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FÜNFUNDZWANZIGSTER JAHRESBERICHT GEMÄSS ARTIKEL 8 ABSATZ 2 DES GEMEINSAMEN STANDPUNKTS 2008/944/GASP DES RATES BETREFFEND GEMEINSAME REGELN FÜR DIE KONTROLLE DER AUSFUHR VON MILITÄRTECHNOLOGIE UND MILITÄRGÜTERN

(C/2024/678)

EINFÜHRUNG

Gegenstand dieses Berichts sind Daten aus dem Jahr 2022 über i) von den Mitgliedstaaten der EU erteilte und verweigerte Ausfuhrgenehmigungen für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter und ii) die Ausfuhren dieser Güter aus EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Außerdem hat der Bericht die im Zusammenhang mit der Umsetzung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts 2008/944/GASP ⁽¹⁾, ⁽²⁾ durchgeführten Maßnahmen zum Gegenstand und enthält nicht erschöpfende Informationen über Verbringungen von Verteidigungsgütern innerhalb der Union, die unter die Richtlinie 2009/43/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates ⁽³⁾ fallen.

Der Bericht wurde vom Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) auf der Grundlage von Daten erstellt, die die Mitgliedstaaten bereitgestellt haben. Die Untergruppe „Ausfuhr konventioneller Rüstungsgüter“ (im Folgenden „COARM“) der Ratsgruppe „Nichtverbreitung und Ausfuhr von Rüstungsgütern“ unterstützt einen ständigen Dialog zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten über die kohärente Anwendung der gemeinsamen Regeln für die Rüstungsexportkontrolle.

Folgende Drittländer haben sich den im Gemeinsamen Standpunkt 2008/944/GASP verankerten Kriterien und Grundsätzen offiziell angeschlossen: Albanien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, Georgien, Island, Kanada, Montenegro, Nordmazedonien und Norwegen. Seit 2012 besteht ein System für den Austausch von Informationen zwischen der EU und Norwegen.

Zusätzlich zu diesem Bericht können Daten über die Ausfuhren von Rüstungsgütern aus den Mitgliedstaaten der EU auch online abgerufen werden ⁽⁴⁾. Das Online-System enthält Angaben zu Wert, Bestimmungsland und Art der Waffenausfuhrgenehmigungen aller Mitgliedstaaten der EU sowie zu den tatsächlichen Ausfuhren aus den Mitgliedstaaten der EU, die solche Daten melden. Das System bietet verschiedene graphische Darstellungen und Tools, die es denjenigen, die sich für den Wert der europäischen Waffenausfuhren, für die ausgeführten Rüstungsgüter und deren Bestimmungsländer interessieren, ermöglichen, eine breite Palette analytischer Zusammenstellungen zu erstellen. Zwar ermöglicht das Online-System es den Nutzern, Daten auf benutzerfreundlichere Weise abzufragen, der im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union veröffentlichte Bericht bleibt jedoch die Hauptinformationsquelle.

I. UMSETZUNG DES GEMEINSAMEN STANDPUNKTS 2008/944/GASP (im Folgenden „Gemeinsamer Standpunkt“)

1. Treffen im Rahmen des politischen Dialogs

Im Jahr 2022 führte der EAD im Rahmen des politischen Dialogs Treffen zu Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Rüstungsexportkontrolle mit Norwegen und den Vereinigten Staaten durch. Die Treffen im Rahmen des politischen Dialogs waren eine Plattform für konstruktive Gespräche über Themen von gemeinsamem Interesse, beispielsweise über die Ausfuhrpolitik gegenüber bestimmten Bestimmungsländern, Einhaltung- und Überwachungsfragen und den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel. Darüber hinaus nahmen auch die Vereinigten Staaten an einer Sitzung der Gruppe COARM teil, um mit den Mitgliedstaaten der EU Fragen der Waffenausfuhrkontrolle zu erörtern.

2. Dialog mit den Akteuren: Europäisches Parlament, Zivilgesellschaft und Wirtschaft

Der EAD beantwortete parlamentarische Anfragen von Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments zur Ausfuhr von Rüstungsgütern und nahm an Veranstaltungen des Europäischen Parlaments im Zusammenhang mit europäischen Ausfuhren von Rüstungsgütern teil ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Für die Mitgliedstaaten der EU rechtsverbindlich.

⁽²⁾ Gemeinsamer Standpunkt 2008/944/GASP des Rates vom 8. Dezember 2008 betreffend gemeinsame Regeln für die Kontrolle der Ausfuhr von Militärtechnologie und Militärgütern (ABl. L 335 vom 13.12.2008, S. 99), geändert durch den Beschluss (GASP) 2019/1560 des Rates vom 16. September 2019 (ABl. L 239 vom 17.9.2019, S. 16).

⁽³⁾ Richtlinie 2009/43/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 6. Mai 2009 zur Vereinfachung der Bedingungen für die innergemeinschaftliche Verbringung von Verteidigungsgütern (ABl. L 146 vom 10.6.2009, S. 1).

⁽⁴⁾ <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/easgap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/74299ecd-7a90-4b89-a509-92c9b96b86ba/state/analysis>

⁽⁵⁾ Ein Beispiel für eine solche Veranstaltung war die öffentliche Anhörung zu dem Thema „Der Krieg in der Ukraine: Auswirkungen auf die Waffenausfuhrpolitik auf EU-Ebene“, die vom Unterausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung (SEDE) am 29. November 2022 durchgeführt wurde. Aufzeichnung abrufbar unter: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/de/webstreaming/subcommittee-on-security-and-defence_20221129-1500-COMMITTEE-SEDE.

Wie bereits in der Vergangenheit wurden regelmäßig Sitzungen der Gruppe COARM durchgeführt, an denen externe Einrichtungen teilnahmen, darunter Büros der Vereinten Nationen (UNODC), Nichtregierungsorganisationen (wie ICRC oder Saferworld) und Unternehmen (Conflict Armament Research).

Das COARM-NRO-Forum fand am 16. Juni 2022 statt; die Organisation wurde von Saferworld übernommen, die das Forum gemeinsam mit dem EAD ausrichtete. Die Gruppe COARM lud auch Vertreter der europäischen Verteidigungsindustrie zu ihren Sitzungen ein und führte Aussprachen, an denen Denkfabriken, die sich mit Themen im Zusammenhang mit dem Handel mit Rüstungsgütern befassen (EU-Konsortium für Nichtverbreitung und Abrüstung) teilnahmen.

3. Werbungs- und Unterstützungsmaßnahmen („Outreach“)

Nach Artikel 11 des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts setzen sich die Mitgliedstaaten „nach Kräften dafür ein, andere Militärtechnologie und Militärgüter exportierende Staaten zu ermutigen, die Grundsätze des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts anzuwenden.“ Die Förderung wirksamer nationaler Rüstungsexportkontrollen sowie der Grundsätze und Kriterien des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts in ausgewählten Drittländern erfolgte durch die Durchführung des Beschlusses (GASP) 2020/1464 des Rates ⁽⁶⁾, (geändert durch den Beschluss (GASP) 2022/848 des Rates ⁽⁷⁾); der Beschluss wurde durch das deutsche Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (im Folgenden „BAFA“) durchgeführt.

Die Werbungs- und Unterstützungsmaßnahmen der EU, die sich an Drittländer richten, waren weiterhin auf die Universalisierung und die Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel ausgerichtet; sie umfassten vom BAFA und von Expertise France im Rahmen des Beschlusses (GASP) 2021/2309 des Rates ⁽⁸⁾ sowie vom Sekretariat des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel im Rahmen des Beschlusses (GASP) 2021/649 des Rates ⁽⁹⁾ durchgeführte Maßnahmen. Nähere Einzelheiten sind nachstehend und in Anhang D zu finden.

4. Überprüfung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts 2008/944/GASP (im Folgenden „Gemeinsamer Standpunkt“)

Im Jahr 2022 setzte die Gruppe COARM ihre Arbeit zur Umsetzung der Zielvorgaben gemäß den Schlussfolgerungen des Rates ⁽¹⁰⁾ von 2019 zur Überprüfung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts fort. Im Frühjahr 2022 nahm der EAD eine interne Datenbank in Betrieb, die länderbezogene Seiten mit einschlägigen Informationen aus frei zugänglichen Quellen über mögliche Bestimmungsorte europäischer militärischer Ausrüstung enthält.

Auf diese Datenbank können lediglich die für die Erteilung von Ausfuhrgenehmigungen zuständigen Beamten aus den Mitgliedstaaten der EU und der EAD zugreifen. Die Datenbank soll zu größerer Konvergenz bei der Anwendung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts durch die Mitgliedstaaten beitragen. Im Herbst 2022 verständigten sich die Mitgliedstaaten auf ein internes Papier über bewährte Verfahren, das Einzelpunkte für die Entwicklung eines nationalen Systems für die Berichterstattung über tatsächliche Ausfuhren enthält.

In Nummer 14 der Schlussfolgerungen beauftragt der Rat die Gruppe COARM, die Durchführung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts in fünf Jahren (2024) erneut zu bewerten. Das Überprüfungsverfahren wurde 2022 damit begonnen, dass drei Schwerpunktgruppen eingesetzt wurden, die sich aus Vertretern der Mitgliedstaaten zusammensetzen. Die Mitarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten in diesen Gruppen war freiwillig. Die Gruppen befassten sich mit den Themen i) gemeinsam hergestellte militärische Ausrüstung, ii) weitere Harmonisierung und iii) Durchsetzung. Die Überprüfung soll im Herbst 2024 abgeschlossen werden.

5. Verweigerungsmitteilungen und Konsultationen

Im Gemeinsamen Standpunkt ist vorgesehen, dass im Falle einer Genehmigungsverweigerung eine Mitteilung erfolgt. Außerdem ist darin für den Fall, dass ein Mitgliedstaat einen Genehmigungsantrag prüft, der eine von einem anderen Mitgliedstaat zuvor nicht genehmigte im Wesentlichen gleichartige Transaktion betrifft, ein Konsultationsverfahren vorgesehen. Diese Konsultation erfolgt über das COARM-Online-System. Es hat sich bereits erwiesen, dass die Transparenz zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten in Bezug auf konkrete Endbestimmungsländer und Endverwender durch dieses System gefördert wird.

Die Zahl der Verweigerungsmitteilungen — aufgeschlüsselt nach Bestimmungsland und Kategorie der Militärgüterliste — ist in Zeile d der Tabellen in Anhang A.I angegeben. Die Zahl der Konsultationsersuchen, die von den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten ausgegangen sind bzw. an sie gerichtet wurden, sowie die Zahl der Konsultationen nach Bestimmungsland sind in den Anhängen B.I bzw. B.II wiedergegeben. Verteidigungsunternehmen in den Mitgliedstaaten sind sich im Allgemeinen der Beschränkungen der Rüstungsexportpolitik bewusst und werden in der Regel davon absehen, eine Genehmigung zu beantragen, wenn sie wissen, dass diese wahrscheinlich verweigert wird.

⁽⁶⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2020/1464 des Rates vom 12. Oktober 2020 über die Förderung wirksamer Waffenausfuhrkontrollen (ABl. L 335 vom 13.10.2020, S. 3).

⁽⁷⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2022/848 des Rates vom 30. Mai 2022 zur Änderung des Beschlusses (GASP) 2020/1464 über die Förderung wirksamer Waffenausfuhrkontrollen (ABl. L 148 vom 31.5.2022, S. 50).

⁽⁸⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2021/2309 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2021 über Outreach-Maßnahmen der Union zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ABl. L 461 vom 27.12.2021, S. 78).

⁽⁹⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2021/649 des Rates vom 16. April 2021 über die Unterstützung der Union für die Tätigkeiten des ATT-Sekretariats zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ABl. L 133 vom 20.4.2021, S. 59).

⁽¹⁰⁾ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12195-2019-INIT/de/pdf>.

Deshalb gibt eine geringe Zahl von Ablehnungen keinen Aufschluss darüber, wie restriktiv die Ausfuhrpolitik in Bezug auf bestimmte Bestimmungsländer tatsächlich ist. Andererseits handelt es sich bei von der EU verhängten Waffenembargos ⁽¹¹⁾ um allgemeine Verbote der Erteilung von Genehmigungen für die entsprechenden Bestimmungsländer.

6. Benutzerleitfaden

Der Benutzerleitfaden ist ein überaus wichtiges Instrument, da in ihm die vereinbarten Leitlinien für die Umsetzung der operativen Bestimmungen des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts und für die Auslegung der darin festgelegten Kriterien zusammengefasst sind. In Artikel 13 des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts wird auf den Leitfaden verwiesen. Er wurde von der Gruppe COARM erstellt und wird regelmäßig aktualisiert: Die letzte Aktualisierung erfolgte im Rahmen der Überprüfung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts, die 2019 durchgeführt wurde. Bei dem Leitfaden handelt es sich nicht um einen verbindlichen Rechtsakt, er wurde jedoch vom Rat gebilligt. Der Rat hat in seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 16. September 2019 den geänderten Benutzerleitfaden ⁽¹²⁾ begrüßt.

Der Benutzerleitfaden ist hauptsächlich für die Stellen bestimmt, die Ausfuhrgenehmigungen erteilen (Beamte, die derartige Genehmigungen erteilen, und sonstige Beamte in einschlägigen staatlichen Behörden und Stellen), und trägt somit in pragmatischer Weise erheblich zur Konvergenz der Strategien und Verfahren der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich der Rüstungsexportkontrolle bei. Der Leitfaden umfasst bewährte Verfahren für die Umsetzung der Kriterien des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts, die von der Gruppe COARM ausgearbeitet wurden, die sich dabei auf bewährte nationale Verfahren stützte und Beiträge von anderen relevanten Stellen, einschließlich der Zivilgesellschaft, einfließen ließ. Durch den Leitfaden soll größere Kohärenz zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung der Kriterien des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts gewährleistet werden. Dazu werden beispielsweise Faktoren festgelegt, die bei der Prüfung von Anträgen auf Ausfuhrgenehmigungen zu beachten sind. Die Entscheidungsfindung stützt sich auf die Sachkenntnis der für die Erteilung von Genehmigungen zuständigen Beamten z. B. in regionalen, rechtlichen, justiziellen, technischen, entwicklungsbezogenen sowie sicherheitsrelevanten und militärischen Fragen.

Der Benutzerleitfaden ist öffentlich zugänglich; er kann auf der Website des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes eingesehen werden ⁽¹³⁾. Durch die Veröffentlichung des Benutzerleitfadens soll für mehr Transparenz gesorgt und das Verständnis für die Gründe und Faktoren gefördert werden, die den tatsächlichen oder potenziellen Entscheidungen der Mitgliedstaaten über die Erteilung oder Verweigerung von Genehmigungen zugrunde liegen, auch wenn die Entscheidung selbst möglicherweise keiner externen Kontrolle unterliegt.

7. Gemeinsame Militärgüterliste der Europäischen Union

In der Gemeinsamen Militärgüterliste der EU sind die Militärgüter aufgeführt, für die Mitgliedstaaten Ausfuhrgenehmigungen im Einklang mit Artikel 12 des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts vorschreiben sollen. Sie ist identisch mit der Liste der Verteidigungsgüter im Anhang der Richtlinie 2009/43/EG ⁽¹⁴⁾. In der Gemeinsamen Militärgüterliste der EU werden die Änderungen an der Militärgüterliste des Wassenaar-Arrangements, die auf den Vollversammlungen des Arrangements vereinbart werden, berücksichtigt. Die aktuelle, seit ihrer Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union vom 1. März 2022 geltende Gemeinsame Militärgüterliste der EU ⁽¹⁵⁾ trägt den Änderungen Rechnung, die auf der Vollversammlung vom 29. November bis 3. Dezember 2021 ⁽¹⁶⁾ vereinbart wurden.

8. Vermittlungstätigkeiten

Im Einklang mit Artikel 5 des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts 2003/468/GASP des Rates ⁽¹⁷⁾ haben die Mitgliedstaaten gesonderte Vereinbarungen für den Austausch von Informationen über erteilte und verweigerte Lizenzen für Vermittlungstätigkeiten getroffen. Darüber hinaus haben die Mitgliedstaaten, die Vermittlern die Verpflichtung auferlegen, für die Ausübung ihrer Vermittlungstätigkeit eine schriftliche Genehmigung einzuholen, und/oder ein Register der Waffenvermittler angelegt haben, gesonderte Vereinbarungen für den Austausch von Informationen über registrierte Vermittler getroffen. Angaben über Lizenzen für Vermittlungstätigkeiten finden sich in Anhang A.III.

Anhang C enthält detaillierte Angaben über die nationale Umsetzung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts 2003/468/GASP.

⁽¹¹⁾ Siehe öffentliches Online-Tool: Weltkarte EU-Sanktionen (EU Sanctions Map).

⁽¹²⁾ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12189-2019-INIT/de/pdf>.

⁽¹³⁾ https://www.eas.europa.eu/eas/disarmament-non-proliferation-and-arms-export-control-0_en.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Die geltende Liste der Verteidigungsgüter wurde mit der Delegierten Richtlinie (EU) 2023/277 der Kommission vom 5. Oktober 2022 (ABl. L 42 vom 10.2.2023, S. 1) angenommen. Zur Angleichung des Anhangs der Richtlinie 2009/43/EG an die aktualisierte Gemeinsame Militärgüterliste vom 20. Februar 2023 wird Ende 2023 eine Delegierte Richtlinie erlassen, die die Aktualisierungen enthält.

⁽¹⁵⁾ ABl. C 100 vom 1.3.2022, S. 3.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Näheres hierzu unter <https://www.wassenaar.org/>.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Gemeinsamer Standpunkt 2003/468/GASP des Rates vom 23. Juni 2003 über die Kontrolle der Waffenvermittlung (ABl. L 156 vom 25.6.2003, S. 79).

II. VERTRAG ÜBER DEN WAFFENHANDEL (ATT)

1. Beteiligung am ATT: Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten

Wie auf den vorangegangenen Konferenzen der Vertragsstaaten haben die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten während des gesamten Vorbereitungszyklus sowie während der Achten Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten (22. bis 26. August 2022) selbst eine aktive Rolle gespielt, bei der die Zusammenarbeit nach der Lieferung — ein von Deutschland, das den Vorsitz führte, als vorrangig erachtetes Thema — im Mittelpunkt stand.

Die Vertragsstaaten vereinbarten einen strukturierten Plan zu der Frage, wie vor der Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten im Jahr 2023 Orientierungsempfehlungen für die Zusammenarbeit nach der Lieferung auszuarbeiten sind. Sie hoben hervor, dass alle Länder zur Zusammenarbeit bereit sind, um in Bezug auf die Universalisierung zu einem substanzielleren Ergebnis zu gelangen. Erwähnenswert sind zudem die Beratungen über den sinkenden Anteil der vorgelegten nationalen Berichte, der ein umgekehrt proportionaler Anstieg der Zahl der unter Verschluss gehaltenen Berichte gegenübersteht, wodurch die Verfügbarkeit von Informationen und das Streben nach mehr Transparenz beeinträchtigt werden. Die Teilnehmer der Konferenz äußerten sich besorgt über die geringe Einhaltung der Berichterstattungspflichten und forderte die Vertragsstaaten nachdrücklich zur Vorlage von Berichten oder zur Inanspruchnahme der verfügbaren Unterstützungsmechanismen auf, zu denen auch die von der EU finanzierten Projekte zählen. Auf der Konferenz wurde die konstituierende Sitzung des Forums für den Austausch von Informationen über Umleitung (DIEF) als eine erste Gelegenheit für die Vertrags- und Unterzeichnerstaaten begrüßt, sich über konkrete Fälle von aufgedeckter oder vermuteter Umleitung auszutauschen sowie konkrete operative Informationen im Zusammenhang mit der Umleitung von Rüstungsgütern auszutauschen. Auf der Konferenz wurde ein klarer Plan für den folgenden Zyklus unter dem Vorsitz der Republik Korea vereinbart, wobei der Vorsitz erklärtermaßen den Schwerpunkt auf die Rolle der Industrie bei einem verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit internationalen Transfers von konventionellen Waffen legen will.

Die aktive Beteiligung der Europäischen Union an der achten Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten (Abgabe von fünf Erklärungen der EU und Durchführung von vier Nebenveranstaltungen)⁽¹⁸⁾ trug wesentlich dazu bei, die langjährige Unterstützung der EU für die wirksame Umsetzung und Universalisierung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel zu bekräftigen. Auf der Konferenz überzeugte die EU durch geschlossenes Auftreten und deutliche Wahrnehmbarkeit, sodass dieses Jahr mindestens 20 Länder und das ATT-Sekretariat der EU für ihre im Rahmen einer Reihe spezieller Ratsbeschlüsse geleistete kontinuierliche Unterstützung dankten.

2. EU-Programm zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des ATT gemäß den Beschlüssen (GASP) 2021/814 und (GASP) 2021/2309 des Rates

Nachdem der Vertrag über den Waffenhandel im Jahr 2014 mit bislang⁽¹⁹⁾ 113 Vertragsstaaten in Kraft getreten ist, besteht weiterhin die Herausforderung, seine universelle Geltung und eine wirksame Durchführung durch die Vertragsstaaten zu erreichen.

Als Beitrag zur Bewältigung dieser Herausforderung hat die EU ein Programm zur Unterstützung der Durchführung für Drittländer angenommen⁽²⁰⁾. Dieses Programm wird vom deutschen Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) und von Expertise France durchgeführt. Darin ist vorgesehen, Drittländer auf ihr Ersuchen hin dabei zu unterstützen, ihre Waffentransfersysteme gemäß den Anforderungen des Vertrags zu stärken. Einzelheiten zu den entsprechenden Maßnahmen finden sich in Anhang D.

3. Unterstützung des Sekretariats des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ATT-Sekretariat)

Der Rat ist mit der Annahme des Beschlusses (GASP) 2021/649 übereingekommen, das Sekretariat des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel bei den Tätigkeiten zu unterstützen, die vorrangig auf die Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel abzielen⁽²¹⁾. Dieser Beschluss steht im Einklang mit dem allgemeinen politischen Ziel der EU, den multilateralen Rahmen, auch im Bereich der Rüstungsexportkontrolle, zu stärken. Einzelheiten zu den entsprechenden Maßnahmen finden sich in Anhang D.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Nähere Einzelheiten sind auf der Website der Achten Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten des ATT abrufbar: <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/csp-8.html?templateId=1662140>.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Stand August 2023.

⁽²⁰⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2021/814 des Rates vom 20. Mai 2021 zur Änderung des Beschlusses (GASP) 2017/915 über Outreach-Maßnahmen der Union zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ABl. L 180 vom 21.5.2021, S. 151) und Beschluss (GASP) 2021/2309 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2021 über Outreach-Maßnahmen der Union zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ABl. L 461 vom 27.12.2021, S. 78).

⁽²¹⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2021/649 des Rates vom 16. April 2021 über die Unterstützung der Union für die Tätigkeiten des ATT-Sekretariats zur Unterstützung der Durchführung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel (ABl. L 133 vom 20.4.2021, S. 59).

III. PRIORITÄTEN DER GRUPPE „AUSFUHR KONVENTIONELLER WAFFEN“ FÜR DIE NAHE ZUKUNFT

Die Gruppe COARM wird 2023 ergänzend zu ihren ständigen Aufgaben unter anderem

1. die Vorbereitungen für die Überprüfung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts 2008/944/GASP des Rates, die im Einklang mit den Schlussfolgerungen des Rates vom 16. September 2019 im Jahr 2024 abgeschlossen werden soll, fortsetzen. In dem sich rasch wandelnden Verteidigungsumfeld der EU setzt sich die Gruppe COARM dafür ein, dass sich die Waffenausfuhrpolitik weiterhin gut in die allgemeine Sicherheits- und Verteidigungslandschaft der EU und die mit der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU — einschließlich der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik — verfolgten Ziele einfügt;
2. weiterhin die Ausfuhrkontrolldimension von Entwicklungen im EU-Verteidigungsbereich — insbesondere in Bezug auf die Europäische Friedensfazilität (siehe unten) und den Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds — prüfen. In Anbetracht des rechtswidrigen Angriffskriegs Russlands gegen die Ukraine wird auch den Anstrengungen, die darauf abzielen, die Umlenkung von Waffen und den illegalen Waffenhandel zu verhindern, gebührende Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet, soweit die entsprechenden Maßnahmen in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Gruppe COARM fallen;
3. aktiv zu den Vorbereitungsarbeiten sowie zur Neunten Konferenz der Vertragsstaaten des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, die im August 2023 stattfinden soll, beitragen, die Durchführung der GASP-Beschlüsse des Rates im Zusammenhang mit dem ATT beaufsichtigen und die Programmplanung und Leitlinien für eventuelle Folgemaßnahmen annehmen.

Die Gruppe COARM wird weiterhin aktiv Kontakt zu anderen einschlägigen Gruppen aufnehmen, um Verbindungen zu benachbarten Arbeitsbereichen herzustellen, unter anderem zur Gruppe „Güter mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck“ und zur Gruppe „Zollunion“. Die Verbindungen zwischen der Gruppe COARM und den nationalen Beamten, die mit der Erteilung von Ausfuhrgenehmigungen und mit der Rechtsdurchsetzung im Bereich der Rüstungsexportkontrolle befasst sind, werden verstärkt.

IV. UNTERSTÜTZUNGSMAßNAHMEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN FRIEDENSAZILITÄT

Mit der Billigung des Beschlusses des Rates zur Einrichtung der Europäischen Friedensfazilität (EFF) am 22. März 2021 ⁽²²⁾ hat die EU einen robusten Mechanismus zur Unterstützung von Partnern in militärischen und verteidigungspolitischen Fragen geschaffen. Dies entspricht der anspruchsvollen Zielvorgabe, wie sie in der Globalen Strategie für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union dargelegt und im Strategischen Kompass näher ausgeführt ist.

Mit der EFF deckt die EU die gemeinsamen Kosten militärischer GSVP-Missionen bzw. -Operationen ab (Säule „Operationen“) und kann damit Partner in Form von militärischer Unterstützung, Ausbildung und Ausrüstung (einschließlich Waffen und Munition) unterstützen, um ihre Fähigkeit zur Krisenprävention und -reaktion sowie zum besseren Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung und damit zur Stärkung der internationalen Sicherheit und letztendlich unserer eigenen Sicherheit zu verbessern (Säule „Hilfsmaßnahmen“). Der vorliegende Bericht enthält lediglich Angaben zu Hilfsmaßnahmen, da im Zusammenhang mit den im Rahmen der Säule „Operationen“ durchgeführten Maßnahmen keine Ausfuhren von Gütern, die in der Gemeinsamen Militärgüterliste der EU aufgeführt sind, erfolgen.

Die EFF war im Jahr 2022 stark gefordert. Die Mobilisierung der EFF als Reaktion auf die grundlose und ungerechtfertigte militärische Aggression Russlands gegen die Ukraine bedeutete einen Paradigmenwechsel für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU. Die EU hat 2022 sechs Unterstützungspakete angenommen, durch die im Rahmen der EFF die Lieferung militärischer Verteidigungsgüter an die Streitkräfte der Ukraine in Höhe von insgesamt 3,1 Mrd. EUR unterstützt wird. Die EU hat zudem aus dem EFF die ukrainischen Streitkräfte unterstützt, die im Rahmen der militärischen Unterstützungsmission der EU zur Unterstützung der Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) ausgebildet werden.

Außerdem wurden aus der EFF im Rahmen der Hilfsmaßnahmen die militärischen Komponenten der friedensunterstützenden Maßnahmen unter afrikanischer Führung finanziell unterstützt, und zwar in Form eines allgemeinen Programms zur Unterstützung der Afrikanischen Union (AMISOM/ATMIS, MNJTF, SAMIM). Außerdem wurde aus der Fazilität eine Reihe von Hilfsmaßnahmen finanziert, die darauf abzielen, die Kapazitäten im Militär- und Verteidigungsbereich von Partnerländern in der östlichen Nachbarschaft (Georgien und Moldau), im Westbalkan (Bosnien und Herzegowina sowie die Balkan Medical Task Force), in der südlichen Nachbarschaft (Libanon) und in Afrika (Unterstützung von Mosambik — auch durch den Einsatz der ruandischen Verteidigungskräfte —, Niger und Mauretanien) zu stärken. Die Zahl der Hilfsmaßnahmen und ihre Gesamtaufschlüsselung spiegeln den globalen Charakter des Instruments wider.

Für die EFF galt für den Zeitraum 2021-2027 zunächst eine finanzielle Obergrenze von 5,692 Mrd. EUR zu jeweiligen Preisen (5 Mrd. EUR zu Preisen von 2018). Der Europäische Rat hat auf seiner Tagung im Dezember 2022 das im Rat erzielte Einvernehmen, durch das die finanzielle Tragfähigkeit der EFF sichergestellt wurde, begrüßt und damit ein klares politisches Signal für das anhaltende Engagement der EU bei der militärischen Unterstützung der Ukraine und anderer Partner gesandt.

⁽²²⁾ Beschluss (GASP) 2021/509 des Rates vom 22. März 2021 zur Einrichtung einer Europäischen Friedensfazilität und zur Aufhebung des Beschlusses (GASP) 2015/528 (ABl. L 102 vom 24.3.2021, S. 14).

Der Rat hatte vereinbart, die finanzielle Gesamtobergrenze der Fazilität um 2,287 Mrd. EUR zu jeweiligen Preisen (2 Mrd. EUR zu Preisen von 2018) anzuheben. Er war ferner übereingekommen, dass die Obergrenze bis 2027 bei Bedarf um weitere 3,5 Mrd. EUR angehoben werden kann ⁽²³⁾.

Die genehmigten Hilfsmaßnahmen und Maßnahmen entsprechen dem von der EU gegenüber einem bestimmten Land oder einer bestimmten Region verfolgten strategischen Gesamtansatz und beruhen auf gründlichen Bedarfsanalysen sowie auf den in dem Beschluss des Rates zur EFF und dem zugehörigen Integrierten methodischen Rahmen für die Bewertung und Ermittlung der erforderlichen Maßnahmen und Kontrollen für Hilfsmaßnahmen im Rahmen der EFF (Dokument ST 14209/20 vom 18. Dezember 2020) dargelegten Analysen.

⁽²³⁾ Der Rat hat am 13. März 2023 einen Beschluss angenommen, mit dem die erste Aufstockung umgesetzt wird und die finanzielle Obergrenze bis 2027 auf 7,979 Mrd. EUR (zu jeweiligen Preisen, bzw. 7 Mrd. EUR zu Preisen von 2018) angehoben wird.

KURZE BESCHREIBUNG DER KATEGORIEN DER GEMEINSAMEN MILITÄRGÜTERLISTE DER EU ⁽²⁴⁾

- ML1 Waffen mit glattem Lauf mit einem Kaliber kleiner als 20 mm, andere Handfeuerwaffen und Maschinenwaffen mit einem Kaliber von 12,7 mm (0,50 Inch) oder kleiner und Zubehör sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML2 Waffen mit glattem Lauf mit einem Kaliber von 20 mm oder größer, andere Waffen oder Bewaffnung mit einem Kaliber größer als 12,7 mm (0,50 Inch), Werfer, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für militärische Zwecke, und Zubehör sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML3 Munition und Zünderstellvorrichtungen sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML4 Bomben, Torpedos, Raketen, Flugkörper, andere Sprengkörper und -ladungen sowie zugehörige Ausrüstung und Zubehör, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML5 Feuerleiteinrichtungen, Überwachungs- und Alarmierungsausrüstung sowie verwandte Systeme, Prüf- oder Justierausrüstung und Ausrüstung für Gegenmaßnahmen, besonders konstruiert für militärische Zwecke, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und besonders konstruiertes Zubehör hierfür
- ML6 Landfahrzeuge und Bestandteile hierfür
- ML7 Chemische Agenzien, „biologische Agenzien“, „Reizstoffe“, radioaktive Stoffe, zugehörige Ausrüstung, Bestandteile und Materialien
- ML8 „Energetische Materialien“ und zugehörige Stoffe
- ML9 Kriegsschiffe (über oder unter Wasser), Marine-Spezialausrüstung, Zubehör, Bestandteile hierfür und andere Überwasserschiffe
- ML10 „Luftfahrzeuge“, „Luftfahrtgeräte nach dem Prinzip leichter-als-Luft“, „unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge“ („UAV“), Triebwerke, „Luftfahrzeug“-Ausrüstung, zugehörige Ausrüstung und Bestandteile, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für militärische Zwecke
- ML11 Elektronische Ausrüstung, „Raumfahrzeuge“ und Bestandteile, soweit nicht anderweitig von der Gemeinsamen Militärgüterliste der EU erfasst
- ML12 Waffensysteme mit hoher kinetischer Energie (high velocity kinetic energy weapon systems) und zugehörige Ausrüstung sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML13 Spezialpanzer- oder Schutzausrüstung, Konstruktionen, Bestandteile und Zubehör
- ML14 „Spezialisierte Ausrüstung für die militärische Ausbildung“ oder für die Simulation militärischer Szenarien, Simulatoren, besonders konstruiert für die Ausbildung im Umgang mit den von Nummer ML1 oder ML2 erfassten Feuerwaffen oder Waffen, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und besonders konstruiertes Zubehör hierfür
- ML15 Bildausrüstung oder Ausrüstung für Gegenmaßnahmen, besonders konstruiert für militärische Zwecke, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und besonders konstruiertes Zubehör hierfür
- ML16 Schmiedestücke, Gussstücke und andere unfertige Erzeugnisse, besonders konstruiert für eine der von Nummer ML1, ML2, ML3, ML4, ML6, ML9, ML10, ML12 oder ML19 erfassten Waren
- ML17 Verschiedene Ausrüstungsgegenstände, Materialien und „Bibliotheken“ sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML18 „Herstellung“sausrüstung, Umweltprüfeinrichtungen und Bestandteile
- ML19 Strahlenwaffen-Systeme, zugehörige Ausrüstung, Ausrüstung für Gegenmaßnahmen oder Versuchsmodelle und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür
- ML20 Kryogenische (Tieftemperatur-) und „supraleitende“ Ausrüstung sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und besonders konstruiertes Zubehör hierfür
- ML21 „Software“
- ML22 „Technologie“

⁽²⁴⁾ Die vollständige Beschreibung der Kategorien, wie sie vom Rat im Jahr 2022 (ABl. C 100 vom 1.3.2022, S. 3) angenommen wurde, findet sich unter: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XG0301%2801%29&qid=1646235149869>.

ANNEX

The attached tables contain the following information:

- A.I EXPORTS AND LICENCE REFUSALS PER DESTINATION, PER REGION AND WORLDWIDE
- A.II EXPORTS TO UNITED NATIONS-MANDATED OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS
- A.III INFORMATION ON BROKERING LICENCES GRANTED AND DENIED
- B.I TOTAL NUMBER OF CONSULTATIONS INITIATED AND RECEIVED BY EACH MEMBER STATE
- B.II TOTAL NUMBER OF CONSULTATIONS PER DESTINATION COUNTRY
- C. INFORMATION ON NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMON POSITION 2003/468/CFSP ON THE CONTROL OF ARMS BROKERING AND COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP DEFINING COMMON RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF EXPORTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT
- D. INFORMATION ON EU OUTREACH ACTIVITIES
- E. INTERNET ADDRESSES FOR NATIONAL REPORTS ON ARMS EXPORTS
- F. EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY — ASSISTANCE MEASURES

TABLE A.I

Figures of Table A.I are broken down per Member State, and per EU Common Military List category where (a) = number of licences issued; (b) = value of licences issued in euros; (c) = value of arms exports in euros (if available) ⁽²⁵⁾; (d) = number of denials (discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to denials concerning more than one ML category or denials for items other than those appearing in the ML ⁽²⁶⁾); and (e) = the number of the criterion of Common Position 2008/944 invoked to support the refusal (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated between brackets).

Statistics are compiled differently by each Member State: no uniform standard is used. Consequently, owing to current procedures regarding arms export reporting or data protection legislation, not all countries have been able to submit the same information ⁽²⁷⁾.

⁽²⁵⁾ To make the table more readable, nil values and/or the mention 'not available' are omitted, and empty rows and columns are deleted.

⁽²⁶⁾ In some instances, in accordance with the Common Position, denials issued for items which do not appear on the Common Military List (for example for license applications for transactions of dual-use items where intended military end-use has been identified) are included in the total.

⁽²⁷⁾ **Austria:** with regard to items covered by the EU Common Military List, the Austrian law distinguishes between 'war material' (as stipulated in the Austrian War Material Act and Regulation) and 'equipment on the Common Military List not listed as war material' covered by the Austrian Foreign Trade Act. As to the value of actual exports by Military List Category (row c), figures may be inaccurate in particular as such data regarding equipment of the Common Military List not listed as war material is available to the competent authorities only after expiration or full utilisation of the individual export licence. Since some licences granted cover goods of more than one ML category per destination, these licences are counted multiple times, one for every ML category (row a). The total number of licenses quoted in this report therefore exceeds the actual number of licenses granted.

Belgium: the data that Belgium provides for this report is the aggregation of the data of its three regions (the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Capital Region) and of its federal government (which is competent for exports by the Belgian armed forces and the Belgian police). Because of differences in data collection and data processing between the competent authorities, Belgium is currently not able to provide data on actual exports (row c).

Czechia: rows a) and b) do not include General transfer licences and Global transfer licences pursuant to the Defence Transfer Directive (2009/43/EC), which could cover goods of more than only one ML Category and allow exports to more than only one Member State. In addition to that, some other licences issued cover goods of more than only one ML Category and their value is the total value of all covered goods. Due to this fact, these types of licences are not included in row b). The sums in rows c) are based on information provided by exporters and also contain actual exports made in 2022 based on licences issued in previous years.

Denmark: with regards to the value listed in rows b) and c) it should be noted, that values listed in row b) 'Value of export licences granted' relates to licences issued according to national legislation, i.e. to third countries. Values listed in row c) 'Value of actual exports' relates to licences issued as global licences (article 6 of the ICT directive), transfers undertaken in accordance with the general licences (article 5 of the ICT directive) and licences issued as individual licences (article 7 of the ICT directive), i.e. actual value of exports within EU and EEA. Some licenses issued according to national legislation, i.e. to third countries, are listed with 'Value of actual exports' in row c). Some licences issued cover goods of more than one ML Category. When reporting in row a), each time a licence concerns a ML category, it is counted as one single licence, so the sums in row a) and column 'Total per destination' do not always reflect the actual numbers of licences granted, but a slightly higher number. The Danish currency (DKK) or other currencies are where relevant converted to EUR using the common exchange rate.

Estonia: licences covering more than one ML category and/or destination are reported under 'multiple destinations' (country). Goods which Estonia is judging to be military goods (national listing), but which are not on the EU Common Military List are reported in category ML 22 'Technology' (as CML category which is the most closely linked). The total number of licences quoted in this report therefore differs from the actual number of licences issued. Data does not include temporary transfers (exhibitions) and items on the EU CML provided to Ukraine and reported under the EPF assistance measures (AM).

Finland: licences covering more than one ML category and/or destination are counted one for every ML category per destination country. Therefore, the total number of licences presented in this report exceeds the actual number of licences issued. Data on licences issued also includes export licences to UN-Mandated or Other International Missions.

France: France requires its defence companies to obtain a licence from the early stages of market prospection. The licence should indicate the potential of the transaction. Any operation, starting from the negotiation stage, requires obtaining a licence: transmission of documentation, demonstrations, participation in calls for tenders, etc. This requirement for transparency and control results in a licenced value (row b) that can greatly differ from the value of the final contracts signed and goods actually exported (row c).

Germany: some licences issued cover goods of more than one ML Category (e.g. one licence for the export of rifles and their ammunition). In reporting in table A.I., each time a licence concerns an ML category, it is counted as one single licence, so the sums in rows a) and column 'Total per destination' do not always reflect the actual numbers of licences granted, but a slightly higher figure (i.e. the number of times a ML category has been affected by a licence for that destination). Germany is not in a position to report the value of actual exports of military goods other than war weapons as no reliable data on this matter is available. In particular, it is not possible to rely on data regarding write-offs from licences that customs authorities gather, because the national or EU lists of military goods and the nomenclature of the Harmonized System used by custom authorities are not congruent. Further, in accordance with rules of the Union Customs Code, there is no reporting requirement for transfers of goods to other EU Member States. This data would therefore lead to an incomplete and unreliable reporting on actual exports of military goods.

Hungary: data provided includes figures of general, global and individual export licences. Transfers of military equipment to Hungarian forces deployed in various missions (table A.II) are not considered regular foreign trade transactions.

Ireland: values in row b) relate to individual export licences issued. Values in row c) relate to actual exports reported by exporters with global licences issued under the ICT directive. As the value of global licences is not always visible ('unlimited value') figures will occur only in row c) and not b). Global licences contain multiple destinations and multiple ML categories, with exports to each destination and category counted as a single licence. Values listed in row a) therefore do not reflect the actual number of licences issued but a slightly higher figure.

The EU User's Guide stipulates that the value of actual exports only needs to be provided where it is available. With regard to actual exports authorised by EU Member States (row c), it is important to note that Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece and Latvia do not provide these data. No aggregation is therefore reported at the EU level.

With regard to the use of global and general licences notably applied to intra-EU transfers pursuant to Directive 2009/43/EC, it is important to note that the actual value of arms transfers and exports under global and general licences is generally reported by EU Member States. This is however dependant on the Member States' ability to report on actual values (row c) as described above and to possible additional national specificities as explained in footnote 20.

Data are reported in Euros and accordingly converted from national currencies for Member States not having the Euro as national currency. Please bear in mind the possible exchange rate fluctuations between the data collection at national level, the date of reporting to the EU level and the date of consultation of the data.

It is important to bear in mind that exports to destinations subject to EU arms embargoes comply with the terms, conditions and possible exceptions set out in the decisions imposing such embargoes. The full list and details of embargoes are available at <https://www.sanctionsmap.eu>.

Exports to UN mandated or other international missions are further reported on in Table A.II.

Latvia: data provided includes figures of individual, global and general export licences. Data might include also export licences for goods after repair and maintenance. Latvia is not providing data on actual exports because it is not possible for customs authorities to gather precise report on actual exports in a reasonable manner, especially on global transfer licences.

Lithuania: data provided includes figures of individual, global and general export licences, data also include actual exports. Licences covering more than one ML category and/or destination are counted one for every ML category per destination country. Therefore, the total number of licences presented in this report exceeds the actual number of licences issued.

The Netherlands: as values of global licenses cannot always be attributed to individual countries, the value of those global licenses has been added to the total value of 'multiple destinations'. The figures on actual exports are based on information provided by the exporters in 2022, and may reflect exports based on a license issued in a previous year. Although much care has been given to the collection of the data on actual exports, the actual exports figures for 2022 may be higher than the values quoted in this report. Some licences cover goods of more than one ML category. Each time a licence concerns an ML category, it is counted as one single licence. Therefore the sum in row 'Number of Export Licences' does not always reflect the actual number of licences granted, but a slightly higher figure.

Poland: License values provided in row b) refer to individual licenses, global licenses issued in a given year for a period of up to 3 years, and national general licenses. The actual values of transfers, provided in the row c), are related to the individual, global and national general licences. Data from rows a), b) and c) do not include temporary transfers.

Portugal: data provided includes figures of export transactions (definitive and temporary) covered by general, global and individual export licences. Some licences cover goods of more than one ML category and destination, so each time a licence concerns an ML category or destination, it is counted as one single licence, so the sum in row 'Number of Export Licences' does not always reflect the actual number of licences granted, but a slightly higher figure. As the value of General and Global licences is not always visible ('unlimited value') figures will occur only in row c) and not b). Data provided does not include figures of export transactions of civilian firearms (for personal protection, hunting, sporting).

Romania: data provided includes figures of general, global and individual export licences. Global and general licences cannot always be attributed to an individual military list category ML or an individual country. Therefore, the figures on number of licences issued (row a) could be slightly higher. Also, on grounds of national security interests, information on certain sensitive exports was not included in the 2022 report.

Slovakia: data provided includes some licences, which cover more than one ML category. Therefore values in row a) are thoroughly recorded, but values in row b) and row c) can have slightly different values. Exhibitions and presentations: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America. Remark related to Ukraine: due to national security interests export to Ukraine will be reported later.

Slovenia: data provided includes figures of general, (ML6) and 3 global (for ML 1, ML 3, ML16 and ML18) and individual export licences. The value of some licences was 0, because weapons and military equipment/defence-related products were exported for the purpose of testing and evaluation, or warranty claim. One Global transfer licence was granted to Slovenian companies in year 2023 for a period of three years, to trade with ML16 to EU countries.

Spain: data provided includes figures of general, global and individual export licences as well as global project export licences. Values in rows a) b) include values on temporary and definitive licences. Values in row c) include only values on definitive licences.

Sweden: the SEK to EUR conversion reflects the average exchange rate for 2022 of 10,63 Swedish krona per Euro. Licences covering more than one ML category and/or destination have been counted multiple times, one for every ML category per country of destination. The total number of licences quoted in this report therefore exceeds the actual number of licences issued. In Table A.III (Brokering Licences Granted), for the license regarding Ukraine, the country of origin has been omitted in order to respect the security interests of that country.

TABLES SETTING OUT EXPORTS AND REFUSALS PER DESTINATION, PER REGION AND WORLDWIDE

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EXPORTS AND REFUSALS PER REGION	
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Sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe)	494
North America (Canada, United States)	499
Central America and the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bonaire/Saint Eustatius and Saba, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago)	506
South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela)	509
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)	513
North East Asia (China (Mainland), China (Hong Kong), China (Macao), Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Korea (Republic of), Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan)	517
South East Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, Vietnam)	522
South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)	527
European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Denmark (Greenland), Denmark (Faroe Islands), Estonia, Finland, France, France (French Polynesia), France (Mayotte), France (New Caledonia), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden)	532
Other European Countries (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Holy See, Iceland, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/1999), Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Kingdom (Bermuda), United Kingdom (Cayman Islands), United Kingdom (Gibraltar), United Kingdom (St Helena), United Kingdom (Turks and Caicos Islands)	538
Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen)	544
Oceania (Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu)	550
EXPORTS AND REFUSALS WORLDWIDE	555

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Afghanistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						3		
	b						2 354 150		
	c								
Total per ML category	a						3		
	b						2 354 150		
	d								
	e								

Afghanistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					93 640			
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Afghanistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							93 640
Germany	a							3
	b							2 354 150
	c							
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							209 460
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							2 354 150
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Albania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	102 050							
	c	1 147							
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c	714 900				343 394			
Netherlands	a		1	1	1				
	b		3 207	3 207	3 207				
	c								
Total per ML category	a	2	1	1	1				
	b	102 050	3 207	3 207	3 207				
	d								
	e								

Albania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							18 000	
	c							18 000	
Poland	a		1						
	b		20 731 716						
	c								
Sweden	a			1					
	b			23 515					
	c			10 064					
Total per ML category	a		1	1				1	
	b		20 731 716	23 515				18 000	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Albania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							102 050
	c							1 147
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							18 000
	c							1 076 294
Netherlands	a							3
	b							9 621
	c							
Poland	a							1
	b							20 731 716
	c							
Sweden	a					1		2
	b					12 228		35 743
	c							10 064
Total per ML category	a					1		9
	b					12 228		20 897 130
	d							
	e							

Algeria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2					2		
	b	2 937					25 016 000		
	c	4 000					3 776 000		
Bulgaria	a	4	3		4		1		
	b	2 037 344	331 539	635 000	492 370	1 886 805	162 137		
	c	671 770	1 749 092	11 875 098	655 020		1 018 399		
Czech Republic	a				1		1		1
	b								
	c			33 762			1 500 458		
France	a				1			1	
	b				681 907			5 490	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Algeria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a					1			2
	b					540 600			424
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b								
	c								
Poland	a	1	1			2	7		
	b	3 654 545	5 171 276			4 050	11 681 636		
	c	350 030	2 721 505			30 154	2 615 072		
Sweden	a				3	3			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	8	4		9	6	11	1	3
	b	5 694 826	5 502 815	635 000	1 174 277	2 431 455	36 859 773	5 490	424
	d								
	e								

Algeria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		3						
	b		3 031 496						
	c		5 371 130						
France	a	1	1	1		1		7	
	b	12 000	76 000	43 425 000		603 000		77 402 580	
	c								
Italy	a		2						
	b		90 000						
	c								
Lithuania	a		4	2					
	b		241 988	219 841					
	c		127 904	64 164					
Netherlands	a			2					
	b			598 490					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Algeria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a		4						
	b		2 208 065						
	c		4 570 975						
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		776 418						
Total per ML category	a	1	14	5		1		7	
	b	12 000	5 647 549	44 243 331		603 000		77 402 580	
	d								
	e								

Algeria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					5
	b		4 448					25 023 385
	c		4 448					3 784 448
Bulgaria	a							12
	b							5 545 195
	c							15 969 379
Czech Republic	a							6
	b							3 031 496
	c		560 688					7 466 038
France	a						1	14
	b						525 000	122 730 977
	c							8 200 000
Germany	a						1	4
	b						10 000	551 024
	c							
Italy	a							3
	b							90 000
	c							157 548 028
Lithuania	a							6
	b							461 829
	c							192 068

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Algeria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a					1	2	5
	b					450 000	598 490	1 646 980
	c						2	2
Poland	a					2		17
	b					1 175 800		23 895 372
	c					1 115 800		11 403 536
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							776 418
Sweden	a		1			2	2	11
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a		2			5	6	83
	b		4 448			1 625 800	1 133 490	182 976 258
	d							
	e							

Andorra

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	19 007							
	c	19 007							
Belgium	a	2		2					
	b	706 118		967 500					
	c								
France	a	1							
	b	6 475							
	c								
Germany	a	16		1					
	b	209 088		94 036					
	c								
Spain	a	6		1					
	b	704 693		29 258					
	c	50 289		5 780					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Andorra

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			23 339					
Total per ML category	a	28		4					
	b	1 645 381		1 090 794					
	d								
	e								

Andorra

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Andorra

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							19 007
	c							19 007
Belgium	a							4
	b							1 673 618
	c							
France	a							1
	b							6 475
	c							
Germany	a							17
	b							303 124
	c							
Spain	a							7
	b							733 951
	c							56 069

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Andorra

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							23 339
Total per ML category	a							32
	b							2 736 175
	d							
	e							

Angola

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a				1				
	b				202 000 000				
	c								
Germany	a						1		
	b						1 185 000		
	c								
Portugal	a	4							
	b	4 812							
	c	3 331							
Total per ML category	a	4			1		1		
	b	4 812			202 000 000		1 185 000		
	d								
	e								

Angola

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					467 000			
	c					467 000			
France	a	3		1					
	b	947 096 174		2 520 000					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Angola

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a	1							
	b	41 379							
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b		184 000 000						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4	2	1		1			
	b	947 137 553	184 000 000	2 520 000		467 000			
	d								
	e								

Angola

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							467 000
	c							467 000
France	a						2	7
	b						91 600 000	1 243 216 174
	c							
Germany	a							2
	b							1 226 379
	c							
Portugal	a							4
	b							4 812
	c							3 331
Spain	a							2
	b							184 000 000
	c							
Total per ML category	a						2	16
	b						91 600 000	1 428 914 365
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Antigua and Barbuda

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Antigua and Barbuda

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Antigua and Barbuda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Argentina

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4							
	b	454 550							
	c	128 432							
Belgium	a	2							
	b	1 684 763							
	c								
Bulgaria	a				1				
	b				967 050				
	c				95 895				
Croatia	a	2							
	b	86 430							
	c	43 215							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Argentina

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	1							1
	b	4 100							76
	c								
Italy	a	2							
	b	60 690							
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					925			
	c					37 175			
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	527 285							
	c	272 769							
Sweden	a				4	1			
	b				30 784 729	5 425 661			
	c				1 441 132				
Total per ML category	a	12			5	2			1
	b	2 817 818			31 751 779	5 426 586			76
	d	1							
	e	7(1)							

Argentina

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1	4	1					
	b	2 743 002 137	5 056 200	325 000					
	c								
Germany	a		3	2					
	b		2 942 486	537 026					
	c								
Italy	a		2						
	b		435 564						
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b		60 000 000						
	c		232 012						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Argentina

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	1	11	3					
	b	2 743 002 137	68 434 250	862 026					
	d								
	e								

Argentina

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							4
	b							454 550
	c							128 432
Belgium	a	3						5
	b	5 000 000						6 684 763
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							967 050
	c							95 895
Croatia	a							2
	b							86 430
	c							43 215
France	a	1					1	8
	b	8 000					20 000	2 748 411 337
	c							2 200 000
Germany	a							7
	b							3 483 688
	c							
Italy	a							4
	b							496 254
	c							562 460
Netherlands	a					1	1	3
	b					925	925	2 775
	c							37 175
Slovakia	a							1
	b							527 285
	c							272 769

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Argentina

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							2
	b							60 000 000
	c							232 012
Sweden	a	1	1			1	1	9
	b	260 730						36 471 120
	c						265 506	1 706 638
Total per ML category	a	5	1			2	3	46
	b	5 268 730				925	20 925	2 857 585 252
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Armenia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	6							
	b	518 624							
	c	1 153							
Total per ML category	a	6							
	b	518 624							
	d								
	e								

Armenia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d					1			
	e					4(1), 7(1)			

Armenia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a		1					7
	b							518 624
	c							1 153

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Armenia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a		1					7
	b							518 624
	d							1
	e							4(1), 7(1)

Aruba

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Aruba

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a						1		
	b						131 972		
	c								
Total per ML category	a						1		
	b						131 972		
	d								
	e								

Aruba

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a					1		2
	b					20 000		151 972
	c							
Total per ML category	a					1		2
	b					20 000		151 972
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Australia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	15	2		2		2		
	b	20 893 770	15 695		1 979 235		176 215 789		
	c	5 895 048	12 559		838 900		116 188		
Belgium	a	5	6						
	b	74 522	1 451 244						
	c								
Denmark	a	4			6	1	2		
	b	1 333 539			344 041	5 700	7 565		
	c								
Finland	a					2			
	b					408 872			
	c	126 697		207 009		181 178			
France	a	2			3	3	2		
	b	99 014			24 347 451	11 738 000	1 794 602		
	c								
Germany	a	81	2	14	3	10	34		
	b	2 919 488	22 222 124	11 399 682	936 946	9 104 411	97 801 392		
	c								
Ireland	a					5			
	b					2 229 921			
	c					2 229 921			
Italy	a			1	2				
	b			600	148 808				
	c								
Latvia	a	9							
	b	13 989 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	1 114 763							
Netherlands	a						3		
	b						2 944 708		
	c						38 563		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Australia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovenia	a	1					1		
	b	5 323					84 060		
	c	5 323					1		
Spain	a	1							
	b	195 000							
	c	16 087							
Sweden	a		3	6	2	6			1
	b			4 640 853	16 003 273	183 414			1 693 050
	c		3 055 077	16 109 893		1 120 678			787 009
Total per ML category	a	119	13	21	18	27	44		1
	b	39 509 656	23 689 063	16 041 135	43 759 754	23 670 318	278 848 116		1 693 050
	d								
	e								

Australia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1						
	b		63 632						
	c		2 333						
Czech Republic	a		2	4	1				
	b		12 692	2 263 862					
	c		12 811	169 539	3 418				
Denmark	a	1	1						
	b	38 882	20 810						
	c								
Finland	a		1	1					
	b		937 720	44 000					
	c		85 202	22 000					
France	a	11	4	4		2	1	3	
	b	248 571 520	1 011 984	2 720 000		1 090 000	60 000	109 420 000	
	c								
Germany	a	34	10	20			3		4
	b	2 943 119	244 693	3 228 818			1 789 349		39 457 837
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Australia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a	6	10	3		1	2	1	
	b	3 014 428	6 395 829	1 189 991		36 750	47 651 079	1 168 507	
	c								
Lithuania	a							2	
	b							49 000	
	c							327 286	
Luxembourg	a					2			
	b					6 664			
	c					6 664			
Netherlands	a	4						1	
	b	2 513 566						2 154 600	
	c	409 535	6 353 943						
Poland	a	1							
	b	62 292							
	c	23 899							
Portugal	a			12					
	b			407 630					
	c			366 450					
Spain	a		3	4					
	b		66 100 000						
	c		12 416 483						
Sweden	a			4			4		
	b			347 075			7 447 515		
	c		122 443	147 543		22 677	519 246	221 225	
Total per ML category	a	57	32	52	1	5	10	7	4
	b	257 143 807	74 787 360	10 201 376		1 133 414	56 947 943	112 792 107	39 457 837
	d								
	e								

Australia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		6				2	30
	b		511 355				110 000	199 789 476
	c		16 610					6 881 638

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Australia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							11
	b							1 525 766
	c							
Czech Republic	a	1	1					9
	b	96 650						2 373 204
	c	95 804	198 527					480 099
Denmark	a	1				6	2	24
	b	320				3 020 930	3 000 000	7 771 787
	c							
Finland	a					1	1	6
	b					145 000		1 535 592
	c					145 000		767 086
France	a	1	1			2	8	47
	b	63	3 500 000			13 822 761	123 577 192	541 752 587
	c							36 700 000
Germany	a	1	10	1		17	14	258
	b	161	2 085 882	220 000		1 360 778	362 852	196 077 532
	c							
Ireland	a					1	1	7
	b					100 000	100 000	2 429 921
	c					100 000	100 000	2 429 921
Italy	a					1	3	30
	b						462 392	60 068 384
	c							13 682 125
Latvia	a							9
	b							13 989 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		4
	b							49 000
	c							1 442 049
Luxembourg	a							2
	b							6 664
	c							6 664

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Australia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a	1					6	15
	b	75 000					524 330	8 212 204
	c						733 792	7 535 833
Poland	a							1
	b							62 292
	c						748	24 647
Portugal	a							12
	b							407 630
	c							366 450
Romania	a					2		2
	b					14 000 000		14 000 000
	c					235 070		235 070
Slovenia	a							2
	b							89 383
	c							5 324
Spain	a							8
	b							66 295 000
	c						10	12 432 580
Sweden	a	4				4	7	41
	b	105 816						30 420 996
	c	134 849				3 195	3 733 249	25 977 084
Total per ML category	a	9	18	1		35	44	518
	b	278 010	6 097 237	220 000		32 449 469	128 136 766	1 146 856 418
	d							
	e							

Austria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	6		2		2	1		1
	b	86 182		149 575		2 994 520	8 475		378 963
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1				1			1
	b	43 318				2 200			2 123
	c	43 318				2 200			2 123

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Austria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Croatia	a	16		5					
	b	2 119 076		17 333 500					
	c	1 281 362		482 754	15 080				
Czech Republic	a	3					4		3
	b								
	c	1 803 135	46	6 977 419			347 287	60 415	886 980
Denmark	a				2		1		
	b								
	c						78 890		
Finland	a	4	1	1	1				
	b	574 540	8 500	1 695	4 732				
	c	63 446	8 500	1 695	4 732		634 172		
France	a					1			1
	b					57 000 000			35 000
	c								
Germany	a	6	8	41	15	2	73		
	b	132 594	653 235	3 234 277	444 865	33 536	52 554 860		
	c								
Hungary	a	1		6	4				
	b	55 000		8 973 733	2 840 880				
	c			2 352 660	473 346		71 439		
Italy	a			2			1		
	b			40 750					
	c								
Latvia	a	14							
	b	38 202 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		10					
	b			264 192					
	c	2 065 027		1 791 179					
Luxembourg	a						1		
	b						93 420		
	c						93 420		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Austria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	12		1			1		
	b	37 665		238			57 325		
	c	13 095					598 461		
Poland	a	1					6		
	b	569 061					60 804		
	c	568 592							
Portugal	a	1	1						
	b	700 000	77 825						
	c								
Romania	a								
	b								
	c			414 000					
Slovakia	a						2		
	b						3 500		
	c						3 500		
Slovenia	a	2	9						
	b	858 000	944 866						
	c	65 268	280 869				144 559		
Spain	a	1	1				14		
	b	145 000					2 480 291		
	c						915 566		
Sweden	a		1	3					1
	b		5 813	14 862 948					42 326
	c	137 892	7 499	714 093			22 377		43 809
Total per ML category	a	69	21	71	22	6	104		7
	b	43 522 436	1 690 239	44 860 908	3 290 477	60 030 256	55 258 675		458 412
	d								
	e								

Austria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a							1	
	b							2 450 500	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Austria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a								2
	b								
	c		81 912						542 179
Denmark	a		1			32			
	b								
	c		1 593			35 241			
Finland	a		1						
	b		60 000						
	c			1 364 995					
France	a		4	1		2		2	1
	b		55 088 000	2 130 000		2 000 000		611 000	405 000
	c								
Germany	a	2	7	8		1		10	30
	b	5 251	109 331	4 182 999		4 911		34 076	972 079
	c								
Greece	a							4	
	b							11 000 000	
	c								
Hungary	a								1
	b								211 700
	c								
Italy	a		1	1					
	b		15 549	1 794 337					
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							84 317	
Netherlands	a							1	
	b							2 894	
	c		30 596					2 894	
Portugal	a							1	
	b							2 194 840	
	c		287 065						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Austria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c								1 263 171
Spain	a		1	3					
	b			9 973 043					
	c		627 528						
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c		23 059			14 178	138 351	13 577	
Total per ML category	a	2	15	13		35		20	34
	b	5 251	55 272 880	18 080 379		2 004 911		16 293 310	1 588 779
	d								
	e								

Austria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							13
	b							6 068 215
	c							
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							47 641
	c							47 641
Croatia	a	1						22
	b	1 190						19 453 766
	c							1 779 196
Czech Republic	a							12
	b							
	c							10 699 373
Denmark	a					1		37
	b							
	c					74 292	74 265	264 281
Finland	a							8
	b							649 467
	c							2 077 540

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Austria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	3					2	17
	b	5 290 001					3 100 100	125 659 101
	c							2 000 000
Germany	a	24	60			5	19	311
	b	1 289 713	968 794			152 409	913 017	65 685 947
	c							
Greece	a							4
	b							11 000 000
	c							
Hungary	a							12
	b							12 081 313
	c							2 897 445
Italy	a							5
	b							1 850 636
	c							4 243 145
Latvia	a							14
	b							38 202 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							12
	b							264 192
	c							3 940 523
Luxembourg	a							1
	b							93 420
	c							93 420
Netherlands	a							15
	b							98 122
	c						2	645 048
Poland	a							7
	b							629 865
	c							568 592
Portugal	a							3
	b							2 972 665
	c							287 065

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Austria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a							
	b							
	c							414 000
Slovakia	a							2
	b							3 500
	c							3 500
Slovenia	a							11
	b							1 802 866
	c							1 753 867
Spain	a						3	23
	b						713 000	13 311 334
	c							1 543 094
Sweden	a						1	6
	b							14 911 087
	c	392 569						1 507 404
Total per ML category	a	28	60			6	25	538
	b	6 580 904	968 794			152 409	4 726 117	314 785 137
	d							
	e							

Azerbaijan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1		1					
	b	7 000		3 000					
	c	7 000		600					
Bulgaria	a			3					
	b			19 439 680					
	c			5 748 905					
Croatia	a	1							
	b	360 000							
	c	36 000							
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	31 600							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Azerbaijan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	2							
	b								
	c	51 737							
Italy	a	2							
	b	15 000							
	c								
Romania	a					2			
	b					27 445			
	c					31 718			
Total per ML category	a	7		4		2			
	b	413 600		19 442 680		27 445			
	d	1					1		
	e	1(1), 4(1)					1(1), 4(1)		

Azerbaijan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Croatia	a					1			
	b					19 209			
	c					19 209			
Spain	a			1					
	b			20 072 277					
	c			11 278 525				260 783	
Total per ML category	a			1		1			
	b			20 072 277		19 209			
	d								
	e								

Azerbaijan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							10 000
	c							7 600

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Azerbaijan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							19 439 680
	c							5 748 905
Croatia	a							2
	b							379 209
	c							55 209
Cyprus	a							1
	b							31 600
	c							
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							
	c							51 737
Italy	a							2
	b							15 000
	c							15 000
Romania	a							2
	b							27 445
	c							31 718
Spain	a							1
	b							20 072 277
	c							11 539 308
Total per ML category	a							15
	b							39 975 211
	d							2
	e							4(2), 1(2)

Bahamas

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bahamas

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Bahamas

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Bahrain

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		1					
	b	21 720		6 440					
	c	18 710		644					
Czech Republic	a	5		1					
	b	21 738							
	c	40 416		692 002					
Germany	a	1							
	b	25 500							
	c								
Greece	a						1		
	b						20 000		
	c								
Italy	a	1	2						
	b	233 200	969						
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					117 396			
	c					117 396			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bahrain

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Poland	a								
	b								
	c			214 000					
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	55 531							
	c	23 366							
Sweden	a					2			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	10	2	2		3	1		
	b	357 689	969	6 440		117 396	20 000		
	d						1		
	e						6(1)		

Bahrain

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a			2					
	b			11 337 022					
	c								
Bulgaria	a			2					
	b			378 509					
	c			1 392 752					
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b								
	c								
France	a		1						
	b		11 732 000						
	c								
Germany	a		2						
	b		28 804						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bahrain

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		3	5					
	b		11 760 804	11 715 531					
	d								
	e								

Bahrain

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							28 160
	c							19 354
Belgium	a							2
	b							11 337 022
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							378 509
	c							1 392 752
Czech Republic	a							7
	b							21 738
	c							732 418
France	a							1
	b							11 732 000
	c							4 300 000
Germany	a							3
	b							54 304
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							20 000
	c							
Italy	a							3
	b							234 169
	c							83 307
Netherlands	a							1
	b							117 396
	c							117 396

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bahrain

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							
	b							
	c							214 000
Slovakia	a							1
	b							55 531
	c							23 366
Sweden	a							2
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a							26
	b							23 978 829
	d							1
	e							6(1)

Bangladesh

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	105 000							
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1					1		
	b	7 221					93 420		
	c	899 707		1 240 198					
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c					2 237 760			
France	a			1		2	1		
	b			8 050 000		115 800 000	4 855 500		
	c								
Germany	a	1	1					1	
	b	6 500	660 000					7 252	
	c								
Hungary	a	2							
	b	33 170							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bangladesh

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a			1	1	1			
	b			3 974 500	10 160 000	35 100			
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					124 366			
	c					5 160			
Spain	a			3					
	b			6 903 004					
	c			6 296 304					
Total per ML category	a	5	1	5	1	4	2	1	
	b	151 891	660 000	18 927 504	10 160 000	115 959 466	4 948 920	7 252	
	d	1							
	e	2(1)							

Bangladesh

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		7						
	b		1 632 427						
	c		998 251	48 053					
France	a		1	3				2	
	b		227 116	144 400 000				30 549 000	
	c								
Germany	a		4	1			2	1	
	b		25 409	1 827			4 069 010	3 611 140	
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b								
	c								
Poland	a		1			1			
	b		662 071			4 600			
	c		4 067 760						
Spain	a			1					
	b								
	c		32 698 466	10 940					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bangladesh

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		14	5		1	2	3	
	b		2 547 023	144 401 827		4 600	4 069 010	34 160 140	
	d								
	e								

Bangladesh

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							105 000
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							100 641
	c							2 139 905
Czech Republic	a							7
	b							1 632 427
	c							3 284 064
France	a						3	13
	b						7 200 001	311 081 617
	c							11 300 000
Germany	a							11
	b							8 381 138
	c							
Hungary	a							2
	b							33 170
	c							
Italy	a							4
	b							14 169 600
	c							24 616 306
Netherlands	a					2	2	5
	b					125 166	125 166	374 698
	c					1 000	1 600	7 760
Poland	a							2
	b							666 671
	c							4 067 760

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bangladesh

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							4
	b							6 903 004
	c							39 005 710
Total per ML category	a					2	5	51
	b					125 166	7 325 167	343 447 966
	d							1
	e							2(1)

Barbados

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	18 300							
	c	18 300							
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	18 300							
	d								
	e								

Barbados

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Barbados

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							18 300
	c							18 300

