64	28.2	25.1	22.4
	≥65	12.5	13.3	16.5
<i>Federal states</i>				
<i>West</i>	Baden-Württemberg	6.6	7.3	
	Bayern	9.4	8.0	
	Berlin	5.0	3.9	
	Bremen	0.8	0.1	
	Hamburg	1.9	0.8	
	Hessen	4.2	4.9	
	Niedersachsen	6.3	5.1	
	Nordrhein-Westfalen	12.2	11.5	
	Rheinland-Pfalz	1.4	2.8	
	Saarland	1.1	0.3	
	Schleswig-Holstein	1.9	1.9	
<i>East</i>	Brandenburg	9.4	9.3	19.5
	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	6.4	7.1	9.6
	Sachsen	17.5	18.4	35.5
	Sachsen-Anhalt	6.9	9.3	17.6
	Thüringen	9.1	9.3	17.9
Participants		639	750	375

Notes: Percentages in BASELINE and MINORITY SUCCESS are based on the combined first and second wave data. MAJORITY SUCCESS was run only in the second wave in the East.

we report our behavioural outcomes: resource allocation, decision rule preferences, and one-group and dictator rule preferences. For our analysis, we pool both waves, and include wave fixed effects in all our regressions. A closer look at the wave effects themselves are relegated to the discussion in [Section 4](#).

3.1 Resource allocation & preferences over decision rules

Allocation decisions. We first look into the allocation behaviour of individuals when facing groups with varying minority compositions. The amount kept for oneself increases with the number of minority members in a group: While participants keep on average 62.02 euro for themselves when facing Group-0, the number

increases to 67.03 euro when facing Group-9. More specifically, in both East and West Germany, the amount kept is significantly higher when facing Group-5 and Group-9 compared to Group-0, see [Table 3](#) column (1), where, for ease of exposition, we leave out group and treatment interactions with region which do not show statistically significant effects.

These differences emerge from two sources. First, there is an overall discrimination of minorities, and secondly, this discrimination increases with the number of minorities in a group. Specifics are as follows. Pooling all resource allocation decisions towards the 40 members we see that minority members are, on average, allocated a significantly lower amount than the majority members, see [Table 3](#) column (2), and also Appendix [Figure B.3](#). Further, those in the East discriminate more at the intensive margin but not at the extensive margin: when pooling treatments, both regions are similar with respect to the percentage who do not allocate equally (28 and 27 percent in the East and West, respectively), however, average discrimination of discriminators is higher in the East. To put it differently, conditional on facing an unequal giver, minority members' endowment is 7.6 percent (21.86 vs. 23.65) lower than their majority counterparts in the West, and 12.3 percent (23.09 vs. 26.34) lower in the East, see also [Table 3](#) column (3).

The magnitude of discrimination also increases with the number of minorities in a group with the difference between the average allocated amount to a majority and minority member amounting to 0.67, 1.00, and 1.83 in Group-1, Group-5 and Group-9, respectively. The increase in discrimination is solely due to higher giving to majority members in groups with fewer minorities as minority members on average receive a similar amount per group composition, see also [Table A.1](#) in the Appendix. MINORITY SUCCESS does not significantly affect resource allocation to groups nor to individuals. The lack of a treatment effect obtains in both regions. The results are qualitatively the same when restricting the sample to those with parents born in Germany (nine percent of the sample, that is, 125 participants, have at least one parent born outside Germany).

In sum, groups with a larger number of minorities receive lower resources with two concordant effects. First, minority members, on average, receive a lower allocation than the majority, and second, they are discriminated more, that is, the magnitude of discrimination is larger, in groups with more minorities. Overall, the magnitude of discrimination is larger in East Germany compared to West Germany. Exposure to minority success stories does not significantly affect the share of discriminators nor the extent of their discrimination in either region.


Decision-making rule preferences. [Figure 2](#) shows the average points allocated to each decision rule. Across all treatments and regions, respondents allocate, on average, 57 points to the democratic rule, 25 points to the one-group rule, and 18 points to the dictator rule.

Table 3. Resource allocation per treatment and minority status

	(1) All Amount Kept	(2) All Amount Given	(3) Unequal Givers Amount Given
Minority		−0.549** (0.227)	−2.222** (0.896)
MINORITY SUCCESS	−4.095 (5.776)	0.566 (0.566)	1.301 (1.204)
MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority		0.108 (0.302)	0.758 (1.108)
East	−9.941* (5.732)	1.175** (0.566)	3.609*** (1.119)
East × Minority		−0.483 (0.333)	−1.349 (1.190)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	10.098 (7.837)	−1.042 (0.778)	−1.574 (1.477)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East × Minority		0.087 (0.460)	−0.181 (1.602)
Group-1	2.452 (1.502)		
Group-5	3.670** (1.510)		
Group-9	5.268*** (1.681)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-1	−3.296 (2.193)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-5	−2.878 (2.121)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-9	−1.698 (2.350)		
Constant	66.599*** (4.392)	26.261*** (0.433)	22.899*** (0.957)
Observations	5556	55560	15520
Participants	1389	1389	388
R^2	0.005	0.004	0.015

Notes: Linear regressions on the amount kept when facing different groups (column (1)), or on the amount allocated to individuals (columns (2) and (3)) in the allocation task in BASELINE and MINORITY SUCCESS. All regressions include wave fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) include all participants in the sample, column (3) restricts the sample to unequal givers, that is, those who do not allocate an equal amount to all 40 reference sample members in the allocation task. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level and depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A large majority, 73 percent, assign positive weight to authoritarian decision rules, with virtually no difference between East and West. The average allocations to the one-group rule are 34 points and 25 points to the dictator rule, respectively.



Notes. Each column depicts average points allocated to the democratic, one-group and dictator rules in a region and treatment. Bars denote the 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 2. Points allocated to decision rules

Regression analyses show no significant impact of MINORITY SUCCESS on whether individuals put positive weight to authoritarian rules (extensive margin) or the degree of support for the one-group and dictator rules (intensive margin), irrespective of region, see Table 4.⁶ The results are qualitatively the same when restricting the sample to those with parents born in Germany, or to those who are born in Germany.

Group preferences in the one-group rule. About 40 percent of the participants allocate unequal decision power across the four groups with no significant difference between treatments. The share of unequal allocators among West German participants is significantly lower at 36 percent compared to 42 percent among East German participants (χ^2 test, $p = 0.020$).

Figure 3 depicts average decision power allocated to groups per region and treatment. Pooling treatments and regions, groups with zero or one minority member, on average, receive larger shares of decision power, 27.4 and 27.7, compared to groups with five or nine minorities, 23.0 and 22.0. In pairwise comparisons between all group compositions, all but the difference between Group-0 and Group-1 are sta-

⁶ Points allocated to the three rules are interdependent, therefore, we analyse the authoritarian rules separately. As such, each fractional probit regression shows the effect of the independent variables (treatment, region, and their interaction) on the fraction of points allocated to a specific rule compared to the other alternatives combined.

Table 4. Preferences for decision-making rules

	(1) Authoritarian	(2) One-group points	(3) Dictator points
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.115 (0.175)	0.002 (0.052)	−0.059 (0.061)
East	−0.171 (0.179)	0.044 (0.057)	−0.009 (0.071)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	0.337 (0.245)	−0.015 (0.075)	0.020 (0.093)
Constant	1.066*** (0.137)	−0.396*** (0.039)	−0.724*** (0.051)
Observations	1389	1024	1024
Pseudo R^2	0.001	0.000	0.001


Notes: Column (1) reports a logistic regression on whether a participant allocates positive points to authoritarian decision rules, thus, equals either zero or one. Columns (2) and (3) report fractional probit regressions on the fraction of points allocated to the one-group and dictator rules, respectively, where the sample is restricted to those who assign positive points to either of the rules. All regressions include wave fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

tistically significant with paired t-test p -values < 0.0015 , and robust to Benjamini-Hochberg multiple testing correction.

We use a fractional probit model to test the effect of treatment and region on the fraction of points allocated to each group separately, controlling for wave, see Table 5, columns (1)-(4). For ease of interpretation, we report a linear regression on the total points allocated to Groups 0 and 1 in column (5) of the same table. In West Germany, MINORITY SUCCESS has no significant effect on the decision power assigned to groups. In East Germany, on the other hand, a curious pattern emerges: Group-5 receives significantly lower decision power in BASELINE, which is offset in treatment MINORITY SUCCESS, see column (3). Thus, contrary to our pre-registered hypothesis, MINORITY SUCCESS decreases decision power discrimination in the East for the group with equal minority-majority split. These results are robust to the exclusion of participants with at least one migrant parent as well as to the exclusion of those who assigned no weight to the one-group rule.⁷

Decision power allocation in the dictator rule. In the pooled data, the 22 most preferred names are those of the majority, and the 13 least preferred names are those of the minority (average points allocated to each name per region and treatment is relegated to Figure B.2). Concordantly, minorities are allocated a

⁷The results are also robust to weighting of group points by the percentage points allocated to the one-group rule while excluding the top two percent. It is important to note that weighting by one-group rule points is conceptually the same as assigning higher weights to participants who assign higher points to the one-group rule. As such, the estimated coefficients are highly sensitive to the behaviour of those who assign very high points to the one-group rule. The same applies to the dictator rule analysis. Overall, we do not consider weighted regressions to be the correct approach in our setting.



Notes. Columns depict average points allocated to each group type in the one-group rule per treatment and region. Bars denote the 95 percent confidence intervals.


Figure 3. Points allocated to groups in the one-group rule

Table 5. Preferences for groups in the one-group rule

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Group:	0	1	5	9	0 & 1
MINORITY SUCCESS	0.025 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.030)	0.018 (0.025)	0.191 (1.335)
East	0.028 (0.037)	0.042 (0.040)	-0.114*** (0.034)	0.036 (0.037)	2.340* (1.374)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	-0.034 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.052)	0.103** (0.043)	-0.037 (0.046)	-1.782 (1.865)
Constant	-0.647*** (0.025)	-0.589*** (0.028)	-0.688*** (0.024)	-0.782*** (0.021)	53.673*** (1.035)
Observations	1389	1389	1389	1389	1389
(Pseudo) R^2	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003

Notes: Columns (1) to (4) report fractional probit regressions of the fraction of points allocated to Group-0, Group-1, Group-5, and Group-9, respectively. Column (5) reports a linear regression of the total points allocated to groups with zero and one minority. All regressions include wave fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

markedly lower share of decision power in the dictator rule than the majority mem-



Notes. Average points allocated to individuals in the dictator rule per minority status, treatment, and region. Bars depict the 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Points allocated to individuals within the dictator rule per minority status, region, and treatment

bers with on average 1.92 and 2.85 points, respectively. Decision power discrimination is larger in the East than in the West in both treatments, see [Figure 4](#).

There is substantial heterogeneity across the two regions with respect to name preferences with the highest average decision power assigned to Sabine (BASELINE, 4.37) and Birgit (MINORITY SUCCESS, 3.64) in East Germany, and Daniel (BASELINE, 4.08) and Sabine (MINORITY SUCCESS, 4.09) in West Germany. Pooling all data and with Benjamini-Hochberg correction for 40 comparisons, MINORITY SUCCESS does not significantly affect name preferences.

Contrary to our (pre-registered) hypothesis, when aggregating over all names, MINORITY SUCCESS treatment increases decision power allocated to the minority in both regions. This increase is, however, not enough to overturn the cleft between the minority and majority decision power, and the estimated average difference between them decreases from 0.90 to 0.58, see the regression results depicted in column (2) of [Table 6](#). The results are robust to the exclusion of participants with at least one migrant parent as well as when weighting assigned points by the percentage points allocated to the dictator rule.

Table 6. Preferences for minority-majority status within the dictator rule

	(1) Points Allocated	(2) Points Diff.
Minority	−0.878*** (0.109)	
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.123** (0.056)	−0.323** (0.153)
Minority × MINORITY SUCCESS	0.330** (0.149)	
East	0.093 (0.061)	0.244 (0.158)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	0.031 (0.081)	0.067 (0.214)
East × Minority	−0.280* (0.161)	
MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority × East	−0.080 (0.214)	
Constant	2.838*** (0.041)	0.900*** (0.111)
Observations	54171	1389
R ²	0.006	0.012

Notes: Linear regression of the points allocated (column(1)), and allocated points difference between a majority and a minority member (column(2)) under the dictator rule with wave fixed effects. Allocated points are integer values ranging between 0 and 100, and a total of 100 points is allocated across 40 individuals. In column (1), since the sum of points is fixed, we exclude one individual, Suleyman, from the regression. The average points allocated to the excluded individual is very similar across the regions and treatments. In column (1), there are 39 observations per participant, and hence, standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. In column (2), there is one observation per participant. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

3.2 Ethnic German success stories: MAJORITY SUCCESS

We introduce an additional treatment, MAJORITY SUCCESS, in the second wave in East Germany, to test whether any success story impacts authoritarian preferences, or if indeed the minority being successful is the decisive factor. We again present participants with individuals' success stories, but now these individuals are not part of the minority, but of the majority (ethnic German). Participants read articles with non-immigrant ethnic German success stories that mirror the original stories in MINORITY SUCCESS. See [Table 1](#) for an example and [Appendix C](#) for the complete set of articles.

We find no effect of MAJORITY SUCCESS on any of our main outcome variables when compared to BASELINE (see [Tables A.2-A.5](#) in the Appendix). Moreover, where we observe an effect of MINORITY SUCCESS, it remains robust vis-a-vis the MAJORITY SUCCESS treatment. That is, MINORITY SUCCESS decreases decision power dis-

crimination of groups with a large number of minorities in the one-group rule, and minority individuals in the dictator rule. All in all, reminders of ethnic German success have no effect on discrimination of minorities in decision power allocation nor on authoritarian rule support.

3.3 Determinants of discrimination and authoritarian rule support

Are certain characteristics predictive of discrimination and support for authoritarian rules? Are there heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of individuals? To answer the first, in this section we separately analyse the predictive power of background characteristics, social dominance orientation and authoritarianism measures, and attitudes towards decision power allocation and beliefs about immigrants. Subsequently, in Section 3.4, we identify different types of participants with respect to their characteristics and test whether minority success stories affect the behaviour of different types differently.

Before detailing the participant characteristics, let us note that none of the measures, attitudes or beliefs are significantly impacted by MINORITY SUCCESS treatment with a Benjamini-Hochberg multiple testing correction. For prediction, we focus on the amount of support for authoritarian rules, and the amounts of discrimination in decision power and resource allocation. Regressions relevant to this section are reported in the Appendix and exclude MAJORITY SUCCESS. Since MAJORITY SUCCESS was run only in the East in the second wave, a comparison to the previous wave nor to the West is not possible. We report the analysis of the East German second wave data separately in Appendix Tables Table A.2–Table A.5. Finally, for ease of exposition, descriptive tables and figures of background characteristics and questionnaire measures are based on the pooled data including BASELINE, MINORITY SUCCESS, and MAJORITY SUCCESS.

3.3.1 Background characteristics. Table A.6 in the Appendix depicts participants' age, gender, marital status, number of children, highest education level, employment status, net monthly household income, and religious affiliation, while Table A.7 in the Appendix depicts their political orientation and voting intentions at the time of the survey, per region. Our sample overrepresents females in the East and males in the West. Compared with the population distribution in 2024, younger (18–24) and older (≥ 65) individuals are somewhat underrepresented in the sample, while respondents aged 25–34 and 55–64 are slightly overrepresented, see also Table A.8. East and West samples differ in directions commensurate with the population statistics when it comes to household income (higher in the West, Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025c) and religion (the majority identifies as Christian in the West and with no religion in the East, Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025a). East German participants also have more children than the West German ones. In both regions, those with university education are overrepresented compared to the population reports in Federal Statistical

Office of Germany (DeStatis) (2025e,f).⁸ Regarding political party preferences, East Germans are more likely to have voting intentions for Die Linke and AfD, as well as the newcomer party BSW in the second wave of the data collection.⁹ In both regions, the party voted for in the last elections track the previous federal election results, see Appendix Table A.9.

Regression results including the background characteristics and political preferences are relegated to Table A.10 and Table A.11 in the Appendix. Joint evaluation of the predictive power of all questionnaire items is relegated to the subsection on Variable Importance. Here, we note that among the background characteristics, age, political orientation, and political party consistently stand out as predictors of discriminatory behaviour. Specifically, in both resource and decision power allocation, discrimination significantly increases with age and right-of-centre political orientation, and is significantly higher for AfD supporters compared to CDU/CSU. Green Party supporters, on the other hand, assign significantly lower weight to authoritarian rules as well as discriminate minorities less in decision power allocation than the other party supporters. Women discriminate minorities significantly less than men in resource allocation, but not when assigning decision power. Among the decision-making rules, the democratic rule gets the highest support from those who would vote for the Green Party and from students.

