

Afrikanistik-Aegyptologie-Online

Rebellen und Mujaheddin - Materialien

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Zusammenfassung

Zahlreiche Materialien sind in den verschiedenen Ausgaben von Wikipedia (deutsch, französisch, englisch) verarbeitet oder als weiterführende ‚links‘ aufgeführt. Die hier abgedruckten Materialien enthalten Veröffentlichungen der UNO und einen Artikel über die Bedrohung des schwarzen Islam durch die radikalen islamistischen Gruppen.

1. Uno-Dokumente zu Ansar Eddine und Iyad ag Ghali

1.1. QE.A.135.13. ANSAR EDDINE [1]

<1> *Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:* 20 March 2013

Ansar Eddine was listed on 20 March 2013 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2083 (2012) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to”, and “recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of” the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.).

<2> *Additional information:*

Ansar Eddine (“*defenders of the faith*”) was founded in December 2011 by Iyad ag Ghali (QI.A.316.13.). Ansar Eddine is linked to the Organization of ‘Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM) (QE.T.14.01.).

In October 2011, AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel (QI.D.232.07.), wanted to use an organization to expand the agenda of his terrorist organization into the Sahel and increase its territorial control over northern Mali.

AQIM wanted to create an ostensibly independent movement that would hide its true roots by abandoning the name ‘Al-Qaida’. AQIM suggested that the new group be led by Iyad ag Ghali.

<3> Since its establishment, Ansar Eddine and its leader, Iyad ag Ghali, have enjoyed AQIM’s continual support:

- Military support: from the battle at Aguelhok on 24 January 2012 to the offensive in early January 2013 against southern Mali, Ansar Eddine received backing from AQIM in its fight

against the Malian Armed Forces, notably in the capture of the towns of Aguelhok on 24 January 2012; Tessalit on 10 March 2012; Kidal on 30 March 2012; Gao on 30 March 2012; and Timbuktu on 1 April 2012.

- Financial support: Iyad ag Ghali received a payment of 400,000 euros from one of the leaders of an AQIM brigade in the Sahel, the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.
- Logistical support: originally comprising some 50 men close to Iyad ag Ghali, Ansar Eddine has welcomed numerous AQIM fighters.

The ties between Ansar Eddine and AQIM have grown stronger since November 2012.

<4>

- November 2012: offices were established north of Gao by a mission combining Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.), and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.).
- November 2012: an alliance was concluded between Ansar Eddine, MUJAO and AQIM and a common strategy was defined.
- 25 November 2012: Iyad ag Ghali expressed his support for AQIM's ideology.

Since the start of Operation Serval, Iyad ag Ghali has aligned himself with AQIM and MUJAO brigades that are fighting the French and Malian armed forces.

1.2. QI.A.316.13. IYAD AG GHALI [2]

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 25.02.2013

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Iyad ag Ghali was listed on 25 February 2013 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2083 (2012) as being associated with Al-Qaida for "*participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of*", "*supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to*", and "*recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of*" the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QE.T.14.01.) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.).

<6>

Additional information:

Iyad ag Ghali served as an intermediary, in 1999 and again in 2003, in the release of Western hostages held by the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), listed as the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QE.T.14.01.), and has since then maintained close ties with AQIM leaders.

Iyad ag Ghali is now the leader of Ansar Eddine (QE.A.135.13) ("defenders of the faith"), which he established in December 2011. This individual and this entity are both linked to AQIM.

Since its establishment, Ansar Eddine and its leader, Iyad ag Ghali, have enjoyed AQIM's continual support:

- Financial support: Iyad ag Ghali received a payment of 400,000 euros from one of the leaders of an AQIM brigade in the Sahel, the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.
- Logistical support: originally comprising some 50 men close to Iyad ag Ghali, Ansar Eddine has welcomed numerous AQIM fighters.

The ties between Ansar Eddine and AQIM have grown stronger since November 2012:

- November 2012: offices were established north of Gao by a mission combining Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.), and the

Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.).

- November 2012: an alliance was concluded between Ansar Eddine, MUJAO and AQIM and a common strategy was defined.

<7> Iyad ag Ghali has explicitly and publicly stated his support for the ideology championed by AQIM, stressing that his views perfectly match those of the Algerian terrorist organization.

Since the start of Operation Serval in January 2013, Iyad ag Ghali has aligned himself with brigades of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.) that are fighting the French and Malian armed forces. Iyad ag Ghali has received backing from AQIM in Ansar Eddine's fight against the Malian Armed Forces, notably in the capture of the towns of Aguelhok on 24 January 2012, Tessalit on 10 March 2012, Kidal on 30 March 2012, Gao on 30 March 2012, and Timbuktu on 1 April 2012.