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Barbados

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							18 300
	d							
	e							

Belarus

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d						1		
	e						1(1)		

Belarus

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Belarus

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							1
	e							1(1)

Belgium

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			3	2		1		
	b			2 072 793	8 485		1 178 868		
	c			3 709 000	8 485				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belgium

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								1
	b								470 020
	c								372 600
Croatia	a	2							
	b	1 080							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	2					1		
	b								
	c	190 601		7 270 200					23 438
Denmark	a					2	2		
	b								
	c					200 125	919 161		
Finland	a	2			1				
	b	27 360			22 806				
	c	17 008			22 806	143 100	66 278		
France	a	12	7	11	7		7	2	2
	b	93 690 523	154 761 735	3 433 006 770	26 089 646		74 754 109	1 401 350	260 000
	c								
Germany	a	5	3	5	8	1	68	1	
	b	36 116	18 741 548	159 802	277 689	346 752	2 374 128	1 550	
	c								
Hungary	a	1		1	6				
	b	80 683		5 000	2 102 648				
	c			5 000	1 135 238				
Italy	a	1		9			1		2
	b	8 340		956 899					169 725
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		1		1			
	b								
	c	11 192		123 647		2 400			
Netherlands	a	2							
	b	80 600							
	c					439 194	154 075		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belgium

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Poland	a			3					
	b			331 512					
	c			936 626					
Portugal	a	1	2	1					
	b	2 160	450 000	54 144					
	c		1 025 000						
Slovakia	a	2	1						
	b	747 642	531						
	c	676 032	531						
Slovenia	a	1		1					
	b	29 176							
	c	29 176		476 995					
Spain	a	4		8	1		2		3
	b	86 210		7 647 300	10 000		1 429 045		2 019 520
	c	562 762		11 956 875	233 730		537 433		1 195 170
Sweden	a		5	3		2			5
	b		12 043 276	35 385		221 037			575 167
	c	113 297		699 544		164 444			1 593 152
Total per ML category	a	36	18	46	25	6	82	3	13
	b	94 789 890	185 997 090	3 444 269 605	28 511 274	567 789	79 736 150	1 402 900	3 494 432
	d								
	e								

Belgium

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					5			
	b					56 600			
	c					56 600			
Czech Republic	a					1			1
	b								
	c		99 389			104 901			1 358 445
Denmark	a					9			
	b								
	c		371 852			11 886			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belgium

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		7	6		7		4	2
	b		16 504 100	99 208 668		21 420 393		43 191 000	23 201 000
	c								
Germany	a	2	8	18			2	1	7
	b	946 706	602 023	3 525 612			6 317 624	2 444	4 725 327
	c								
Greece	a		1					1	
	b		500 000					27 000 000	
	c								
Italy	a			3		1			3
	b			8 145 640					73 908
	c								
Netherlands	a								1
	b								2 188
	c		12 795						
Poland	a								1
	b								510 458
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		4 242 398						
Romania	a					1			
	b					120 000			
	c					9 525		94 130	
Spain	a		13	4					
	b		430 000 000	12 244 134					
	c		11 156 043						
Sweden	a			2			7		
	b			28 218			245 190		
	c			12 090			225 018		
Total per ML category	a	2	29	33		24	9	6	15
	b	946 706	447 606 123	123 152 272		21 596 993	6 562 814	70 193 444	28 512 881
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belgium

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					12
	b		26 539					3 343 285
	c		26 539					3 800 624
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							470 020
	c							372 600
Croatia	a							2
	b							1 080
	c							
Czech Republic	a		7					12
	b							
	c		106 797					9 153 771
Denmark	a	1				3	1	18
	b							
	c					2 244 194	163 872	3 911 090
Estonia	a					1		1
	b					1		1
	c					1		1
Finland	a							3
	b							50 166
	c	5 463					12 000	266 655
France	a	1				2	14	91
	b	22 800				16 882 000	12 946 103	4 017 340 197
	c							75 800 000
Germany	a	7	14			7	6	163
	b	27 677	1 273 933			825 869	4 415 301	44 600 101
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							27 500 000
	c							
Hungary	a							8
	b							2 188 331
	c							1 140 238

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belgium

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a					2		22
	b					2 116 247		11 470 759
	c							6 586 544
Lithuania	a							3
	b							
	c							137 239
Netherlands	a						1	4
	b						100 000	182 788
	c						12 750	618 814
Poland	a						1	5
	b						211 473	1 053 443
	c							936 626
Portugal	a							4
	b							506 304
	c							5 267 398
Romania	a							1
	b							120 000
	c							103 655
Slovakia	a							3
	b							748 173
	c							676 563
Slovenia	a		3					5
	b		954 895					984 071
	c							506 171
Spain	a						10	45
	b						2 368 506	455 804 715
	c					18 044	97 500	25 757 557
Sweden	a	1	1			2		28
	b							13 148 273
	c						46 599	2 854 144
Total per ML category	a	10	26			17	33	433
	b	50 477	2 255 367			19 824 117	20 041 383	4 579 511 707
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Belize

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Belize

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Belize

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Benin

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1							
	b	159 000							
	c	159 000							
France	a	1		2			10		
	b	1 740 000		23 165 000			5 186 772		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	2		2			10		
	b	1 899 000		23 165 000			5 186 772		
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Benin

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a					3		2	
	b					25 514 220		7 266 000	
	c								
Total per ML category	a					3		2	
	b					25 514 220		7 266 000	
	d								
	e								

Benin

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							159 000
	c							159 000
France	a						1	19
	b						500 000	63 371 992
	c							
Total per ML category	a						1	20
	b						500 000	63 530 992
	d							
	e							

Bermuda

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bermuda

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Bermuda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Bhutan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	1							
	b	6 140							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	6 140							
	d								
	e								

Bhutan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a					1			
	b					118 940			
	c								
Total per ML category	a					1			
	b					118 940			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bhutan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							6 140
	c							
Denmark	a							1
	b							118 940
	c							
Total per ML category	a							2
	b							125 080
	d							
	e							

Bolivia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a	1							
	b	274 192							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	274 192							
	d								
	e								

Bolivia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Bolivia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a		1					1
	b		13 005 000					13 005 000
	c							100 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bolivia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							1
	b							274 192
	c							
Total per ML category	a		1					2
	b		13 005 000					13 279 192
	d							
	e							

Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	2		4					
	b	17 180		70 813					
	c	6 987		58 360					
Total per ML category	a	2		4					
	b	17 180		70 813					
	d								
	e								

Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a							6
	b							87 993
	c							65 347

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							6
	b							87 993
	d							
	e							

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	51 763							
	c	39 999							
Bulgaria	a				1				
	b				19 800				
	c				19 800				
Croatia	a	8	1	5	1				
	b	1 012 794	14 069	3 068 450	2 499 070				
	c	458 325		752 386	2 499 070				
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	10 250							
	c								
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b			99 735					
	c			94 750			99 062		
Finland	a	1							
	b	2 300							
	c								
France	a	1	1	2					
	b	16 750	1 380	78 585 000					
	c								
Germany	a	2		2			1		
	b	150 050		84 415			506 000		
	c								
Hungary	a	2		7					
	b	21 000		424 000					
	c			7 750					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Latvia	a					1			
	b					3 000			
	c								
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	794							
	c	688							
Slovenia	a	2		1					
	b	119 123		1 240 800					
	c	75 282		242 056					
Total per ML category	a	20	2	18	2	1	1		
	b	1 384 824	15 449	83 502 400	2 518 870	3 000	506 000		
	d	5		1					
	e	3(5), 7(1)		3(1)					

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Croatia	a					4			
	b					15 090			
	c					15 090			
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c								230 558
Total per ML category	a					4			
	b					15 090			
	d								
	e								

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					3
	b		26 539					78 302
	c		26 539					66 538

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a		2					2
	b		1 085 300					1 085 300
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							19 800
	c							19 800
Croatia	a							19
	b							6 609 473
	c							3 724 871
Cyprus	a							1
	b							10 250
	c							
Czech Republic	a		3					4
	b		112 210					211 945
	c		111 890					536 260
Finland	a							1
	b							2 300
	c							
France	a							4
	b							78 603 130
	c							
Germany	a							5
	b							740 465
	c							
Hungary	a							9
	b							445 000
	c							7 750
Latvia	a							1
	b							3 000
	c							
Slovakia	a							1
	b							794
	c							688

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a							3
	b							1 359 923
	c							317 338
Total per ML category	a		6					54
	b		1 224 049					89 169 682
	d							6
	e							3(6), 7(1)

Botswana

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a				2	1			
	b				589 800 000	9 457 500			
	c								
Germany	a	1							
	b	99 350							
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			10 425					
Total per ML category	a	1			2	1			
	b	99 350			589 800 000	9 457 500			
	d								
	e								

Botswana

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1						
	b		13 910 000						
	c								
Portugal	a						1		
	b						1 272 063		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Botswana

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		34 123						
Total per ML category	a		1				1		
	b		13 910 000				1 272 063		
	d								
	e								

Botswana

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a					1	2	7
	b						460 001	613 627 501
	c							900 000
Germany	a							1
	b							99 350
	c							
Portugal	a							1
	b							1 272 063
	c							
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							34 123
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							10 425
Total per ML category	a					1	2	9
	b						460 001	614 998 914
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brazil

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	55							
	b	16 952 694							
	c	7 402 499							
Belgium	a	20				1			1
	b	2 112 975				70 000			7 650 000
	c								
Croatia	a	3							
	b	5 455 813							
	c	869 209							
Czech Republic	a	2	1	4					
	b		27 258	439 243					
	c	175 307		112 875			592		
Denmark	a				1				
	b								
	c								
Finland	a					2			
	b					10 000			
	c								
France	a	1		1		2			
	b	260		414 200 000		25 350 500			
	c								
Germany	a	1		1	1	2	3	1	
	b	117		855 588	668 847	34 830 000	654 455	430 000	
	c								
Italy	a	89	1			2	6		
	b	33 967 173	133 770			512 174	24 322 428		
	c								
Netherlands	a							1	
	b							738 358	
	c	79 280							
Slovakia	a	15							
	b	10 418 483							
	c	4 604 587							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brazil

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovenia	a	8		5					
	b	1 448 878		1 481 982					
	c	1 448 878		1 747 102					
Spain	a	211		1		1	3		
	b	706 166		1 714 637		464 902	38 088		
	c	681 261				464 902	25 980		
Sweden	a			2	2				2
	b			971 246	3 607 137				210 220
	c	13 245	48 801		1 988 056	763 987			207 276
Total per ML category	a	405	2	14	4	10	12	2	3
	b	71 062 559	161 028	419 662 696	4 275 984	61 237 576	25 014 971	1 168 358	7 860 220
	d	2		1					
	e	7(2)		7(1)					

Brazil

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1		2	1
	b					9 600		87 488	1 901 450
	c					9 600			316 908
Belgium	a							2	
	b							59 396	
	c								
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		4 408 554						
Estonia	a		1						
	b		375 178						
	c								
France	a	3	7	2		4		1	
	b	1 482 000	39 807 421	1 760 001		180 550		15 000	
	c								
Germany	a	14	29	12			1	2	4
	b	11 164 784	1 545 345	47 679 355			503 036	287 975	118 875
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brazil

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a							7	
	b							2 400 000	
	c								
Italy	a		10	2					
	b		566 741	1 203 040					
	c								
Netherlands	a	3		2					
	b	4 350 826		5 713					
	c			11 848					
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		41 735 573						
Romania	a			1					
	b			949 667					
	c			157 326					
Spain	a		5						
	b		13 963 354						
	c		11 916 841	1 406 185					
Sweden	a						1		
	b						321 680		
	c		279 962 349	576 107					
Total per ML category	a	20	52	19		5	2	14	5
	b	16 997 610	56 258 039	51 597 776		190 150	824 716	2 849 859	2 020 325
	d								1
	e								2(1), 7(1)

Brazil

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4				1	64
	b		129 361				25 000	19 105 593
	c		98 136					7 827 143
Belgium	a							24
	b							9 892 371
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brazil

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Croatia	a							3
	b							5 455 813
	c							869 209
Czech Republic	a		3					10
	b		68 062					534 563
	c		14 972					4 712 300
Denmark	a							1
	b							
	c							
Estonia	a							1
	b							375 178
	c							
Finland	a							2
	b							10 000
	c							
France	a	3					2	26
	b	22 000					551 000	483 368 732
	c							88 200 000
Germany	a	4				8	8	91
	b	540 027				961 823	2 302 929	102 543 156
	c							
Greece	a							7
	b							2 400 000
	c							
Italy	a		1					111
	b		3 485 500					64 190 826
	c							62 133 361
Netherlands	a						4	10
	b						106 713	5 201 610
	c						2	91 130
Poland	a							
	b							
	c						1 877	1 877

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brazil

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							41 735 573
Romania	a							1
	b							949 667
	c							157 326
Slovakia	a							15
	b							10 418 483
	c							4 604 587
Slovenia	a							13
	b							2 930 860
	c							3 195 980
Spain	a						1	222
	b							16 887 147
	c							14 495 169
Sweden	a					1	4	12
	b							5 110 283
	c					237 857	1 500 858	285 298 536
Total per ML category	a	7	8			9	20	613
	b	562 027	3 682 923			961 823	2 985 642	729 374 282
	d							4
	e							2(1), 7(4)

Brunei

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a						1		
	b						720 000		
	c								
Germany	a						2		
	b						30 300		
	c								
Netherlands	a					2			
	b					138 351			
	c					27 130			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brunei

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a				1				
	b				27 300				
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c		5 908	71 566					
Total per ML category	a				1	2	3		
	b				27 300	138 351	750 300		
	d								
	e								

Brunei

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a		1						
	b		53 991 997						
	c		24 786 500						
Spain	a		2						
	b		45 000 000						
	c		38 366						
Total per ML category	a		3						
	b		98 991 997						
	d								
	e								

Brunei

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a							1
	b							720 000
	c							100 000
Germany	a							2
	b							30 300
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Brunei

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a					1	1	4
	b					111 221	111 221	360 793
	c							27 130
Poland	a							1
	b							53 991 997
	c							24 786 500
Spain	a						1	4
	b							45 027 300
	c							38 366
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							77 474
Total per ML category	a					1	2	12
	b					111 221	111 221	100 130 390
	d							
	e							

Bulgaria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	4 653							
	c								
Croatia	a	1		3					
	b	950 000		9 183 700					
	c	950 000		3 326 155					
Czech Republic	a	2	1	5	2	1	2		
	b								
	c	302 660	133 889	4 232 005	14 520	430 213	12 839 670	716 571	
Finland	a	1							
	b	100 000							
	c	24 390							
France	a			1			1		
	b			30 200 000			45 000		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bulgaria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	1		2		4	1		
	b	7 800		408 700		65 134	13 901		
	c								
Hungary	a	3	5	1	1	1	1		
	b	1 026 405	1 676 623	82 900	231	1 931	4 760		
	c		1 615 100						
Italy	a			1	1		1		
	b			15 761	1 144 744		537 300		
	c								
Latvia	a	8							
	b	13 856 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	1 274 464							
Netherlands	a	1							
	b	1 228							
	c								
Poland	a			1		1	1		1
	b			100 000		911 218	35 000		12 678
	c		2 657 500	35 338					
Romania	a	5	2	16		1			2
	b	3 898 832	4 648 622	32 126 510		265 200			965 220
	c	5 066 311	4 648 622	19 423 514	1 919 673				363 000
Slovakia	a	2	1	2			1		
	b	814 400	200	2 308 793			4 260		
	c	368 000		786 393					
Slovenia	a						1		
	b						30 000		
	c	860 811							
Spain	a	1		1		5			2
	b	100 000		195 000		526 043			602
	c	11 628		195 000		150 000			129 302

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bulgaria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	1		1	3	2			1
	b					329 204			32 920
	c	51 193		109 814					38 630
Total per ML category	a	30	9	34	7	15	9		6
	b	20 759 318	6 325 445	74 621 364	1 144 975	2 098 730	670 221		1 011 420
	d								
	e								

Bulgaria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		2						
	b		3 050 000						
	c								
Czech Republic	a		4	1		1			
	b								
	c		679 443	22 550		69 986			1 908 411
Denmark	a					1			
	b								
	c								
France	a					1		1	
	b					2 750 000			
	c								
Germany	a	3		4					1
	b	1 757 629		2 091 745					12 416
	c								
Italy	a			2					
	b			27 940					
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b		95 400						
	c		95 400					56 229	
Poland	a			1					
	b			48 405					
	c			47 503					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bulgaria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Romania	a			1					1
	b			37 734					183 551
	c			525 741					183 551
Spain	a		1						
	b		3 271 308						
	c		3 271 308						
Sweden	a			1					
	b			11 287					
	c			5 042					
Total per ML category	a	3	7	10		3		1	2
	b	1 757 629	6 416 708	2 217 111		2 750 000			195 967
	d								
	e								

Bulgaria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							4 653
	c							
Belgium	a							2
	b							3 050 000
	c							
Croatia	a							4
	b							10 133 700
	c							4 276 155
Czech Republic	a		1					20
	b							
	c		170 924					21 520 842
Denmark	a							1
	b							
	c							
Finland	a							1
	b							100 000
	c							24 390

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bulgaria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a					1	8	13
	b					2 255 000	6 341 001	41 591 001
	c							2 400 000
Germany	a	2	5			3	7	33
	b	74 931	65 380			15 092	2 507	4 515 235
	c							
Hungary	a							12
	b							2 792 850
	c							1 615 100
Italy	a							5
	b							1 725 745
	c							656 065
Latvia	a							8
	b							13 856 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							95 400
	c							1 426 093
Netherlands	a							1
	b							1 228
	c						202	202
Poland	a					1		6
	b					902		1 108 203
	c							2 740 341
Romania	a						1	29
	b						9 457	42 135 126
	c							32 130 412
Slovakia	a						1	7
	b						1 897 450	5 025 103
	c						446 613	1 601 006
Slovenia	a							1
	b							30 000
	c							860 811

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Bulgaria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a						7	17
	b						1 348 621	5 441 574
	c							3 757 238
Sweden	a	1	1			1	2	14
	b	4 138 567						4 511 978
	c							204 679
Total per ML category	a	3	7			6	26	178
	b	4 213 498	65 380			2 270 994	9 599 036	136 117 796
	d							
	e							

Burkina Faso

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	2	1	1	1				1
	b	1 374 620	926 500	99 820	911 680				160 720
	c								291 648
Czech Republic	a	2	1	2			1		
	b								
	c								
France	a				3	1	2		
	b				11 281 836	395 000	1 750 000		
	c								
Germany	a						2		
	b						620 862		
	c								
Spain	a						1		
	b						117 249		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4	2	3	4	1	6		1
	b	1 374 620	926 500	99 820	12 193 516	395 000	2 488 111		160 720
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Burkina Faso

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1					1	
	b		1 590 260					888 386	
	c		1 590 260						
Czech Republic	a			1				3	
	b							324 092	
	c								
France	a					1		2	
	b					1 647 517		2 303 186	
	c								
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		376 244					46 868	
Total per ML category	a		1	1		1		6	
	b		1 590 260			1 647 517		3 515 664	
	d								
	e								

Burkina Faso

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							2 478 646
	c							1 590 260
Bulgaria	a							6
	b							3 473 340
	c							291 648
Czech Republic	a							10
	b							324 092
	c							
France	a							9
	b							17 377 539
	c							900 000
Germany	a							2
	b							620 862
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Burkina Faso

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							1
	b							117 249
	c							423 112
Total per ML category	a							30
	b							24 391 728
	d							
	e							

Burundi

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a						1		
	b						9 814 000		
	c								
Total per ML category	a						1		
	b						9 814 000		
	d								
	e								

Burundi

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		2	1					
	b		2 500 000	2 150 000					
	c								
Total per ML category	a		2	1					
	b		2 500 000	2 150 000					
	d								
	e								

Burundi

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a							4
	b							14 464 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Burundi

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							14 464 000
	d							
	e							

Cambodia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b								
	c	307 380							
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cambodia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cambodia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							307 380
Germany	a						1	1
	b						7 759	7 759
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cambodia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a						1	2
	b						7 759	7 759
	d							
	e							

Cameroon

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	1							
	b	1 390							
	c								
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c				85 600				
France	a	1	1		3		2		
	b	518 000	1 800 000		1 067 200		34 550 000		
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b	13 050							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	1		3		2		
	b	532 440	1 800 000		1 067 200		34 550 000		
	d								
	e								

Cameroon

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					2 238			
France	a		1			2			
	b		100 000			52 345			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cameroon

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Hungary	a		1						
	b		77 000						
	c		77 000						
Lithuania	a		1						
	b		2 768 252						
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		28 346						
Total per ML category	a		3			2			
	b		2 945 252			52 345			
	d								
	e								

Cameroon

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							1 390
	c							
Bulgaria	a							
	b							
	c							85 600
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							2 238
France	a						1	11
	b						3 850 000	41 937 545
	c							6 900 000
Hungary	a							1
	b							77 000
	c							77 000
Italy	a							1
	b							13 050
	c							13 050

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cameroon

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a							1
	b							2 768 252
	c							
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							28 346
Total per ML category	a						1	15
	b						3 850 000	44 797 237
	d							
	e							

Canada

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	8	1	2					
	b	5 467 442	600	1 231 269					
	c	3 513 810	600	1 231 269					
Belgium	a	5							1
	b	483 733							4 317 558
	c								
Czech Republic	a	3						1	
	b	21 168						14 370	
	c	57 966		28 846				15 186	
Denmark	a	7		1		1			
	b	8 502		563		21 125			
	c								
Finland	a	1							
	b	1 060 000							
	c	153 260							
France	a	2	2	1	3	2			
	b	32 641	440 200	2 500 002	812 260 000	37 500 000			
	c								
Germany	a	53	7	21	1	9	33		
	b	1 838 001	1 237 715	11 466 238	872	1 959 807	13 595 918		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Canada

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a	1							
	b	4 620							
	c								
Italy	a	2	1	5	1				
	b	117 159	6 483 240	1 352 283	526 000				
	c								
Netherlands	a	1	1			1	2		
	b	4 957	355 325			325 750	23 500		
	c		500 000		8 074	1 831 771			
Poland	a						12		
	b						929 943		
	c						524 767		
Spain	a			2	2	11			
	b			7 417	2 213 614				
	c			6 165	1 370 084		14 960		
Sweden	a		1			11			1
	b		125 964			37 109 757			1 881 167
	c		1 105 536			4 381 617			551 899
Total per ML category	a	83	13	32	7	35	47	1	2
	b	9 038 223	8 643 044	16 557 772	815 000 486	76 916 439	14 549 361	14 370	6 198 725
	d								
	e								

Canada

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1						
	b		109 000						
	c		52 969						
Bulgaria	a								1
	b								42 937 361
	c								5 387 523
Czech Republic	a					3			
	b					36 613			
	c					4 436 315			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Canada

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a								
	b								
	c		1 569 719						
Finland	a								
	b								
	c		113 067			12 900			
France	a	1	5	1		2	1	5	
	b	143 485	15 080 000	800 000		3 247 374	30 400 000	170 203 245	
	c								
Germany	a	1	21	4		1	3	6	4
	b	16 871	2 675 946	222 263		7 092	245 489	2 087 471	1 118 061
	c								
Greece	a							3	
	b							1 100 000	
	c								
Italy	a		4	9			1	1	
	b		346 457	47 487 524			203 433		
	c								
Netherlands	a	5	1						
	b	2 205 823	606						
	c	187 090	330 617						
Poland	a		29			1			1
	b		195 188 916			608 500			4 977 153
	c		2 827 071			371 672			2 179 743
Portugal	a		2						
	b		375 000						
	c		392 024						
Romania	a		1	1					
	b		1 234 567	6 372					
	c		778 524	6 371					
Spain	a		16	1				2	
	b		722 576 753						
	c		4 608 723						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Canada

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a							1	
	b							1 014 871	
	c					338 301		1 226 530	
Total per ML category	a	7	80	16		7	5	18	6
	b	2 366 179	937 587 245	48 516 159		3 899 579	30 848 922	174 405 587	49 032 575
	d								
	e								

Canada

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a						1	13
	b						50 000	6 858 311
	c							4 798 648
Belgium	a		1					7
	b		127 000					4 928 291
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							42 937 361
	c							5 387 523
Czech Republic	a							7
	b							72 151
	c							4 538 313
Denmark	a					2	1	12
	b					1 000 013	1 000 000	2 030 203
	c							1 569 719
Finland	a							1
	b							1 060 000
	c							279 227
France	a	3				3	11	42
	b	3 150 001				7 403 806	38 710 408	1 121 871 162
	c							10 000 000
Germany	a	9	10			10	16	209
	b	154 158	654 811			87 925	848 207	38 216 845
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Canada

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a							3
	b							1 100 000
	c							
Hungary	a					2		3
	b					16 500 000		16 504 620
	c					478 813		478 813
Ireland	a					1	1	2
	b					10 000	10 000	20 000
	c					10 000	10 000	20 000
Italy	a					2	11	37
	b					169 684	822 190	57 507 970
	c							8 123 879
Netherlands	a					2	3	16
	b					825 750	417 358	4 159 069
	c						559 849	3 417 401
Poland	a		1			1	14	59
	b		695			22 481	220 794	201 948 482
	c		685			939	36 802	5 941 679
Portugal	a							2
	b							375 000
	c							392 024
Romania	a					1		3
	b					251 452		1 492 391
	c							784 895
Spain	a						4	38
	b						200 000	724 997 784
	c							5 999 932
Sweden	a	3				3	5	25
	b	396 926						40 528 685
	c	86 873				1 088 728	710 479	9 489 963
Total per ML category	a	15	12			27	67	480
	b	3 701 085	782 506			26 271 111	42 278 957	2 266 608 325
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Cape Verde

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c	7 289		3 552					
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cape Verde

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a			2					
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a			2					
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cape Verde

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							10 841
Spain	a							2
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a							2
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cayman Islands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cayman Islands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cayman Islands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Central African Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						2		
	b						338 415		
	c								
Malta	a			1					
	b			5 700					
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c	5 400			300	16 400	92 541	2 600	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Central African Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a			1			2		
	b			5 700			338 415		
	d		1						
	e		2(1)						

Central African Republic

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c			4 250		11 000			
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Central African Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							2
	b							338 415
	c							
Malta	a							1
	b							5 700
	c							
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							132 491
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							344 115
	d							1
	e							2(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Chad

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c	6 099 000	1 551 000						
France	a	2	1		3	1	3		
	b	398 635	2 920 000		855 368	200 000	1 690 684		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	2	1		3	1	3		
	b	398 635	2 920 000		855 368	200 000	1 690 684		
	d								
	e								

Chad

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a					1		2	
	b					4 050 000		5 510 000	
	c								
Italy	a		2						
	b		2 279 039						
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		17 509						
Total per ML category	a		2			1		2	
	b		2 279 039			4 050 000		5 510 000	
	d		1						
	e		2(1), 3(1), 7(1), 8(1)						

Chad

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							
	b							
	c							7 650 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Chad

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a						1	14
	b						21 740 000	37 364 687
	c							3 400 000
Italy	a							2
	b							2 279 039
	c							452 207
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							17 509
Total per ML category	a						1	16
	b						21 740 000	39 643 726
	d							1
	e							8(1), 2(1), 3(1), 7(1)

Chile

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	6							
	b	419 302							
	c	375 351							
Belgium	a	3				1			
	b	5 754				808 985			
	c								
Croatia	a	2							
	b	59 046							
	c	59 046							
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b								
	c								
Denmark	a						1		
	b						29 795		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Chile

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a				1	1			
	b					29 000 000			
	c								
Germany	a	3					21	1	1
	b	45 057					6 836 055	3 185	385
	c								
Greece	a						8		
	b						138 000		
	c								
Italy	a	1	2	1	3		2		
	b	2 995 000	661 434	1 631 791	5 243 211		71 283		
	c								
Latvia	a	4							
	b	778 000							
	c								
Netherlands	a		1				1		
	b		15 750				22 500		
	c								
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	1 823							
	c	1 823							
Spain	a		2		4		4		1
	b				475 989		7 165 160		917 364
	c				416 644		788 828		143 221
Total per ML category	a	21	5	1	8	2	37	1	2
	b	4 303 982	677 184	1 631 791	5 719 200	29 808 985	14 262 793	3 185	917 749
	d								
	e								

Chile

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					2 500			
	c					2 500			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Chile

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1						
	b		14 836 500						
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							115 920	
	c							115 920	
Croatia	a					2			
	b					733 800			
	c					166 215			
France	a	3	2	5				6	
	b	40 250 000	2 565 961	37 075 370				49 328 760	
	c								
Germany	a	5	1	2				1	
	b	1 556 322	278 472	3 536 068				55 872	
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							185 000	
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		5 775						
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							7 090	
	c							7 090	
Netherlands	a	1							
	b	1 861							
	c		188 397						
Poland	a					1			
	b					1 633 229			
	c					1 073 391			
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		10 700						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Chile

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a		3					6	
	b		60 015 500					1 814 700	
	c		1 767 161					1 188 674	
Total per ML category	a	9	8	7		4		17	
	b	41 808 183	77 702 208	40 611 438		2 369 529		51 507 342	
	d								
	e								

Chile

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							7
	b							421 802
	c							377 851
Belgium	a							5
	b							15 651 239
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							115 920
	c							115 920
Croatia	a							4
	b							792 846
	c							225 261
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							
Denmark	a							1
	b							29 795
	c							
France	a						2	20
	b						12 301 001	170 521 092
	c							4 500 000
Germany	a					2		37
	b					168 385		12 479 801
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Chile

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a							10
	b							323 000
	c							
Italy	a						1	11
	b						137 000	10 745 494
	c							9 985 921
Latvia	a							4
	b							778 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							7 090
	c							7 090
Netherlands	a							3
	b							40 111
	c							188 397
Poland	a							1
	b							1 633 229
	c							1 073 391
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							10 700
Slovenia	a							1
	b							1 823
	c							1 823
Spain	a							20
	b							70 388 713
	c							4 304 528
Total per ML category	a					2	3	127
	b					168 385	12 438 001	283 929 955
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

China

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a					1			
	b					6 125 000			
	c								
Germany	a								4
	b								3 740 413
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	3 000 000							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1				1			4
	b	3 000 000				6 125 000			3 740 413
	d								
	e								

China

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		4						
	b		2 319 449						
	c		8 047 797						
France	a		7					12	
	b		6 458 036					24 488 300	
	c								
Italy	a						1		
	b						290 000		
	c								
Total per ML category	a		11				1	12	
	b		8 777 485				290 000	24 488 300	
	d		2						
	e		1(2), 4(2), 5(2), 7(2)						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

China

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							4
	b							2 319 449
	c							8 047 797
France	a						3	23
	b						393 300	37 464 636
	c							70 000 000
Germany	a						1	5
	b						1	3 740 414
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							3 000 000
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							290 000
	c							291 200
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						100	100
Total per ML category	a						4	34
	b						393 301	46 814 499
	d						1	3
	e						1(1)	1(3), 4(2), 5(2), 7(2)

Colombia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Denmark	a				1				
	b				43 046				
	c								
France	a		1	2	5	1			
	b		28 215 000	828 700 000	172 503 544	179 100 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Colombia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a		2						
	b		10 372 283						
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					266 834			
	c					727 122			
Spain	a			1			4		
	b			656 104			2 982 473		
	c			1 621 643	181 519		2 875 598		
Total per ML category	a		3	3	6	2	4		
	b		38 587 283	829 356 104	172 546 590	179 366 834	2 982 473		
	d								
	e								

Colombia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					2			
	b					16 740			
	c					16 740			
France	a		1	1				1	
	b		6 153 652 456	2 600 000				28 400 000	
	c								
Germany	a	1	1	1					
	b	925 733	2 229	13 264					
	c								
Italy	a			1					
	b			442 087					
	c								
Spain	a		1	2					
	b			440 551					
	c		2 155 912	434 949					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Colombia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	1	3	5		2		1	
	b	925 733	6 153 654 685	3 495 902		16 740		28 400 000	
	d								
	e								

Colombia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					1
	b		1 499					1 499
	c		1 499					1 499
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							16 740
	c							16 740
Denmark	a							1
	b							43 046
	c							
France	a						1	13
	b						20 001 000	7 413 172 000
	c							900 000
Germany	a							3
	b							941 226
	c							
Italy	a							3
	b							10 814 370
	c							377 163
Netherlands	a					1	1	3
	b					266 834	266 834	800 502
	c					100	2	727 224
Spain	a						1	9
	b							4 079 128
	c							7 269 621

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Colombia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a		1			1	3	35
	b		1 499			266 834	20 267 834	7 429 868 511
	d							
	e							

Comoros

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Comoros

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Comoros

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Congo (Democratic Republic of)

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	3	2	4	4				
	b	14 120 758	1 201 872	12 902 751	33 351 920				
	c	1 711 794	3 571 801	35 725 200	2 226 316				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Congo (Democratic Republic of)

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						1		
	b						267 003		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	2	4	4		1		
	b	14 120 758	1 201 872	12 902 751	33 351 920		267 003		
	d								
	e								

Congo (Democratic Republic of)

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a					1		2	
	b					750 000		4 392 000	
	c								
Total per ML category	a					1		2	
	b					750 000		4 392 000	
	d								
	e								

Congo (Democratic Republic of)

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							13
	b							61 577 301
	c							43 235 111
France	a							3
	b							5 142 000
	c							
Germany	a							1
	b							267 003
	c							
Total per ML category	a							17
	b							66 986 304
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Congo (Republic of)

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Congo (Republic of)

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Congo (Republic of)

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Costa Rica

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	16 000							
	c	16 000							
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	16 000							
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Costa Rica

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Costa Rica

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							16 000
	c							16 000
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							16 000
	d							
	e							

Croatia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2					2		
	b	4 742					50 192		
	c						50 192		
Bulgaria	a	2		3					
	b	128 925		156 600					
	c	128 925		12 000					
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c			1 019 427			226 021		
Finland	a	2					1		
	b	82 000					250		
	c	3 332					56 607		
France	a	1							
	b	16 160							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Croatia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a			2			2		
	b			397 180			528		
	c								
Hungary	a	7		4					
	b	1 513 400		201 680					
	c	222 421		2 400					
Italy	a				1				
	b				261 166				
	c								
Latvia	a	7							
	b	4 731 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a			2					
	b								
	c	309 195		249 696					
Netherlands	a	2	1	1	1				
	b	1 945	2 838	2 838	2 838				
	c								
Poland	a							1	
	b							26 730	
	c							26 730	
Slovakia	a	2	2						
	b	156 000	303 000						
	c	66 000							
Spain	a	1							
	b	8 940							
	c								
Sweden	a	1	2						
	b		16 771						
	c		16 771	56 472					
Total per ML category	a	27	5	12	2		5	1	
	b	6 643 112	322 609	758 298	264 004		50 970	26 730	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Croatia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		2	4					
	b								
	c		78 604	1 455 513					
Denmark	a					4			
	b								
	c					2 866			
France	a		1	1		4			1
	b		525 291 861	1 780 000		23 000 000			6 510 000
	c								
Germany	a								1
	b								500 000
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							309 195	
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		3 904						
Poland	a		1						
	b		30 530						
	c		30 530						
Portugal	a			2					
	b			150 000					
	c								
Romania	a		4						
	b		351 925						
	c		352 555						
Slovenia	a								2
	b								1 500 000
	c								9 690 832
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c					52 482			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Croatia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		8	7		8			4
	b		525 674 316	1 930 000		23 000 000			8 510 000
	d								
	e								

Croatia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		6					10
	b		278 245					333 179
	c		278 245					328 437
Bulgaria	a							5
	b							285 525
	c							140 925
Czech Republic	a							6
	b							
	c							2 779 565
Denmark	a							4
	b							
	c							2 866
Finland	a							3
	b							82 250
	c							59 939
France	a							8
	b							556 598 021
	c							200 000
Germany	a	1	2				1	9
	b	192	3 203				10 000	911 103
	c							
Hungary	a							11
	b							1 715 080
	c							224 821
Italy	a							1
	b							261 166
	c							365 399

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Croatia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Latvia	a							7
	b							4 731 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							2
	b							
	c							868 086
Netherlands	a							5
	b							10 459
	c							3 904
Poland	a							2
	b							57 260
	c							57 260
Portugal	a							2
	b							150 000
	c							
Romania	a							4
	b							351 925
	c							352 555
Slovakia	a							4
	b							459 000
	c							66 000
Slovenia	a							2
	b							1 500 000
	c							9 690 832
Spain	a						1	2
	b							8 940
	c							
Sweden	a							3
	b							16 771
	c							125 725
Total per ML category	a	1	8				2	90
	b	192	281 448				10 000	567 471 679
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Cuba

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a			2					
	b			65 000					
	c	2 500							
Total per ML category	a			2					
	b			65 000					
	d								
	e								

Cuba

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Cuba

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							2
	b							65 000
	c							2 500
Total per ML category	a							2
	b							65 000
	d							
	e							

Curacao

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	169 950							
	c	5 726							
Netherlands	a	2		1					
	b	13 774		12 489					
	c	378		24 600					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Curacao

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	3		1					
	b	183 724		12 489					
	d								
	e								

Curacao

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Curacao

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							169 950
	c							5 726
Netherlands	a							3
	b							26 263
	c							24 978
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							196 213
	d							
	e							

Cyprus

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	2		1					
	b	4 220 517							
	c	771 254		167 673			12 561		
France	a	1	2		1	1	3		
	b	24 800	6 435 900		7 400 000	3 000 000	150 000		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cyprus

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a				2				
	b				25 667 750				
	c								
Italy	a				1				
	b								
	c								
Slovakia	a					1			
	b					100			
	c					100			
Spain	a					1			1
	b					376 043			
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	2	1	4	3	3		1
	b	4 245 317	6 435 900		33 067 750	3 376 143	150 000		
	d	1							
	e	1(1), 3(1)							

Cyprus

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		2						
	b		3 002 808						
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							5 950	
	c							5 950	
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c					1 047			
France	a		1					1	
	b		150 000					50 000	
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							12 000	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cyprus

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a					1			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a		3			1		3	
	b		3 152 808					67 950	
	d								
	e								

Cyprus

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							2
	b							3 002 808
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							5 950
	c							5 950
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							4 220 517
	c							952 535
France	a						1	11
	b						2 002 000	19 212 700
	c							7 800 000
Germany	a					2		4
	b					60 000		25 727 750
	c							
Greece	a					1		2
	b					804 000		816 000
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							
	c							4 633 700
Slovakia	a							1
	b							100
	c							100

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Cyprus

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a						6	8
	b						1 998 961	2 375 004
	c							
Total per ML category	a					3	7	34
	b					864 000	4 000 961	55 360 829
	d							1
	e							1(1), 3(1)

Czech Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	35		10	1		2		
	b	4 724 781		9 653 024	17 500		243 158		
	c	315 273		2 927 771	34 000		137 032		
Belgium	a	7							3
	b	12 584 033							8 082 140
	c								
Bulgaria	a	5	4	24	19	1	3		3
	b	636 950	14 027 620	262 493 352	218 896 603	14 760	11 519 152		3 666 508
	c	155 425	6 725 380	104 924 840	141 163 064	9 600	4 749 822		77 717
Croatia	a		3	5			3		
	b		438 000	5 826 686			285 940		
	c		348 000	894 835			285 940		
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c							6 015	
Denmark	a						1		
	b								
	c						423 627		
Finland	a	8	1				1		
	b	610 870	1 100				22 400		
	c	371 160	880						
France	a	1	1	3		1	2		2
	b	3 040	10 150 000	302 300 000		1 320 000	133 470 002		1 341 000
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Czech Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a			7		6	30		
	b			9 782 542		134 347	151 789 521		
	c								
Hungary	a	9	2	3			3	1	
	b	4 680 525	26 000	1 791 251			1 454 000	38 000	
	c	1 728	26 000				316 601		
Italy	a	1	1	1			8		
	b	6 744					4 821 271		
	c								
Latvia	a	8							
	b	10 597 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	3		3		1	4		
	b						719 800		
	c	998 390		445 970		14 400	404 240		
Netherlands	a	5		1					
	b	115 705		18 275					
	c	72 080					15 463		
Poland	a	6	2	2	1	3	46		1
	b	695 344	105 980	4 543 733	1 031 360	3 204 522	1 204 099		93 000
	c	4 086	165 440	1 450 000		2 782 282	316 797	8 700	7 074
Romania	a	1	1	7					
	b	462 279	1 070 940	8 227 397					
	c		1 070 940	8 180 029					
Slovakia	a	30	20	33	9	4	47	4	2
	b	20 438 281	14 522 267	266 648 691	51 060 000	3 305 807	20 832 814	86 495	135 000
	c	12 669 185	1 120 330	47 796 679	15 995 500	1 831 697	15 991 841	84 233	124 500
Slovenia	a	2		1					
	b	3 737 500		5 160					
	c	155 071		301 455					
Spain	a			3		1	1		
	b			297 036		71 000	334 888		
	c	28 058		235 960	155 341	71 000			

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Czech Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	5							2
	b	1 122							206 928
	c	41 530	15 914	920 377	23 793 211	96 802			59 401
Total per ML category	a	126	35	103	30	17	151	5	13
	b	59 294 174	40 341 907	871 587 147	271 005 463	8 050 436	326 697 045	124 495	13 524 576
	d								
	e								

Czech Republic

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					5			
	b					21 422 531			
	c		1 753			2 767 939			4 537 544
Denmark	a					24			
	b								
	c					56 262			
Estonia	a		1						
	b		176 900						
	c								
Finland	a					1			
	b					34 701			
	c					35 997			
France	a		1	3		6		2	
	b		170 000	975 000		77 054 047		630 000	
	c								
Germany	a		1	6		1		1	94
	b		147 420	466 075		8 680		2 450 000	9 118 007
	c								
Hungary	a		1						3
	b		68 400						3 698 855
	c								552 167
Italy	a		5	2		1	1		
	b		1 904 770	498 000		40 720			
	c								

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Czech Republic

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a			1				1	
	b			16 800					
	c			16 800				114 536	
Poland	a		7	1		2			
	b		130 589	295 029		2 320 000			
	c		202 245						
Portugal	a			1					
	b			24 900					
	c			22 500					
Romania	a		2						3
	b		2 042						35 455
	c		11 865						35 790
Slovakia	a		10	3		5			
	b		1 587 377	170 596		4 403 890			
	c		464 032	20 116		4 107 455			
Slovenia	a								1
	b								107 240
	c								29 752
Spain	a		3			1		1	
	b		102 500					11 900	
	c		3 117 662					11 900	
Sweden	a							4	
	b							174 356	
	c		2 821 750			343 467		199 125	
Total per ML category	a		31	17		46	1	9	101
	b		4 289 998	2 446 400		105 284 569		3 266 256	12 959 557
	d								
	e								

Czech Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					49
	b		2 241					14 640 704
	c		2 241					3 416 317

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Czech Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a		1			1		12
	b		52 641			75 000		20 793 814
	c							
Bulgaria	a							64
	b							532 677 476
	c							265 113 084
Croatia	a							11
	b							6 550 626
	c							1 528 775
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c							6 015
Denmark	a					1		26
	b							
	c					40		479 929
Estonia	a							1
	b							176 900
	c							
Finland	a							11
	b							669 071
	c							408 037
France	a		1				2	25
	b		27 232 000				11 287 500	565 932 589
	c							8 600 000
Germany	a	25	26			6	18	221
	b	375 175	1 920 607			85 132	91 019	176 368 525
	c							
Hungary	a		1				1	24
	b		435 911				25 000	12 217 942
	c							896 496
Italy	a		4				1	25
	b		2 234 496					9 506 001
	c							19 630 357

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Czech Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Latvia	a							8
	b							10 597 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		14
	b							736 600
	c							1 994 336
Netherlands	a							6
	b							133 980
	c						2	87 545
Poland	a	1	1				2	75
	b	76 400	29 440				20 937	13 750 433
	c	76 400	29 440					5 042 464
Portugal	a							1
	b							24 900
	c							22 500
Romania	a							14
	b							9 798 113
	c							9 298 624
Slovakia	a	2				1	2	172
	b	18 000				520	4 792 915	388 002 653
	c	18 000				520	304 655	100 528 743
Slovenia	a		1					5
	b		212 040					4 061 940
	c							486 278
Spain	a						5	15
	b						1 376 411	2 193 735
	c							3 619 921
Sweden	a	1						12
	b							382 406
	c	4 702	9 641			8 545 976	30 841 728	67 693 624
Total per ML category	a	29	36			10	31	791
	b	469 575	32 119 376			160 652	17 593 782	1 769 215 408
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Denmark

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		3	2	1			
	b	195 503		106 953	15 986	45 250			
	c	1 283		50 190	12 389	45 250			
Belgium	a	11							
	b	467 776							
	c								
Croatia	a	1							
	b	1 400							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	4	2						2
	b								
	c	43 538	9 332	5 670 275			403 639		12 489
Finland	a	12							
	b	708 450							
	c	170 539							
France	a		1	2		1	2		
	b		113 900 000	178 015 600		74 050 000	1 080		
	c								
Germany	a	2	3	5	3		65		
	b	126 000	441 985	6 768 889	2 974 310		70 211 552		
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			180 000					
	c			152 175					
Italy	a		4	3	1		1		
	b		769 655	3 396 832	148 800		83 801		
	c								
Latvia	a	9							
	b	10 616 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c	165 232							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Denmark

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	10		1	1				
	b	43 824		536	43 728				
	c	17 219	269 120		1 608 818	787 084			
Romania	a			1					
	b			94 586					
	c			37 834					
Slovakia	a			1					
	b			1 406					
	c			1 406					
Sweden	a		5	13		2	9		
	b		1 326 345	6 875 932		97 999	4 949 820		
	c	150 648	2 860 350	1 390 542		509 669	5 196 058	344 406	25 111
Total per ML category	a	51	15	30	7	4	77		2
	b	12 158 953	116 437 985	195 440 734	3 182 824	74 193 249	75 246 253		
	d								
	e								

Denmark

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		3	1					
	b		20 662 550	477 650					
	c								
Bulgaria	a					2			
	b					2 751 750			
	c					2 273 420			
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c					24 403		1 691 221	
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					8 136			
France	a	1	2	3		1			
	b	185 800 000	181 170 000	7 190 000		1 750 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Denmark

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a		3	6				1	5
	b		38 629	509 854				5 400	19 164
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							973 000	
	c								
Italy	a		1	2					
	b		50 429						
	c								
Lithuania	a			1					
	b			35 000					
	c			35 000				13 587	
Luxembourg	a								6
	b								724 147
	c								724 147
Netherlands	a								1
	b								107 406
	c		1 166 449	192 709					524 860
Poland	a					2			
	b					15 719 580			
	c					725 673			
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		3 423 701						
Spain	a	1		5				1	
	b	175 620		9 973 043				30 750	
	c	175 620						30 750	
Sweden	a			1		2			
	b			75 294		34 454			
	c		130 503	332 232		126 990	5 205		
Total per ML category	a	2	9	19		7		4	12
	b	185 975 620	201 921 608	18 260 841		20 255 784		1 009 150	850 717
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Denmark

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							8
	b							363 692
	c							109 112
Belgium	a					1		16
	b					25 100		21 633 076
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							2 751 750
	c							2 273 420
Croatia	a							1
	b							1 400
	c							
Czech Republic	a							8
	b							
	c							7 854 897
Finland	a	5						17
	b	3 684						712 134
	c	1 964						180 639
France	a						3	16
	b						2 812 000	744 688 680
	c							19 800 000
Germany	a	10	4			9	7	123
	b	82 872	350 360			156 345	16 004	81 701 364
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							973 000
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							180 000
	c							152 175
Italy	a					1	2	15
	b							4 449 517
	c							5 141 224

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Denmark

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Latvia	a							9
	b							10 616 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							35 000
	c							213 819
Luxembourg	a							6
	b							724 147
	c							724 147
Netherlands	a						1	14
	b						20 000	215 494
	c					325	130 452	4 697 036
Poland	a							2
	b							15 719 580
	c							725 673
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							3 423 701
Romania	a					1		2
	b					20 000 000		20 094 586
	c					3 568 668		3 606 502
Slovakia	a							1
	b							1 406
	c							1 406
Spain	a					1	10	18
	b					27 000	1 737 130	11 943 543
	c					27 000		233 370
Sweden	a	3				1	4	40
	b	40 231					113 152	13 513 227
	c	450 875					923 747	12 446 336
Total per ML category	a	18	4			14	27	302
	b	126 787	350 360			20 208 445	4 698 286	930 317 596
	d							
	e							

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Djibouti

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1		1					
	b	22 100		225 000					
	c								
France	a		1	2	3		1		
	b		110 000	820 000	1 006 340		4 000 000		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1	1	3	3		1		
	b	22 100	110 000	1 045 000	1 006 340		4 000 000		
	d								
	e								

Djibouti

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b								
	c								
France	a					1		1	
	b					110 669		29 490	
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		51 345						
Total per ML category	a		1			1		1	
	b					110 669		29 490	
	d								
	e								

Djibouti

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							247 100
	c							

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Djibouti

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							
France	a							9
	b							6 076 499
	c							600 000
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						180 000	180 000
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							51 345
Total per ML category	a							12
	b							6 323 599
	d							
	e							

Dominica

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Dominica

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Dominica

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Dominican Republic

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	2		1					
	b	3 501		38 673					
	c	6 457		26 697					
Italy	a			3					
	b			836 163					
	c								
Slovenia	a	2							
	b	48 590							
	c	48 590							
Total per ML category	a	4		4					
	b	52 091		874 836					
	d								
	e								

Dominican Republic

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Dominican Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							42 174
	c							33 154

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Dominican Republic

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							3
	b							836 163
	c							835 160
Slovenia	a							2
	b							48 590
	c							48 590
Total per ML category	a							8
	b							926 927
	d							
	e							

East Timor

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

East Timor

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

East Timor

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ecuador

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a						1		
	b						103 550 000		
	c								
Spain	a					1			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a					1	1		
	b						103 550 000		
	d								
	e								

Ecuador

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a			1					
	b			44 767					
	c								
France	a			1		1			
	b			60 000		800 000			
	c								
Germany	a	1							
	b	92 453							
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b		40 000 000						
	c		27 648						
Sweden	a			1					
	b			7 525					
	c			3 133					
Total per ML category	a	1	2	3		1			
	b	92 453	40 000 000	112 292		800 000			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ecuador

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							44 767
	c							
France	a						1	4
	b						3 635 000	108 045 000
	c							1 400 000
Germany	a	1						2
	b	3 346						95 799
	c							
Spain	a							3
	b							40 000 000
	c							27 648
Sweden	a							1
	b							7 525
	c							3 133
Total per ML category	a	1					1	11
	b	3 346					3 635 000	148 193 091
	d							
	e							

Egypt

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a			1			1		
	b			24 580			150 000		
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1	1						
	b	700 000	81 540						
	c	360 649	2 200	924 750					365 200
Croatia	a	1							
	b	1 900							
	c								
Cyprus	a	10							
	b	77 570							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Egypt

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	4		4	2		5	2	
	b			1 079	1 847 188		1 449 628	1 938 951	
	c	25 932		1 672			1 520 382	610 606	
France	a		4		4	10	1		
	b		5 884 600		2 649 550 000	1 239 405 500	3 100 000		
	c								
Germany	a			1	1				
	b			532 512	2 654 400				
	c								
Greece	a						7		
	b						2 516 000		
	c								
Italy	a	1		1	1				
	b				69 820 000				
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					707 231			
	c								
Poland	a		1		3				
	b		1 490 362		200 912				
	c		1 469 848						
Romania	a								
	b								
	c				783 754				
Slovakia	a	2	1						
	b	3 388	217 455						
	c	2 200							
Spain	a		1			3	14		1
	b					25 456 747	10 375 622		330 060
	c					456 747	5 319 826		
Total per ML category	a	19	8	7	11	14	28	2	1
	b	782 858	7 673 957	558 171	2 724 072 500	1 265 569 478	17 591 250	1 938 951	330 060
	d							2	
	e							1(2)	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Egypt

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a			4		2		1	
	b			4 647 293		252 250		724 525	
	c			658 354		3 774 310		1 049 324	
Croatia	a					1			
	b					8 750			
	c					8 750			
Czech Republic	a		1	1		2			
	b								
	c		116 639			919			
France	a		3	6		2	1	4	
	b		34 018 743	14 941 002		9 004 800	1 625 000	24 530 000	
	c								
Germany	a		1	2		1			
	b		263 920	326 049		45 977			
	c								
Greece	a					1		1	
	b					10 000		74 000	
	c								
Italy	a			1			2		
	b						2 900 000		
	c								
Spain	a		5	1				2	
	b		200 000 000	10 000					
	c		5 157 364						
Total per ML category	a		10	15		9	3	8	
	b		234 282 663	19 924 344		9 321 777	4 525 000	25 328 525	
	d			1					
	e			2(1)					

Egypt

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					1
	b		26 458					26 458
	c		26 458					26 458

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Egypt

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							2
	b							174 580
	c							
Bulgaria	a							9
	b							6 405 608
	c							7 134 787
Croatia	a							2
	b							10 650
	c							8 750
Cyprus	a							10
	b							77 570
	c							
Czech Republic	a		2				1	24
	b							5 236 846
	c							2 276 150
France	a		2			6	13	56
	b		3 350 000			1 626 416 001	95 084 026	5 706 909 672
	c							162 400 000
Germany	a					1	1	8
	b					4 669	24 177 000	28 004 527
	c							
Greece	a							9
	b							2 600 000
	c							
Italy	a					1		7
	b							72 720 000
	c							512 374 001
Netherlands	a					1	1	3
	b					707 231	707 231	2 121 693
	c							
Poland	a		1					5
	b		10 278					1 701 552
	c		10 137					1 479 985

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Egypt

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a							
	b							
	c							783 754
Slovakia	a							3
	b							220 843
	c							2 200
Spain	a						1	28
	b							236 172 429
	c							10 933 937
Total per ML category	a		6			9	17	167
	b		3 386 736			1 627 127 901	119 968 257	6 062 382 428
	d					1		4
	e					2(1)		1(2), 2(2)

El Salvador

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b	4 071							
	c	1 171							
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	4 071							
	d								
	e								

El Salvador

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

El Salvador

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							4 071
	c							1 171
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							4 071
	d							
	e							

Equatorial Guinea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Equatorial Guinea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Equatorial Guinea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Eritrea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Eritrea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Eritrea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Estonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			3	3				
	b			3 861 380	5 926 355				
	c			2 392 739	2 300 579				
Belgium	a	3							
	b	2 442 786							
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1					
	b			6 084 330					
	c			6 084 330					
Croatia	a	3							
	b	37 814							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Estonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1		2	1				
	b				4 818 416				
	c	1 688		188 449	4 818 178				
Denmark	a								
	b								
	c						451 780		
Finland	a	3			1				
	b	3 187 508			403 493				
	c	8 445			4 974 476		108 500	1 468 710	
France	a			1	1				
	b			106 871 000	261 000 000				
	c								
Germany	a	4	5	7	2		3		
	b	15 648 220	55 017	2 780 060	14 455 325		58 269		
	c								
Italy	a	1		1					
	b	11 279		14 827 110					
	c								
Latvia	a	1							
	b	16 319							
	c								
Lithuania	a	3		15					
	b								
	c	56 207		64 246					
Netherlands	a						2		
	b						1 017 741		
	c								
Poland	a						1		
	b						892 500		
	c					3 622 000			
Slovakia	a						1		
	b						11 050		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Estonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a	1	2	2	2				
	b	400	15 451 682	7 728 750	46 272				
	c	685	3 003 204		46 272				
Sweden	a			6		1			
	b			15 589 134					
	c	13 017	3 885 111	8 483 639	1 209 858	740 517	2 712 884		
Total per ML category	a	20	7	38	10	1	7		
	b	21 344 326	15 506 699	157 741 764	286 649 861		1 979 560		
	d								
	e								

Estonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		7 975	69 875		15 845			
Denmark	a					9			
	b								
	c					177 167			
Finland	a			1		2			
	b			594 044		3 180 212			
	c			698 866		4 428 751			
France	a			4		1			
	b			773 882 000		1 000 000			
	c								
Germany	a			2				1	3
	b			222 663				104 500	649 029
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							111 366	
Spain	a		2						
	b		379 402						
	c		379 402						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Estonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a			1			1		
	b			5 644			48 421		
	c			2 401		126 410	1 542 640	844 436	
Total per ML category	a		2	8		12	1	1	3
	b		379 402	774 704 351		4 180 212	48 421	104 500	649 029
	d								
	e								

Estonia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							6
	b							9 787 735
	c							4 693 318
Belgium	a							3
	b							2 442 786
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							6 084 330
	c							6 084 330
Croatia	a							3
	b							37 814
	c							
Czech Republic	a							4
	b							4 818 416
	c							5 102 010
Denmark	a							9
	b							
	c							628 947
Finland	a	1				1	1	10
	b	15 796						7 381 053
	c	9 310				56 300		11 753 358
France	a	1					2	10
	b	2 550 001					6 350 000	1 151 653 001
	c							8 800 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Estonia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	1	1			1	3	33
	b	3 750	170			24 000	5 002	34 006 005
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							14 838 389
	c							8 692 174
Latvia	a							1
	b							16 319
	c							
Lithuania	a							18
	b							
	c							231 819
Netherlands	a							2
	b							1 017 741
	c						1	1
Poland	a							1
	b							892 500
	c							3 622 000
Slovakia	a							1
	b							11 050
	c							
Spain	a						3	12
	b							23 606 506
	c							3 429 563
Sweden	a	3				1	3	16
	b							15 643 199
	c	41 799					1 322 274	20 924 986
Total per ML category	a	6	1			3	12	132
	b	2 569 547	170			24 000	6 355 002	1 272 236 844
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Eswatini

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Eswatini

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a			1					
	b			45 000					
	c								
Total per ML category	a			1					
	b			45 000					
	d								
	e								

Eswatini

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a							1
	b							45 000
	c							
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							45 000
	d							
	e							

Ethiopia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a						1		
	b						4 675		
	c	34 404					246 194		
Poland	a	1							
	b	188 437							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ethiopia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a						1		
	b						14 180		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1					2		
	b	188 437					18 855		
	d								
	e								

Ethiopia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a			1					
	b			60 030					
	c		242 206	60 030					
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		1 260 941				496 426		
Total per ML category	a			1					
	b			60 030					
	d		2	3					
	e		1(1), 4(1)	2(3), 3(1)					

Ethiopia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							64 705
	c							582 834
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c		24 460					1 781 827
Poland	a							1
	b							188 437
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ethiopia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovakia	a							1
	b							14 180
	c							
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							267 322
	d	1				3		9
	e	2(1)				2(3), 3(1)		1(1), 2(7), 3(2), 4(1)

Fiji

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Fiji

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Fiji

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Finland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3		3					
	b	4 231		92 965					
	c	3 735		82 217					
Belgium	a	12		4			2		
	b	586 438		83 383			83 499		
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1					4		
	b								
	c	286 362					37 575		731 678
Denmark	a				3	2	2		
	b								
	c				1 248 987	3 000	2 006 824		
Estonia	a						3		
	b						1 204 500		
	c						1 158 625		
France	a			4	2		2		2
	b			264 880 000	10 928 500		1 216 034		3 272 280
	c								
Germany	a	3	4	9			16	1	
	b	147 250	90 223	7 261 467			1 631 961	3 400	
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			1 180 800					
	c			259 200					
Italy	a	1					1	1	
	b						107 957	9 125	
	c								
Latvia	a	12							
	b	7 976 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		5		1			
	b					64 000			
	c	235 632		227 584		64 000			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Finland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	1					2		
	b	1 355					699 880		
	c		1 000				723 859		
Poland	a						7		
	b						499 180		
	c								
Slovakia	a						4		
	b						161 341		
	c						47 817		
Spain	a	1		2					
	b			10 549 250					
	c			5 221					
Sweden	a	2	1	10	2	15	2	1	6
	b	2 728		8 748 924		461 052 246	705 438		2 653 461
	c	114 193	1 356 886	3 553 911	94 597	729 011	3 914 087		763 203
Total per ML category	a	37	5	38	7	18	45	3	8
	b	8 718 002	90 223	292 796 789	10 928 500	461 116 246	6 309 790	12 525	5 925 741
	d								
	e								

Finland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					3			
	b					3 659 054			
	c					1 407 328			
Belgium	a		3						1
	b		3 433 645						808 255
	c								
Czech Republic	a							1	
	b								
	c			101 741			1 095 699	862	
Denmark	a	3				72			
	b								
	c					227 915			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Finland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Estonia	a		1						
	b		1 254 275						
	c								
France	a		3	3		2		2	
	b		1 695 500	100 150 000		17 000 000		27 600 000	
	c								
Germany	a	1	1	3				15	3
	b	980	1 934	2 402 625				6 387 761	13 786 146
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							512 000	
	c								
Italy	a	1		1		1			
	b	72 500		50 000		40 000			
	c								
Lithuania	a			1				1	
	b			637 500					
	c			637 500				1 187 090	
Luxembourg	a								1
	b								51 308
	c								1
Netherlands	a	1	3			1		3	
	b	4 612 017	862 418			7 296		15 041	
	c		405 061			30		8 438	
Poland	a			2		1			
	b			94 113		10 265			
	c								10 265
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		15 088						
Spain	a		6	4					
	b		2 603 897	23 329 589					
	c		1 350 526	200					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Finland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a	4		8			1	1	
	b			47 029					
	c		716 887	24 392		39 987	66 460	1 047 781	
Total per ML category	a	10	17	22		80	1	24	5
	b	4 685 497	9 851 669	126 710 856		20 716 615		34 514 802	14 645 709
	d								
	e								

Finland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4				1	14
	b		98 803				185 000	4 040 053
	c		98 803				185 000	1 777 083
Belgium	a							22
	b							4 995 220
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1					7
	b							
	c							2 253 917
Denmark	a	4				2	1	89
	b							
	c	27 481				1 112 261	1 112 220	5 738 688
Estonia	a							4
	b							2 458 775
	c							1 158 625
France	a		1				5	26
	b		500 000				41 635 000	468 877 314
	c							7 900 000
Germany	a	5	8			5	6	80
	b	428 255	824 409			1 129 228	1 001 304	35 096 943
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							512 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Finland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a							1
	b							1 180 800
	c							259 200
Italy	a					1		7
	b							279 582
	c							4 558 843
Latvia	a							12
	b							7 976 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		10
	b							701 500
	c							2 351 806
Luxembourg	a							1
	b							51 308
	c							1
Netherlands	a							11
	b							6 198 007
	c						2	1 138 390
Poland	a	1						11
	b	23 647						627 205
	c	23 647						33 912
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							15 088
Slovakia	a							4
	b							161 341
	c							47 817
Spain	a						8	21
	b						1 743 501	38 226 237
	c							1 355 947
Sweden	a	2	1			5	5	66
	b							473 209 826
	c	214 186				72 086	1 012 491	13 720 158

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Finland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	12	15			14	26	387
	b	451 902	1 423 212			1 129 228	44 564 805	1 044 592 111
	d							
	e							

France

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4		2	4				
	b	41 900		130 540	55 112				
	c			261 926	226 778				
Belgium	a	85	4	14	4	7	1		2
	b	14 884 028	1 053 796	535 011	121 994	62 110	7 500		3 918 110
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1	1						
	b	28 660	30 800						
	c	145 360	30 800	97 532					
Croatia	a	6							
	b	58 278							
	c	30 488							
Czech Republic	a	4		3				1	9
	b							70 912	
	c	182 170		352 735			1 805 739	91 615	799 469
Denmark	a					6	3		
	b								
	c					211 646	2 824 759		
Estonia	a					1	1		
	b					300 000	1		
	c					25 000	1		
Finland	a	2		2	3				5
	b	1 653 600		2 685	20 337				8 778 825
	c	276 942		48 485	71 297				235 349
Germany	a	33	11	33	15	8	14	3	
	b	10 527 015	723 943	16 033 909	16 690 594	5 126 579	12 665 726	372	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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France

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a			3					
	b			4 301 300					
	c			2 031 048	123 157		242 957		
Ireland	a				1				
	b				6 345				
	c				6 345				
Italy	a	3	5	22	35	8	21	6	7
	b	6 878	6 452	20 128 065	64 388 633	3 122 093	582 599	526 517	10 495 350
	c								
Latvia	a	10							
	b	4 038 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a			4		3			
	b					70 400			
	c	529 769		972 483		121 100			
Luxembourg	a					2			
	b					637 008			
	c					1			
Netherlands	a	12		4	2	1	1		
	b	15 740		21 614	190 393	5 000 000	9		
	c	7 286	16 220	8 406	1 908 389	16 187 072	1 487 978		
Poland	a	2	1	1			4		1
	b	48 060	126 620	75 000			4 449		1 251 000
	c	48 060					241 500		
Portugal	a		9	6			3	1	
	b		64 890 000	6 401 200			8 560 000	57 708	
	c		647 280	218 000			560 000		
Romania	a			1		6	2		
	b			11 040		177 895	632 807		
	c			33 903		305 115	627 523		
Slovakia	a	1		2	1	1	1		
	b	6 780		9 600	15 000				
	c	6 780		9 600					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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France

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	300 000							
	c	35 565							
Spain	a	1	16	1	4	9	16		5
	b	106 867	1 272 294	2 875	5 994 660	2 154 849	3 973 115		1 191 205
	c	913 487	501 419	2 875	8 832 713	4 488 105	133 500		1 410 885
Sweden	a	3	6	15	4	8			15
	b	37 294	85 499	47 029	8 154 858	3 823 524			21 935 815
	c	258 397	194 133	5 007 467	12 999	3 195 218	5 161 304		7 803 215
Total per ML category	a	168	53	113	73	60	67	11	44
	b	31 753 100	68 189 404	47 699 868	95 637 926	20 474 458	26 426 206	655 509	47 570 305
	d								
	e								

France

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					6 632			
	c					6 632			
Belgium	a		67	19					4
	b		10 131 012	24 179 322					3 566 995
	c								
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c		964 008						
Czech Republic	a		5	1					
	b								
	c		1 281 942			294 349		107 913	
Denmark	a	1	4	1		43			
	b								
	c	331 372	370 825			79 756			
Estonia	a							1	
	b							150 000	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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France

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a								
	b								
	c		1 903 367			36 047			4 087 398
Germany	a	32	131	47			2	11	22
	b	422 603	18 002 058	7 790 066			26 141	1 326 368	1 236 531
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							422 000	
	c								
Ireland	a		1						
	b		9 000						
	c		9 000						
Italy	a	5	88	31			1	4	11
	b	3 284 912	3 903 249	58 716 250					1 297 359
	c								
Lithuania	a			1				1	
	b			15 000				22 000	
	c							135 054	
Netherlands	a	8	1					2	
	b	2 013 944	141 780					441 490	
	c	1 668 032	16 589 205	1 132		448		1 450 401	232 351
Poland	a		10			7			2
	b		940 000			65 744 988			17 104 633
	c					1 120 154			976 691
Portugal	a		1	3		7			
	b		2 250	62 400		19 129 000			
	c		18 363 757	26 430		108 000			
Romania	a		1			1		8	3
	b		3 825			150 000		3 007 015	33 419
	c		197 255			83 415		1 306 750	14 971
Spain	a	3	50	31				6	
	b	138 050	1 019 142 795	92 024 435				635 900	
	c	238 690	753 266 067	7 686 595				635 900	

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France

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a	1		9			8	1	
	b			4 217 529			587 865	32 461	
	c			3 132 202		186 577	111 196	160 263	
Total per ML category	a	50	359	143		59	11	35	42
	b	5 859 509	1 052 275 969	187 005 002		85 030 620	614 006	6 037 234	23 238 937
	d								
	e								

France

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							11
	b							234 184
	c							495 336
Belgium	a						6	213
	b						46 181	58 506 059
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							59 460
	c							1 237 700
Croatia	a							6
	b							58 278
	c							30 488
Czech Republic	a	1	11					35
	b	1 570 405	7 729					1 649 046
	c		281 593					5 197 525
Denmark	a	2				6	3	69
	b							
	c	3 506				94	26 806	3 848 764
Estonia	a							3
	b							450 001
	c							25 001
Finland	a							12
	b							10 455 447
	c							6 658 885