3.3.2 Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. Following Ho et al. (2015), we analyse the two components, dominance and non-egalitarianism, of social dominance orientation (SDO) separately. The distribution of SDO scores for both components in the whole sample are presented in Figure B.4 in the Appendix. In our whole sample, a preference for group dominance appears among 32 percent, and a preference for group inequality obtains among 41 percent.¹⁰ The two components show a moderate correlation with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.56.

Six left-wing authoritarianism items are selected from Costello et al. (2022), and five right-wing authoritarianism items are selected from Altemeyer (1998). An exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation retains two orthogonal factors corresponding to the two measures. Specifically, the first factor shows five items with primary loadings larger than 0.30 and negligible cross-loadings. As these items stem from the anti-hierarchical aggression and anti-conventionalism subscales of Costello et al. (2022), we interpret this factor as a left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) measure. The second factor has three items with primary loadings larger than 0.30 on items stemming from the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale of Altemeyer

⁸ The reference comparisons are based on the German micro-census data of 2022. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany does not publish the percentage of individuals who have children, rather household composition types. It is therefore not possible to compare the number of children in our sample with the population level statistics.

⁹ AfD is the right-wing party in Germany, Die Linke and BSW are both left-wing parties. BSW was founded in January 2024 and thus did not exist yet in the first wave.

¹⁰ According to Ho et al. (2015), individuals high in the dominance aspect prefer high-power groups to subjugate low-power ones, also by aggressive means, whereas individuals high in the non-egalitarian aspect prefer some groups to receive resources over others.

(1998). We thus interpret the second factor as right-wing-authoritarianism. In our regressions, we use the predicted factor values using the Bartlett method. For ease of interpretation, we also construct left- and right-wing authoritarianism from the retained items by taking their sum scores divided by the number of items. Their distributions in the whole sample are presented in [Figure B.5](#) in the Appendix. Based on this sum-score construct, 24 percent of our sample, on average, agree to some extent with the left-wing authoritarianism questions, and 54 percent do so for the right-wing authoritarianism questions.

The authoritarianism measure based on child-rearing values, see (MacWilliams, 2016), is simply a sum score of four questions, where a higher score is interpreted as higher authoritarianism. Seven percent of our sample always chooses the authoritarian answer, whereas 21 percent always chooses the non-authoritarian one. A distribution of the answers in the whole sample is depicted in [Figure B.6](#) in the Appendix.

Regarding the predictive power of the authoritarian measures, three results stand out (see [Table A.12](#) in the Appendix for the regression results). First, right-wing-authoritarianism predicts all the main experimental outcomes: the higher the RWA score, the higher the resource discrimination, support for authoritarian decision rules, decision power allocated to groups with zero or one minority in the one-group rule as well as to majority individuals in the dictator rule. Second, the non-egalitarianism subscale of SDO is a significant predictor of our main outcomes except for discrimination in the decision power allocation in the dictator rule. Third, support for authoritarian decision rules is significantly associated with both SDO dimensions, LWA, and RWA, aligning with the theoretical constructs. The child-rearing measure of authoritarianism has no predictive power in our sample.

3.3.3 Power and immigration attitudes, and beliefs about immigrants. In this block, we discuss three sets of questions. The first set measures attitudes towards decision power allocation. For this measure, we vary statements in three domains: (i) who should make important political decisions (political power), (ii) who should lead important companies (economic power), and (iii) whose needs the government should take into account when shaping policy (state power). In each domain, four statements are exclusionary on the basis of ethnic, geographic or religious origin, and two are egalitarian. Histograms depicting the answer distributions in the whole sample are depicted in [Figures B.7–B.9](#) in the Appendix. In our whole sample, a large minority agrees to some degree with assigning power to only ethnic Germans: 39 percent for political, 33 percent for economic power, and 35 percent for state power.¹¹ Compared to the West, East Germans, on average, disagree significantly

¹¹ Of note here is the low correlation between positions regarding assigning power exclusively to ethnic Germans and to everyone. A factor analysis with Varimax rotation points to the possibility of two distinct traits driving these attitudes: while the first factor has positive loadings on all exclusionary statements of the three domains, the second has positive loadings on the egalitarian statements. This result aligns with LASSO estimation results mentioned in this subsection that always include one

more with assigning political, state, or economic power to Christians as well as utilization of state power to benefit everyone born in Germany. They also agree significantly more that only ethnic Germans should have power in all three domains.¹² None of the attitudes are affected by our treatments. We also include one question from Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023), with a nuanced difference to the formulation in the state power block. Specifically, participants state from a scale from 1, only ethnic Germans, to 7, everyone living in Germany, whom the government should care about. Similar to the state power results, 31 percent chooses a value less than four, see [Figure B.10](#) in the Appendix.¹³

The second set of questions measures attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, and Muslims. Answer distributions based on the whole sample are depicted in [Figures B.10–B.14](#) in the Appendix. 42 percent of the participants consider the number of immigrants to be a big or a very big problem. One third would never consider an immigrant as German. A majority, 63 percent, agree to some extent that immigrants come only to exploit the welfare system. A smaller group, 38 percent, consider lack of effort as the culprit of immigrants' poverty, as opposed to circumstances outside their control. This is higher than the 31 percent who consider lack of effort as the culprit for poverty when asked generically. Nineteen percent believe that, given the same circumstances, an immigrant receives more government transfers than a non-immigrant. Attitude towards Muslims is rather negative with 56 percent agreeing to some extent that many Muslims make them feel like a foreigner, and 38 percent is in favour of a Muslim ban on immigration. Overall, 44 percent have no foreign-born friends. In all but two of these items—reason for immigrants' poverty and the transfers they receive—, the two regions statistically differ with East Germans having more negative attitudes towards immigrants.¹⁴

The third set of questions measures beliefs about immigrants. Compared to official statistics on the immigrant unemployment rate (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025d) and countries of origin (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025b), as well as survey evidence on religion from the Pew Research Center (2024), beliefs substantially diverge from actual values with no significant differences across treatments. [Figure 5](#) depicts the averages for these categories. These divergences are consistent with the patterns documented by Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023), and we discuss this in more detail in [Section 4](#).


Perhaps surprisingly, correlation between errors is rather small, the maximum Pearson correlation coefficient being 0.40, even among the items of origin countries. The details are as follows. Regarding the unemployment rate of immigrants, East Germans overestimate more than West Germans with average 22.1 and 15.0

exclusionary and one egalitarian item as a predictor of our outcome variables. We are agnostic as to why such a relationship obtains, and leave it for future work.

¹² With Benjamini-Hochberg correction on 18 t-tests at $\alpha=0.05$.

¹³ This question is moderately correlated with the state power questions 1, 2, 3, and 6, with correlation coefficients ranging from -0.47 for the sixth question and 0.64 for the first.

¹⁴ With Benjamini-Hochberg correction on eight t-tests at $\alpha=0.05$.



Notes. Immigrant country of origin data stems from the micro-census of 2022 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025b), religion data from the 2020 survey by Pew Research Center (2024), and unemployment rate from the micro-census of 2022 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2025d).

Figure 5. Actual and belief percentages of immigrant country of origin, religion, and unemployment rate in East and West Germany

percentage point errors in the two regions, respectively. As a benchmark, the non-immigrant unemployment rate is also overestimated, but to a smaller extent, with no significant difference across the two regions, 13.2 versus 12.1 percentage points error in East and West, respectively. In both regions, the error rate pertaining to immigrants is higher than non-immigrants with paired t-test p -values < 0.001 . When it comes to immigrants' origin, the highest errors obtain when estimating the percentage of immigrants from East Europe (underestimated by 24.4 percentage points) and North Africa (overestimated by 12.8 percentage points). Comparing East and West Germans' error rates shows significant differences for categories USA-Canada, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Australia-New Zealand. Nonetheless, for all categories, the error directions are the same in both regions.¹⁵ Lastly, participants overestimate the percentage of Muslim and Jewish immigrants as well as adherents of non-Abrahamic religions by 12.3, 8.7, and 12.5 percentage points, respectively. Concordantly, the remaining category, percentage of Christian immigrants is substantially underestimated. East and West Germans' average belief errors are in the

¹⁵ With Benjamini-Hochberg correction for nine t-tests at $\alpha=0.05$.

same direction for all categories, however differ significantly from one another in magnitude except for Muslims.

Before proceeding to the regression analysis to test the predictive power of attitudes and beliefs in discrimination and authoritarian rule support, we first reduce the number of items, as many items are strongly correlated with one another. We select the items (independent variables) based on LASSO estimations.¹⁶ Specifically, for each of the four main outcome variables, we make LASSO estimations using CR minimization. We retain the maximal variable list from these four estimations excluding an item if it has more than 0.80 correlation with an existing one, and run linear regressions using this set. The results are reported in [Table A.13](#) in the Appendix.

A first observation is that select power attitudes are strong predictors of discrimination. Agreement with an egalitarian statement—designating that political or economic power can be held by all people regardless of ethnic and religious background or that the state should care for everyone living in Germany—is associated with lower support for authoritarian rules, and lower discrimination when assigning power to groups or minority individuals. For resource discrimination, attitudes towards prioritising Christians’ needs when exercising state power appears as the most predictive. In fact, jointly evaluating these variables masks the relatively large predictive power of singular questions that are ethnically exclusionary or egalitarian. For example, only including two questions, political power for ethnic Germans and political power for everyone, in a linear regression with wave fixed effects explain 4.6 percent of within wave variation in authoritarian-rule support. Furthermore, someone who fully agrees with sole ethnic German decision power compared to someone who fully disagrees is predicted to i) discriminate minorities in resource allocation by 1.9 euros more (1.9 vs 0.0), ii) support authoritarian rules by 21.3 percentage points more (56.2 vs. 34.9 total points), iii) support Group-0 and Group-1 by 9.5 percentage points more (60.2 vs. 50.7 total points) in the one-group rule, and iv) discriminate minorities by 1.2 percentage points more in dictator decision power allocation (1.6 vs. 0.4).

Second, among items measuring immigration attitudes, one stands out as a consistent predictor of discrimination. Namely, those who believe that immigrants receive more transfers than non-immigrants are significantly more likely to discriminate in resource and decision power allocation. Support for authoritarian rules is negatively associated with having foreign-born friends and being concerned about income inequality in general. Attitudes towards immigration in general and Mus-

¹⁶We choose this method over principal component analysis because we are interested in seeing which items significantly predict our main outcome variables rather than composite measures.

lim immigration in particular are significantly associated with resource discrimination.¹⁷


Third, beliefs about immigrant unemployment rate, origin, and religion do not point to systematic effects. Immigrant-unemployment-rate estimation error is significantly associated with support for authoritarian decision rules. Among origin categories, belief error in the US-Canada category is the only one significantly associated with any of our main outcomes, namely, decision power allocation to groups with minimal minorities. Among religion categories, error in the Muslim rate estimation explains support for authoritarian rules, and decision power discrimination of minorities.¹⁸

3.3.4 Variable importance: Random forest predictions. To evaluate the demographic and survey measures jointly while allowing their interactions, we use all our data including BASELINE, MINORITY SUCCESS, and MAJORITY SUCCESS and employ a random forest algorithm with bootstrap sampling of root mean square errors (RSME) on the validation sample. Further, we repeatedly sample the training set, and calculate the importance of variables, that is, the change in RMSE after a random shuffling of values of each variable or a variable group. Variable groups comprise conceptually highly related variables. We consider two such groups: decision power attitudes, and errors in the estimates of immigrant origin countries and religion. The resulting variable importance graphs are depicted in [Figure 6](#).

For all the main outcome measures, decision power attitudes consistently show very high or the highest importance in authoritarian rule support, and decision-power and resource discrimination. Despite singular belief errors about immigrants' origin and religion not showing significant correlation with our outcome measures in our regressions, when considered all together, they predict authoritarian rule support and decision power discrimination better than attitudes towards immigration. Nonetheless, and notably, attitudes towards Muslims are an exception; they are highly predictive of discrimination, both in decision power and resource allocation. Finally, the dominance component of SDO and right-wing authoritarianism are good predictors of authoritarian rule support. This confirms that these constructs do capture behaviour when it comes to authoritarian rule choice, but not when it comes to decision power discrimination. The rest of the variables typically have low or no predictive power.

¹⁷ Here, a more positive attitude regarding the number of immigrants appears to increase resource discrimination. When only this item is used as an independent variable in the regression, it has a larger and significantly negative coefficient. Plausibly, for some subgroups of participants, the relationship reverses, and hence the positive coefficient conditional on all other variables.

¹⁸ The estimated positive coefficient in Column (2) is due to the convex relationship between Muslim immigrant error rate and support for authoritarian rules. In fact, most accurate participants show the highest support for the democratic rule. For simplicity, we do not report estimations with second degree polynomials.



Notes. This figure depicts variable importance graphs resulting from random forest predictions on the main behavioural outcome measures, data pooled over all treatments and regions. The respective outcomes are: (a) the difference in the average money allocated to the majority and the minority, (b) total points assigned to the one-group and dictator rule, (c) total points assigned to Group-0 and Group-1 within the one-group rule, and (d) the difference in the average points assigned to the majority and the minority within the dictator rule.

Figure 6. Variable importance graphs

3.4 Predicting treatment effects based on participant clusters: Latent class analysis

To identify distinct types of participants with respect to their social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, attitudes towards decision power allocation, and beliefs about immigrants, we employ Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a model-based clustering method that estimates the probability of each observation belonging to a latent discrete class based on a set of observed continuous and ordinal indicators (Vermunt and Magidson, 2002). Compared to heuristic approaches such as k-means, LCA provides a probabilistic framework that accounts for measurement uncertainty and allows for model selection through information criteria and entropy. We estimate solutions ranging from two to seven profiles, selecting the optimal number based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), classification entropy, and the interpretability of the resulting profiles. The four-profile solution provides the best balance of statistical fit and substantive interpretability, with entropy indicating high class separation (0.985) and clusters comprising at least 10 percent of the sample. All continuous variables were standardised prior to estimation. Analyses were conducted in Python using the StepMix package (Morin et al., 2025).

The four classes differ with respect to their social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, decision power attitudes, and attitudes towards and beliefs about

immigrants and Muslims. The final predicted class in the whole sample (also including participants in MAJORITY SUCCESS) comprise 53.6, 22.2, 14.2, and 10.0 percent respectively. The scores of the largest class, the first class, are closest to the average of the whole sample. The second class' scores are markedly lower in SDO, and right- and left-wing authoritarianism, they disagree more to exclusionary decision power statements, show more positive beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims, and their belief error regarding the immigrant unemployment rate is lower than the other classes. In short, the second class exhibits more inclusionary attitudes. The third class has the opposite trajectory to the second, and is thus more exclusionary. The fourth class shows mixed tendencies with smaller divergences from the average.

Table A.14 in the Appendix tests whether there is heterogeneity in treatment effects across different latent classes by repeating our regression analysis including the interaction of treatment and class. Two results stand out. First, compared to the largest group (the first class), the second class predicts less discrimination in decision power, whereas the third class predicts higher authoritarianism, and higher resource and decision-power discrimination. Second, authoritarian rule support of those in the second class is significantly lower in MINORITY SUCCESS compared to BASELINE. Thus, we observe a differential treatment effect with respect to authoritarian rule support where minority success stories reduce said support only among those with inclusionary attitudes.

4 Discussion

In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether success stories influence authoritarian preferences as well as resource discrimination. Most participants assign a positive weight on authoritarian decision rules, substantially favour groups with few minorities over those with many, and allocate more decision power to majority members compared to minority members. We also observe resource discrimination against minority members. Minority success stories do not have an impact on these outcomes except a reduction in discrimination of minorities in decision power allocation.

Why do we not find a shift to authoritarian behaviour after encountering minority success stories as we originally hypothesized? This may stem from two sources. Perhaps, minority success stories simply do not affect authoritarian preferences. Recent work on priming also found no effect on attitudes towards immigrants or political intentions. Dylong, Setzepfand, and Uebelmesser (2024), for instance, tested in a survey experiment in Germany two different primes: the Covid-19 crisis and economic threat via immigration. They found null effects of these primes on attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, Voelkel et al. (2022) tested interventions to reduce affective polarization and found that a reduction in affective polarization did not translate into lower support for undemocratic candidates. Alternatively, our inter-

vention may be too weak to generate a power threat. For our study, we selected the minority success stories to confer importance and power within the whole society. Since in Germany, no minority group constitutes a power threat based on aggregate educational or economic outcomes, it is likely that participants perceive the success stories we presented as unrepresentative, and a few successful minority members do not constitute a power threat.