2. Uno-Dokumente zu AQMI

2.1. QE.T.14.01. THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

<8> *Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:* 28 March 2011

Dates on which the narrative summary was updated: 7 November 2013; 27 November 2013; 16 December 2013; 27 December 2013

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb was originally listed under the name of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat on 6 October 2001 pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden or the Taliban for "*participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of*" Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01.).

<9> *Additional information:*

The Organization of 'Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb' (AQIM) was created in Algeria in 1998 by Hassan Hattab as the 'Salafist Group for Call and Combat' (GSPC). GSPC was a splinter entity of the 'Armed Islamic Group' (QE.A.6.01.), which was the largest and most extreme terrorist group in Algeria at the time. GSPC was renamed AQIM in January 2007 following the group's union with 'Al-Qaida' (QE.A.4.01.), which was announced by Al-Qaida leader Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QI.A.6.01.) on 11 September 2006.

AQIM has conducted numerous attacks against Algerian security and law enforcement bodies and facilities in connection with its stated objective of overthrowing the Algerian Government and establishing an Islamic caliphate. Following its formal alliance with Al-Qaida, AQIM expanded its aims and declared its intention to attack Western targets. In late 2006 and early 2007, it conducted several attacks against convoys of foreign nationals in Algeria. In December 2007, AQIM attacked the United Nations office in Algiers, killing 17, at the same time as it attacked the Algerian Constitutional Council.

GSPC, and then as AQIM, has abducted numerous foreigners for ransom, starting in February 2003 with 32 tourists in the south of Algeria, then others in Tunisia, Niger, Mali and Mauritania.

<10> AQIM's leader is Abdelmalek Droukdel (QI.D.232.07.). The group operates primarily in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria, northern Mali, eastern Mauritania and western Niger. Its sources of funding include financial support from cells in Europe,

extortion and kidnapping.

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.) is a splinter group of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

In October 2011, AQIM's leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel (QI.D.232.07.), wanted cover to expand the agenda of his terrorist organization into the Sahel and increase its territorial control over northern Mali.

<11> AQIM wanted to create an ostensibly independent movement that would hide its true roots by abandoning the name "Al-Qaida". AQIM suggested that the new group be led by Iyad ag Ghali (QI.A.316.13). Since its establishment, Ansar Eddine (QE.A.135.13) and its leader, Iyad ag Ghali, have enjoyed AQIM's continual support:

- Military support: from the battle at Aguelhok on 24 January 2012 to the offensive in early January 2013 against southern Mali, Ansar Eddine received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Malian Armed Forces, notably in the capture of the towns of Aguelhok on 24 January 2012; Tessalit on 10 March 2012; Kidal on 30 March 2012; Gao on 30 March 2012; and Timbuktu on 1 April 2012.
- Financial support: Iyad ag Ghali received a payment of 400,000 euros from one of the leaders of an AQIM brigade in the Sahel, the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.
- Logistical support: originally comprising some 50 men close to Iyad ag Ghali, Ansar Eddine has welcomed numerous AQIM fighters.

<12> The ties between Ansar Eddine and AQIM have grown stronger since November 2012.

- November 2012: offices were established north of Gao by a mission combining Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (QE.M.134.12.), and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.).
- November 2012: an alliance was concluded between Ansar Eddine, MUJAO and AQIM and a common strategy was defined.
- 25 November 2012: Iyad ag Ghali expressed his support for AQIM's ideology.

Since the start of Operation Serval, Iyad ag Ghali has aligned himself with AQIM and MUJAO brigades that are fighting the French and Malian armed forces.

Es folgt eine lange Liste mit Namen von Individuen und Organisationen, die vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen mit AQIM in Verbindung gebracht werden.

3. Uno-Dokumente zu MUJAO

3.1. QE.M.134.12. MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJAO)

<13> *Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:* 5 December 2012

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 27 November 2013

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was listed on 5 December 2012 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 12 of resolution 1989 (2011) as being associated with the Organization of Al-

Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.) for participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of that entity.

<14> *Additional information:*

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is a splinter group of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.), which formally announced its existence following the abduction of three humanitarian workers from a Saharan refugee camp in Tindouf on 23 October 2011. This was MUJAO's first attack.