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France

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	19	32			43	57	513
	b	339 224	2 846 468			4 696 316	2 103 546	100 557 459
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							422 000
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							4 301 300
	c							2 397 162
Ireland	a							2
	b							15 345
	c							15 345
Italy	a					7	8	262
	b					2 112 000	7 331 700	175 902 057
	c							129 147 573
Latvia	a							10
	b							4 038 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							9
	b							107 400
	c							1 758 406
Luxembourg	a							2
	b							637 008
	c							1
Netherlands	a	1	1			1	6	40
	b	2 361	174 333			5 000 000	5 626 114	18 627 778
	c	2 420				901	963 341	40 523 582
Poland	a					1	10	39
	b					3 055 000	596 930	88 946 680
	c							2 386 405
Portugal	a		5				2	37
	b		23 300 000				60 000	122 462 558
	c		556 000					20 479 467

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France

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a						4	26
	b						2 099 800	6 115 801
	c		19 500				280 127	2 868 559
Slovakia	a							6
	b							31 380
	c							16 380
Slovenia	a							1
	b							300 000
	c							35 565
Spain	a	3				3	37	185
	b					25 000	8 380 791	1 135 042 836
	c					875 880	549 928	779 536 044
Sweden	a	6				2	17	95
	b	59 257					558 123	39 539 254
	c	28 331					2 182 342	27 433 644
Total per ML category	a	32	49			63	150	1 582
	b	1 971 247	26 328 530			14 888 316	26 803 185	1 768 459 331
	d							
	e							

French Polynesia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

French Polynesia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		531 059						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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French Polynesia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

French Polynesia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							531 059
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Gabon

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	25 100							
	c	25 100							
Czech Republic	a	1		1					
	b								
	c	8 509		1 208					
France	a			1					
	b			2 500 000					
	c								
Romania	a	1							
	b	19 880							
	c	19 880							
Total per ML category	a	3		2					
	b	44 980		2 500 000					
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Gabon

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a					1			
	b								
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b		50 000 000						
	c		164 084						
Total per ML category	a		2			1			
	b		50 000 000						
	d								
	e								

Gabon

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							25 100
	c							25 100
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							
	c							9 717
France	a							1
	b							2 500 000
	c							
Romania	a							1
	b							19 880
	c							19 880
Spain	a							2
	b							50 000 000
	c							164 084
Total per ML category	a							8
	b							52 544 980
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Gambia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Gambia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Gambia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Georgia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	22		3					
	b	1 39 206		128 000					
	c	98 910		66 780					
Belgium	a	7							
	b	60 141							
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1	1				
	b			2 264 000	1 370 000				
	c				1 370 000				
Cyprus	a	6							
	b	42 810							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Georgia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a						1		
	b								
	c						146 521		
Denmark	a	1							
	b	6 048							
	c								
Estonia	a	1		1					
	b	130 000		23 855					
	c								
Hungary	a	2							
	b	94 500							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	22 595							
Poland	a				1				
	b				11 432 600				
	c								
Spain	a	1	1						
	b	1 392							
	c	1 392							
Total per ML category	a	41	1	5	2		1		
	b	474 097		2 415 855	12 802 600				
	d			1					
	e			4(1)					

Georgia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		1 576 090						
France	a			4					
	b			184 580 001					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Georgia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a			1					
	b			590 000					
	c								
Poland	a		2						
	b		5 902 023						
	c								
Romania	a		1						
	b		221 134						
	c		221 134						
Total per ML category	a		3	5					
	b		6 123 157	185 170 001					
	d								
	e								

Georgia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							25
	b							267 206
	c							165 690
Belgium	a							7
	b							60 141
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							3 634 000
	c							1 370 000
Cyprus	a							6
	b							42 810
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1					2
	b		2 615					2 615
	c		2 056					1 724 667
Denmark	a					1	1	3
	b					50 561	50 561	107 170
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Georgia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Estonia	a							2
	b							1 53 855
	c							
France	a							4
	b							184 580 001
	c							1 800 000
Hungary	a							2
	b							94 500
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							590 000
	c							590 000
Lithuania	a							1
	b							
	c							22 595
Poland	a						1	4
	b						51 414	17 386 037
	c							
Romania	a							1
	b							221 134
	c							221 134
Spain	a							2
	b							1 392
	c							1 392
Total per ML category	a		1			1	2	62
	b		2 615			50 561	101 975	207 140 861
	d							1
	e							4(1)

Germany

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	41		14	7	2	27		
	b	365 911		49 782 632	817 806	705 448	12 247 925		
	c	148 682		1 467 219	631 424	748	4 036 754		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Germany

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	57	3	12	1	3	2		4
	b	5 808 267	17 308 772	839 642	200 600	437 514	6 492		16 520 151
	c								
Bulgaria	a	5	2	1		9			
	b	9 062 395	82 780	36 456		2 085 542			
	c	2 602 657	69 100	36 456		275 078			
Croatia	a	12		1					
	b	304 010		30					
	c	37 205							
Czech Republic	a			5	1	1	2	12	2
	b			1 017 301					
	c	14 331		8 405 602	21 754	1 780 655	5 871 447	34 959 677	172 424
Denmark	a	1				3	5		
	b								
	c				45 503	522 707	794 750		
Estonia	a					1	2		
	b					10 000	56 692		
	c					10 000	56 692		
Finland	a	1							
	b	250 000							
	c	389 892		1 740					
France	a		2	10	6	3	4		9
	b		7 380	332 919 500	2 710 575	24 547 500	23 378 729		16 863 400
	c								
Greece	a			1	13		44	10	
	b			842 000	1 900 000		21 900 000	1 900 000	
	c								
Hungary	a	10		9			2		3
	b	6 434 850		130 258 554			109 610		6 500 000
	c	143 818		15 511 248			1 286		510 242
Ireland	a					3			
	b					134 784			
	c					134 784			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Germany

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a	10	9	24	46	10	18	1	
	b	113 189	2 134 658	29 030 648	24 825 881	120 180 469	185 991 691	17 360	
	c								
Latvia	a	7							
	b	1 420 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a			3					
	b								
	c			456 752					
Luxembourg	a				1				
	b				163 940				
	c				163 940				
Netherlands	a	122	5	21	4	3	29		1
	b	1 348 415	828 965	318 689	2 758 326	1 500 000	15 220 658		20 000
	c	872 722	330 429	650 830	320 000	34 265 579	12 278 939		20 000
Poland	a		1		1	1	10		
	b		2 250		186 000	13 440 735	148 805		
	c						86 822		
Portugal	a					1			
	b					30 000			
	c								
Romania	a		2		1	1			
	b		62 115		109 633	31 780			
	c		62 115		224	46 906	118 452		
Slovakia	a		1	2	1	1	18	1	
	b		5 000	17 966	6 660	2 800	181 746	430 000	
	c		5 000	17 966	6 660	2 800	162 108	430 000	
Slovenia	a	2	1	2			1	1	
	b	608 400	230 000	22 303			487 914	444 601	
	c	978 450	230 000	96 783			1 674 092	444 601	
Spain	a	15		2	18	2	13		
	b	419 300		22 000	35 686 202				
	c	10 306 665		895 080	9 799 115				26 448

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Germany

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	2	2	28	5	23	10		18
	b	124 627	6 588	1 262 831		605 198 562	196 582		3 819 709
	c	438 623	17 952	11 997 184	10 948 545	9 701 554	628 655		5 380 026
Total per ML category	a	285	28	135	105	67	187	25	37
	b	26 259 364	20 668 508	546 370 552	69 365 623	768 305 134	259 926 844	2 791 961	43 723 260
	d								
	e								

Germany

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a	14	1	1		29	1		1
	b	1 491 852	3 392 690	519 468		1 411 700	150 000		8 800 000
	c	1 110 954				1 054 273			
Belgium	a		21	5			4	1	
	b		168 695	26 049 448			17 034 599	17 925	
	c								
Bulgaria	a							3	11
	b							387 244	26 936 435
	c							344 990	4 257 803
Czech Republic	a		2	3			2	3	2
	b								
	c		1 251 420	2 694 729		66 080	417 924	1 255 759	792 948
Denmark	a	1		1		100			
	b								
	c	1 449 990	3 000	18 587 829		365 509			
Estonia	a		1	2					
	b		185 000	5 064 045					
	c			24 937					
Finland	a	1	1			2			
	b	259 200	1 641 440			540 000			
	c	259 200	576 440	40 000		112 409			
France	a	5	17	16		8	2	4	5
	b	22 383 753	11 606 567	297 218 002		58 202 546	46 500 000	3 492 000	4 053 600
	c								

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Germany

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a			12				4	
	b			1 500 000				177 000 000	
	c								
Hungary	a			1					6
	b			25 900					8 273 011
	c								1 574 805
Ireland	a			2					
	b			59 139					
	c			59 139					
Italy	a	5	143	49		3	2	1	13
	b	14 099 084	7 959 056	19 801 316		60 661		319 146	1 636 722
	c								
Lithuania	a			1				1	
	b			95 106					
	c			95 106				1 924 380	
Luxembourg	a		5			1			1
	b		1 150 809			150 000			45 510
	c		45 036			1			1
Netherlands	a	7	2				2	2	6
	b	210 847	123 000				7 505 000	197 500	1 651 386
	c	229 401	11 397 922	694 265		4 402 394	460 000	2 172 036	464 782
Poland	a	1	3	1		1			14
	b	311	12 291 156	240 000		750 000			25 526 656
	c		7 137 457						5 636 216
Portugal	a	3		2					
	b	45 000		1 673 212					
	c		9 078 923	591 357					
Romania	a		20					4	
	b		24 628 643					428 539	
	c	1 158	1 256 470					175 925	
Slovakia	a		3						
	b		1 875 610						
	c		882 201						

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Germany

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovenia	a						4		
	b						5 340 900		
	c						2 067 900		36 834
Spain	a	1	44	20				2	
	b	6 900 000	674 675 081	60 052 881					
	c	1 305 000	552 781 933	21 302 508					54 082
Sweden	a	3		5		11	2	1	
	b			844 841		655 094	29 252		
	c		832 613	1 233 162		7 116 271	41 075		
Total per ML category	a	41	263	121		155	19	26	59
	b	45 390 047	739 697 747	413 143 358		61 770 001	76 559 751	181 842 354	76 923 320
	d								
	e								

Germany

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	6	10				2	156
	b	508 660	348 983				210 000	80 753 075
	c	50 103	251 023					8 751 180
Belgium	a							113
	b							84 392 105
	c							
Bulgaria	a							31
	b							38 590 852
	c							7 586 084
Croatia	a							13
	b							304 040
	c							37 205
Czech Republic	a		14					49
	b							1 017 301
	c		227 327			489 712	189 395	58 611 184
Denmark	a	3				7	4	125
	b							
	c	10 145				5 662 780	5 662 493	33 104 706

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Germany

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Estonia	a						1	7
	b						1	5 315 738
	c							91 629
Finland	a	3				5		13
	b	544				1 839 000		4 530 184
	c	549				1 648 870	782 469	3 811 569
France	a	4	1			5	31	132
	b	2 373 500	1 600 000			6 741 280	74 546 659	929 144 991
	c							67 000 000
Greece	a							84
	b							205 042 000
	c							
Hungary	a	2				2		35
	b	66 020				21 500 000		173 167 945
	c	7 700				2 780 737		20 529 836
Ireland	a							5
	b							193 923
	c							193 923
Italy	a					5	7	346
	b					829 770	1 000 000	407 999 651
	c							126 129 611
Latvia	a							7
	b							1 420 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		6
	b							95 106
	c							2 476 238
Luxembourg	a							8
	b							1 510 259
	c							208 978
Netherlands	a	6	4			3	14	231
	b	377 783	111 518			1 050 000	4 267 142	37 489 229
	c	1 087 103	9 335			41 939	1 805 244	71 502 920

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Germany

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a	2	1				9	45
	b	43 435	35 600				2 499 496	55 164 444
	c	48 863	37 388				1 067 634	14 014 380
Portugal	a					1		7
	b					100 000		1 848 212
	c					39 943		9 710 223
Romania	a					1		29
	b					3 000 000		28 260 710
	c							1 661 250
Slovakia	a							27
	b							2 519 782
	c							1 506 735
Slovenia	a							11
	b							7 134 118
	c							5 528 660
Spain	a	3				2	25	147
	b	136 000					2 557 214	780 448 678
	c							596 470 831
Sweden	a	9	3			10	20	152
	b	8 082 827				1 226 605	1 006 490	622 454 008
	c	3 773 384	658 408			5 930 750	65 656 206	124 354 408
Total per ML category	a	38	33			42	113	1 779
	b	11 588 769	2 096 101			36 286 655	86 087 002	3 468 796 351
	d							
	e							

Ghana

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	5					2		
	b	2 500					14 108 289		
	c	2 500							
Bulgaria	a								3
	b								765 552
	c		189 924	125 118					956 512

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Ghana

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	4		2					
	b								
	c	741 790					81 032		
Germany	a						1		
	b						60 270		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	9		2			3		3
	b	2 500					14 168 559		765 552
	d								
	e								

Ghana

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					1 717 000			
	c					525 130			
Czech Republic	a		3			1			
	b		162 585						
	c		5 317 090						
France	a			1				2	
	b			1 000 000				7 266 000	
	c								
Lithuania	a		1						
	b		4 697 755						
	c								
Spain	a		1						
	b		17 000 000						
	c		95 461						
Total per ML category	a		5	1		2		2	
	b		21 860 340	1 000 000		1 717 000		7 266 000	
	d								
	e								

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Ghana

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a						1	8
	b						264 672	14 375 461
	c							2 500
Bulgaria	a							4
	b							2 482 552
	c							1 796 684
Czech Republic	a							10
	b							162 585
	c							6 139 912
France	a						1	4
	b						3 850 000	12 116 000
	c							
Germany	a							1
	b							60 270
	c							
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							715 376
Lithuania	a							1
	b							4 697 755
	c							
Spain	a							1
	b							17 000 000
	c							95 461
Total per ML category	a						2	29
	b						4 114 672	50 894 623
	d							
	e							

Gibraltar

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a	2	2	2					
	b	4 388	3 013	7 853					
	c	2 293	3 013						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Gibraltar

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	2	2	2					
	b	4 388	3 013	7 853					
	d								
	e								

Gibraltar

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Gibraltar

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a						1	7
	b							15 254
	c							5 306
Total per ML category	a						1	7
	b							15 254
	d							
	e							

Greece

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	1 750							
	c	1 750							
Belgium	a	1							
	b	45 521							
	c								
Croatia	a	2							
	b	80 150							
	c	29 350							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Greece

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1					1		
	b								
	c	790			30 588		13 372		
Denmark	a						2		
	b								
	c						205 264		
Finland	a	1							
	b	2 350							
	c								
France	a			4	7	2	1		
	b			2 209 720 000	414 468 100	43 000 000	45 000		
	c								
Germany	a		4	2	7	1	30		
	b		881 940	2 967 050	46 464 821	5 574	67 488 845		
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			80 000					
	c			9 800					
Italy	a		5	1	3	1			
	b		2 178 841	218 400	225 607				
	c								
Netherlands	a			10					
	b			907 436					
	c					1 230 000	23 634		
Poland	a			1					
	b			2 167					
	c								
Slovakia	a	1		1	1				
	b	69 900		202 600	43 500				
	c	69 900		192 700	43 500				
Spain	a					1			3
	b					752 085			2 511 250
	c	9 200					75 295		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Greece

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	1							
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	8	9	20	18	5	34		3
	b	199 671	3 060 781	2 214 097 653	461 202 028	43 757 659	67 533 845		2 511 250
	d								
	e								

Greece

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a		1			1			
	b		32 139			12 000			
	c					317 980			
Czech Republic	a		1	2					
	b								
	c		20 761	194 645					
Denmark	a					2			
	b								
	c	980				56 588			
France	a	3	6	3					
	b	3 901 402 254	85 889 574	379 056 000					
	c								
Germany	a	7	8	6			1	4	30
	b	5 836 270	977 447	4 263 088			4 579 375	3 311 066	983 619
	c								
Italy	a	1		4					
	b	10 000 000		1 014 352					
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							11 040	
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		94 194	18 000				627 450	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Greece

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a					1			
	b					35 493			
	c								
Portugal	a			1					
	b			150 560					
	c		1 491 297	150 560					
Romania	a						1		1
	b						5 120		318 803
	c						5 120		141 836
Spain	a		4	4					
	b		1 129 739	10 018 043					
	c		629 739						
Sweden	a						2		
	b						44 107		
	c					14 835	53 127		
Total per ML category	a	11	20	20		4	4	4	31
	b	3 917 238 524	88 028 899	394 502 043		47 493	4 628 602	3 311 066	1 302 422
	d								
	e								

Greece

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							1 750
	c							1 750
Belgium	a							1
	b							45 521
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							44 139
	c							317 980
Croatia	a							2
	b							80 150
	c							29 350

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Greece

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							5
	b							
	c							260 156
Denmark	a							4
	b							
	c					1 007		263 839
Finland	a							1
	b							2 350
	c							
France	a					2	16	44
	b					39 800 000	174 494 003	7 247 874 931
	c							979 000 000
Germany	a	4	3			5	10	122
	b	63 763	2 439 998			499 308	3 872 504	144 634 668
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							80 000
	c							9 800
Italy	a							15
	b							13 637 200
	c							17 162 982
Lithuania	a							
	b							
	c							11 040
Netherlands	a							10
	b							907 436
	c					2 350	202	1 995 830
Poland	a							2
	b							37 660
	c							
Portugal	a							1
	b							150 560
	c							1 641 857

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Greece

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a							2
	b							323 923
	c							146 956
Slovakia	a							3
	b							316 000
	c							306 100
Spain	a						8	20
	b						2 712 811	17 123 928
	c							714 234
Sweden	a							3
	b							44 107
	c							67 962
Total per ML category	a	4	3			7	34	239
	b	63 763	2 439 998			40 299 308	181 079 318	7 425 304 323
	d							
	e							

Greenland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	16 100							
	c	3 820							
Denmark	a	1		3				1	
	b	16 129		12 917				215	
	c								
Finland	a								
	b								
	c	3 236							
Germany	a	3		1					
	b	50 518		5 697					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Greenland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	6		4				1	
	b	82 747		18 614				215	
	d								
	e								

Greenland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a			1					
	b			92 270					
	c								
Total per ML category	a			1					
	b			92 270					
	d								
	e								

Greenland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							16 100
	c							3 820
Denmark	a					1	1	7
	b							29 261
	c							
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							3 236
Germany	a					1		6
	b					4 394		152 879
	c							
Total per ML category	a					2	1	15
	b					4 394		198 240
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Grenada

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Grenada

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Grenada

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Guatemala

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Croatia	a	3							
	b	220 691							
	c	220 691							
Estonia	a	1							
	b	166 597							
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b	169 865							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Guatemala

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	5							
	b	557 153							
	d								
	e								

Guatemala

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1						
	b		1 469 409						
	c								
Total per ML category	a		1						
	b		1 469 409						
	d		1						
	e		2(1)						

Guatemala

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Croatia	a							3
	b							220 691
	c							220 691
Estonia	a							1
	b							166 597
	c							
France	a							1
	b							1 469 409
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							169 865
	c							173 965
Total per ML category	a							6
	b							2 026 562
	d							1
	e							2(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Guernsey

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Guernsey

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Guernsey

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Guinea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								1
	b								146 574
	c								178 651
Croatia	a	6	1						
	b	3 394 600	136 500						
	c	558 600							
Total per ML category	a	6	1						1
	b	3 394 600	136 500						146 574
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Guinea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1			6			
	b		37 950			19 696 020			
	c								
Total per ML category	a		1			6			
	b		37 950			19 696 020			
	d								
	e								

Guinea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							146 574
	c							178 651
Croatia	a							7
	b							3 531 100
	c							558 600
France	a					2		9
	b					89 505 000		109 238 970
	c							
Total per ML category	a					2		17
	b					89 505 000		112 916 644
	d							
	e							

Guinea-Bissau

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Guinea-Bissau

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Guinea-Bissau

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Guyana

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4							
	b	665 997							
	c	319 583							
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c	91 999							
Total per ML category	a	4							
	b	665 997							
	d								
	e								

Guyana

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Guyana

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							4
	b							665 997
	c							319 583
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c							91 999
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							845 797
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							665 997
	d							
	e							

Haiti

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Haiti

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Haiti

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Holy See

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	1							
	b	3 351							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	3 351							
	d								
	e								

Holy See

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Holy See

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							1
	b							3 351
	c							
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							3 351
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Honduras

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Honduras

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d		1						
	e		2(1)						

Honduras

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							1
	e							2(1)

Hong Kong

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a							1	
	b							58 968	
	c								
Total per ML category	a							1	
	b							58 968	
	d	1		1				2	
	e	1(1), 2(1), 7(1)		1(1), 2(1), 7(1)				2(2)	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hong Kong

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c			389 780					
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c	1 455 927							
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Hong Kong

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c							389 780
Italy	a							1
	b							58 968
	c							
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c							1 455 927
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							58 968
	d							4
	e							1(2), 2(4), 7(2)

Hungary

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	13	1	1		1	2		
	b	32 225	1 725 868	799 800		591 269	7 375 680		
	c	21 584					1 676 291		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hungary

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	8							1
	b	20 430 026							9 000 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a		1		1		2	1	
	b		44 880		1 260 000		559 000	14 000	
	c		51 230				293 000		
Czech Republic	a	1					1		3
	b								
	c	1 582 023		1 349 887			85 484		1 009 695
Finland	a								
	b								
	c	1 664			111 451				
France	a			1		1			
	b			67 230 900					
	c								
Germany	a	1	1	5		1	5		
	b	7 605 000	28 750 000	169 436 461		1 169 000	263 900		
	c								
Italy	a			1		1			
	b			100 125		1 058 826			
	c								
Latvia	a	11							
	b	16 935 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		1					
	b								
	c	600 449		67 994					
Netherlands	a	2					2		
	b	6 950					15 493		
	c								
Poland	a	1							
	b	2 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hungary

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Romania	a					1			
	b					30 040			
	c					30 040			
Slovakia	a	1	1				3		
	b	673 200	15 000				319 550		
	c	132 000	15 000				234 280		
Slovenia	a			1					
	b			678 400					
	c	38 007		445 489					
Spain	a	1			2				
	b	120 000			797 306				
	c	1 200			172 306				
Sweden	a		5	6	1	2			
	b				254 240				
	c		1 448 498	1 983 683	217 884	757 170			92 673
Total per ML category	a	40	9	16	4	7	15	1	4
	b	45 804 401	30 535 748	238 245 686	2 311 546	2 849 135	8 533 623	14 000	9 000 000
	d								
	e								

Hungary

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					222 228			
	c					222 228			
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b								
	c		2 132 384	349 265					7 158 057
Denmark	a					4			
	b								
	c					2 534			
Finland	a					1			
	b					52 000			
	c					3 000			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hungary

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		2	5		2	1	1	
	b		1 054 747	77 575 978		8 500 000	250 000	7 305 000	
	c								
Germany	a		3	6					2
	b		105 900	23 767 945					6 036 927
	c								
Italy	a		3	1					
	b		549 032						
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							260 566	
Sweden	a		1				1		
	b						1 578		
	c		84 653				53 910		
Total per ML category	a		9	13		8	2	2	2
	b		1 709 679	101 343 923		8 774 228	251 578	7 305 000	6 036 927
	d								
	e								

Hungary

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a						1	20
	b						35 000	10 782 070
	c							1 920 103
Belgium	a							9
	b							29 430 026
	c							
Bulgaria	a							5
	b							1 877 880
	c							344 230
Czech Republic	a		4					10
	b							
	c		71 893					13 738 688

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hungary

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Denmark	a					1		5
	b							
	c					107		2 641
Finland	a						1	2
	b						3 000 000	3 052 000
	c							116 115
France	a	1				2	3	19
	b	186				11 020 000	9 350 002	182 286 813
	c							2 300 000
Germany	a	5	12			6	13	60
	b	8 838 609	2 899 782			90 487	245 012	249 209 023
	c							
Italy	a	1						7
	b	2 516 519						4 224 502
	c							1 334 565
Latvia	a							11
	b							16 935 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		4
	b							
	c							929 009
Netherlands	a							4
	b							22 443
	c						2	2
Poland	a							1
	b							2 000
	c							
Romania	a							1
	b							30 040
	c							30 040
Slovakia	a							5
	b							1 007 750
	c							381 280

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Hungary

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a							1
	b							678 400
	c							483 496
Spain	a							3
	b							917 306
	c							173 506
Sweden	a	5				1	8	30
	b	3 817 110					47 029	4 119 957
	c	897 554					77 270 774	82 806 799
Total per ML category	a	12	16			11	26	197
	b	15 172 424	2 899 782			11 110 487	12 677 043	504 575 210
	d							
	e							

Iceland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	142 888							
	c	18 371							
Czech Republic	a	3							
	b	10 716							
	c	18 272							
Hungary	a			1					
	b			104 000					
	c			104 000					
Netherlands	a	1							
	b	595							
	c	595							
Spain	a	1							
	b	8 980							
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			39 564					1 263

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Iceland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	7		1					
	b	163 179		104 000					
	d								
	e								

Iceland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a								2
	b								7 300
	c								
Portugal	a	1							
	b	685 000							
	c		2 400 000						
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c		43 471						
Total per ML category	a	1							2
	b	685 000							7 300
	d								
	e								

Iceland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					3
	b		15 000					157 888
	c							18 371
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							10 716
	c							18 272
Germany	a							2
	b							7 300
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Iceland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a							1
	b							104 000
	c							104 000
Netherlands	a							1
	b							595
	c							595
Portugal	a							1
	b							685 000
	c							2 400 000
Spain	a							1
	b							8 980
	c							
Sweden	a	3						3
	b							
	c	13 604						97 902
Total per ML category	a	3	1					15
	b		15 000					974 479
	d							
	e							

India

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		5					
	b	8 850		13 948					
	c	4 023		11 303					
Belgium	a	2	5			3	1		1
	b	102 912	1 729 008			1 413 442	10 000 000		4 500 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1	1	15	2	3			
	b	4 256	50	28 342 686	5 110 616	23 611			
	c	6 747	96	16 241 356	17 041 156	20 075			
Croatia	a	3							
	b	2 865							
	c	2 865							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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India

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Cyprus	a	75							
	b	360 715							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	5		2			26		
	b	65 785		101 815			11 349 290		
	c	58 986		9 687			25 003 938		
Denmark	a					1			
	b					29 600			
	c								
Estonia	a						3		
	b						272 675		
	c						122 675		
Finland	a								
	b								
	c	4 070 547							
France	a		3	6	16	23	4		1
	b		8 677 700	30 207 200	87 622 753	1 467 204 381	12 032 148		280 000
	c								
Germany	a	59		31	4	6	3		1
	b	516 333		258 591	165 703	6 236 830	303 676		683 610
	c								
Italy	a	1	6	4	6	3		2	
	b	96 805	610 621	7 263 584	8 275 931	6 132 073		54 390	
	c								
Malta	a	1		1					
	b	18 000		5 110					
	c	18 000							
Netherlands	a					8	2		
	b					467 947	70 118		
	c					1 201 628	231 607		
Poland	a				2		3		
	b				7 112 176		1 735 195		
	c				90 705		1 361 453		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

India

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Romania	a				1	1			
	b				9 496 676	99 954			
	c								
Slovakia	a					1			
	b					24 800			
	c								
Spain	a			3	3	4			
	b			6 336 017	1 744 390				
	c			6 367 877	1 539 690				
Sweden	a		2	1	1	9			
	b			7 524 667		924 903			
	c		6 133 194	108 493 490		878 645			
Total per ML category	a	149	17	68	35	62	42	2	3
	b	1 176 521	11 017 379	80 053 618	119 528 245	1 482 557 541	35 763 102	54 390	5 463 610
	d								
	e								

India

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		9						1
	b		684 967						71 230
	c								64 995
Belgium	a		7						2
	b		267 019						432 636
	c								
Bulgaria	a			2				1	
	b			2 267 560				9 479	
	c			2 267 560		19 543		9 479	
Czech Republic	a		2				1	2	
	b		310 794						
	c		204 534						
France	a	27	32	19		3	2	15	4
	b	6 436 458 153	302 840 688	330 569 392		8 500 000	111 720 000	25 134 000	26 233 850
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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India

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a	22	14	18		1			4
	b	36 698 461	910 401	2 105 840		15 582			553 064
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							99 076	
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			666 800					
	c			666 968					
Italy	a	8	35	4					
	b	1 992 452	19 151 185	58 800 605					
	c								
Netherlands	a	3	1						
	b	4 330 641	35 410						
	c	6 789 394	267 272					124 380	
Poland	a	1	2	1			2		
	b	97 710	3 207 610	14 276			131 334		
	c			14 102			30 846		
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		1 340 322						
Romania	a		1						2
	b		106 450						130 278
	c		50 888						35 470
Slovakia	a						1		
	b						7 826 666		
	c								
Spain	a		5	8				3	
	b		49 246 159	2 350 838					
	c	1 610 927	2 500 580	1 231 767					
Sweden	a						1		
	b						16 706		
	c					171 205	16 706		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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India

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	61	108	53		4	7	23	13
	b	6 479 577 417	376 760 683	396 775 311		8 515 582	119 694 706	25 242 555	27 421 058
	d								
	e								

India

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2					19
	b		69 327					848 322
	c		6 302					86 623
Belgium	a							21
	b							18 445 017
	c							
Bulgaria	a		1					26
	b		40					35 758 298
	c		76					35 606 088
Croatia	a							3
	b							2 865
	c							2 865
Cyprus	a							75
	b							360 715
	c							
Czech Republic	a		7					45
	b		245 066					12 072 750
	c		136 489					25 413 634
Denmark	a							1
	b							29 600
	c							
Estonia	a							3
	b							272 675
	c							122 675
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							4 070 547

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

India

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	2	7		1	1	41	207
	b	18 651	43 017 170		1 650 000	4 075 000	198 714 214	9 094 955 300
	c							1 123 400 000
Germany	a	2	2			8	23	198
	b	1 929 081	114 881			84 946	9 011 321	59 588 320
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							99 076
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							666 800
	c							666 968
Italy	a		1				2	72
	b		432 850				1 253 816	104 064 312
	c							49 033 147
Lithuania	a						4	4
	b						72 780	72 780
	c						72 685	72 685
Malta	a							2
	b							23 110
	c							18 000
Netherlands	a						8	22
	b						5 853 183	10 757 299
	c						142 206	8 756 487
Poland	a						12	23
	b						1 451 533	13 749 834
	c						67 009	1 564 115
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							1 340 322
Romania	a							5
	b							9 833 358
	c							86 358

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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India

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovakia	a							2
	b							7 851 466
	c							
Spain	a						2	28
	b							59 677 404
	c	141 678						13 392 519
Sweden	a		1			3	7	25
	b					3 598	838 079	9 307 953
	c		1 397 450			9 994	548 924	117 649 608
Total per ML category	a	4	21		1	12	99	784
	b	1 947 732	43 879 334		1 650 000	4 163 544	217 194 926	9 438 437 254
	d					1		1
	e					2(1)		2(1)

Indonesia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	2 660 765							
	c	2 670 765							
Belgium	a	4		2					
	b	1 255 196		408 170					
	c								
Bulgaria	a	2			2	2	4		
	b	1 155 130			498 448	138 900	232 970		
	c	1 155 130		13 750	247 748	194 070	232 970		
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	18 400							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	7			1	1	6	1	
	b	579 140					607 311		
	c	1 660 659					309 955	1 402	
Denmark	a				4				
	b				4 513 441				
	c								

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Indonesia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a		1	4	1	1	2	2	
	b		58 530 000	963 962 775	2 591 515 000	91 000	6 000	203 150	
	c								
Germany	a	2		1	2	4	5	2	2
	b	44 521		729 250	442 315	261 046	302 486	25 215	1 075
	c								
Hungary	a	3							
	b	129 147							
	c	66 783							
Italy	a	13		1					
	b	12 047 141							
	c								
Latvia	a			1					
	b			3 000					
	c								
Netherlands	a					2			
	b					519 564			
	c					471 969			
Poland	a					3	4		
	b					273 875	67 381		
	c					275 907	66 861		
Romania	a	1							
	b	30 380							
	c	30 380							
Slovakia	a			4		1			
	b			919 410		31 500			
	c			802 230		31 500			
Slovenia	a	3							
	b	343 025							
	c	343 025							
Spain	a		1	5	3	3	3		
	b			2 302 560	847 570	109 200			
	c	502 257		960	847 570		2 121 160		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Indonesia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a		2						
	b								
	c		24 386 411						
Total per ML category	a	37	4	18	13	17	24	5	2
	b	18 262 845	58 530 000	968 325 165	2 597 816 774	1 425 085	1 216 148	228 365	1 075
	d								
	e								

Indonesia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		2					2	
	b		86 303					1 217 804	
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1				1	
	b			131 840				587 070	
	c			131 840				596 245	
Czech Republic	a							2	
	b								
	c		13 033					143 306	
Denmark	a			1					
	b								
	c								
France	a		8	4		5	1	1	1
	b		261 825 238	1 211 495 001		96 301 200	967 000	1 070 000	810 000
	c								
Germany	a	1	3	1					
	b	122 565 389	197 764	43 189					
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							360 400	
	c								
Italy	a	1		1					
	b	31 275		45 600					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Indonesia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							782 100	
	c								
Netherlands	a	1	1						
	b	64 000	224 564						
	c								
Poland	a								
	b								
	c			6 882					
Portugal	a			1					
	b			29 200					
	c								
Spain	a		7				1	6	
	b		288 500				35 140	1 710 000	
	c		269 593				35 140	1 440 060	
Sweden	a			1					
	b			11 287					
	c			4 885					
Total per ML category	a	3	21	10		5	2	14	1
	b	122 660 664	262 622 369	1 211 756 117		96 301 200	1 002 140	5 727 374	810 000
	d								
	e								

Indonesia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2					3
	b		73 328					2 734 093
	c		73 328					2 744 093
Belgium	a		2					12
	b		28 569 633					31 537 106
	c							
Bulgaria	a							12
	b							2 744 358
	c							2 571 753

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Indonesia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Cyprus	a							1
	b							18 400
	c							
Czech Republic	a		4					22
	b		245 053					1 431 504
	c		160 380					2 288 735
Denmark	a					3		8
	b					3 763 441		8 276 882
	c							
France	a	2				3	9	45
	b	11 756				203 100 001	374 270 300	5 764 158 421
	c							75 900 000
Germany	a	2	1			2	2	30
	b	18 864	50 000			2 058	4	124 683 176
	c							
Greece	a					1		2
	b					1 137 250		1 497 650
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							129 147
	c							66 783
Italy	a							16
	b							12 124 016
	c							11 108 669
Latvia	a							1
	b							3 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							782 100
	c							
Netherlands	a					4	6	14
	b					522 614	2 226 249	3 556 991
	c						1 502 829	1 974 798

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Indonesia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							7
	b							341 256
	c							349 650
Portugal	a							1
	b							29 200
	c							
Romania	a							1
	b							30 380
	c							30 380
Slovakia	a							5
	b							950 910
	c							833 730
Slovenia	a							3
	b							343 025
	c							343 025
Spain	a							29
	b							5 292 970
	c							5 216 740
Sweden	a		2				2	7
	b							11 287
	c							24 391 296
Total per ML category	a	4	11			13	19	223
	b	30 620	28 938 014			208 525 364	376 496 553	5 960 675 872
	d		1					1
	e		7(1)					7(1)

Iran

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						1		
	b						188 232		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Iran

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a						1		
	b						188 232		
	d								
	e								

Iran

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Iran

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							1
	b							188 232
	c							
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							188 232
	d							
	e							

Iraq

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a				4		1		
	b				12 447 927		40 960 000		
	c		12 797 622	13 957 219	45 880 656		27 464 390		
Croatia	a	2							
	b	3 114 523							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b	45 186							
	c	39 763				9 158 068			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Iraq

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						4		
	b						909 789		
	c								
Romania	a			1					
	b			1 262 287					
	c	3 280 286	1 013 010	1 262 287					
Total per ML category	a	3		1	4		5		
	b	3 159 709		1 262 287	12 447 927		41 869 789		
	d								
	e								

Iraq

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c							12 132 848	
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		11 733 522						
France	a	1		2			3	3	
	b	30 075 001		17 300 050			24 000 064	6 342 000	
	c								
Germany	a					1			
	b					785 000			
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1		2		1	3	3	
	b	30 075 001		17 300 050		785 000	24 000 064	6 342 000	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Iraq

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							5
	b							53 407 927
	c							112 232 735
Croatia	a							2
	b							3 114 523
	c							
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							45 186
	c							20 931 353
France	a			1			1	11
	b			4 000 000			10 000	81 727 115
	c							92 000 000
Germany	a	1						6
	b	764 489						2 459 278
	c							
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							5 376 000
Romania	a							1
	b							1 262 287
	c							5 555 583
Total per ML category	a	1		1			1	26
	b	764 489		4 000 000			10 000	142 016 316
	d							
	e							

Ireland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2			2				
	b	3 299			292 226				
	c	9 285			10 460				
Belgium	a			1					
	b			54 000					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ireland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								1
	b								339 034
	c								446 861
Czech Republic	a						1		2
	b								
	c			280 973					38 018
Finland	a				1				
	b				9 640				
	c				9 640				
France	a								1
	b								75 000
	c								
Germany	a			1			10		
	b			100 050			86 134		
	c								
Italy	a			1					
	b			416 600					
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					72 000			
	c								
Spain	a			1		1			1
	b			15 905 127		376 043			
	c			15 905 127					
Sweden	a	1			1		2		
	b						8 499 111		
	c	35 695	11 282	27 044	2 851 437		8 075 849		
Total per ML category	a	3		4	4	2	13		5
	b	3 299		16 475 777	301 866	448 043	8 585 245		414 034
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ireland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1				1		
	b		3 000 000				158 020		
	c								
Denmark	a					2			
	b								
	c					964			
France	a		1	1					
	b		117 405	28 000					
	c								
Germany	a		2	1					
	b		13 474	5 250					
	c								
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		130 000						
Spain	a		1						
	b								
	c		188 809						
Sweden	a			1					
	b			11 287					
	c			8 368					
Total per ML category	a		5	3		2	1		
	b		3 130 879	44 537			158 020		
	d								
	e								

Ireland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							4
	b							295 525
	c							19 745
Belgium	a							3
	b							3 212 020
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ireland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							339 034
	c							446 861
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							
	c							318 991
Denmark	a							2
	b							
	c					414 518	414 518	830 000
Finland	a							1
	b							9 640
	c							9 640
France	a							3
	b							220 405
	c							
Germany	a	1					1	16
	b	545					6 000	211 453
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							416 600
	c							154 535
Netherlands	a							1
	b							72 000
	c							130 000
Spain	a						1	5
	b						650 340	16 931 510
	c							16 093 936
Sweden	a	1						6
	b	4 607						8 515 005
	c	14 559						11 024 234
Total per ML category	a	2					2	46
	b	5 152					656 340	30 223 192
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Israel

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a						1		
	b						491 844		
	c						770		
Belgium	a					1			1
	b					189 000			1 680 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1		2	1				
	b	6 549 612		268 405	447 018				
	c	399 682		127 305	447 018				
Czech Republic	a	7		6			8		1
	b	103 262		1 449 358			21 576 984		
	c	1 088 624	550 686	484 696			11 620 062	120 742	9 370
Denmark	a				1				
	b				134 409				
	c								
Estonia	a	1							
	b	52 500							
	c	17 292							
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					44 000			
France	a	1		1	7	7	1	2	4
	b	15 992		300 000	9 151 000	267 035 000	300 000	5 168 000	12 191 080
	c								
Germany	a			1	5	5	21	4	1
	b			6 357 400	2 753 754	1 545 140	2 604 961	85 001	1 862
	c								
Greece	a				2				
	b				310 382				
	c								
Hungary	a	20							
	b	1 137 200							
	c	43 253							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Israel

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a		2	1	1				
	b		848 162		6 490				
	c								
Latvia	a	3							
	b	495 000							
	c								
Netherlands	a				1				
	b				10 150 000				
	c				10 115 000				
Poland	a				1				
	b				128 228				
	c				126 504				
Portugal	a				12				
	b				3 241 104				
	c				550 710				
Romania	a			2	2	6	6		
	b			523 156	476 178	635 356	20 970 564		
	c		107 760	655 065	7 342 510	274 144	9 336 460		
Slovakia	a			2	2		2		
	b			2 189 020	59 240		932 200		
	c			2 160 500	59 240		916 750		
Spain	a		3		2	3	7		
	b				219 800	3 000	9 900		
	c			11 400	314 345	1 363 545	9 900		
Sweden	a					4			
	b					1 274 490			
	c					446 567			
Total per ML category	a	33	5	15	37	26	46	6	7
	b	8 353 566	848 162	11 087 339	27 077 603	270 681 986	46 886 453	5 253 001	13 872 942
	d					1			
	e					1(1), 2(1), 7(1)			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Israel

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a			1	1			1	
	b			1 500	898 947			146 992	
	c			1 500	586 194			146 992	
Belgium	a		5					2	
	b		1 449 726					341 560	
	c								
Czech Republic	a		5	5			3	15	2
	b		63 111	3 403 325			2 437 499	2 724 111	9 769 998
	c		112 490	5 867 567			875 548	2 232 683	2 398 371
Finland	a			1					
	b			582 400					
	c			582 400					
France	a		9	6		1		14	4
	b		7 596 735	9 705 865		2 575 000		21 779 219	14 931 000
	c								
Germany	a	14		7			2		1
	b	373 805		2 639 333			15 534 099		41 006
	c								
Greece	a							3	
	b							398 700	
	c								
Italy	a		15					1	1
	b		4 574 068						97 732
	c								
Latvia	a			2				1	
	b			3 369 000				260 000	
	c								
Luxembourg	a								6
	b								106 013
	c								19 981
Malta	a		2						
	b		4 492 794						
	c		1 597 429						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Israel

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		2 038 871	236 891					
Poland	a		1						
	b		344 508						
	c								
Portugal	a		1						
	b		1 267 826						
	c		2 079 787						
Romania	a		5	1				1	
	b		43 264 972	37 986 704				19 743	
	c		16 240 794	10 765 399				2 812 839	
Slovakia	a		3	2				5	
	b		67 554	150 500				9 923 147	
	c		64 781	144 500				841 968	
Slovenia	a						1		7
	b						299 000		407 425
	c								217 358
Spain	a		7	4	1			6	1
	b		8 000 000					1 059 735	
	c		14 087					632 930	
Total per ML category	a	14	53	29	2	1	6	49	22
	b	373 805	71 121 294	57 838 627	898 947	2 575 000	18 270 598	36 653 207	25 353 174
	d								
	e								

Israel

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		3				2	9
	b		76 449				125 000	1 740 732
	c		76 449					811 905
Belgium	a							9
	b							3 660 286
	c							

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Israel

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							4
	b							7 265 035
	c							974 005
Czech Republic	a	1	5					58
	b		75 127					41 602 775
	c	579 573	92 512					26 032 924
Denmark	a					1	2	4
	b					134 409	134 409	403 227
	c							
Estonia	a						1	2
	b						1	52 501
	c						1	17 293
Finland	a							1
	b							582 400
	c							626 400
France	a	2	2				5	66
	b	175 500	2 265 642				2 900 011	356 090 044
	c							15 300 000
Germany	a	2	2	1		5	17	88
	b	13 952	51 200	50 000		51 847	185 459	32 288 819
	c							
Greece	a							5
	b							709 082
	c							
Hungary	a							20
	b							1 137 200
	c							43 253
Italy	a		3				1	25
	b		3 756 197					9 282 649
	c							17 301 452
Latvia	a							6
	b							4 124 000
	c							

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Israel

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Luxembourg	a							6
	b							106 013
	c							19 981
Malta	a							2
	b							4 492 794
	c							1 597 429
Netherlands	a						1	2
	b						75 000	10 225 000
	c	51 178					70 002	12 511 942
Poland	a						1	3
	b						114 204	586 940
	c							126 504
Portugal	a							13
	b							4 508 930
	c							2 630 497
Romania	a	1				2		26
	b	5 698				2 144 412		106 026 783
	c	2 094 808	1 802 250			1 507 380		52 939 409
Slovakia	a							16
	b							13 321 661
	c							4 187 739
Slovenia	a							8
	b							706 425
	c							217 358
Spain	a							34
	b							9 292 435
	c							2 346 207
Sweden	a							4
	b							1 274 490
	c							446 567
Total per ML category	a	6	15	1		8	30	411
	b	195 150	6 224 615	50 000		2 330 668	3 534 084	609 480 221
	d							1
	e							1(1), 2(1), 7(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Italy

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	20		1			1		
	b	442 486		2 366 129			4 008 504		
	c	27 883		2 366 129					
Belgium	a	12		12	2		2		2
	b	2 049 500		36 687 261	1 509 337		1 621 510		11 700 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1							
	b	200 580							
	c	18 760			14 875 612				
Czech Republic	a	1		3					3
	b								
	c	25 310		3 217 396		6 888 663	81 731		60 262
Denmark	a					5	1		
	b								
	c					17 650	95 533		
Finland	a	1			5				
	b	496			174 162				
	c	50 903		2 227 817	174 165				
France	a	1	1	4	14	6	1	2	5
	b	2 850	1 725 000	105 905 000	78 000 273	14 769 317	500 000	21 931 250	10 996 000
	c								
Germany	a	6	15	11	8	12	34		
	b	195 795	2 894 019	21 968 663	166 582	11 023 964	1 344 585		
	c								
Hungary	a			3					
	b			992 000					
	c			335 518					
Latvia	a	10							
	b	3 888 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		2					
	b								
	c	417 510		484 345					

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Italy

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	1		2	1	1		1	1
	b	596		1 707 896	4 500	4 140		63 150	2 800
	c	596		1 999 517	19 935 103	1 240 640			
Poland	a	1				3	12		
	b	1 379 131				26 600	420 405		
	c	272 021							
Portugal	a	3							
	b	5 200							
	c								
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	14 050							
	c	14 050		2 232 356					
Spain	a	4	3	11	6	2	4		8
	b	199 200		379 430	773 629	21 947 635			640 990
	c	13 600	870 730	268 938	9 729 694	38 695			350 819
Sweden	a	1				14			1
	b					4 112 677			1 410 875
	c			1 858 499	96 040	1 538 711			2 659 464
Total per ML category	a	64	19	49	36	43	55	3	20
	b	8 377 884	4 619 019	170 006 379	80 628 483	51 884 333	7 895 004	21 994 400	24 750 665
	d								
	e								

Italy

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		20						6
	b		16 813 021						210 992
	c								
Bulgaria	a			2		3		2	1
	b			11 019		325 000		30 595	34 664 720
	c			11 019		678 503		3 790	6 404 866
Czech Republic	a		3						
	b								
	c		1 291 910			1 168 970			31 007 852

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Italy

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a	1		2		40			
	b								
	c	75 877	321 004	890 841		67 337			
Estonia	a		1	2					
	b		636 000	219 740					
	c								
Finland	a		1						
	b		1 571 440						
	c		1 391 069			416 000			
France	a	10	30	6		3			7
	b	20 579 291	361 080 895	264 976 000		11 125 000			8 984 685
	c								
Germany	a	11	89	37		1	7	6	33
	b	156 452	36 713 697	12 081 114		1 335	17 433 681	2 356 264	3 120 898
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							263 785	
Netherlands	a	1	4						
	b	338 464	89 099						
	c	2 457	16 375 667	937 101	81 158			215 000	
Poland	a	4	1			1			
	b	636 603	50 152			2 100 000			
	c	20 079	114 134						
Portugal	a	1							
	b	2 500 000							
	c		1 542 256						
Romania	a								1
	b								19 580
	c								19 580
Spain	a		30	17		2			
	b		332 735 740	351 496 868		20 175			
	c		24 970 939	20 300 371					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Italy

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a					1	2		
	b					150 023	801 072		
	c	232 794				313 595	1 652		
Total per ML category	a	28	179	66		51	9	9	48
	b	24 210 810	749 690 044	628 784 741		13 721 533	18 234 753	2 386 859	47 000 875
	d								
	e								

Italy

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							22
	b							6 817 119
	c							2 394 012
Belgium	a							56
	b							70 591 621
	c							
Bulgaria	a							9
	b							35 231 914
	c							21 992 550
Czech Republic	a		5					15
	b							
	c		85 994					43 828 088
Denmark	a	1				1		51
	b							
	c					70 871	51 577	1 590 690
Estonia	a							3
	b							855 740
	c							
Finland	a						1	8
	b						100 000	1 846 098
	c							4 259 954
France	a	2	1			3	36	132
	b	1 100 200	98 914			9 718 593	209 642 010	1 121 135 278
	c							79 900 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Italy

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	6	20			18	25	339
	b	86 527	453 620			356 646	1 395 004	111 748 846
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							992 000
	c							335 518
Latvia	a							10
	b							3 888 000
	c							
Lithuania	a			1				5
	b							
	c			263 785				1 429 425
Netherlands	a						2	14
	b						66 000	2 276 645
	c	88 476		76 039		825	663 217	41 615 796
Poland	a						2	24
	b						12 372	4 625 263
	c							406 234
Portugal	a		2					6
	b		181 709					2 686 909
	c							1 542 256
Romania	a							1
	b							19 580
	c							19 580
Slovenia	a							1
	b							14 050
	c							2 246 406
Spain	a	1				1	17	106
	b						3 302 758	711 496 425
	c							56 543 786
Sweden	a	4				2	6	31
	b	1 104 127				423 263	1 222 758	9 224 795
	c	1 610 339					745 910	9 057 004

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Italy

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	14	28	1		25	89	836
	b	2 290 854	734 243			10 498 502	215 740 902	2 083 450 283
	d							
	e							

Ivory Coast

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1	2	2	1				
	b	2 460 500	305 100	2 014 478	260 529				
	c	2 510 500	463 580	2 991 634	150 955				
France	a	2	1	1		1	3		
	b	136 100	1 400	54 540		10 864 000	18 796 803		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	3	3	1	1	3		
	b	2 596 600	306 500	2 069 018	260 529	10 864 000	18 796 803		
	d								
	e								

Ivory Coast

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c		1 810 000						
France	a	1		7		2			
	b	2 346 600		40 890 079		771 160			
	c								
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		72 067						
Total per ML category	a	1		7		2			
	b	2 346 600		40 890 079		771 160			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Ivory Coast

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a						1	7
	b						3 000 000	8 040 607
	c							7 926 669
France	a					2	1	21
	b					7 182 000	100 000	81 142 682
	c							2 200 000
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							72 067
Total per ML category	a					2	2	28
	b					7 182 000	3 100 000	89 183 289
	d							
	e							

Jamaica

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	1							
	b	186 759							
	c								
France	a	1							
	b	96 680							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	2							
	b	283 439							
	d								
	e								

Jamaica

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a							1	
	b							6 184 916	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Jamaica

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a							1	
	b							6 184 916	
	d								
	e								

Jamaica

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							186 759
	c							
France	a							2
	b							6 281 596
	c							
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							6 468 355
	d							
	e							

Japan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	8	3	1			1		
	b	282 410	243 518	2 383 370			2 728 985		
	c	231 049	245 032	2 383 370					
Belgium	a	3							
	b	67 384							
	c								
Czech Republic	a								1
	b								
	c								15 014
Denmark	a					3			
	b					42 200			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Japan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Estonia	a						1		
	b						50 000		
	c						50 000		
Finland	a		1			1			
	b		280 000			130 000			
	c						312 057		
France	a							1	
	b							450 000	
	c								
Germany	a	50	8	15	4	11	29	1	3
	b	810 747	269 793	7 861 503	8 587 225	3 578 184	1 411 082	1 125	439 475
	c								
Hungary	a			3					
	b			38 537					
	c			24 791					
Italy	a		3						
	b		194 619						
	c								
Netherlands	a				2				
	b				24 416				
	c					22 851			
Sweden	a		1	5	1	1			1
	b		31 604	512 551	199 077	61 138			82 771
	c		14 128 412	540 261	253 290				
Total per ML category	a	61	16	24	7	16	31	2	5
	b	1 160 541	1 019 534	10 795 961	8 810 718	3 811 522	4 190 067	451 125	522 246
	d								
	e								

Japan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a					1			
	b					3 600			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Japan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a		1						
	b		1 621 074						
	c								
France	a	1	5	1		2	1	3	
	b	65 000	4 360 000	24 000		13 000 000	155 000	22 017 000	
	c								
Germany	a	4	25	10			1	12	
	b	645 938	3 108 863	3 759 022			1 123 280	6 029 382	
	c								
Italy	a		14	4				3	
	b		820 197	3 063 435				191 400	
	c								
Netherlands	a	2	1						
	b	35 630	9 103 323						
	c	19 000	1 470 476						
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		1 484 650						
Spain	a							1	
	b							18 000	
	c							168 000	
Sweden	a						3		
	b						161 708		
	c					24 678	203 669		
Total per ML category	a	7	46	15		3	5	19	
	b	746 568	19 013 457	6 846 457		13 003 600	1 439 988	28 255 782	
	d								
	e								

Japan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					14
	b		52 064					5 690 347
	c		52 064					2 911 515

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Japan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							3
	b							67 384
	c							
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							15 014
Denmark	a							4
	b							45 800
	c							
Estonia	a							1
	b							50 000
	c							50 000
Finland	a					1		4
	b					150 000		2 181 074
	c							312 057
France	a	1				1	4	20
	b	18 180				4 900 000	45 800 000	90 789 180
	c							16 000 000
Germany	a	1	4			4	6	188
	b	1 265	187 687			685 223	301 001	38 800 795
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							38 537
	c							24 791
Italy	a						1	25
	b							4 269 651
	c							3 332 685
Netherlands	a		1			1	2	9
	b		9 103 323			175 175	9 278 498	27 720 365
	c					57 500		1 569 827
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							1 484 650

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Japan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a					2		3
	b					5 249 800		5 267 800
	c					5 205 163		5 373 163
Sweden	a	5				1	6	24
	b	427 827						1 476 676
	c	414 971						15 565 281
Total per ML category	a	7	6			10	19	299
	b	447 272	9 343 074			11 160 198	55 379 499	176 397 609
	d							
	e							

Jersey

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Jersey

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Jersey

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Jordan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	16							
	b	156 221							
	c	139 495							
Belgium	a	2		1					
	b	216 292		636 000					
	c								
Bulgaria	a	2		1					
	b	22 855		5 565					
	c	22 855							
Croatia	a	2							
	b	1 668 500							
	c								
Cyprus	a	4							
	b	36 930							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	2					1		
	b	1 290 454					168 940		
	c	1 196 000		340 913			2 092		
Finland	a	1							
	b	252 615							
	c								
Germany	a	1	1	1			1		
	b	9 300	12 000	150 000			1 513 000		
	c								
Greece	a						1		
	b						126 438		
	c								
Italy	a	2							
	b	3 754 098							
	c								
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c			5 016					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Jordan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	32	1	3			3		
	b	7 407 265	12 000	791 565			1 808 378		
	d								
	e								

Jordan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a			1					
	b			787 500					
	c								
France	a			3		2		2	
	b			21 950 003		420 000		20 984 000	
	c								
Germany	a		3				1		
	b		5 709				2 000 000		
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b								
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							149 898	
	c							149 898	
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		199 842						
Sweden	a					1			
	b					136 385			
	c					31 508			
Total per ML category	a		4	4		3	1	3	
	b		5 709	22 737 503		556 385	2 000 000	21 133 898	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Jordan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		3					20
	b		20 405					964 126
	c		18 414					157 909
Belgium	a							3
	b							852 292
	c							
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							28 420
	c							22 855
Croatia	a							2
	b							1 668 500
	c							
Cyprus	a							4
	b							36 930
	c							
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							1 459 394
	c							1 539 005
Finland	a							1
	b							252 615
	c							
France	a							7
	b							43 354 003
	c							
Germany	a		1					9
	b		477 500					4 167 509
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							126 438
	c							
Italy	a							3
	b							3 754 098
	c							983 434

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Jordan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a							1
	b							149 898
	c							149 898
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						2	2
Slovenia	a							
	b							
	c							5 016
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							199 842
Sweden	a							1
	b							136 385
	c							31 508
Total per ML category	a		4					58
	b		497 905					56 950 608
	d							
	e							

Kazakhstan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4		2					
	b	550 561		141 000					
	c	51 019		85 714					
Belgium	a	1							
	b	23 266							
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1	1		3	1			
	b	80 500	336 000		407 760	378 200			
	c	80 500				378 200			
Cyprus	a	7							
	b	88 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kazakhstan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	4					5		
	b	11 564					883 788		
	c						893 280	69 889	
Estonia	a	1							
	b	554 000							
	c								
France	a					2			
	b					15 133 600			
	c								
Germany	a	13		1					
	b	1 075 572		9 500					
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b	10 387							
	c								
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						81 000		
	c						72 000		
Slovakia	a	3							
	b	490 938							
	c	486 449							
Total per ML category	a	35	1	3	3	3	6		
	b	2 884 788	336 000	150 500	407 760	15 511 800	964 788		
	d								
	e								

Kazakhstan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					4		1	
	b					1 122 004		197 060	
	c					1 122 004		197 060	
Czech Republic	a		2			2			
	b		202 000						
	c		15 560 580			9 985			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Kazakhstan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1					1	
	b		165 405 408					73 100 000	
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							135 200	
	c								
Italy	a					1			
	b					64 110			
	c								
Spain	a		6						
	b		120 000 000						
	c		1 002 569						
Total per ML category	a		9			7		3	
	b		285 607 408			1 186 114		73 432 260	
	d		1						
	e		1(1), 7(1)						

Kazakhstan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							6
	b							691 561
	c							136 733
Belgium	a							1
	b							23 266
	c							
Bulgaria	a							11
	b							2 521 524
	c							1 777 764
Cyprus	a							7
	b							88 000
	c							
Czech Republic	a							13
	b							1 097 352
	c							16 533 734

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Kazakhstan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Estonia	a							1
	b							554 000
	c							
France	a						2	6
	b						201 000	253 840 008
	c							18 800 000
Germany	a							14
	b							1 085 072
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							135 200
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							74 497
	c							74 497
Lithuania	a						2	2
	b						28 960	28 960
	c						28 960	28 960
Netherlands	a							1
	b							81 000
	c						2	72 002
Slovakia	a							3
	b							490 938
	c							486 449
Spain	a							6
	b							120 000 000
	c							1 002 569
Total per ML category	a						4	74
	b						229 960	380 711 378
	d							1
	e							1(1), 7(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kenya

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	5		1					
	b	1 36 993		60 000					
	c	82 933		60 000					
Czech Republic	a	2							
	b								
	c	109 758							
France	a					1	1		
	b					22 800 000	36 500 000		
	c								
Italy	a	1		1					
	b	91 500		389 750					
	c								
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	83 750							
	c	83 750							
Spain	a			1					
	b			137 250					
	c			137 250					
Total per ML category	a	9		3		1	1		
	b	312 243		587 000		22 800 000	36 500 000		
	d								
	e								

Kenya

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a			1		3			
	b								
	c					122 024			
France	a	1						1	
	b	240 000						2 196 000	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kenya

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	1		1		3		1	
	b	240 000						2 196 000	
	d								
	e								

Kenya

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							6
	b							196 993
	c							142 933
Czech Republic	a		1					7
	b		28 424					28 424
	c		28 385					260 167
France	a						1	5
	b						1	61 736 001
	c							400 000
Italy	a							2
	b							481 250
	c							1 469 908
Slovakia	a							1
	b							83 750
	c							83 750
Spain	a							1
	b							137 250
	c							137 250
Total per ML category	a		1				1	22
	b		28 424				1	62 663 668
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kiribati

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Kiribati

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Kiribati

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Kosovo

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	52 500							
	c	23 543							
Croatia	a	1	1	1					
	b	39 830	49 400	3 945 000					
	c								
Czech Republic	a			1				1	
	b			1 037 248					
	c			979 558				36 590	
France	a						1		
	b						2 900 000		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kosovo

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	1					1		
	b	9 169					759 000		
	c								
Italy	a			1	1				
	b			2 107 111	6 500				
	c								
Slovenia	a	2							
	b	83 745							
	c	83 745							
Total per ML category	a	6	1	3	1		2	1	
	b	185 244	49 400	7 089 359	6 500		3 659 000		
	d								
	e								

Kosovo

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a					1			
	b					21 720			
	c								
Total per ML category	a					1			
	b					21 720			
	d								
	e								

Kosovo

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							52 500
	c							23 543
Croatia	a							3
	b							4 034 230
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kosovo

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							1 037 248
	c							1 016 148
France	a							1
	b							2 900 000
	c							
Germany	a							3
	b							789 889
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							2 113 611
	c							1 207 687
Slovenia	a							2
	b							83 745
	c							83 745
Total per ML category	a							15
	b							11 011 223
	d							
	e							

Kuwait

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	9					2		
	b	120 480					550 906 045		
	c	99 033					88 190		
Belgium	a	1							
	b	3 000							
	c								
Croatia	a	3							
	b	15 030							
	c	8 200							
Cyprus	a	4							
	b	33 947							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kuwait

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1		2				1	
	b	65 638		712					
	c			10 307					
Denmark	a						1		
	b						632		
	c								
France	a		3		4	1	2	3	
	b		5 274 823		21 198 100	356 000	347 534 000	258 915 250	
	c								
Germany	a	1					1	1	
	b	948					506 000	17 552	
	c								
Hungary	a			3	1				
	b			9 885	115				
	c								
Italy	a	4			1				
	b	1 156 012			71 435 089				
	c								
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						472 020		
	c								
Spain	a		1	1		3			
	b		1 907 257	14 802 750		20 400			
	c		1 747 600			23 576			
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c							2 426 893	
Total per ML category	a	23	4	6	6	4	7	5	
	b	1 395 055	7 182 080	14 813 347	92 633 304	376 400	899 418 697	258 932 802	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kuwait

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a				1				
	b				12 500 000				
	c								
Belgium	a					1	2		
	b					39 000	37 662 830		
	c								
France	a					1	2	4	
	b					832	48 750 003	18 444 000	
	c								
Germany	a		8	1					5
	b		377 351	1 013 248					563 108
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							5 841 000	
	c								
Italy	a		4						
	b		33 135 116						
	c								
Netherlands	a							1	
	b							472 020	
	c							944 040	
Spain	a							2	
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a		12	1	1	2	4	8	5
	b		33 512 467	1 013 248	12 500 000	39 832	86 412 833	24 757 020	563 108
	d								
	e								

Kuwait

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a						1	13
	b						68 798	563 595 323
	c							187 223

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Kuwait

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							4
	b							37 704 830
	c							
Croatia	a							3
	b							15 030
	c							8 200
Cyprus	a							4
	b							33 947
	c							
Czech Republic	a							4
	b							66 350
	c							10 307
Denmark	a							1
	b							632
	c							
France	a	1						21
	b	12 070 000						712 543 008
	c							218 500 000
Germany	a					2	3	22
	b					30 001	120 001	2 628 209
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							5 841 000
	c							
Hungary	a							4
	b							10 000
	c							
Italy	a							9
	b							105 726 217
	c							1 090 629 445
Netherlands	a							2
	b							944 040
	c							944 040

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Kuwait

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Spain	a							7
	b							16 730 407
	c							1 771 176
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c	65 841				112 306		2 605 040
Total per ML category	a	1				2	4	95
	b	12 070 000				30 001	188 799	1 445 838 993
	d							
	e							

Kyrgyzstan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	6		3					
	b	479 571		32 748					
	c	94 987		28 547					
Croatia	a	3	2	1					
	b	85 238	251 735	720 045					
	c	85 238	251 735	720 045					
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	75 220							
	c								
Germany	a	7		1					
	b	155 700		41 280					
	c								
Hungary	a	6							
	b	267 143							
	c	213 683							
Latvia	a	2							
	b	24 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	3							
	b								
	c	71 897							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Kyrgyzstan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	16 440							
	c	16 440							
Slovenia	a			7					
	b			2 125 800					
	c			793 680					
Total per ML category	a	29	2	12					
	b	1 103 312	251 735	2 919 873					
	d	1		4					
	e	4(1)		4(4)					

Kyrgyzstan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d		1			1		1	
	e		4(1)			4(1)		4(1)	

Kyrgyzstan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							9
	b							512 319
	c							123 534
Croatia	a							6
	b							1 057 018
	c							1 057 018
Cyprus	a							1
	b							75 220
	c							
Germany	a							8
	b							196 980
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Kyrgyzstan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a							6
	b							267 143
	c							213 683
Latvia	a							2
	b							24 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							3
	b							
	c							71 897
Slovakia	a							1
	b							16 440
	c							16 440
Slovenia	a							7
	b							2 125 800
	c							793 680
Total per ML category	a							43
	b							4 274 920
	d							8
	e							4(8)

Laos

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Laos

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Laos

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Latvia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a		1	1					
	b		252 064	80 000					
	c								
Belgium	a	4		1					
	b	5 972 313		11 480					
	c								
Estonia	a	2			4				
	b	5 405			866 701				
	c	1 035			866 701				
Finland	a	1		1			2		
	b	22 000		22 080			850 000		
	c	11 200		1 060 260	7 000	132 000	26 581 762		
France	a			1					
	b			267 000					
	c								
Germany	a	3	3			1	2		
	b	8 103 892	2 803 560			8 260	5 793 600		
	c								
Italy	a	1		2					
	b	6 682		2 848 748					
	c								
Lithuania	a	59		32					
	b	1							
	c	2 232 052		537 481					
Netherlands	a	1	1						
	b	3 715	900 000						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Latvia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a			1		3			
	b			2 476 500					
	c				549 082				
Sweden	a	3	7	7		7			
	b	2 050	395 518	15 490 776		19 228 464			
	c	15 075	13 187	11 738 094	128 644	4 449 640			
Total per ML category	a	74	12	46	4	11	4		
	b	14 116 058	4 351 142	21 196 584	866 701	19 236 724	6 643 600		
	d								
	e								

Latvia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		2						
	b								
	c		1 591 375	390 764					
Denmark	a					6			
	b								
	c					3 997			
Estonia	a						2	1	
	b						9 845	2 995	
	c								
Finland	a			1					
	b			45 306					
	c			45 306					
France	a					1			
	b					5 000 000			
	c								
Germany	a			2				1	
	b			145 700				2 255	
	c								
Greece	a							4	
	b							8 637 590	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Latvia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a					1		4	
	b					255 000		101 600	
	c							241 818	
Netherlands	a							1	
	b							3 271	
	c								
Spain	a		1						
	b								
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c					1 330 341			
Total per ML category	a		3	3		8	2	11	
	b			191 006		5 255 000	9 845	8 747 711	
	d								
	e								

Latvia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							332 064
	c							
Belgium	a							5
	b							5 983 793
	c							
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							
	c							1 982 139
Denmark	a					1		7
	b							
	c					1 006 157	1 006 144	2 016 298
Estonia	a						2	11
	b						93 116	978 062
	c							867 736

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Latvia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Finland	a					1	1	7
	b							939 386
	c					200 000	242 000	28 279 528
France	a							2
	b							5 267 000
	c							1 300 000
Germany	a	1	5			1		19
	b	27 184	7 256			1		16 891 708
	c							
Greece	a							4
	b							8 637 590
	c							
Italy	a						1	4
	b							2 855 430
	c							497 753
Lithuania	a					2		98
	b							356 601
	c							3 011 351
Netherlands	a							3
	b							906 986
	c							
Spain	a						1	6
	b							2 476 500
	c							549 082
Sweden	a		1			1	8	34
	b							35 116 808
	c						33 391	17 708 372
Total per ML category	a	1	6			6	13	204
	b	27 184	7 256			1	93 116	80 741 928
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lebanon

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	111 785							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	4							
	b								
	c	1 170 609							
France	a		1	1		1		1	
	b		109 650 000	119 000		14 841		325 000	
	c								
Germany	a						1		
	b						12 715		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	5	1	1		1	1	1	
	b	111 785	109 650 000	119 000		14 841	12 715	325 000	
	d								
	e								