On the other hand, our results rule out the possibility that reminders of successful minorities lowers discrimination or improves attitudes towards them. In our sample, those who hold ethnocentric attitudes are unaffected by minority success stories, and when a positive impact of minority success, that is, lower discrimination, is observed, it is confined to those with egalitarian or positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Our data was collected in two waves two years apart. A potential worry is thus that behaviour may be impacted by the changing political climate. To study whether waves impact treatment effects in combination with region, we repeat our analysis including wave as a dummy variable and its interaction with treatment and region. The results are relegated to Tables A.15–A.18 in the Appendix. Two distinct effects obtain. First, in resource allocation, unequal allocators in the West become more selfish, that is, keep significantly more for themselves in the second wave's baseline, and (based on the predicted margins) the magnitude of minority discrimination decreases from 4.05 euros to 0.40. There is no significant effect of wave in MINORITY SUCCESS in the West. In the East, on the other hand, minority discrimination in MINORITY SUCCESS decreases from the first to the second wave from 5.11 euros to 1.77. Second, only in the East, we observe a significant change in the second wave with respect to decision rule support. Specifically, in BASELINE of the second wave in the East, while support for the one-group rule significantly decreases by 8.3 percentage points, within the one-group rule discrimination increases: groups with zero and one minority are assigned 6.6 percentage points higher decision power. This change is offset in MINORITY SUCCESS of the second wave. Dictator points allocation remain unimpacted by wave. A final note is on the wave effects on SDO, authoritarianism, and attitudes towards and beliefs about immigration and redistribution. Among all our measures, the only significant change across the two waves is in the East with respect to attitudes towards income inequality revealing decreased concern over income inequality in the society; on a scale from 1, not a problem, to 5, a very serious problem, their average answer decreased from 3.9 in the first wave to 3.7 in the second (two-tailed t-test $p=0.019$). We should also note that our pool's voting intentions track the subsequent election outcomes, and, hence, we see shifts with respect to political party support, see Table A.9 in the Appendix. In sum, from 2023 to 2025, two regions shifted in discriminatory behaviour in different directions: Whereas participants in the West became less discriminating in resource allocation in BASELINE, participants in the East became less discriminating in Mi-

NORITY SUCCESS. Overall support for the one-group rule decreased in the East over time.

The long-running Leipzig Authoritarianism Study (LAS, Decker et al., 2024) last published in 2024 forms a relevant benchmark for some of our measures. Six of our questionnaire items are similar to or the same as those in the LAS. To compare, we focus on fully or mostly agree answers in each region separately.¹⁹ In stark contrast to the LAS, we consistently find larger agreements to the ethno-centric and Muslim-phobic statements in the West than in the East. Specifically, the agreement with the statement "Foreigners only come here to exploit the welfare state." is higher in the West compared to East Germany (29.7 versus 22.2) in our study, and vice-versa in the LAS (29.9 versus 46.3). The agreement with the statement "Muslims should be banned from immigrating to Germany." is 53.3 percent in the West and 40.2 in the East, where the corresponding numbers were 32.8 and 43.2 in the LAS. Finally, agreement with the statement "The many Muslims here sometimes make me feel like a stranger in my own country." is 38.3 in the West and 30.6 in the East; corresponding percentages are 48.2 and 48.7 in the LAS. It is noteworthy that agreement to anti-Muslim statements increased substantially from 2022—the earlier edition of LAS—to 2024 in the West and remained relatively stable in the East.

The other items common to both our study and the LAS originate from the right-wing authoritarianism scale of Altemeyer (1998). In these again, the regional differences we observe are somewhat at odds with those in the LAS. For example, we find substantially higher support for a strong party that embodies the nation in the East (29.9 percent strongly or fully agreeing) than in the West (19.6 percent strongly or fully agreeing) whereas in the LAS, it was slightly higher in the West (18.4 percent) than in the East (14.4 percent). Likewise, trusting the authorities in government is higher in the West in our sample, whereas LAS reported both regions to be similar on this measure.²⁰

All in all, our results significantly diverge in regional differences in ethno-centrism, Muslim-phobia and right-wing authoritarianism compared to the LAS. A potential reason for this is that our sample under-represents those high on right-wing authoritarianism in the East, which also correlates with the other two constructs. Such an under-representation would lower our study's estimates of author-

¹⁹ Our answer scale runs from from 1, strongly disagree, to 6, strongly agree, without a mid-point answer, and the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study scale is from 1 to 5 where 3 stands for partly agree. Due to regional differences in attitudes, we do not compare our whole sample that over-represents East Germany to the average of their representative German sample.

²⁰ Our item is: "It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government than to listen to the noisy rabblers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds." We find 27.8 percent strongly or fully agreeing in the West, and 21.9 percent in the East. LAS reported only a combined authoritarian submission score, of which a variant of this question is part, designating 18.3 and 17.4 percent in the West and East, respectively, falling into this category. We also asked "The 'old-fashioned ways' and 'old-fashioned values' still show the best way to live." In LAS, the wording was different, and only the conventionalism scale results, of which this question is part, were reported. We find 17.4 and 21.4 percent support in the West and the East, respectively. LAS reported substantially higher numbers with 31.6 percent in the West and 33.3 percent in the East as conventionalist.

itarian rule support and discrimination in decision power. However, since our treatment effects are not contingent on attitudes towards Muslims nor authoritarianism measures, our main conclusion vis-a-vis the effect of minority success stories on authoritarianism remain unaffected. Likewise, given that our sample already contains a sizeable authoritarian subgroup, we do not expect the inclusion of further authoritarian respondents to meaningfully shift the associations between these measures and the behavioural outcomes.

We relate our findings to Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023). Misperceptions regarding immigrant origins and religions documented in their data dating from 2018 also appear rather consistently in the data we collected in 2023 and 2025. Specifically, participants in our study overestimate the percentage of Muslim immigrants by 12.4 percentage points, versus 13.9 in theirs, of unemployment rate of immigrants by 19.4 percentage points, versus 32.3, share of immigrants in the population by 10.7 percentage points, versus 15.5, and share of immigrants from North Africa by 12.8 percentage points, versus 14.5. Looking at attitudes, 38 percent of our sample state lack of effort as the reason for immigrants being poor, versus 41 percent in their sample, and 15 percent believe that immigrants get more transfers than natives, versus 20 percent in theirs. The number of immigrants is not a problem or no problem at all for 25.7 percent of our sample, and it was 23 percent in theirs. About 62.1 percent would consider an immigrant German some time after arrival or after citizenship, excluding the “depends where they come from” category, and 55 percent do so in theirs.

Finally, we compare measures pertaining to government mandate and attitudes towards inequality: The average answer to whom should the government care about, where 1 is only ethnic Germans, and 7 is all people living in Germany, is 4.62 in our sample, and 4.58 in theirs. Somewhat surprisingly, perceptions of income inequality is markedly more positive in our sample, where 59.4 percent consider it a serious or very serious problem in comparison to 76 percent in their study. To summarize, beliefs about and attitudes towards immigrants are remarkably consistent for over more than seven years despite the increasing valence of immigration themes in politics.

To conclude, we document in a German sample substantial support for authoritarian decision rules that, by design, exclude fractions of the population from decision power. In particular, within our study, participants with Muslim-sounding names are discriminated against in decision power allocation. Our findings contribute to and solidify previous findings in the literature. The exact drivers of the rise in populist movements are still under-investigated and call for further research.

References

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Werner Krause** (2020). “The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties’ Policy Positions: A Regression Discontinuity Approach.” *British Journal of Political Science*, 50 (3): 829–47. DOI: [10.1017/S0007123418000029](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000029). [2]
- Adida, Claire L., Adeline Lo, and Melina R. Platas** (2018). “Perspective taking can promote short-term inclusionary behavior toward Syrian refugees.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 115 (38): 9521–26. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804002115>. [7]
- Åkesson, Jimmie** (2024). “Man kan hävda att det pågår ett folkutbyte.” *Expressen*. <https://www.expressen.se/debatt/man-kan-havda-att-det-pagar-ett-folkutbyte/> (visited on 01/12/2026). [2]
- Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva** (2023). “Immigration and redistribution.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90 (1): 1–39. DOI: [10.1093/restud/rdac011](https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac011). [2, 7, 12, 25, 33]
- Altemeyer, Bob** (1998). “The Other “Authoritarian Personality”.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. vol. 30, Elsevier, 47–92. DOI: [10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60382-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60382-2). [5, 12, 23, 32]
- Amiot, Catherine E., and Richard Y. Bourhis** (2005). “Ideological beliefs as determinants of discrimination in positive and negative outcome distributions.” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 35 (5): 581–98. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.238>. [6]
- Arzheimer, Kai** (2024). “Im Osten nichts Neues? Die elektorale Unterstützung von AfD und Linkspartei in den alten und neuen Bundesländern bei der Bundestagswahl 2021.” In *Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen zur Bundestagswahl 2021*. Harald Schoen and Bernhard Weißels, ed. Springer, 139–78. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1). [3]
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Theresa Bernemann** (2024). “‘Place’ does matter for populist radical right sentiment, but how? Evidence from Germany.” *European Political Science Review*, 16 (2): 167–86. DOI: [10.1017/S1755773923000279](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000279). [3]
- Bayerlein, Michael** (2021). “Chasing the Other “Populist Zeitgeist”? Mainstream Parties and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism.” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 62: 411–33. DOI: [10.1007/s11615-021-00299-x](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-021-00299-x). [2]
- Becker, Sascha O., Lukas Mergele, and Ludger Woessmann** (2020). “The Separation and Reunification of Germany: Rethinking a Natural Experiment Interpretation of the Enduring Effects of Communism.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34 (2): 143–71. DOI: [10.1257/jep.34.2.143](https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.34.2.143). [3]
- Bischofberger, Conny** (2019). “Wann hört das endlich auf, Herr Strache?” *Kronen Zeitung*. <https://www.krone.at/1911848> (visited on 01/12/2026). [2]
- Bizumic, Boris, and John Duckitt** (2018). “Investigating Right Wing Authoritarianism With a Very Short Authoritarianism Scale.” *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 6 (1): Number: 1, 129–50. DOI: [10.5964/jspp.v6i1.835](https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v6i1.835). [6]
- Carl, Matthew** (2018). “The Effect of Communism on People’s Attitudes Toward Immigration.” *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: [10.2139/ssrn.3246617](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3246617). [3]
- Chen, Daniel L., Martin Schonger, and Chris Wickens** (2016). “oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments.” *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance*, 9: 88–97. DOI: [10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001). [13]

- Conzo, Pierluigi, Giulia Fuochi, Laura Anfossi, Federica Spaccatini, and Cristina O. Mosso** (2021). “Negative media portrayals of immigrants increase ingroup favoritism and hostile physiological and emotional reactions.” *Scientific Reports*, 11 (1): 16407. DOI: [10.1038/s41598-021-95800-2](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95800-2). [7]
- Cosentino, Gabriele** (2020). “From Pizzagate to the Great Replacement: The Globalization of Conspiracy Theories.” In *Social Media and the Post-Truth World Order: The Global Dynamics of Disinformation*. Palgrave Pivot, 59–86. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-030-43005-4_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43005-4_3). [2]
- Costello, Thomas H., Shauna M. Bowes, Sean T. Stevens, Irwin D. Waldman, Arber Tasimi, and Scott O. Lilienfeld** (2022). “Clarifying the structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 122: 135–70. DOI: [10.1037/pspp0000341](https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000341). [12, 23]
- Couttenier, Mathieu, Sophie Hatte, Mathias Thoenig, and Stephanos Vlachos** (2024). “Anti-Muslim Voting and Media Coverage of Immigrant Crimes.” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 106 (2): 576–85. DOI: [10.1162/rest_a_01152](https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01152). [7]
- Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson** (2014). “On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology.” *Psychological Science*, 25 (6): 1189–97. DOI: [10.1177/0956797614527113](https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614527113). [2]
- Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson** (2015). “Corrigendum: On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology.” *Psychological Science*, 26 (6): PMID: 26045530, 950–52. DOI: [10.1177/0956797615578857](https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615578857). [2]
- Decker, Oliver, Johannes Kiess, Ayline Heller, and Elmar Brähler** (2024). “Vereint im Ressentiment – Autoritäre Dynamiken und rechtsextreme Einstellungen. Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie.” DOI: [978-3-8379-3397-0](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8379-3397-0). [32]
- Dennison, James, and Alexander Kustov** (2025). “Public Belief in the “Great Replacement Theory”.” *International Migration Review*. DOI: [10.1177/01979183251343877](https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183251343877). [2]
- Die Bundeswahlleiterin, Wiesbaden** (2025). “Bundestagswahl 2025: Amtliches Endergebnis.” Datenlizenz Deutschland – Namensnennung – Version 2.0 (<https://www.govdata.de/dl-de/by-2-0>). https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/e4f0d19a-107e-4523-91cd-94c376c44bbd/btw25_kerg.csv (visited on 02/11/2026). [47]
- Duckitt, John, Boris Bizumic, Stephen W. Krauss, and Edna Heled** (2010). “A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model.” *Political Psychology*, 31 (5): 685–715. DOI: [10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x). [5]
- Dylong, Patrick, Paul Setzepfand, and Silke Uebelmesser** (2024). “Priming attitudes toward immigrants: Implications for migration research and survey design.” *European Journal of Political Economy*, 85: 102554. DOI: [10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102554](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102554). [30]
- Dylong, Patrick, and Silke Uebelmesser** (2024). “Biased beliefs about immigration and economic concerns: Evidence from representative experiments.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 217: 453–82. DOI: [10.1016/j.jebo.2023.11.017](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.11.017). [7]
- Engler, Sarah, and David Weisstanner** (2021). “The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support.” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28 (2): 153–73. DOI: [10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636). [6]

- Erhard, Lukas, Raphael H. Heiberger, and Michael Windzio** (2022). “Diverse Effects of Mass Media on Concerns about Immigration: New Evidence from Germany, 2001–2016.” *European Sociological Review*, 38 (4): 629–47. DOI: [10.1093/esr/jcab063](https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcab063). [6]
- Facchini, Giovanni, Yotam Margalit, and Hiroyuki Nakata** (2022). “Countering public opposition to immigration: The impact of information campaigns.” *European Economic Review*, 141: 103959. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103959>. [7]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2024). “Bevölkerung: Bundesländer, Stichtag, Geschlecht, Altersjahre.” <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/url/abf02afc> (visited on 03/09/2026). [46]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025a). “Bevölkerung nach Religionszugehörigkeit im Zensus 2022 und im Zensus 2011 – je Bundesland.” https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Zensus2022/Publikationen/Downloads-Publikationen/Sonderauswertungen/religionszugehoerigkeit_zensus2022_und_zensus2011_bundesland.html (visited on 10/01/2025). [22]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025b). “Ausländer: Deutschland, Stichtag, Geschlecht/Altersjahre/Familienstand, Ländergruppierungen/Staatsangehörigkeit.” <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/table/12521-0002> (visited on 10/01/2025). [3, 25, 26]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025c). “Bevölkerung, Erwerbstätige, Erwerbslose, Erwerbspersonen, Nichterwerbspersonen aus Hauptwohnsitzhaush.: Bundesländer, Jahre, Geschlecht, Größenkl. persönl. monatl. Nettoeinkommen.” <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/statistic/12211/table/12211-1003/search/s/JTtybmV0dG9laW5rb21tZW4lMjI=> (visited on 10/01/2025). [22]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025d). “Indicator 4.2 Reducing the unemployment rate.” <https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Migration-Integration/Tables/reducing-unemployment-rate.html> (visited on 10/01/2025). [25, 26]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025e). “Personen ab 15 Jahren: Höchster beruflicher Abschluss.” <https://ergebnisse.zensus2022.de/datenbank/online/statistic/2000S/table/2000S-1003> (visited on 10/02/2025). [22]
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis)** (2025f). “Personen ab 15 Jahren: Höchster Schulabschluss.” <https://ergebnisse.zensus2022.de/datenbank/online/statistic/2000S/table/2000S-1005> (visited on 10/02/2025). [22, 23]
- Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner** (1997). “Perceived threat and authoritarianism.” *Political Psychology*, 18 (4): 741–70. DOI: [10.1111/0162-895X.00077](https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00077). [5, 12]
- Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim** (2024). “Politbarometer 2023 (Cumulated Data Set).” (ZA8785; Version 1.0.1) [Data set]. GESIS, Cologne. DOI: [10.4232/1.14405](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.14405). [47]
- Frey, Arun** (2020). “‘Cologne Changed Everything’—The Effect of Threatening Events on the Frequency and Distribution of Intergroup Conflict in Germany.” *European Sociological Review*, 36 (5): 684–99. DOI: [10.1093/esr/jcaa007](https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa007). [7]
- Fuster, Andreas, and Basit Zafar** (2023). “Chapter 4 - Survey experiments on economic expectations.” In *Handbook of Economic Expectations*. Elsevier, 107–30. DOI: [10.1016/B978-0-12-822927-9.00010-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-822927-9.00010-0). [6]
- Gidron, Noam** (2022). “Populism and Social Status.” In *The Populism Interviews*. Routledge, 73–78. DOI: [10.4324/9781003250388-15](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003250388-15). [2]

- Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall** (2017). “The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right.” *The British Journal of Sociology*, 68 (S1): S57–S84. DOI: [10.1111/1468-4446.12319](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12319). [2]
- Greiner, Ben** (2015). “Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE.” *Journal of the Economic Science Association*, 1 (1): 114–25. DOI: [10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4). [12]
- Haaland, Ingar, Christopher Roth, and Johannes Wohlfart** (2023). “Designing Information Provision Experiments.” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 61 (1): 3–40. DOI: [10.1257/jel.20211658](https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20211658). [6]
- Harmon-Jones, Cindy, Brock Bastian, and Eddie Harmon-Jones** (2016). “The Discrete Emotions Questionnaire: A New Tool for Measuring State Self-Reported Emotions.” *PLOS ONE*, 11 (8): e0159915. DOI: [10.1371/journal.pone.0159915](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0159915). [11]
- Hartman, Todd K., Thomas V.A. Stocks, Ryan McKay, Jilly Gibson-Miller, Liat Levita, Anton P. Martinez, Liam Mason, Orla McBride, Jamie Murphy, Mark Shevlin, et al.** (2021). “The authoritarian dynamic during the COVID-19 pandemic: Effects on nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment.” *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 12 (7): 1274–85. DOI: [10.1177/1948550620978](https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620978). [6]
- Heller, Ayline, Oliver Decker, Bjarne Schmalbach, Manfred Beutel, Jörg M. Fegert, Elmar Brähler, and Markus Zenger** (2020). “Detecting Authoritarianism Efficiently: Psychometric Properties of the Screening Instrument Authoritarianism – Ultra Short (A-US) in a German Representative Sample.” *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11: 533863. DOI: [10.3389/fpsyg.2020.533863](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.533863). [6]
- Ho, Arnold K., Jim Sidanius, Nour Kteily, Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington, Felicia Pratto, Kristin E. Henkel, Rob Foels, and Andrew L. Stewart** (2015). “The nature of social dominance orientation: Theorizing and measuring preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO scale.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 109 (6): 1003. DOI: [10.1037/pspi0000033](https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000033). [6, 11, 23]
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal R., Martin Dolezal, Steven M. Van Hauwaert, Reinhard Heinisch, Diana Lucia Hofmann, Gilles Ivaldi, Gefjon Off, Sanna Salo, Anna-Sophie Heinze, Ben Stanley, and Lisa Zanotti** (2024). “The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on (social) democracy.” *The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) EU Office Brussels and Karl-Renner-Institute*. [2]
- Krupenkin, Masha, Shawndra Hill, and David Rothschild** (2024). “Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric and ICE Reporting Interest: Evidence from a Large-Scale Study of Web Search Data.” *British Journal of Political Science*, 54 (3): 748–70. DOI: [10.1017/S0007123423000558](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123423000558). [7]
- Kteily, Nour S., Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin** (2011). “Social dominance orientation: Cause or ‘mere effect’?: Evidence for SDO as a causal predictor of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic and racial outgroups.” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 47 (1): 208–14. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.09.009>. [6]
- Linz, Juan José** (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. [2]
- Maad, Assma** (2019). “« Je ne connais pas cette théorie du “grand remplacement” » : l’amnésie de Marine Le Pen.” *Le Monde*. <https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/>

- 2019/03/18/je-ne-connaiss-pas-cette-theorie-du-grand-remplacement-l-amnesie-de-marine-le-pen_5437907_4355770.html (visited on 01/12/2026). [2]
- MacWilliams, Matthew** (2016). “American Authoritarianism in Black and White.” *Doctoral Dissertations*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7275/8988637.0>. [24]
- Madrigal, Guadalupe, and Stuart Soroka** (2023). “Migrants, Caravans, and the Impact of News Photos on Immigration Attitudes.” *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 28 (1): 49–69. DOI: [10.1177/19401612211008430](https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211008430). [6]
- Margalit, Yotam** (2019). “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33 (4): 152–70. DOI: [10.1257/jep.33.4.152](https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.4.152). [2]
- Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr** (2020). “Polity V Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018.” *Center for Systemic Peace*, 176: [2]
- Michinov, Nicolas, Michaël Dambrun, Serge Guimond, and Alain Méot** (2005). “Social dominance orientation, prejudice, and discrimination: A new computer-based method for studying discriminatory behaviors.” *Behavior Research Methods*, 37 (1): 91–98. DOI: [10.3758/BF03206402](https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03206402). [6]
- Miller, Warren E., Donald R. Kinder, and Steven J. Rosenstone** (1993). *American National Election Study, 1992: Pre-and Post-Election Survey*. Inter-University Consortium for Political, and Social Research. DOI: [10.3886/ICPSR06067.v3](https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06067.v3). [5, 11]
- Ministerium des Inneren, für Digitalisierung und Kommunen Baden-Württemberg** (2023). “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2022 Baden-Württemberg.” https://im.baden-wuerttemberg.de/fileadmin/redaktion/m-im/intern/dateien/pdf/20230622_Verfassungsschutzbericht_2022.pdf (visited on 01/12/2026). [2]
- Morin, Sacha, Robin Legault, Félix Laliberté, Zsuzsa Bakk, Charles-Édouard Giguère, Roxane de la Sablonnière, and Éric Lacourse** (2025). “StepMix: a python package for pseudo-likelihood estimation of generalized mixture models with external variables.” *Journal of Statistical Software*, 113: 1–39. DOI: [10.18637/jss.v113.i08](https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v113.i08). [29]
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser** (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press. (Visited on 03/12/2026). [2]
- Mutz, Diana C.** (2018). “Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 115 (19): DOI: [10.1073/pnas.1718155115](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115). [2]
- Osborne, Danny, Thomas H. Costello, John Duckitt, and Chris G. Sibley** (2023). “The psychological causes and societal consequences of authoritarianism.” *Nature reviews psychology*, 2 (4): 220–32. [2, 5]
- Osborne, Danny, Nicole Satherley, Todd D. Little, and Chris G. Sibley** (2021). “Authoritarianism and social dominance predict annual increases in generalized prejudice.” *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 12 (7): 1136–45. [6]
- Pew Research Center** (2024). “Religious Composition of the World’s Migrants, 1990-2020.” <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/08/19/religious-composition-of-the-worlds-migrants-1990-2020/> (visited on 10/01/2025). [25, 26]
- Pratto, Felicia, James H. Liu, Shana Levin, Jim Sidanius, Margaret Shih, Hagit Bachrach, and Peter Hegarty** (2000). “Social Dominance Orientation and the Legitimization of Inequality Across Cultures.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31 (3): 369–409. DOI: [10.1177/0022022100031003005](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022100031003005). [6]
- Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle** (1994). “Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes.”

- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67 (4): 741–63. DOI: [10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741](https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741). [6]
- Rueß, Stefanie, Gerald Schneider, and Jan P. Vogler** (2025). “Illiberal Norms, Media Reporting, and Bureaucratic Discrimination: Evidence from State-Citizen Interactions in Germany.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 00104140251400334. DOI: [10.1177/00104140251400334](https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140251400334). [6]
- Stelter, Marleen, Iniobong Essien, Anette Rohmann, Juliane Degner, and Stefanie Kemme** (2023). “Shooter biases and stereotypes among police and civilians.” *Acta Psychologica*, 232: 103820. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103820>. [6]
- Stenner, Karen** (2005). *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press. [5, 12]
- Swencionis, Jillian K., Enrique R. Pouget, and Phillip A. Goff** (2021). “Supporting social hierarchy is associated with White police officers’ use of force.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118 (18): e2007693118. DOI: [10.1073/pnas.2007693118](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2007693118). [6]
- Tabellini, Marco** (2020). “Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 87 (1): 454–86. DOI: [10.1093/restud/rdz027](https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz027). [2]
- Unzueta, Miguel M., Benjamin A. Everly, and Angélica S. Gutiérrez** (2014). “Social dominance orientation moderates reactions to Black and White discrimination claimants.” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 54: 81–88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.04.005>. [6]
- Valentino, Nicholas A.** (1999). “Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes During Evaluations of the President.” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 63 (3): 293–320. DOI: [10.1086/297722](https://doi.org/10.1086/297722). [6]
- Vermunt, Jeroen K., and Jay Magidson** (2002). “Latent class cluster analysis.” In *Applied latent class analysis*. Jacques A. Hagenaars and Allan L. McCutcheon, ed. vol. 11, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 89–106. [29]
- Vidigal, Robert** (2022). “Authoritarianism and Right-Wing Voting in Brazil.” *Latin American Research Review*, 57 (3): 554–72. DOI: [10.1017/lar.2022.32](https://doi.org/10.1017/lar.2022.32). [5, 12]
- Voelkel, Jan G., James Chu, Michael N. Stagnaro, Joseph S. Mernyk, Chrystal Redekopp, Sophia L. Pink, James N. Druckman, David G. Rand, and Robb Willer** (2022). “Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes.” *Nature Human Behaviour*. DOI: [10.1038/s41562-022-01466-9](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01466-9). [30]
- Walentek, Dawid, Natalia Letki, Peter Thisted Dinesen, and Ulf Liebe** (2025). “Measuring the effect of media framing on behavior towards refugees.” *European Union Politics*, 26 (4): 714–35. DOI: [10.1177/14651165251365550](https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165251365550). [7]
- Wilders, Geert** (2018). “We are being replaced. If we don’t close our borders and stop islamic immigration immediately, we’ll cease to exist as.” [Post]. X. <https://x.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1058648218572066816> (visited on 01/12/2026). [2]
- Wojcieszak, Magdalena, and R Kelly Garrett** (2018). “Social Identity, Selective Exposure, and Affective Polarization: How Priming National Identity Shapes Attitudes Toward Immigrants Via News Selection.” *Human Communication Research*, 44 (3): 247–73. DOI: [10.1093/hcr/hqx010](https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqx010). [6]

Zussman, Asaf (2023). "Discrimination in Times of Crises and the Role of the Media." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 15 (4): 422–51. DOI: [10.1257/app.20210732](https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210732).
[7]

A Additional tables

Table A.1. Resource allocation per treatment, group, and minority status

	(1) All	(2) Unequal Givers
Minority	-1.70*** (0.44)	-6.20*** (1.57)
MINORITY SUCCESS	0.55 (0.57)	1.34 (1.20)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ Minority	0.15 (0.23)	0.66 (0.80)
East	1.16** (0.57)	3.65*** (1.12)
East $\times$ Minority	-0.44* (0.23)	-1.45* (0.80)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ East	-1.01 (0.78)	-1.64 (1.45)
Group-1	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.41)
Group-5	0.22* (0.13)	0.77* (0.46)
Group-9	1.22*** (0.38)	4.37*** (1.36)
Minority $\times$ Group-1	1.24*** (0.41)	4.43*** (1.45)
Minority $\times$ Group-5	0.99*** (0.37)	3.53*** (1.33)
Constant	26.18*** (0.44)	22.56*** (0.97)
Observations	55560	15520
Participants	1389	388
R^2	0.00	0.02

Notes: Linear regressions on the amount allocated to individuals in the allocation task with wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level and depicted in parentheses. Column (1) uses all the participants, column (2) restricts the sample to unequal givers, that is, those who do not allocate an equal amount to all 40 in the allocation task. For the Minority-Group interaction, Group-9 is the benchmark, as Group-0 does not contain any minority member and, thus, the interaction does not exist. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2. Resource allocation per treatment and minority status in the East in the second wave

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Unequal Givers
Minority		−1.224*** (0.384)	−3.901*** (1.143)
MINORITY SUCCESS	12.795 (7.795)	−1.279* (0.747)	−0.449 (1.131)
MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority		0.726 (0.456)	2.130 (1.429)
MAJORITY SUCCESS	4.031 (6.652)	−0.247 (0.635)	−0.316 (1.033)
MAJORITY SUCCESS × Minority		0.030 (0.460)	−0.060 (1.386)
Group-1	−0.083 (2.549)		
Group-5	6.290* (3.309)		
Group-9	8.610* (4.469)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-1	1.371 (3.795)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-5	−5.444 (4.219)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-9	−6.831 (5.264)		
MAJORITY SUCCESS × Group-1	−2.253 (3.112)		
MAJORITY SUCCESS × Group-5	−3.253 (3.784)		
MAJORITY SUCCESS × Group-9	−1.175 (5.254)		
Constant	57.414*** (5.371)	27.347*** (0.511)	26.408*** (0.826)
Observations	3188	31880	9480
Participants	797	797	237
R ²	0.004	0.004	0.013

Notes: Linear regressions on the amount kept when facing different groups (column (1)), or on the amount allocated to individuals (columns (2) & (3)) in the allocation task in East Germany in the second wave. Column (3) restricts the sample to unequal givers, that is, those who do not allocate an equal amount to all 40 in the allocation task. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level and depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3. Preferences for decision-making rules in the East in the second wave

	(1) Authoritarian=1	(2) One-group points	(3) Dictator points
MINORITY SUCCESS	0.120 (0.226)	0.023 (0.070)	-0.039 (0.094)
MAJORITY SUCCESS	-0.026 (0.208)	0.066 (0.067)	0.025 (0.090)
Constant	0.984*** (0.173)	-0.464*** (0.056)	-0.623*** (0.076)
Observations	797	584	584
<i>PseudoR</i> ²	0.001	0.000	0.000

Notes: A comparison of treatments in East Germany in the second wave. Column (1) reports a logistic regression on whether a participant allocates positive points to authoritarian decision rules. Columns (2) and (3) report fractional probit regressions on the fraction of points allocated to the one-group and dictator rules, respectively, where the sample is restricted to those who assign positive points to either of the rules. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4. Preferences for groups in the one-group rule in the East in the second wave

	(1) Group: 0	(2) 1	(3) 5	(4) 9	(5) 0 & 1
MINORITY SUCCESS	-0.053 (0.053)	-0.075 (0.052)	0.094** (0.044)	0.061 (0.053)	-4.297** (1.898)
MAJORITY SUCCESS	0.022 (0.055)	-0.020 (0.053)	0.055 (0.045)	-0.059 (0.049)	0.094 (1.770)
Constant	-0.559*** (0.045)	-0.560*** (0.045)	-0.818*** (0.038)	-0.781*** (0.044)	57.586*** (1.469)
Observations	797	797	797	797	797
<i>(Pseudo)R</i> ²	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.011

Notes: A comparison of treatments in East Germany in the second wave. Columns (1–4) depict fractional probit regressions of the fraction of points allocated to Group-0, Group-1, Group-5, and Group-9, respectively. Column (5) depicts a linear regression of the total points allocated to the two groups with zero and one minority. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5. Preferences for minority-majority status within the dictator rule in the East in the second wave

	(1) All
Minority	−1.299*** (0.160)
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.155** (0.076)
Minority × MINORITY SUCCESS	0.376* (0.204)
MAJORITY SUCCESS	−0.065 (0.071)
Minority × MAJORITY SUCCESS	0.150 (0.190)
Constant	2.995*** (0.059)
Observations	31083
R^2	0.007

Notes: Linear regression of the points allocated to individuals under the dictator rule in the East in the second wave. Allocated points are integer values ranging between 0 and 100, and a total of 100 points is allocated across 40 individuals. Since the sum of points is fixed, we exclude one individual, Suleyman, from the regression. The average points allocated to the excluded individual is very similar across the regions and treatments. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6. Background characteristics

		East	West	<i>p</i> -value
(Within category %)				
<i>Gender</i>				
	Male	44.3	55.1	< 0.001
	Female	55.5	44.9	
	Other	0.2	0.0	
<i>Age</i>				
	18-24	6.0	5.6	0.031
	25-34	17.1	20.1	
	35-44	19.6	20.1	
	45-54	16.5	17.2	
	55-64	24.9	26.7	
	≥65	15.9	10.3	
<i>Marital status</i>				
	Single	39.4	38.5	0.077
	Married or cohabiting	45.6	49.9	
	Separated, divorced or widowed	14.9	11.6	
<i>Number of children</i>				
	0	39.1	47.8	0.003
	1	24.6	20.1	
	2	26.5	22.6	
	>2	9.8	9.5	
<i>Education</i>				
	No high school, Haupt- or Realschule	41.5	35.7	0.087
	Fachabitur, Abitur	23.6	24.7	
	Bachelor	14.1	16.6	
	Master, PhD or other	20.8	23.0	
<i>Employment</i>				
	Full-time	48.9	49.5	0.161
	Part-time	13.4	16.0	
	Self-employed	4.2	5.3	
	Student	5.7	5.9	
	Unemployed or job searching	7.2	7.1	
	Retired	20.6	16.0	
<i>Net monthly household income</i>				
	< 1100€	10.0	7.1	< 0.001
	1100€ - 1500€	9.9	8.2	
	1501€ - 2000€	12.2	8.5	
	2001€ - 2600€	16.7	14.9	
	2601€ - 4000€	31.2	29.6	
	> 4001€	20.1	31.8	
<i>Religion</i>				
	Christian	22.9	54.7	< 0.001
	Atheist or no religion	62.2	35.4	
	Other religion or no answer	14.8	10.0	
Total		1091	673	

Notes: Descriptives per region, all treatments (BASELINE, MINORITY SUCCESS, MAJORITY SUCCESS) combined. *p*-values derive from Pearson's χ^2 test of independence comparing the distribution of each categorical variable across the two regions, East and West.