MUJAO co-exists and works together with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb from which its operational capabilities derive. MUJAO operates in the same geographical area in the Sahel and shares objectives of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. It grew considerably in its first twelve months of operation.

MUJAO is the result of internal struggles within Katibat al Moulathamoune, a part of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QI.B.136.03.). The causes of those struggles were linked to the leadership of the group, the distribution of ransoms paid for hostages and the sharing of profits from drug trafficking.

MUJAO's leaders are known to be drug traffickers involved in the drugs trade in the Sahel and southern Algeria.

<15> MUJAO has claimed responsibility for the following operations:

- The abduction of three humanitarian workers from a Saharan refugee camp in the region of Tindouf, Algeria, on 23 October 2011.
- The abduction of seven Algerian diplomats, including the Consul, in Gao, Mali, on 5 April 2012.
- The attack on the Gendarmerie Nationale base in Tamanrasset, Algeria, on 23 March 2012.
- The attack on the Gendarmerie Nationale base in Ouargla, Algeria, on 29 June 2012.

<16> Taking advantage of the uprising of rebel movements in northern Mali in early 2012, MUJAO has seized the towns of Gao and Bourem and taken supplies of weapons from Malian arsenals. It is thus heavily armed with, for example, heavy machine guns (14.5 and 23 mm), anti-tank grenade launchers (RPG-7), mortars (60 and 82 mm), conventional (TNT) and home-made explosives, night-vision binoculars and means of communication (mobile and satellite telephones, and VHF radios).

In November 2012, an alliance was concluded between MUJAO, Ansar Eddine (QE.A.135.13.) and AQIM (QE.T.14.01.). A common strategy was defined and offices were established north of Gao by a mission combining MUJAO, Ansar Eddine, and the AQIM.

Since the start of Operation Serval, Iyad ag Ghali (QI.A.316.13.) has aligned himself with AQIM and MUJAO brigades that are fighting the French and Malian armed forces.

<17> *Related listed individuals and entities:*

Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01.), listed on 6 October 2001:

- Ansar Eddine (QE.A.135.13.) listed on 20 March 2013
- Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QI.B.136.03.), listed on 11 November 2003
- Amor Mohamed Ghedeir (QI.H.250.08.), listed on 3 July 2008
- Iyad ag Ghali (QI.A.316.13.) listed on 25 February 2013

- Mohamed Lahbous (QI.L.319.13.) listed on 24 October 2013

4. Die Bedrohung des “schwarzen Islam” [3]

Ousman Blondin DIOP

Le fondamentalisme avance en Afrique, au sud du Sahara

<18> ...
Bref, en atteignant le nord du Mali, dans un Sahel frappé par la sécheresse et une sévère crise alimentaire, les groupes armés islamistes sont désormais la principale menace de déstabilisation de la région. Si l'urgence reste bien de rétablir durablement l'Etat du Mali dans son intégrité territoriale, il faut également reconnaître qu'une autre menace se profile à l'horizon, celle qui pèse sur l'islam noir.

Historiquement, l'islamisation de l'Afrique noire s'est construite sur la rencontre entre des sociétés aux traditions sociales et spirituelles indigènes avec des valeurs nouvelles, différentes et d'origine arabo-berbère, véhiculées par le commerce caravanier, mais qui parviendront à un syncrétisme religieux tout à fait original. Ces sociétés préislamiques sont caractérisées par une conception de l'univers, la " weltanschauung ", fondée sur l'animisme, la force et la présence des esprits, la possibilité d'un dialogue avec les morts, d'où le culte des ancêtres, et la capacité d'agir sur les événements grâce aux pouvoirs supposés " surnaturels " détenus par certains membres de la communauté (chamans ou marabouts). Mis ensemble, tous ces éléments seront incorporés dans l'acceptation de la soumission à l'islam dont la foi est simple, claire et solide.

Cette africanisation de l'islam favorise l'expansion de cette religion entre 680 et 1840 (arrivée des premiers Portugais) pour en faire un instrument de résistance face au christianisme, religion des envahisseurs étrangers véhiculée par les administrateurs coloniaux et les missionnaires.

<19> Ainsi, si l'islam a pu épouser les valeurs et pratiques antéislamiques des sociétés spirituelles traditionnelles des Africains, cela tient précisément à sa souplesse d'adaptation qui n'entraînait pas de rupture avec la coutume. Tolérance de la polygamie, maintien de l'esclavage, des rites funéraires locaux, les lignages matrilineaires et des croyances non systématiques, y compris les fétiches.