Lebanon

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1	1			1			
	b	56 239	1 500 000			6 235			
	c								
Romania	a		4	1					
	b		147 520	121 406					
	c		516 628	90 138					
Total per ML category	a	1	5	1		1			
	b	56 239	1 647 520	121 406		6 235			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lebanon

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Cyprus	a							1
	b							111 785
	c							
Czech Republic	a							4
	b							
	c							1 170 609
France	a							7
	b							111 671 315
	c							100 000
Germany	a							1
	b							12 715
	c							
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							235 950
Romania	a							5
	b							268 926
	c							606 766
Total per ML category	a							18
	b							112 064 741
	d							
	e							

Lesotho

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1		1		1			
	b	357 660		510 800		82 500			
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1		1		1			
	b	357 660		510 800		82 500			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lesotho

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Lesotho

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							950 960
	c							
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							950 960
	d							
	e							

Liberia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Liberia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Liberia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a						1	1
	b						3 850 000	3 850 000
	c							
Total per ML category	a						1	1
	b						3 850 000	3 850 000
	d							
	e							

Libya

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a			1			3		
	b			21 700			3 786 495		
	c								
Total per ML category	a			1			3		
	b			21 700			3 786 495		
	d								
	e								

Libya

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Libya

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							4
	b							3 808 195
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Libya

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							3 808 195
	d							
	e							

Liechtenstein

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	14		48					
	b	383 737		243 191					
	c	378 777		239 764					
Germany	a		1						
	b		2 800						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	14	1	48					
	b	383 737	2 800	243 191					
	d								
	e								

Liechtenstein

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a								1
	b								1 600
	c								
Total per ML category	a								1
	b								1 600
	d								
	e								

Liechtenstein

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							62
	b							626 928
	c							618 541

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Liechtenstein

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							2
	b							4 400
	c							
Total per ML category	a							64
	b							631 328
	d							
	e							

Lithuania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1		3	1				
	b	21 078		6 987 315	472 482				
	c			36 481					
Belgium	a	3		2					
	b	167 246		59 806 255					
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1							
	b	117 353							
	c	117 353				59 400			
Croatia	a	3							
	b	27 178							
	c	27 178							
Czech Republic	a	1							1
	b								
	c	3 705 520		2 851 936	3 195				1 227 023
Denmark	a								
	b								
	c						1 066 280		
Estonia	a	2							
	b	4 829							
	c	4 829							
Finland	a	1							
	b	1 850							
	c	8 298		265 000	4 799 540	2 024 084			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lithuania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a	1		2				1	
	b	23 265		175 130 000				220 000	
	c								
Germany	a	3		2			3		
	b	18 894 800		2 426 804			78 383		
	c								
Hungary	a			4			3		
	b			10 923 428			205 000		
	c			175 168					
Italy	a			2		2			
	b			683 986		8 124 000			
	c								
Latvia	a	51		37					
	b	23 325 000		421 000					
	c								
Netherlands	a	1					1		
	b	9 257					40 500		
	c	9 257					75 000		
Poland	a								
	b								
	c							33 000	
Portugal	a	8	3	1	2	1	1		
	b	391 494	185 400	49 592	1 117 472	199 666	2 378 135		
	c								
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c	69 325							
Spain	a		1		4				1
	b		1 752		14 185 745				134 100
	c		455 178		12 799 818	82 350			2 242 695
Sweden	a	2	1	6					
	b	282 175		14 108 652					
	c	243 271		5 691 120					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lithuania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	78	5	59	7	3	8	1	2
	b	43 265 525	187 152	270 537 032	15 775 699	8 323 666	2 702 018	220 000	134 100
	d								
	e								

Lithuania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					40 208			
	c					40 208			
Belgium	a			1					
	b			872 500					
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					40 000			
	c					2 000			
Czech Republic	a			2					
	b								
	c		284 439	139 593		1 093 672			
Denmark	a					16			
	b								
	c					558 690			
Finland	a	1							
	b	911 690							
	c	3 638 000							
France	a		1					1	
	b		310 000					130 000	
	c								
Germany	a			1					3
	b			6 648					19 314 950
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							199 600	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lithuania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a					2			
	b					446 218			
	c					413 218			
Portugal	a	1							
	b	197 781							
	c								
Slovakia	a		1						
	b		61 840						
	c		61 840						
Spain	a			2					
	b			45 000					
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			2 148					
Total per ML category	a	2	2	6		20		3	3
	b	1 109 471	371 840	924 148		526 426		329 600	19 314 950
	d								
	e								

Lithuania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					7
	b		26 474					7 547 557
	c							76 689
Belgium	a							6
	b							60 846 001
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							157 353
	c							178 753
Croatia	a							3
	b							27 178
	c							27 178

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Lithuania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a		1					5
	b							
	c							9 305 378
Denmark	a							16
	b							
	c					635 677	635 677	2 896 324
Estonia	a							2
	b							4 829
	c							4 829
Finland	a							2
	b							913 540
	c					301 196	40 000	11 076 118
France	a						2	8
	b						6 850 000	182 663 265
	c							3 100 000
Germany	a	2	2			1	1	18
	b	26 679	12 626			1	1	40 760 892
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							199 600
	c							
Hungary	a							7
	b							11 128 428
	c							175 168
Italy	a							4
	b							8 807 986
	c							1 702 087
Latvia	a							88
	b							23 746 000
	c							
Netherlands	a							2
	b							49 757
	c							84 257

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Lithuania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							2
	b							446 218
	c							446 218
Portugal	a							17
	b							4 519 540
	c							
Slovakia	a							1
	b							61 840
	c							61 840
Slovenia	a							
	b							
	c							69 325
Spain	a						9	17
	b						1 743 411	16 110 008
	c							15 580 041
Sweden	a						2	11
	b							14 390 827
	c	14 531						5 951 070
Total per ML category	a	2	4			1	14	220
	b	26 679	39 100			1	8 593 412	372 380 819
	d							
	e							

Luxembourg

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		4	1		4		
	b	451 800		914 495	4 770		11 283		
	c	3 800		45 754	4 770		6 268		
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c			18 367			3 098		
Denmark	a					2			
	b								
	c					72 420			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Luxembourg

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a				2			2	
	b				86 400			670	
	c								
Germany	a	2	1				20		
	b	66 150	52 654				2 360 568		
	c								
Greece	a				1				
	b				166 701				
	c								
Latvia	a	8							
	b	2 716 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	57 136							
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						110 250		
	c				3 028 800		392 500		
Slovakia	a			2					
	b			924 400					
	c								
Spain	a				4				
	b				3 045 065				
	c				3 868 877				
Sweden	a	1			1		1		
	b						11 287		
	c						11 287		
Total per ML category	a	14	1	6	9	2	26	2	
	b	3 233 950	52 654	1 838 895	3 302 936		2 493 388	670	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Luxembourg

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1		1	
	b					218 750		300 000	
	c					218 750		300 000	
Belgium	a			2					
	b			14 595 873					
	c								
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		38 029					6 296	
Denmark	a					8			
	b								
	c					38 998			
France	a		3						
	b		204 347						
	c								
Germany	a		7	10				5	
	b		869 497	235 205				3 725 874	
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b								
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c								
Poland	a					1			
	b					45 000			
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		145 032						
Spain	a		9						
	b		393 477						
	c		1 386 565						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Luxembourg

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		20	12		10		7	
	b		1 467 321	14 831 078		263 750		4 025 874	
	d								
	e								

Luxembourg

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							13
	b							1 901 098
	c							579 342
Belgium	a							2
	b							14 595 873
	c							
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c							65 790
Denmark	a					1		11
	b							
	c					27		111 445
France	a						2	9
	b						14 000	305 417
	c							4 400 000
Germany	a	4	4			2	4	59
	b	1 019 339	10 065			1 501	150 003	8 490 856
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							166 701
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							
	c							1 179 276
Latvia	a							8
	b							2 716 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Luxembourg

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a					1		3
	b							
	c							57 136
Netherlands	a							1
	b							110 250
	c						78 500	3 499 800
Poland	a							1
	b							45 000
	c							
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							145 032
Slovakia	a							2
	b							924 400
	c							
Spain	a						2	15
	b							3 438 542
	c							5 255 442
Sweden	a						1	4
	b							11 287
	c							11 287
Total per ML category	a	4	4			4	9	130
	b	1 019 339	10 065			1 501	164 003	32 705 424
	d							
	e							

Macao

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	6		5					
	b	44 596		213 580					
	c	367		132 657					
Hungary	a			1					
	b			90 000					
	c			71 000					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Macao

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	6		6					
	b	44 596		303 580					
	d			1					
	e			1(1), 7(1)					

Macao

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Macao

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							11
	b							258 176
	c							133 024
Hungary	a							1
	b							90 000
	c							71 000
Total per ML category	a							12
	b							348 176
	d							1
	e							1(1), 7(1)

Madagascar

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Madagascar

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Madagascar

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Malawi

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a	4	2		3		1		
	b	299 194	319 127		15 326 433		8 647 800		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4	2		3		1		
	b	299 194	319 127		15 326 433		8 647 800		
	d								
	e								

Malawi

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1						
	b		500 000						
	c								
Spain	a		1						
	b		18 500						
	c	6 150	36 018						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malawi

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		2						
	b		518 500						
	d								
	e								

Malawi

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a							1
	b							500 000
	c							
Italy	a	1						11
	b	765 000						25 357 554
	c							
Spain	a							1
	b							18 500
	c							42 168
Total per ML category	a	1						13
	b	765 000						25 876 054
	d							
	e							

Malaysia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3		5					
	b	377 968		85 908					
	c	377 968		10 714					
Belgium	a	5	1						
	b	262 826	270 000						
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1			1		
	b			64 800			15 495		
	c			64 800			16 568		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malaysia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Cyprus	a	5							
	b	63 647							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	5		4		1		1	
	b	78 323		2 990 026				1 661	
	c	55 028		151 949	428 505			1 661	
Denmark	a						2		
	b						217 651		
	c								
France	a	1		1	2	4	1	1	
	b	2 700 000		139 700 000	85 402 048	381 770 000	7 500	200 000	
	c								
Germany	a			1	2				3
	b			540	3 867				1 038
	c								
Hungary	a	1		1					
	b	46 253		105					
	c	46 252		105					
Netherlands	a					2			
	b					625 058			
	c					27 875			
Poland	a						1		
	b						310 421		
	c								
Romania	a					1			
	b					45 400			
	c			585 185					
Slovakia	a			1					
	b								
	c								
Spain	a		2	1		3			
	b			509 000		1 964 400			
	c		8 438 169	509 000	24 000		17 441		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malaysia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a					1	1		
	b					47 029	601 973		
	c		298 627			4 021	601 973		
Total per ML category	a	20	3	15	4	12	6	2	3
	b	3 529 017	270 000	143 350 379	85 405 915	384 451 887	1 153 040	201 661	1 038
	d								
	e								

Malaysia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1						1
	b		6 300 000						309 724
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							60 400	
	c							9 060	
Czech Republic	a		1	3				2	
	b		4 468						
	c		4 403			679 446		28 082	
France	a	7	3	11		3			
	b	755 427 081	1 120 478	397 035 000		40 590 000			
	c								
Germany	a	3	4	4				1	
	b	12 046	123 518	522 843				21 361	
	c								
Poland	a								
	b								
	c						48 844		
Portugal	a		6	3					
	b		138 835	69 038					
	c		52 000	43 738					
Slovakia	a		1						
	b		270 000						
	c		270 000						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malaysia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a		6	2			1	7	
	b		623 140				58 800	2 684 860	
	c		42 578 106				58 800	167 000	
Sweden	a			2					
	b								
	c			30 555					
Total per ML category	a	10	22	25		3	1	11	1
	b	755 439 127	8 580 439	397 626 881		40 590 000	58 800	2 766 621	309 724
	d								
	e								

Malaysia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							8
	b							463 876
	c							388 682
Belgium	a		1					9
	b		19 050 400					26 192 950
	c							
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							140 695
	c							90 428
Cyprus	a							5
	b							63 647
	c							
Czech Republic	a							17
	b							3 074 478
	c							1 349 074
Denmark	a							2
	b							217 651
	c							
France	a	2	1			5	2	44
	b	1 560 267	80 000			5 480 000	14 600 000	1 825 672 374
	c							7 000 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malaysia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	1					2	21
	b	82					2	685 297
	c							
Hungary	a							2
	b							46 358
	c							46 357
Ireland	a						1	1
	b						14 000	14 000
	c						14 000	14 000
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							49 575 000
Netherlands	a					2	2	6
	b					617 333	617 333	1 859 724
	c						50	27 925
Poland	a					2		3
	b					99 871		410 292
	c							48 844
Portugal	a							9
	b							207 873
	c							95 738
Romania	a							1
	b							45 400
	c							585 185
Slovakia	a							2
	b							270 000
	c							270 000
Spain	a					1	2	25
	b						120 000 000	125 840 200
	c						36 618 745	88 411 261
Sweden	a						1	5
	b						47 029	696 031
	c							935 176

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malaysia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	3	2			10	10	163
	b	1 560 349	19 130 400			6 197 204	135 278 364	1 985 900 846
	d							
	e							

Maldives

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1		1		1			
	b	687 180		94 500		161 420			
	c	687 180		94 500		161 420			
Total per ML category	a	1		1		1			
	b	687 180		94 500		161 420			
	d								
	e								

Maldives

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a					1			
	b					8 700			
	c								
Germany	a					1			
	b					92 060			
	c								
Total per ML category	a					2			
	b					100 760			
	d								
	e								

Maldives

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							943 100
	c							943 100

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Maldives

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Finland	a							1
	b							8 700
	c							
Germany	a							1
	b							92 060
	c							
Total per ML category	a							5
	b							1 043 860
	d							
	e							

Mali

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c	407 500		116 200	34 100				
Germany	a	2					2		
	b	40 386					243 460		
	c								
Malta	a	4							
	b	36 789							
	c	36 679							
Spain	a								
	b								
	c						2 455 595		
Total per ML category	a	6					2		
	b	77 175					243 460		
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mali

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c					104 300			
France	a			1				1	
	b			2 820 000				1 356	
	c								
Germany	a		1				1		
	b		3 780				15 923		
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							923 400	
	c								
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		30 266 960					35 151	
Total per ML category	a		1	1			1	2	
	b		3 780	2 820 000			15 923	924 756	
	d					2		1	
	e					2(2), 3(2), 4(2), 6(2)		7(1)	

Mali

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							
	b							
	c							662 100
France	a							2
	b							2 821 356
	c							100 000
Germany	a							6
	b							303 549
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Mali

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a							1
	b							923 400
	c							
Malta	a							4
	b							36 789
	c							36 679
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							32 757 706
Total per ML category	a							13
	b							4 085 094
	d							3
	e							2(2), 3(2), 4(2), 6(2), 7(1)

Malta

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a								
	b								
	c	7 650							
Belgium	a	2							
	b	314 583							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b								
	c	19 169							
Finland	a	1							
	b	10 200							
	c								
Germany	a	1		1	1				
	b	2 310		12 668	8 580				
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malta

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a			1					
	b			30 000					
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b	4 946 386							
	c								
Netherlands	a	5							
	b	11 409							
	c	13 341							
Sweden	a	1		1					
	b								
	c			1 883					
Total per ML category	a	12		3	1				
	b	5 284 888		42 668	8 580				
	d								
	e								

Malta

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a					1			
	b								
	c					11 885			
Germany	a			1					
	b			290 000					
	c								
Spain	a		1						
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a		1	1		1			
	b			290 000					
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malta

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							
	b							
	c							7 650
Belgium	a							2
	b							314 583
	c							
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							19 169
Denmark	a							1
	b							
	c							11 885
Finland	a							1
	b							10 200
	c							
France	a							
	b							
	c							200 000
Germany	a							4
	b							313 558
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							30 000
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							4 946 386
	c							51 073 106
Netherlands	a						1	6
	b						50 000	61 409
	c							13 341
Spain	a							1
	b							
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Malta

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a							2
	b							
	c							1 883
Total per ML category	a						1	20
	b						50 000	5 676 136
	d							
	e							

Marshall Islands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Marshall Islands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Marshall Islands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mauritania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								1
	b								183 136
	c								183 136
France	a						1		
	b						23 835 000		
	c								
Malta	a	2							
	b	2 000							
	c	2 000							
Total per ML category	a	2					1		1
	b	2 000					23 835 000		183 136
	d								
	e								

Mauritania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1	1						
	b	82 547	5 526 000						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1	1						
	b	82 547	5 526 000						
	d								
	e								

Mauritania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							183 136
	c							183 136
France	a					1	1	5
	b					925 503	8 840 000	39 209 050
	c							600 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Mauritania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Malta	a							2
	b							2 000
	c							2 000
Total per ML category	a					1	1	8
	b					925 503	8 840 000	39 394 186
	d							
	e							

Mauritius

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			1					
	b			15 000					
	c			13 786					
France	a		1		1				
	b		1 400		35 000				
	c								
Germany	a	6		1					
	b	88 083		27 838					
	c								
Malta	a	1							
	b	371							
	c	371							
Total per ML category	a	7	1	2	1				
	b	88 454	1 400	42 838	35 000				
	d								
	e								

Mauritius

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a					3			
	b					207 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Mauritius

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a					3			
	b					207 000			
	d								
	e								

Mauritius

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							15 000
	c							13 786
France	a							5
	b							243 400
	c							
Germany	a						1	8
	b						1 180	117 101
	c							
Malta	a							1
	b							371
	c							371
Total per ML category	a						1	15
	b						1 180	375 872
	d							
	e							

Mayotte

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mayotte

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Mayotte

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Mexico

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a								1
	b								750 000
	c								550 000
Belgium	a						1		
	b						22 366		
	c								
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b			692 042					
	c								
France	a			2		2			
	b			188 090 000		288 580 000			
	c								
Germany	a								1
	b								12 600
	c								
Italy	a	1							
	b	19 890							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mexico

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a	2							
	b	1 102 674							
	c	550 162							
Sweden	a		1			2			
	b					43 769 106			
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	1	3		4	1		2
	b	1 122 564		188 782 042		332 349 106	22 366		762 600
	d								
	e								

Mexico

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					22 400			
	c					22 400			
France	a		4	1		1	1		
	b		1 471 016	9 658		3 199	138 900		
	c								
Germany	a		6			2			
	b		22 456			1 181 200			
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		24 420 000						
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b		1 270 000						
	c		7 077 315						
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c					169 410			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mexico

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		13	1		4	1		
	b		27 183 472	9 658		1 206 799	138 900		
	d								1
	e								7(1)

Mexico

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							750 000
	c							550 000
Belgium	a		2					3
	b		1 800 000					1 822 366
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							22 400
	c							22 400
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							692 042
	c							
France	a		2			1	3	17
	b		17 222 000				7 445 000	502 959 773
	c							200 000
Germany	a							9
	b							1 216 256
	c							
Italy	a		1					3
	b		672 800					25 112 690
	c							479 386
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						2	2
Poland	a						1	1
	b						9 517	9 517
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mexico

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovakia	a							2
	b							1 102 674
	c							550 162
Spain	a						1	3
	b							1 270 000
	c							7 077 315
Sweden	a		1			2	2	8
	b							43 769 106
	c							169 410
Total per ML category	a		6			3	7	49
	b		19 694 800				7 454 517	578 726 824
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Micronesia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Micronesia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Micronesia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Moldova

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	1 30 392							
	c	39 655							
Bulgaria	a				3				
	b				2 436 800				
	c				2 350 000				
Germany	a					1	1		
	b					2 204 000	8 845 000		
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	14 000							
	c								
Romania	a			1					
	b			113 485					
	c			113 485					
Total per ML category	a	4		1	3	1	1		
	b	144 392		113 485	2 436 800	2 204 000	8 845 000		
	d	1		2					
	e	7(1)		1(2), 7(2)					

Moldova

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a					1			
	b					26 343			
	c					26 343			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Moldova

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovakia	a			1					
	b			103 500					
	c								
Total per ML category	a			1		1			
	b			103 500		26 343			
	d								
	e								

Moldova

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							130 392
	c							39 655
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							2 436 800
	c							2 350 000
Germany	a							2
	b							11 049 000
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							14 000
	c							
Lithuania	a						1	2
	b						1 257	27 600
	c						1 257	27 600
Romania	a							1
	b							113 485
	c							113 485
Slovakia	a							1
	b							103 500
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Moldova

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a						1	13
	b						1 257	13 874 777
	d					1		4
	e					7(1)		1(2), 7(4)

Monaco

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Monaco

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Monaco

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Mongolia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	36 067							
	c	36 067							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mongolia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a		1	2					
	b		70 360	253 400					
	c		70 360						
Czech Republic	a							1	
	b							1 578	
	c			470 050					
Finland	a	1							
	b	152 000							
	c	11 632							
Germany	a	7		2					
	b	151 926		41 172					
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	73 660							
	c	36 829							
Total per ML category	a	10	1	4				1	
	b	413 653	70 360	294 572				1 578	
	d								
	e								

Mongolia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Mongolia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							36 067
	c							36 067

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mongolia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							323 760
	c							70 360
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							1 578
	c							470 050
Finland	a							1
	b							152 000
	c							11 632
Germany	a							9
	b							193 098
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							73 660
	c							36 829
Total per ML category	a							16
	b							780 163
	d							
	e							

Montenegro

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4		1					
	b	142 047		9 625					
	c	80 564		8 542					
Croatia	a	2							
	b	25 800							
	c	25 800							
Germany	a	1							
	b	7 293							
	c								
Slovenia	a							1	
	b								
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Montenegro

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	7		1				1	
	b	175 140		9 625					
	d	1							
	e	7(1)							

Montenegro

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					180			
	c					180			
Slovenia	a					1			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a					2			
	b					180			
	d								
	e								

Montenegro

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							5
	b							151 672
	c							89 106
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							180
	c							180
Croatia	a							2
	b							25 800
	c							25 800
Denmark	a					1	1	2
	b					10 638	10 638	21 276
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Montenegro

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							1
	b							7 293
	c							
Slovenia	a							2
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a					1	1	13
	b					10 638	10 638	206 221
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Morocco

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			1					
	b			3 600					
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1							
	b	1 597 500							
	c	1 597 500							
Czech Republic	a				1		2	1	
	b							2 684	
	c		1 612 689				25 103 164		
France	a	12	1	8	3	8	1		
	b	2 830 552	14 664 000	2 736 930	44 200 100	914 952 500	45 300		
	c								
Germany	a					3			1
	b					7 001 968			140
	c								
Italy	a	2		1					
	b	1 918 330		859 200					
	c								
Romania	a			1					
	b			1 540 835					
	c			1 540 835					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Morocco

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a			1	1	1			
	b				84 000				
	c			3 669 360	519 095				1 000 000
Total per ML category	a	15	1	12	5	12	3	1	1
	b	6 346 382	14 664 000	5 140 565	44 284 100	921 954 468	45 300	2 684	140
	d								
	e								

Morocco

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					286 900			
	c					286 900			
Czech Republic	a			1			1		
	b			814 925					
	c			924 012					
France	a		5	4				4	
	b		101 744 738	21 081 302				133 194 420	
	c								
Germany	a		1						1
	b		535 000						38 900
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		1 094 548						
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							3 498 000	
	c								
Malta	a		1						
	b		38 000						
	c								
Netherlands	a	1							
	b	8 500 000							
	c	695 045							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Morocco

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		10 821 559						
Romania	a						1		
	b						284 900		
	c						34 680		
Spain	a		1					4	
	b		30 000 000					54 000	
	c		846 362					53 350	
Total per ML category	a	1	9	5		1	2	9	1
	b	8 500 000	133 412 286	21 896 227		286 900	284 900	136 746 420	38 900
	d								
	e								

Morocco

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							3 600
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							1 884 400
	c							1 884 400
Czech Republic	a							6
	b							817 609
	c							27 639 865
France	a		1			1	9	57
	b		5 820 000			178 190 000	158 054 422	1 577 514 264
	c							177 000 000
Germany	a		2				2	10
	b		2 759 059				53 250	10 388 317
	c							
Italy	a							4
	b							3 872 078
	c							8 018 580

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Morocco

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a							1
	b							3 498 000
	c							
Malta	a						1	2
	b						2 500	40 500
	c							
Netherlands	a						2	3
	b						8 500 100	17 000 100
	c							695 045
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							10 821 559
Romania	a							2
	b							1 825 735
	c							1 575 515
Spain	a							8
	b							30 138 000
	c							6 088 167
Total per ML category	a		3			1	14	96
	b		8 579 059			178 190 000	166 610 272	1 646 982 603
	d							
	e							

Mozambique

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a				1				
	b				310 000				
	c				201 500				
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c	2 800							
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	13 510							
	c	13 510							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Mozambique

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	1			1				
	b	13 510			310 000				
	d								
	e								

Mozambique

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					18 944			
France	a							1	
	b							13 175 000	
	c								
Portugal	a		2						
	b		1 067						
	c			41 220		7 500			
Total per ML category	a		2					1	
	b		1 067					13 175 000	
	d								
	e								

Mozambique

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							310 000
	c							201 500
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							18 944
France	a							1
	b							13 175 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Mozambique

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Portugal	a							2
	b							1 067
	c							51 520
Slovenia	a							1
	b							13 510
	c							13 510
Total per ML category	a							5
	b							13 499 577
	d							
	e							

Myanmar [Burma]

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Myanmar [Burma]

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Myanmar [Burma]

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Namibia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	11		3					
	b	237 389		18 731					
	c	104 381		9 267					
Finland	a	2							
	b	206 500							
	c	3 333							
Germany	a	11							
	b	71 095							
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			43 107					
Total per ML category	a	24		3					
	b	514 984		18 731					
	d	1							
	e	3(1)							

Namibia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Namibia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					15
	b		1 200					257 320
	c		1 200					114 848
Finland	a							2
	b							206 500
	c							3 333

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Namibia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a						2	2
	b						3 850 001	3 850 001
	c							
Germany	a							11
	b							71 095
	c							
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							43 107
Total per ML category	a		1				2	30
	b		1 200				3 850 001	4 384 916
	d							1
	e							3(1)

Nauru

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Nauru

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Nauru

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Nepal

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a					1			
	b					97 986			
	c								
Total per ML category	a					1			
	b					97 986			
	d								
	e								

Nepal

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Nepal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							1
	b							97 986
	c							
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							97 986
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Netherlands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	6	4	4					
	b	1 267 550	4 336 800	10 179 310					
	c	912 838	55 300	7 450 200					
Bulgaria	a				1				
	b				17 000 000				
	c								
Czech Republic	a	5	2	5	6		1		
	b			5 083 858	18 350 939				
	c	287 327	20 147	794 265	1 875 925		29 601 041	155 298	7 281
Denmark	a					2	3		
	b								
	c				17 920	1 095 173	304 506		
Finland	a	1	1	3					
	b	2 175	125	622 890					
	c	4 266		55 308					
France	a				1	3	2		1
	b				379 000	939 919	1 005 001		150
	c								
Germany	a	9	29	9		49	170	1	
	b	147 416	1 992 595	1 794 195 350		4 428 524	9 850 826	181	
	c								
Greece	a					8			
	b					394 000			
	c								
Hungary	a				6				
	b				845 600				
	c				259 100				
Italy	a	4	8		2	2	8		
	b	21 806 000	4 521 245		17 723 760	6 122 925	78 947 079		
	c								
Latvia	a	11							
	b	10 233 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Netherlands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Lithuania	a			1					
	b								
	c	561 189		28 281					
Poland	a	4			1		5		
	b	213 467			1 069		21 180		
	c	212 705							
Portugal	a	3		1		1			
	b	7 027		777		6 375			
	c								
Spain	a	1		1		1	1		3
	b	4 000		1 393 500		376 043			400
	c			1 393 500					301
Sweden	a	4	6	1	2	5	4		
	b		12 047 472	39 808		9 490 486	536 373		
	c	7 555	2 667 485			445 958	28 398 387	912 968	
Total per ML category	a	48	50	25	19	71	194	1	4
	b	33 680 635	22 898 237	1 811 515 493	54 300 368	21 758 272	90 360 459	181	550
	d								
	e								

Netherlands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					26 395			
	c					26 395			
Czech Republic	a		3	2					
	b		10 026						
	c		3 967 627	1 135 376		12 210	145	16 781	
Denmark	a		1			22			
	b								
	c		30 818 519			155 506			
Estonia	a		2						
	b		467 000						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Netherlands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					40 555			
France	a	2	6	3		6		4	1
	b	9 830 650 000	18 039 300	16 390 000		25 000 000		195 140 550	400 000
	c								
Germany	a	6	23	17				12	8
	b	154 288	643 774	6 923 719				568 883	2 035 843
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							2 105 000	
	c								
Hungary	a								
	b								
	c		3 159						
Ireland	a	4							
	b	3 900							
	c	3 900							
Italy	a	1	15	11			1		
	b	573 747	457 100	2 531 110			826 800		
	c								
Lithuania	a			1					
	b			672 000					
	c							68 315	
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		48 784						
Poland	a		2			2			
	b		224 797			25 605 600			
	c					320 848			
Portugal	a			2					
	b			335 141					
	c		2 141 164	287 405					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Netherlands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Romania	a								
	b								
	c		1 577			24 038			
Spain	a		5	3				1	
	b		7 731 077	135 000					
	c		417 392 349					29 740	
Sweden	a			1		1			
	b			5 644					
	c			21 546		376 496	8 512	569 592	
Total per ML category	a	13	57	40		32	1	18	9
	b	9 831 381 935	27 573 074	26 992 614		50 631 995	826 800	197 814 433	2 435 843
	d								
	e								

Netherlands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a						1	16
	b						1 975 712	17 785 767
	c							8 444 733
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							17 000 000
	c							
Czech Republic	a		5					29
	b							23 444 823
	c		103 022					37 976 445
Denmark	a	3	1			4	3	39
	b							
	c					79 817	79 643	32 551 084
Estonia	a	1						3
	b	550 000						1 017 000
	c							
Finland	a	6						11
	b	75 044						700 234
	c	785						100 914

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Netherlands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	1				4	9	43
	b	4 560				38 265 917	5 270 003	10 131 484 400
	c							106 400 000
Germany	a	24	21			14	28	420
	b	1 717 544	1 136 549			97 930	2 397 011	1 826 290 433
	c							
Greece	a							9
	b							2 499 000
	c							
Hungary	a		1					7
	b		50 000					895 600
	c							262 259
Ireland	a							4
	b							3 900
	c							3 900
Italy	a					1	2	55
	b					3 217 109		136 726 875
	c							11 191 038
Latvia	a							11
	b							10 233 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							2
	b							672 000
	c							657 785
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						11 000	59 784
Poland	a						3	17
	b						3 015 117	29 081 230
	c					29 040		562 593
Portugal	a		2					9
	b		42 930					392 250
	c							2 428 569

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Netherlands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a					2	4	6
	b					23 000 000	10 468 577	33 468 577
	c					2 300 448	5 266 296	7 592 359
Spain	a						7	23
	b						2 928 853	12 568 873
	c							418 815 890
Sweden	a	2	1			2	2	31
	b	40 210						22 159 993
	c	691 539					46 599	34 146 637
Total per ML category	a	37	31			27	59	736
	b	2 387 358	1 229 479			64 580 956	26 055 273	12 266 423 955
	d							
	e							

New Caledonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	690 000							
	c	26 496							
Germany	a	3							
	b	14 475							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4							
	b	704 475							
	d								
	e								

New Caledonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		148 844						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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New Caledonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

New Caledonia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							690 000
	c							26 496
Germany	a							3
	b							14 475
	c							
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							148 844
Total per ML category	a							4
	b							704 475
	d							
	e							

New Zealand

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	10	3	2					
	b	1 297 494	30 276	4 088					
	c	229 897	19 676	61 958					
Czech Republic	a	1	1						
	b								
	c	21 686	199						
Denmark	a	3							
	b	118 011							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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New Zealand

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Finland	a	2							
	b	2 070 000							
	c	3 031							
France	a					1			
	b								
	c								
Germany	a	26	2	2			1		1
	b	525 914	549	45 772			96		104
	c								
Ireland	a	3							
	b	7 500							
	c	7 500							
Latvia	a	10							
	b	13 084 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	557 027							
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c					36 120			
Poland	a	1							
	b	7 010							
	c	3 907							
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	1 850							
	c								
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c	2 130							
Spain	a	1							
	b	200 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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New Zealand

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a		2	6					
	b			1 802 408					
	c		12 473	636 580					
Total per ML category	a	59	8	10		1	1		1
	b	17 311 779	30 825	1 852 268			96		104
	d								
	e								

New Zealand

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b		529						
	c		451						
France	a		3	1				1	
	b		55 451 499						
	c								
Germany	a	8	1	4					
	b	867 689	1 333	822 639					
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		20 000 000						
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							45 521	
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c		1 384 435						
Sweden	a						1		
	b						48 591		
	c			6 444			41 310		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

New Zealand

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	8	6	5			1	2	
	b	867 689	75 453 361	822 639			48 591		
	d								
	e								

New Zealand

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					16
	b		17 321					1 349 179
	c							311 531
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							529
	c							22 336
Denmark	a					2	2	7
	b					2 003 500	2 003 500	4 125 011
	c							
Finland	a							2
	b							2 070 000
	c							3 031
France	a					1		7
	b					100 000		55 551 499
	c							8 000 000
Germany	a	4	1			3	1	54
	b	31 804	6 750			15 175	30 090	2 347 915
	c							
Ireland	a							3
	b							7 500
	c							7 500
Italy	a							1
	b							20 000 000
	c							990 522
Latvia	a							10
	b							13 084 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

New Zealand

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a					1		3
	b							
	c							602 548
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c							1 420 555
Poland	a							1
	b							7 010
	c							3 907
Slovakia	a							1
	b							1 850
	c							
Slovenia	a							
	b							
	c							2 130
Spain	a							1
	b							200 000
	c							
Sweden	a						2	11
	b							1 850 999
	c	91 374						788 181
Total per ML category	a	4	2			7	5	120
	b	31 804	24 071			2 118 675	2 033 590	100 595 492
	d							
	e							

Nicaragua

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Nicaragua

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Nicaragua

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Niger

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	3	1	2	1				
	b	271 900	400 000	1 919 000	283 800				
	c	10 500	400 000	146 000					
Czech Republic	a	1	1	1					
	b								
	c								
France	a				2		2		
	b				1 010 938		6 561 354		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4	2	3	3		2		
	b	271 900	400 000	1 919 000	1 294 738		6 561 354		
	d								
	e								

Niger

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1						
	b		16 320 150						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Niger

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		2	1		3		1	
	b		24 071	1 258 000		1 910 600		2 196 000	
	c								
Germany	a		1			1			
	b		288 289			92 137			
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		48 943						
Total per ML category	a		4	1		4		1	
	b		16 632 510	1 258 000		2 002 737		2 196 000	
	d								
	e								

Niger

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							16 320 150
	c							
Bulgaria	a							7
	b							2 874 700
	c							556 500
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							
	c							
France	a							11
	b							12 960 963
	c							3 000 000
Germany	a							2
	b							380 426
	c							
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							48 943

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Niger

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							24
	b							32 536 239
	d							
	e							

Nigeria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	5	7	14	3				
	b	3 107 936	3 660 325	28 594 210	5 167 303				
	c	536 000	895 837	13 841 982	4 540 773				
Croatia	a	5	1	1					
	b	223 590	900	12 000					
	c	218 350		12 000					
Czech Republic	a	12	1	8			2		
	b	5 546 786	22 284	14 817 720			2 280 037		
	c	5 227 861	243 128	8 765 257	5 720 575		3 462 318		
France	a		1		3		1		
	b		54 400 000		63 880 000		1 355 000		
	c								
Germany	a								1
	b								636
	c								
Italy	a	2							
	b	13 678 193							
	c								
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						375 000		
	c						288 925		
Poland	a	1		2					
	b	290 269		782 565					
	c	300 801		458 565					
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	540 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Nigeria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	26	10	25	6		4		1
	b	23 386 774	58 083 509	44 206 495	69 047 303		4 010 037		636
	d								
	e								

Nigeria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		2			1			
	b		2 984 597						
	c		2 723 813						
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					28 343			
France	a	2	4					1	
	b	36 617 500	16 364 883					9 950 000	
	c								
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		66 000						
	c								
Poland	a		1						
	b		2 001 659						
	c		1 930 735						
Portugal	a		1						
	b		1 685 400						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	2	9			1		1	
	b	36 617 500	23 102 539					9 950 000	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Nigeria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							29
	b							40 529 774
	c							19 814 592
Croatia	a							7
	b							236 490
	c							230 350
Czech Republic	a							26
	b							25 651 424
	c							26 142 952
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							28 343
France	a	1				1	3	17
	b	19 220 000				7 100 000	4 400 007	213 287 390
	c							700 000
Germany	a							1
	b							636
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							13 678 193
	c							8 600 997
Netherlands	a							2
	b							441 000
	c							288 925
Poland	a							4
	b							3 074 493
	c							2 690 101
Portugal	a							1
	b							1 685 400
	c							
Slovakia	a							1
	b							540 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Nigeria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	1				1	3	90
	b	19 220 000				7 100 000	4 400 007	299 124 800
	d							
	e							

North Korea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

North Korea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

North Korea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

North Macedonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	133 164							
	c	65 187							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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North Macedonia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a			3	1				1
	b			645 392	182 412				264 090
	c			308 635	109 447	969 204			
Croatia	a	2							
	b	60 565							
	c	23 625							
Czech Republic	a	1						1	1
	b	36 637						103 806	7 409
	c	33 480						98 779	7 041
Germany	a	7							
	b	182 501							
	c								
Lithuania	a				1				
	b				9 750				
	c				9 750				
Netherlands	a	1	1	1	1				
	b	9 680	2 838	2 838	2 838				
	c	9 680	2 838	2 838	2 838				
Total per ML category	a	14	1	4	3			1	2
	b	422 547	2 838	648 230	195 000			103 806	271 499
	d								
	e								

North Macedonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		2	1			1		
	b			28 900 000			53 300 001		
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							36 000	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

North Macedonia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		2	1			1	1	
	b			28 900 000			53 300 001	36 000	
	d								
	e								

North Macedonia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							133 164
	c							65 187
Bulgaria	a							5
	b							1 091 894
	c							1 387 286
Croatia	a							2
	b							60 565
	c							23 625
Czech Republic	a							3
	b							147 852
	c							139 300
France	a						2	6
	b						4	82 200 005
	c							
Germany	a							7
	b							182 501
	c							
Lithuania	a							2
	b							45 750
	c							9 750
Netherlands	a							4
	b							18 194
	c						2	18 196

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

North Macedonia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a						2	32
	b						4	83 879 925
	d							
	e							

Norway

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	21		1	2		3		
	b	5 524 701		220	660 143		70 053 234		
	c	4 665 516		220			284		
Belgium	a	9		5					1
	b	9 594 200		1 577 382					127 485
	c								
Croatia	a	21		1					
	b	520 116		50					
	c	280 950							
Czech Republic	a			4			2		
	b			1 282 312					
	c			2 393 802			61 051		
Denmark	a		1	1	2	23			
	b								
	c	88 710		10 723	588 036	688 444	721 508		
Estonia	a						1		
	b						1 300 000		
	c						1 300 000		
Finland	a	1		2	1	3		1	
	b	5 060		40 900	5 245	330 223		129 500	
	c	23 114		40 900	5 245	14 581 247	433 299		1 785
France	a			3	6	4	3	1	1
	b			70 310 668	25 630 206	29 260 000	89 618 556	138 240	270 000
	c								
Germany	a	10	15	11	14	17	5		
	b	81 952	48 996	2 337 108	3 081 188	2 134 794	8 031 779		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Norway

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a		2	1		1			1
	b		201 838			575 194			
	c								
Latvia	a	11							
	b	15 619 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	625 327							
Netherlands	a			1	7		4	2	
	b			175 000	5 649 996		1 670 595	1 476 716	
	c		6 566		1 964 541		297 080	800 610	1 200
Poland	a			2		13			
	b			658 290		11 182 362			
	c			10 110		594 681			
Portugal	a	1							
	b	2 923							
	c								
Slovakia	a				1	1			
	b				7 624 585	44 000			
	c					44 000			
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	7 334							
	c	7 334							
Spain	a	1	1	4	5				1
	b	3 100		4 201 582	13 591 440				431 280
	c	24 948		171 500	7 007 379				137 779
Sweden	a	3	3	19	3	9	3		5
	b			1 384 782	47 123	783 328			594 173
	c	114 353	3 547 624	22 617 659	61 364	1 691 341	25 935 391		1 608 902
Total per ML category	a	80	22	55	41	71	21	4	9
	b	31 358 386	250 834	81 968 294	56 289 926	44 309 901	170 674 164	1 744 456	1 422 938
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Norway

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			1
	b					57 000			203 552
	c					57 000			179 940
Belgium	a		3						2
	b		2 898 370						35 519
	c								
Czech Republic	a								1
	b								652 147
	c								634 354
Denmark	a		1	3		31			
	b								
	c	155 200	2 043 302	3 003		19 186			
Estonia	a			1				1	
	b			455 561				179 191	
	c								
Finland	a		2					1	
	b		1 450 000					200 000	
	c		584 440					32 474	
France	a	1		9				1	
	b	144 000 000		38 800 000				4 320 000	
	c								
Germany	a	19	6	6					8
	b	1 627 314	119 963	6 508 596					1 902 955
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							1 286 500	
	c								
Italy	a	2	1	2					1
	b	24 115 520	945	14 290					137 551
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							85 654	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Norway

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Netherlands	a	2	2	3				2	
	b	15 549	53 476	1 502 677				54 846	
	c	5 122	1 473 309	853 148		90		3 546	
Poland	a		1	9		2			3
	b		321 167	1 526 663		274 675 200			346 837
	c		46 764	492 100		21 715 909			501 496
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		2 054 364	419 486					
Romania	a	1							
	b	40 760 927							
	c	36 872 667							
Spain	a		4	1				1	
	b		17 320						
	c		23 578						
Sweden	a					1	1	1	
	b								
	c		396 480			163 737	141 762	4 798	
Total per ML category	a	25	20	34		35	1	9	16
	b	210 519 310	4 861 241	48 807 787		274 732 200		6 040 537	3 278 561
	d								
	e								

Norway

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2				1	32
	b		10 241				500 000	77 009 091
	c		10 241					4 913 201
Belgium	a							20
	b							14 232 956
	c							
Croatia	a							22
	b							520 166
	c							280 950

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Norway

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a		1					8
	b		5 238					1 939 697
	c		5 301					3 094 508
Denmark	a					4	2	68
	b							
	c					5 086	5 073	4 328 271
Estonia	a						1	4
	b						136 802	2 071 554
	c						136 802	1 436 802
Finland	a							11
	b							2 160 928
	c	21 499					126 486	15 850 489
France	a	1				2	7	39
	b	229 150 000				7 343 285	11 930 004	650 770 959
	c							31 400 000
Germany	a	4	11			3	10	139
	b	26 068	2 046 598			217 201	3 336 189	31 500 701
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							1 286 500
	c							
Italy	a						2	13
	b							25 045 338
	c							10 453 898
Latvia	a							11
	b							15 619 000
	c							
Lithuania	a						1	3
	b							
	c							710 981
Netherlands	a							23
	b							10 598 855
	c	79 381		64 232			92 503	5 641 328

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Norway

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							30
	b							288 710 519
	c							23 361 060
Portugal	a		2					3
	b		144 000					146 923
	c							2 473 850
Romania	a							1
	b							40 760 927
	c							36 872 667
Slovakia	a							2
	b							7 668 585
	c							44 000
Slovenia	a							1
	b							7 334
	c							7 334
Spain	a	1					2	21
	b							18 244 722
	c							7 365 184
Sweden	a	9	6			4	8	75
	b	11 526	15 745				576 860	3 413 537
	c	4 209 725	12 924			79 667	2 222 639	62 808 366
Total per ML category	a	15	22			13	34	527
	b	229 187 594	2 221 822			7 560 486	16 479 855	1 191 708 292
	d							
	e							

Oman

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	17		1					
	b	314 838		200 429					
	c	18 894		85 457					
Belgium	a	4		4					
	b	382 441		7 234 500					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Oman

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a			2					1
	b			2 556					1 262 500
	c			10 665	824 370				
Czech Republic	a	2							
	b								
	c								700 664
Finland	a								
	b								
	c				375 840				
France	a			1	5		1		
	b			4 734 000	475 790 000		500 000		
	c								
Germany	a	10		2	1				
	b	666 034		161 660	640 461				
	c								
Italy	a	1	5		1				
	b		80 619		10 650				
	c								
Netherlands	a					2			
	b					453 323			
	c					496 635			
Poland	a								
	b								
	c	703 950							
Spain	a		1	7			1		
	b		1 630	11 066 903			43 283 506		
	c			18 613 280		1 314 000	23 701 519		
Sweden	a				1	2			
	b				28 218				
	c								
Total per ML category	a	34	6	17	8	4	2		1
	b	1 363 313	82 249	23 400 048	476 469 329	453 323	43 783 506		1 262 500
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Oman

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Estonia	a	1							
	b	45 890 530							
	c								
France	a		2	4		1		1	
	b		1 390 551	2 555 000		80 000		31 400 000	
	c								
Germany	a	2	5				1	1	2
	b	17 706	43 724 928				18 303	3 170 000	4 545
	c								
Italy	a		2	2					
	b		59 319	36 638					
	c								
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		28 277						
	c		1 603 713						
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		942 945	8 808 606					
Sweden	a							1	
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	10	6		1	1	3	2
	b	45 908 236	45 203 075	2 591 638		80 000	18 303	34 570 000	4 545
	d								
	e								

Oman

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2					20
	b		6 859					522 126
	c		6 859					111 210
Belgium	a							8
	b							7 616 941
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Oman

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							1 265 056
	c							835 035
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							
	c							700 664
Estonia	a							1
	b							45 890 530
	c							
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							375 840
France	a					1	3	19
	b					17 900 000	4 150 000	538 499 551
	c							57 400 000
Germany	a	1				1		26
	b	44 610				827 080		49 275 327
	c							
Italy	a							11
	b							187 226
	c							2 519 874
Netherlands	a					2	2	7
	b					453 323	453 323	1 388 246
	c							2 100 348
Poland	a							
	b							
	c							703 950
Spain	a							9
	b							54 352 039
	c							53 380 350
Sweden	a		1			1	1	7
	b							28 218
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Oman

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	1	3			5	6	113
	b	44 610	6 859			19 180 403	4 603 323	699 025 260
	d							
	e							

Pakistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Croatia	a	2							
	b	1 171 700							
	c	68 300							
Cyprus	a	13							
	b	313 512							
	c								
Czech Republic	a						2		
	b						203 167		
	c	34 325		164 485			128 700		
France	a		1	2	3	2			
	b		250 000	65 120 000	44 250 000	78 200 000			
	c								
Germany	a				1				
	b				148 260				
	c								
Italy	a	1			3	11			
	b	68 200			96 435 660	3 504 551			
	c								
Poland	a								
	b								
	c	995							
Spain	a	2	2	2			1		
	b	47 877	12 124 650	838 696			270 147		
	c	7 413	26 698 686				829 138		
Sweden	a					2			
	b					9 405 833			
	c					3 417 980			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Pakistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	18	3	4	7	15	3		
	b	1 601 289	12 374 650	65 958 696	140 833 920	91 110 384	473 314		
	d	10		1		3			
	e	2(1), 3(2), 4(1), 7(9)		7(1)		1(2), 4(3)			

Pakistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		2						
	b		19 000 000						
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					481 000			
	c					558 762			
Czech Republic	a			1			1		
	b								
	c		73 652	488 111					6 248
Denmark	a					1			
	b					334 829			
	c								
France	a	1	12	5				1	
	b	50 000	253 843 310	10 301 600				1 374 000	
	c								
Germany	a		1	4				2	
	b		26 250	717 024				1 541 558	
	c								
Italy	a		5	4					
	b		1 718 887	11 317 568					
	c								
Netherlands	a	2	1						
	b	55 445 000	1 000 000						
	c		419 686						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Pakistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		419 617						
Romania	a		9						
	b		6 848 753						
	c		5 858 602						
Spain	a	1	3	2					
	b	1 900 000	1 558 093	13 090 513					
	c	160 118	2 011 186	11 846 484					
Sweden	a			2					
	b			21 022 038					
	c		11 624						
Total per ML category	a	4	33	18		2	1	3	
	b	57 395 000	283 995 293	56 448 743		815 829		2 915 558	
	d	4							
	e	1(3), 4(4)							

Pakistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					1
	b		27 316					27 316
	c		27 316					27 316
Belgium	a							2
	b							19 000 000
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							481 000
	c							558 762
Croatia	a							2
	b							1 171 700
	c							68 300
Cyprus	a							13
	b							313 512
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Pakistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a		8					12
	b		121 427					324 594
	c		4 845 976				879 815	6 621 312
Denmark	a							1
	b							334 829
	c							
France	a		1			1	4	33
	b		6 720 000			400 000	607 810	461 116 720
	c							37 600 000
Germany	a							8
	b							2 433 092
	c							
Italy	a							24
	b							113 044 866
	c							131 530 216
Netherlands	a						2	5
	b						57 715 241	114 160 241
	c							419 686
Poland	a							
	b							
	c							995
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							419 617
Romania	a		8				2	19
	b		1 638 231				2 047 420	10 534 404
	c		1 095 119				2 047 204	9 000 925
Spain	a							13
	b							29 829 976
	c							41 553 025
Sweden	a					3	3	10
	b							30 427 871
	c						140 524	3 570 128

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Pakistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a		18			4	11	144
	b		8 506 974			400 000	60 370 471	783 200 121
	d					3	1	22
	e					1(3), 4(3)	1(1), 4(1)	1(9), 2(1), 3(2), 4(12), 7(10)

Palau

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Palau

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Palau

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Palestine

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Palestine

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Palestine

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Panama

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	7							
	b	196 583							
	c	154 136							
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b	30 531							
	c								
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	164 200							
	c	29 901							
Total per ML category	a	9							
	b	391 314							
	d	1							
	e	7(1)							

Panama

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a							1	
	b								
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Panama

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a							1	
	b								
	d								
	e								

Panama

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							7
	b							196 583
	c							154 136
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							30 531
	c							
Slovenia	a							1
	b							164 200
	c							29 901
Spain	a							1
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a							10
	b							391 314
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Papua New Guinea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Papua New Guinea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Papua New Guinea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a						1	1
	b						2 360	2 360
	c							
Total per ML category	a						1	1
	b						2 360	2 360
	d							
	e							

Paraguay

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b			56 992					
	c			97 851					
Slovakia	a	2							
	b	213 305							
	c	135 251							
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	145 500							
	c	292 500							
Spain	a	3							
	b	252 500							
	c	67 110							
Total per ML category	a	6		1					
	b	611 305		56 992					
	d	2							
	e	7(2)							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Paraguay

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Paraguay

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							56 992
	c							97 851
Slovakia	a							2
	b							213 305
	c							135 251
Slovenia	a							1
	b							145 500
	c							292 500
Spain	a							3
	b							252 500
	c							67 110
Total per ML category	a							7
	b							668 297
	d							2
	e							7(2)

Peru

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4							
	b	264 650							
	c	125 947							
Belgium	a	1							
	b	934							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Peru

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a			1	1				
	b			102 100 000	740 000				
	c								
Germany	a	1							
	b	6 830							
	c								
Italy	a				1				
	b				741 300				
	c								
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	809 600							
	c								
Spain	a			1			1		1
	b			886 000			1 474 040		
	c						2 169 258		
Sweden	a								1
	b								658 408
	c	15 314							646 098
Total per ML category	a	7		2	2		1		2
	b	1 082 014		102 986 000	1 481 300		1 474 040		658 408
	d								
	e								

Peru

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b		185 630						
	c		253 727						
France	a			1					
	b			386 400					
	c								
Germany	a	1	1						
	b	144 237	64 112						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Peru

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a	1							
	b	4 120 000							
	c								
Italy	a		3						
	b		14 946 161						
	c								
Spain	a		4						
	b		608 799						
	c		535 197						
Total per ML category	a	2	9	1					
	b	4 264 237	15 804 702	386 400					
	d								
	e								

Peru

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							4
	b							264 650
	c							125 947
Belgium	a							1
	b							934
	c							
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							185 630
	c							253 727
France	a		2			1	3	9
	b		1 607 655			10 000	2 100 100	106 944 155
	c							4 100 000
Germany	a	1						4
	b	35 940						251 119
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							4 120 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Peru

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							4
	b							15 687 461
	c							337 456
Slovenia	a							1
	b							809 600
	c							
Spain	a							7
	b							2 968 839
	c							2 704 455
Sweden	a						1	2
	b							658 408
	c							661 412
Total per ML category	a	1	2			1	4	34
	b	35 940	1 607 655			10 000	2 100 100	131 890 796
	d							
	e							

Philippines

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a						1		
	b						250 000		
	c								
Bulgaria	a			5		1			
	b			15 487 517		18 459			
	c	116 000		532 973		30 000			
Croatia	a			1					
	b			305 500					
	c								
Czech Republic	a	2							
	b	850 804							
	c	784 065							
Finland	a					1			
	b					2 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Philippines

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a			1	1				
	b			33 320 000	110 000 000				
	c								
Germany	a			1					
	b			3 849 269					
	c								
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	111 000							
	c	111 000							
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	1 259 597							
	c	1 259 597							
Spain	a			8	1				
	b			14 392 249	1 193 259				
	c			22 959 343			2 334 500		
Sweden	a					2			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4		16	2	4	1		
	b	2 221 401		67 354 535	111 193 259	20 459	250 000		
	d	1				1	3		
	e	2(1), 3(1), 7(1)				2(1)	2(3), 3(3), 7(2)		

Philippines

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	2	1						
	b	1 195 000	13 780						
	c								
Germany	a		1	1					2
	b		5 525	1 565 784					91 287
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							190 710	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Philippines

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a		2						
	b		22 952						
	c								
Poland	a		2						
	b		249 968						
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		507						
Spain	a		3					1	
	b							78 000	
	c		29 708 332					78 000	
Total per ML category	a	2	9	1				2	2
	b	1 195 000	292 225	1 565 784				268 710	91 287
	d								
	e								

Philippines

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							1
	b							250 000
	c							
Bulgaria	a							6
	b							15 505 976
	c							678 973
Croatia	a							1
	b							305 500
	c							
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							850 804
	c							784 065
Finland	a							1
	b							2 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Philippines

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	1					1	7
	b	86 000					1 410 000	146 024 780
	c							2 400 000
Germany	a						1	6
	b						1	5 511 866
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							190 710
	c							
Italy	a							2
	b							22 952
	c							35 334 661
Netherlands	a						1	1
	b						20 000	20 000
	c							
Poland	a		1				1	4
	b		591 144				1 903 400	2 744 512
	c							
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							507
Slovakia	a							1
	b							111 000
	c							111 000
Slovenia	a							1
	b							1 259 597
	c							1 259 597
Spain	a							13
	b							15 663 508
	c						718 974	55 799 149
Sweden	a					2	2	6
	b							
	c						60 635	60 635

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Philippines

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	1	1			2	6	53
	b	86 000	591 144				3 333 401	188 463 205
	d							5
	e							2(5), 3(4), 7(3)

Poland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	30	1	9		1	1		
	b	1 779 248	15 000	4 841 500		169 500	10 271		
	c	1 227 989		521 674			10 271		
Belgium	a	11					2		1
	b	1 735 639					240 050		1 858 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	6	17	63	43	5	14		4
	b	14 474 047	106 704 409	773 403 553	813 117 918	2 033 780	40 933 800		443 500
	c	7 934 050	64 474 005	167 881 900	321 450 745	1 535 385	39 733 000		291 500
Croatia	a	7							
	b	517 990							
	c	78 820							
Czech Republic	a	7	3	8	1		4		6
	b								
	c	603 601	760 258	5 230 135	1 928 510		5 103 907		542 722
Denmark	a					3			
	b								
	c		30 158			200 150	87 810		
Estonia	a				3				
	b				7 479 500				
	c				3 113 600				
Finland	a	11	2	1	1		3		
	b	1 863 740	1 230 500	8 200	403 423		3 900 000		
	c	256 974	79 100	130 260			1 939 194		
France	a			3	3		1		
	b			232 250 900	4 061 081		1 769 602		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Poland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	14	3	8	3	12	107	1	
	b	1 313 286	170 902	7 646 764	77 242	1 033 469	9 750 921	78	
	c								
Greece	a				1				
	b				5 541 770				
	c								
Hungary	a	11		7					
	b	2 550 994		325 905					
	c	691 900		54 305					
Ireland	a							1	
	b							120 000	
	c							120 000	
Italy	a	1	4	7	2				
	b	66 000	320 300	64 307 360	112 642				
	c								
Latvia	a	13							
	b	14 721 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	2		10					
	b								
	c	1 450 725		1 974 309		13 900			
Netherlands	a	38	3	7		1			
	b	104 581	30 000	3 232 610		348 107			
	c	56 798	30 000			1 325 102			
Slovakia	a	2	4	11	3		28		3
	b	150 500	325 373	31 122 233	16 328 000		3 664 570		12 707 825
	c	100 250	104 060	20 785 297	42 000		3 416 851		32 640
Slovenia	a	2		1					
	b			36 966					
	c	43 468		94 689					
Spain	a	1			1	1			1
	b	14 800			126 900				32 700
	c	28 832			591 280				32 700

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Poland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	3		1	6	2			1
	b	818			7 665 754	3 903 421			470 292
	c	186 349		187 439					568 081
Total per ML category	a	159	37	136	67	25	160	2	16
	b	39 292 643	108 796 484	1 117 175 991	854 914 230	7 488 277	60 269 214	120 078	15 512 317
	d								
	e								

Poland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		2						
	b		307 998						
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					256 870			
	c					256 870		655 836	
Czech Republic	a		6	12				1	
	b								
	c		1 759 690	1 611 209		418 650	313 894	22 627	29 494
Denmark	a					111			
	b								
	c					1 656 529			
Estonia	a						2		
	b						86 200		
	c								
France	a	1	1	8		13	1	2	1
	b	31 600 000	30 440 000	1 286 190 002		31 476 000	385 875	1 509 000	87 500
	c								
Germany	a	1	12	6				3	6
	b	4 646	512 696	831 382				3 313	396 223
	c								
Greece	a							3	
	b							942 800	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Poland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a			2					5
	b			987 019					2 405 273
	c								
Lithuania	a					2		2	
	b					195 900		500 000	
	c					195 900		788 215	
Netherlands	a					1		3	
	b					188 665		18 443	
	c			29 208		514 394			
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c			235 428					
Romania	a							1	7
	b							79 039	225 375
	c							16 689	89 825
Slovakia	a		1			1			
	b		33 000			68 800			
	c		33 000						
Slovenia	a								1
	b								450 611
	c								450 611
Spain	a		5	4		2		1	
	b		144 109	4 497 182		4 328 220		1 380 000	
	c		8 384 077						
Sweden	a		1	2					
	b		85	8 465					
	c		65 461	3 397		308 956	1 314 372		
Total per ML category	a	2	28	34		131	3	16	20
	b	31 604 646	31 437 888	1 292 514 050		36 514 455	472 075	4 432 595	3 564 982
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Poland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	1	1					44
	b	52 620	6 142					6 874 281
	c	2 631	6 142					1 768 707
Belgium	a							16
	b							4 141 687
	c							
Bulgaria	a							153
	b							1 751 367 877
	c							604 213 291
Croatia	a							7
	b							517 990
	c							78 820
Czech Republic	a		14					62
	b							
	c		1 615 010					19 939 707
Denmark	a					2		116
	b							
	c					16 453	16 332	2 007 432
Estonia	a							5
	b							7 565 700
	c							3 113 600
Finland	a							18
	b							7 405 863
	c							2 405 528
France	a	1	2			1	2	40
	b	3 000	18 310 000			1 113 577	5 430 100	1 644 626 637
	c							35 500 000
Germany	a	11	19			8	26	240
	b	505 790	285 581			96 522	1 571 254	24 200 069
	c							
Greece	a							4
	b							6 484 570
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Poland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a							18
	b							2 876 899
	c							746 205
Ireland	a	1						2
	b	3 000						123 000
	c	3 000						123 000
Italy	a		6			1	1	29
	b		7 431 513					75 630 107
	c							15 303 246
Latvia	a							13
	b							14 721 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1	2	19
	b							695 900
	c						254 224	4 677 273
Netherlands	a					1	2	56
	b					348 107	348 207	4 618 720
	c						2	1 955 504
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							235 428
Romania	a							8
	b							304 414
	c							106 514
Slovakia	a						1	54
	b						2 748 200	67 148 501
	c							24 514 098
Slovenia	a							4
	b							487 577
	c							588 768
Spain	a	1					11	28
	b						1 757 281	12 281 192
	c							9 036 889

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Poland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a	2	1			4	2	25
	b					3 292		12 052 127
	c	23 278	516 804				25 729	3 199 866
Total per ML category	a	17	43			18	47	961
	b	564 410	26 033 236			1 561 498	11 855 042	3 644 124 111
	d							
	e							

Portugal

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			2	1				
	b			21 280	2 035				
	c			5 000	2 035				
Belgium	a	5		1					
	b	106 636		227					
	c								
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c	258 958		340 831					
Denmark	a						1		
	b								
	c								
Finland	a	1							
	b	300 000							
	c	1 222							
France	a	1		1		2			
	b	3 100		25 410		23 300 000			
	c								
Germany	a	2			1	1	2		
	b	4 026			700	5 094	440 251		
	c								
Italy	a			3		2			
	b			501 942					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Portugal

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Latvia	a	14							
	b	13 094 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c	1 011 403							
Netherlands	a	4		1			1		
	b	7 335		6 000			157 000		
	c					164 511			
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	3 000							
	c	3 000							
Slovenia	a			1					
	b			2 415					
	c			2 415					
Spain	a	1		2	1				
	b	45 000		81 750	200 750				
	c	17 685	73 923		200 750				
Sweden	a	2	2						
	b		2 064						
	c	61 664	2 045	317 120					
Total per ML category	a	31	2	11	3	5	4		
	b	13 563 097	2 064	639 024	203 485	23 305 094	597 251		
	d								
	e								

Portugal

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b								
	c			205 766					
Denmark	a					3			
	b								
	c		106 158			2 021			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Portugal

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		1			1		1	
	b		1 801 000			1 000 000		1 340 000	
	c								
Germany	a	4	4	4					
	b	21 943	4 025	3 257 270					
	c								
Italy	a		3						
	b		273 652						
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							7 095	
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		724						
	c		1 629 570						
Poland	a					9			
	b					179 636			
	c					118 179			
Spain	a		2	2					
	b		1 300						
	c		1 053 565	25 657					
Sweden	a			2					
	b			52 202					
	c			20 806					
Total per ML category	a	4	11	9		13		1	
	b	21 943	2 080 701	3 309 472		1 179 636		1 340 000	
	d								
	e								

Portugal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							23 315
	c							7 035

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Portugal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							6
	b							106 863
	c							
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							
	c							805 555
Denmark	a							4
	b							
	c					104 000	5	212 184
Finland	a							1
	b							300 000
	c							1 222
France	a	2				1	5	15
	b	2 479					10 963 002	38 434 991
	c							1 000 000
Germany	a		22			3	6	49
	b		63 252			133 625	6	3 930 192
	c							
Italy	a					1		9
	b							775 594
	c							1 631 051
Latvia	a							14
	b							13 094 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							
	b							
	c							1 018 498
Netherlands	a							7
	b							171 059
	c						2	1 794 083
Poland	a							9
	b							179 636
	c							118 179

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Portugal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovakia	a							1
	b							3 000
	c							3 000
Slovenia	a		1					2
	b		1 750					4 165
	c		1 750					4 165
Spain	a					1	9	18
	b						1 376 501	1 705 301
	c							1 371 580
Sweden	a	2	1				2	11
	b	4 741						59 007
	c	20 562						422 197
Total per ML category	a	4	24			6	22	150
	b	7 220	65 002			133 625	12 339 509	58 787 123
	d							
	e							

Qatar

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		1					
	b	893 115		83 000					
	c	893 115		83 000					
Belgium	a	4							
	b	35 982							
	c								
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c			6 891					45 894
Finland	a	1							
	b	16 500							
	c	12 066							
France	a	1	5	1	8	3	2		
	b	5 750	1 375 540	54 305 000	2 635 738 142	353 730 000	71 570 001		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Qatar

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	4		3	6	1	1		1
	b	75 286		2 860 404	12 943 963	1 464	27 333 750		390
	c								
Italy	a	4			5	1			
	b	51 873 030			133 751 593	50 373 962			
	c								
Netherlands	a					1			
	b					977 967			
	c					104 050			
Slovenia	a							2	
	b							64 014	
	c							17 809	
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c				36 100				
Total per ML category	a	16	5	5	19	6	3	2	1
	b	52 899 663	1 375 540	57 248 404	2 782 433 698	405 083 393	98 903 751	64 014	390
	d								
	e								

Qatar

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					3			
	b					522 946			
	c					518 148			
Belgium	a						1		
	b						839 329		
	c								
Bulgaria	a					3			
	b					1 575 882			
	c					1 554 882			
Finland	a			1					
	b			187 225					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Qatar

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		5	2		2	2	4	
	b		418 296 291	90 905 002		582 963	13 700 002	19 628 000	
	c								
Germany	a	2	13	3			3	3	11
	b	279 011	2 768 236	1 022 250			452 250	1 144 883	432 846
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							48 400	
	c								
Italy	a		8	3					
	b		3 835 176	15 862 800					
	c								
Netherlands	a	1	1	1					
	b	10 128	5 000 000	540 622					
	c		1 772 007						
Poland	a					1			
	b					1 400			
	c					1 400			
Spain	a		1						
	b		2 000 000						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	3	28	10		9	6	8	11
	b	289 139	431 899 703	108 517 899		2 683 191	14 991 581	20 821 283	432 846
	d								
	e								

Qatar

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							6
	b							1 499 061
	c							1 494 263
Belgium	a							5
	b							875 311
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Qatar

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							1 575 882
	c							1 554 882
Czech Republic	a		1					1
	b							
	c		166 312					219 097
Finland	a						1	3
	b						500 000	703 725
	c						668 790	680 856
France	a	1				2	6	44
	b	1 550 001				30 720 000	46 524 622	3 738 631 314
	c							1 136 500 000
Germany	a	1				3	1	56
	b	68 880				828 182	1	50 211 796
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							48 400
	c							
Italy	a						1	22
	b							255 696 561
	c							1 877 748 468
Netherlands	a					2	3	9
	b					1 518 588	6 518 588	14 565 893
	c							1 876 057
Poland	a							1
	b							1 400
	c							1 400
Slovenia	a							2
	b							64 014
	c							17 809
Spain	a							1
	b							2 000 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Qatar

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c	454 408						490 508
Total per ML category	a	2	1			7	12	154
	b	1 618 881				33 066 770	53 543 211	4 065 873 357
	d							
	e							