Table A.7. Political preferences

		East	West	<i>p</i> -value
(Within category %)				
<i>Political orientation</i>				
	Left of center	33.5	31.4	0.302
	Center	36.0	39.7	
	Right of center	30.4	29.0	
<i>Would vote for</i>				
	CDU/CSU	17.0	20.2	< 0.001
	SPD	11.5	18.7	
	Grüne	9.0	18.0	
	FDP	4.0	5.5	
	Die Linke	14.8	5.6	
	AfD	25.5	14.1	
	Other	11.1	16.2	
	BSW	7.0	1.6	
Total		1091	673	

Notes: Descriptives per region, all treatments (BASELINE, MINORITY SUCCESS, MAJORITY SUCCESS) combined. *p*-values derive from Pearson's χ^2 test of independence comparing the distribution of each categorical variable across the two regions, East and West.

Table A.8. Gender and age distribution of sample and overall population

	East						West				
	W1	W2	Pop.	<i>p</i> (W1)	<i>p</i> (W2)		W1	W2	Pop.	<i>p</i> (W1)	<i>p</i> (W2)
<i>Age-adj. Gender</i>											
Male	43.6	44.0	50.5	0.018	< 0.001		51.3	56.6	50.1	0.656	0.026
Female	56.4	56.0	49.5				48.7	43.4	49.9		
<i>Age</i>											
18-24	6.2	5.9	8.8	< 0.001	< 0.001		4.7	6.9	10.1	< 0.001	0.005
25-34	17.8	16.8	12.2				19.4	21.0	17.7		
35-44	17.8	20.3	19.1				18.1	22.7	18.3		
45-54	14.7	17.1	17.0				18.6	15.5	16.9		
55-64	29.8	23.2	22.7				28.3	24.7	21.4		
≥65	13.7	16.7	20.1				11.0	9.3	15.5		
Total	292	797	8.8				382	291	51.5		

Notes: Gender and age sample composition compared to 2024 population distributions (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DeStatis), 2024). Population data is restricted to the sample age range of 18-74 years to ensure comparability. The comparison excludes two respondents with gender recorded as "other", as this category is not represented in population statistics. *p*-values derive from Pearson's χ^2 goodness-of-fit tests. Age-adjusted gender shares are calculated by weighting the sample's gender shares in each age group according to the population's age distribution. Before age adjustments, the share of females in the sample is 54.5% in East Wave 1 ($p = 0.088$), 56.1% in East Wave 2 ($p < 0.001$), 47.1% in West Wave 1 ($p = 0.361$), and 41.9% in West Wave 2 ($p = 0.010$). These differences do not substantively alter overall conclusions regarding sample representativeness.

Table A.9. Sample voting intentions and official election or polling results

		N	CDU/ CSU	SPD	Grüne	FDP	Die Linke	AfD	BSW	Other
<i>Wave 1</i>										
Baden- Württemberg	Sample	55	20.0	10.9	21.8	12.7	5.5	7.3	n.a.	21.8
	Poll	950	29.4	14.8	28.0	8.4	2.7	12.8	n.a.	3.8
Bayern	Sample	71	23.9	16.9	12.7	5.6	4.2	15.5	n.a.	21.1
	Poll	1156	36.9	13.8	22.4	6.4	2.4	9.3	n.a.	8.7
Berlin	Sample	22	31.8	18.2	27.3	4.5	4.5	0.0	n.a.	13.6
	Poll	502	22.3	21.9	26.5	4.4	10.4	9.8	n.a.	4.8
Brandenburg	Sample	57	10.5	21.1	5.3	7.0	14.0	14.0	n.a.	28.1
	Poll	544	24.1	22.1	16.4	5.7	9.0	19.1	n.a.	3.7
Bremen	Sample	4	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	n.a.	0.0
Hamburg	Sample	11	9.1	36.4	9.1	0.0	18.2	0.0	n.a.	27.3
Hessen	Sample	39	7.7	15.4	23.1	10.3	2.6	2.6	n.a.	38.5
	Poll	527	28.5	19.7	25.2	8.5	4.7	9.7	n.a.	3.6
Mecklenburg- Vorpommern	Sample	42	16.7	16.7	4.8	4.8	14.3	23.8	n.a.	19.0
	Poll	240	22.5	20.8	11.3	5.0	11.7	23.8	n.a.	5.0
Niedersachsen	Sample	43	18.6	20.9	32.6	2.3	2.3	11.6	n.a.	11.6
	Poll	704	25.1	24.3	27.1	6.1	3.6	10.5	n.a.	3.3
Nordrhein- Westfalen	Sample	97	12.4	22.7	20.6	5.2	3.1	12.4	n.a.	23.7
	Poll	1337	31.1	22.4	25.4	6.9	2.8	8.4	n.a.	3.1
Rheinland-Pfalz	Sample	16	12.5	0.0	12.5	6.3	6.3	31.3	n.a.	31.3
Saarland	Sample	7	14.3	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.6	n.a.	42.9
Sachsen	Sample	93	17.2	7.5	9.7	5.4	11.8	30.1	n.a.	18.3
	Poll	827	29.1	15.1	13.5	5.6	9.1	23.2	n.a.	4.4
Sachsen-Anhalt	Sample	55	12.7	21.8	7.3	9.1	10.9	21.8	n.a.	16.4
	Poll	344	31.1	15.1	10.8	3.8	11.6	22.7	n.a.	4.9
Schleswig-Holstein	Sample	17	11.8	29.4	11.8	11.8	11.8	11.8	n.a.	11.8
Thüringen	Sample	47	19.1	21.3	6.4	10.6	14.9	14.9	n.a.	12.8
	Poll	383	23.5	17.8	11.0	3.9	11.7	29.5	n.a.	2.6
<i>Wave 2</i>										
Baden- Württemberg	Sample	42	23.8	23.8	14.3	4.8	2.4	21.4	2.4	7.1
	Population	6.3 M	31.6	14.2	13.6	5.6	6.8	19.8	4.1	4.3
Bayern	Sample	49	36.7	10.2	20.4	4.1	4.1	14.3	6.1	4.1
	Population	8.0 M	37.2	11.5	12.0	4.2	5.7	19.0	3.1	7.2
Berlin	Sample	39	28.2	23.1	12.8	10.3	7.7	17.9	0.0	0.0
	Population	1.9 M	18.3	15.1	16.8	3.8	19.9	15.2	6.7	4.2
Brandenburg	Sample	146	20.5	11.0	6.8	2.1	17.8	21.2	12.3	8.2
	Population	1.6 M	18.1	14.8	6.6	3.2	10.7	32.5	10.7	3.4
Bremen	Sample	2	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hamburg	Sample	7	14.3	57.1	14.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hessen	Sample	25	32.0	28.0	8.0	0.0	4.0	16.0	0.0	12.0
	Population	3.6 M	28.9	18.4	12.6	5.0	8.7	17.8	4.4	4.2
Mecklenburg- Vorpommern	Sample	88	17.0	14.8	13.6	3.4	11.4	20.5	9.1	10.2
	Population	1.0 M	17.8	12.4	5.4	3.2	12.0	35.0	10.6	3.6
Niedersachsen	Sample	35	22.9	14.3	17.1	2.9	5.7	8.6	11.4	17.1
	Population	5.0 M	28.1	23.0	11.5	4.1	8.1	17.8	3.8	3.6
Nordrhein- Westfalen	Sample	67	17.9	11.9	14.9	0.0	14.9	25.4	4.5	10.4
	Population	10.5 M	30.1	20.0	12.4	4.4	8.3	16.8	4.1	3.8
Rheinland-Pfalz	Sample	14	14.3	35.7	7.1	7.1	0.0	28.6	0.0	7.1
Saarland	Sample	2	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0
Sachsen	Sample	290	20.3	9.0	12.1	3.1	13.4	26.9	7.2	7.9
	Population	2.6 M	19.7	8.5	6.5	3.2	11.3	37.3	9.0	4.4
Sachsen-Anhalt	Sample	125	15.2	8.0	8.8	4.0	14.4	32.8	7.2	9.6
	Population	1.3 M	19.2	11.0	4.4	3.1	10.8	37.1	11.2	3.3
Schleswig-Holstein	Sample	9	11.1	44.4	22.2	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	11.1
Thüringen	Sample	148	12.2	8.8	6.1	2.0	20.9	30.4	13.5	6.1
	Population	1.3 M	18.6	8.8	4.2	2.8	15.2	38.6	9.4	2.5

Notes: This table compares respondents' reported voting intentions with the closest available federal election or polling results. The reference values for *Wave 1* are based on representative polling data from 2023 by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2024). The reference values for *Wave 2* are 2025 German federal election results sourced from Die Bundeswahlleiterin (2025). For states with fewer than 20 observations in the sample, only sample percentages are reported.

Table A.10. Linear regressions with background characteristics

	(1) Res. Diff	(2) Auth. Rules	(3) Groups 0 & 1	(4) Dict. Diff
MINORITY SUCCESS	-0.054 (0.337)	-3.719 (2.621)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.377** (0.152)
East	0.645* (0.359)	-1.748 (2.788)	0.025* (0.014)	0.284* (0.162)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	-0.189 (0.471)	4.672 (3.662)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.058 (0.212)
Female	-0.588** (0.243)	-2.186 (1.890)	0.001 (0.010)	0.156 (0.110)
Age	0.028** (0.012)	0.094 (0.090)	0.001* (0.001)	0.025*** (0.005)
Income (ref. = 2601€–4000€)				
< 1100€	0.252 (0.527)	5.700 (4.098)	0.013 (0.021)	-0.235 (0.238)
1100€ – 1500€	-0.070 (0.466)	-0.973 (3.622)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.240 (0.210)
1501€ – 2000€	-0.621 (0.441)	0.127 (3.430)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.648*** (0.199)
2001€ – 2600€	-0.294 (0.369)	-1.984 (2.865)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.046 (0.166)
> 4001€	-0.399 (0.323)	-1.350 (2.507)	0.005 (0.013)	0.010 (0.145)
Marital status (ref. = Married or cohabiting)				
Single	-0.201 (0.327)	-3.031 (2.540)	0.031** (0.013)	0.313** (0.147)
Separated/divorced/widowed	-0.077 (0.390)	1.579 (3.031)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.000 (0.176)
Children (ref. = 0)				
1 child	-0.317 (0.337)	1.505 (2.621)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.046 (0.152)
2 children	-0.447 (0.349)	4.294 (2.710)	0.011 (0.014)	0.275* (0.157)
>2 children	-0.514 (0.468)	-4.089 (3.634)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.144 (0.211)
Education (ref. = No high school, Haupt- or Realschule)				
Fachabitur/Abitur	-0.271 (0.321)	-4.218* (2.498)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.251* (0.145)
Bachelor	-0.354 (0.366)	0.569 (2.848)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.248 (0.165)
Master/PhD or other	-0.147 (0.332)	-2.176 (2.580)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.350** (0.150)
Employment (ref. = Full-time)				
Part-time	-0.305 (0.363)	-0.640 (2.825)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.055 (0.164)
Self-employed	0.615 (0.559)	-6.676 (4.347)	-0.043* (0.022)	-0.173 (0.252)
Student	-0.423 (0.592)	-10.057** (4.603)	-0.043* (0.024)	-0.163 (0.267)
Unemployed	-0.084 (0.536)	-4.884 (4.165)	0.015 (0.021)	0.123 (0.242)
Retired	-0.611 (0.409)	0.273 (3.177)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.190 (0.184)
Religion (ref. = Christian)				
Atheist or no religion	-0.097 (0.269)	-1.830 (2.089)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.185 (0.121)
Other religion / no answer	-0.046 (0.390)	2.734 (3.033)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.536*** (0.176)
Constant	0.323 (0.704)	44.729*** (5.471)	0.510*** (0.028)	0.005 (0.317)
Observations	1387	1387	1387	1387
R ²	0.025	0.035	0.025	0.065

Notes: Linear regressions with wave fixed effects. The outcome variables are: (1) the difference between average resource allocated to the majority and minority in the resource allocation task; (2) the total weight allocated to authoritarian decision rules, that are, one-group and dictator rules; (3) total decision power allocated to Group-0 and Group-1 in the one-group rule; and (4) the difference between average decision power allocated to the majority and minority in the dictator rule. Reference groups are the largest group within each category. Two non-binary individuals are excluded from the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.11. Linear regressions with political preferences

	(1) Res. Diff	(2) Auth. Rules	(3) Groups 0 & 1	(4) Dict. Diff
MINORITY SUCCESS	-0.069 (0.332)	-2.303 (2.592)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.320** (0.151)
East	0.362 (0.347)	-2.304 (2.714)	0.014 (0.014)	0.160 (0.158)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ East	-0.070 (0.463)	3.706 (3.620)	-0.016 (0.018)	0.084 (0.211)
<i>Political orientation (ref. = Center)</i>				
Left of center	0.296 (0.307)	3.240 (2.398)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.037 (0.140)
Right of center	0.717** (0.302)	4.694** (2.361)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.369*** (0.138)
<i>Political party (ref. = CDU/CSU)</i>				
SPD	-0.124 (0.414)	-0.686 (3.233)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.128 (0.188)
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	-0.447 (0.450)	-10.525*** (3.520)	-0.044** (0.018)	-0.501** (0.205)
FDP	0.346 (0.568)	3.636 (4.441)	0.004 (0.023)	0.150 (0.259)
Die Linke	-0.256 (0.492)	-2.358 (3.848)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.208 (0.224)
AfD	0.973** (0.389)	4.136 (3.038)	0.039** (0.015)	0.458*** (0.177)
Other	-0.367 (0.416)	-7.289** (3.249)	-0.009 (0.016)	0.053 (0.189)
BSW	0.947 (0.661)	-1.490 (5.168)	0.013 (0.026)	0.457 (0.301)
Constant	0.193 (0.372)	43.810*** (2.905)	0.525*** (0.015)	0.787*** (0.169)
Observations	1389	1389	1389	1389
R^2	0.026	0.026	0.048	0.050

Notes: Linear regressions with wave fixed effects. The outcome variables are: (1) the difference between average resource allocated to the majority and minority in the resource allocation task; (2) the total weight allocated to authoritarian decision rules, that are, one-group and dictator rules; (3) total decision power allocated to Group-0 and Group-1 in the one-group rule; and (4) the difference between average decision power allocated to the majority and minority in the dictator rule. In Column (2), comparing Greens to the rest with Benjamini-Hochberg multiple testing correction, Wald test p -values < 0.0333 for all but BSW and Other, and in Column (4) corresponding p -values < 0.0189 for all except Die Linke. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.12. Linear regressions with social dominance orientation and authoritarianism measures

	(1) Res. Diff	(2) Auth. Rules	(3) Groups 0 & 1	(4) Dict. Diff
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.148 (0.331)	−2.577 (2.498)	−0.001 (0.013)	−0.363** (0.151)
East	0.518 (0.343)	−0.002 (2.589)	0.022 (0.014)	0.226 (0.157)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	−0.090 (0.462)	2.528 (3.490)	−0.017 (0.019)	0.077 (0.211)
Authoritarianism: Child-rearing	−0.777* (0.453)	2.591 (3.416)	−0.007 (0.018)	−0.072 (0.207)
SDO: Dominance	0.082 (0.152)	5.086*** (1.144)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.033 (0.069)
SDO: Non-egalitarianism	0.419*** (0.141)	2.493** (1.063)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.103 (0.064)
Left-wing Authoritarianism	0.068 (0.102)	1.923** (0.767)	−0.001 (0.004)	−0.078* (0.046)
Right-wing Authoritarianism	0.396*** (0.120)	4.546*** (0.909)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.248*** (0.055)
Constant	−0.011 (0.393)	30.271*** (2.967)	0.515*** (0.016)	0.730*** (0.180)
Observations	1389	1389	1389	1389
R^2	0.029	0.094	0.031	0.045

Notes: Linear regressions with wave fixed effects. The outcome variables are: (1) the difference between average resource allocated to the majority and minority in the resource allocation task; (2) the total weight allocated to authoritarian decision rules, that are, one-group and dictator rules; (3) total decision power allocated to Group-0 and Group-1 in the one-group rule; and (4) the difference between average decision power allocated to the majority and minority in the dictator rule. Child-rearing measure of authoritarianism is a average score of four questions ranging from 0 to 1, where a higher score indicates higher authoritarianism. SDO components are based on the average sum scores of four questions each, and each component's score ranges are from 0 to 5 where a higher score indicates higher dominance or higher non-egalitarianism. Left- and right-wing authoritarianism are scores from a factor analysis centered around zero, see the main text for details. A higher positive score indicates a higher alignment with the respective authoritarianism construct, and vice-versa for a negative score. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.13. Linear regressions with decision power attitudes and immigration measures