S'y ajoutent le sentiment coreligionnaire qui rejoint l'esprit communautaire africain et surtout la propagation par des Africains eux-mêmes qui contribua à ôter à l'islam son caractère étranger.

Si l'islam s'est imposé sans mal, c'est parce qu'il apportait une plus-value au corps social endogène, par empilement et non par substitution. Aujourd'hui encore en Afrique, on voit même des marabouts se consacrer autant à la prière qu'à certaines pratiques animistes. De même, en Afrique du Nord, les confréries religieuses noires continuent de se livrer à des danses de possession tout en portant des vêtements musulmans. Aussi substrat et emprunt sont-ils difficiles à distinguer tant la symbiose entre animisme et islam a enraciné l'un dans l'autre.

<20> La crise du nord du Mali met certes en lumière la revendication touareg, une communauté portée par le sentiment d'être des citoyens maliens de seconde classe. Sans être à proprement parler des Arabes, les Touareg sont des produits du fait colonial qui a confiné ces anciens seigneurs du désert dans des frontières ressenties comme limitatives de leur nomadisme. Il n'y a pas d'évidence que les Touareg soient soudainement devenus des partisans fanatiques d'un islam politique radical.

En revanche, ils ont toujours revendiqué plus de liberté et une autonomie accrue. Il appartient à la Communauté économique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cédéao) et au Mali de trouver des réponses adéquates à cette vieille revendication.

Reste la réponse au fondamentalisme musulman et au projet d'instauration de la charia par le

mouvement Ansar Eddine. Face au risque de disparition ou de renoncement à leur identité, les leaders d'opinion et intellectuels africains du Sahel doivent d'urgence revendiquer leur attachement à leur islam au nom de l'unité du corps social africain. La mondialisation des conflits et la faiblesse institutionnelle de nombreux pays africains devraient inciter, pour leur part, les leaders politiques négro-africains et ceux du monde arabo-berbère à s'atteler à créer un cadre nouveau de débat et de dialogue qui va au-delà de la sempiternelle distribution de pétrodollars pour se pencher sur leurs urgences sociétales et civilisationnelles.

- <21> Les élites des deux parties doivent ensemble ouvrir le débat de l'islam sur sa propre diversité et reconnaître, enfin, l'exception religieuse négro-africaine au même titre qu'il existe un islam turc, irano-indien, malaisien, pakistanais, etc. Car le projet de charia engage dans son sillage des règles juridiques importées d'une autre ère de l'islam, d'une autre culture, ainsi que des valeurs, un modèle de société et de développement.

A cet égard, il y a lieu, de la part des pays arabes qui accordent des libéralités importantes aux institutions religieuses d'Afrique de reconsidérer leur générosité dès l'instant où elle est détournée de son objet.

- <22> Enfin, l'Afrique subsaharienne ne doit pas se laisser divertir de ses propres urgences de développement face aux défis contemporains, au moment où elle entre dans sa propre période d'invention de sa place dans le monde. Face aux risques de division entre coreligionnaires musulmans, elle doit, au contraire, renouveler la prophétie de Mahomet - le fatum mahometum - et reprendre à son compte l'engagement initial de l'islam par un code social nouveau qui prône l'égalité entre tous les êtres humains, protège l'honneur des femmes, met fin à toute forme d'esclavage, en vue de développer des postures dynamiques inclusives inspirées des principes de base de l'islam.

Oui, l'Afrique des " Lumières " doit savoir dire non à un islam qui se poserait comme un frein à l'épanouissement des libertés et serait facteur de choc des cultures.

Ousman Blondin Diop

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UN 2011a

UN. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al Qaida and associated individuals and entities. QE.A.135. Ansar Eddine.

UN 2011b

UN. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al Qaida and associated individuals and entities. QI. A. 31613. Iyad Ag Ghali.

UN 2011c

UN. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. QE.T.14.01. Al-Qaida.

UN 2011d

UN. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. QE.M.134.12. MUJAO

[1] Security Council Committee: Ansar Eddine.

[2] Security Council Committee: Iyad Ag Ghali.

[3] Ousman Blondin Diop. 2012. – Konzept und Inhalt des « schwarzen Islam » werden kritisch analysiert in: Forum: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: *Journal of African History* 55, 1, 2014, 1-36.

Lizenz

Empfohlene Zitierweise

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Volltext

Kommentare

Es liegen noch keine Kommentare vor.

Möchten Sie Stellung zu diesem Artikel nehmen oder haben Sie Ergänzungen?

Kommentar einreichen.