Romania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		1					
	b	8 324		30 000					
	c	4 996		296					
Belgium	a	1		5	1				
	b	6 792		1 009 155	15 000				
	c								
Bulgaria	a	6	9	31	10		1		3
	b	69 340 721	58 875 865	321 678 242	208 209 117		61 200 000		861 290
	c	1 601 105	13 171 440	114 917 725	120 447 100				861 290
Czech Republic	a	1						2	1
	b								
	c	681 420		1 808 094			737 674	255 544	4 342
Denmark	a						1		
	b								
	c								
France	a						1		
	b						5 238 750		
	c								
Germany	a	1		3			31		
	b	70 000		1 085 085			1 111 891		
	c								
Greece	a				1		1		
	b				1 600 000		1 600 000		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Romania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a	8		20					
	b	818 456		624 943					
	c	6 888		348 011					
Italy	a	4		9			4		
	b	117 650		550 207			1 948 500		
	c								
Latvia	a	2							
	b	119 000							
	c								
Netherlands	a	2			1				
	b	2 440			24 133				
	c								
Poland	a								1
	b								46 989
	c								46 989
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c	670 791	23 000	449 331			24 633 520		
Slovakia	a						1		
	b						30 000		
	c						30 000		
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c			155 124					
Spain	a			2	5		2		3
	b			1 670 470	2 880 609		91 999		13 743
	c				5 177 964		91 998		1 228
Sweden	a	1	2			2			
	b		11 451			771 278			
	c		11 673	169 109		766 812			
Total per ML category	a	28	11	71	18	2	42	2	8
	b	70 483 383	58 887 316	326 648 102	212 728 859	771 278	71 221 140		922 022
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Romania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1						
	b		496 109						
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							963 768	
	c							963 768	
Croatia	a								1
	b								437 000
	c								135 656
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b								
	c		61 739						
Denmark	a					3			
	b								
	c		54 270			3 271			
France	a	2	6	8			1	4	
	b	1 455 002 078	71 968 400	189 140 001			500 000	89 575 000	
	c								
Germany	a							1	2
	b							398 900	409 505
	c								
Italy	a		1				1		
	b		7 554						
	c								
Lithuania	a			3					
	b			199 800					
	c			199 800				340 403	
Netherlands	a		3	1					
	b		23 954	85 421					
	c	17 622 517	6 960						
Poland	a		1			1			
	b		6 098			210 000			
	c		6 098			18 831			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Romania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		13 302 264	26 930		19 430			
Spain	a							1	
	b							60 000	
	c							60 000	
Sweden	a			1					
	b			84 653					
	c			6 444					
Total per ML category	a	2	13	13		4	2	7	3
	b	1 455 002 078	72 502 115	189 509 875		210 000	500 000	90 997 668	846 505
	d								
	e								

Romania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					4
	b		30 061					68 385
	c							5 292
Belgium	a							8
	b							1 527 056
	c							
Bulgaria	a							61
	b							721 129 003
	c							251 962 428
Croatia	a							1
	b							437 000
	c							135 656
Czech Republic	a		1					6
	b							
	c		25 302					3 574 115
Denmark	a	1				2	1	8
	b							
	c					309		57 850

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Romania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	2				1	5	30
	b	1 557 021				88 000	8 130 400	1 821 199 650
	c							3 800 000
Germany	a	2	5			1	14	60
	b	800 432	17 931			142 470	341 582	4 377 796
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							3 200 000
	c							
Hungary	a							28
	b							1 443 399
	c							354 899
Italy	a					2	1	22
	b							2 623 911
	c							32 931 092
Latvia	a							2
	b							119 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							3
	b							199 800
	c							540 203
Netherlands	a						2	9
	b						109 554	245 502
	c					2	187 502	17 816 981
Poland	a						1	4
	b						951 700	1 214 787
	c							71 918
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							39 125 266
Slovakia	a							1
	b							30 000
	c							30 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Romania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a							
	b							
	c							155 124
Spain	a						4	17
	b						698 281	5 415 102
	c							5 331 190
Sweden	a							6
	b							867 382
	c							954 038
Total per ML category	a	5	7			6	28	272
	b	2 357 453	47 992			230 470	10 231 517	2 564 097 773
	d							
	e							

Russia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Russia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d		1						
	e		1(1)						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Russia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							1
	e							1(1)

Rwanda

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	2	1	6	3				
	b	95 450	1 779 500	14 198 324	14 669 574				
	c	95 450		316 404	2 027 754				
Czech Republic	a	2		1				2	
	b								
	c	87 140	27 340	773	184 388		398 774		
Poland	a	1	1			1			
	b	5 013 080	1 237 210			447 299			
	c								
Slovakia	a	1	1	4	2				
	b		130 000	27 193 393	14 703 735				
	c			2 758 449					
Spain	a					1			
	b					18 000 000			
	c					963 193			
Total per ML category	a	6	3	11	5	2		2	
	b	5 108 530	3 146 710	41 391 717	29 373 309	18 447 299			
	d								
	e								

Rwanda

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a					2	1	2	
	b								
	c			886 688		242 722	76 704		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Rwanda

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Estonia	a		1						
	b		2 199 000						
	c								
France	a							1	
	b							2 196 000	
	c								
Slovakia	a					1		2	
	b					646 500		16 306 390	
	c							2 147 290	
Slovenia	a						2		
	b						1 629 600		
	c						814 800		
Total per ML category	a		1			3	3	5	
	b		2 199 000			646 500	1 629 600	18 502 390	
	d							1	
	e							7(1)	

Rwanda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							12
	b							30 742 848
	c							2 439 608
Czech Republic	a							10
	b							
	c	329 257						2 233 786
Estonia	a							1
	b							2 199 000
	c							
France	a						1	2
	b						5 000 001	7 196 001
	c							
Lithuania	a						1	1
	b						185 849	185 849
	c						185 849	185 849

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Rwanda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							3
	b							6 697 589
	c							
Slovakia	a							11
	b							58 980 018
	c							4 905 739
Slovenia	a							2
	b							1 629 600
	c							814 800
Spain	a						1	2
	b							18 000 000
	c							963 193
Total per ML category	a						3	44
	b						5 185 850	125 630 905
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Saint Barthelemy

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Barthelemy

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Saint Barthelemy

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Saint Helena

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Helena

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Helena

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Saint Kitts and Nevis

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Saint Kitts and Nevis

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Kitts and Nevis

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Saint Lucia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	76 750							
	c	76 750							
Total per ML category	a	3							
	b	76 750							
	d								
	e								

Saint Lucia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Saint Lucia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							76 750
	c							76 750
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							76 750
	d							
	e							

Saint Martin

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Martin

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Martin

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2							
	b	26 811							
	c	13 497							
Total per ML category	a	2							
	b	26 811							
	d								
	e								

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							26 811
	c							13 497
Total per ML category	a							2
	b							26 811
	d							
	e							

Samoa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Samoa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Samoa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

San Marino

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

San Marino

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

San Marino

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							6 704

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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San Marino

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Sao Tome and Principe

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Sao Tome and Principe

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Sao Tome and Principe

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Saudi Arabia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	5	3	7	2				
	b	13 160 731	4 828 442	334 138 368	21 982 500				
	c	1 548 546	1 377 104	26 112 470					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Saudi Arabia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Croatia	a	1							
	b	1 802 300							
	c	903 025							
Cyprus	a	10		4					
	b	2 263 247		874 340					
	c								
Czech Republic	a	2				1	3		
	b								
	c						2 820 746		
Estonia	a				1		1		
	b				2 000		168 717		
	c						168 475		
France	a	1	4	4	4	6	5	3	
	b	205 800	4 538 000	141 484 710	631 588 000	81 731 500	5 230 000	470 150	
	c								
Germany	a		2			1			
	b		7 600 000			27 150 000			
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			307 500					
	c								
Italy	a				1	3	1		
	b				1 223 420	147 815	1 560 000		
	c								
Latvia	a	1							
	b	50 000							
	c								
Poland	a								1
	b								370 000
	c								
Romania	a					3			
	b					167 772			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Saudi Arabia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a			1				1	
	b							354 665	
	c							354 665	
Spain	a	1		3		3	3		
	b			261 222		120 000	4 800 000		
	c			41 975 870	11 340	904 081	2 098 657		
Sweden	a				1	1			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	21	9	20	9	18	13	4	1
	b	17 482 078	16 966 442	477 066 140	654 795 920	109 317 087	11 758 717	824 815	370 000
	d								
	e								

Saudi Arabia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c					108 000			
Czech Republic	a			3		3		1	
	b					727			
	c								
Estonia	a						1		
	b						1 160		
	c								
France	a		4	5		4	3	7	
	b		1 526 562	45 430 000		200 796 400	6 700 003	70 658 550	
	c								
Germany	a		40	1			1		3
	b		7 482 456	250 000			9 536		310 548
	c								
Italy	a		26	3					
	b		111 933 890	7 093 545					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Saudi Arabia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a					1			
	b					357 200			
	c								
Portugal	a		1						
	b		270 948						
	c		2 224 554						
Spain	a	1	13					2	
	b	793 880 679	300 389 278					160 000	
	c	793 880 179	17 486 792					1 941 320	
Sweden	a		1	1					
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1	85	13		8	5	10	3
	b	793 880 679	421 603 134	52 773 545		201 154 327	6 710 699	70 818 550	310 548
	d						1		
	e						2(1), 4(1), 6(1)		

Saudi Arabia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							17
	b							374 110 041
	c							29 146 120
Croatia	a							1
	b							1 802 300
	c							903 025
Cyprus	a							14
	b							3 137 587
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1				1	15
	b						2 116 833	2 117 560
	c		336 001			35 823	449 322	3 641 892
Estonia	a							3
	b							171 877
	c							168 475

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Saudi Arabia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	1	1			1	11	64
	b	60 040 000	10 000				143 148 507	1 393 558 182
	c							470 800 000
Germany	a	1				2		51
	b	500 000				927 080		44 229 620
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							307 500
	c							
Italy	a						1	35
	b						1 485 260	123 443 930
	c							140 816 195
Latvia	a							1
	b							50 000
	c							
Poland	a		4					6
	b		26 049 918					26 777 118
	c		3 061 368					3 061 368
Portugal	a							1
	b							270 948
	c							2 224 554
Romania	a							3
	b							167 772
	c							
Slovakia	a							2
	b							354 665
	c							354 665
Spain	a						1	27
	b							1 099 611 179
	c							858 298 239
Sweden	a					1	1	6
	b							
	c						1 192 980	1 192 980

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Saudi Arabia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	2	6			4	15	247
	b	60 540 000	26 059 918			927 080	146 750 600	3 070 110 279
	d							1
	e							2(1), 4(1), 6(1)

Senegal

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a			1					
	b			16 800					
	c			16 800					
Bulgaria	a		1	1	1				1
	b		126 100	24 500	240 400				366 272
	c		325 300	676 490	660 400				469 734
Czech Republic	a		1	2	1				1
	b		330 003						
	c	4 466	1 044 348		857 604				
France	a	2	1	1	2	1	3		
	b	289 536	19 168	58 300 000	109 895 000	14 027 500	39 665 000		
	c								
Spain	a			1				1	
	b			520 000				131 000	
	c			520 000				131 000	
Total per ML category	a	2	3	6	4	1	3	1	2
	b	289 536	475 271	58 861 300	110 135 400	14 027 500	39 665 000	131 000	366 272
	d								
	e								

Senegal

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a						2		
	b						109 868		
	c			283 000			109 868		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Senegal

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a		2					2	
	b		5 100 000					2 301 600	
	c								
Germany	a		1						
	b		19 950						
	c								
Italy	a	2							
	b	5 750 000							
	c								
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		61 889 282						
Total per ML category	a	2	3				2	2	
	b	5 750 000	5 119 950				109 868	2 301 600	
	d								
	e								

Senegal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							16 800
	c							16 800
Bulgaria	a						2	8
	b						18 000	885 140
	c						18 000	2 542 792
Czech Republic	a							5
	b							330 003
	c							1 906 418
France	a					2		16
	b					9 850 000		239 447 804
	c							2 500 000
Germany	a							1
	b							19 950
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Senegal

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							2
	b							5 750 000
	c							9 572 823
Lithuania	a						1	1
	b						10 860	10 860
	c						10 860	10 860
Portugal	a	1						1
	b	23 388						23 388
	c							
Spain	a						1	3
	b							651 000
	c							62 540 282
Total per ML category	a	1				2	4	38
	b	23 388				9 850 000	28 860	247 134 945
	d							
	e							

Serbia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	5					1		2
	b	523 740					629 500		36 938
	c	119 750							36 938
Belgium	a	2							1
	b	85 339							3 042 090
	c								
Bulgaria	a			14	2				1
	b			5 618 160	88 650				1 200 000
	c		16 500	822 546	616				973 440
Croatia	a	1		1					1
	b	1 035		6 930					20 240
	c	1 035		6 930					
Czech Republic	a	1					3		4
	b	329 737					356 450		1 193 975
	c	295 056					355 284		741 481

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Serbia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a			1		2			1
	b			28 159 000		85 040 000			7 251
	c								
Germany	a	19		4	1				1
	b	370 322		472 514	10 002				165
	c								
Hungary	a	5		5					
	b	174 140		70 000					
	c			8 900					
Italy	a			1					
	b								
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c	34 730							
Poland	a			1					1
	b			170 000					867 535
	c								
Romania	a			2					
	b			18 662 264					
	c			1 918 328					
Slovakia	a	2	1	3					
	b	42 467	93 968	1 435 060					
	c	42 467	93 968	194 060					
Slovenia	a	2		1					
	b	3 778		2 999					
	c								
Spain	a	1							2
	b	10 313							18 336
	c	73 904							11 477
Total per ML category	a	38	1	33	3	2	4		14
	b	1 540 871	93 968	54 596 927	98 652	85 040 000	985 950		6 386 530
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Serbia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		1	1					
	b		321 924						
	c			7 206					
France	a		4	5				1	
	b		2 097 722	548 590 000				3 165 000	
	c								
Germany	a							1	
	b							1 962 094	
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							67 072	
	c							76 350	
Slovenia	a								8
	b								561 816
	c								491 186
Spain	a		3						
	b		90 000 000						
	c								
Total per ML category	a		8	6				3	8
	b		92 419 646	548 590 000				5 194 166	561 816
	d								
	e								

Serbia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	3	1					12
	b	545 000	1 770					1 736 948
	c	12 490	1 770					170 948
Belgium	a		1					4
	b		5 460 883					8 588 312
	c							
Bulgaria	a							17
	b							6 906 810
	c							1 813 102

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Serbia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Croatia	a							3
	b							28 205
	c							7 965
Czech Republic	a							10
	b							2 202 086
	c							1 399 027
France	a		1			1	6	22
	b		850 000			5 425 000	2 629 001	675 962 974
	c							133 100 000
Germany	a	2						28
	b	68 230						2 883 327
	c							
Hungary	a							10
	b							244 140
	c							8 900
Italy	a							1
	b							
	c							69 250
Lithuania	a					1		2
	b							67 072
	c							111 080
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						2	2
Poland	a		1					3
	b		3 870					1 041 405
	c		3 870					3 870
Romania	a						1	3
	b						54 500	18 716 764
	c						7 500	1 925 828
Slovakia	a						1	7
	b						13 180	1 584 675
	c						13 180	343 675

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Serbia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a							11
	b							568 593
	c							491 186
Spain	a							6
	b							90 028 649
	c							85 381
Total per ML category	a	5	4			2	8	139
	b	613 230	6 316 523			5 425 000	2 696 681	810 559 960
	d							
	e							

Seychelles

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Seychelles

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Seychelles

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Sierra Leone

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1		1					
	b	2 300 000		6 134 700					
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1		1					
	b	2 300 000		6 134 700					
	d								
	e								

Sierra Leone

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Sierra Leone

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							8 434 700
	c							
Total per ML category	a							2
	b							8 434 700
	d							
	e							

Singapore

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1	3	2	2		5		
	b	93	248 266	81 337	161 862		6 631 270		
	c		237 183	18 648			6 255 270		
Belgium	a	2		1		1			2
	b	11 212		26 640		95 052			292 500
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Singapore

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a			2				1	1
	b			29 048					
	c			29 590					
Denmark	a						3		
	b						3 321 048		
	c								
Finland	a				1	1	2		
	b				43 866	100 000	320 000		
	c								
France	a			1	5	4	1	1	3
	b			1 500 600	1 158 720 315	420 260 000	505 474	3 654 500	29 211 750
	c								
Germany	a	4		4		3	32	1	
	b	481 457		425 215		84 550	8 405 155	11 500	
	c								
Ireland	a						2		
	b						1 469 159		
	c						1 469 159		
Italy	a	3	6	1	5		1		
	b	43 333	170 030 365		313 540		19 500		
	c								
Netherlands	a					1	1		
	b					2 787	2 089 710		
	c					749 398	722 515		
Poland	a					1			
	b					500			
	c					500			
Spain	a			1	1		1		
	b			1 234 200	188 070		33 638		
	c			1 234 200	188 070		33 638		
Sweden	a				1	1			2
	b								12 369
	c				266 726	1 131 890			742 169

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Singapore

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	10	9	12	15	12	48	3	8
	b	536 095	170 278 631	3 297 040	1 159 427 653	420 542 889	22 794 954	3 666 000	29 516 619
	d								
	e								

Singapore

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a							3	
	b							384 332	
	c								
Czech Republic	a		1	3					
	b		6 519	143 209					
	c			610 046					
Denmark	a	1							
	b	109 180							
	c								
France	a	2	1	7		6	1	8	1
	b	1 515 224	48 876	601 640 000		11 690 000	12 500 000	30 014 000	250 000
	c								
Germany	a	1	5	5		2	1		
	b	146 581 427	1 529 964	689 990		750 277	1 000 000		
	c								
Italy	a	4	2				2		1
	b	3 991 155	1 003 475				1 207 367		47 265
	c								
Netherlands	a	4					4		
	b	317 586					83 993		
	c	95 936	223 162				42 661		
Poland	a								1
	b								927 432
	c								20 296
Spain	a		2					2	
	b								
	c	204 420	106 948 839						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Singapore

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c	65 948		3 078		547 639	3 083		
Total per ML category	a	12	11	15		8	8	13	3
	b	152 514 572	2 588 834	602 473 199		12 440 277	14 791 360	30 398 332	1 224 697
	d								
	e								

Singapore

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2					15
	b		6 606					7 129 434
	c		6 606					6 517 707
Belgium	a							9
	b							809 736
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1					9
	b		33 054					211 830
	c							639 636
Denmark	a						1	5
	b							3 430 228
	c							
Finland	a							4
	b							463 866
	c							
France	a	1				1	6	49
	b	22 000					7 666 125	2 279 198 864
	c							433 700 000
Germany	a	1	3			6	6	74
	b	11 229	15 007 863			32 161	82 282	175 093 070
	c							
Ireland	a							2
	b							1 469 159
	c							1 469 159

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Singapore

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							25
	b							176 656 000
	c							27 317 943
Netherlands	a					1	5	16
	b					2 787	872 967	3 369 830
	c						67 469	1 901 141
Poland	a							2
	b							927 932
	c							20 796
Spain	a						1	8
	b							1 455 908
	c							108 609 167
Sweden	a					2	4	10
	b						56 905	69 274
	c					11 889	1 706 811	4 479 233
Total per ML category	a	2	6			10	23	228
	b	33 229	15 047 523			34 948	8 678 279	2 650 285 131
	d							
	e							

Slovakia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		2					
	b	197 096 377		1 139 393					
	c			266 997	13 299				
Belgium	a	3							
	b	281 323							
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1		6	2	3	1		
	b	3 380 000		29 597 250	1 111 180	242 820	441 000		
	c		54 000	4 328 467	1 111 180	134 700	441 000		
Croatia	a	16		3					
	b	394 340		351 584					
	c	334 463		227 180					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovakia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	6	4	21	4	1	11	3	4
	b								
	c	250 336	3 184 821	28 068 796	4 432 856	33 443	4 186 931	254 757	260 338
Denmark	a					2			
	b								
	c					24 274			
Finland	a	2		2					
	b	39 000		644 600					
	c	72 153		12 393					
France	a			4					
	b			201 230 900					
	c								
Germany	a		2	7		2	4		
	b		5 024 854	9 205 112		1 746 680	150 514 214		
	c								
Hungary	a	7		11	2	2	5		
	b	3 211 900		3 237 749	1 561 500	44 750	604 100		
	c	111 867		161 860		44 750	12 600		
Italy	a	2		5	1		1		
	b	6 918		36 874 900			780		
	c								
Lithuania	a			2					
	b								
	c			185 999					
Netherlands	a	4							
	b	7 189							
	c	4 379							
Poland	a	1	2	4	2	2	4		
	b	130 650	138 000	1 528 235	580 243	104 408	631 230		
	c	114 400	28 000	1 499 051	535 900	167 930	892 500		
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	69 000							
	c	15 028							

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Slovakia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a			1	7				1
	b			802 860	91 692 500				
	c			802 860	8 868 400				
Sweden	a	3							
	b								
	c			702 572					448
Total per ML category	a	48	8	68	18	12	26	3	5
	b	204 616 697	5 162 854	284 612 583	94 945 423	2 138 658	152 191 324		
	d								
	e								

Slovakia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					28 088			
	c					28 088			
Czech Republic	a		5	5		3			8
	b								
	c		1 158 292	408 845		175 269	199 715	2 418 116	324 099
Denmark	a					9			
	b								
	c					72 104			
France	a		1	2		1		1	
	b		117 000 000	9 430 000		2 000 000		3 360 000	
	c								
Germany	a			3			1	2	
	b			660 023			4 070	2 648 250	
	c								
Poland	a		4						
	b		81 841						
	c		5 866						
Portugal	a			2					
	b			29 834					
	c			29 834					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovakia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovenia	a								2
	b								641 018
	c								641 018
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c					6 402			
Total per ML category	a		10	12		14	1	3	10
	b		117 081 841	10 119 857		2 028 088	4 070	6 008 250	641 018
	d								
	e								

Slovakia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2			1	1	9
	b		10 462			500 000	7 500 000	206 274 320
	c		10 462					318 846
Belgium	a							3
	b							281 323
	c							
Bulgaria	a							13
	b							34 772 250
	c							6 069 347
Croatia	a							19
	b							745 924
	c							561 643
Czech Republic	a	2	1					78
	b							
	c	1 188	47 500			49 837	5 528	45 460 667
Denmark	a							11
	b							
	c					2 677 473	2 677 473	5 451 324
Finland	a							4
	b							683 600
	c							84 546

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovakia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a						1	10
	b						1 000 000	334 020 900
	c							9 100 000
Germany	a		6			3	2	32
	b		1 511 060			220 871	319 150	171 854 284
	c							
Hungary	a							27
	b							8 659 999
	c							331 077
Italy	a							9
	b							36 882 598
	c							6 876 909
Lithuania	a						1	3
	b						199 000	199 000
	c						28 952	214 951
Netherlands	a							4
	b							7 189
	c						2	4 381
Poland	a	3						22
	b	1 033 215						4 227 822
	c	641 620						3 885 267
Portugal	a							2
	b							29 834
	c							29 834
Slovenia	a							3
	b							710 018
	c							656 046
Spain	a						8	17
	b						1 864 364	94 359 724
	c							9 671 260
Sweden	a	3						6
	b	45 340						45 340
	c	62 526					88 132	860 080

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovakia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	8	9			4	13	272
	b	1 078 555	1 521 522			720 871	10 882 514	893 754 125
	d							
	e							

Slovenia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		3	1		1		
	b	301 165		195 920	626 500		26 822		
	c	775		17 663	626 500		26 822		
Belgium	a	4		4					
	b	768 454		126 348					
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1							
	b	7 853							
	c	7 853					50 000		
Croatia	a	13		2					
	b	537 613		354 455					
	c	198 100		62 104					
Czech Republic	a	1		2			3		1
	b								
	c	463		1 167 793			19 315		140 692
Denmark	a					1	1		
	b								
	c						29 456		
Finland	a	3							
	b	714 800							
	c	61 261			3 040 900		430 964		
France	a			3		2			
	b			60 840 000		10 742 500			
	c								
Germany	a	2					2		
	b	601 588					2 788		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovenia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a	7		5			1		
	b	3 852 880		654 200			8 000		
	c	53 424		6 660					
Italy	a			1					
	b			51 000					
	c								
Latvia	a	6							
	b	4 919 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	32 941							
Netherlands	a	2							
	b	2 070							
	c	1 800							
Slovakia	a	1					1		
	b	390 000							
	c	40 560							
Spain	a	1		4	3				4
	b	80 000		1 310 223	4 129 740				385 000
	c	3 300		1 506 820	1 514 490				
Sweden	a	1		1					
	b								
	c	62 536		101 394		88 770			
Total per ML category	a	45		25	4	3	9		5
	b	12 175 423		63 532 146	4 756 240	10 742 500	37 610		385 000
	d								
	e								

Slovenia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					3		1	
	b					21 480		1 039 268	
	c					9 764			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Slovenia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1					2	
	b		3 000 000					23 116	
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					15 350			
	c					15 350			
Czech Republic	a			1					
	b								
	c			355 537		269			
Denmark	a					6			
	b								
	c					250 238			
France	a			1					
	b			32 091					
	c								
Germany	a			1				3	
	b			250 893				17 939	
	c								
Greece	a					1		1	
	b					6 000 000		9 800	
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							114 282	
Slovakia	a					2			
	b					1 700 000			
	c					341 700			
Sweden	a						2		
	b								
	c					5 654			
Total per ML category	a		1	3		13	2	8	
	b		3 000 000	282 984		7 736 830		1 090 123	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Slovenia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							11
	b							2 211 155
	c							681 524
Belgium	a							11
	b							3 917 918
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							23 203
	c							73 203
Croatia	a							15
	b							892 068
	c							260 204
Czech Republic	a							8
	b							
	c		84 857					1 768 926
Denmark	a					2	1	11
	b							
	c					66 749	66 709	413 152
Finland	a							3
	b							714 800
	c							3 533 125
France	a							6
	b							71 614 591
	c							2 600 000
Germany	a	2	7			1	4	22
	b	9 600	22 328			1	2 512	907 649
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							6 009 800
	c							
Hungary	a							13
	b							4 515 080
	c							60 084

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Slovenia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a							1
	b							51 000
	c							102 000
Latvia	a							6
	b							4 919 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		3
	b							
	c							147 223
Netherlands	a							2
	b							2 070
	c							1 800
Slovakia	a							4
	b							2 090 000
	c							382 260
Spain	a						2	14
	b							5 904 963
	c							3 024 610
Sweden	a	1					1	6
	b							
	c	898						259 252
Total per ML category	a	3	7			4	8	140
	b	9 600	22 328			1	2 512	103 773 297
	d							
	e							

Solomon Islands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Solomon Islands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Solomon Islands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Somalia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	2		1					
	b	115 510		563 475					
	c	114 720							
Denmark	a		1						
	b		449 060						
	c								
Germany	a						2		
	b						619 542		
	c								
Romania	a	1		4					
	b	574 548		1 874 405					
	c	307 692							
Total per ML category	a	3	1	5			2		
	b	690 058	449 060	2 437 880			619 542		
	d	1	1	1	1				
	e	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Somalia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Finland	a					2			
	b					128 869			
	c					8 221			
Germany	a					1		1	
	b					9 900		39 300	
	c								
Total per ML category	a					3		1	
	b					138 769		39 300	
	d			1					
	e			1(1), 3(1), 7(1)					

Somalia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							678 985
	c							114 720
Denmark	a							1
	b							449 060
	c							
Finland	a							2
	b							128 869
	c							8 221
Germany	a							4
	b							668 742
	c							
Romania	a							5
	b							2 448 953
	c							307 692
Total per ML category	a							15
	b							4 374 609
	d							5
	e							1(5), 3(5), 7(5)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

South Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	14		2					
	b	5 695 684		565 000					
	c	281 657		166 397					
Belgium	a	2				2			
	b	130 947				1 265 640			
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1		1					
	b	34 176		110 000					
	c	34 176		110 000					
Czech Republic	a	5							
	b	105 842							
	c	206 309							
Denmark	a	3							
	b	188 172							
	c								
Finland	a	2					1		
	b	996 500					47 981		
	c	62 854							
France	a			1	2	1			
	b			2 000 000	7 040 000	175 000			
	c								
Germany	a	23		2	1	5		1	1
	b	662 293		56 436	409 680	642 306		727	164
	c								
Greece	a				2				
	b				1 774 998				
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	8 000							
	c								
Italy	a			1					
	b								
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

South Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Latvia	a	3							
	b	1 515 000							
	c								
Slovenia	a	2			1	1			
	b	419 600			65 910	27 235			
	c	18 205			65 910				
Spain	a	1		1	1	3			
	b	2 000							
	c								
Sweden	a				1	2			2
	b				8 465	188 117			498 509
	c	194 633		304 545	29 808	180 931			177 477
Total per ML category	a	57		8	8	14	1	1	3
	b	9 758 214		2 731 436	9 299 053	2 298 298	47 981	727	498 673
	d								
	e								

South Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							2	
	b							1 750 000	
	c							1 750 000	
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b		10 900						
	c		10 007						
France	a		4			3			
	b		6 065 630			8 340 000			
	c								
Germany	a	3		4					
	b	3 178 062		2 350 614					
	c								
Spain	a		2						
	b								
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a		5						
	b		627 246						
	c		44 046			294 784	25 735		
Total per ML category	a	3	12	4		3		2	
	b	3 178 062	6 703 776	2 350 614		8 340 000		1 750 000	
	d								
	e								

South Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					19
	b		5 500					8 016 184
	c							2 198 054
Belgium	a							4
	b							1 396 587
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							144 176
	c							144 176
Czech Republic	a		2					8
	b		28 800					145 542
	c		85 034					301 350
Denmark	a							3
	b							188 172
	c							
Finland	a							3
	b							1 044 481
	c					12 500		75 354
France	a	1					1	13
	b	10 000					95 000	23 725 630
	c							3 200 000
Germany	a						1	41
	b						5 000	7 305 282
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a							2
	b							1 774 998
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							8 000
	c							
Italy	a						1	2
	b							
	c							926 400
Latvia	a							3
	b							1 515 000
	c							
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						6 500 102	6 500 102
Slovenia	a							4
	b							512 745
	c							84 115
Spain	a							8
	b							2 000
	c							
Sweden	a					2		12
	b					8 936		1 331 273
	c					8 465	3 479 849	4 740 273
Total per ML category	a	1	3			2	3	125
	b	10 000	34 300			8 936	100 000	47 110 070
	d							
	e							

South Korea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4			1	1	2	1	
	b	44 252			149 242	2 457 114	970 000	25 096	
	c	41 893			149 242		540 000	13 689	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Korea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	6				1			
	b	665 296				5 810			
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1		1	1				
	b	42 082		2 240	278 223				
	c	53 004		840	278 223				
Cyprus	a	2							
	b	12 100							
	c								
Czech Republic	a						8		1
	b						298 033		22 036
	c						1 216 838		23 240
Denmark	a					1			
	b					10 800			
	c								
France	a	1	1	1	13	13	8		7
	b	500 000	22 200 000	101 100 000	129 488 000	75 901 975	32 798 835		5 712 880
	c								
Germany	a	7	2	2	1	13	54	3	7
	b	152 221	100 509	856 379	29 075	23 501 802	75 684 926	5 226 773	3 145
	c								
Ireland	a					3			
	b					190 456			
	c					190 456			
Italy	a	1	3		3	2			
	b	8 550	1 398 658		215 341	41 000			
	c								
Lithuania	a					1			
	b					55 335			
	c								
Netherlands	a					3	3	2	
	b					11 875 332	135 187	488 350	
	c					4 098 111		328 850	

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South Korea

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Poland	a		1				2		
	b		323 578				139 423		
	c		480 948				974		
Spain	a					2			
	b								
	c								14 400
Sweden	a				1	6			3
	b					489 244			70 544
	c					4 731 788			1 278 310
Total per ML category	a	22	7	4	20	46	77	6	18
	b	1 424 501	24 022 745	101 958 619	130 159 881	114 528 868	110 026 404	5 740 219	5 808 605
	d								
	e								

South Korea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a								2
	b								55 974 145
	c								24 365 216
Belgium	a		1						
	b		52 364						
	c								
Czech Republic	a		10						
	b		388 748						
	c		355 663						
Denmark	a			9					
	b			290 323					
	c								
Finland	a								
	b								
	c					242 338			
France	a	7	6	9		2		7	1
	b	135 664 520	30 009 151	89 393 500		3 283 000		13 192 000	901 500
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Korea

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a	108	15	24		3		2	5
	b	39 069 346	1 405 855	8 598 157		275 919		31 900	1 126 624
	c								
Greece	a							5	
	b							2 000	
	c								
Ireland	a	1							
	b	158 433							
	c	157 433							
Italy	a	1	5	7					4
	b	20 453	585 726	2 390 602					270 005
	c								
Netherlands	a	6		1				1	1
	b	621 936		57 627				42 436	18 232
	c	90 400	151 010	57 627		70		42 436	
Poland	a		2						
	b		6 767 100						
	c		713 422						
Romania	a								1
	b								9 496 676
	c								407 612
Spain	a		1	2					
	b		116 399 916	36 679 980					
	c		11 357 258	6 570 397					
Sweden	a						3	1	
	b						14 600 860		
	c	437 542				418 297			
Total per ML category	a	123	40	52		5	3	16	14
	b	175 534 688	155 608 860	137 410 189		3 558 919	14 600 860	13 268 336	67 787 182
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Korea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		13					24
	b		891 809					60 511 658
	c		286 579					25 396 619
Belgium	a							8
	b							723 470
	c							
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							322 545
	c							332 067
Cyprus	a							2
	b							12 100
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1					20
	b		596					709 413
	c		596					1 596 337
Denmark	a	1						11
	b	50						301 173
	c							
Estonia	a						1	1
	b						1 000	1 000
	c						1	1
Finland	a							
	b							
	c							242 338
France	a		1			5	7	89
	b		1 000 002			61 011 227	5 909 001	708 065 591
	c							97 000 000
Germany	a	3	10			11	25	295
	b	334 792	324 285			89 991	9 706 506	166 518 205
	c							
Greece	a					1		6
	b					263 000		265 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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South Korea

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Ireland	a						3	7
	b						1 030 999	1 379 888
	c						1 030 999	1 378 888
Italy	a					7	1	34
	b					541 074	2 180 000	7 651 409
	c							90 554 934
Lithuania	a							1
	b							55 335
	c							
Netherlands	a	5				4	7	33
	b	2 813 200				12 048 229	14 240 232	42 340 761
	c	112 241				100	112 544	4 993 389
Poland	a					1	3	9
	b					10	16 530 831	23 760 942
	c						126 707	1 322 051
Romania	a							1
	b							9 496 676
	c							407 612
Spain	a						1	6
	b							153 079 896
	c							17 942 055
Sweden	a					2	3	19
	b						2 012 378	17 173 026
	c						616 336	7 482 273
Total per ML category	a	9	25			31	51	569
	b	3 148 042	2 216 692			73 953 531	51 610 947	1 192 368 088
	d							
	e							

South Sudan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a			2	1				
	b			94 311	98 721				
	c			94 311	98 721				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

South Sudan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a			2	1				
	b			94 311	98 721				
	d								
	e								

South Sudan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

South Sudan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							3
	b							193 032
	c							193 032
Total per ML category	a							3
	b							193 032
	d					1		1
	e					1(1), 3(1), 8(1)		8(1), 1(1), 3(1)

Spain

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	89 750							
	c	87 100							
Belgium	a	22		6					5
	b	1 844 145		1 908 070					623 486
	c								
Bulgaria	a					4			
	b					18 400			
	c					18 400			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Spain

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a			1					1
	b								
	c	676 016		4 453 883			57 395		2 882
Denmark	a					2	2		
	b								
	c					63 570	6 955 739		
Finland	a	4							1
	b	3 118 800							1 025 144
	c	19 073		64 200	850 000				1 467 671
France	a	1		11	5	4	3	1	6
	b	3 500		104 895 160	5 121 250	23 523 215	1 133 000	1 400 225	13 380 000
	c								
Germany	a	6	6	16	5	12	32		
	b	3 487 812	113 092	8 278 761	2 081 518	1 147 228	731 216		
	c								
Italy	a		2	17	6	2	5		1
	b		305 756	31 943 479	3 177 533	16 739 761	11 625 028		
	c								
Latvia	a	13				1			
	b	22 062 000				165 000			
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c	259 449				73 400			
Netherlands	a	4	1		1		2		
	b	35 148	250 000		1 307 400		275 000		
	c	3 553	46 927			347 111	899 716	7 692	
Poland	a						1		
	b						570 000		
	c								
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c						92 000		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Spain

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Romania	a						1		
	b						35 820		
	c						35 820		
Slovakia	a			4				2	3
	b			182 870				623 953	4 368 663
	c			180 610				623 953	
Slovenia	a								
	b								
	c	14 720		438 429					
Sweden	a	7		8	2				7
	b	188 032		2 152 770					1 907 385
	c	156 419		2 622 495	11 851	212 912	255 082		1 602 018
Total per ML category	a	60	9	63	19	25	46	3	24
	b	30 829 187	668 848	149 361 110	11 687 701	41 593 604	14 370 064	2 024 178	21 304 678
	d								
	e								

Spain

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		34						3
	b		1 084 552						110 767
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					540 000			
	c					284 710			
Czech Republic	a		2	1					
	b								
	c		288 814	10 532					
Denmark	a		2			8			
	b								
	c					3 838			
Finland	a								
	b								
	c		1 569			14 250			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Spain

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	9	25	20		1	1	8	4
	b	72 962 991	198 079 899	360 095 668		20 000 000	2 286 000	162 385 000	5 570 120
	c								
Germany	a	10	180	22			6	4	32
	b	1 491 912	27 179 232	2 167 509			3 073 932	515 056	24 974 362
	c								
Italy	a	3	57	9					3
	b	3 369 834	7 717 263	2 101 207					92 753
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							215 588	
Netherlands	a		1	1				2	
	b		15 230	100 320				36 670	
	c		1 323 523	10 542			342 289		
Poland	a		5			2			3
	b		87 608 949			207 700			476 753
	c		21 367 597			98 080			849 315
Portugal	a			1					
	b			12 647					
	c		4 126 675						
Romania	a		1						10
	b		258 014						46 793
	c		193 860						46 905
Sweden	a			6					
	b			69 603					
	c			454 943		633 957			
Total per ML category	a	22	307	60		12	7	14	55
	b	77 824 737	321 943 139	364 546 954		20 747 700	5 359 932	162 936 726	31 271 548
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Spain

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							89 750
	c							87 100
Belgium	a							70
	b							5 571 020
	c							
Bulgaria	a							5
	b							558 400
	c							303 110
Czech Republic	a		4					9
	b							
	c		81 205					5 570 727
Denmark	a		1			2		17
	b							
	c	5 000				550		7 028 697
Finland	a							5
	b							4 143 944
	c							2 416 763
France	a	9				3	13	124
	b	2 143 015				3 200 000	6 876 007	983 055 050
	c							79 400 000
Germany	a	43	20			28	28	450
	b	1 334 930	323 665			795 030	1 154 337	78 849 592
	c							
Italy	a	1	2			3	5	116
	b	13 500 000	498 258				352 870	91 423 742
	c							59 435 381
Latvia	a							14
	b							22 227 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							
	b							
	c							548 437

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Spain

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a					1	4	17
	b					80 000	513 700	2 613 468
	c						730 362	3 711 715
Poland	a		1				7	19
	b		1 000 000				63 078 567	152 941 969
	c							22 314 992
Portugal	a							1
	b							12 647
	c							4 218 675
Romania	a							12
	b							340 627
	c							276 585
Slovakia	a							9
	b							5 175 486
	c							804 563
Slovenia	a		1					1
	b		17 405					17 405
	c		17 405					470 554
Sweden	a					3	1	34
	b					45 148		4 362 938
	c					39 488		5 989 165
Total per ML category	a	53	29			40	58	906
	b	16 977 945	1 839 328			4 120 178	71 975 481	1 351 383 038
	d							
	e							

Sri Lanka

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	950							
	c	950							
Czech Republic	a	3		2					
	b	123 855		191 858					
	c	55 849							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sri Lanka

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	4		2					
	b	124 805		191 858					
	d								
	e								

Sri Lanka

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b		4 356						
	c								
Lithuania	a		1						
	b		1 133 950						
	c		1 133 950						
Total per ML category	a		2						
	b		1 138 306						
	d								
	e								

Sri Lanka

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							950
	c							950
Czech Republic	a							6
	b							320 069
	c							55 849
Germany	a	1						1
	b	48 750						48 750
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							1 133 950
	c							1 133 950

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sri Lanka

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	1						9
	b	48 750						1 503 719
	d							
	e							

Sudan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a						1		
	b						212 685		
	c								
Total per ML category	a						1		
	b						212 685		
	d								
	e								

Sudan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Sudan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a							1
	b							212 685
	c							
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							212 685
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Suriname

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Suriname

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Suriname

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Sweden

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3		1	2		2		
	b	195 300		7 889	209 460		575 680		
	c	19 802		30 623	226 068				
Belgium	a	9				1			2
	b	548 352				42 000			250 314
	c								
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					5 189 821			
	c					12 522			
Czech Republic	a	2			2			1	
	b								
	c	46 134		2 724 533	57 841		214 746	43 389	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sweden

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Denmark	a				1	5	3		
	b								
	c				25 986	708 454	1 797 926		
Estonia	a					3			
	b					2 678 784			
	c					198 777			
Finland	a	6		4		4			1
	b	960 750		17 323 276		3 492 100			676 500
	c	98 318		149 810	213 113	738 488	3 655 499		676 500
France	a	1	1	12	2	9	1	1	2
	b	2 900	14 677 750	5 330 114 420	10 802 000	409 332 000	1 140 001	600	6 130
	c								
Germany	a		46	38	17	20	42		
	b		21 849 269	11 703 515	5 317 144	3 281 859	2 550 828		
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	95 000							
	c								
Ireland	a				1				
	b				575 835				
	c				575 835				
Italy	a	2			7	1	1		
	b	8 425			2 947 128	4 156 923			
	c								
Latvia	a	10		1					
	b	52 153 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		3					
	b			6 800					
	c	260 449		227 584					
Luxembourg	a		1						
	b		69 775						
	c		1						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sweden

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	13		7	1		3	1	
	b	44 515		17 035	369 320		424 200	22 910	
	c	14 018		5 951	423 293	162 546	267 519	376 619	
Poland	a		1				3		
	b		104 000				4 624 900		
	c						171 444		
Romania	a			1					
	b			72 208					
	c								
Slovakia	a	1		1			4	1	1
	b	6 008		1 046 232			7 000 000	495 500	10 494
	c	6 008		348 744			7 000 000	495 500	
Slovenia	a	1							
	b								
	c								
Spain	a		4	14	14	4			6
	b			22 146 719	19 602 044	1 131 956			301
	c	14 980		575 495	9 402 336	160 384			301
Sweden	a				6	2	1		
	b						4 138 567		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	50	53	82	53	50	60	4	12
	b	54 014 250	36 700 794	5 382 438 094	39 822 931	429 305 443	20 454 176	519 010	943 739
	d								
	e								

Sweden

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		1			2		1	
	b		2 443			222 965		4 975	
	c								
Czech Republic	a						1	2	3
	b								
	c			62 874			8 273 050	368 022	2 438 473

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Sweden

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Denmark	a	2	4			56			
	b								
	c	2 619 585	1 110 216			81 290			
Finland	a		1	1		2			
	b		2 141 752	876 500		313 845			
	c		2 145 817			544 923			
France	a	4	4	9		3	3	5	
	b	1 762 113	92 243 469	39 155 000		2 900 000	29 750 601	259 245 000	
	c								
Germany	a	18	30	28			5	5	15
	b	1 906 904	19 605 695	5 087 522			69 448	3 013 979	36 961 115
	c								
Greece	a			1				2	
	b			7 060				14 824 510	
	c								
Italy	a		5	13		2			
	b		201 270	770 130		308 061			
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c							215 588	
Netherlands	a	1						1	
	b	60 000						321	
	c	2 000	619 733	24 600		1 230			376 040
Poland	a					2			
	b					13 253 692			
	c					329 442			
Portugal	a			1					
	b			70 000					
	c		758 500	30 800					
Romania	a		3				2		
	b		59 725				15 909		
	c		63 190				15 909		

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Sweden

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a	1	11	1				6	
	b	727 000	613 856	1 204 000				899 790	
	c	1 454 000	9 963 962	300 000				421 244	
Total per ML category	a	26	59	54		67	11	22	18
	b	4 456 017	114 868 210	47 170 212		16 998 563	29 835 958	277 988 575	36 961 115
	d								
	e								

Sweden

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	1						9
	b	440 000						1 428 329
	c							276 493
Belgium	a							16
	b							1 071 049
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							5 189 821
	c							12 522
Czech Republic	a		2					13
	b							
	c	67 982	34 384					14 331 428
Denmark	a	2				8	4	85
	b							
	c					1 397 784	1 785 890	9 527 131
Estonia	a							3
	b							2 678 784
	c							198 777
Finland	a					2	1	22
	b					1 918 800		27 703 523
	c	45 410				2 275 000		10 542 878
France	a	1				5	12	75
	b	1 900				22 487 880	19 702 129	6 233 323 893
	c							51 000 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sweden

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	8	15			15	17	319
	b	343 395	248 383			346 549	559 586	112 845 191
	c							
Greece	a							3
	b							14 831 570
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							95 000
	c							
Ireland	a							1
	b							575 835
	c							575 835
Italy	a						3	34
	b						261 800	8 653 737
	c							8 950 215
Latvia	a							11
	b							52 153 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							4
	b							6 800
	c							703 621
Luxembourg	a							1
	b							69 775
	c							1
Netherlands	a	1				1	1	30
	b	486 755				450 000	450 000	2 325 056
	c	20					410 076	2 683 645
Poland	a	1						7
	b	14 650						17 997 242
	c							500 886
Portugal	a							1
	b							70 000
	c							789 300

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Sweden

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a							6
	b							147 842
	c							79 099
Slovakia	a							8
	b							8 558 234
	c							7 850 252
Slovenia	a							1
	b							
	c							
Spain	a					1	1	63
	b							46 325 666
	c							22 292 702
Sweden	a		2			2	3	16
	b							4 138 567
	c							
Total per ML category	a	14	19			34	42	730
	b	1 286 700	248 383			25 203 229	20 973 515	6 540 188 914
	d							
	e							

Switzerland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	123	1	50		3	24		
	b	20 812 992	7 500	2 912 584		17 806 304	10 333 981		
	c	4 114 036	7 700	1 047 951		6 796 304	1 215 277		
Belgium	a	24		1					20
	b	3 263 153		156 677					4 298 302
	c								
Bulgaria	a						14		
	b						568 205		
	c	48 830					514 150		
Croatia	a	16	1						
	b	211 892	705						
	c	104 014	705						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Switzerland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	15		1			46		3
	b	62 884					417 332		30 338
	c	160 584				377 614	544 903	37 069	24 932
Denmark	a	9	1	1		6	31		
	b	194 892	11 895	11 895		43 428	8 118 335		
	c								
Finland	a	7	1		1				1
	b	2 560 485	150		2 304				55
	c	156 010			14 475				
France	a	12	4	4	3	2			
	b	132 127	130 345	11 015 500	1 575 106 730	960 000			
	c								
Germany	a	6	33	60	2	58	185	1	5
	b	93 005	1 633 948	54 552 167	96 593	4 493 727	15 274 385	79	95 739
	c								
Greece	a							7	
	b							400	
	c								
Hungary	a	7		13	2		5		1
	b	240 677		43 820 974	2 800 000		54 669		30 000
	c	9 600		6 309 221	1 142				23 777
Ireland	a	1	1			1	1		
	b	5 000	1 239			1 931 909	112 800		
	c	5 000	1 239			1 931 909	112 800		
Italy	a		2	5	1	12			
	b		550	720 005	84 728	4 861 067			
	c								
Latvia	a	9							
	b	4 474 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1				1			
	b					4 075			
	c	314 944				1 675			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Switzerland

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Netherlands	a	8		8	2	2	18		
	b	32 628		451 452	35 143	122 912	4 373 562		
	c	16 068		43 643	26 393	194 824	506 937		
Poland	a			3			15		
	b			201 260			428 785		
	c						132 404		
Romania	a								
	b								
	c						365 816		
Slovakia	a	1	4						2
	b	26 200	414 623						59 340
	c		2 582						32 800
Slovenia	a	2		5	1				
	b	331 845		1 444 529	877 800				
	c	20 873		697 938	585 200				
Spain	a	1			1		14		3
	b	40 000					8 576 330		129 953
	c	11 116			1 787 644		130 433		119 033
Sweden	a	2	2	16	3	8	2	1	6
	b			250 460	185 897	18 013 391			955 445
	c	42 798	52 016	768 400	924 621	3 100 151	25 013 993		402 932
Total per ML category	a	244	50	167	16	93	355	9	41
	b	32 481 780	2 200 955	115 537 503	1 579 189 195	48 236 813	48 258 384	479	5 599 172
	d								
	e								

Switzerland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					14			
	b					655 673			
	c					651 584			
Belgium	a		1						2
	b		20 044						15 967
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Switzerland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Croatia	a								1
	b								21 335
	c								21 335
Czech Republic	a		1					8	6
	b		29 867					2 202 825	55 276 548
	c		30 438	116 022				2 378 214	3 552 297
Denmark	a					36			
	b					4 037 233			
	c								
Estonia	a			1					
	b			459 643					
	c			245 123					
Finland	a		8	1					
	b		1 630 494	99 500					
	c		708 360	337 516		46 103			
France	a		5	4		1	2	7	1
	b		675 884 161	46 945 000		25 500	1 223 000	16 913 618	
	c								
Germany	a		47	22		1	17	23	66
	b		2 040 677	11 949 795		9 505	4 252 830	228 676	11 473 251
	c								
Greece	a							5	
	b							4 701 173	
	c								
Italy	a		20	3					2
	b		587 856	263 208					117 605
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b								
	c							235 392	
Netherlands	a							1	
	b							12 295	
	c							12 295	216 451

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Switzerland

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a		1			2			
	b		142 755			8 624 400			
	c					5 209 694			
Romania	a								1
	b								69 393
	c							132 321	
Slovenia	a								1
	b								51 191
	c								147 320
Spain	a		4			1		2	
	b					3 041 177		1 987 569	
	c					38 204		3 009 000	
Sweden	a		2	1		2	2	1	
	b					45 374			
	c		846 675			149 046			
Total per ML category	a		89	32		57	21	48	80
	b		680 335 854	59 717 146		16 438 862	5 475 830	26 046 156	67 025 290
	d								
	e								

Switzerland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	1	8			1	7	232
	b	129 199	338 602			5 000	4 480 998	57 482 833
	c	129 199	14 518				5 927	13 982 496
Belgium	a	1	1					50
	b	3 436 446	3 075 000					14 265 589
	c							
Bulgaria	a							14
	b							568 205
	c							562 980
Croatia	a							18
	b							233 932
	c							126 054

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Switzerland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a	1	1					82
	b	322						58 020 116
	c	280	3 712					7 226 065
Denmark	a					1	1	86
	b					5 972 000	5 972 000	24 361 678
	c							
Estonia	a							1
	b							459 643
	c							245 123
Finland	a	1				2		22
	b	118				3 000		4 296 106
	c					3 750	384 958	1 651 172
France	a	3	4			1	7	60
	b	166 650	9 280 000			1 640 010	10 054 000	2 349 476 641
	c							42 700 000
Germany	a	52	42			16	62	698
	b	2 812 794	1 920 761			16 014 701	3 502 116	130 444 749
	c							
Greece	a							12
	b							4 701 573
	c							
Hungary	a							28
	b							46 946 320
	c							6 343 740
Ireland	a							4
	b							2 050 948
	c							2 050 948
Italy	a							45
	b							6 635 019
	c							9 402 081
Latvia	a							9
	b							4 474 000
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Switzerland

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a					1		4
	b							4 075
	c							552 011
Netherlands	a					2	1	42
	b					7 518	54 500	5 090 010
	c					7 518	10 002	1 034 131
Poland	a						1	22
	b						57 102	9 454 302
	c							5 342 098
Romania	a							1
	b							69 393
	c							498 137
Slovakia	a							7
	b							500 163
	c							35 382
Slovenia	a							9
	b							2 705 365
	c							1 451 331
Spain	a					3		29
	b					1 555 004		15 330 033
	c					1 484 724		6 580 154
Sweden	a	4				1	6	59
	b	846 525						20 297 092
	c	638 900				34 246		31 973 778
Total per ML category	a	63	56			28	85	1 534
	b	7 392 054	14 614 363			25 197 233	24 120 716	2 757 867 785
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Syria

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Syria

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Syria

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Taiwan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4							
	b	78 992							
	c	78 992							
Belgium	a	1					1		
	b	384 217					11 450		
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1					1		
	b						5 449		
	c			2 817 826					
Finland	a							1	
	b							21 500	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Taiwan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	1		1		1			1
	b	1 572 679		2 101 800		2 160			100
	c								
Italy	a	2	1	1					
	b	19 392	21 855						
	c								
Lithuania	a								
	b								
	c			21 150					
Poland	a								1
	b								920 000
	c								
Total per ML category	a	9	1	2		1	2	1	2
	b	2 055 280	21 855	2 101 800		2 160	16 899	21 500	920 100
	d								
	e								

Taiwan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a								2
	b								37 000
	c								
Belgium	a		2				1		
	b		9 008 010				573 768		
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							72 000	
	c							72 000	
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c							49 712	
Germany	a	5		3					
	b	6 116 556		12 696 352					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Taiwan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Italy	a		1	1					
	b		3 074 454	62 450 000					
	c								
Netherlands	a	5							
	b	12 957 802							
	c	10 028 231							
Spain	a	3		2					
	b	3 636 270		1 100 000					
	c	257 499		780 550					
Total per ML category	a	13	3	6			1	1	2
	b	22 710 628	12 082 464	76 246 352			573 768	72 000	37 000
	d								
	e								

Taiwan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		3					9
	b		390 536					506 528
	c		390 536					469 528
Belgium	a							5
	b							9 977 445
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							72 000
	c							72 000
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							5 449
	c							2 867 538
Finland	a							1
	b							21 500
	c							
Germany	a	1	1			1	1	16
	b	53 344	9 503			600 422	25 000	23 177 916
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Taiwan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a		2				1	9
	b		2 660 417					68 226 118
	c							18 592 374
Lithuania	a							
	b							
	c							21 150
Netherlands	a							5
	b							12 957 802
	c							10 028 231
Poland	a							1
	b							920 000
	c							
Spain	a					1		6
	b							4 736 270
	c							1 038 049
Total per ML category	a	1	6			2	2	55
	b	53 344	3 060 456			600 422	25 000	120 601 028
	d							
	e							

Tajikistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	6		9					
	b	1 269 150		143 318					
	c	1 146 329		100 164					
Bulgaria	a	9	3		2	5			
	b	1 228 455	2 460 000		1 500 000	276 630			
	c	1 228 455	2 460 000		1 500 000	276 630			
Total per ML category	a	15	3	9	2	5			
	b	2 497 605	2 460 000	143 318	1 500 000	276 630			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Tajikistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Tajikistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							15
	b							1 412 468
	c							1 246 493
Bulgaria	a							19
	b							5 465 085
	c							5 465 085
Total per ML category	a							34
	b							6 877 553
	d							
	e							

Tanzania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		1					
	b	44 482		1 968					
	c	44 482		1 968					
Belgium	a				1				
	b				3 288 000				
	c								
Czech Republic	a	2							
	b	369 164							
	c	197 356							
France	a	1							
	b	614 149							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tanzania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	5		1	1				
	b	1 027 795		1 968	3 288 000				
	d								
	e								

Tanzania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1						1	
	b	143 212 000						2 196 000	
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1						1	
	b	143 212 000						2 196 000	
	d								
	e								

Tanzania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							46 450
	c							46 450
Belgium	a							1
	b							3 288 000
	c							
Czech Republic	a							2
	b							369 164
	c							197 356
France	a					1		4
	b					28 000 000		174 022 149
	c							
Total per ML category	a					1		10
	b					28 000 000		177 725 763
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Thailand

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	2		2					
	b	29 626		153 620					
	c	29 626		132 699					
Belgium	a	2							
	b	108 593							
	c								
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c			261 821					
Croatia	a	11							
	b	92 590							
	c	12 950							
Czech Republic	a	5		9			3	1	
	b	199 471		1 561 531			214 611		
	c	519 987		2 164 611			1 431 483		
France	a			2	3	3		1	
	b			87 410 000	67 288 000	885 301 000			
	c								
Germany	a	4				2	1		1
	b	47 098				854 901	12 500		300
	c								
Hungary	a	3							
	b	70 157							
	c	18 183							
Italy	a		3	1		1			
	b		210 085	1 813 500		78 000			
	c								
Netherlands	a					2	1		
	b					1 139 342	12 587		
	c					328 023			
Slovakia	a	29							
	b	15 306 802							
	c	2 618 980							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Thailand

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a					1			
	b					13 725 000			
	c			71 912		238 709			
Sweden	a					6	1		
	b								
	c					55 773			
Total per ML category	a	56	3	14	3	15	6	2	1
	b	15 854 337	210 085	90 938 651	67 288 000	901 098 243	239 698		300
	d					1			
	e					2(1)			

Thailand

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							2	
	b							2 414 260	
	c							199 287	
Belgium	a		2						
	b		9 891 000						
	c								
Czech Republic	a		2			1		1	
	b								
	c		61 445				159 948		
France	a	1	2			3			
	b	835 000	247 661			33 600 000			
	c								
Germany	a		6	7				1	
	b		13 603 750	3 061 468				1 873 497	
	c								
Italy	a		1			1			
	b		8 319			13 000			
	c								
Netherlands	a			1					
	b			1 102 010					
	c			288 300					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Thailand

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a		2						
	b		55 521 430						
	c		36 258 044						
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		8 600						
Spain	a		2					3	
	b							507 500	
	c		169 245					292 000	
Sweden	a			1					
	b								
	c		40 387 815				5 113		
Total per ML category	a	1	17	9		5		7	
	b	835 000	79 272 160	4 163 478		33 613 000		4 795 257	
	d								
	e								

Thailand

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							6
	b							2 597 506
	c							361 612
Belgium	a							4
	b							9 999 593
	c							
Bulgaria	a							
	b							
	c							261 821
Croatia	a							11
	b							92 590
	c							12 950
Czech Republic	a		2					24
	b		3 804					1 979 417
	c		47 989					4 385 463

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Thailand

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a						2	17
	b						1 511 125	1 076 192 786
	c							14 500 000
Germany	a					3	4	29
	b					60 947	10 102	19 524 563
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							70 157
	c							18 183
Italy	a							7
	b							2 122 904
	c							39 115 368
Netherlands	a					2	5	11
	b					1 139 342	2 241 484	5 634 765
	c						260	616 583
Poland	a		1					3
	b		1 999					55 523 429
	c		1 971					36 260 015
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							8 600
Slovakia	a							29
	b							15 306 802
	c							2 618 980
Spain	a					1		7
	b					475 000		14 707 500
	c					475 000		1 246 866
Sweden	a					3	3	14
	b					2 351 458	940 583	3 292 041
	c							40 448 701
Total per ML category	a		3			9	14	165
	b		5 803			4 026 747	4 703 294	1 207 044 053
	d							1
	e							2(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Togo

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a	1			1				
	b	200 000			120 000				
	c	200 000			120 000				
Croatia	a	3	1	1					
	b	6 206 338	360 000	1 236 546					
	c								
Italy	a	1		1					
	b	42 256		1 140 000					
	c								
Total per ML category	a	5	1	2	1				
	b	6 448 594	360 000	2 376 546	120 000				
	d								
	e								

Togo

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1	1			2		2	
	b	3 000 000	400 000			17 475		7 266 000	
	c								
Lithuania	a		1						
	b		500 000						
	c		500 000						
Spain	a		1						
	b		1 104 466						
	c		1 104 466						
Total per ML category	a	1	3			2		2	
	b	3 000 000	2 004 466			17 475		7 266 000	
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Togo

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							320 000
	c							320 000
Croatia	a	1						6
	b	10 000						7 812 884
	c							
France	a						1	7
	b						3 850 000	14 533 475
	c							1 400 000
Italy	a							2
	b							1 182 256
	c							42 256
Lithuania	a							1
	b							500 000
	c							500 000
Spain	a							1
	b							1 104 466
	c							1 104 466
Total per ML category	a	1					1	19
	b	10 000					3 850 000	25 453 081
	d							
	e							

Tonga

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tonga

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Tonga

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Trinidad and Tobago

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1							
	b	4 071							
	c	521							
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	4 071							
	d								
	e								

Trinidad and Tobago

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Trinidad and Tobago

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a							1
	b							4 071
	c							521
Total per ML category	a							1
	b							4 071
	d							
	e							

Tunisia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	77 530							
	c	29 856							
Belgium	a	1					1		
	b	36 866					1 015 000		
	c								
Croatia	a	1							
	b	10							
	c	10							
Czech Republic	a			3					
	b			374 110					
	c			979 540					
France	a	1		1	1	1	1		
	b	95 000		32 100 000	18 690 530	65 000 000	651 442		
	c								
Germany	a				1	1			
	b				2 906	421 680			
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		50 442						
	c								
Spain	a					1			
	b					40 269 729			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tunisia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	6	1	4	2	3	2		
	b	209 406	50 442	32 474 110	18 693 436	105 691 409	1 666 442		
	d								
	e								

Tunisia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							1	
	b							21 460	
	c							21 460	
Bulgaria	a					1		1	
	b					3 220 000		22 416	
	c					8 413 280		22 416	
Czech Republic	a		2						
	b								
	c		213 130						
France	a		2	1					
	b		8 540 000	470 000					
	c								
Germany	a			1					
	b			228 089					
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							658 439	
	c								
Romania	a							1	
	b							6 572	
	c							6 572	
Spain	a							1	
	b							77 000	
	c							77 000	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tunisia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		4	2		1		6	
	b		8 540 000	698 089		3 220 000		785 887	
	d								
	e								

Tunisia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		3					7
	b		426 761					525 751
	c		426 761					478 077
Belgium	a							2
	b							1 051 866
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							3 242 416
	c							8 435 696
Croatia	a							1
	b							10
	c							10
Czech Republic	a							5
	b							374 110
	c							1 192 670
France	a	1					2	11
	b	2 000 000					9 001	127 555 973
	c							1 900 000
Germany	a							3
	b							652 675
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							658 439
	c							
Italy	a							1
	b							50 442
	c							10 004 932

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tunisia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a							1
	b							6 572
	c							6 572
Spain	a							2
	b							40 346 729
	c							77 000
Total per ML category	a	1	3				2	37
	b	2 000 000	426 761				9 001	174 464 983
	d							
	e							

Turkmenistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a	1			1				
	b	575 002			259 500 000				
	c								
Germany	a					1			
	b					67 048			
	c								
Italy	a			2					
	b								
	c								
Romania	a			1					
	b			2 564					
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1		3	1	1			
	b	575 002		2 564	259 500 000	67 048			
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Turkmenistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a		2						
	b		1 652 589						
	c								
Italy	a	1						1	
	b							18 000	
	c								
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		24 322						
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1	3					1	
	b		1 676 911					18 000	
	d								
	e								

Turkmenistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a							2
	b							260 075 002
	c							2 000 000
Germany	a							3
	b							1 719 637
	c							
Italy	a							4
	b							18 000
	c							68 309 385
Netherlands	a							1
	b							24 322
	c							
Romania	a							1
	b							2 564
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Turkmenistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							11
	b							261 839 525
	d							
	e							

Turks and Caicos Islands

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Turks and Caicos Islands

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Turks and Caicos Islands

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Tuvalu

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Tuvalu

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Tuvalu

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Türkiye

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	1					1		
	b	29 780					40 089		
	c								
Bulgaria	a	3	8	10		5			
	b	93 739	2 024 029	13 752 317		222 723			
	c	93 739	1 220 949	13 129 000		231 466			
Croatia	a	3							
	b	232 905							
	c	107 585							
Czech Republic	a	1		7			6	1	6
	b			36 990 265			4 585 630		7 150 089
	c			848 971		123 354	3 426 991		197 836
Estonia	a					2	1		
	b					208 616	100 000		
	c								
France	a			1	3	4	2	1	
	b			410 000	7 091 000	10 765 903	115 000	393 100	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Türkiye

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a			1				2	
	b			306				568 775	
	c								
Hungary	a			13					
	b			170 000					
	c			6 700					
Italy	a		2	1	1	2	1		
	b		671 036	23 640 000	1 099 700	467 364			
	c								
Latvia	a			1					
	b			17 000					
	c								
Netherlands	a	41		3		2			
	b	81 550		3 500		77 321			
	c					20 347 563			
Poland	a								3
	b								3 349 811
	c								64 784
Romania	a			1	6	1			1
	b			19 705	1 832 355	4 600			147 198
	c				1 730 734	4 600			277 018
Slovakia	a		2						
	b		1 826 454						
	c		1 812 840						
Spain	a				8		4		2
	b				885 124		1 992 150		38 250
	c	79 804			1 600 997		551 103		38 250
Total per ML category	a	49	12	38	18	16	15	4	12
	b	437 974	4 521 519	75 003 093	10 908 179	11 746 527	6 832 869	961 875	10 685 348
	d			1	1				
	e			4(1)	4(1)				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Türkiye

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		6						8
	b		25 687						117 595
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							27 040	
	c							25 350	
Czech Republic	a		16						
	b		8 723 610						
	c		2 043 687	19 639 853					216 766
Estonia	a			1					
	b			58 853					
	c								
France	a		2	4		2		10	1
	b		218 010	9 547 500		52 500 000		33 247 750	2 140 000
	c								
Germany	a	1	6	1		1			
	b	3 385 000	548 652	4 300		95			
	c								
Italy	a		47	7				1	4
	b		561 893 219	425 157				2 865 403	23 822
	c								
Luxembourg	a								1
	b								5 438
	c								840
Netherlands	a		1	2			1		1
	b		4 134	89 128			83 750		76 000
	c	337 167	25 474	104 937					36 266
Poland	a		1						
	b		2 980						
	c		67 203						
Romania	a								9
	b								227 391
	c								67 476

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Türkiye

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovenia	a						1		
	b						593 000		
	c						581 000		
Spain	a	10	17	3					
	b	1 071 925	1 169 983 033	4 168 552					
	c	280 541	123 869 866	2 952 376					
Sweden	a			1			1		
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	11	96	19		3	3	12	24
	b	4 456 925	1 741 399 325	14 293 490		52 500 095	676 750	36 140 193	2 590 246
	d	1	1						
	e	4(1)	7(1)						

Türkiye

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							16
	b							213 151
	c							
Bulgaria	a							27
	b							16 119 848
	c							14 700 504
Croatia	a							3
	b							232 905
	c							107 585
Czech Republic	a	2	22					61
	b	17 654	248 244					57 715 492
	c	3 972	594 193					27 095 623
Estonia	a							4
	b							367 469
	c							
France	a		1				4	35
	b		15 465				2 687 201	119 130 929
	c							39 900 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Türkiye

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a		1				2	15
	b		8				7 437	4 514 573
	c							
Hungary	a							13
	b							170 000
	c							6 700
Italy	a		3			2	3	74
	b		3 995 000				3 080 600	598 161 301
	c							51 680 171
Latvia	a							1
	b							17 000
	c							
Luxembourg	a							1
	b							5 438
	c							840
Netherlands	a					1	3	55
	b					58 013	85 996	559 392
	c					35	337 167	21 188 609
Poland	a						5	9
	b						1 302 877	4 655 668
	c							131 987
Romania	a							18
	b							2 231 249
	c							2 079 828
Slovakia	a							2
	b							1 826 454
	c							1 812 840
Slovenia	a							1
	b							593 000
	c							581 000
Spain	a						3	47
	b						6 000 000	1 184 139 034
	c					441 557	2 026 412	131 840 906

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Türkiye

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a					2	2	6
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a	2	27			5	22	388
	b	17 654	4 258 717			58 013	13 164 111	1 990 652 903
	d							4
	e							4(3), 7(1)

Uganda

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	30 350							
	c	30 350							
Bulgaria	a			2	2		2		
	b			14 485 520	4 319 873		4 774 560	180 000	
	c		23 422 000		2 762 818		12 113 420		
Croatia	a	1							
	b	33 028							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1	1	1			2		
	b						2 163 012		
	c		234 935				1 265 203		
France	a					1			
	b					30 000			
	c								
Poland	a	1		1		1			1
	b	130 500		272 832		252 000			1 392 000
	c								
Total per ML category	a	4	1	4	2	2	4		1
	b	193 878		14 758 352	4 319 873	282 000	6 937 572	180 000	1 392 000
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uganda