		(1) Res. Diff	(2) Auth. Rules	(3) Groups 0 & 1	(4) Dict. Diff
MINORITY SUCCESS		-0.057 (0.323)	-1.892 (2.536)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.273* (0.146)
East		0.477 (0.343)	-2.262 (2.688)	0.009 (0.014)	0.082 (0.155)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East		-0.108 (0.451)	2.337 (3.539)	-0.022 (0.018)	0.020 (0.204)
Political Power:	Western European	0.102 (0.130)	-0.411 (1.023)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.098* (0.059)
	Living in Germany	0.018 (0.087)	0.132 (0.679)	0.007** (0.004)	0.038 (0.039)
Economic Power:	Ethnic German	-0.212 (0.136)	0.521 (1.068)	0.002 (0.005)	0.080 (0.062)
	Western European	-0.052 (0.173)	-1.469 (1.357)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.121 (0.078)
	Christian	0.024 (0.157)	0.995 (1.229)	0.003 (0.006)	0.050 (0.071)
	Born in Germany	0.126 (0.111)	-0.904 (0.871)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.050)
	Anyone	0.054 (0.087)	-0.446 (0.682)	0.005 (0.004)	0.086** (0.039)
State Power:	Western European	0.236 (0.150)	-0.680 (1.177)	0.001 (0.006)	0.057 (0.068)
	Christian	-0.458*** (0.149)	-1.774 (1.172)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.009 (0.068)
	Born in Germany	0.079 (0.106)	-0.453 (0.835)	0.004 (0.004)	0.060 (0.048)
	Living in Germany	0.011 (0.097)	2.509*** (0.764)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.012 (0.044)
Unemployed Immigrant: Error %		0.003 (0.006)	0.209*** (0.045)	0.000* (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)
Unemployed German: Error %		-0.015* (0.008)	-0.022 (0.062)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.007** (0.004)
Immigrant Origin Error %:	U.S. & Canada	0.026 (0.021)	-0.051 (0.162)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.009)
	Central & South America	-0.016 (0.028)	0.260 (0.218)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.014 (0.013)
	North Africa	0.004 (0.016)	0.095 (0.126)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.007)
	Rest of Africa	-0.011 (0.019)	0.092 (0.150)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.006 (0.009)
	Middle East	0.022* (0.012)	-0.050 (0.096)	0.001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.006)
	Asia	0.024 (0.019)	0.152 (0.146)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.015* (0.008)
	Islam	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.115** (0.057)	0.000 (0.000)	0.007** (0.003)
	Judaism	-0.009 (0.018)	0.211 (0.142)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.009 (0.008)
	Other Religion	-0.017 (0.011)	0.016 (0.088)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.005)
Attitudes Towards Immigration, Muslims, Redistribution:					
Number of Immigrants is/is not a Problem		0.271** (0.136)	1.821* (1.068)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.080 (0.062)
Immigrants Come to Exploit		0.043 (0.131)	-1.832* (1.028)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.059)
Immigrants are German When...		0.144 (0.138)	-1.207 (1.082)	0.003 (0.006)	0.026 (0.063)
Muslim Immigration Should be Banned		-0.286** (0.125)	-0.784 (0.981)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.108* (0.057)
Muslims Make Me Feel Like a Foreigner		-0.189 (0.119)	0.197 (0.932)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.075 (0.054)
Reason for Poverty for Immigrants		-0.217 (0.278)	-3.825* (2.180)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.090 (0.126)
Immigrants Receive Less/More Transfers		-0.669*** (0.230)	-0.572 (1.804)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.244** (0.104)
Immigrants Pay Less/More Income Tax		-0.098 (0.328)	2.173 (2.571)	0.032** (0.013)	0.201 (0.148)
Friends Born Outside Germany (Y/N)		0.028 (0.244)	-3.899** (1.914)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.106 (0.111)
Whom Should the Government Care About		-0.095 (0.088)	1.000 (0.688)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.086** (0.040)
Income Inequality is/is not a Problem		-0.058 (0.116)	-2.144** (0.907)	0.010** (0.005)	0.041 (0.052)
Constant		4.245*** (1.153)	57.544*** (9.049)	0.582*** (0.046)	1.570*** (0.522)
Observations		1359	1359	1359	1359
R ²		0.09690	0.1234	0.1338	0.1536

Notes: Linear regressions with wave fixed effects. The outcome variables are: (1) the difference between average resource allocated to the majority and minority in the resource allocation task; (2) the total weight allocated to authoritarian decision rules, that are, one-group and dictator rules; (3) total weight allocated to groups 0 and 1 in the one-group rule; and (4) the difference between the average weight allocated to the majority and minority in the dictator rule. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.14. Linear regressions controlling for latent classes

	(1) Res. Diff	(2) Auth. Rules	(3) Groups 0 & 1	(4) Dict. Diff
MINORITY SUCCESS	-0.126 (0.308)	2.017 (2.465)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.397*** (0.144)
Class 2	-0.751* (0.410)	-5.919* (3.280)	-0.062*** (0.017)	-0.797*** (0.192)
Class 3	2.397*** (0.484)	10.572*** (3.868)	0.067*** (0.020)	0.393* (0.227)
Class 4	0.604 (0.646)	7.293 (5.167)	0.013 (0.027)	0.280 (0.303)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ Class 2	0.430 (0.562)	-9.996** (4.491)	0.033 (0.023)	0.232 (0.263)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ Class 3	0.244 (0.669)	1.371 (5.351)	0.018 (0.027)	0.503 (0.314)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ Class 4	-1.157 (0.841)	-6.696 (6.726)	-0.005 (0.034)	0.107 (0.394)
Constant	0.561** (0.226)	42.248*** (1.808)	0.549*** (0.009)	1.124*** (0.106)
Observations	1359	1359	1359	1359
R^2	0.054	0.047	0.046	0.052

Notes: Linear regressions with wave fixed effects. The outcome variables are: (1) the difference between average resources allocated to the majority and minority in the resource allocation task; (2) the total weight allocated to authoritarian decision rules, that are, one-group and dictator rules; (3) total weight allocated to Group-0 and Group-1 in the one-group rule; and (4) the difference between the average weight allocated to the majority and minority in the dictator rule. Classes are based on the latent class analysis as described in [Section 3.4](#). The largest group, Class-1, forms the reference. Thirty participants, who answered “depends on where they come from” to the question when they would consider immigrants as Germans, are excluded from the cluster analysis and hence the regression. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.15. Resource allocation per treatment and minority status controlling for wave

	(1) All Amount Kept	(2) All Amount Given	(3) Unequal Givers Amount Given
Minority		−0.843*** (0.307)	−4.045*** (1.362)
MINORITY SUCCESS	−4.278 (7.692)	0.469 (0.749)	−1.166 (1.649)
MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority		0.415 (0.383)	2.278 (1.644)
East	−7.891 (7.793)	0.777 (0.765)	1.590 (1.324)
East × Minority		0.033 (0.416)	0.935 (1.681)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	1.463 (10.498)	0.237 (1.042)	1.178 (2.158)
Group-1	2.452 (1.503)		
Group-5	3.670** (1.511)		
Group-9	5.268*** (1.682)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-1	−3.296 (2.194)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-5	−2.878 (2.122)		
MINORITY SUCCESS × Group-9	−1.698 (2.350)		
Wave=2	6.215 (8.821)	−0.892 (0.875)	−4.247** (1.843)
Wave=2 × East	−3.179 (11.513)	0.744 (1.137)	4.015* (2.165)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS	0.686 (11.547)	0.213 (1.143)	4.817** (2.383)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS × East	14.166 (15.563)	−2.198 (1.546)	−5.278* (2.982)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East × Minority		−1.021 (0.702)	−4.279* (2.589)
Wave=2 × Minority		0.722 (0.451)	3.645** (1.745)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority		−0.750 (0.610)	−3.107 (2.173)
Wave=2 × East × Minority		−1.136* (0.655)	−4.437* (2.307)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS × East × Minority		2.082** (0.962)	7.237** (3.281)
Constant	63.125*** (5.808)	26.719*** (0.566)	25.050*** (1.069)
Observations	5556	55560	15520
Participants	1389	1389	388
R ²	0.007	0.005	0.019

Notes: Linear regressions on the amount kept when facing different groups (Column (1)), or on the amount allocated to individuals (Columns (2–3)) in the allocation task controlling for wave and its interaction with treatment and region. Column (3) restricts the sample to unequal givers, that is, those who do not allocate an equal amount to all 40 in the allocation task. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level and depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.16. Preferences for decision-making rules controlling for wave

	(1) Authoritarian= 1	(2) One-group points	(3) Dictator points
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.050 (0.045)	−0.000 (0.026)	−0.031 (0.028)
East	−0.057 (0.048)	0.056** (0.028)	−0.018 (0.030)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	0.122* (0.068)	−0.017 (0.040)	0.018 (0.042)
Wave=2	−0.020 (0.050)	0.016 (0.029)	0.006 (0.030)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS	0.064 (0.069)	−0.003 (0.040)	0.031 (0.042)
Wave=2 × East	0.050 (0.071)	−0.083** (0.041)	0.034 (0.043)
Wave=2 × MINORITY SUCCESS × East	−0.112 (0.096)	0.029 (0.056)	−0.030 (0.059)
Constant	0.755*** (0.032)	0.332*** (0.018)	0.245*** (0.019)
Observations	1389	1024	1024
R^2	0.003	0.009	0.006

Notes: Linear regressions controlling for wave and its interaction with treatment and region. Column (1) depicts a linear regression on whether a participant allocates positive points to authoritarian decision rules. Columns (2) and (3) depict linear regressions on the fraction of points allocated to the one-group and dictator rules, respectively, where the sample is restricted to those who assign positive points to either of the rules. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.17. Preferences for groups in the one-group rule controlling for wave

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Group:</i>	0	1	5	9	0 & 1
MINORITY SUCCESS	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.038 (0.046)	0.035 (0.040)	0.012 (0.031)	-1.445 (1.767)
East	-0.018 (0.016)	0.027 (0.055)	-0.073* (0.041)	0.100* (0.051)	-0.858 (1.896)
MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ East	0.017 (0.023)	0.054 (0.076)	0.025 (0.061)	-0.138** (0.061)	3.460 (2.679)
Wave=2	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.052)	0.067 (0.048)	0.025 (0.036)	-2.878 (1.952)
Wave=2 $\times$ MINORITY SUCCESS	0.025 (0.023)	0.042 (0.068)	-0.135** (0.062)	0.012 (0.051)	3.866 (2.693)
Wave=2 $\times$ East	0.057** (0.024)	0.027 (0.081)	-0.095 (0.068)	-0.121* (0.073)	6.587** (2.760)
Wave=2 $\times$ MINORITY SUCCESS $\times$ East	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.133 (0.105)	0.170* (0.088)	0.175* (0.090)	-10.178*** (3.775)
Constant	0.270*** (0.011)	-0.589*** (0.034)	-0.718*** (0.028)	-0.785*** (0.025)	54.734*** (1.246)
Observations	1389	1389	1389	1389	1389
(Pseudo) R^2	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.008


Notes: Columns (1) to (4) report fractional probit regressions of the fraction of points allocated to Group-0, Group-1, Group-5, and Group-9, respectively. Column (5) reports a linear regression of the total points allocated to groups with zero and one minority. All regressions include wave fixed effects and its interaction with treatment and region. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.18. Preferences for minority-majority status within the dictator rule controlling for wave

	(1) All
Minority	−0.785*** (0.154)
MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.116 (0.075)
Minority × MINORITY SUCCESS	0.308 (0.202)
East	0.058 (0.088)
MINORITY SUCCESS × East	0.099 (0.118)
East × Minority	−0.210 (0.231)
MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority × East	−0.194 (0.312)
Constant	2.799*** (0.057)
Wave=1	0.093 (0.081)
Wave=1 × MINORITY SUCCESS	−0.024 (0.112)
Wave=1 × East	0.045 (0.121)
Wave=1 × MINORITY SUCCESS × East	−0.115 (0.163)
Wave=1 × Minority	−0.229 (0.213)
Wave=1 × MINORITY SUCCESS × Minority	0.073 (0.295)
Wave=1 × East × Minority	−0.074 (0.317)
Wave=1 × MINORITY SUCCESS × East × Minority	0.189 (0.430)
Observations	54171
R^2	0.006


Notes: Linear regression of the points allocated to individuals under the dictator rule in BASELINE and MINORITY SUCCESS controlling for wave and its interactions with treatment and region. Allocated points are integer values ranging between 0 and 100, and a total of 100 points is allocated across 40 individuals. Since the sum of points is fixed, we exclude one individual, Suleyman, from the regression. The average points allocated to the excluded individual is very similar across the regions and treatments. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, and are depicted in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B Additional figures




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of how strong participants experienced the respective emotions while reading the articles.

Figure B.1. Emotions




Notes. The figure depicts average points allocated to each reference sample member per region and treatment in the dictator rule. Bars denote the 95 percent confidence intervals. Names are sorted in descending order according to BASELINE in East Germany.

Figure B.2. Points allocated to each name within the dictator rule per region and treatment




Notes. Each column depicts average euros allocated to minority and majority in the allocation decision in a region and treatment. Bars denote the 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure B.3. Allocation per Minority Status




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of the two subcomponents of the social dominance orientation measure, by region.

Figure B.4. Social Dominance Orientation




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of the left- and right-wing authoritarianism scales, by region.

Figure B.5. Left- and Right-Wing Authoritarianism




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of which traits participants deem more important in children.

Figure B.6. Authoritarianism Measure Based on Child-Rearing Values




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' agreement on who should make political decisions in Germany.

Figure B.7. Political Power




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' agreement on who should run large companies in Germany.

Figure B.8. Economic Power




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' agreement on who should be the beneficiary of political decisions in Germany.

Figure B.9. State Power




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' attitudes towards government support in Germany.

Figure B.10. Attitudes towards Government Support




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' attitudes towards income inequality and poverty in Germany.

Figure B.11. Attitudes towards income inequality and poverty




Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' attitudes towards immigration in Germany.

Figure B.12. Attitudes towards immigration



Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims in Germany.

Figure B.13. Attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims



Notes. The figure depicts the distribution of participants' beliefs about immigrants in Germany.

Figure B.14. Beliefs about immigrants

C Articles

Article 1

MINORITY SUCCESS . Ijad Madisch was born in Wolfsburg in 1980 as the son of Syrian immigrants. He studied at Hannover Medical School (MHH) and subsequently worked as a postdoctoral researcher in virology at Harvard Medical School. In 2008, he founded ResearchGate in Berlin and has served as the company's Chief Executive Officer ever since. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

BASELINE . Each year, the number of scientific publications increases. Most scientific papers are published in fee-based academic journals. ResearchGate was founded in Berlin in 2008. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Sören Hofmayer studied at Hannover Medical School (MHH) from 2002 to 2008 and subsequently worked at the Institute of Virology and the Department of Immunology and Rheumatology at MHH. In 2008, he founded ResearchGate in Berlin and has served as the company's Chief Strategy Officer ever since. ResearchGate is a globally used platform for the dissemination of scientific publications outside academic journals and currently has more than 20 million users. The company employs more than 300 people, most of whom are based in Berlin.

Question.

[all treatments] What is the primary purpose of ResearchGate?

- a) Anyone can use it to connect with friends.
- b) **Researchers use it to circulate their research articles.**
- c) Users discuss political views on the platform.

Article 2

MINORITY SUCCESS . Avni Yerli was born in 1970 in Giresun, Turkey, and has lived in Germany since 1974. In 1999, he founded the video game development company Crytek in Coburg. Crytek employs around 550 people and is one of the largest German companies in the video game industry. Its most successful games are Far Cry and the Crysis series.

BASELINE . The market for computer and video games in Germany is growing steadily. The video game development company Crytek is one of the largest German companies in the video game industry. The company was founded in 1999 in Coburg and employs around 550 people. Its most successful games are Far Cry and the Crysis series.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Thomas Hertzler was born in 1964 in Mülheim an der Ruhr. In 1988, he founded the video game development company Blue Byte in his hometown. Now a subsidiary of Ubisoft, the company employs more than 600 people across three development studios and is one of the largest German game developers. Its most successful games are Die Siedler, Anno, and Battle Isle.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Who is the founder of Crytek?

- a) Avni Yerli
- b) Ahmet Yenel
- c) Armin Herling

[BASELINE] What is Crytek?