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a		1						
	b		430 946						
	c		308 630						
Croatia	a								
	b								
	c					1			
Czech Republic	a					1			
	b					34 128			
	c			278 692		29 604	50 623		
France	a							1	
	b							2 196 000	
	c								
Total per ML category	a		1			1		1	
	b		430 946			34 128		2 196 000	
	d								
	e								

Uganda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							30 350
	c							30 350
Bulgaria	a						1	8
	b						19 449 271	43 640 170
	c						9 141 359	47 748 227
Croatia	a							1
	b							33 028
	c							1
Czech Republic	a							6
	b							2 197 140
	c							1 859 057
France	a							2
	b							2 226 000
	c							1 400 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Uganda

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							4
	b							2 047 332
	c							
Total per ML category	a						1	22
	b						19 449 271	50 174 020
	d							
	e							

Ukraine

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a		4	1	3		4	1	
	b		12 768 000		4 706 000		25 348 356		
	c								
Croatia	a	1	3	2					
	b	6 750	334 000	185 800					
	c		190 800	180 000					
Czech Republic	a	41	26	62	34	2	30	13	3
	b	10 336 255	19 296 055	220 437 147	110 121 371	192 868	161 915 241	4 158 294	10 868
	c	13 988 789	32 777 284	253 740 892	197 673 769	285 326	79 842 366	3 096 175	314 387
Denmark	a	4		1			1		
	b	295 081		26 821 333			682 707		
	c								
Estonia	a	4				1	2		
	b	620 101				3 759 180	6 777 978		
	c	504 896				3 759 180			
Finland	a	1							
	b	11 200							
	c								
France	a	5	7	13	10	3	14	2	2
	b	2 747 934	80 307 047	799 663 430	514 253 806	27 623 545	110 121 318	920 000	12 754 600
	c								
Germany	a	28	13	17	9	9	51	1	
	b	3 360 176	194 577 730	152 952 993	858 006 064	269 747 603	660 559 847	42 450	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ukraine

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Italy	a		1				3		
	b						3 800 000		
	c								
Latvia	a	5		13	8		2		
	b	324 000		1 661 000	9 902 000		178 000		
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		22	4	4	1		
	b			2 811 506	569 973	3 294 900	9 839 400		
	c	1 529 096		5 593 921	569 973	3 294 900	9 839 400		
Netherlands	a	19	13	16	21	7	20		
	b	19 647 537	52 485 752	34 671 575	43 596 230	20 779 742	64 003 289		
	c	19 637 024	52 485 752	34 671 575	43 596 030	9 479 742	64 003 289		
Poland	a	50	60	110	57	9	47	2	4
	b	87 533 976	168 366 774	1 758 014 258	135 427 684	9 894 128	736 437 588	3 438 000	6 468 337
	c	952 011	45 359 815	158 519 015	270 820 579	2 167 800	238 185 096	316 074	1 906 198
Portugal	a	8		2			2		
	b	314 392		12 368 700			1 039 826		
	c	191 700					1 039 826		
Spain	a	3		9	10	2	4		
	b	4 303 134		249 380 680	39 520 235	9 010 000	7 442 069		
	c	6 488 132		9 578 180	9 528 912	150 000	1 790 370		
Sweden	a							1	
	b							66 800	
	c							65 263	
Total per ML category	a	170	127	268	156	37	181	20	9
	b	129 500 536	528 135 358	3 258 968 422	1 716 103 363	344 301 966	1 788 145 619	8 625 544	19 233 805
	d								
	e								

Ukraine

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					1			
	b					9 600			
	c					9 600			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ukraine

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a					3		1	
	b					888 548		5 000 000	
	c								
Croatia	a					1			
	b					15 400 000			
	c					15 400 000			
Czech Republic	a		21	4		22	1	20	7
	b		21 993 415	23 327 804		1 259 828	76 328	25 023 416	116 426
	c		3 516 967	23 908 372		12 813 510	74 542	9 077 551	146 491
Denmark	a					2			
	b					696 075			
	c								
Estonia	a		11	1		3		1	
	b		3 101 279	87 142		284 139		175 000	
	c		2 457 487	87 142		22 000		164 800	
Finland	a			2		11			
	b			450 000		3 049 637			
	c					1 166 403			
France	a		4	6		16	1	18	
	b		80 045 178	125 161 181		39 319 359	32 500	58 289 374	
	c								
Germany	a	1	5	13		65		14	
	b	1 500 000	15 653 850	13 250 771		36 954 209		13 810 614	
	c								
Greece	a					10			
	b					33 652 500			
	c								
Ireland	a					1			
	b					198 440			
	c					198 440			
Latvia	a		1	1		6			
	b		2 400 000	1 000		585 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ukraine

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a			17		4		8	
	b			8 003 461		2 352 040		2 678 790	
	c			8 003 461		2 352 040		2 678 790	
Netherlands	a	1	3	3		18		40	
	b	426 053	5 407 785	4 480 265		23 007 622		13 712 701	
	c	426 053	11 311 555	4 572 068		15 354 529		14 682 830	
Poland	a		13	6		15		6	
	b		15 766 374	6 735 886		52 863 983		11 510 919	
	c		9 815 556	220 985		67 117 319		1 379 983	
Portugal	a		3	2		2		1	
	b		10 778 916	12 114		2 928 328		193 990	
	c		3 591 600	12 114		2 928 328		193 990	
Spain	a					2			
	b					177 902			
	c					3 787 365			
Sweden	a					3		1	
	b					311 615		29 469	
	c					311 615		29 469	
Total per ML category	a	2	61	55		185	2	110	7
	b	1 926 053	155 146 797	181 509 624		213 938 825	108 828	130 424 273	116 426
	d	1							
	e	3(1)							

Ukraine

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							9 600
	c							9 600
Belgium	a							17
	b							48 710 904
	c							
Croatia	a							7
	b							15 926 550
	c							15 770 800

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ukraine

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a		2					288
	b		42 085					598 307 401
	c		55 059					631 311 480
Denmark	a					1		9
	b					13		28 495 209
	c							
Estonia	a	3						26
	b	10 527 533						25 332 352
	c	10 508 334						17 503 839
Finland	a							14
	b							3 510 837
	c							1 166 403
France	a	2				2	5	110
	b	29 810 000				260 675 000	212 730 112	2 354 454 384
	c							640 500 000
Germany	a	27				13	17	283
	b	13 002 014				872 258	11 012 822	2 245 303 401
	c							
Greece	a							10
	b							33 652 500
	c							
Ireland	a							1
	b							198 440
	c							198 440
Italy	a							4
	b							3 800 000
	c							4 255 218
Latvia	a							36
	b							15 051 000
	c							
Lithuania	a						1	62
	b						1 215	29 551 285
	c						1 215	33 862 796

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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Ukraine

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a	2				1	3	167
	b	4 760 851				1 000 000	3 039 773	291 019 175
	c	9 183 596					2 039 775	281 443 818
Poland	a							379
	b							2 992 457 907
	c							796 760 431
Portugal	a	1						21
	b	35 814						27 672 080
	c	35 814						7 993 372
Spain	a							30
	b							309 834 020
	c							31 322 959
Sweden	a						2	7
	b						300 987	708 871
	c							406 347
Total per ML category	a	35	2			17	28	1 472
	b	58 136 212	42 085			262 547 271	227 084 909	9 023 995 916
	d							1
	e							3(1)

United Arab Emirates

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	13		1			2		
	b	451 830		41 000			1 384 800		
	c	421 989		41 000					
Bulgaria	a	1	1	2					
	b	32 985	37 800	1 537 104					
	c			1 528 024	2 000				
Croatia	a	2	1	1					
	b	954	1 459 779	3 598 657					
	c								
Cyprus	a	1							
	b	3 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Arab Emirates

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Czech Republic	a	1	1	3			27	2	
	b			643 516			3 961 654		
	c	164 317		22 706			6 628 071		
Finland	a								
	b								
	c						238		
France	a		1	4	17	11	9		
	b		18 350	277 960 000	1 578 386 200	596 919 911	10 745 001		
	c								
Germany	a	9	1	4			3		
	b	131 110	6 836 887	176 770			9 368 579		
	c								
Greece	a						3		
	b						140 000		
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	45 000							
	c								
Italy	a	2	2		1	4			
	b		1 034 396		525 000	99 101 849			
	c								
Lithuania	a					1			
	b					13 500			
	c								
Netherlands	a				1	3			
	b				1 707 813	2 168 253			
	c		723 105		8 538 201	1 250 274			
Poland	a				1				
	b				9 603				
	c								
Romania	a							2	
	b							3 848 250	
	c							3 358 250	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Arab Emirates

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a			2					
	b			5 880					
	c								
Slovenia	a			1					
	b								
	c								
Spain	a		2	2	1	5	4		
	b			423 200		35 700 000			
	c			389 200		10 290 000	1 308 860		
Sweden	a					3			
	b								
	c					225 085			
Total per ML category	a	30	9	20	21	27	48	4	
	b	664 879	9 387 212	284 386 127	1 580 628 616	733 903 513	25 600 034	3 848 250	
	d	1	1						
	e	7(1)	4(1), 7(1)						

United Arab Emirates

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Croatia	a					1			
	b					3 520 000			
	c					3 520 000			
Czech Republic	a		3	1					
	b		50 555						
	c		124 700						
Finland	a			2					1
	b			84 352					170 458
	c			354 352					
France	a	3	12	15		3	2	5	
	b	1 190 000	5 350 192	1 225 649 372		9 653 327	31 400 001	79 024 000	
	c								
Germany	a		13	1					
	b		1 199 789	250 803					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Arab Emirates

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a							2	
	b							13 040 000	
	c								
Italy	a		4	3					
	b		376 041	19 390 891					
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							111 344	
	c								
Luxembourg	a					1			
	b					5 994			
	c					5 994			
Netherlands	a								
	b								
	c	28 032							
Portugal	a		2						
	b		28 350						
	c		17 436 432						
Spain	a			1			1		
	b						12 888 003		
	c		5 492 382				490 414		
Sweden	a			2					
	b			32 920 417					
	c		61 921 050	99 288					
Total per ML category	a	3	34	25		5	3	8	1
	b	1 190 000	7 004 927	1 278 295 835		13 179 321	44 288 004	92 175 344	170 458
	d		2						
	e		1(1), 2(1), 4(1), 7(1)						

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United Arab Emirates

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4				1	21
	b		52 985				5 500	1 936 115
	c		19 360					482 349
Bulgaria	a							4
	b							1 607 889
	c							1 530 024
Croatia	a							5
	b							8 579 390
	c							3 520 000
Cyprus	a							1
	b							3 000
	c							
Czech Republic	a	1	4					43
	b		15 326					4 671 051
	c		3 114					6 942 908
Estonia	a					1		1
	b					1	1	2
	c					1	1	2
Finland	a					1		4
	b							254 810
	c							354 590
France	a	2	1			5	27	117
	b	1 850 001	4 000 000			25 202 000	593 674 686	4 441 023 041
	c							355 100 000
Germany	a					2	2	35
	b					108 215	293 660	18 365 813
	c							
Greece	a							5
	b							13 180 000
	c							
Hungary	a							1
	b							45 000
	c							

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United Arab Emirates

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Italy	a						2	18
	b						574 273	121 002 450
	c							34 007 091
Lithuania	a							2
	b							124 844
	c							
Luxembourg	a							1
	b							5 994
	c							5 994
Netherlands	a					1	2	7
	b					1 568 253	3 276 066	8 720 385
	c						14	10 539 626
Poland	a							1
	b							9 603
	c							
Portugal	a							2
	b							28 350
	c							17 436 432
Romania	a					2		4
	b					54 975		3 903 225
	c					47 975		3 406 225
Slovakia	a							2
	b							5 880
	c							
Slovenia	a							1
	b							
	c							
Spain	a						6	22
	b							49 011 203
	c						2 522 654	20 493 510
Sweden	a					2	2	9
	b							32 920 417
	c						4 722 327	66 967 750

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United Arab Emirates

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	3	9			14	42	306
	b	1 850 001	4 068 311			26 933 444	597 824 186	4 705 398 462
	d							4
	e							1(1), 2(1), 4(2), 7(3)

United Kingdom

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	34	4	6	1	1	2		
	b	6 256 112	151 150	1 848 482	894 000	1 504 718	4 165 300		
	c	3 498 034	106 840	1 515 946	1 262 328	752 359	449 663		
Belgium	a	92		9	1	1	4		7
	b	30 663 251		3 785 535	4 000 000	4 000 000	11 675 989		2 070 129
	c								
Bulgaria	a	3	4	4	1	1			1
	b	4 578 395	10 458 640	164 930 721	49 731	7 745			636 660
	c	4 230 885	9 830 779	1 265 362	49 731	7 745			559 548
Czech Republic	a	1		11	2		3	1	4
	b	25 443		17 573 458	17 084		81 417		556 808
	c	15 164		3 109 713	2 895 718		81 169		546 189
Denmark	a	12		1	2	7	10		
	b	372 381		6 258	151 539	897 805	602 476		
	c								
Estonia	a						2		
	b						560 252		
	c						36 763		
Finland	a	5		1	2			7	1
	b	1 432 950		184 304	356 400			1 193 119	313 605
	c	28 163		184 304	1 015 874			156 413	549 916
France	a		3	3	25	7	4	2	4
	b		4 030 795	21 752 000	57 306 590	15 597 261	1 420 000	8 650 000	1 045 000
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Kingdom

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	273	32	58	20	15	133	1	1
	b	13 106 359	68 080	7 776 307	8 062 289	13 648 886	222 367 596	146	92 250
	c								
Greece	a				1				
	b				2 280				
	c								
Hungary	a	7		4	1				
	b	1 111 627		613 900	5 706				
	c	704 516		200 400	5 420				
Ireland	a	6	1	1	25	3	2		
	b	19 208	582	9 662	1 114 451	217 168	10 053		
	c	19 208	582	9 662	1 114 451	217 168	10 053		
Italy	a	2	3	2	11	5	1		
	b	1 300	100 857	1 278 405	27 956 446	78 378	34 196		
	c								
Latvia	a	23		1			1		
	b	60 860 000		1 000			230 000		
	c								
Lithuania	a	1		2					
	b			704 575					
	c	1 234 259		704 575					
Malta	a	1							
	b	11 430							
	c	11 430							
Netherlands	a	19	4	3	6	3	9		
	b	92 822	31 250	32 326	1 618 833	1 868 062	1 526 911		
	c	98 944		3 315	857 323	193 500	604 902		
Poland	a	2		1	1		2		
	b	943 441		1 104 970	51 948		818 740		
	c						93 387		
Romania	a			1	3				
	b			7 700 000	65 043 827				
	c			7 700 000	17 682 478				

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Kingdom

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a				1				
	b				6 000				
	c								
Slovenia	a	1							
	b	895							
	c	880							
Spain	a	3		6	8	1	20	1	4
	b	3 356 209		2 042 937	27 189 118		579 473 192		562 600
	c	817 144		367 678	30 035 645	2 569 217	46 014 322		6 692
Sweden	a		13	26	9	9			7
	b		56 400 667	1 081 678	9 060 848	40 840 571			173 067
	c	277 555	551 624	1 161 095	6 812 008	16 893 824	1 269 399		163 129
Total per ML category	a	485	64	140	120	53	193	12	29
	b	122 831 823	71 242 021	232 426 518	202 887 090	78 660 594	822 966 122	9 843 265	5 450 119
	d								
	e								

United Kingdom

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							1	2
	b							541 350	15 995
	c							541 350	13 087
Belgium	a		40	2		1	2	3	5
	b		136 361 838	27 000 331		4 000 000	4 004 680	4 004 192	4 149 699
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1			4	1	
	b			176 860			188 017	23 650	
	c			176 860			65 617	23 650	
Czech Republic	a		7	4				2	5
	b		21 795 684	1 597				10 679	286 815
	c		120 730	2 972 113				71 472	264 920
Denmark	a			1		8			
	b			825 348		92 899			
	c		6 198 484						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Kingdom

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Estonia	a			7					
	b			4 303 192					
	c			97 636					
Finland	a		3	1		1			
	b		3 730 022	120 200		100 000			
	c		2 551 029	120 200		44 000			
France	a	6	39	11		5	1	9	4
	b	11 032 791	147 283 557	133 115 409		28 836 550	840 000	107 628 500	7 080 002
	c								
Germany	a	24	98	49		1	5	15	81
	b	2 815 102	35 816 652	39 751 363		3 059	364 479	1 403 736	77 290 524
	c								
Greece	a	1		8		1		1	
	b	11 550		180 000		7 238 272		60 000	
	c								
Hungary	a		1	1					
	b		3 200 000	1 610 000					
	c		71 040						
Ireland	a	3	2					6	
	b	249 060	88 029					30 504 127	
	c	249 060	88 029					30 504 127	
Italy	a	1	122	63			1		20
	b	312 000	70 429 422	15 094 869					12 437 569
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							7 900	
	c							525 674	
Luxembourg	a								8
	b								584 148
	c								370 517
Netherlands	a	20	9	3			1	1	
	b	104 885 195	1 019 234	459 666			100 000	25 000	
	c	3 141 080	11 720 676	344 985				247 000	605 328

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Kingdom

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Poland	a	2	21			1		1	8
	b	274 378	23 969 969			24 289 324		15 965	24 725 997
	c	33 610	1 374 511			987 400			835 487
Portugal	a	5	30	8					
	b	2 499 628	8 683 110	329 660					
	c		49 111 091	74 365					
Romania	a		29						2
	b		1 734 385						62 000
	c		1 414 905						16 761
Slovakia	a							1	
	b							3 000	
	c								
Spain	a	3	97	20			1	12	18
	b	317 082	1 207 075 213	77 977 340			545 547	184 945	11 748 763
	c	762 266	253 210 220	54 066 668				184 945	5 506 972
Sweden	a	4	1	1			7	1	
	b	156 607	5 879	46 089			252 154	1 307 665	
	c		11 587	20 168		997 722	465 820		4 204
Total per ML category	a	69	499	180		18	22	55	153
	b	122 553 393	1 661 192 994	300 991 924		64 560 104	6 294 877	145 720 709	138 381 512
	d								
	e								

United Kingdom

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4					55
	b		2 549 160					17 926 267
	c		1 189 608					9 329 215
Belgium	a	1	2			1	7	178
	b	4 000 000	4 002 351			4 000 000	412 000 001	659 717 996
	c							
Bulgaria	a							20
	b							181 050 419
	c							16 210 177

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United Kingdom

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Czech Republic	a	3	8			1	2	54
	b	2 091 381	564 782				10 177 081	53 182 229
	c	887 279	1 041 520			902 290	2 725 936	15 634 213
Denmark	a					12	11	64
	b					14 415 682	14 415 682	31 780 070
	c							6 198 484
Estonia	a							9
	b							4 863 444
	c							134 399
Finland	a					1	2	24
	b					264 000		7 694 600
	c					326 500	10 104	4 986 503
France	a	3				5	34	165
	b	1 300 839				3 054 391	49 876 808	599 850 493
	c							98 200 000
Germany	a	9	32			48	69	964
	b	294 528	3 725 168			5 066 569	22 400 349	454 053 442
	c							
Greece	a					1		13
	b					23 730		7 515 832
	c							
Hungary	a					2		16
	b					8 500 000		15 041 233
	c					29 110		1 010 486
Ireland	a					2	4	55
	b					100 000	641 925	32 954 265
	c					100 000	641 925	32 954 265
Italy	a					7	21	259
	b					109 026	229 200	128 061 668
	c							155 926 967
Latvia	a							25
	b							61 091 000
	c							

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United Kingdom

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a					1	1	6
	b							712 475
	c							2 464 508
Luxembourg	a							8
	b							584 148
	c							370 517
Malta	a							1
	b							11 430
	c							11 430
Netherlands	a			1		1	10	90
	b			25 000		47 667	1 463 568	113 195 534
	c	180 438					687 054	18 684 545
Poland	a						24	63
	b						3 197 336	79 392 068
	c						20 125	3 344 520
Portugal	a					1		44
	b					384 768		11 897 166
	c					384 768		49 570 224
Romania	a		2				1	38
	b		154 963				268 188	74 963 363
	c		117 025					26 931 169
Slovakia	a							2
	b							9 000
	c							
Slovenia	a							1
	b							895
	c							880
Spain	a	3				1	10	208
	b					4 500	30 479	1 910 507 925
	c	9 100				269 256	62 797	393 882 922
Sweden	a	25	2			7	22	134
	b	35 569 307	47 029			752 467	2 285 618	147 979 646
	c	1 630 621				1 579 324	7 912 134	39 750 214

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United Kingdom

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	44	50	1		91	218	2 496
	b	43 256 055	11 043 453	25 000		36 722 800	516 986 235	4 594 036 608
	d							
	e							

United States

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	102	1	16			6		
	b	800 125 765	1 960	70 152 240			7 168 598		
	c	224 545 291		538 332			200 101		
Belgium	a	327	1	14		2	6		1
	b	127 107 948	48 964	5 887 146		288 125	2 964 525		16 306 575
	c								
Bulgaria	a	25	2	19	8		5		
	b	15 872 170	1 879 700	110 617 111	17 349 055		1 316 520		
	c	5 715 706	53 700	35 859 096	6 033 368		23 635		
Croatia	a	66	17	3					
	b	582 803 819	733 147	320 194					
	c	67 882 741	615 162	1 744					
Cyprus	a	2							
	b	10 694							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	20	1	12	7		3	10	1
	b	1 460 818		25 456 964	38 084 092		236 535	11 031 041	392 021
	c	1 691 948	4 685 353	13 463 672	56 485 267		302 017	1 482 196	40 037
Denmark	a	7	3		6	9			
	b	56 332	1 440 998		1 674 743	4 420 897			
	c					2 858 620			
Estonia	a						1		
	b	129 128					300 000		
	c						292 260		
Finland	a	4		2	1	2			
	b	10 920 070		5 332 648	120 000	453 720			
	c	837 585		3 300 976		80 000			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United States

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a	9	2	2	15	6			4
	b	3 136 536	9 390 000	32 290 000	40 714 976	2 986 801			13 393 712
	c								
Germany	a	614	24	32	26	44	100		50
	b	175 405 013	3 025 908	98 048 247	21 892 871	36 946 322	16 901 084		11 235 584
	c								
Greece	a				9	1			
	b				19 395 850	4 100			
	c								
Hungary	a	37		13		3	1		
	b	16 024 774		467 225 471		5 000 000	1 194		
	c	802 820		26 310 489					
Ireland	a	3				17			
	b	1 450				46 102 325			
	c	1 450				46 102 325			
Italy	a		1	1	3	4	16		
	b		5 840		499 023	2 947 305	223 387 979		
	c								
Latvia	a	25		3					
	b	138 000 000		500 000					
	c								
Lithuania	a	4		1		2			
	b	15 678 781		108 500		2 500			
	c	18 734 292				2 500			
Luxembourg	a			1		1			
	b			4 537		4 537			
	c			4 537		4 537			
Malta	a	4		1					
	b	3 611		449					
	c	1 704		449					
Netherlands	a	24	15	18	11	3	20		
	b	2 368 787	24 893 718	12 059 190	60 313 594	1 790 087	2 615 083		
	c	654 808	1 517 880	37 203	20 963 968	4 799 438	1 153 162		

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United States

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Poland	a	12		2	2	2	5		2
	b	21 570 529		438 551 000	4 021 191	42 535	788 267		6 182 243
	c	2 900 510	37 000	2 890 859	3 741 517	42 275	401 043		
Portugal	a	3			2	1			
	b	4 543 766			1 121 300	161 049			
	c						2 149 660		
Romania	a	3		5					
	b	476 865		15 458 037					
	c	2 950 200	104 859	2 894 257	1 716		49 244		82 905
Slovakia	a	5							
	b	1 205 990							
	c	515 444							
Slovenia	a	6		2					
	b	94 795 000		36 245 000					
	c	2 800 952		247 000					
Spain	a	23	4	8	9	3	17		1
	b	31 265	2 640	4 136 969	28 206 238	650 000	1 659 546		3 264 000
	c	928 811	870	597 084	1 125 018		1 689 684		
Sweden	a		29	28		37	2		21
	b		44 581 786	137 609 585		71 409 164	61 444		35 602 491
	c		47 960 742	114 301 280		28 266 781	6 890		18 844 843
Total per ML category	a	1 325	100	183	99	137	182	10	80
	b	2 011 729 111	86 004 661	1 460 003 288	233 392 933	173 209 467	257 400 775	11 031 041	86 376 626
	d								
	e								

United States

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a			1	1	1		1	17
	b			9 495	5 000 000	25 000 000		253 982	60 508 229
	c			9 495				253 982	7 945 905
Belgium	a	3	17	5			1		4
	b	2 224 138	56 517 065	661 973			35 466 304		1 287 449
	c								

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United States

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a		6	1					
	b		9 153 926	11 351					
	c		1 613 673						
Czech Republic	a	1	16	9		2	1		7
	b		3 059 846	4 550 303					23 041
	c		22 146 484	1 402 627					9 544
Denmark	a	3	37			7			
	b	29 465	9 154 639			272 290			
	c		57 402 144					2 858 620	
Estonia	a		4					1	
	b		600 174					138 473	
	c		595 564						
Finland	a	2						1	
	b	224 394						329 376	
	c	229 213	138 710	533 215		162 334			
France	a		25	15		1	4	10	4
	b		653 456 101	75 249 329		5 346 200	12 529 000	20 785 654	46 057 012
	c								
Germany	a	29	78	84			3	15	43
	b	9 241 434	47 637 435	408 568 155			2 022 018	12 114 702	8 048 115
	c								
Greece	a		30	10				13	
	b		4 781 750	21 780 790				26 971 972	
	c								
Hungary	a		2						
	b		2 261 158						
	c		15 732						
Ireland	a		10	1					
	b		37 293 766	325 156					
	c		37 293 766	325 156					
Italy	a	7	73	12			2		13
	b	9 812 845	71 651 733	6 698 745			201 770 812		6 382 287
	c								

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United States

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Latvia	a			4					
	b			556 000					
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							20 000	
	c							2 206 371	
Luxembourg	a								3
	b								2 977 190
	c								2 386 473
Malta	a					3		1	
	b					956		243	
	c					516			
Netherlands	a		26	1		1	2	6	16
	b		143 515 183	761 357		8 500	1 058 829	24 989 728	1 243 415
	c	79 550	291 962 956	1 423 292	375 160		1 281 412	1 680 548	106 390
Poland	a		95	1				1	8
	b		918 808 524	282 160				8 375	22 524 973
	c		178 150 703	389 578				165 021	7 193 149
Portugal	a	1	6	1					
	b	94 500	476 000	500 000					
	c		208 863 996					312 454	74 514
Romania	a		2	1					
	b		24 252 690	435 897					
	c		4 050 245	435 897					
Slovakia	a			1			1		
	b			26 351			555 200		
	c			26 310			555 200		
Spain	a	1	94	25		1		10	3
	b	2 664 979	65 969 100	43 083 000				115 405	
	c	147 590	10 312 494	8 256 461				135 005	
Sweden	a		1	2			11	1	
	b		4 702 917	17 871			21 365 476	62 116	
	c		17 004 325	286 114		1 120 521	146 533		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United States

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	47	522	174	1	16	25	61	118
	b	24 291 755	2 053 292 007	563 517 933	5 000 000	30 627 946	274 767 639	85 790 026	149 051 711
	d								
	e								

United States

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		14			2	6	168
	b		20 502 282			10 000 000	17 086 234	1 015 808 785
	c		7 721 268				2 436	241 216 810
Belgium	a		5				4	390
	b		383 138				121 054 500	370 197 850
	c							
Bulgaria	a						2	68
	b						11 462 820	167 662 653
	c						11 462 820	60 761 998
Croatia	a							86
	b							583 857 160
	c							68 499 647
Cyprus	a							2
	b							10 694
	c							
Czech Republic	a	1	2					93
	b	275 369	5 997					84 576 027
	c	1 118 255	196 291				167 761	103 191 452
Denmark	a					30	28	130
	b					25 642 497	25 586 422	68 278 283
	c		2 858 620			2 858 620		68 836 624
Estonia	a							6
	b							1 167 775
	c							887 824
Finland	a						2	14
	b						362 550	17 742 758
	c						121 826	5 403 859

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

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United States

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	2				8	23	130
	b	544 001				3 514 327	113 168 323	1 032 561 972
	c							159 300 000
Germany	a	39	94	1		24	60	1 360
	b	2 921 385	1 090 789	40 100		6 007 888	3 310 238	864 457 288
	c							
Greece	a							63
	b							72 934 462
	c							
Hungary	a							56
	b							490 512 597
	c							27 129 041
Ireland	a					4	4	39
	b					300 000	400 000	84 422 697
	c					300 000	400 000	84 422 697
Italy	a		2			2	17	153
	b		1 786 660			219 812	7 673 714	532 836 755
	c							223 590 774
Latvia	a							32
	b							139 056 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		9
	b							15 809 781
	c							20 943 163
Luxembourg	a							5
	b							2 986 264
	c							2 395 547
Malta	a							9
	b							5 259
	c							2 669
Netherlands	a	1	2			2	15	163
	b	17 587	16 989 588			1 480 632	27 466 562	321 571 840
	c	3 711	93 895	286 008		9	2 321 855	328 741 245

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

United States

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a	2	13			1	115	261
	b	331 915	10 131 259			49 936	38 480 367	1 461 773 274
	c	311 637	812 931				611 186	197 647 409
Portugal	a							14
	b							6 896 615
	c							211 400 624
Romania	a					2		13
	b					883 190		41 506 679
	c		25 377			645 773		11 240 473
Slovakia	a							7
	b							1 787 541
	c							1 096 954
Slovenia	a							8
	b							131 040 000
	c		1 265					3 049 217
Spain	a						7	206
	b							149 783 142
	c							23 193 017
Sweden	a	2	2			19	24	179
	b		260 918			1 410 875	2 351 458	319 436 101
	c	261 026	99 252			8 752 990	3 183 814	240 235 111
Total per ML category	a	47	134	1		95	307	3 664
	b	4 090 257	51 150 631	40 100		49 509 157	368 403 188	7 978 680 252
	d							
	e							

Uruguay

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1							
	b	30 350							
	c	30 350							
Finland	a	2							
	b	150 200							
	c	3 890							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uruguay

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a	1							
	b	97 980							
	c								
Germany	a	2							
	b	66 481							
	c								
Latvia	a	4							
	b	1 022 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b	276 935							
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			17 727					
Total per ML category	a	11							
	b	1 643 946							
	d	1							
	e	7(1)							

Uruguay

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	1							
	b	336 400 000							
	c								
Total per ML category	a	1							
	b	336 400 000							
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uruguay

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							1
	b							30 350
	c							30 350
Finland	a							2
	b							150 200
	c							3 890
France	a							2
	b							336 497 980
	c							
Germany	a							2
	b							66 481
	c							
Latvia	a							4
	b							1 022 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		2
	b							276 935
	c							
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							17 727
Total per ML category	a					1		13
	b							338 043 946
	d							1
	e							7(1)

Uzbekistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a			1					
	b			571 814					
	c			2 457 094					
France	a		1			2			
	b		71 340 000			1 140 482 500			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uzbekistan

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Germany	a	6		2					
	b	72 909		17 423					
	c								
Hungary	a	2		1					
	b	19 200		17 500					
	c	12 966		17 293					
Lithuania	a	1							
	b								
	c	36 735							
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	66 956							
	c	66 956							
Total per ML category	a	10	1	4		2			
	b	159 065	71 340 000	606 737		1 140 482 500			
	d								
	e								

Uzbekistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							339 300	
	c							339 300	
Czech Republic	a								
	b								
	c		40 040						
Estonia	a							1	
	b							1 548 815	
	c								
France	a							1	
	b							21 650 000	
	c								
Germany	a		2						
	b		2 767						
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uzbekistan

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Spain	a								
	b								
	c		163 811						
Total per ML category	a		2					3	
	b		2 767					23 538 115	
	d								
	e								

Uzbekistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					1
	b		35 468					35 468
	c							
Bulgaria	a							2
	b							911 114
	c							2 796 394
Czech Republic	a							
	b							
	c							40 040
Estonia	a							1
	b							1 548 815
	c							
France	a							4
	b							1 233 472 500
	c							25 000 000
Germany	a							10
	b							93 099
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							36 700
	c							30 259
Lithuania	a							1
	b							
	c							36 735

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Uzbekistan

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a							
	b							
	c						2	2
Slovakia	a							1
	b							66 956
	c							66 956
Spain	a							
	b							
	c							163 811
Total per ML category	a		1					23
	b		35 468					1 236 164 652
	d							
	e							

Vanuatu

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Vanuatu

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Vanuatu

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Venezuela

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Venezuela

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Venezuela

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Vietnam

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	1		1					
	b	11 575		21 250					
	c	11 575		21 250					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Vietnam

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Croatia	a	6							
	b	2 322 863							
	c	867 420							
Czech Republic	a	1	1	1	1		2		
	b		1 209 032	336 484	1 999 244		4 073 860		
	c			1 971 398	1 931 600		3 727 706		
France	a			1	1	2		1	
	b			4 650	2 800 000	11 792 500		25 500	
	c								
Italy	a			1					
	b			3 951 000					
	c								
Poland	a						1		
	b						26 838		
	c								
Total per ML category	a	8	1	4	2	2	3	1	
	b	2 334 438	1 209 032	4 313 384	4 799 244	11 792 500	4 100 698	25 500	
	d					2			
	e					2(1), 7(1)			

Vietnam

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							20 960	
	c							20 960	
Czech Republic	a			3		1			
	b			2 454 061					
	c		18 179 838	2 769 477					
France	a		1	3			1	1	
	b		301 100 000	5 130 000			2 250 003	1 147 000	
	c								
Spain	a			3					
	b			52 463 232					
	c		133 399	18 282 546					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Vietnam

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a		1	9		1	1	2	
	b		301 100 000	60 047 293			2 250 003	1 167 960	
	d			1		2			
	e			2(1)		2(2)			

Vietnam

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							2
	b							32 825
	c							32 825
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							20 960
	c							20 960
Croatia	a							6
	b							2 322 863
	c							867 420
Czech Republic	a		2					12
	b		478 255					10 550 936
	c		39 303					28 619 322
France	a						1	12
	b						5 000	324 254 653
	c							8 900 000
Italy	a							1
	b							3 951 000
	c							90 736
Poland	a							1
	b							26 838
	c							
Spain	a						1	4
	b						5 000 000	57 463 232
	c						87 859	18 503 804

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Vietnam

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a		2				2	39
	b		478 255				5 005 000	398 623 307
	d					1	1	7
	e					2(1), 7(1)	2(1)	2(6), 7(2)

Yemen

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Yemen

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Yemen

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

Zambia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	3							
	b	51 250							
	c	51 250							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Zambia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Bulgaria	a								
	b								
	c			1 555 394					
Denmark	a	1							
	b	3 360							
	c								
Germany	a	2							
	b	20 340							
	c								
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c			42 667					
Total per ML category	a	6							
	b	74 950							
	d								
	e								

Zambia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Zambia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							3
	b							51 250
	c							51 250
Bulgaria	a							
	b							
	c							1 555 394

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Zambia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Denmark	a							1
	b							3 360
	c							
Germany	a							2
	b							20 340
	c							
Italy	a							
	b							
	c							320 362
Sweden	a							
	b							
	c							42 667
Total per ML category	a							6
	b							74 950
	d							
	e							

Zimbabwe

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

Zimbabwe

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a								
	b								
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

Zimbabwe

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a							
	b							
	d							
	e							

[multiple destinations]

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
France	a	1	15	27	34	49	6	2	
	b	145 800	1 804 975 663	2 736 643 730	7 031 228 121	3 801 445 165	43 564 491	18 456	
	c								
Netherlands	a	5	5	4	6	8	6		
	b	1 244 718	1 244 718	1 203 297	1 344 718	5 361 120	3 217 297		
	c		9 787			17 680			
Total per ML category	a	6	20	31	40	57	12	2	
	b	1 390 518	1 806 220 381	2 737 847 027	7 032 572 839	3 806 806 285	46 781 788	18 456	
	d								
	e								

[multiple destinations]

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	50	43	88		6	5	52	
	b	2 855 503 104	1 137 184 275	2 177 337 705		43 600 004	17 600 000	551 828 242	
	c								
Netherlands	a	4	7	6		2	6	6	1
	b	1 203 297	91 493 393	1 345 468		125 000	1 620 994	5 177 787	66 000 000
	c								
Total per ML category	a	54	50	94		8	11	58	1
	b	2 856 706 401	1 228 677 668	2 178 683 173		43 725 004	19 220 994	557 006 029	66 000 000
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER DESTINATION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

[multiple destinations]

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	1	1	6		41	165	592
	b	3 000	11 033 150	46 180 000		665 168 179	1 302 867 671	24 226 326 756
	c							2 300 000
Netherlands	a		1	2	4	8	24	105
	b		23 190 097	44 755	1 203 297	5 223 082	33 093 757	243 336 795
	c						169 403	196 870
Total per ML category	a	1	2	8	4	49	189	697
	b	3 000	34 223 247	46 224 755	1 203 297	670 391 261	1 335 961 428	24 469 663 551
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

North Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	5		1			2		
	b	80 467		3 600			25 016 000		
	c	33 856					3 776 000		
Belgium	a	1					1		
	b	36 866					1 015 000		
	c								
Bulgaria	a	5	3		4		1		
	b	3 634 844	331 539	635 000	492 370	1 886 805	162 137		
	c	2 269 270	1 749 092	11 875 098	655 020		1 018 399		
Croatia	a	1							
	b	10							
	c	10							
Czech Republic	a			3	2		3	1	1
	b			374 110				2 684	
	c		1 612 689	1 013 302			26 603 622		
France	a	13	1	9	5	9	2	1	
	b	2 925 552	14 664 000	34 836 930	63 572 537	979 952 500	696 742	5 490	
	c								
Germany	a			1	1	5	3		3
	b			21 700	2 906	7 964 248	3 786 495		564
	c								
Italy	a	3	1	1					
	b	1 918 330	50 442	859 200					
	c								
Poland	a	1	1			2	7		
	b	3 654 545	5 171 276			4 050	11 681 636		
	c	350 030	2 721 505			30 154	2 615 072		
Romania	a			1					
	b			1 540 835					
	c			1 540 835					
Spain	a			1	1	2			
	b				84 000	40 269 729			
	c			3 669 360	519 095				1 000 000
Sweden	a				3	3			
	b								
	c								
Total per ML category	a	29	6	17	16	21	19	2	4
	b	12 250 614	20 217 257	38 271 375	64 151 813	1 030 077 332	42 358 010	8 174	564
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets).

North Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							1	
	b							21 460	
	c							21 460	
Bulgaria	a					2		1	
	b					3 506 900		22 416	
	c					8 700 180		22 416	
Czech Republic	a		5	1			1		
	b		3 031 496	814 925					
	c		5 584 260	924 012					
France	a	1	8	6		1		11	
	b	12 000	110 360 738	64 976 302		603 000		210 597 000	
	c								
Germany	a		1	1					1
	b		535 000	228 089					38 900
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							658 439	
	c								
Italy	a		3						
	b		1 184 548						
	c								
Lithuania	a		4	2				1	
	b		241 988	219 841				3 498 000	
	c		127 904	64 164					
Malta	a		1						
	b		38 000						
	c								
Netherlands	a	1		2					
	b	8 500 000		598 490					
	c	695 045							
Poland	a		4						
	b		2 208 065						
	c		4 570 975						
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		10 821 559						
Romania	a						1	1	
	b						284 900	6 572	
	c						34 680	6 572	
Spain	a		1					5	
	b		30 000 000					131 000	
	c		1 622 780					130 350	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	2	27	12		3	2	22	1
	b	8 512 000	147 599 835	66 837 647		4 109 900	284 900	214 934 887	38 900
	d								
	e								

North Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4					13
	b		431 209					25 552 736
	c		431 209					4 262 525
Belgium	a							2
	b							1 051 866
	c							
Bulgaria	a							16
	b							10 672 011
	c							26 289 475
Croatia	a							1
	b							10
	c							10
Czech Republic	a							17
	b							4 223 215
	c		560 688					36 298 573
France	a	1	1			1	12	82
	b	2 000 000	5 820 000			178 190 000	158 588 423	1 827 801 214
	c							187 100 000
Germany	a		2				3	21
	b		2 759 059				63 250	15 400 211
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							658 439
	c							
Italy	a							8
	b							4 012 520
	c							175 571 540
Lithuania	a							7
	b							3 959 829
	c							192 068
Malta	a						1	2
	b						2 500	40 500
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a					1	4	8
	b					450 000	9 098 590	18 647 080
	c						2	695 047
Poland	a					2		17
	b					1 175 800		23 895 372
	c					1 115 800		11 403 536
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							10 821 559
Romania	a							3
	b							1 832 307
	c							1 582 087
Spain	a							10
	b							70 484 729
	c							6 941 585
Sweden	a		1			2	2	11
	b							
	c							
Total per ML category	a	1	8			6	22	220
	b	2 000 000	9 010 268			179 815 800	167 752 763	2 008 232 039
	d							
	e							

Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	42		9			2		
	b	6 223 748		677 499			14 108 289		
	c	622 653		268 218					
Belgium	a	3			1	2			
	b	132 337			3 288 000	1 265 640			
	c								
Bulgaria	a	24	15	39	19	1	3		7
	b	24 619 610	8 399 397	81 876 889	59 733 800	82 500	4 779 235	180 000	1 622 254
	c	11 913 044	30 819 442	55 698 733	12 908 937		12 359 614		2 079 681
Croatia	a	15	3	2					
	b	9 857 556	497 400	1 248 546					
	c	776 950		12 000					
Czech Republic	a	32	5	18	1		5	2	1
	b	6 021 792	352 287	14 817 720			4 443 049		
	c	6 583 189	1 549 751	8 767 238	6 762 567		5 207 327		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Denmark	a	4	1						
	b	191 532	449 060						
	c								
Finland	a	4					1		
	b	1 203 000					47 981		
	c	66 187							
France	a	9	7	8	25	8	30		
	b	3 696 420	59 251 968	86 839 540	987 871 682	57 949 000	183 704 613		
	c								
Germany	a	45		3	1	5	12	1	2
	b	981 547		84 274	409 680	642 306	3 547 237	727	800
	c								
Greece	a				2				
	b				1 774 998				
	c								
Hungary	a	1							
	b	8 000							
	c								
Italy	a	9	2	3	3		1		
	b	14 124 193	319 127	1 529 750	15 326 433		8 647 800		
	c								
Latvia	a	3							
	b	1 515 000							
	c								
Malta	a	7		1					
	b	39 160		5 700					
	c	39 050							
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						375 000		
	c						288 925		
Poland	a	4	1	3		2			1
	b	5 622 286	1 237 210	1 055 397		699 299			1 392 000
	c	300 801		458 565					
Portugal	a	4							
	b	4 812							
	c	18 820		3 552	300	16 400	92 541	2 600	
Romania	a	2		4					
	b	594 428		1 874 405					
	c	327 572							
Slovakia	a	3	1	4	2		1		
	b	623 750	130 000	27 193 393	14 703 735		14 180		
	c	83 750		2 758 449					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovenia	a	3			1	1			
	b	433 110			65 910	27 235			
	c	31 715			65 910				
Spain	a	1		3	1	4	1	1	
	b	2 000		657 250		18 000 000	117 249	131 000	
	c			657 250		963 193	2 455 595	131 000	
Sweden	a				1	2			2
	b				8 465	188 117			498 509
	c	194 633		400 744	29 808	180 931			177 477
Total per ML category	a	215	35	97	57	25	57	4	13
	b	75 894 281	70 636 449	217 860 363	1 083 182 703	78 854 097	219 784 633	311 727	3 513 563
	d	2	2	1	1				
	e	1(1), 3(2), 7(1)	1(1), 2(1), 3(1), 7(1)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)				

Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1					3	
	b		1 590 260					2 638 386	
	c		1 590 260					1 750 000	
Belgium	a		1						
	b		16 320 150						
	c								
Bulgaria	a		1	1		2	2		
	b		430 946	60 030		2 184 000	109 868		
	c		2 360 836	343 030		1 096 430	109 868		
Croatia	a								
	b								
	c					1			
Czech Republic	a		7	2		9	1	5	
	b		3 158 082			34 128		324 092	
	c		9 311 851	1 165 380		394 350	623 753		
Estonia	a		1						
	b		2 199 000						
	c								
Finland	a					2			
	b					128 869			
	c					57 746			
France	a	10	20	12		28		23	
	b	1 132 594 821	50 528 534	50 638 079		63 067 006		70 440 632	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a	4	3	4		2	1	1	
	b	3 219 441	312 019	2 350 614		102 037	15 923	39 300	
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							923 400	
	c								
Hungary	a		1						
	b		77 000						
	c		77 000						
Italy	a	2	2						
	b	5 750 000	2 279 039						
	c								
Lithuania	a		3	1					
	b		7 966 007	45 000					
	c		500 000						
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		66 000						
	c								
Poland	a		1						
	b		2 001 659						
	c		1 930 735						
Portugal	a		3				1		
	b		1 686 467				1 272 063		
	c		146 143	45 470		18 500			
Slovakia	a					1		2	
	b					646 500		16 306 390	
	c							2 147 290	
Slovenia	a						2		
	b						1 629 600		
	c						814 800		
Spain	a		9	2					
	b		252 122 966						
	c	6 150	94 038 705					82 019	
Sweden	a		5						
	b		627 246						
	c		44 046			294 784	25 735		
Total per ML category	a	16	59	22		44	7	35	
	b	1 141 564 262	341 365 375	53 093 723		66 162 540	3 027 454	90 672 200	
	d		3	4		2		2	
	e		1(1), 2(1), 3(1), 4(1), 7(1), 8(1)	1(1), 2(3), 3(2), 7(1)		2(2), 3(2), 4(2), 6(2)		7(2)	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		2				1	60
	b		6 700				264 672	25 509 554
	c		1 200					4 232 331
Belgium	a							7
	b							21 006 127
	c							
Bulgaria	a						4	118
	b						22 467 271	206 545 800
	c						9 159 359	138 848 974
Croatia	a	1						21
	b	10 000						11 613 502
	c							788 951
Czech Republic	a		3					91
	b		57 224					29 208 374
	c	329 257	137 879					40 832 542
Denmark	a							5
	b							640 592
	c							
Estonia	a							1
	b							2 199 000
	c							
Finland	a							7
	b							1 379 850
	c					12 500		136 433
France	a	2				10	20	212
	b	19 230 000				142 562 503	151 985 011	3 060 359 809
	c							28 200 000
Germany	a						2	86
	b						6 180	11 712 085
	c							
Greece	a							3
	b							2 698 398
	c							
Hungary	a							2
	b							85 000
	c							77 000
Italy	a	1					1	24
	b	765 000						48 741 342
	c							22 113 379
Latvia	a							3
	b							1 515 000
	c							

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Sub-Saharan Africa

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Lithuania	a						2	6
	b						196 709	8 207 716
	c						196 709	696 709
Malta	a							8
	b							44 860
	c							39 050
Netherlands	a							2
	b							441 000
	c						6 680 102	6 969 027
Poland	a							12
	b							12 007 851
	c							2 690 101
Portugal	a	1						9
	b	23 388						2 986 730
	c							344 326
Romania	a							6
	b							2 468 833
	c							327 572
Slovakia	a							14
	b							59 617 948
	c							4 989 489
Slovenia	a							7
	b							2 155 855
	c							912 425
Spain	a						2	24
	b							271 030 465
	c							98 333 912
Sweden	a					2		12
	b					8 936		1 331 273
	c					8 465	3 479 849	4 836 472
Total per ML category	a	5	5			12	32	740
	b	20 028 388	63 924			142 571 439	174 919 843	3 783 506 964
	d	1				4		22
	e	2(1)				1(1), 2(3), 3(2), 8(1)		1(7), 2(11), 3(12), 4(3), 6(2), 7(8), 8(2)

North America

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	110	2	18			6		
	b	805 593 207	2 560	71 383 509			7 168 598		
	c	228 059 101	600	1 769 601			200 101		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Belgium	a	332	1	14		2	6		2
	b	127 591 681	48 964	5 887 146		288 125	2 964 525		20 624 133
	c								
Bulgaria	a	25	2	19	8		5		
	b	15 872 170	1 879 700	110 617 111	17 349 055		1 316 520		
	c	5 715 706	53 700	35 859 096	6 033 368		23 635		
Croatia	a	66	17	3					
	b	582 803 819	733 147	320 194					
	c	67 882 741	615 162	1 744					
Cyprus	a	2							
	b	10 694							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	23	1	12	7		3	11	1
	b	1 481 986		25 456 964	38 084 092		236 535	11 045 411	392 021
	c	1 749 914	4 685 353	13 492 518	56 485 267		302 017	1 497 382	40 037
Denmark	a	14	3	1	6	10			
	b	64 834	1 440 998	563	1 674 743	4 442 022			
	c					2 858 620			
Estonia	a						1		
	b	129 128					300 000		
	c						292 260		
Finland	a	5		2	1	2			
	b	11 980 070		5 332 648	120 000	453 720			
	c	990 845		3 300 976		80 000			
France	a	11	4	3	18	8			4
	b	3 169 177	9 830 200	34 790 002	852 974 976	40 486 801			13 393 712
	c								
Germany	a	667	31	53	27	53	133		50
	b	177 243 014	4 263 623	109 514 485	21 893 743	38 906 129	30 497 002		11 235 584
	c								
Greece	a				9	1			
	b				19 395 850	4 100			
	c								
Hungary	a	38		13		3	1		
	b	16 029 394		467 225 471		5 000 000	1 194		
	c	802 820		26 310 489					
Ireland	a	3				17			
	b	1 450				46 102 325			
	c	1 450				46 102 325			
Italy	a	2	2	6	4	4	16		
	b	117 159	6 489 080	1 352 283	1 025 023	2 947 305	223 387 979		
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Latvia	a	25		3					
	b	138 000 000		500 000					
	c								
Lithuania	a	4		1		2			
	b	15 678 781		108 500		2 500			
	c	18 734 292				2 500			
Luxembourg	a			1		1			
	b			4 537		4 537			
	c			4 537		4 537			
Malta	a	4		1					
	b	3 611		449					
	c	1 704		449					
Netherlands	a	25	16	18	11	4	22		
	b	2 373 744	25 249 043	12 059 190	60 313 594	2 115 837	2 638 583		
	c	654 808	2 017 880	37 203	20 972 042	6 631 209	1 153 162		
Poland	a	12		2	2	2	17		2
	b	21 570 529		438 551 000	4 021 191	42 535	1 718 210		6 182 243
	c	2 900 510	37 000	2 890 859	3 741 517	42 275	925 810		
Portugal	a	3			2	1			
	b	4 543 766			1 121 300	161 049			
	c						2 149 660		
Romania	a	3		5					
	b	476 865		15 458 037					
	c	2 950 200	104 859	2 894 257	1 716		49 244		82 905
Slovakia	a	5							
	b	1 205 990							
	c	515 444							
Slovenia	a	6		2					
	b	94 795 000		36 245 000					
	c	2 800 952		247 000					
Spain	a	23	4	10	11	14	17		1
	b	31 265	2 640	4 144 386	30 419 852	650 000	1 659 546		3 264 000
	c	928 811	870	603 249	2 495 102		1 704 644		
Sweden	a		30	28		48	2		22
	b		44 707 750	137 609 585		108 518 921	61 444		37 483 658
	c		49 066 278	114 301 280		32 648 398	6 890		19 396 742
Total per ML category	a	1 408	113	215	106	172	229	11	82
	b	2 020 767 334	94 647 705	1 476 561 060	1 048 393 419	250 125 906	271 950 136	11 045 411	92 575 351
	d								
	e								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1	1	1	1		1	17
	b		109 000	9 495	5 000 000	25 000 000		253 982	60 508 229
	c		52 969	9 495				253 982	7 945 905
Belgium	a	3	17	5			1		4
	b	2 224 138	56 517 065	661 973			35 466 304		1 287 449
	c								
Bulgaria	a		6	1					1
	b		9 153 926	11 351					42 937 361
	c		1 613 673						5 387 523
Czech Republic	a	1	16	9		5	1		7
	b		3 059 846	4 550 303		36 613			23 041
	c		22 146 484	1 402 627		4 436 315			9 544
Denmark	a	3	37			7			
	b	29 465	9 154 639			272 290			
	c		58 971 863					2 858 620	
Estonia	a		4					1	
	b		600 174					138 473	
	c		595 564						
Finland	a	2						1	
	b	224 394						329 376	
	c	229 213	251 777	533 215		175 234			
France	a	1	30	16		3	5	15	4
	b	143 485	668 536 101	76 049 329		8 593 574	42 929 000	190 988 899	46 057 012
	c								
Germany	a	30	99	88		1	6	21	47
	b	9 258 305	50 313 381	408 790 418		7 092	2 267 507	14 202 173	9 166 176
	c								
Greece	a		30	10				16	
	b		4 781 750	21 780 790				28 071 972	
	c								
Hungary	a		2						
	b		2 261 158						
	c		15 732						
Ireland	a		10	1					
	b		37 293 766	325 156					
	c		37 293 766	325 156					
Italy	a	7	77	21			3	1	13
	b	9 812 845	71 998 190	54 186 269			201 974 245		6 382 287
	c								
Latvia	a			4					
	b			556 000					
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							20 000	
	c							2 206 371	
Luxembourg	a								3
	b								2 977 190
	c								2 386 473
Malta	a					3		1	
	b					956		243	
	c					516			
Netherlands	a	5	27	1		1	2	6	16
	b	2 205 823	143 515 789	761 357		8 500	1 058 829	24 989 728	1 243 415
	c	266 640	292 293 573	1 423 292	375 160		1 281 412	1 680 548	106 390
Poland	a		124	1		1		1	9
	b		1 113 997 440	282 160		608 500		8 375	27 502 126
	c		180 977 774	389 578		371 672		165 021	9 372 892
Portugal	a	1	8	1					
	b	94 500	851 000	500 000					
	c		209 256 020					312 454	74 514
Romania	a		3	2					
	b		25 487 257	442 269					
	c		4 828 769	442 268					
Slovakia	a			1			1		
	b			26 351			555 200		
	c			26 310			555 200		
Spain	a	1	110	26		1		12	3
	b	2 664 979	788 545 853	43 083 000				115 405	
	c	147 590	14 921 217	8 256 461				135 005	
Sweden	a		1	2			11	2	
	b		4 702 917	17 871			21 365 476	1 076 987	
	c		17 004 325	286 114		1 458 822	146 533	1 226 530	
Total per ML category	a	54	602	190	1	23	30	79	124
	b	26 657 934	2 990 879 252	612 034 092	5 000 000	34 527 525	305 616 561	260 195 613	198 084 286
	d								
	e								

North America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		14			2	7	181
	b		20 502 282			10 000 000	17 136 234	1 022 667 096
	c		7 721 268				2 436	246 015 458

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a		6				4	397
	b		510 138				121 054 500	375 126 141
	c							
Bulgaria	a						2	69
	b						11 462 820	210 600 014
	c						11 462 820	66 149 521
Croatia	a							86
	b							583 857 160
	c							68 499 647
Cyprus	a							2
	b							10 694
	c							
Czech Republic	a	1	2					100
	b	275 369	5 997					84 648 178
	c	1 118 255	196 291				167 761	107 729 765
Denmark	a					32	29	142
	b					26 642 510	26 586 422	70 308 486
	c		2 858 620			2 858 620		70 406 343
Estonia	a							6
	b							1 167 775
	c							887 824
Finland	a						2	15
	b						362 550	18 802 758
	c						121 826	5 683 086
France	a	5				11	34	172
	b	3 694 002				10 918 133	151 878 731	2 154 433 134
	c							169 300 000
Germany	a	48	104	1		34	76	1 569
	b	3 075 543	1 745 600	40 100		6 095 813	4 158 445	902 674 133
	c							
Greece	a							66
	b							74 034 462
	c							
Hungary	a					2		59
	b					16 500 000		507 017 217
	c					478 813		27 607 854
Ireland	a					5	5	41
	b					310 000	410 000	84 442 697
	c					310 000	410 000	84 442 697
Italy	a		2			4	28	190
	b		1 786 660			389 496	8 495 904	590 344 725
	c							231 714 653

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Latvia	a							32
	b							139 056 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		9
	b							15 809 781
	c							20 943 163
Luxembourg	a							5
	b							2 986 264
	c							2 395 547
Malta	a							9
	b							5 259
	c							2 669
Netherlands	a	1	2			4	18	179
	b	17 587	16 989 588			2 306 382	27 883 920	325 730 909
	c	3 711	93 895	286 008		9	2 881 704	332 158 646
Poland	a	2	14			2	129	320
	b	331 915	10 131 954			72 417	38 701 161	1 663 721 756
	c	311 637	813 616			939	647 988	203 589 088
Portugal	a							16
	b							7 271 615
	c							211 792 648
Romania	a					3		16
	b					1 134 642		42 999 070
	c		25 377			645 773		12 025 368
Slovakia	a							7
	b							1 787 541
	c							1 096 954
Slovenia	a							8
	b							131 040 000
	c		1 265					3 049 217
Spain	a						11	244
	b						200 000	874 780 926
	c							29 192 949
Sweden	a	5	2			22	29	204
	b	396 926	260 918			1 410 875	2 351 458	359 964 786
	c	347 899	99 252			9 841 718	3 894 293	249 725 074
Total per ML category	a	62	146	1		122	374	4 144
	b	7 791 342	51 933 137	40 100		75 780 268	410 682 145	10 245 288 577
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central America and the Caribbean

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	15							1
	b	504 394							750 000
	c	284 409							550 000
Belgium	a	1					1		
	b	186 759					22 366		
	c								
Croatia	a	3							
	b	220 691							
	c	220 691							
Czech Republic	a	5		2					
	b	42 174		730 715					
	c	8 149		26 697					
Estonia	a	1							
	b	166 597							
	c								
France	a	1		2		2			
	b	96 680		188 090 000		288 580 000			
	c								
Germany	a								1
	b								12 600
	c								
Italy	a	2		3					
	b	189 755		836 163					
	c								
Netherlands	a	4		5					
	b	30 954		83 302					
	c	7 365		82 960					
Slovakia	a	2							
	b	1 102 674							
	c	550 162							
Slovenia	a	3							
	b	212 790							
	c	78 491							
Spain	a			2					
	b			65 000					
	c	2 500							
Sweden	a		1			2			
	b					43 769 106			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central America and the Caribbean

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	37	1	14		4	1		2
	b	2 753 468		189 805 180		332 349 106	22 366		762 600
	d	1							
	e	7(1)							

Central America and the Caribbean

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					1			
	b					22 400			
	c					22 400			
France	a		5	1		1	1	1	
	b		2 940 425	9 658		3 199	138 900	6 184 916	
	c								
Germany	a		6			2	1		
	b		22 456			1 181 200	131 972		
	c								
Italy	a		1						
	b		24 420 000						
	c								
Spain	a		2					1	
	b		1 270 000						
	c		7 077 315						
Sweden	a								
	b								
	c					169 410			
Total per ML category	a		14	1		4	2	2	
	b		28 652 881	9 658		1 206 799	270 872	6 184 916	
	d		2						1
	e		2(2)						7(1)

Central America and the Caribbean

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a							16
	b							1 254 394
	c							834 409
Belgium	a		2					4
	b		1 800 000					2 009 125
	c							
Bulgaria	a							1
	b							22 400
	c							22 400

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central America and the Caribbean

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Croatia	a							3
	b							220 691
	c							220 691
Czech Republic	a							7
	b							772 889
	c							34 846
Estonia	a							1
	b							166 597
	c							
France	a		2			1	3	20
	b		17 222 000				7 445 000	510 710 778
	c							200 000
Germany	a					1		11
	b					20 000		1 368 228
	c							
Italy	a		1					7
	b		672 800					26 118 718
	c							1 488 511
Netherlands	a							9
	b							114 256
	c						2	90 327
Poland	a						1	1
	b						9 517	9 517
	c							
Slovakia	a							2
	b							1 102 674
	c							550 162
Slovenia	a							3
	b							212 790
	c							78 491
Spain	a						1	6
	b							1 335 000
	c							7 079 815
Sweden	a		1			2	2	8
	b							43 769 106
	c							169 410
Total per ML category	a		6			4	7	99
	b		19 694 800			20 000	7 454 517	589 187 163
	d							4
	e							2(2), 7(2)

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South America

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	74							
	b	18 787 543							
	c	8 382 162							
Belgium	a	26				2			1
	b	3 804 426				878 985			7 650 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a				1				
	b				967 050				
	c				95 895				
Croatia	a	7							
	b	5 601 289							
	c	971 470							
Czech Republic	a	3	1	5					
	b		27 258	496 235					
	c	267 306		210 726			592		
Denmark	a				2		1		
	b				43 046		29 795		
	c								
Finland	a	2				2			
	b	150 200				10 000			
	c	3 890							
France	a	2	1	4	7	4	1		
	b	98 240	28 215 000	1 345 000 000	173 243 544	233 450 500	103 550 000		
	c								
Germany	a	8		1	1	2	24	2	2
	b	122 585		855 588	668 847	34 830 000	7 490 510	433 185	461
	c								
Greece	a						8		
	b						138 000		
	c								
Italy	a	93	5	1	4	2	8		
	b	37 297 055	11 167 487	1 631 791	5 984 511	512 174	24 393 711		
	c								
Latvia	a	8							
	b	1 800 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	1							
	b	276 935							
	c								
Netherlands	a		1			2	1	1	
	b		15 750			267 759	22 500	738 358	
	c	79 280				764 297			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South America

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Slovakia	a	18							
	b	11 159 073							
	c	5 012 607							
Slovenia	a	11		5					
	b	2 405 801		1 481 982					
	c	1 743 201		1 747 102					
Spain	a	214	2	3	4	2	12		2
	b	958 666		3 256 741	475 989	464 902	11 659 761		917 364
	c	748 371		1 621 643	598 163	464 902	5 859 664		143 221
Sweden	a			2	6	1			3
	b			971 246	34 391 866	5 425 661			868 628
	c	28 559	48 801	17 727	3 429 188	763 987			853 374
Total per ML category	a	467	10	21	25	17	55	3	8
	b	82 461 813	39 425 495	1 353 693 583	215 774 853	275 839 981	147 284 277	1 171 543	9 436 453
	d	6		1					
	e	7(6)		7(1)					

South America

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					2		2	1
	b					12 100		87 488	1 901 450
	c					12 100			316 908
Belgium	a		1	1				2	
	b		14 836 500	44 767				59 396	
	c								
Bulgaria	a					2		1	
	b					16 740		115 920	
	c					16 740		115 920	
Croatia	a					2			
	b					733 800			
	c					166 215			
Czech Republic	a		1						
	b		185 630						
	c		4 662 281						
Estonia	a		1						
	b		375 178						
	c								
France	a	8	14	11		5		8	
	b	3 121 134 137	6 201 082 038	42 206 771		980 550		77 743 760	
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South America

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Germany	a	22	35	17			1	3	4
	b	13 883 529	4 832 644	51 765 713			503 036	343 847	118 875
	c								
Greece	a	1						9	
	b	4 120 000						2 585 000	
	c								
Italy	a		16	3					
	b		15 954 241	1 645 127					
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							7 090	
	c							7 090	
Netherlands	a	4		2					
	b	4 352 687		5 713					
	c		188 397	11 848					
Poland	a					1			
	b					1 633 229			
	c					1 073 391			
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		41 746 273						
Romania	a			1					
	b			949 667					
	c			157 326					
Spain	a		17	2				6	
	b		174 587 653	440 551				1 814 700	
	c		16 634 771	1 841 134				1 188 674	
Sweden	a			1			1		
	b			7 525			321 680		
	c		279 962 349	579 240					
Total per ML category	a	35	85	38		12	2	32	5
	b	3 143 490 353	6 411 853 884	97 065 834		3 376 419	824 716	82 757 201	2 020 325
	d								1
	e								2(1), 7(1)

South America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		5				1	85
	b		130 860				25 000	20 944 441
	c		99 635					8 810 805

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a	3						36
	b	5 000 000						32 274 074
	c							
Bulgaria	a							4
	b							1 099 710
	c							228 555
Croatia	a							9
	b							6 335 089
	c							1 137 685
Czech Republic	a		3					13
	b		68 062					777 185
	c		14 972					5 155 877
Denmark	a							3
	b							72 841
	c							
Estonia	a							1
	b							375 178
	c							
Finland	a							4
	b							160 200
	c							3 890
France	a	4	3			1	10	83
	b	30 000	14 612 655			10 000	38 608 101	11 379 965 296
	c							101 400 000
Germany	a	6				10	8	146
	b	579 313				1 130 208	2 302 929	119 861 270
	c							
Greece	a							18
	b							6 843 000
	c							
Italy	a		1				1	134
	b		3 485 500				137 000	102 208 597
	c							74 242 158
Latvia	a							8
	b							1 800 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					1		3
	b							284 025
	c							7 090
Netherlands	a					2	6	19
	b					267 759	374 472	6 044 998
	c					100	4	1 043 926

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South America

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Poland	a							1
	b							1 633 229
	c						1 877	1 075 268
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							41 746 273
Romania	a							1
	b							949 667
	c							157 326
Slovakia	a							18
	b							11 159 073
	c							5 012 607
Slovenia	a							16
	b							3 887 783
	c							3 490 303
Spain	a						2	266
	b							194 576 327
	c							29 100 543
Sweden	a	1	1			2	6	24
	b	260 730						42 247 336
	c					237 857	1 766 364	287 687 446
Total per ML category	a	14	13			16	34	892
	b	5 870 043	18 297 077			1 407 967	41 447 502	11 933 499 319
	d							8
	e							2(1), 7(8)

Central Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	16		14					
	b	2 299 282		317 066					
	c	1 292 335		214 425					
Belgium	a	1							
	b	23 266							
	c								
Bulgaria	a	10	4	1	5	6			
	b	1 308 955	2 796 000	571 814	1 907 760	654 830			
	c	1 308 955	2 460 000	2 457 094	1 500 000	654 830			
Croatia	a	3	2	1					
	b	85 238	251 735	720 045					
	c	85 238	251 735	720 045					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Cyprus	a	8							
	b	163 220							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	4					5		
	b	11 564					883 788		
	c						893 280	69 889	
Estonia	a	1							
	b	554 000							
	c								
France	a	1	1		1	4			
	b	575 002	71 340 000		259 500 000	1 155 616 100			
	c								
Germany	a	26		4		1			
	b	1 304 181		68 203		67 048			
	c								
Hungary	a	8		1					
	b	286 343		17 500					
	c	226 649		17 293					
Italy	a	1		2					
	b	10 387							
	c								
Latvia	a	2							
	b	24 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a	4							
	b								
	c	108 632							
Netherlands	a						1		
	b						81 000		
	c						72 000		
Romania	a			1					
	b			2 564					
	c								
Slovakia	a	5							
	b	574 334							
	c	569 845							
Slovenia	a			7					
	b			2 125 800					
	c			793 680					

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Total per ML category	a	90	7	31	6	11	6		
	b	7 219 772	74 387 735	3 822 992	261 407 760	1 156 337 978	964 788		
	d	1		4					
	e	4(1)		4(4)					

Central Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a					4		2	
	b					1 122 004		536 360	
	c					1 122 004		536 360	
Czech Republic	a		2			2			
	b		202 000						
	c		15 600 620			9 985			
Estonia	a							1	
	b							1 548 815	
	c								
France	a		1					2	
	b		165 405 408					94 750 000	
	c								
Germany	a		4						
	b		1 655 356						
	c								
Greece	a							1	
	b							135 200	
	c								
Italy	a	1				1		1	
	b					64 110		18 000	
	c								
Netherlands	a		1						
	b		24 322						
	c								
Spain	a		6						
	b		120 000 000						
	c		1 166 380						
Total per ML category	a	1	14			7		7	
	b		287 287 086			1 186 114		96 988 375	
	d		2			1		1	
	e		1(1), 4(1), 7(1)			4(1)		4(1)	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		1					31
	b		35 468					2 651 816
	c							1 506 760
Belgium	a							1
	b							23 266
	c							
Bulgaria	a							32
	b							8 897 723
	c							10 039 243
Croatia	a							6
	b							1 057 018
	c							1 057 018
Cyprus	a							8
	b							163 220
	c							
Czech Republic	a							13
	b							1 097 352
	c							16 573 774
Estonia	a							2
	b							2 102 815
	c							
France	a						2	12
	b						201 000	1 747 387 510
	c							45 800 000
Germany	a							35
	b							3 094 788
	c							
Greece	a							1
	b							135 200
	c							
Hungary	a							9
	b							303 843
	c							243 942
Italy	a							6
	b							92 497
	c							68 383 882
Latvia	a							2
	b							24 000
	c							
Lithuania	a						2	6
	b						28 960	28 960
	c						28 960	137 592