- a) **A video game company.**
- b) A manufacturer of computer components.
- c) A manufacturer of electronic household appliances.

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Who is the founder of Blue Byte?

- a) **Thomas Hertzler**
- b) Theodor Herzog
- c) Timon Herzberger

Article 3

MINORITY SUCCESS . Metin Colpan was born in 1955 in Istanbul, Turkey. In 1961, he moved with his family to Darmstadt. He received his doctorate in organic chemistry and chemical engineering from the Technical University of Darmstadt in 1983. In 1984, he founded Qiagen. Since then, Qiagen has become one of the success stories of European biotechnology and is the first German company to be listed on the US Nasdaq stock exchange. Qiagen currently has a market capitalisation of 11 billion US dollars and is one of the world's leading companies in the development, manufacture, and marketing of chemical products for the isolation, purification, and manipulation of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and RNA (ribonucleic acid). The company employs approximately 6,200 people worldwide.

BASELINE . Biotechnology refers to the use of biological processes to solve problems and produce useful products. One of the best-known areas of biotechnology is the production of therapeutic proteins and other medicines using genetic engineering. Qiagen is one of the success stories of European biotechnology. Qiagen has been founded in 1984 and is the first German company to be listed on the US Nasdaq stock exchange. Qiagen currently has a market capitalisation of 11 billion US dollars and is one of the world's leading companies in the development, manufacture, and marketing of chemical products for the isolation, purification, and manipulation of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and RNA (ribonucleic acid). The company employs approximately 6,200 people worldwide.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Karsten Henco was born in 1952 in Hanover. He studied biochemistry at the universities of Hanover and Darmstadt and subsequently completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Institute of Molecular Biology at the University of Zurich. In 1984, he founded Qiagen. Since then, Qiagen has become one of the success stories of European biotechnology and is the first German company to be listed on the US Nasdaq stock exchange. Qiagen currently has a market capitalisation of 11 billion US dollars and is one of the world's leading companies in the development, manufacture, and marketing of chemical products for the isolation, purification, and manipulation of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and RNA (ribonucleic acid). The company employs approximately 6,200 people worldwide.

Question.

[all treatments] Which statement does not apply to Qiagen?

- a) It is the first German company traded on the Nasdaq.
- b) It is one of the largest biotechnology companies in Europe.
- c) **It produces Covid-19 vaccines.**

Article 4

MINORITY SUCCESS . Elmir Omerbegovic was born in 1979 in Mettmann as the son of Yugoslav parents. In 2005, he founded the hip-hop label Selfmade Records in Bochum. Selfmade Records subsequently became one of the most successful hip-hop labels in Europe. At the beginning of 2014, a joint venture with Universal Music was announced. Until its closure in 2022, the company had many well-known rap artists under contract, including Kollegah, Casper, Genetikk, the 257ers, Farid Bang, and Karate Andi. Selfmade Records released more than 40 albums, twelve of which reached number one in the charts, and two thirds of all artists were awarded gold or platinum.

BASELINE . Selfmade Records is one of the most successful hip-hop labels in Europe. The label was founded in Bochum in 2005 and subsequently became one of the most successful hip-hop labels in Europe. At the beginning of 2014, a joint

venture with Universal Music was announced. Until its closure in 2022, the company had many well-known rap artists under contract, including Kollegah, Casper, Genetikk, the 257ers, Farid Bang, and Karate Andi. Selfmade Records released more than 40 albums, twelve of which reached number one in the charts, and two thirds of all artists were awarded gold or platinum.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Andreas Läsker was born in 1963 in Ludwigsburg. In 1996, he founded the music label Four Music in Stuttgart. Four Music subsequently became one of the most successful labels in Europe. In 2005, what is now Sony Music Entertainment acquired shares in the label. To this day, the company has many well-known artists under contract, including Marteria, Casper, and Clueso. The label has released numerous albums, achieved a total of 19 number-one chart placements, and received more than 100 gold or platinum awards.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS & BASELINE] What type of music was released under the Selfmade Records label?

- a) Classical music
- b) **Rap**
- c) Jazz

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Which well-known artists are signed to the Four Music label?

- a) Prinz Pi, OK Kid
- b) **Marteria, Casper**
- c) Disarstar, Juse Ju

Article 5

MINORITY SUCCESS . Ivan Đikić was born in Yugoslavia in 1966. He studied medicine at the University of Zagreb. In 1997, he obtained a doctorate in molecular biology from the University of Zagreb and the New York University School of Medicine. He subsequently founded his own research group at the Ludwig Institute for Cancer Research in Uppsala, Sweden. Since 2002, he has been a professor at Goethe University Frankfurt. Đikić's research focuses on deciphering the molecular mechanisms of cellular signalling pathways that are of great importance for human diseases such as cancer, neurodegenerative disorders, and inflammation. He has received the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize, endowed with 2.5 million euros and the most important German research award, as well as the German Cancer Prize and—as the first European scientist—the AACR Prize of the American Association for Cancer Research.

BASELINE . Recent medical research focuses on deciphering the molecular mechanisms of cellular signalling pathways that are of great importance for human diseases such as cancer, neurodegenerative disorders, and inflammation. In recent years, among others, the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize, endowed with 2.5 million euros and the most important German research award, as well as the German Cancer Prize, have been awarded to researchers working in this field.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Robert Zeiser was born in 1975 in Freiburg im Breisgau. He studied medicine at the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg, Tel Aviv University, and the University of South Florida. After completing his specialist training in haematology and oncology, he undertook a postdoctoral research stay at Stanford University School of Medicine. Since 2013, he has been a Heisenberg Professor and, since 2019, has headed the Department of Tumour Immunology at Freiburg University Hospital. Zeiser's research focuses on reducing complications following stem cell transplantation, preventing leukaemia relapse, and the development of new cancer therapies. He has been awarded the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize, endowed with 2.5 million euros and the most important German research award, as well as the German Cancer Prize.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Where was Ivan Đikić born and what is he working on?

- a) **He was born in Yugoslavia and specializes in molecular cancer research.**
- b) He was born in Hungary and specializes in molecular signalling pathways in HIV.
- c) He was born in Yugoslavia and specializes in heart failure.

[BASELINE] With regard to the article, is the following statement true? "A newly emerging field of research aims to understand the cellular transmission mechanisms in cancer and neurodegenerative disorders."

- a) **True.**
- b) False.
- c) Cannot be inferred from the text.

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Where was Robert Zeiser born and what is he working on?

- a) **He was born in Freiburg im Breisgau and specializes in tumor immunology.**
- b) He was born in Biberach an der Riß and specializes in molecular signalling pathways in HIV.
- c) He was born in Rottenburg am Neckar and specializes in heart failure.

Article 6

MINORITY SUCCESS . Esin Rager was born in 1968 in Washington, D.C., in the United States, as the daughter of a Turkish father and a German mother. She has

lived in Turkey, Russia, and Austria before moving to Hamburg. After graduating from high school, she initially worked as a freelance journalist, media developer, and marketing consultant. In 2002, she founded Samova, a tea brand. Samova primarily supplies retail outlets and has more than 20,000 regular customers. Since 2021, Rager has also served as Vice President of FC St. Pauli.

BASELINE . The expected revenue in the German tea segment amounted to 0.77 billion euros in 2023, and the market is expected to grow annually. Fifty-five per cent of expenditure and five per cent of consumption volume in the tea segment are attributable to out-of-home consumption (for example, in bars and restaurants). Samova is a tea brand that was founded in 2002. Samova primarily supplies retail outlets and has more than 20,000 regular customers.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Emilie Wegner was born in Berlin in the 1990s and studied nutritional sciences at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. In 2019, she founded the start-up Hülsenreich, a producer of healthy legume-based snacks. The start-up won the state's Hugo Junkers Award in the category "Most Innovative Projects in the Food Industry". In recent years, Hülsenreich has achieved steadily increasing revenues and expanded its production facilities, and its products are now sold, among other places, in supermarkets and drugstores.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS & BASELINE] Which of the following statements is false?

- a) Samova sells its tea mainly to businesses.
- b) Samova was founded in 2002.
- c) **Samova was founded by Jan Holzapfel.**

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Which of the following statements is false?

- a) Hülsenreich produces healthy snacks based on legumes.
- b) Hülsenreich was founded in 2019.
- c) **Hülsenreich was founded by Elias Wagner.**

Article 7

MINORITY SUCCESS . Tarané Yuson was born in Iran. At the age of 15, she emigrated to Germany on her own, settling in Göttingen. After completing her studies in communication sciences in Hamburg, she began her career at Jil Sander, held management positions at Montblanc and BBDO, and in 1999 took over the managing directorship of the advertising agency Select NY. In 2013, she founded Yes Ideas in Hamburg, a successful advertising agency specialising in lifestyle branding, and has served as its Managing Director ever since.

BASELINE . In 2021, advertising expenditure in Germany amounted to approximately 36.06 billion euros. According to the German Advertising Federation (Zentralverband der deutschen Werbewirtschaft, ZAW), net advertising revenues for media companies totalled around 25.87 billion euros. Yes Ideas is a successful advertising agency that was founded in Hamburg in 2013 and specialises in lifestyle branding.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Kathrin de Buhr was born in Oldenburg. She completed vocational training as a media designer and began her career as a graphic designer in 1999. In 2010, she founded DESIGNSTUUV in Aurich, a successful advertising agency specialising in holistic brand marketing that has received multiple awards. De Buhr continues to serve as Managing Director of DESIGNSTUUV.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Who is the founder of Yes Ideas?

- a) Teresa Huson
- b) Yasmin Zuson
- c) **Tarané Yuson**

[BASELINE] What is Yes Ideas?

- a) A consulting firm.
- b) A market research company.
- c) **An advertising agency.**

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Who is the founder of DESIGNSTUUV?

- a) Karina de Bock
- b) Caroline de Buisson
- c) **Kathrin de Buhr**

Article 8

MINORITY SUCCESS . Dilek Gürsoy was born in 1976 in Neuss as the daughter of Turkish parents who immigrated in 1969. She studied medicine at the University of Düsseldorf. She subsequently worked as a assistant doctor, specialist physician, and senior physician. She was involved in the development of a novel artificial heart that operates without wires or external power sources. In 2012, she became the first female surgeon in Europe to implant an artificial heart. Since March 2019, she has been working as a specialist in surgery and as head of the LVAD programme in the Department of Cardiac Surgery at the Helios Clinic in Siegburg. In 2019, she was awarded the “Physician of the Year 2019” prize by the German Medical Association.

BASELINE . An artificial heart is implanted in patients with an incurable heart disease (for example, heart failure) when the patient's heart is no longer able to maintain adequate blood circulation throughout the body. In October 1990, the waiting period for a transplant was successfully bridged for the first time in Germany using an artificial heart in a child at the German Heart Centre Berlin (DHZB). Today, patients with artificial hearts can be supported for more than five years using mechanical circulatory support systems. In recent years, artificial heart implantation has become a standard procedure in cardiac surgery due to numerous technical improvements in pump design and surgical advances in implantation techniques.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Ulrike Herberg was born in 1963 in Herbede. She studied medicine at Ruhr University Bochum and worked, among other positions, as a junior doctor in paediatrics at Bonn University Hospital. The focus of her research and clinical work is paediatric cardiology. Since 2022, Herberg has been Director and Chair of the Department of Paediatric Cardiology at RWTH Aachen University Hospital. The department recently achieved a breakthrough by successfully treating the world's smallest known patient using a minimally invasive procedure via the neck vessels. Herberg is Vice President of the German Society for Paediatric Cardiology and Congenital Heart Defects.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Which of the following statements is false?

- a) Dilek Gürsoy was born in Germany to Turkish parents.
- b) Dilek Gürsoy is the first female surgeon in Europe to have transplanted an artificial heart.
- c) **Dilek Gürsoy currently works as a heart surgeon in New York.**

[BASELINE] Which of the following statements is false?

- a) The first successful artificial heart transplant in Germany took place in 1990.
- b) Nowadays, implanting an artificial heart is a standard procedure.
- c) **With an artificial heart, patients can lead a normal life without further heart problems.**

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Which of the following statements is false?

- a) Ulrike Herberg was born in Germany.
- b) Ulrike Herberg is the director of the Clinic for Pediatric Cardiology at RWTH Aachen University Hospital.
- c) **Ulrike Herberg currently works as a heart surgeon in New York.**

Article 9

MINORITY SUCCESS . Saliha Özcan was born in 1988 in Bruchsal as the daughter of Turkish parents. She studied teaching with a focus on home economics, German, English, and Islamic theology and subsequently worked as a primary school

teacher. In 2011, she founded her YouTube channel 'Sallys Tortenwelt' which has since been renamed 'Sallys Welt'. Today, 'Sallys Welt' has more than two million subscribers on YouTube and employs 145 people. The company generates annual revenues in the mid double-digit million-euro range and offers baking ingredients, household products, fashion items, and gardening accessories. The weekly podcast hosted by Sally and her husband is listened to by more than 100,000 subscribers.

BASELINE . In the German YouTube landscape, the three most popular channels each have around 20 million subscribers. These channels offer content related to children's games, educational materials on a wide range of topics, and experiments using various materials. Cooking channels are also highly popular, with the three leading channels each having approximately two million subscribers. Some of these cooking channels have expanded their activities into product development and merchandising.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Pamela Reif was born in 1996 in Karlsruhe. In 2013, she founded her YouTube channel, on which she publishes at-home fitness videos and which now has more than 10 million subscribers. In addition to her online activities, she is the author of several books on nutrition and fitness and markets healthy snacks and protein products under the brand name „Naturally Pam“, which are sold, among other places, in supermarkets and drugstores. The entrepreneur's net worth is currently estimated at approximately nine million euros.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Which of the following statements is true?

- a) Sallys Welt is a YouTube channel about gardening.
- b) Sallys Welt is a learning platform for high school students.
- c) **Saliha Özcan founded Sallys Tortenwelt in 2011.**

[BASELINE] Which of the following statements is true?

- a) The most popular YouTube channels in German have 2 million subscribers.
- b) Cooking channels on YouTube have more than 20 million subscribers.
- c) **Some YouTube cooking channels also sell their own products and merchandise.**

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Which of the following statements is true?

- a) Pamela Reif has a YouTube channel about gardening.
- b) Pamela Reif runs a learning platform for high school students.
- c) **Pamela Reif started her fitness channel on YouTube in 2013.**

Article 10

MINORITY SUCCESS . Enise Lauterbach (née Solak) was born in 1975 in Frankenthal as the daughter of Turkish parents. She completed her medical degree

at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz and specialised in the treatment of cardiac arrhythmias using catheter ablation. Until 2019, she served as Head of the Cardiology Department at the Centre for Outpatient Rehabilitation in Trier. Since March 2020, she has been leading the start-up company LEMOA medical GmbH & Co. KG, which develops software for digital health applications. Her goal is to further advance heart failure therapy through the use of artificial intelligence and to significantly improve prognosis in patients with heart failure. In 2020, Focus magazine named Lauterbach one of the 100 most influential women in Germany.

BASELINE . In medicine, artificial intelligence is increasingly used as a tool to support diagnosis. Algorithms can help improve prognostic assessments for diseases such as heart failure. One example is pulmonary hypertension, a form of heart failure in which it is particularly difficult for clinicians to predict which treatments individual patients will require. By training algorithms on data from thousands of patients, such prognoses are expected to improve significantly.

MAJORITY SUCCESS . Christine Lang was born in 1957 in Bochum. She studied and obtained her doctorate at Ruhr University Bochum and completed her habilitation in 1993 at the Technical University of Berlin in the field of microbiology and molecular genetics, in which she now holds the position of adjunct professor. In 2001, she founded the biotechnology company Organobalance, followed in 2010 by Organobalance Medical AG, which focus on the development of microbial active substances. One significant development by Organobalance Medical AG was the active ingredient Pylopass, designed to bind the pathogenic gastric bacterium *Helicobacter pylori*, which can cause inflammation, gastric ulcers, and cancer, and which represents an alternative to conventional antibiotic therapies.

Question.

[MINORITY SUCCESS] Who is Enise Lauterbach?

- a) **A cardiac surgeon who works on diagnosing heart failure using artificial intelligence.**
- b) A pharmacologist who develops drugs for heart failure.
- c) A geneticist who works on gene therapy for heart failure.

[BASELINE] Regarding the article, how does the use of artificial intelligence (AI) help in medicine?

- a) **By analyzing a large number of previous cases, AI helps predict medical conditions.**
- b) By using AI in medicine, doctors can completely replace diagnosis and rely entirely on algorithms.
- c) AI makes it possible to completely eliminate diseases such as heart failure without the need for further medical treatment.

[MAJORITY SUCCESS] Who is Christine Lang?

- a) **A microbiologist working on the development of microbial active substances.**
- b) A pharmacologist developing antibiotic therapies.
- c) A geneticist working on gene therapy to combat the pathogenic stomach bacterium *Helicobacter pylori*.