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Central Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Netherlands	a							2
	b							105 322
	c						4	72 004
Romania	a							1
	b							2 564
	c							
Slovakia	a							5
	b							574 334
	c							569 845
Slovenia	a							7
	b							2 125 800
	c							793 680
Spain	a							6
	b							120 000 000
	c							1 166 380
Total per ML category	a		1				4	185
	b		35 468				229 960	1 889 868 028
	d							9
	e							1(1), 4(8), 7(1)

North East Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	23	3	6	1	1	3	1	
	b	486 317	243 518	2 596 950	149 242	2 457 114	3 698 985	25 096	
	c	388 368	245 032	2 516 027	149 242		540 000	13 689	
Belgium	a	10				1	1		
	b	1 116 897				5 810	11 450		
	c								
Bulgaria	a	1	1	3	1				
	b	42 082	70 360	255 640	278 223				
	c	53 004	70 360	840	278 223				
Cyprus	a	2							
	b	12 100							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1					9	1	2
	b						303 482	1 578	22 036
	c			3 287 876			1 216 838		38 254
Denmark	a					4			
	b					53 000			
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North East Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Estonia	a						1		
	b						50 000		
	c						50 000		
Finland	a	1	1			1		1	
	b	152 000	280 000			130 000		21 500	
	c	11 632					312 057		
France	a	1	1	1	13	14	8	1	7
	b	500 000	22 200 000	101 100 000	129 488 000	82 026 975	32 798 835	450 000	5 712 880
	c								
Germany	a	65	10	20	5	25	83	4	15
	b	2 687 573	370 302	10 860 854	8 616 300	27 082 146	77 096 008	5 227 898	4 183 133
	c								
Hungary	a	2		4					
	b	3 073 660		128 537					
	c	36 829		95 791					
Ireland	a					3			
	b					190 456			
	c					190 456			
Italy	a	3	7	1	3	2		1	
	b	27 942	1 615 132		215 341	41 000		58 968	
	c								
Lithuania	a					1			
	b					55 335			
	c			21 150					
Netherlands	a				2	3	3	2	
	b				24 416	11 875 332	135 187	488 350	
	c					4 120 962		328 850	
Poland	a		1				2		1
	b		323 578				139 423		920 000
	c		480 948				974		
Spain	a					2			
	b								
	c								14 400
Sweden	a		1	5	2	7			4
	b		31 604	512 551	199 077	550 382			153 315
	c		14 128 412	540 261	253 290	4 731 788			1 278 310
Total per ML category	a	109	25	40	27	64	110	11	29
	b	8 098 571	25 134 494	115 454 532	138 970 599	124 467 550	114 233 370	6 273 390	10 991 364
	d	1		2				2	
	e	1(1), 2(1), 7(1)		1(2), 2(1), 7(2)				2(2)	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North East Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a								4
	b								56 011 145
	c								24 365 216
Belgium	a		3				1		
	b		9 060 374				573 768		
	c								
Bulgaria	a							1	
	b							72 000	
	c							72 000	
Czech Republic	a		14						
	b		2 708 197						
	c		8 403 460	389 780				49 712	
Denmark	a			9		1			
	b			290 323		3 600			
	c								
Finland	a		1						
	b		1 621 074						
	c					242 338			
France	a	8	18	10		4	1	22	1
	b	135 729 520	40 827 187	89 417 500		16 283 000	155 000	59 697 300	901 500
	c								
Germany	a	117	40	37		3	1	14	5
	b	45 831 840	4 514 718	25 053 531		275 919	1 123 280	6 061 282	1 126 624
	c								
Greece	a							5	
	b							2 000	
	c								
Ireland	a	1							
	b	158 433							
	c	157 433							
Italy	a	1	20	12			1	3	4
	b	20 453	4 480 377	67 904 037			290 000	191 400	270 005
	c								
Netherlands	a	13	1	1				1	1
	b	13 615 368	9 103 323	57 627				42 436	18 232
	c	11 593 558	1 621 486	57 627		70		42 436	
Poland	a		2						
	b		6 767 100						
	c		713 422						
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		1 484 650						

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North East Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Romania	a								1
	b								9 496 676
	c								407 612
Spain	a	3	1	4				1	
	b	3 636 270	116 399 916	37 779 980				18 000	
	c	257 499	11 357 258	7 350 947				168 000	
Sweden	a						6	1	
	b						14 762 568		
	c	437 542				442 975	203 669		
Total per ML category	a	143	100	73		8	10	48	16
	b	198 991 884	195 482 266	220 502 998		16 562 519	16 904 616	66 084 418	67 824 182
	d		2						
	e		1(2), 4(2), 5(2), 7(2)						

North East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		17					59
	b		1 334 409					67 002 776
	c		729 179					28 946 753
Belgium	a							16
	b							10 768 299
	c							
Bulgaria	a							7
	b							718 305
	c							474 427
Cyprus	a							2
	b							12 100
	c							
Czech Republic	a		1					28
	b		596					3 035 889
	c		596					13 386 516
Denmark	a	1						15
	b	50						346 973
	c							
Estonia	a						1	2
	b						1 000	51 000
	c						1	50 001
Finland	a					1		6
	b					150 000		2 354 574
	c							566 027

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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North East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
France	a	1	1			6	14	132
	b	18 180	1 000 002			65 911 227	52 102 301	836 319 407
	c							183 000 000
Germany	a	5	15			16	33	513
	b	389 401	521 475			1 375 636	10 032 508	232 430 428
	c							
Greece	a					1		6
	b					263 000		265 000
	c							
Hungary	a							6
	b							3 202 197
	c							132 620
Ireland	a						3	7
	b						1 030 999	1 379 888
	c						1 030 999	1 378 888
Italy	a		2			7	3	70
	b		2 660 417			541 074	2 180 000	80 496 146
	c							112 771 193
Lithuania	a							1
	b							55 335
	c							21 150
Netherlands	a	5	1			5	9	47
	b	2 813 200	9 103 323			12 223 404	23 518 730	83 018 928
	c	112 241				57 600	112 644	18 047 474
Poland	a					1	3	10
	b					10	16 530 831	24 680 942
	c						126 707	1 322 051
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							1 484 650
Romania	a							1
	b							9 496 676
	c							407 612
Spain	a					3	1	15
	b					5 249 800		163 083 966
	c					5 205 163		24 353 267
Sweden	a	5				3	9	43
	b	427 827					2 012 378	18 649 702
	c	414 971					616 336	23 047 554

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North East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	17	37			43	76	986
	b	3 648 658	14 620 222			85 714 151	107 408 747	1 537 368 531
	d						1	8
	e						1(1)	1(6), 2(4), 4(2), 5(2), 7(5)

South East Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	8	3	10	2		5		
	b	3 080 027	248 266	342 115	161 862		6 631 270		
	c	3 089 934	237 183	183 311			6 255 270		
Belgium	a	13	1	3		1	1		2
	b	1 637 827	270 000	434 810		95 052	250 000		292 500
	c								
Bulgaria	a	2		6	2	3	5		
	b	1 155 130		15 552 317	498 448	157 359	248 465		
	c	1 271 130		873 344	247 748	224 070	249 538		
Croatia	a	17		1					
	b	2 415 453		305 500					
	c	880 370							
Cyprus	a	6							
	b	82 047							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	21	1	16	2	2	11	4	1
	b	1 707 738	1 209 032	4 917 089	1 999 244		4 895 782	1 661	
	c	3 327 119		4 317 548	2 360 105		5 469 144	3 063	
Denmark	a				4		5		
	b				4 513 441		3 538 699		
	c								
Finland	a				1	2	2		
	b				43 866	102 000	320 000		
	c								
France	a	1	1	10	13	14	5	6	3
	b	2 700 000	58 530 000	1 225 898 025	4 015 725 363	1 699 214 500	1 238 974	4 083 150	29 211 750
	c								
Germany	a	10		7	4	9	40	3	6
	b	573 076		5 004 274	446 182	1 200 497	8 750 441	36 715	2 413
	c								
Hungary	a	7		1					
	b	245 557		105					
	c	131 218		105					

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South East Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Ireland	a						2		
	b						1 469 159		
	c						1 469 159		
Italy	a	16	9	4	5	1	1		
	b	12 090 474	170 240 450	5 764 500	313 540	78 000	19 500		
	c								
Latvia	a			1					
	b			3 000					
	c								
Netherlands	a					9	2		
	b					2 425 102	2 102 297		
	c					1 604 395	722 515		
Poland	a					4	6		
	b					274 375	404 640		
	c					276 407	66 861		
Romania	a	1				1			
	b	30 380				45 400			
	c	30 380		585 185					
Slovakia	a	30		5		1			
	b	15 417 802		919 410		31 500			
	c	2 729 980		802 230		31 500			
Slovenia	a	4							
	b	1 602 622							
	c	1 602 622							
Spain	a		3	15	6	7	4		
	b			18 438 009	2 256 199	15 798 600	33 638		
	c	502 257	8 438 169	24 775 415	1 059 640	238 709	4 506 739		
Sweden	a		2		1	10	2		2
	b					47 029	601 973		12 369
	c		24 690 946	71 566	266 726	1 191 684	601 973		742 169
Total per ML category	a	136	20	79	40	64	91	13	14
	b	42 738 133	230 497 748	1 277 579 154	4 025 958 145	1 719 469 414	30 504 838	4 121 526	29 519 032
	d	1				4	3		
	e	2(1), 3(1), 7(1)				2(3), 7(1)	2(3), 3(3), 7(2)		

South East Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a							2	
	b							2 414 260	
	c							199 287	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South East Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Belgium	a		5					5	1
	b		16 277 303					1 602 136	309 724
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1				3	
	b			131 840				668 430	
	c			131 840				626 265	
Czech Republic	a		4	9		2		5	
	b		10 987	2 597 270					
	c		18 258 719	3 379 523		679 446	159 948	171 388	
Denmark	a	1		1					
	b	109 180							
	c								
France	a	12	16	25		17	3	10	2
	b	758 972 305	564 356 033	2 215 300 001		182 181 200	15 717 003	32 231 000	1 060 000
	c								
Germany	a	5	19	18		2	1	2	2
	b	269 158 862	15 460 521	5 883 274		750 277	1 000 000	1 894 858	91 287
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							551 110	
	c								
Italy	a	5	5	1		1	2		1
	b	4 022 430	1 034 746	45 600		13 000	1 207 367		47 265
	c								
Lithuania	a							1	
	b							782 100	
	c								
Netherlands	a	5	1	1			4		
	b	381 586	224 564	1 102 010			83 993		
	c	95 936	223 162	288 300			42 661		
Poland	a		5						1
	b		109 763 395						927 432
	c		61 044 544	6 882			48 844		20 296
Portugal	a		6	4					
	b		138 835	98 238					
	c		61 107	43 738					
Slovakia	a		1						
	b		270 000						
	c		270 000						
Spain	a		22	5			2	19	
	b		45 911 640	52 463 232			93 940	4 980 360	
	c	204 420	179 845 880	18 282 546			93 940	1 977 060	

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South East Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a			4					
	b			11 287					
	c	65 948	40 387 815	38 518		547 639	8 196		
Total per ML category	a	28	84	69		22	12	49	7
	b	1 032 644 363	753 448 024	2 277 632 752		182 944 477	18 102 303	45 124 254	2 435 708
	d			1		2			
	e			2(1)		2(2)			

South East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		4					34
	b		79 934					12 957 734
	c		79 934					10 044 919
Belgium	a		3					35
	b		47 620 033					68 789 385
	c							
Bulgaria	a							22
	b							18 411 989
	c							3 623 935
Croatia	a							18
	b							2 720 953
	c							880 370
Cyprus	a							6
	b							82 047
	c							
Czech Republic	a		9					87
	b		760 166					18 098 969
	c		247 672					38 373 675
Denmark	a					3	1	15
	b					3 763 441		11 924 761
	c							
Finland	a							5
	b							465 866
	c							
France	a	6	1			9	21	175
	b	1 680 023	80 000			208 580 001	399 462 550	11 416 221 878
	c							542 500 000
Germany	a	4	4			11	16	163
	b	30 175	15 057 863			95 166	100 150	325 536 031
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a					1		3
	b					1 137 250		1 688 360
	c							
Hungary	a							8
	b							245 662
	c							131 323
Ireland	a						1	3
	b						14 000	1 483 159
	c						14 000	1 483 159
Italy	a							51
	b							194 876 872
	c							162 542 377
Latvia	a							1
	b							3 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							1
	b							782 100
	c							
Netherlands	a					10	20	52
	b					2 393 297	6 089 254	14 802 103
	c						1 570 608	4 547 577
Poland	a		2			2	1	21
	b		593 143			99 871	1 903 400	113 966 256
	c		1 971					61 465 805
Portugal	a							10
	b							237 073
	c							104 845
Romania	a							2
	b							75 780
	c							615 565
Slovakia	a							37
	b							16 638 712
	c							3 833 710
Slovenia	a							4
	b							1 602 622
	c							1 602 622
Spain	a					2	5	90
	b					475 000	125 000 000	265 450 618
	c					475 000	37 425 578	277 825 353
Sweden	a		2			7	12	42
	b					2 351 458	1 044 517	4 068 633
	c					11 889	1 767 446	70 392 515

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South East Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	10	25			45	77	885
	b	1 710 198	64 191 139			218 895 484	533 613 871	12 491 130 563
	d		1			1	1	14
	e		7(1)			2(1), 7(1)	2(1)	2(12), 3(4), 7(6)

South Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	4		5					
	b	114 800		13 948					
	c	4 973		11 303					
Belgium	a	3	5			3	1		1
	b	109 052	1 729 008			1 413 442	10 000 000		4 500 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	3	1	16	2	4	1		
	b	698 657	50	28 437 186	5 110 616	185 031	93 420		
	c	1 593 634	96	17 576 054	17 041 156	181 495			
Croatia	a	5							
	b	1 174 565							
	c	71 165							
Cyprus	a	88							
	b	674 227							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	8		4			28		
	b	189 640		293 673			11 552 457		
	c	149 160		174 172		2 237 760	25 132 638		
Denmark	a					1			
	b					29 600			
	c								
Estonia	a						3		
	b						272 675		
	c						122 675		
Finland	a								
	b								
	c	4 070 547							
France	a		4	9	19	27	5		1
	b		8 927 700	103 377 200	131 872 753	1 661 204 381	16 887 648		280 000
	c								
Germany	a	60	1	31	5	7	6	1	1
	b	522 833	660 000	258 591	313 963	6 334 816	2 657 826	7 252	683 610
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South Asia

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Hungary	a	2							
	b	33 170							
	c								
Italy	a	2	6	5	10	15		2	
	b	165 005	610 621	11 238 084	114 871 591	9 671 724		54 390	
	c								
Malta	a	1		1					
	b	18 000		5 110					
	c	18 000							
Netherlands	a					9	2		
	b					592 313	70 118		
	c					1 206 788	231 607		
Poland	a				2		3		
	b				7 112 176		1 735 195		
	c	995			90 705		1 361 453		
Romania	a				1	1			
	b				9 496 676	99 954			
	c								
Slovakia	a					1			
	b					24 800			
	c								
Spain	a	2	2	8	3	4	1		
	b	47 877	12 124 650	14 077 717	1 744 390		270 147		
	c	7 413	26 698 686	12 664 181	1 539 690		829 138		
Sweden	a		2	1	1	11			
	b			7 524 667		10 330 736			
	c		6 133 194	108 493 490		4 296 625			
Total per ML category	a	178	21	80	43	83	50	3	3
	b	3 747 826	24 052 029	165 226 176	270 522 165	1 689 886 797	43 539 486	61 642	5 463 610
	d	11		1		3			
	e	2(2), 3(2), 4(1), 7(9)		7(1)		1(2), 4(3)			

South Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		9						1
	b		684 967						71 230
	c								64 995
Belgium	a		9						2
	b		19 267 019						432 636
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Bulgaria	a			2		1		1	
	b			2 267 560		481 000		9 479	
	c			2 267 560		578 305		9 479	
Czech Republic	a		10	1			2	2	
	b		1 947 577						
	c		1 276 437	536 164					6 248
Denmark	a					2			
	b					453 769			
	c								
Finland	a					1			
	b					8 700			
	c					93 640			
France	a	28	45	27		3	2	18	4
	b	6 436 508 153	556 911 114	485 270 992		8 500 000	111 720 000	57 057 000	26 233 850
	c								
Germany	a	22	19	23		2	2	3	4
	b	36 698 461	962 060	2 824 691		107 642	4 069 010	5 152 698	553 064
	c								
Greece	a							2	
	b							99 076	
	c								
Hungary	a			1					
	b			666 800					
	c			666 968					
Italy	a	8	41	8					
	b	1 992 452	20 870 072	70 118 173					
	c								
Lithuania	a		1						
	b		1 133 950						
	c		1 133 950						
Netherlands	a	5	2						
	b	59 775 641	1 035 410						
	c	6 789 394	686 958					124 380	
Poland	a	1	3	1		1	2		
	b	97 710	3 869 681	14 276		4 600	131 334		
	c		4 067 760	14 102			30 846		
Portugal	a								
	b								
	c		1 759 939						
Romania	a		10						2
	b		6 955 203						130 278
	c		5 909 490						35 470

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South Asia

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Slovakia	a						1		
	b						7 826 666		
	c								
Spain	a	1	8	11				3	
	b	1 900 000	50 804 252	15 441 351					
	c	1 771 045	37 210 232	13 089 191					
Sweden	a			2			1		
	b			21 022 038			16 706		
	c		11 624			171 205	16 706		
Total per ML category	a	65	157	76		10	10	29	13
	b	6 536 972 417	664 441 305	597 625 881		9 555 711	123 763 716	62 318 253	27 421 058
	d	4							
	e	1(3), 4(4)							

South Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		3					22
	b		96 643					981 588
	c		33 618					114 889
Belgium	a							24
	b							37 451 157
	c							
Bulgaria	a		1					32
	b		40					37 283 039
	c		76					39 247 855
Croatia	a							5
	b							1 174 565
	c							71 165
Cyprus	a							88
	b							674 227
	c							
Czech Republic	a		15					70
	b		366 493					14 349 840
	c		4 982 465				879 815	35 374 859
Denmark	a							3
	b							483 369
	c							
Estonia	a							3
	b							272 675
	c							122 675

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Finland	a							1
	b							8 700
	c							4 164 187
France	a	2	8		1	2	48	253
	b	18 651	49 737 170		1 650 000	4 475 000	206 522 025	9 867 153 637
	c							1 172 300 000
Germany	a	3	2			8	23	223
	b	1 977 831	114 881			84 946	9 011 321	72 995 496
	c							
Greece	a							2
	b							99 076
	c							
Hungary	a							3
	b							699 970
	c							666 968
Italy	a		1				2	100
	b		432 850				1 253 816	231 278 778
	c							205 389 129
Lithuania	a						4	5
	b						72 780	1 206 730
	c						72 685	1 206 635
Malta	a							2
	b							23 110
	c							18 000
Netherlands	a					2	12	32
	b					125 166	63 693 590	125 292 238
	c					1 000	143 806	9 183 933
Poland	a						12	25
	b						1 451 533	14 416 505
	c						67 009	5 632 870
Portugal	a							
	b							
	c							1 759 939
Romania	a		8				2	24
	b		1 638 231				2 047 420	20 367 762
	c		1 095 119				2 047 204	9 087 283
Slovakia	a							2
	b							7 851 466
	c							
Spain	a						2	45
	b							96 410 384
	c	141 678						93 951 254

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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South Asia

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a		1			6	10	35
	b					3 598	838 079	39 735 824
	c		1 397 450			9 994	689 448	121 219 736
Total per ML category	a	5	39		1	18	115	999
	b	1 996 482	52 386 308		1 650 000	4 688 710	284 890 564	10 570 210 136
	d					4	1	24
	e					1(3), 2(1), 4(3)	1(1), 4(1)	1(9), 2(3), 3(2), 4(12), 7(10)

European Union

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	180	7	70	27	5	43		
	b	207 738 173	6 329 732	93 263 318	8 448 717	1 511 467	25 728 383		
	c	2 824 741	55 300	21 631 879	4 096 787	45 998	5 943 630		
Belgium	a	266	7	64	8	13	10		21
	b	71 130 040	18 362 568	101 210 407	1 846 931	3 536 144	1 967 526		52 331 164
	c								
Bulgaria	a	30	34	129	76	24	21	1	13
	b	97 420 802	179 766 354	1 393 449 783	1 259 594 818	9 587 323	114 652 952	14 000	5 782 475
	c	12 754 806	84 575 955	398 283 250	599 047 701	2 047 285	45 266 822		2 052 091
Croatia	a	82	3	19			3		
	b	5 028 929	438 000	33 049 955			285 940		
	c	2 966 966	348 000	4 993 028	15 080		285 940		
Czech Republic	a	46	12	56	17	3	35	19	38
	b	4 220 517		6 101 159	23 169 355			70 912	
	c	11 732 806	4 108 493	86 590 674	13 183 367	9 132 974	61 648 633	36 543 281	5 919 733
Denmark	a	2		3	6	35	28	1	
	b	16 129		12 917				215	
	c		30 158		1 338 396	3 119 169	18 042 305		
Estonia	a	4			7	5	6		
	b	10 234			8 346 201	2 988 784	1 261 193		
	c	5 864			3 980 301	233 777	1 215 318		
Finland	a	68	5	14	13	4	7		7
	b	14 230 489	1 240 225	18 625 426	1 038 593	3 492 100	4 772 650		10 480 469
	c	1 913 722	88 480	4 016 968	14 279 120	3 037 672	33 472 976	1 468 710	2 379 520
France	a	20	15	78	51	36	31	9	31
	b	93 770 138	301 657 765	13 135 802 560	821 046 825	685 524 451	243 846 308	24 954 095	46 228 960
	c								
Germany	a	110	144	215	87	132	766	7	
	b	67 182 063	85 238 836	2 075 858 806	114 627 120	29 556 000	543 669 396	5 581	
	c								

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European Union

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Greece	a			1	16	8	45	10	
	b			842 000	9 208 471	394 000	23 500 000	1 900 000	
	c								
Hungary	a	65	7	81	19	3	15	1	3
	b	24 320 093	1 702 623	163 843 443	7 350 859	46 681	2 385 470	38 000	6 500 000
	c	1 232 046	1 641 100	21 405 053	1 990 841	44 750	644 883		510 242
Ireland	a				2	3		1	
	b				582 180	134 784		120 000	
	c				582 180	134 784		120 000	
Italy	a	32	38	112	106	29	71	8	10
	b	27 104 491	10 236 907	206 892 812	114 955 894	159 504 997	284 646 006	553 002	10 665 075
	c								
Latvia	a	225		38		1			
	b	255 617 319		421 000		165 000			
	c								
Lithuania	a	76		94		6	4		
	b	1		270 992		134 400	719 800		
	c	12 528 411		7 837 550		289 200	404 240		
Luxembourg	a		1		1	2	1		
	b		69 775		163 940	637 008	93 420		
	c		1		163 940	1	93 420		
Netherlands	a	244	11	56	12	7	45	2	2
	b	1 881 682	2 011 803	6 233 167	4 700 638	6 924 247	18 018 056	86 060	22 800
	c	1 086 144	693 696	2 664 704	27 224 403	56 148 839	16 917 144	384 311	20 000
Poland	a	16	7	12	5	10	100	1	4
	b	3 037 713	476 850	6 580 647	1 798 672	17 687 483	9 112 552	26 730	1 403 667
	c	1 219 864	2 850 940	3 921 015	535 900	6 572 212	1 709 063	68 430	54 063
Portugal	a	16	15	9	2	3	4	1	
	b	1 105 881	65 603 225	6 505 713	1 117 472	236 041	10 938 135	57 708	
	c	670 791	1 695 280	667 331			25 285 520		
Romania	a	6	5	26	1	9	3		2
	b	4 361 111	5 781 677	40 531 741	109 633	504 915	668 627		965 220
	c	5 066 311	5 781 677	28 089 280	1 919 897	382 061	781 795		363 000
Slovakia	a	44	30	59	15	7	111	8	9
	b	23 455 711	15 171 371	302 464 791	67 453 160	3 308 707	32 208 831	1 635 948	17 221 982
	c	14 137 715	1 244 921	70 119 395	16 087 660	1 834 597	26 886 397	1 633 686	157 140
Slovenia	a	13	10	7			2	1	
	b	5 616 126	1 174 866	745 244			517 914	444 601	
	c	2 318 939	510 869	4 243 735			1 818 651	444 601	
Spain	a	34	27	56	72	31	53		42
	b	1 329 717	16 725 728	72 608 790	179 171 422	27 711 697	8 309 338		6 929 811
	c	11 912 082	4 904 454	33 743 751	71 942 168	4 990 534	1 753 792		5 389 849

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European Union

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	45	45	110	33	87	29	1	57
	b	638 846	25 940 797	79 214 189	16 074 852	1 108 228 898	19 037 178		33 054 878
	c	2 087 354	12 508 786	58 333 495	39 365 066	23 397 188	54 375 970	1 257 374	20 629 231
Total per ML category	a	1 624	423	1 309	576	463	1 433	71	239
	b	909 216 205	737 929 102	17 744 528 860	2 640 805 753	2 061 815 127	1 346 339 675	29 906 852	191 586 501
	d	1							
	e	1(1), 3(1)							

European Union

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a	14	1	1		46	1	2	1
	b	1 491 852	3 392 690	519 468		5 691 135	150 000	1 339 268	8 800 000
	c	1 110 954				3 070 266		300 000	
Belgium	a		158	28		2	5	5	14
	b		65 152 833	66 174 793		222 965	17 192 619	2 496 516	4 697 009
	c								
Bulgaria	a		1	2		15		7	12
	b		32 139	11 019		25 363 501		1 387 557	61 601 155
	c		965 761	11 019		6 596 772		1 974 334	15 200 213
Croatia	a								1
	b								437 000
	c								135 656
Czech Republic	a		36	36		5	3	7	16
	b		10 026						
	c		16 075 745	9 208 814		3 445 651	10 300 427	5 887 597	45 559 958
Denmark	a	8	12	4		591			
	b								
	c	4 477 804	33 157 437	19 478 670		3 922 392			
Estonia	a		6	4			4	2	
	b		2 719 175	5 283 785			96 045	152 995	
	c			24 937					
Finland	a	2	4	3		8			
	b	1 170 890	5 414 632	1 515 850		4 120 758			
	c	3 897 200	6 018 262	2 149 167		5 640 068			4 087 398
France	a	37	123	103		63	9	43	22
	b	15 522 142 480	1 769 905 064	3 904 602 410		311 177 986	79 672 476	795 563 550	49 211 905
	c								
Germany	a	97	509	240		3	24	86	297
	b	12 705 584	105 526 832	81 257 177		14 926	31 504 271	26 872 328	125 252 141
	c								

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European Union

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a		1	13		1		27	
	b		500 000	1 507 060		6 000 000		243 638 300	
	c								
Hungary	a		1	1					10
	b		68 400	25 900					12 183 566
	c		3 159						2 126 972
Ireland	a	4	1	2					
	b	3 900	9 000	59 139					
	c	3 900	9 000	59 139					
Italy	a	16	323	131		9	6	5	35
	b	31 400 077	23 038 924	96 437 301		449 442	826 800	319 146	5 506 015
	c								
Lithuania	a			9		3		15	
	b		95 400	1 671 206		450 900		623 600	
	c		95 400	984 206		195 900		6 462 449	
Luxembourg	a		5			1			8
	b		1 150 809			150 000			820 965
	c		45 036			1			724 149
Netherlands	a	18	15	2		2	2	15	8
	b	7 235 272	1 256 205	185 741		195 961	7 505 000	715 630	1 760 980
	c	19 524 407	49 834 363	1 907 557	81 158	4 918 496	802 289	4 476 219	1 598 033
Poland	a	5	34	5		34			20
	b	636 914	101 364 112	677 547		126 628 172			43 618 500
	c	20 079	28 863 927	47 503		3 144 425			7 472 487
Portugal	a	5	1	15		7		1	
	b	2 742 781	2 250	2 508 694		19 129 000		2 194 840	
	c		58 918 120	1 401 244		127 430			
Romania	a		31	1		2	3	13	26
	b		25 304 174	37 734		270 000	21 029	3 514 593	862 976
	c	1 158	2 076 772	525 741		116 978	21 029	1 593 494	532 458
Slovakia	a		15	3		8			
	b		3 557 827	170 596		6 172 690			
	c		1 441 073	20 116		4 449 155			
Slovenia	a						4		6
	b						5 340 900		2 698 869
	c						2 067 900		12 112 218
Spain	a	6	189	100		5		19	
	b	7 940 670	2 472 924 281	574 993 218		4 348 395		3 018 340	
	c	3 173 310	1 790 600 377	49 615 331				1 189 534	54 082
Sweden	a	8	2	40		15	26	7	
	b		85	5 461 696		839 571	1 757 485	206 817	
	c	232 794	4 674 926	5 259 173		10 996 598	3 561 518	2 834 774	

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European Union

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	220	1 468	743		820	87	254	476
	b	15 587 470 420	4 581 424 858	4 743 100 334		511 225 402	144 066 625	1 082 043 480	317 451 081
	d								
	e								

European Union

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	8	27			1	6	440
	b	1 001 280	827 950			500 000	9 905 712	376 639 145
	c	52 734	673 455				185 000	39 990 744
Belgium	a		1			2	6	610
	b		52 641			100 100	46 181	406 520 437
	c							
Bulgaria	a							365
	b							3 148 663 878
	c							1 168 776 009
Croatia	a	1						109
	b	1 190						39 241 014
	c							8 744 670
Czech Republic	a	3	71					403
	b	1 570 405	7 729					35 150 103
	c	69 170	2 935 808			539 549	194 923	323 077 603
Denmark	a	17	2			45	19	773
	b							29 261
	c	46 132				15 565 160	13 773 624	112 951 247
Estonia	a	1				1	3	43
	b	550 000				1	93 117	21 501 530
	c					1		5 460 198
Finland	a	15				9	5	164
	b	95 068				3 757 800	3 100 000	73 054 950
	c	63 481				4 481 366	1 076 469	88 070 579
France	a	28	6			30	174	909
	b	15 048 663	47 740 914			151 572 247	618 742 019	38 618 210 816
	c							1 559 300 000
Germany	a	207	313			188	303	3 728
	b	17 396 126	17 685 420			9 929 727	20 571 662	3 364 853 996
	c							
Greece	a					1		123
	b					804 000		288 293 831
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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European Union

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a	2	2			2	1	213
	b	66 020	485 911			21 500 000	25 000	240 541 966
	c	7 700				2 780 737		32 387 483
Ireland	a	1						14
	b	3 000						912 003
	c	3 000						912 003
Italy	a	2	12			24	31	1 000
	b	16 016 519	10 164 267			8 275 126	8 946 370	1 015 939 171
	c							519 309 871
Latvia	a							264
	b							256 203 319
	c							
Lithuania	a			1		9	3	220
	b						199 000	4 165 299
	c			263 785			283 176	29 344 317
Luxembourg	a							19
	b							3 085 917
	c							1 026 548
Netherlands	a	8	5			7	34	495
	b	866 899	285 851			6 928 107	11 550 717	78 364 816
	c	1 178 019	9 335	76 039		46 342	4 992 863	194 584 361
Poland	a	8	3			2	35	301
	b	1 191 347	1 065 040			3 055 902	70 386 592	388 748 440
	c	790 530	66 828			29 040	1 067 634	58 433 940
Portugal	a		9			1	2	91
	b		23 524 639			100 000	60 000	135 826 379
	c		556 000			39 943		89 361 659
Romania	a					4	9	141
	b					46 000 000	12 577 834	141 511 264
	c		19 500			5 869 116	5 546 423	58 686 690
Slovakia	a	2				1	4	316
	b	18 000				520	9 438 565	482 278 699
	c	18 000				520	751 268	138 781 643
Slovenia	a		6					49
	b		1 186 090					17 724 610
	c		19 155					23 536 068
Spain	a	8				9	195	846
	b	136 000				52 000	39 258 735	3 415 458 142
	c					920 924	647 428	1 980 837 616
Sweden	a	46	12			37	88	688
	b	17 337 017				1 698 308	2 947 552	1 312 438 169
	c	8 241 632	1 184 853			14 588 300	180 195 922	443 724 954

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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European Union

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Total per ML category	a	357	469	1		373	918	12 324
	b	71 297 534	103 026 452			254 273 838	807 849 056	53 865 357 155
	d							1
	e							1(1), 3(1)

Other European countries

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	241	5	110	3	4	30		2
	b	34 421 299	158 650	5 145 102	1 554 143	19 311 022	85 182 015		36 938
	c	13 169 496	114 540	2 879 803	1 262 328	7 548 663	1 665 224		36 938
Belgium	a	137	4	18	4	1	9	1	29
	b	44 401 982	12 768 000	6 487 094	8 706 000	4 000 000	37 064 434		9 538 006
	c								
Bulgaria	a	6	12	35	9	6	14		3
	b	4 672 134	12 482 669	206 650 270	4 147 393	230 468	568 205		2 100 750
	c	5 088 354	11 068 228	21 274 448	3 899 594	1 551 809	514 150		1 532 988
Croatia	a	56	6	10	1				1
	b	2 471 687	398 174	7 206 230	2 499 070				20 240
	c	1 037 334	191 505	939 316	2 499 070				
Cyprus	a	8							
	b	84 660							
	c								
Czech Republic	a	71	26	87	36	2	91	17	21
	b	11 320 296	19 296 055	277 420 165	110 138 455	192 868	167 356 070	4 262 100	8 949 487
	c	14 564 235	32 777 284	261 167 686	200 569 487	786 294	84 557 347	3 268 613	1 831 866
Denmark	a	26	2	4	4	36	42		
	b	868 402	11 895	26 839 486	151 539	941 233	9 403 518		
	c	88 710		10 723	588 036	688 444	721 508		
Estonia	a	5		1		3	6		
	b	750 101		23 855		3 967 796	8 738 230		
	c	504 896				3 759 180	1 336 763		
Finland	a	15	1	3	4	3		8	2
	b	4 011 995	150	225 204	363 949	330 223		1 322 619	313 660
	c	207 287		225 204	1 035 594	14 581 247	433 299	156 413	551 701
France	a	19	15	27	47	22	24	6	8
	b	2 903 286	84 469 567	1 009 895 598	2 179 388 332	169 246 709	204 174 874	10 101 340	14 076 851
	c								
Germany	a	364	94	154	46	100	377	5	7
	b	17 573 266	196 331 554	218 269 846	869 256 136	292 229 010	916 343 607	611 450	188 154
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Greece	a				1			7	
	b				2 280			400	
	c								
Hungary	a	24		43	3		5		1
	b	1 655 944		45 202 874	2 805 706		54 669		30 000
	c	714 116		6 636 971	6 562				23 777
Ireland	a	7	2	1	25	4	3		
	b	24 208	1 821	9 662	1 114 451	2 149 077	122 853		
	c	24 208	1 821	9 662	1 114 451	2 149 077	122 853		
Italy	a	4	10	11	14	20	5		1
	b	16 300	974 281	27 745 521	29 147 374	5 982 003	3 834 196		
	c								
Latvia	a	48		15	8	1	3		
	b	81 277 000		1 679 000	9 902 000	3 000	408 000		
	c								
Lithuania	a	5		24	5	5	1		
	b			3 516 081	579 723	3 298 975	9 839 400		
	c	3 760 951		6 298 496	579 723	3 296 575	9 839 400		
Malta	a	1							
	b	11 430							
	c	11 430							
Netherlands	a	89	19	33	38	14	51	2	
	b	19 864 812	52 523 047	35 339 898	50 906 247	22 848 037	71 574 357	1 476 716	
	c	19 762 311	52 495 156	34 721 371	46 447 125	30 215 629	65 412 208	800 610	1 200
Poland	a	52	60	117	59	22	64	2	8
	b	88 477 417	168 366 774	1 760 148 778	146 912 232	21 076 490	737 685 113	3 438 000	10 685 683
	c	952 011	45 359 815	158 529 125	270 820 579	2 762 481	238 410 887	316 074	1 970 982
Portugal	a	9		2			2		
	b	317 315		12 368 700			1 039 826		
	c	191 700					1 039 826		
Romania	a			5	9	3			1
	b			26 495 454	66 876 182	32 045			147 198
	c			9 731 813	19 413 212	36 318	365 816		277 018
Slovakia	a	4	7	3	2	1			2
	b	69 461	2 335 045	1 435 060	7 630 585	44 000			59 340
	c	43 155	1 909 390	194 060		44 000			32 800
Slovenia	a	10		7	1			1	
	b	546 720		2 688 328	877 800				
	c	188 114		939 994	585 200				
Spain	a	19	4	22	32	3	42	1	12
	b	8 432 209	3 013	255 662 310	81 185 917	9 010 000	597 483 741		1 180 419
	c	7 549 022	3 013	10 123 138	49 960 577	2 719 217	48 486 228		313 231

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Sweden	a	5	18	61	15	26	5	2	18
	b		56 400 667	2 716 920	9 293 868	59 637 290		66 800	1 722 685
	c	434 706	4 151 264	24 610 057	7 797 993	21 685 316	52 218 783	65 263	2 176 226
Total per ML category	a	1 225	285	793	366	276	774	52	116
	b	324 171 924	606 521 362	3 933 171 436	3 583 439 382	614 530 246	2 850 873 108	21 279 425	49 049 411
	d	8		5	1		2		
	e	1(1), 3(5), 4(1), 7(3)		1(2), 3(1), 4(2), 7(2)	4(1)		1(2), 4(1)		

Other European countries

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a					16		1	3
	b					722 273		541 350	219 547
	c					718 184		541 350	193 027
Belgium	a		50	2		4	2	4	17
	b		139 305 939	27 000 331		4 888 548	4 004 680	9 004 192	4 318 780
	c								
Bulgaria	a			1		1	4	3	
	b			176 860		180	188 017	68 690	
	c			176 860		180	65 617	67 000	
Croatia	a					6			1
	b					15 434 299			21 335
	c					15 434 299			21 335
Czech Republic	a		46	9		22	1	30	19
	b		52 864 500	23 329 401		1 259 828	76 328	27 236 920	56 331 936
	c		7 287 912	46 643 566		12 813 510	74 542	11 527 237	5 045 386
Denmark	a		1	4		77			
	b			825 348		4 826 207			
	c	155 200	8 241 786	3 003		19 186			
Estonia	a		11	11		3		2	
	b		3 101 279	5 364 391		284 139		354 191	
	c		2 457 487	429 901		22 000		164 800	
Finland	a		13	4		12		1	
	b		6 810 516	669 700		3 149 637		200 000	
	c		3 843 829	457 716		1 256 506		32 474	
France	a	7	56	44		24	5	46	6
	b	155 032 791	905 528 628	1 115 639 091		120 681 409	55 395 501	223 564 242	9 220 002
	c								
Germany	a	45	162	91		69	22	53	158
	b	9 327 416	54 179 794	71 464 825		36 988 588	4 617 309	17 405 120	90 675 630
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a	1		8		11		7	
	b	11 550		180 000		40 890 772		6 047 673	
	c								
Hungary	a		1	1					
	b		3 200 000	1 610 000					
	c		71 040						
Ireland	a	3	2			1		6	
	b	249 060	88 029			198 440		30 504 127	
	c	249 060	88 029			198 440		30 504 127	
Italy	a	3	190	76			1	1	27
	b	24 427 520	632 911 442	16 387 524				2 865 403	12 716 547
	c								
Latvia	a		1	1		6			
	b		2 400 000	1 000		585 000			
	c								
Lithuania	a			17		5		13	
	b			8 003 461		2 378 383		2 789 762	
	c			8 003 461		2 378 383		3 601 860	
Luxembourg	a								9
	b								589 586
	c								371 357
Netherlands	a	23	15	11		18	2	44	1
	b	105 326 797	6 484 629	6 531 736		23 007 622	183 750	13 804 842	76 000
	c	3 909 422	24 531 014	5 875 138		15 354 619		14 945 671	858 045
Poland	a	2	40	15		20		7	11
	b	274 378	66 836 984	8 262 549		360 452 907		11 526 884	25 072 834
	c	33 610	11 304 034	713 085		95 030 322		1 379 983	1 336 983
Portugal	a	6	33	10		2		1	
	b	3 184 628	19 462 026	341 774		2 928 328		193 990	
	c		57 157 055	505 965		2 928 328		193 990	
Romania	a	1	30						12
	b	40 760 927	1 955 519						358 784
	c	36 872 667	1 636 039					132 321	84 237
Slovakia	a			1				1	
	b			103 500				3 000	
	c								
Slovenia	a					1	1		9
	b						593 000		613 007
	c						581 000		638 506
Spain	a	13	125	25		3	1	15	18
	b	1 389 007	2 467 075 566	102 218 169		3 219 079	545 547	2 172 514	11 748 763
	c	1 042 807	377 103 664	68 297 569		3 825 569		3 454 728	5 506 972

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Sweden	a	4	3	4		6	11	4	
	b	1 56 607	5 879	69 604		356 989	252 154	1 337 134	
	c		1 298 213	30 232		1 622 120	607 582	34 267	4 204
Total per ML category	a	108	779	335		307	50	239	291
	b	340 140 681	4 362 210 730	1 388 179 264		622 252 628	65 856 286	349 620 034	211 962 751
	d	2	2			1			
	e	3(1), 4(1)	1(1), 7(1)			4(1), 7(1)			

Other European countries

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a	4	17			1	8	445
	b	674 199	2 941 312			5 000	4 980 998	155 893 848
	c	141 689	1 242 676				5 927	29 519 845
Belgium	a	2	6			1	7	298
	b	7 436 446	13 623 534			4 000 000	412 000 001	748 547 967
	c							
Bulgaria	a							94
	b							231 285 636
	c							45 239 228
Croatia	a							81
	b							28 051 035
	c							20 122 859
Cyprus	a							8
	b							84 660
	c							
Czech Republic	a	6	39			1	2	526
	b	2 109 357	975 174				10 177 081	773 296 021
	c	891 531	1 813 731			902 290	2 725 936	689 248 453
Denmark	a					20	16	232
	b					20 448 894	20 448 881	84 765 403
	c					5 086	5 073	10 526 755
Estonia	a	3					1	46
	b	10 527 533					136 802	33 248 317
	c	10 508 334					136 802	19 320 163
Finland	a	1				3	2	72
	b	118				267 000		17 664 771
	c	21 499				330 250	521 548	23 654 567
France	a	9	6			11	65	447
	b	260 427 489	10 145 465			278 137 686	289 907 130	7 097 935 991
	c							987 600 000

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Germany	a	94	86			80	160	2 167
	b	16 203 634	7 692 535			22 170 729	40 258 913	2 881 787 516
	c							
Greece	a					1		36
	b					23 730		47 156 405
	c							
Hungary	a					2		80
	b					8 500 000		63 059 193
	c					29 110		7 481 576
Ireland	a					2	4	60
	b					100 000	641 925	35 203 653
	c					100 000	641 925	35 203 653
Italy	a		3			9	26	401
	b		3 995 000			109 026	3 309 800	764 421 937
	c							233 606 976
Latvia	a							83
	b							96 255 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					3	4	82
	b						2 472	30 408 257
	c						2 472	37 761 321
Luxembourg	a							9
	b							589 586
	c							371 357
Malta	a							1
	b							11 430
	c							11 430
Netherlands	a	2		1		5	17	385
	b	4 760 851		25 000		1 113 198	4 643 837	420 491 376
	c	9 443 415		64 232		7 553	3 166 505	328 011 224
Poland	a		1				31	511
	b		3 870				4 608 729	3 413 829 622
	c		3 870				20 125	828 943 966
Portugal	a	1	2			1		69
	b	35 814	144 000			384 768		40 401 169
	c	35 814				384 768		62 437 446
Romania	a		2				2	65
	b		154 963				322 688	137 103 760
	c		117 025				7 500	68 673 966
Slovakia	a						1	22
	b						13 180	11 693 171
	c						13 180	2 236 585

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Other European countries

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a							30
	b							5 318 855
	c							2 932 814
Spain	a	4				4	16	359
	b					1 559 504	6 030 479	3 548 916 237
	c	9 100				2 195 537	2 089 209	582 679 581
Sweden	a	41	8			15	40	286
	b	36 427 358	62 774			764 695	3 163 465	172 434 889
	c	6 492 850	12 924			1 693 237	10 134 773	135 070 010
Total per ML category	a	167	170	1		159	402	6 895
	b	338 602 799	39 738 627	25 000		337 584 230	800 646 381	20 839 855 705
	d					1		22
	e					7(1)		1(6), 3(7), 4(7), 7(8)

Middle East

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	59		4			5		
	b	1 958 204		330 869			552 782 689		
	c	1 591 236		210 101			88 960		
Belgium	a	11		6		1	1		1
	b	637 715		7 895 080		189 000	150 000		1 680 000
	c								
Bulgaria	a	10	5	14	7		1		1
	b	20 466 183	4 947 782	335 951 998	34 877 445		40 960 000		1 262 500
	c	2 331 732	14 176 926	42 660 433	47 154 044		27 464 390		365 200
Croatia	a	11	1	1					
	b	6 603 207	1 459 779	3 598 657					
	c	911 225							
Cyprus	a	30		4					
	b	2 526 479		874 340					
	c								
Czech Republic	a	29	1	16	2	1	44	5	1
	b	1 526 278		2 094 665	1 847 188		27 157 206	1 938 951	
	c	3 725 661	550 686	1 559 187		9 158 068	22 591 353	731 348	755 928
Denmark	a				1		1		
	b				134 409		632		
	c								
Estonia	a	1			1		1		
	b	52 500			2 000		168 717		
	c	17 292					168 475		

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Finland	a	2							
	b	269 115							
	c	12 066			375 840	44 000	238		
France	a	3	18	12	49	39	21	9	4
	b	227 542	126 741 313	478 902 710	8 001 401 442	2 539 192 752	438 979 002	264 878 400	12 191 080
	c								
Germany	a	26	4	12	13	7	33	5	2
	b	908 178	14 448 887	10 238 746	18 992 578	28 696 604	42 437 026	102 553	2 252
	c								
Greece	a				2		12		
	b				310 382		2 802 438		
	c								
Hungary	a	21		4	1				
	b	1 182 200		317 385	115				
	c	43 253							
Italy	a	15	11	2	11	8	1		
	b	57 016 340	1 964 146		276 772 242	149 623 626	1 560 000		
	c								
Latvia	a	4							
	b	545 000							
	c								
Lithuania	a					1			
	b					13 500			
	c								
Netherlands	a				2	8	1		
	b				11 857 813	4 424 170	472 020		
	c		723 105		18 653 201	1 968 355			
Poland	a		1		5				1
	b		1 490 362		338 743				370 000
	c	703 950	1 469 848	214 000	126 504				
Portugal	a				12				
	b				3 241 104				
	c				550 710				
Romania	a			3	2	9	6	2	
	b			1 785 443	476 178	803 128	20 970 564	3 848 250	
	c	3 280 286	1 120 770	1 917 352	8 126 264	274 144	9 336 460	3 358 250	
Slovakia	a	3	1	5	2		2	1	
	b	58 919	217 455	2 194 900	59 240		932 200	354 665	
	c	25 566		2 160 500	59 240		916 750	354 665	
Slovenia	a			1				2	
	b							64 014	
	c			5 016				17 809	

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Spain	a	1	8	13	3	17	29		1
	b		1 908 887	26 554 075	219 800	61 300 147	58 469 028		330 060
	c		1 747 600	60 989 750	325 685	14 351 949	32 438 762		
Sweden	a				2	12			
	b				28 218	1 274 490			
	c				36 100	671 652		2 426 893	
Total per ML category	a	226	50	97	115	103	158	24	11
	b	93 977 860	153 178 611	870 738 868	8 350 558 897	2 785 517 417	1 187 841 522	271 186 833	15 835 892
	d	1	1			1	1	2	
	e	7(1)	4(1), 7(1)			1(1), 2(1), 7(1)	6(1)	1(2)	

Middle East

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a			2	2	3		1	
	b			789 000	13 398 947	522 946		146 992	
	c			1 500	586 194	518 148		146 992	
Belgium	a		5	2		1	3	2	
	b		1 449 726	11 337 022		39 000	38 502 159	341 560	
	c								
Bulgaria	a			6		5		1	
	b			5 025 802		1 828 132		724 525	
	c			2 051 106		5 437 192		13 182 172	
Croatia	a					2			
	b					3 528 750			
	c					3 528 750			
Czech Republic	a		9	11		5	3	16	2
	b		113 666	3 403 325		727	2 437 499	2 724 111	9 769 998
	c		12 087 351	5 867 567		919	875 548	2 232 683	2 398 371
Estonia	a	1					1		
	b	45 890 530					1 160		
	c								
Finland	a			4					1
	b			853 977					170 458
	c			936 752					
France	a	5	37	43		17	13	44	4
	b	31 321 240	481 411 074	1 428 436 294		223 119 557	126 175 073	292 789 769	14 931 000
	c								
Germany	a	18	85	15		2	8	4	22
	b	670 522	55 851 193	5 501 683		830 977	18 014 188	4 314 883	1 352 053
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Greece	a					1		8	
	b					10 000		19 402 100	
	c								
Italy	a		60	12			2	1	1
	b		153 913 610	42 383 874			2 900 000		97 732
	c								
Latvia	a			2				1	
	b			3 369 000				260 000	
	c								
Lithuania	a							2	
	b							261 242	
	c							149 898	
Luxembourg	a					1			6
	b					5 994			106 013
	c					5 994			19 981
Malta	a		2						
	b		4 492 794						
	c		1 597 429						
Netherlands	a	1	2	1				1	
	b	10 128	5 028 277	540 622				472 020	
	c	28 032	5 414 591	236 891				944 040	
Poland	a		1			2			
	b		344 508			358 600			
	c					1 400			
Portugal	a		4						
	b		1 567 124						
	c		21 740 773						
Romania	a		9	2				1	
	b		43 412 492	38 108 110				19 743	
	c		16 757 422	10 855 537				2 812 839	
Slovakia	a		3	2				5	
	b		67 554	150 500				9 923 147	
	c		64 781	144 500				841 968	
Slovenia	a						1		7
	b						299 000		407 425
	c								217 358
Spain	a	1	26	6	1		1	12	1
	b	793 880 679	510 389 278	10 000			12 888 003	1 219 735	
	c	793 880 179	29 293 412	8 808 606			490 414	2 574 250	
Sweden	a		1	3		1		1	
	b			32 920 417		136 385			
	c		61 921 050	99 288		31 508			

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Total per ML category	a	26	244	111	3	40	32	100	44
	b	871 773 099	1 258 041 296	1 572 829 626	13 398 947	230 381 068	201 217 082	332 599 827	26 834 679
	d		2	1			1		
	e		1(1), 2(1), 4(1), 7(1)	2(1)			2(1), 4(1), 6(1)		

Middle East

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		13				4	93
	b		183 156				199 298	570 312 101
	c		147 540					3 290 671
Belgium	a							33
	b							62 221 262
	c							
Bulgaria	a							50
	b							446 044 367
	c							154 823 195
Croatia	a							15
	b							15 190 393
	c							4 439 975
Cyprus	a							34
	b							3 400 819
	c							
Czech Republic	a	2	13				2	162
	b		90 453				2 116 833	55 220 900
	c	579 573	597 939			35 823	449 322	64 197 327
Denmark	a					1	2	5
	b					134 409	134 409	403 859
	c							
Estonia	a					1	1	7
	b					1	2	46 114 910
	c					1	2	185 770
Finland	a					1	1	9
	b						500 000	1 793 550
	c						668 790	2 037 686
France	a	7	6	1		15	66	413
	b	75 685 502	9 625 642	4 000 000		1 700 238 001	885 491 852	17 135 739 245
	c							2 512 400 000
Germany	a	6	3	1		16	24	306
	b	1 391 931	528 700	50 000		2 777 074	24 776 121	231 886 149
	c							

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Greece	a							23
	b							22 524 920
	c							
Hungary	a							26
	b							1 499 700
	c							43 253
Italy	a		3			1	5	133
	b		3 756 197				2 059 533	692 047 300
	c							3 682 075 217
Latvia	a							7
	b							4 174 000
	c							
Lithuania	a							3
	b							274 742
	c							149 898
Luxembourg	a							7
	b							112 007
	c							25 975
Malta	a							2
	b							4 492 794
	c							1 597 429
Netherlands	a					6	9	31
	b					4 247 395	11 030 208	38 082 653
	c	51 178					70 018	28 089 411
Poland	a		5				1	16
	b		26 060 196				114 204	29 076 613
	c		3 071 505					5 587 207
Portugal	a							16
	b							4 808 228
	c							22 291 483
Romania	a	1				4		39
	b	5 698				2 199 387		111 628 993
	c	2 094 808	1 802 250			1 555 355		63 291 737
Slovakia	a							24
	b							13 958 580
	c							4 567 970
Slovenia	a							11
	b							770 439
	c							240 183
Spain	a						8	128
	b							1 467 169 692
	c						2 522 654	947 423 261

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Middle East

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Sweden	a		1			4	4	29
	b							34 359 510
	c	520 249				112 306	5 915 307	71 734 353
Total per ML category	a	16	44	2		49	127	1 622
	b	77 083 131	40 244 344	4 050 000		1 709 596 267	926 422 460	20 993 307 726
	d					1		11
	e					2(1)		1(4), 2(5), 4(3), 6(2), 7(4)

Oceania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Austria	a	25	5	2	2		2		
	b	22 191 264	45 971	4 088	1 979 235		176 215 789		
	c	6 124 945	32 235	61 958	838 900		116 188		
Belgium	a	5	6						
	b	74 522	1 451 244						
	c								
Czech Republic	a	1	1						
	b								
	c	21 686	199						
Denmark	a	7			6	1	2		
	b	1 451 550			344 041	5 700	7 565		
	c								
Finland	a	2				2			
	b	2 070 000				408 872			
	c	129 728		207 009		181 178			
France	a	2			3	4	2		
	b	99 014			24 347 451	11 738 000	1 794 602		
	c								
Germany	a	107	4	16	3	10	35		1
	b	3 445 402	22 222 673	11 445 454	936 946	9 104 411	97 801 488		104
	c								
Ireland	a	3				5			
	b	7 500				2 229 921			
	c	7 500				2 229 921			
Italy	a			1	2				
	b			600	148 808				
	c								
Latvia	a	19							
	b	27 073 000							
	c								

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Oceania

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8
Lithuania	a	2							
	b								
	c	1 671 790							
Netherlands	a						3		
	b						2 944 708		
	c					36 120	38 563		
Poland	a	1							
	b	7 010							
	c	3 907							
Slovakia	a	1							
	b	1 850							
	c								
Slovenia	a	1					1		
	b	5 323					84 060		
	c	7 453					1		
Spain	a	2							
	b	395 000							
	c	16 087							
Sweden	a		5	12	2	6			1
	b			6 443 261	16 003 273	183 414			1 693 050
	c		3 067 550	16 746 473		1 120 678			787 009
Total per ML category	a	178	21	31	18	28	45		2
	b	56 821 435	23 719 888	17 893 403	43 759 754	23 670 318	278 848 212		1 693 154
	d								
	e								

Oceania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
Austria	a		1						
	b		63 632						
	c		2 333						
Czech Republic	a		3	4	1				
	b		13 221	2 263 862					
	c		13 262	169 539	3 418				
Denmark	a	1	1						
	b	38 882	20 810						
	c								
Finland	a		1	1					
	b		937 720	44 000					
	c		85 202	22 000					

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Oceania

		ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12	ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16
France	a	11	7	5		2	1	4	
	b	248 571 520	56 463 483	2 720 000		1 090 000	60 000	109 420 000	
	c								
Germany	a	42	11	24			3		4
	b	3 810 808	246 026	4 051 457			1 789 349		39 457 837
	c								
Italy	a	6	11	3		1	2	1	
	b	3 014 428	26 395 829	1 189 991		36 750	47 651 079	1 168 507	
	c								
Lithuania	a							3	
	b							49 000	
	c							372 807	
Luxembourg	a					2			
	b					6 664			
	c					6 664			
Netherlands	a	4						1	
	b	2 513 566						2 154 600	
	c	409 535	7 738 378						
Poland	a	1							
	b	62 292							
	c	23 899							
Portugal	a			12					
	b			407 630					
	c			366 450					
Spain	a		3	4					
	b		66 100 000						
	c		12 416 483						
Sweden	a			4			5		
	b			347 075			7 496 106		
	c		122 443	153 987		22 677	560 556	221 225	
Total per ML category	a	65	38	57	1	5	11	9	4
	b	258 011 496	150 240 721	11 024 015		1 133 414	56 996 534	112 792 107	39 457 837
	d								
	e								

Oceania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a		7				2	46
	b		528 676				110 000	201 138 655
	c		16 610					7 193 169

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Oceania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Belgium	a							11
	b							1 525 766
	c							
Czech Republic	a	1	1					12
	b	96 650						2 373 733
	c	95 804	198 527					502 435
Denmark	a	1				8	4	31
	b	320				5 024 430	5 003 500	11 896 798
	c							
Finland	a					1	1	8
	b					145 000		3 605 592
	c					145 000		770 117
France	a	1	1			3	8	54
	b	63	3 500 000			13 922 761	123 577 192	597 304 086
	c							44 700 000
Germany	a	5	11	1		20	16	313
	b	31 965	2 092 632	220 000		1 375 953	395 302	198 427 807
	c							
Ireland	a					1	1	10
	b					100 000	100 000	2 437 421
	c					100 000	100 000	2 437 421
Italy	a					1	3	31
	b						462 392	80 068 384
	c							14 672 647
Latvia	a							19
	b							27 073 000
	c							
Lithuania	a					2		7
	b							49 000
	c							2 044 597
Luxembourg	a							2
	b							6 664
	c							6 664
Netherlands	a	1					6	15
	b	75 000					524 330	8 212 204
	c						733 792	8 956 388
Poland	a							2
	b							69 302
	c						748	28 554
Portugal	a							12
	b							407 630
	c							366 450

EU ARMS EXPORTS PER REGION IN 2022

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Oceania

		ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Romania	a					2		2
	b					14 000 000		14 000 000
	c					235 070		235 070
Slovakia	a							1
	b							1 850
	c							
Slovenia	a							2
	b							89 383
	c							7 454
Spain	a							9
	b							66 495 000
	c						10	12 432 580
Sweden	a	4				4	9	52
	b	105 816						32 271 995
	c	226 223				3 195	3 733 249	26 765 265
Total per ML category	a	13	20	1		42	50	639
	b	309 814	6 121 308	220 000		34 568 144	130 172 716	1 247 454 270
	d							
	e							

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6
Austria	a	802	25	249	35	10	98
	b	1 103 478 725	7 028 697	174 078 064	12 293 199	23 279 603	896 532 018
	c	265 868 209	684 890	29 746 626	6 347 257	7 594 661	18 585 373
	d						
	e						
Belgium	a	809	24	105	13	26	31
	b	250 883 370	34 629 784	121 914 537	13 840 931	11 672 198	53 445 301
	c						
	d						1
	e						6(1)
Bulgaria	a	116	77	262	134	44	51
	b	169 890 567	210 673 851	2 173 998 008	1 384 956 978	12 784 316	162 780 934
	c	44 299 635	144 973 799	586 558 390	688 861 686	4 659 489	86 896 548
	d						
	e						
Croatia	a	266	32	37	1		3
	b	616 262 444	3 778 235	46 449 127	2 499 070		285 940
	c	75 804 160	1 406 402	6 666 133	2 514 150		285 940
	d						
	e						
Cyprus	a	144		4			
	b	3 553 427		874 340			
	c						
	d						
	e						
Czech Republic	a	244	48	219	67	8	234
	b	26 521 985	20 884 632	332 702 495	175 238 334	192 868	216 828 369
	c	42 129 225	45 284 455	380 607 624	279 360 793	21 315 096	233 622 791
	d	10	2	4	1		1
	e	1(3), 2(1), 3(1), 4(1), 7(9)	1(1), 3(1), 4(1), 7(2)	1(3), 3(1), 7(4)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)		1(1), 4(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6
Denmark	a	53	6	8	29	87	79
	b	2 592 447	1 901 953	26 852 966	6 861 219	5 471 555	12 980 209
	c	88 710	30 158	10 723	1 926 432	6 666 233	18 763 813
	d						
	e						
Estonia	a	12		1	8	8	18
	b	1 662 560		23 855	8 348 201	6 956 580	10 790 815
	c	528 052			3 980 301	3 992 957	3 185 491
	d						
	e						
Finland	a	99	7	19	19	16	10
	b	34 066 869	1 520 375	24 183 278	1 566 408	4 926 915	5 140 631
	c	7 405 904	88 480	7 750 157	15 690 554	17 924 097	34 218 570
	d						
	e						
France	a	84	83	190	285	240	135
	b	110 906 851	2 590 803 176	20 481 176 295	24 671 661 026	13 405 627 834	1 271 236 089
	c						
	d		1	1	1	2	
	e		2(1)	4(1)	4(1)	2(2)	
Germany	a	1 488	288	517	193	356	1 512
	b	272 543 718	323 535 875	2 442 480 821	1 036 164 401	476 613 215	1 734 077 036
	c						
	d	16		1		4	4
	e	2(2), 3(7), 7(10)		3(1)		1(2), 2(1), 4(3)	1(1), 2(3), 3(3), 7(2)
Greece	a			1	30	9	65
	b			842 000	30 691 981	398 100	26 440 438
	c						
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6
Hungary	a	168	7	147	23	6	21
	b	46 834 361	1 702 623	676 735 315	10 156 680	5 046 681	2 441 333
	c	3 186 931	1 641 100	54 465 702	1 997 403	44 750	644 883
	d	3		6			
	e	1(1), 3(1), 4(2)		1(2), 2(1), 4(4), 7(2)			
Ireland	a	13	2	1	27	32	5
	b	33 158	1 821	9 662	1 696 631	50 806 563	1 592 012
	c	33 158	1 821	9 662	1 696 631	50 806 563	1 592 012
	d					2	
	e					1(1), 2(1), 7(2)	
Italy	a	182	91	152	162	81	103
	b	150 077 431	203 667 673	257 850 704	558 760 757	328 360 829	546 489 192
	c						
	d						
	e						
Latvia	a	334		57	8	2	3
	b	505 851 319		2 603 000	9 902 000	168 000	408 000
	c						
	d						
	e						
Lithuania	a	92		119	5	15	5
	b	15 955 717		3 895 573	579 723	3 504 710	10 559 200
	c	36 804 076		14 157 196	579 723	3 588 275	10 243 640
	d						
	e						
Luxembourg	a		1	1	1	3	1
	b		69 775	4 537	163 940	641 545	93 420
	c		1	4 537	163 940	4 538	93 420
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6
Malta	a	13		3			
	b	72 201		11 259			
	c	70 184		449			
	d			1			
	e			4(1)			
Netherlands	a	367	52	116	71	64	138
	b	25 395 910	81 044 361	54 918 854	129 147 426	56 833 917	101 651 123
	c	21 589 908	55 939 624	37 506 238	113 296 771	102 714 274	84 836 124
	d						
	e						
Poland	a	86	71	134	73	42	199
	b	122 369 500	177 066 050	2 206 335 822	160 183 014	39 784 232	762 476 769
	c	6 432 068	52 920 056	166 013 564	275 315 205	9 683 529	245 090 120
	d	1					
	e	7(1)					
Portugal	a	32	15	11	16	4	6
	b	5 971 774	65 603 225	18 874 413	5 479 876	397 090	11 977 961
	c	881 311	1 695 280	670 883	551 010	16 400	28 567 547
	d						
	e						
Romania	a	12	5	45	13	23	9
	b	5 462 784	5 781 677	87 688 479	76 958 669	1 485 442	21 639 191
	c	11 654 749	7 007 306	44 758 722	29 461 089	692 523	10 533 315
	d	1		1			
	e	7(1)		7(1)			
Slovakia	a	115	39	76	21	10	114
	b	53 669 564	17 853 871	334 207 554	89 846 720	3 409 007	33 155 211
	c	23 668 224	3 154 311	76 034 634	16 146 900	1 910 097	27 803 147
	d	1					
	e	3(1), 7(1)					

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6
Slovenia	a	51	10	29	2	1	3
	b	105 617 492	1 174 866	43 286 354	943 710	27 235	601 974
	c	8 771 487	510 869	7 976 527	651 110		1 818 652
	d	1					
	e	2(1), 3(1), 7(1)					
Spain	a	296	50	133	133	86	159
	b	11 196 734	30 764 918	395 464 278	295 557 569	173 205 075	678 002 448
	c	21 666 543	41 792 792	148 847 737	128 440 120	23 728 504	98 034 562
	d						
	e						
Sweden	a	50	104	219	66	215	38
	b	638 846	127 080 818	234 992 419	75 999 619	1 338 154 044	19 700 595
	c	2 745 252	113 795 231	323 515 093	51 178 171	90 688 247	107 203 616
	d						
	e						
Total per ML category	a	5 928	1 037	2 855	1 435	1 388	3 040
	b	3 641 509 754	3 906 568 256	30 142 454 009	28 759 498 082	15 949 747 554	6 581 326 209
	d	33	3	14	2	8	6
	e	1(4), 2(4), 3(11), 4(3), 7(23)	1(1), 2(1), 3(1), 4(1), 7(2)	1(5), 2(1), 3(2), 4(6), 7(7)	1(1), 3(1), 4(1), 7(1)	1(3), 2(4), 4(3), 7(2)	1(2), 2(3), 3(3), 4(1), 6(1), 7(2)

WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Austria	a	1	3	14	13	4	3
	b	25 096	786 938	1 491 852	5 840 549	1 317 963	18 398 947
	c	13 689	586 938	1 110 954	1 645 562	10 995	586 194
	d						
	e						
Belgium	a	1	57	3	249	38	
	b		96 615 803	2 224 138	338 186 909	105 218 886	
	c						
	d				1		
	e				2(1), 3(1), 7(1), 8(1)		