D Instructions

Screen 1–Welcome

Thank you for participating in our study. We are researchers from the University of Cologne. Our goal is to understand how information influences views. Regardless of your political views, by participating in this survey you are contributing to our societal knowledge. It is possible that you may not agree with the information presented, and that is perfectly fine.

Please note that for the success of our research it is very important that you **answer honestly and read the questions carefully** before answering. If you don't know an answer, please give your best estimate. To ensure the quality of the survey data, your answers will be subjected to statistical control methods to detect inconsistent or hasty responses.

Please complete the entire survey once you have started. This should take approximately 40 minutes on average.

Your participation is completely voluntary and you can withdraw from participation at any time without giving reasons. However, in order for us to use your data for research, it is necessary that you complete all parts of the study. To receive payment, you must complete the study in full.

You may receive additional payments in today's study, depending on your decisions and those of other participants.

In this study, all your decisions will remain anonymous. This means we will not link your answers to your person.

☐ I agree to the above conditions and would like to participate in the study.

Screen 2–Articles

First, we ask you to read 10 articles. Please read each article carefully. After each article, you will answer a question about its content. For each correct answer, you will receive 10 cents.

[For the articles, see [Appendix C](#)]

Screen 23–Groups

In the next two parts of this study, you will encounter four groups of 10 participants each. The composition of the groups remains the same throughout the study. Group members are identified by displaying their first names, which we collected previously. Group members were informed that their names would be displayed to future study participants. However, you will not learn the decisions of these group members during or after the study. This is common knowledge.

The following applies to the next two parts: At the end of the study, one study participant will be randomly selected, and their decision in one of the two parts will be implemented. With a 90% probability, the decisions in Part 1 and with a 10% probability, the decisions in Part 2 will determine the additional payments.

Screen 24–Overview of the four groups

[Visual overview of the groups is displayed here.]

Screen 25–Part 1

In this part, you make the same decision separately for each of the four groups. In each decision, you see the first names of the group members of the current group.

Your task is to distribute 330 euros among the 10 members of a group and yourself.

Payment. If you are randomly selected for a payment from Part 1 at the end of the study, your decision determines your payment as well as the payments of the group members for a randomly selected group.

Comprehension Question. Between whom do you have to divide 330 euros?

- Between myself and one other person.
- **Between myself and the 10 members of each group.**
- Between myself and all four groups at once.

Screen 26–29–Decision for group X

You must fill in every field and distribute exactly 330 euros in total.

[Allocation form]

You have currently distributed X euros and still need to distribute Y euros.

Screen 30–Part 2

In Part 2, you indicate how much you prefer different decision rules that determine how 1,200 euros are divided among the members of the four groups.

There are three decision rules. These decision rules differ in **who influences the payment of all participants**. For all decision rules, all members of the four groups decide how much of the 1,200 euros is allocated to each member of the four groups, including themselves. Just like you, all members of the four groups are informed of the first names of all members for the decision.

Decision Rule 1: All 40 members decide. All members of the four groups determine the payment for everyone. Each participant's payment will correspond to the average amount allocated to them **by all members of the four groups**.

Decision Rule 2: One group decides. All members of one group determine the payment for everyone. Each participant's payment will correspond to the average amount allocated to them **by the members of one group**.

Decision Rule 3: One participant decides. A single participant determines the payment for everyone. Each participant's payment will correspond to the amount allocated to them **by this participant**.

Payment. If you are randomly selected for a payment from Part 2 at the end of the study, your decision in this part determines the decision rule used to make payments to all members of the four groups. Your own payment will correspond to the payment of a randomly selected group member from the four groups.

Your Decisions. You will first indicate for Decision Rules 2 and 3 which groups or participants you prefer if the corresponding rule is selected. Then you indicate how much you prefer the three decision rules.

For this, you receive 100 points on each screen. You distribute these 100 points among the options presented to you (i.e., groups, participants, or rules). The more you prefer an option, the more points you should allocate to that option. If you want a particular option to never determine the payments, allocate 0 points to that option. If you prefer one option alone, allocate 100 points to that option. You must distribute all 100 points among the respective options.

Each point you allocate corresponds to a one-percent probability that the corresponding option will be selected.

Comprehension Question. Which of the following statements is not correct?

- You will distribute 100 points among the options (groups, participants, or rules).
- One point corresponds to a one-percent probability that an option will be selected.
- **If you are randomly selected for the payment, your earnings always correspond to the average income.**
- If you are randomly selected for the payment and Decision Rule 2 is chosen based on your point distribution, the group whose decisions determine the final payments will be selected based on your point distribution for the groups.
- At the end of the study, a participant will be randomly selected to receive an additional payment.

Screen 31–Decision Rule 2

As a reminder, Decision Rule 2 states that a single group determines everyone's payment. For Decision Rule 2, we now ask you to indicate which groups you prefer for this.

You must fill in every field and distribute exactly 100 points in total.

[preference elicitation]

You have currently distributed X points and still need to distribute Y points.

Screen 32–Decision Rule 3

As a reminder, Decision Rule 3 states that a single participant determines everyone's payment. For Decision Rule 3, we now ask you to indicate which participants you prefer for this.

You must fill in every field and distribute exactly 100 points in total.

[preference elicitation]

You have currently distributed X points and still need to distribute Y points.

Screen 33–Weighting of the three decision rules

Please now indicate how much you prefer the different decision rules that will determine everyone's payment.

[overview of the four groups & preference elicitation]

You have currently distributed X points and still need to distribute Y points.

Screen 34–Thank you

On the following pages, we would like to ask you to answer some more questions.

[For the questionnaire, see [Appendix E](#)]

Screen 55–Free comment

If you have any comments or suggestions about this study, you can enter them here.

Screen 56–Result Questions

You answered X questions about the articles correctly and will receive an additional payment of Y euros.

If you are randomly selected for the additional payment for your group decisions, you will receive the corresponding amount in the coming weeks.

The study is complete once you click "Continue."

E Questionnaire

Screen 35–Questions About Your Emotions

When you read the articles, how strongly did you experience the following emotions?

[7er Likert scale from „very strong“ to „not at all“]

- Anger
- Horror
- Sadness
- Serenity
- Disgust
- Joy
- Terror
- Rage
- Grief
- (Feeling of) nausea
- Apprehension
- Relaxation
- Nervousness
- Loneliness
- Fear
- Fury
- Satisfaction
- Revulsion
- (Feeling of) emptiness
- Panic
- Calmness
- Dread
- Recovery
- Repulsion
- Worry
- Enjoyment
- Annoyance
- Affection

Screen 36–Questions About Yourself

The first for questions were asked at the very beginning of the experiment in wave 2, in order to assign treatments based on living in West or East Germany.

Which gender do you identify with?

- Male
- Female
- Non-binary

How old are you?

In which federal state do you live?

- Baden-Württemberg
- Bavaria
- Berlin
- Brandenburg
- Bremen
- Hamburg
- Hesse
- Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
- Lower Saxony
- North Rhine-Westphalia
- Rhineland-Palatinate
- Saarland
- Saxony
- Saxony-Anhalt
- Schleswig-Holstein
- Thuringia

What is your highest level of education?

- No degree
- Hauptschulabschluss
- Realschulabschluss
- Fachabitur
- High school diploma
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Doctorate

- Other

What is your current employment status?

- Full-time
- Part-time
- Self-employed
- Unemployed and seeking work
- Student/Apprentice
- Currently not employed and not seeking work
- Retired

What was the monthly net income of your household in the last year? We mean the sum of wages, salary, income from self-employment, retirement benefits, pensions, public assistance income, rental income, housing allowance, child benefit, and other income after deducting taxes and social security contributions.

- <1100
- 1100-1500
- 1501-2000
- 2001-2600
- 2601-4000
- 4001-7500
- >7500

What is your marital status?

- Single
- Married
- Permanently separated or divorced
- In a registered civil partnership
- Widowed

How many children do you have?

- I have no children.
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 or more

Were you born in Germany?

- Yes
- No

If No: Where were you born?

[Complete list of countries]

Were both your parents born in Germany?

- Yes
- No

If No: Where was your father born?

[Complete list of countries]

If No: Where was your mother born?

[Complete list of countries]

Screen 37–Questions About Yourself

In politics, people talk about right and left. In general, how would you describe your own political position? Where on this scale would you classify yourself?

[Likert Scale from „1 Left“ to „10 Right“]

Which party would you vote for if there were a federal election next Sunday?

- CDU/CSU
- SPD
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- FDP
- Die Linke
- AfD
- BSW (only wave 2)
- Other

Did you vote in the last federal election?

- Yes
- No

If Yes: Welche Partei haben Sie gewählt?

- CDU/CSU
- SPD
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- FDP

- Die Linke
- AfD
- BSW (only wave 2)
- Other

To which religion do you feel affiliated?

- Christianity
- Islam
- Judaism
- Buddhism
- Hinduism
- Atheism or no religion
- Other faith
- I prefer not to answer.

How important is religion in your life?

[Likert Scale from 1 „unimportant“ to 10 „very important“]

Screen 38–Your opinion

How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

In Germany, important political decisions should...

- ... only be made by people of German origin.
- ... only be made by people of Western European origin, e.g., German, French, or British.
- ... only be made by people of European origin.
- ... only be made by people with a Christian faith.
- ... be made by people who were born in Germany, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.
- ... be made by people who have lived in Germany for a long time, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.

Screen 39–Your opinion

Think of large and important German companies such as Volkswagen, Bayer, or Siemens. How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

A large and important German company...

- ... should be run by people of German origin.

- ... should only be run by people of Western European origin, e.g., German, French, or British.
- ... should only be run by people of European origin.
- ... should only be run by people with a Christian faith.
- ... should be run by people who were born in Germany, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.
- ... can be run by anyone, regardless of their cultural, ethnic, and religious background.

Screen 40–Your opinion

Think about the different backgrounds people who nowadays live in Germany have. How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

In shaping policy, the government should...

- ... consider only or mainly the needs of those who have a German origin.
- ... consider only or mainly the needs of those who have a Western European, e.g., German, French, or British, origin.
- ... consider only or mainly the needs of those who have a European origin.
- ... consider only or mainly the needs of those with a Christian faith.
- ... consider only or mainly the needs of those who were born in Germany, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.
- ... consider the needs of all people who live in Germany, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.

Screen 41–Your assessment

There are a number of traits that people think children should have. However, to some people, some traits are more important than others. Here are some pairs of desirable traits. For each of these pairs, which of the two traits do you think is more important for a child to have?

Independence or respect for elders

- Independence
- Respect

Curiosity or good manners

- Curiosity
- Manners

Self-reliance or obedience

- Self-reliance
- Obedience

Being considerate or being well-mannered

- Considerate
- Well-mannered

Screen 42–Your opinion

How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

- Rich people should be forced to give up virtually all of their wealth.
- If I could remake society, I would put people who currently have the most privilege at the very bottom.
- Political violence can be constructive when it serves the cause of social justice.
- Deep down, just about all conservatives are racist, sexist, and homophobic.
- I cannot imagine myself becoming friends with a political conservative.
- I don't support shutting down speakers with sexist, homophobic, or racist views.
- It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government than to listen to the noisy rabblers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
- Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.
- The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
- What our country needs most is discipline and unity, which we should pursue by all means.
- What Germany needs now is a single strong party that embodies the nation as a whole.
- Please answer this question with <I completely agree> to show that you are completing the survey attentively.

Screen 43–Your opinion

How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

- An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
- Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

- No one group should dominate in society.
- Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
- Group equality should not be our primary goal.
- It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
- We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
- We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

Screen 44–Your opinion

In your opinion, income differences between rich and poor are:

- Not a problem at all
- An unimportant problem
- A problem
- A serious problem
- A very serious problem

Some people think that the government should not care about income differences between the rich and the poor. Others believe that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality. On a scale of 1 to 7, please rate your opinion on this issue, where 1 means that the government should not address income inequality, and 7 means that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality.

[7-point Likert Scale from „should not care“ to „do everything to reduce“]

Which of these two things has more to do with a person being poor?

- Lack of effort on that person's part.
- Circumstances beyond that person's control.

Screen 45–Your estimate

In the following questions, we use the term “immigrants” to refer to people who were not born in Germany and who moved here legally at some point in their lives.

The pie chart below shows all people currently living in Germany, including both those born in Germany and those not born in Germany. Of the people currently living in Germany, how many do you think were not born in Germany? Move the slider to indicate what you think the percentage is—out of every 100 people in Germany—of those who were not born in Germany.

[elicitation]

Screen 46–Your estimate

This pie chart shows the total number of legal immigrants currently living in Germany. Where do you think these immigrants come from?

The geographical categories include: Western Europe comprises the countries west of Switzerland, as well as Greece and Finland. Eastern Europe comprises the countries of the Balkans and the Baltic states, as well as Russia and Ukraine. The Caucasus countries include Georgia and Armenia. The Middle East includes, among others, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Israel. Asia includes, among others, Pakistan and Afghanistan. North Africa includes Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.

Please enter in the appropriate field how many of every 100 immigrants you think come from each region. (Note that your answers must total 100 for all regions combined.)

- USA and Canada
- Central and South America
- Western Europe (excluding Germany)
- Eastern Europe and Caucasus
- North Africa
- Rest of Africa
- Middle East
- Asia
- Australia/New Zealand

Screen 47–Your estimate

Think again about all the legal immigrants currently living in Germany. What do you think their religion is? Please enter in the appropriate field how many out of every 100 immigrants you believe practice each of these religions.

- Christianity
- Islam
- Judaism
- Buddhism
- Hinduism
- Atheism or no religion
- Other faith

Screen 48–Your estimate

Out of every 100 people born in Germany who are available to the labor market, how many are currently unemployed? Unemployed are people who are not currently working but are looking for work.

Let us now compare this with the number of unemployed among legal immigrants. For every 100 legal immigrants available to the labor market, how many do you think are currently unemployed?

Screen 49–Your opinion

Some people believe that the government should only support people of German origin. Others believe that the government should care equally about all people living in Germany, regardless of which country they come from and regardless of whether they are of German origin. On a scale of 1 to 7, please rate your opinion on this issue, where 1 means that the government should focus on supporting people of German origin, and 7 means that the government should care equally for all people living in Germany.

[7-point Likert Scale from „German origin“ to „all people“]

Screen 50–Your opinion

What is your opinion about the number of legal immigrants from abroad who are allowed to come to Germany to live? Choose the answer that best reflects your opinion.

- The excessive number of legal immigrants today is a very big problem. We should ask many of the legal immigrants to leave the country and we should stop accepting new immigrants.
- The number of legal immigrants nowadays is a big problem and we should greatly reduce the amount of allowed immigration in the future.
- The number of legal immigrants nowadays is sometimes a problem and we should try to reduce the number of those who are allowed to come a little bit.
- The number of legal immigrants nowadays is not a problem. We should let in the same number of immigrants every year as we have been doing.
- The number of legal immigrants today is not a problem at all. We should even let more legal immigrants to live in Germany and should increase the number of those allowed to come in each year.

Screen 51–Your opinion

How much do you agree with each statement?

[6-point Likert Scale from „I completely agree“ to „I completely disagree“]

- Foreigners only come here to take advantage of our welfare state.
- Muslims should be banned from immigrating to Germany.
- The many Muslims here sometimes make me feel like a stranger in my own country.

Screen 52–Your opinion

Assume that someone was not born in Germany but now lives here. At what point would you call this person a "German"?

- Immediately, right after arrival.
- After he has spent a long time in Germany.
- Depends on where he comes from.
- As soon as he obtains citizenship.
- I would never consider him "German," but if his children were born in Germany, I would consider them "German."
- I would never refer to him or his children as "German."

Screen 53–Your estimate

Which of these two things has more to do with a legal immigrant being poor?

- Lack of effort on his part.
- Circumstances beyond his control.

Imagine two people, Peter and Mehmet, both currently living in Germany with their families. Peter was born in Germany, whereas Mehmet immigrated to Germany legally 30 years ago. Both are 35 years old, have 3 children, and earn the same low income from their jobs. In your opinion, does Mehmet pay more, the same, or less income tax than Peter?

[5-point Likert Scale from „much more“ to „much less“]

In your opinion, does Mehmet, who is an immigrant, receive more, the same, or less in government transfer payments (for example, welfare, child support, unemployment benefits, or housing benefits) than Peter?

[5-point Likert Scale from „much more“ to „much less“]

Screen 54–Your friendships

Do you have friends or acquaintances who were born outside Germany?

- Yes
- No

If Yes: Where do these friends or acquaintances come from? Please mark all categories that apply.

[Yes/No for the following categories]

- USA and Canada
- Central and South America
- Western Europe (excluding Germany)

- Eastern Europe and Caucasus
- North Africa
- Rest of Africa
- Middle East
- Asia
- Australia/New Zealand