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Bulgaria	a	1	24		8	14	
	b	194 000	10 767 979		9 617 011	7 684 462	
	c		6 029 960		4 940 270	4 981 415	
	d						
	e						
Croatia	a		1				
	b		20 240				
	c						
	d						
	e						
Cyprus	a						
	b						
	c						
	d						
	e						
Czech Republic	a	60	66	1	153	82	1
	b	17 323 297	9 363 544		67 305 228	36 959 086	
	c	42 113 576	8 585 818		120 708 382	69 686 972	3 418
	d				5	1	
	e				1(5), 4(2), 5(2), 7(4)	1(1), 3(1), 7(1)	
Denmark	a	1		13	51	18	
	b	215		177 527	9 175 449	1 115 671	
	c			4 633 004	100 371 086	19 481 673	
	d			1	1		
	e			4(1)	2(1), 4(1)		
Estonia	a			1	23	15	
	b			45 890 530	8 994 806	10 648 176	
	c				3 053 051	454 838	
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Finland	a	9	9	4	19	12	
	b	1 344 119	10 794 129	1 395 284	14 783 942	3 083 527	
	c	1 625 123	2 931 221	4 126 413	10 199 070	4 098 850	
	d						
	e						
France	a	34	58	178	423	391	
	b	304 490 931	121 095 233	30 397 665 556	12 711 440 102	11 652 604 132	
	c						
	d	4		1	1		
	e	1(2), 2(2)		4(1)	4(1)		
Germany	a	28	90	402	993	558	
	b	6 425 361	16 309 675	404 564 768	294 412 000	659 171 472	
	c						
	d			3	4	5	
	e			1(3), 4(3)	1(1), 2(2), 7(1)	2(5), 3(1)	
Greece	a	17		2	31	31	
	b	1 900 400		4 131 550	5 281 750	23 467 850	
	c						
	d						
	e						
Hungary	a	1	4		5	3	
	b	38 000	6 530 000		5 606 558	2 302 700	
	c		534 019		166 931	666 968	
	d				1		
	e				4(1)		
Ireland	a	1		8	13	3	
	b	120 000		411 393	37 390 795	384 295	
	c	120 000		410 393	37 390 795	384 295	
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Italy	a	11	11	49	749	267	
	b	666 360	10 665 075	80 440 205	978 481 018	350 297 896	
	c						
	d						
	e						
Latvia	a				1	7	
	b				2 400 000	3 926 000	
	c						
	d						
	e						
Lithuania	a				8	29	
	b				9 437 345	9 939 508	
	c				1 857 254	9 051 831	
	d						
	e						
Luxembourg	a				5		
	b				1 150 809		
	c				45 036		
	d						
	e						
Malta	a				3		
	b				4 530 794		
	c				1 597 429		
	d			1			
	e			3(1)			
Netherlands	a	7	2	83	72	27	
	b	2 789 484	22 800	205 120 165	258 231 912	11 128 764	
	c	1 513 771	21 200	43 311 969	382 531 922	9 800 653	456 318
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Poland	a	3	17	9	214	22	
	b	3 464 730	20 953 593	1 071 294	1 407 152 944	9 236 532	
	c	384 504	2 025 045	77 588	293 473 171	1 171 150	
	d						
	e						
Portugal	a	1		12	55	42	
	b	57 708		6 021 909	23 707 702	3 856 336	
	c	2 600			403 091 639	2 362 867	
	d						
	e						
Romania	a	2	3	1	83	6	
	b	3 848 250	1 112 418	40 760 927	103 114 645	39 537 780	
	c	3 358 250	722 923	36 873 825	31 208 492	11 980 872	
	d						
	e						
Slovakia	a	9	11		19	7	
	b	1 990 613	17 281 322		3 895 381	450 947	
	c	1 988 351	189 940		1 775 854	190 926	
	d						
	e						
Slovenia	a	4					
	b	508 615					
	c	462 410					
	d						
	e						
Spain	a	2	58	25	519	185	1
	b	131 000	12 621 654	811 411 605	7 096 131 405	826 429 501	
	c	131 000	6 860 701	800 483 000	2 573 288 474	175 541 785	
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11	ML12
Sweden	a	3	109	12	12	60	
	b	66 800	75 487 092	156 607	5 336 127	59 857 513	
	c	3 749 530	46 040 538	736 284	405 426 791	6 446 552	
	d						
	e						
Total per ML category	a	196	523	817	3 721	1 821	5
	b	345 384 979	410 427 495	32 002 935 310	23 401 605 181	13 818 618 997	18 398 947
	d	4		6	13	6	
	e	1(2), 2(2)		1(3), 3(1), 4(5)	1(6), 2(4), 3(1), 4(5), 5(2), 7(6), 8(1)	1(1), 2(5), 3(2), 7(1)	

WORLDWIDE

		ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18
Austria	a	68	1	13	27	12	114
	b	31 948 454	150 000	7 443 186	127 511 601	1 675 479	27 098 599
	c	4 318 698		3 213 071	32 886 051	194 423	11 176 324
	d						
	e						
Belgium	a	7	12	18	38	5	18
	b	5 150 513	95 739 530	13 503 800	11 045 598	12 436 446	63 606 346
	c						
	d						
	e						
Bulgaria	a	33	6	20	13		1
	b	34 524 857	297 885	3 605 377	104 538 516		40
	c	23 570 203	175 485	16 605 946	20 587 736		76
	d						
	e						
Croatia	a	10			2	2	
	b	19 696 849			458 335	11 190	
	c	19 129 265			156 991		
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18
Cyprus	a						
	b						
	c						
	d						
	e						
Czech Republic	a	50	12	65	44	13	157
	b	1 331 296	2 513 827	30 285 123	66 124 975	4 051 781	2 331 894
	c	21 780 176	12 034 218	19 868 617	53 019 507	3 083 590	11 686 568
	d						
	e						
Denmark	a	678				19	2
	b	5 555 866				370	
	c	3 941 578		2 858 620		46 132	2 858 620
	d						
	e						
Estonia	a	3	5	6		4	
	b	284 139	97 205	2 194 474		11 077 533	
	c	22 000		164 800		10 508 334	
	d						
	e						
Finland	a	23		2	1	16	
	b	7 407 964		529 376	170 458	95 186	
	c	7 465 532		32 474	4 087 398	84 980	
	d						
	e						
France	a	174	45	299	43	67	36
	b	979 880 485	449 562 953	2 772 856 310	147 615 269	377 835 573	170 516 998
	c						
	d	1					
	e	2(1)					

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18
Germany	a	86	70	187	544	378	540
	b	40 258 658	65 035 845	76 286 489	267 832 587	41 075 919	48 198 165
	c						
	d	4		1	2	1	1
	e	2(3), 3(2), 4(3), 6(2), 7(1)		7(1)	2(1), 7(2)	2(1)	7(1)
Greece	a	13		80			
	b	46 900 772		302 114 270			
	c						
	d						
	e						
Hungary	a				10	2	2
	b				12 183 566	66 020	485 911
	c				2 126 972	7 700	
	d	1		1			
	e	4(1)		4(1)			
Ireland	a	1		6		1	
	b	198 440		30 504 127		3 000	
	c	198 440		30 504 127		3 000	
	d						
	e						
Italy	a	12	17	13	81	3	25
	b	563 302	254 849 491	4 562 456	25 019 851	16 781 519	26 953 691
	c						
	d						
	e						
Latvia	a	6		1			
	b	585 000		260 000			
	c						
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18
Lithuania	a	8		37			
	b	2 829 283		8 030 794			
	c	2 574 283		12 800 475			
	d						
	e						
Luxembourg	a	4			26		
	b	162 658			4 493 754		
	c	12 659			3 501 960		
	d						
	e						
Malta	a	3		1			
	b	956		243			
	c	516					
	d			1			
	e			7(1)			
Netherlands	a	23	16	74	27	17	9
	b	23 337 083	10 452 566	47 357 043	69 098 627	8 533 537	49 568 859
	c	20 273 185	2 126 362	22 213 294	2 562 468	10 788 564	103 230
	d		1				
	e		2(1), 4(1), 6(1)				
Poland	a	59	2	8	41	10	25
	b	489 686 008	131 334	11 535 259	97 120 892	1 523 262	37 854 203
	c	99 621 210	79 690	1 545 004	18 202 658	1 102 167	3 957 790
	d						
	e						
Portugal	a	9	1	2		2	11
	b	22 057 328	1 272 063	2 388 830		59 202	23 668 639
	c	3 074 258		506 444	74 514	35 814	556 000
	d						
	e						

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

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WORLDWIDE

		ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18
Romania	a	2	4	15	41	1	10
	b	270 000	305 929	3 540 908	10 848 714	5 698	1 793 194
	c	116 978	55 709	4 545 226	1 059 777	2 094 808	3 059 271
	d						
	e						
Slovakia	a	9	2	8		2	
	b	6 819 190	8 381 866	26 232 537		18 000	
	c	4 449 155	555 200	2 989 258		18 000	
	d						
	e						
Slovenia	a	1	8		22		6
	b		7 862 500		3 719 301		1 186 090
	c		3 463 700		12 968 082		20 420
	d						
	e						
Spain	a	9	4	93	22	12	
	b	7 567 474	13 527 490	13 470 054	11 748 763	136 000	
	c	3 825 569	584 354	10 899 620	5 561 054	150 778	
	d						
	e						
Sweden	a	22	61	15		102	29
	b	1 332 945	45 972 175	2 620 938		54 955 674	323 692
	c	15 757 738	5 130 495	4 316 796	4 204	16 243 824	2 694 479
	d						
	e						
Total per ML category	a	1 313	266	963	982	668	985
	b	1 728 349 520	956 152 659	3 359 321 594	959 530 807	530 341 389	453 586 321
	d	6	1	3	2	1	1
	e	2(4), 3(2), 4(4), 6(2), 7(1)	2(1), 4(1), 6(1)	4(1), 7(2)	2(1), 7(2)	2(1)	7(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Austria	a			4	29	1 525
	b			10 505 000	32 621 914	2 483 505 884
	c				193 363	384 763 278
	d					
	e					
Belgium	a			3	17	1 474
	b			4 100 100	533 100 682	1 767 314 872
	c					
	d					2
	e					2(1), 3(1), 6(1), 7(1), 8(1)
Bulgaria	a				6	810
	b				33 930 091	4 320 244 872
	c				20 622 179	1 653 762 817
	d					
	e					
Croatia	a					354
	b					689 461 430
	c					105 963 041
	d					
	e					
Cyprus	a					148
	b					4 427 767
	c					
	d					
	e					
Czech Republic	a			1	4	1 529
	b				12 293 914	1 022 252 648
	c			1 477 662	4 417 757	1 370 786 245
	d					24
	e					1(15), 2(1), 3(5), 4(5), 5(2), 7(21)

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Denmark	a			109	71	1 224
	b			56 013 684	52 173 212	180 872 343
	c			18 428 866	13 778 697	193 884 345
	d					2
	e					2(1), 4(2)
Estonia	a			2	6	112
	b			2	230 921	107 199 797
	c			2	136 805	26 026 631
	d					
	e					
Finland	a			15	11	291
	b			4 319 800	3 962 550	119 290 811
	c			4 969 116	2 388 633	125 086 572
	d					
	e					
France	a	7	1	141	642	3 556
	b	50 180 000	1 650 000	3 419 685 738	4 387 379 006	130 475 869 557
	c					7 536 100 000
	d			1		13
	e			1(1), 3(1), 8(1)		1(3), 2(6), 3(1), 4(4), 8(1)
Germany	a	3		384	664	9 281
	b	310 100		45 055 252	111 676 781	8 362 028 138
	c					
	d			10	3	59
	e			1(3), 2(6), 3(1), 4(3), 7(2)	1(2), 2(1), 4(1)	1(12), 2(25), 3(15), 4(13), 6(2), 7(20)
Greece	a			4		283
	b			2 227 980		444 397 091
	c					
	d					
	e					

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Hungary	a			6	1	406
	b			46 500 000	25 000	816 654 748
	c			3 288 660		68 772 019
	d					12
	e					1(3), 2(1), 3(1), 4(9), 7(2)
Ireland	a			8	14	135
	b			510 000	2 196 924	125 858 821
	c			510 000	2 196 924	125 857 821
	d					2
	e					1(1), 2(1), 7(2)
Italy	a			46	100	2 155
	b			9 314 722	26 844 815	3 830 646 987
	c					5 503 881 533
	d					
	e					
Latvia	a					419
	b					526 103 319
	c					
	d					
	e					
Lithuania	a	1		16	15	350
	b				499 921	65 231 774
	c	263 785			584 002	92 504 540
	d					
	e					
Luxembourg	a					42
	b					6 780 438
	c					3 826 091
	d					
	e					

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Malta	a				1	24
	b				2 500	4 617 953
	c					1 668 578
	d					3
	e					3(1), 4(1), 7(1)
Netherlands	a	3	4	50	159	1 381
	b	69 755	1 203 297	35 277 790	191 501 405	1 362 684 678
	c	426 279		112 604	20 521 457	932 646 215
	d					1
	e					2(1), 4(1), 6(1)
Poland	a			9	213	1 237
	b			4 404 000	133 705 967	5 686 055 405
	c			1 145 779	1 932 088	1 180 172 386
	d					1
	e					7(1)
Portugal	a			2	2	223
	b			484 768	60 000	191 938 824
	c			424 711		442 511 278
	d					
	e					
Romania	a			13	13	301
	b			63 334 029	14 947 942	482 436 676
	c			8 305 314	7 601 127	215 090 276
	d					2
	e					7(2)
Slovakia	a			1	5	448
	b			520	9 451 745	606 664 048
	c			520	764 448	161 638 965
	d					1
	e					3(1), 7(1)

EU ARMS EXPORTS WORLDWIDE IN 2022

Key: (a) = number of licences issued, (b) = value of licences issued in Euros, (c) = value of arms exports in Euros (if available), (d) = total EU number of licence refusals (small discrepancies may appear between breakdowns and totals due to refusals concerning more than one ML item or refusals for items other than those appearing in the ML). (e) = criteria numbers on which refusals are based (the approximate number of times each criterion is invoked is indicated in brackets)

WORLDWIDE

		ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Total
Slovenia	a					137
	b					164 928 137
	c					36 643 257
	d					1
	e					2(1), 3(1), 7(1)
Spain	a			18	243	2 048
	b			7 336 304	170 489 214	10 555 191 486
	c			8 796 624	42 684 879	4 091 318 096
	d					
	e					
Sweden	a			106	211	1 434
	b			6 237 870	12 357 449	2 061 271 223
	c			26 506 961	212 192 987	1 434 372 789
	d					
	e					
Total per ML category	a	14	5	938	2 427	31 327
	b	50 559 855	2 853 297	3 715 307 559	5 729 451 953	176 463 929 727
	d			11	3	123
	e			1(4), 2(6), 3(2), 4(3), 7(2), 8(1)	1(2), 2(1), 4(1)	1(34), 2(38), 3(26), 4(35), 5(2), 6(4), 7(52), 8(2)

TABLE A.II

Exports to United Nations-mandated or other international missions in 2022⁽²⁸⁾Destination Country: **Afghanistan**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Finland	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)
Germany	— United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) — EU Delegation (EEAS)	— Cross-country vehicles with special protection — Cross-country vehicles with special protection and spare parts

Destination Country: **Bhutan**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Denmark	UN mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (Bhutan is the recipient and end-user country; the products are to be used as part of the UN mission in CAR).	Ballistic plates (ML13)

Destination Country: **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Greece	EUFOR ALTHEA	Pistol M1911A1 (1 pc), Pistol magazine M1911A1 (3 pcs), Rifle M16A2 (1 pc), Rifle magazine M16A2 (7 pcs), Cartridges 5,56 (210 pcs), Cartridges 0,45" (21 pcs), Thigh gun case (1 pc), Bullet proof vest (1 pc), Bullet proof plates (2 pcs), Bullet proof vest case (1 pc), Cleaning water tank with pouch (1 pc), Long living haversack (1 pc), Individual mosquito net (1 pc), Map case (1 pc), Individual raincoat (1 pc), Waterproof uniform (1 pc), Helmets KEVLAR (1 pc), Helmet cover KEVLAR (1 pc), Special type outfit (1 pc), Antiballistic glasses (2 pairs), CBRN uniform (1 pc), CBRN mask Cobra (1 pc), CBRN mask Cobra filter (2 pcs), CBRN Cobra mask and filter pouch (1 pc), CBRN shoe cover (1 pair), CBRN gloves (1 pair).
Hungary	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)	Body armour, bulletproof vests, kevlar helmets, pistols, rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles

Destination Country: **Burkina Faso**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel (RACC)	Cross-country vehicle with special protection and spare parts

⁽²⁸⁾ The following Member States submitted a nil report: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.

Destination Country: **Cameroon**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Finland	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)
France	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	4x4 armoured vehicle

Destination Country: **Central African Republic**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	EU Delegation (EEAS) European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)	Cross-country vehicle with special protection and spare parts
Malta	EU Advisory Mission (EUAM RCA)	Ammunition
Portugal	EU Training Mission (EUTM RC) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic — MINUSCA	Handguns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and components (ML 1), Hand grenades and other explosive devices (ML 4), Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment (ML 5), Ground vehicles and components (ML 6), Equipment and communication systems (ML 11), Protection equipment (ML 13), Containers specially designed or 'modified' for military use (ML 17)

Destination Country: **Congo (Democratic Republic of)**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
France	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO)	t100edDual stage turbo replacement kit; T100EE LP turbo replacement kit; T100EE HP turbo replacement kit; T100EE starter ring assy replacement kit; propeller; 120MF capacitor hole ø20 bracket assy; ROD L=116MM; T100EE fuel pump replacement kit

Destination Country: **Iceland**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	Iceland Air Policing	Several aircrafts and equipment (ML 10)

Destination Country: **Iraq**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Austria	United Nation Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	Pistols, parts thereof and Magazines ML1
Germany	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)	Cross-country vehicle with special protection and spare parts

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Greece	NATO Mission	— Pistol M1911A1 0, 45" (1 pc), Magazines M1911 (3 pcs), Rifle M16A2 (1 pc), Magazines M16A2 (10 pcs), Bayonet with sheath (1 pc), Blanc shot stopper (1 pc), Cleaning collection (1 pc), Cartridges 5,56 (210 pcs), Uniform, Mask, Carrying Bag, Shoes, CBRN Gloves (1 pc), CBRN filter (1 pc). — Cleaning water tank (1 pc), Mosquito net desert (1 pc), Map case (1 pc), Waterproof uniform GORTEX (1 pair), CBRN shoe cover (1 pair), CBRN gloves (1 pair), KEVLAR helmet (1 pc), CBRN mask Cobra (1 pc), CBRN mask Cobra filter (2 pcs), CBRN uniform (1 pair), Cobra mask Carrying Bag (1 pc), First aid kit (1 col), Antiballistic glasses (1 pair), Army engineer duty glove (1 pair), KEVLAR desert helmet cover (1 pc), Sleeping bag MRK (1 pc), Bergin bag (1 pc), Hydration carrier bag (1 pc), USMC vest (1 pc), Bucket hat desert (1 pc), Pistol holster desert (1 pc), Jacket Greek Army (1 pc), Back Bag (1 pc), Plate carrier (1 pc), Antiballistic plate (2 pcs), Hemostatic bandage (1 pc).
Hungary	NATO Mission in Iraq	Radio sets, pistol, night vision devices, bulletproof vests, rifles

Destination Country: **Italy**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	United Nations Global Service Center (UNGSC)	Cross-country vehicles with special protection

Destination Country: **Kosovo** ⁽²⁹⁾

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Hungary	Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Kevlar helmets, bulletproof vest, combat vest kits, gasmask sets, rifles, pistols, ammunition, crypto unit, shields, night vision goggles, aiming lasers, rifle scopes, red dot sights, magazines, aimpoint, APC

Destination Country: **Lebanon**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Spare parts for cross-country vehicle with special protection
Hungary	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Kevlar helmets, rifles, pistols, bulletproof vests, ceramic plates

⁽²⁹⁾ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Destination Country: **Libya**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	— European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) — United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	— Cross-country vehicles with special protection and spare parts — Ammunition for rifles, revolvers and pistols

Destination Country: **Lithuania**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	Baltic Air Policing and NATO Assurance Measures	Handguns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and components (ML 1), Grenade launchers (ML2), Ammunition (ML 3), Hand grenades and other explosive devices (ML 4), Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment (ML 5), Ground vehicles and components (ML 6), Naval Equipment (ML 9)

Destination Country: **Mali**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Austria	European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali)	Components and spare parts ML6
France	European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali)	Ballistic protection helmet; smoke grenades coloured; sting-ball grenade; optical adapter for helmet.
Germany	— United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) — United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilizations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	— Cross-country vehicles with special protection — Spare parts for rifles, revolvers and pistols, aiming systems, training equipment for moving target systems
Greece	European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)	— Battle belt (1 pc), MOLLE pistol holster (1 pc), MOLLE pistol magazine holster (4 pcs), MOLLE riffle magazine holster (4 pcs), MOLLE empty magazine holster (1 pc), MOLLE tourniquet pouch (1 pc), GLOCK pistol (1 pc), GLOCK pistol magazine (9 pc), CZ-99 pistol magazine (8 pc), Cartridges 5,56 (240 pcs), Cartridges 9 mm (60 pcs). — Battle belt (1 pc), MOLLE pistol holster (1 pc), MOLLE pistol magazine holster (4 pcs), MOLLE riffle magazine holster (4 pcs), MOLLE empty magazine holster (1 pc), MOLLE tourniquet pouch (1 pc), GLOCK pistol (1 pc), GLOCK pistol magazine (9 pc), CZ-99 pistol magazine (8 pc), Cartridges 5,56 (240 pcs), Cartridges 9 mm (60 pcs), Cartridges 5,56 (480 pcs), Cartridges 9 mm (68 pcs), Battle belt (2 pc), MOLLE pistol holster (2 pc), MOLLE pistol magazine holster (8 pcs), Pistol magazine holster single (10 pc), Riffle M16M4 magazine holster triple (10 pc), Riffle M16M4 magazine holster double (10 pc), MOLLE riffle magazine holster (8 pcs), MOLLE riffle empty magazine holster (2 pcs), Riffle M16M4 gun sling (2 pcs), MOLLE tourniquet pouch (2 pc), Summer underwear (4 pcs).

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Hungary	European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)	Rifles, ACOG optics, bulletproof vests, ceramic plates, ammunition, magazines
Malta	European Union Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)	Semi-automatic rifles, magazines, blast deflector, aiming system

Destination Country: **Mozambique**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Finland	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)
Greece	European Union Training Mission (EUTM)	Rifle M16M4A1 (8 pcs) Machine Gun MINIMI (1 pc), binoculars miscellaneous (17 pcs), Laser sight MAWL (6 pcs), Magnifier aim point (9 pcs), Night vision binocular (1 pc), Laser sight (2 pcs), Pistol GLOCK 17, Silencers (2 pcs), Night vision binocular NYX LW (8 pcs), Wireless PRM 4720B (10 pcs), Batteries MIL R4516 (20 pcs).
Portugal	European Union Training Mission (EUTM)	Handguns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and components (ML1), Equipment and communication systems (ML11), Protection equipment (ML13)

Destination Country: **Netherlands**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Cross-country vehicles with special protection
Portugal	EU — FRONTEX	Several aircrafts and equipment (ML10)

Destination Country: **Niger**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
France	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)	Ballistic protection helmet; accessories; jacket for wearing ballistic plates; individual ballistic protection plate; flash suppressor; magazine; FIOCCHI CAL. .223 REM ammunition; 9mm ammunition; marking rounds for training; Cal. 5.56x45_OA-15 semi-automatic rifle; silencer.

Destination Country: **Nigeria**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Finland	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)

Destination Country: **Norway**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	NATO — COLD RESPONSE 2022	Equipment and communication systems (ML11)

Destination Country: **Poland**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	NATO Assurance Measures — Baltic Air Policing	Equipment and communication systems (ML11)

Destination Country: **Romania**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	Tailored Forward Presence	Handguns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and components (ML1), Grenade launchers (ML2), Ammunition (ML3), Ground vehicles and components (ML6), Equipment and communication systems (ML11), Protection equipment (ML13)

Destination Country: **Somalia**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Denmark	United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNMAS Somalia UNSOS/UNSOM)	De-armer Disrupter Systems and Power cartridges (ML2)
Finland	United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)
France	African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)	Ballistic protection helmet; jacket for wearing ballistic plates; ballistic protection plate
Germany	EU-Mission European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP)	Ballistic helmets, night vision devices

Destination Country: **South Sudan**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Bulgaria	Unit MONBATT in the frame of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	7,62 x 39 mm cartridge with steel core: 124 600 pcs 7,62 x 39 mm cartridge with tracer bullet T45: 33 600 pcs 7,62 x 54 mm cartridge with steel core: 79 200 pcs 14,5 mm cartridge with bullet B 32: 4 800 pcs 82 mm fragmentation mine: 144 pcs 40 mm PG-7VM round: 432 pcs

Destination Country: **Spain**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Portugal	EU — FRONTEX	Several aircrafts and equipment (ML10)

Destination Country: **Ukraine**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Germany	International Organization for Migration — Mission Ukraine (IOM)	Cross-country vehicles with special protection

Destination Country: **United States**

Exporting Member State	United Nations-mandated or other international missions	Description of goods
Finland	World Bank	Tactical vests and helmets (ML13)

TABLE A.III

1. Brokering licences granted by Member States in 2022 ⁽³⁰⁾**BULGARIA**

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Saudi Arabia	1	15 052 972	ML3	52 000 000 pcs	15 052 972	China
Algeria	1	55 043	ML6	514 pcs	55 043	Ukraine
Saudi Arabia	1	23 100 000	ML4	1 000 pcs	23 100 000	Belarus
Rwanda	1	223 200	ML3	620 000 pcs	223 200	China

CROATIA

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Togo	2	9 900,62	ML1a.	16	9 900,62	Türkiye
Nigeria	1	128 925,00	ML1a.	30	0,00	Bulgaria
Nigeria	1	12 000,00	ML3a.	30 000	0,00	Bulgaria
Nigeria	1	66 000,00	ML1a.	150	0,00	Slovakia
USA	1	1 593 849,81	ML3a.	5 000 000	0,00	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Poland	2	2 222 014,15	ML3a.	16 000 000	0,00	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria	2	2 325 041,72	ML3a.	1 075 799	0,00	Bosnia and Herzegovina

CZECH REPUBLIC

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Burkina Faso	1	253 638	1	—	0	Kazakhstan
Algeria	1	13 577	4	—	0	United States

⁽³⁰⁾ The following Member States submitted a nil report: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Indonesia	2	89 950 538	4 6 10	— — 4 pcs	1 468	Türkiye Türkiye Poland
Israel	1	528	1	—	0	United States
Nigeria	3	2 485 853	1 4 6	— 3 852 pcs —	2 280 276	Kazakhstan Slovakia United Arab Emirates
Senegal	1	348 077	4	1000 pcs	345 013	Spain
Ukraine	28	11 607 976	2 3 4 6 10 13 15	165 pcs — 1 500 pcs 11 pcs 31 sets, 15 pcs 53262 pcs, 196 sets 40 pcs	7 691 367	Jordan Slovakia Slovakia, Poland Oman United Arab Emirates, Canada, United Kingdom, United States Canada, Israel, North Macedonia, Türkiye Canada, United States
United States	2	5 071 722	2 4	250 pcs 822 pcs	3 856 752	Jordan Jordan

ESTONIA

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Malaysia	1	37 752	ML10	4 968	37 752	Ukraine
Lithuania	2	66 119	EST2 (ML)	1 320	66 119	Switzerland
Lithuania	2	113 563	EST2 (ML)	1 020	113 563	USA
Ukraine	2	7 186 558	ML3	12500	7 186 558	Czechia
Ukraine	1	15 650	ML2	10	15 650	Croatia
Algeria	1	0	ML10	267	698 296	UA
Italy	1	9 773 272	ML6	Autonomous systems concept development	9 773 272	Estonia

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Australia, Germany, Spain, France, Indonesia, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, USA	1	5 000 000	ML6, ML21, ML22	THeMis lifecycle services	5 000 000	Estonia

GERMANY

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Australia	1	11 595 434	ML 11A	433 pcs.	11 595 434	Norway
Israel	1	36 724	ML 9A	7 pcs.	36 724	United Kingdom
Japan	4	333 170	ML 4B	68 pcs.	333 170	United Kingdom
Norway	1	66 075	ML 8F	250 kg	66 075	South Korea
South Korea	1	13 003	ML 5B	1 set	13 003	Switzerland
South Korea	1	50 600	ML 8A	400 kg	50 600	Norway
South Korea	1	15 500	ML 11A	2 sets	15 500	United Kingdom
Ukraine	1	4 800 000	ML 6B	17 pcs.	4 800 000	United Arab Emirates
Ukraine	2	12 984 446	ML 13C	30 200 pcs.	12 984 446	United States
United Kingdom	1	21 185	ML 3A	17 000 pcs.	21 185	Switzerland

HUNGARY

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Norway	1	500	3	0	0	Switzerland
Romania	1	35 000	3	0	0	Switzerland
Iraq (*)	0	0	1	500	2 495 000	Bulgaria
Iraq (*)	0	0	2	1 727	12 942 000	Bulgaria
Iraq (*)	0	0	3	20 006 000	18 673 000	Bulgaria

(*) License issued in 2020, prolonged for an additional year in 2021.

IRELAND

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Serbia	2	31 174	ML6	4	31 174	Canada

ITALY

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Australia	6	193 805,32	4, 9, 10, 11, 15	293 days – 12 weeks	193 805,32	Australia
Austria	1	3 310 288,00	10, 11, 15	500	3 310 288,00	Italy
Egypt	3	34 920,40	3, 4, 14	12 – 20 000 hours – 52 weeks	34 920,40	Italy, France
France	11	478 475,38	4, 5, 11	40 days – 48 months – 2 – 300 hours – 156 weeks	478 475,38	France, United States
Germany	45	3 970 256,09	4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 21, 22	4 832 – 245 months	3 970 256,09	Germany, Italy, UK, Kuwait, Spain
India	1	23 360,58	11, 21	300 days	23 360,58	India
Kuwait	2	7 604 643,34	11, 21	11 000	7 604 643,34	United States
Lithuania	2	458 800,00	3, 5	12	458 800,00	Italy, Spain
Morocco	1	420,40	4	52 weeks	420,40	France
Pakistan	1	625 968,00	11	100 hours	625 968,00	Pakistan
Peru	1	158 840,00	6	10	158 840,00	Spain
Philippines	1	4 816 140,00	6	28	4 816 140,00	Brazil
Poland	1	517 983,40	11	1	517 983,40	Australia
Qatar	5	208 221 638,46	4, 5, 9, 10	629 – 170 weeks	208 221 638,46	Italy, France, Austria, Qatar
Romania	1	35 504 867,08	6	130	35 504 867,08	Romania
Saudi Arabia	3	1 404 741,61	4, 10	15 – 52 weeks	1 404 741,61	Saudi Arabia, France
Senegal	1	117 000,00	9	15 days	117 000,00	Israel, Italy
Singapore	1	5 045,00	4	52 weeks	5 045,00	France
South Africa	1	50 151 664,93	10	2	50 151 664,93	Belgium

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
South Korea	1	94 600,00	9	200	94 600,00	South Korea
Spain	15	223 562,25	3, 10	662	223 562,25	Italy, France, UK, Germany
Sweden	1	673 861,07	4	300	673 861,07	South Africa
United Arab Emirates	2	162 603,00	1, 3, 11	120 days – 3 300 hours	162 603,00	Italy, France
United Kingdom	211	69 934 908,56	4, 10, 11	40 354 – 30 days – 1 year	69 934 908,56	Italy, France, Germany, UK, Spain
United States	1	7 930 955,00	6	28	7 930 955,00	Italy

LITHUANIA

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Ukraine	3	—	ML13		649 000	Israel
Ukraine	2	—	ML13		585 000	Türkiye
Ukraine	1	—	ML13		50 000	South Africa

NETHERLANDS

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Pakistan	1	N/A	ML9	2	110 740 000	Romania
Ukraine	1	508 800	ML4	N/A	5 596 800	Czechia

POLAND

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Switzerland	1	47 585	ML6	1	19 034	Australia
Czechia	1	62 000	ML6	1	62 000	Germany
UK	1	8 765	ML6	1	80 000	Czechia
Ukraine	2	78 330	ML5	80	167 300	USA
Uganda	4	21 164 212	ML3, ML4, ML7, ML10	107 784	22 493 094	Bulgaria, India, USA

Destination	Number of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Vietnam	1	3 269 072	ML3	18 839	9 973 133	Italy

ROMANIA

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Argentina	1	290 475	ML10	n/a	0	South Africa
Azerbaijan	4	575 752	ML10	n/a	108 583	South Africa
India	1	2 000 000	ML18	n/a	107 502	South Africa
Nigeria	1	4 723 291	ML6	n/a	0	United Arab Emirates

SPAIN

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Chile	1	174 000	3	600 000		Bosnia-Herzegovina
Ukraine	1	508	13	1 800		Mexico

SWEDEN

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
France	2		ML4, ML14			Denmark
United Kingdom	4		ML4, ML14			Denmark
Denmark	1		ML6			Estonia
Ireland	1		ML6			Estonia
Luxemburg	1		ML6			Estonia
Netherlands	2		ML6			Estonia
Finland	1		ML6, ML21			Finland
France	1		ML4			Finland
United Kingdom	2		ML4			Finland
Norway	3		ML4, ML5			France
Indonesia	1		ML2			India

Destination	No of licences issued	Value of brokering licences issued (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
United States of America	2		ML10			India
Denmark	3		ML3			Italy
France	1		ML11			Italy
France	1		ML17			Latvia
India	1		ML17			Latvia
Denmark	6		ML6			Netherlands
Ireland	1		ML6			Netherlands
Luxemburg	1		ML6			Netherlands
Netherlands	1		ML6			Netherlands
Germany	2		ML6			Netherlands
Ireland	1		ML6			Spain
Hungary	1		ML3			Spain
Netherlands	1		ML6			United Kingdom
Switzerland	2		ML4			United Kingdom
United Kingdom	1		ML4			United Kingdom
Germany	1		ML5			United Kingdom
Australia	1		ML13			Germany
Norway	1		ML4			Germany
Ukraine	1		ML13			—
Belgium	1		ML5			United States of America
Luxemburg	1		ML6			Austria
United States of America	1		ML10, ML11, ML18, ML21			United States of America

2. *Brokering licences refused by Member States in 2022*

IRELAND

Destination	No of licences denied	Value of brokering licences denied (EUR)	ML categories	Quantity of brokered items	Value of brokered items (EUR)	Country of origin
Saudi Arabia	1	95 998	ML6	31	95 998	UK

TABLE B.I

Total number of consultations initiated and received by each Member State in 2022

Member State	Number of consultations initiated	Number of consultations received
Austria	4	—
Belgium	1	4
Czechia	5	4
Finland	—	1
France	—	4
Germany	9	14
Greece	1	1
Hungary	6	—
Ireland	—	1
Italy	1	—
Latvia	1	—
Netherlands	6	5
Romania	1	—
Spain	1	—
Sweden	—	2
TOTAL	36	36

TABLE B.II

Total number of consultations initiated by Member States in 2022 per destination

Destination Country	Number of consultations
Bangladesh	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Brazil	1
China (Macao)	2
Malaysia	1
Moldova	4
Morocco	3
Pakistan	1
Panama	1
Qatar	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Thailand	6
Türkiye	5
Turkmenistan	1
Ukraine	2
United Arab Emirates	4
TOTAL	36

TABLE C

Member States' implementing legislation or administrative rules for Common Positions 2003/468/CFSP and 2008/944/CFSP

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
Austria	Foreign Trade Act (AußWG, Federal Gazette I No 26/2011 as last amended by Federal Gazette I no. 87/2020) and War Material Act (KMG, Federal Gazette I no. 540/1977 in its current version)	Implementation completed.	Foreign Trade Act (AußWG, Federal Gazette I No 26/2011 as last amended by Federal Gazette I no. 87/2020) and War Material Act (KMG, Federal Gazette I no. 540/1977 in its current version)	Implementation completed.
Belgium	Law of 25 March 2003, article 15, (published in Moniteur belge of 7.7.2003, modifying law of 5.8.1991	Partial implementation.	Flemish Region: Flemish Parliament Act on the import, export, transit and transfer of defence-related products, and other materials for military use, law enforcement materials, civilian firearms, components and munitions — 15.6.2012, as amended by the Flemish Parliament Act of 30.6.2017 Walloon Region: Decree regarding the import, export, transit and transfer of civil weapons and defence material — 21.6.2012 Brussels Capital Region: Ordinance regarding the import, export, transit and transfer of defence material, military material, law enforcement material, civil weapons, and parts, components and ammunitions — 20.6.2013 Federal government: Law of 26 March 2003 (published in Moniteur belge of 7.7.2003), modifying law of 5.8.1991	Flemish Region: Implementation completed Walloon Region: Implementation completed Brussels Capital Region: Implementation completed Federal government: Implementation completed
Bulgaria	Latest amendments: Export control of defence-related products and dual use items and technologies Act, entered into force 30.6.2012 Regulation for the implementation of the Export Control Act (adopted by Decree 205/15.7.2012)	Implementation completed.	Ministerial Decree — November 2009	Implementation completed.

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
Croatia	Act on the trade control of military goods and non-military lethal goods (OG 80/13, in force since 6 July 2013)	Implementation completed.	Act on the trade control of military goods and non-military lethal goods (OG 80/13, in force since 6 July 2013)	Implementation completed.
Cyprus	Cyprus issued the Export, brokering and the provision of technical assistance (military equipment) Regulations of 2011 in December 2011. These Regulations set the legal framework for the implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Common Position 2003/468/CFSP and Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP.	Implementation completed.	Cyprus issued the Export, brokering and the provision of technical assistance (military equipment) Regulations of 2011 in December 2011. These Regulations set the legal framework for the implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Common Position 2003/468/CFSP and Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP.	Implementation completed.
Czechia	Act No 38/1994 Coll. on foreign trade in military material.	Implementation completed.	Act No 38/1994 Coll. on foreign trade in military material reflects certain provisions of the Common Position.	Updated national ML listing 22 items in conformity with the EU ML is included in Decree 210/2012 Coll. as amended by Decree 153/2021 Coll. of 22 September 2021 and Decree 46/2023 Coll. of 14 February 2023.
Denmark	Amendment Act no. 555 of 24 June 2005 to the Danish Weapons Act (arms brokering etc.)	Implementation completed.		Implementation completed.
Estonia	Legislation on brokering was adopted in 2004. Current Strategic Goods Act (ref no RT I, 22.12.2011, 2) entered into force in 1.1.2012	Implementation completed.	Current Strategic Goods Act (ref no RT I, 22.12.2011, 2) entered into force in 1.1.2012	Implementation completed.
Finland	Act on the Export of Defence Materiel (282/2012).	Fully implements the Common Position on Brokering.	Act on the Export of Defence Materiel (282/2012).	Implementation completed.

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
France	Code de la Défense (Art. L2332-1)	Implementation completed.	The existing legal requirements in connection with the political principles adopted by the government make it possible to immediately apply the regulations laid down in the Common Position within the Commission established by Decree no55-965.	Implementation completed. General directives approved by political authorities and specific directives in the event of specific situations, such as embargoes, conflict areas, or human rights situation. France bases its export decisions on the criteria defined in the framework of international treaties, conventions, instruments or fora to which it subscribes (such as Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Arms Trade Treaty, criteria laid down by the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Council).
Germany	War Weapons Control Act (KrWaffKontrG), in the version promulgated on 22 November 1990, Federal Law Gazette 1990 I, p. 2506, last amended by Article 25 of the Act of 19 December 2022, Federal Law Gazette 2022 I p. 2606; Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG), Federal Law Gazette 2013 I p. 1482, last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 20 December 2022, Federal Law Gazette 2022 I p. 2752, and Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (AWV), Federal Law Gazette 2013 I p. 2865; 2021 I p. 4304, last amended by Article 10 of the Act of 19 December 2022, Federal Law Gazette I p. 2632	Implementation completed.	The existing legal requirements (Foreign Trade and Payments Act — AWG, Federal Law Gazette 2013 I p. 1482, last amended by last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 20 December 2022, Federal Law Gazette 2022 I p. 2752 and Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation -AWV, Federal Law Gazette 2013 I p. 2865; 2021 I p. 4304, last amended by 10 of the Act of 19 December 2022, Federal Law Gazette I p. 2632, in connection with the 'Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment' of June 2019 make it possible to immediately apply the regulations laid down in the Common Position.	Implementation completed.
Greece	Law 4028/2011 of 11 November 2011 (Government Gazette 242), which incorporated the Common Position 2003/468/CFSP	Implementation completed.	Directive (EU) 2017/853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons was incorporated in the Greek legal corpus with Law 4678/2020 of 20 March 2020, (Government Gazette 70A), modifying Law 2168/1993.	Implementation completed.

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
Hungary	The provisions on the control of brokering activities have been in force in Hungary since 2004. Currently the control of arms brokering is regulated by the Government Decree 156/2017. (VI. 16.) on the detailed regulations of the licensing of defence related activity and the certification of enterprises.	Implementation completed.	The criteria laid down in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP are included in Annex II. to the Government Decree 156/2017. (VI.16.) on the detailed regulations of the licensing of defence related activity and the certification of enterprises.	Implementation completed.
Ireland	Control of Exports Act 2008 (No 1 of 2008) Control of Exports (Brokering Activities, Goods and Technology) Regulations 2021 (S.I. No. 207 of 2021)	Implementation completed.	Control of Exports (Brokering Activities, Goods and Technology) Regulations 2021 (S.I. No. 207 of 2021) and S.I. No. 291 of 2019, the European Communities (Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Related Products) (Amendment) Regulations 2019 give effect to licensing requirements for the Common Military List. The criteria of the Common Position are taken into account as a minimum standard when assessing all licence applications.	Implementation completed.
Italy	Law No. 185 of 9 July 1990. New provisions on controlling the export, import and transit of military goods Modified and integrated by DL n. 105 of 22 June 2012. Implementing regulation approved with Ministerial Decree No. 19 of 7 January 2013.	Implementation completed.	Law No. 185 of 9 July 1990. New provisions on controlling the export, import and transit of military goods Modified and integrated by DL n. 105 of 22 June 2012. Implementing regulation approved with Ministerial Decree No. 19 of 7 January 2013.	Implementation completed.
Latvia	Law on the Circulation of Strategic Goods, in force since 19 July 2007 (last amended on 7 January 2021)	Implementation completed.	Law on the Circulation of Strategic Goods, in force since 19 July 2007 (last amended on 7 January 2021)	Implementation completed.
Lithuania	Law on the Control of Strategic Goods (came into effect on 1 August 2004, lastly amended on 5 December 2019, No XIV-1738 amendments came into force from 1 April 2023). Law on the Control of Arms and Ammunition of 15 January 2002, lastly amended on 22 December 2022 No. XIV-1740, came into force from 1 July 2023.	Implementation completed.	Law on the Control of Strategic Goods (came into effect on 1 August 2004, lastly amended on 5 December 2019, No XIV-1738 amendments came into force from 1 April 2023). Law on the Control of Arms and Ammunition of 15 January 2002, lastly amended on 22 December 2022 No. XIV-1740, came into force from 1 July 2023.	Implementation completed.

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
Luxembourg	Law of 27 June 2018 voted by Parliament on 26 April 2018 and published on 20 July 2018 in Luxembourg's O.J. No 603	Implementation completed.	Law of 27 June 2018 voted by Parliament on 26 April 2018 and published on 20 July 2018 in Luxembourg's O.J. No 603	Implementation completed.
Malta	Subsidiary legislation 365.13. Military Equipment (Export Control) Regulations	Implementation completed.	The Common Position is not part of Maltese Law, however, it is applied when analysing cases through the Military Equipment (Export Control) Regulations. Subsidiary legislation 365.13.	Implementation completed.
Netherlands	Strategic Services Act (as of January 2012)	Implementation completed.	The Netherlands national legal framework has not been changed after the adoption of the Common Position. The legal basis for the application of the regulations laid down in the Common Position consists of several existing Acts, Decrees, Decisions and Regulations. General Customs Act: Algemene Douanewet (Adw) (stb. 2008, 111) wetten.nl — Regeling — Algemene douanewet — BWBR0023746 (overheid.nl) Strategic Goods Order 2012: Besluit Strategische Goederen (Stcr. 2011, 19960) wetten.nl — Regeling — Besluit strategische goederen — BWBR0024139 (overheid.nl) Implementation measure for Strategic Goods: Uitvoeringsregeling strategische goederen 2012 (Stcr. 2011, 1996) wetten.nl — Regeling — Uitvoeringsregeling strategische goederen 2012 — BWBR0030610 (overheid.nl) 2015 Arms and Munitions Act: Wet Wapens en Munitie (Stb. 1995, 292) wetten.nl — Regeling — Wet wapens en munitie — BWBR0008804 (overheid.nl)	Implementation completed.
Poland	Law of 29.11.2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the state and to maintaining international peace and security (Journal of Laws 2020, item 509). Note: Poland first adopted legislation covering brokering activities in the Act of 11 December 1997 on administrating of foreign trade in goods and services and transfers of special goods (Journal of Laws 1997, No 157, item 1026).	Implementation completed.	Law of 29.11.2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the state and to maintaining international peace and security (Journal of Laws 2020, item 509).	Implementation completed.

Member State	Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering		Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment	
	National legislation reference no.	Information concerning state of play	National legislation or administrative rules reference no.	Information concerning state of play
Portugal	Law no. 49/2009 of 5 August 2009.	Implementation completed.	Law no. 37/2011 of 22 June 2011.	Implementation completed.
Romania	Government's Emergency Ordinance No. 158/1999 on the control regime of exports, imports and other operations with military good, republished (2021).	Implementation completed.	Government's Emergency Ordinance No. 158/1999 on the control regime of exports, imports and other operations with military goods, republished.	Implementation completed.
Slovakia	Act No 392/2011 on trading with defence industry products and on amendments and supplements of certain acts (in force since 1 December 2011).	Implementation completed.	Act No 392/2011 on trading with defence industry products and on amendments and supplements of certain acts (in force since 1 December 2011).	Implementation completed.
Slovenia	Decree on production consents and trade permits for military weapons and equipment and on preliminary permits for import, export, transit and transfer of defence products (The Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, no. 59/11, 88/11, 74/12, 46/13, 29/14, 37/15, 62/16, 30/17, 14/18 and 36/19, 172/21, and 42/23). Brokers are bound to obtain trading permit.	Implementation completed.	Article 77 of the Defence Act (Official Gazette 103/04) specifies that an export license may be refused on the basis of Slovenia's international commitments and obligations.	Implementation completed.
Spain	Law 53/2007 of 28.12.2007 Royal Decree 679/2014 of 1.8.2014 Royal Decree 494/2020 of 28.4.2020 Royal Decree 414/2022 of 31.05.2022 Order ICT/1020/2021 of 24.9.2021 Order ICT/5342023 of 26.05.2023	Implementation completed.	Law 53/2007 of 28.12.2007 Royal Decree 679/2014 of 1.8.2014 Royal Decree 494/2020 of 28.4.2020 Royal Decree 414/2022 of 31.05.2022 Order ICT/1020/2021 of 24.9.2021 Order ICT/5342023 of 26.05.2023	Implementation completed.
Sweden	Military equipment act 1992:1300 (5 §) and Military Equipment Ordinance 1992:1303 (7 §).	Implementation completed.	Military Equipment Act 1992:1300 (1 §, 6 §) and Military Equipment Ordinance 1992:1303 (annex). The Ordinance with Instructions for the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, No 2010:1101 (1a §).	Implementation completed.

TABLE D
INFORMATION ON EU OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464, amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/848 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the EU Outreach Project on the Promotion of Effective Arms Export Controls

‘COARM Outreach Project V’ – implemented by: BAFA

I. INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE WORKSHOPS

Algeria

Online, 15-16 March 2022

Given the success of the first individual assistance activity with Algeria, they requested a follow-up individual activity.

The two-day event focused on different subject matters in the area of arms trade controls, divided into four thematic sessions covering:

- Structured exchange with- and outreach to industry dealing with military and arms exports
- Internal compliance programmes
- Risk management systems for licensing and customs authorities dealing with military and arms exports
- The role of technological innovations.

In total, ten experts supported the activity: eight experts from EU Member States (including five experts from BAFA). In addition, the event was supported by two experts from Georgia and Serbia.

Nine participants from relevant authorities of Algeria participated in the event.

Serbia

In-person (Belgrade), 14 July 2022

The outreach event for the Serbian arms production industry, was organised as back-to-back with a study visit to Serbia for Armenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The participants of the study visit had the opportunity to gain first impressions and experiences regarding how an outreach to industry event can be organised as well as of the expectations from both industry and the authorities in the field of arms export controls.

Approx. 80 representatives of the Serbian arms production industry attended the event.

One main objective of this outreach event pursued by the Serbian side (i.e. Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication) was to inform the industry about the intention to introduce ICP (Internal Compliance Programme). In this respect, the Serbian side was supported by an EU Expert from Germany who held a presentation on the topic related to structured exchange and outreach to industry in Germany. Further topics related to licensing procedures, the necessity of the re-export clause on the end-user certificate, reporting and registration. It has to be pointed out that the presence of the representatives of the Bosnia and Herzegovinian Ministry of Trade and Economic Relation brought an added-value to the outreach event, by offering the representatives of the Serbian defence industry to ask directly question to the Bosnia and Herzegovinian licensing authority as the industries of the two countries (i.e Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) are inter-linked.

II. REGIONAL WORKSHOPS

For Central Asia

Online, 26-27 January 2022

This workshop built closely on the previous outreach events as well as on the recent geopolitical developments in the region. Therefore, the workshop kicked off with updates on the newest developments in the field of export control and continued with topics on prevention of diversion, illicit trafficking as well as trade of firearms, which are current and important issues for the Central Asian region. Furthermore, the second day put a special spotlight on regional and interagency cooperation. Seven experts (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Kyrgyzstan, Great Britain, Serbia), including WCO and Frontex supported this regional outreach activity.

Sixteen participants from the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan as well as from Tajikistan representing several national authorities; the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development as well as Customs took part in the workshop. Due to internal restrictions, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could not take part in the event.

The agenda included followings topics:

- latest developments in the area of arms trade controls from the EU perspective, including EU Common Position's assessment criteria;
- security instruments to counter diversion as well as illicit trade, including the presentation of the content of the "Handbook on Detection of Firearms for Border Guards and Customs Officers", which was developed by Frontex;
- fostering efficient regional cooperation in Central Asia;
- cross-national interagency cooperation;
- assistance cooperation in the face of the pandemic — national experience and challenges.

III. CROSS REGIONAL WORKSHOPS

For Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe/Caucasus

In-person (Albania, Tirana), 17-18 May 2022 — BAFA and Expertise France

BAFA organised, in cooperation with the EU P2P Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods (CoE 64) implemented by the consortium led by Expertise France, a cross-regional workshop on e-licensing for partner countries from South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in the framework of the EU Outreach Project on the Promotion of Effective Arms Export Controls (EU COARM OP V), based on the Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464. The event was the first under the COARM V project to be held in person.

E-licensing is a relatively new topic for many partner countries, and is of growing interest. Partner countries from different EU-funded projects participated in this workshop which focussed exclusively on e-licencing.

The workshop aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of existing e-licensing systems and the various factors that should be taken into account, when contemplating the introduction of such systems. It aimed at assisting participating partner countries to better assess if an e-licensing system is needed, and if so, which features and tools such a system should have for meeting the respective national needs. Against this background, the workshop provided an in-depth overview of different approaches to e-licensing.

The Cross-Regional Workshop was supported by eleven EU experts from Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy and Romania, two members of the European Commission and three colleagues of the US Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program.

Thirty-one participants representing the competent authorities from Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo ⁽³¹⁾, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia as well as one participant from Costa Rica took part in the workshop.

The agenda included:

- e-Licensing systems — Existing systems and software programmes
- e-Licensing systems — What is available on the market?
- Impact of e-licensing on the industry
- e-Licensing systems Maintenance, operationalization, cost implications and IT support

For Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe/Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa

In-person (Georgia, Tbilisi), 11-12 October 2022

A cross-regional and cross-project workshop for beneficiary partner countries from Eastern Europe and Caucasus, South-Eastern Europe, North Africa and Mediterranean, and Central Asian regions was conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia. It was organised in cooperation with the EU P2P Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods (CoE 64) implemented by the consortium led by Expertise France.

⁽³¹⁾ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Content wise the activity focused on tackling the importance of addressing new challenges and how those can best be faced in the area of export control. The workshop dealt with controlling intangible technology transfers (ITT) as well as outreach to academia and research sector, again subjects important to both pillars of export control (the conventional arms control pillar as well as for dual-use trade control). Therefore, this cross-regional workshop aimed at providing partner countries with the opportunity to take note of the current discussions, trends, and challenges in the field of strategic trade controls with particular focus on intangible transfers of technology and the risks academia and research institutions have to be made aware of. In addition, the cross-regional and cross-project workshop offered a platform for the participants to share national experiences, efforts and challenges in this field. At the same time, the objective of the workshop was to underline the importance of ITT controls in general and how adequate controls could be implemented best.

Eight experts from Germany, Spain, France, Romania, as well as from industry and academic/research sector supported the workshop.

Thirty participants from Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Republic of North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Morocco and Serbia representing several national authorities took part in the workshop. Due to visa restrictions, Kosovo⁽³²⁾ could not take part in the workshop and was offered the possibility to participate online.

The agenda included following items:

- Introduction into Legal Background of Transfer of Technology and state of the play regarding strategic trade control over transfer of technology in the partner countries
- The control of transfer of technology from private sector's perspective
- Internal Compliance programmes and due diligence
- The importance of Outreach to Academia — experiences and lessons learned from the perspective of control authorities

IV. BI-NATIONAL WORKSHOPS

Bi-national assistance KAZAKHSTAN and KYRGYZSTAN

In-person (Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan), 26-27 July 2022

This activity focused on approaches of organising technical assessments in export control and ways to optimize the incorporation and use of technical expertise best into export control administration processes.

In this two-day activity, discussion about intended establishment of commodity identification centres took place, as both partner countries requested within the COARM V project support in this respect.

Three experts from Poland, Lithuania and Romania supported the bi-national activity. Eighteen participants from Kazakhstan and 6 participants from Kyrgyzstan representing several national authorities attended, among which the Kazakh Ministry for Industry and Infrastructure, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee and from Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy and Commerce, State Customs Service, Kyrgyz National University and Ministry for Natural Resources, Ecology and Technical Oversight.

The workshop also aimed at offering participants from Kazakh and Kyrgyz customs and licensing authorities the opportunity to start identifying multiple options at the decision-making stage, to exchange ideas with experts and to invite stakeholders who could assist in the establishment of the national centres.

V. STUDY VISITS

Study Visit to Italy for ALBANIA, ALGERIA, JORDAN and LEBANON

In-person (Italy, Livorno and Rome), 21-23 June 2022

The three-day event organised by BAFA in cooperation with the Italian licensing authority UAMA, aimed to provide participants with an in-depth practical example and was organised in order to share best practices from an export control system in an EU country.

The participants received an overview of best practices for effective export control from different Italian agencies. Special attention was paid to inter-agency cooperation between licensing authority and customs. Furthermore, the topics concerning industry compliance as well as customs and law enforcement procedures at ports were addressed. The last part of this outreach event included an on-site visit of a production plant of Leonardo S.p.A in Livorno, where customs officers presented how to conduct an on-site customs clearance control for the export of military equipment manufactured in the plant.

⁽³²⁾ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Nine experts supported the study visit (eight Italian experts from licensing and customs authorities, as well as one customs expert from Croatia). Representatives from an Italian exporting company, Leonardo S.p.A. supported the event as well. Thirteen participants from Albania, Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon representing several national authorities participated, among which the State Export Control Authority, General Directorate of National Security, Ministry of Defense, General Directorate of Customs, Ministry of Economy and Trade.

The agenda included:

- the role of the licensing authority in the field of export controls, including legal basis;
- the role of industry, using one of Italy's most important arms manufacturing companies, Leonardo S.p.A, as a practical example.
- the role of customs in arms export controls, including customs risk management procedures as well as two-on-site visits to the customs chemical laboratory and to the installations at the Port of Livorno;
- practical examples of applied customs control procedures in the port's cargo terminal.

Study Visit to Serbia for ARMENIA and BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA

In-person (Serbia, Belgrade), 12-14 July 2022

The study visit was organised as back-to-back with an Outreach event for the Serbian arms production industry.

This two-day study visit was part of a peer-to-peer exercise that Serbia and Georgia are conducting in tandem. The follow-up study visit to Georgia is planned for July 2023. The study visit to Serbia focused on the pre-licensing phase and therefore covered topics such as internal compliance programmes, transparency, and dialogue with industry and academia, including tools for shaping this dialogue.

The peer-to-peer approach made it possible to also gain knowledge of the Georgian approach in this matter, as Georgia shared its expertise within the study visit to Serbia, too. The same will happen in July 2023 vice versa, offering the participants the unique opportunity to gain insights in a more comprehensive way. While the study visit to Serbia centred on the pre-licensing phase, the study visit to Georgia will focus on the licensing phase as such. BAFA, highlighted in the official invitation that same participants should attend both study visits in order to maximise the benefit from the peer-to-peer approach.

The event was attended by fourteen people on the first day, and seventeen people on the second day. Because of the special peer-to-peer approach of this event the activity was supported by two trainers from Serbia and Georgia that were recently trained by BAFA.

The agenda included:

- the pre-licensing phase, namely the issue of registration
- awareness raising, especially the dialogue between industry and authority and as well the tools at the authority's and industry's disposal to shape this dialogue
- ICP (Internal Compliance Programme)
- the company's obligations, such as transparency and reporting.
- outreach to industry during the pandemic
- the constant challenging-issue of identification of goods, especially for authorities with no in house technical expertise.

2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

I. NATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Benin

Awareness-raising workshop on the ATT and Benin's obligations: use of the national checklist and planning for the drafting of the national ATT law

Hybrid Event (Cotonou), 9 December 2022 — Expertise France

This activity was a continuation of the assistance provided to Benin during the second phase of the EU P2P ATT project. After developing their National Control List (NCL), Beninese authorities wished to sensitize relevant institutions to its use. This activity also provided an opportunity to prepare the next step in the implementation of the ATT: the drafting of the national law internalizing the provisions of the ATT. Finally, the activity raised awareness of the Treaty's obligations among new officials in the relevant national institutions.

Cameroon

Workshop to launch the drafting of the Cameroon National Control List

In-person (Yaoundé), 8-9 November 2022 — Expertise France

This activity was a continuation of the legal assistance provided during the second phase of the EU P2P ATT project. The Cameroonian authorities wished to develop their National Control List (NCL), an obligation of the ATT and an essential element for the effectiveness of their national control regime.

Capacity Building Workshop on Conventional Arms Export and Import Reporting

In-person (Yaoundé), 10-11 November 2022 — Expertise France

This activity was a continuation of the legal assistance provided during the second phase of the EU P2P ATT project. Cameroonian authorities requested support to strengthen their annual reporting capacity under the ATT, Article 13(3) which requires States Parties to submit an annual report to the Secretariat on exports and imports of conventional arms.

Chile

Bilateral Cooperation

In-person (Santiago), 27 October 2022 — BAFA

Chile is a new long-term partner country within the EU ATT Outreach Project and this workshop was the first bilateral cooperation between BAFA and Chile under the EU ATT OP-III framework. Under the second phase of the project, Chile expressed a very keen interest in receiving EU support for ATT implementation and participated in three ad-hoc activities. It was therefore considered very important to harness this momentum and provide the country with long-term, dedicated assistance.

This first workshop aimed to kick off the new cooperation, to raise awareness of important stipulations of the treaty, to discuss procedures for regulating the export of listed items and to identify topics of discussion for future cooperation and for more workshops in the framework of the project. The activity was also an opportunity to address Chile's draft export control legislation, which will likely be one of the main areas of focus for support in the future.

The workshop was supported by four experts (Spain, Sweden, Mexico, Philippines). Furthermore, two Small Arms Survey representatives shared their expertise with the participants, in order to gain synergies, where appropriate, with both projects being implemented in the region.

Costa Rica

Cross-regional and cross-project workshop on e-licensing

In person, Albania (Tirana), 17-18 May 2022 — BAFA and Expertise France

E-licensing is a relatively new topic for many partner countries, and is of growing interest. Partner countries from different EU-funded projects participated in this workshop which focussed exclusively on e-licencing. We addressed:

- different e-licensing systems used in EU Member States
- a case study of an EU country that currently does not use e-licensing
- e-Licensing systems available on the market: the EU's dual-use e-licensing system and Stratlink
- impact of e-licensing on industry
- technical and follow up implications

Participants: Costa Rica (*partner country under EU ATT Outreach Program*), and partner countries from South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (*EU COARM Outreach Program, and EU P2P Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods (CoE 64)*). Costa Rica had in the past expressed its own significant interest in e-licensing.

Côte d'Ivoire

Sensitisation of senators to the draft law on arms and ammunition control and its compliance with the provisions of the ATT

In-person (Yamoussoukro), 20-22 June 2022 — Expertise France

Activity organised at the request of the national authorities to complete the legal assistance provided by Expertise France on the drafting and sensitization of the draft law on arms and ammunition, which will become the backbone of the national arms control legislation.

The activity was jointly organised and delivered by experts from Expertise France and Côte d'Ivoire's SALW National Commission (ComNat), as well as from the SALW Division of ECOWAS. An effective exchange of knowledge and synergy with the ATT, the ECOWAS Convention and national arms control practice was ensured.

All suggestions made by Expertise France during the previous workshop on the draft law with members of parliament in September 2021 have been integrated by the authorities bringing the text into compliance with the ATT.

Sensitisation of judges and judicial police officers to the draft law on arms and ammunition control and its compliance with the provisions of the ATT

In-person (Yamoussoukro), 23 June 2022 — Expertise France

Activity organised at the request of the national authorities to sensitize crucial actors in the fight against illicit arms trafficking and to the ATT. Participants were walked through the current arms control legal framework as well as the content of the draft law. The activity was jointly organised and delivered by experts from Expertise France and Cote d'Ivoire's National SALW Commission (ComNat), as well as from the SALW Division of ECOWAS, ensuring the exchange of knowledge and synergy with the ATT, the ECOWAS Convention and national arms control practice.

Kazakhstan

National Assistance Workshop

In-person (Nur-Sultan), 28-29 July 2022 — BAFA

This was the first activity with Kazakhstan as a long-term partner country under the EU ATT OP-III. Kazakhstan already participated in an ad-hoc workshop in the second phase of the project and has been identified as a promising prospect for future cooperation, in particular given its interest in the ATT in a region where there is little support for the Treaty at the moment.

This first national activity served to learn more about the current status of the ATT in Kazakhstan, while reinforcing the importance and message of the ATT.

Issues such as technical assessments, identification and classification, interagency cooperation and record keeping were all addressed. A needs assessment, which included recommendations and ideas for next steps, was also conducted.

Niger

Legal workshop: national revision of the Niger Firearms Act

In-Person (Niamey), 4-6 October 2022 — Expertise France

Expertise France conducted a final read-through of the draft law and submitted a last round of suggestions to finalise the text and ensure maximum compliance with the ATT.

Senegal

Launch of a project to strengthen reporting on conventional arms exports and imports

In-person (Dakar), 1-2 December 2022 — Expertise France

This activity was a continuation of the assistance provided during the second phase of the EU P2P ATT project. Senegalese authorities requested support to strengthen their annual reporting capacities under the ATT.

Thailand

National Assistance Workshop

In-person (Bangkok), 1-2 June 2022 — BAFA

Twenty-two participants from various relevant Thai authorities attended the first national assistance workshop for Thailand. The Thai side gave an overview of the current state and structure of their export control system.

Together with the experts, they identified gaps and areas for improvement. The activity also served to (re)-establish a channel of communication with the Thai authorities.

Other agenda items focused on the ATT (significant, history and status quo), the treaty's obligations, and the establishment of an export controls system in line with ATT requirements. The experts also gave recommendations on different fields of ATT implementation in Thailand, as well as suggestions for future cooperation.

Zambia

National Assistance Workshop

In-person (Lusaka), 16-18 August 2022 — BAFA

This workshop aimed at continuing the cooperation established under the second project phase which concluded in the drafting of the National Conventional Arms Control Bill (2021).

The first part aimed at raising awareness of ATT implementation needs and the cooperation with the EU and BAFA of high-level officials, many of which were new in their positions and appointed by the president after the general elections in 2021. The workshop therefore also intended to support a successful passing of the draft bill being reviewed in the President's cabinet by some of the officials participating in the workshop. The second and third day of the workshop were dedicated to reviewing the work already done by Zambia and to supporting the start of drafting of secondary legislation stipulating procedures, responsibilities as well as the scope of controls in line with the ATT.

II. REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

ASEAN

Kick-off meeting for phase III of the programme in South East Asia

Online, 20 April 2022 — BAFA, Expertise France

A total of eighteen participants from Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand attended, among which the relevant national ATT stakeholders from all four countries including the licensing authorities from Malaysia and the Philippines.

The conference was the first major activity under the new phase of the project. It was designed as a multilateral kick-off event and aimed to bring all signatory states of the ASEAN community (Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) to the table to discuss possibilities, expectations and common goals for future cooperation with the region within the third project phase.

To achieve important goals for the region (universalisation and effective implementation of the treaty), the conference aimed to provide an opportunity for countries of the ASEAN region and the implementing entities to exchange ideas on future bilateral and multinational workshops, to recap findings of the second project phase and to discuss the current status of implementation of the Treaty in the region, including possible challenges.

We invited five participants each from all five signatory states in Southeast Asia. Cambodia did not respond to the invitation. Singapore attended without holding a presentation.

Latin America

Regional Workshop I

Online, 27 April 2022 — BAFA

This workshop focused on awareness raising for high-level officials for Latin America and Caribbean. More specifically, it addressed decision makers in the region, who can drive the implementation process of the ATT and therefore aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of the importance of the implementation of the ATT as well as its key elements (in particular Article 5, 1 and Article 5, 2 of the Treaty). In accordance with this, a focus was placed on the need to have a legislation in place, which is in line with the Treaty's provisions and objectives.

The duration of the event was limited to two hours in order to ensure the participation of all representatives despite possible tight schedules.

The Regional Workshop was supported by four experts from Greece, Spain, Mexico and Philippines. Eighteen participants from relevant authorities of Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Peru participated in the event. An expert from the Philippines presented his country's approach to transposing ATT provisions into national legislation, thus encouraging south-south cooperation and exchanges of experience.

Regional Workshop II

In-person (Chile, Santiago), 25-26 October 2022 — BAFA

This two-day workshop was a follow-up to the online session of 27 April 2022 and the first in-person activity for the Latin America and Caribbean Region under the EU ATT OP-III framework. The aim was to continue the fruitful regional discussions on important steps to take on national level when it comes to ATT implementation. It also aimed at further assisting partner states to identify individual needs regarding ATT implementation and to provide a platform to discuss with partners of the region common procedural challenges including how to resolve those best.

The Regional Workshop was supported by an expert from Spain, Sweden, Mexico and the Philippines. Two Small Arms Survey representatives and one representative from CARICOM IMPACS also participated. Thirty participants from relevant authorities of Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Peru joined the event.

The agenda items included:

- the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty for the region of Latin America and the Caribbean
- items to control: Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5
- regional cooperation in the field of arms export controls in Latin America and the Caribbean
- central obligations under the ATT: Articles 5, 6, 7 including the EU Licensing Criteria
- transposing ATT provisions into national legislation — the case of Spain, Mexico and the Philippines.

III. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Side event at the eighth Conference of the States Parties to the ATT (CSP 8)

In-person (Geneva) 24 August 2022 — Expertise France / BAFA

The CSP side event was intended to raise awareness about the EU's implementation support activities, raise awareness of countries which may subsequently seek assistance, present the outline of the third phase of the programme, and inform about recently implemented activities.

The session was followed by a question-and-answer session of approximately 30 minutes.

Liberia and Gambia expressed their interest in participating in the project. Georgia and Costa Rica expressed their gratitude for the good cooperation. The next steps of cooperation were discussed with Kazakhstan.

Podcast series

Winter 2022 — Expertise France

A first podcast dedicated to the challenges and issues related to the ATT CSP 8 (August 2022), in French and in English was produced and loaded on the platform of the programme.

3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Implemented by: ATT Secretariat

Council Decision 2021/649 was adopted to support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Thus, in partnership with the ATT Secretariat, the Union provided the necessary resources for activities to support States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT and to strengthen the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT. The text below relates to work undertaken from April 2021 to December 2022.

Project 1: support for capacity building of ATT National Points of Contact

For: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Eswatini, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Montenegro, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, State of Palestine, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia

The overall objective is to build the capacity of States Parties National Points of Contact (NPC), including increasing their knowledge of ATT obligations and raising their awareness with respect to ATT process developments.

To this end, the *Guidance Document for National Points of Contact (NPCs)* was developed in early 2022, with input from various stakeholders including long-serving and recently-appointed NPCs. The *Guidance Document* provides guidance on the role and possible tasks of NPCs. It was launched at the Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8) side event in August 2022. Eighty copies of the Guidance document were printed and distributed during the event and it has been translated into 5 UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish). The *Guidance Document* and other resources useful to NPCs are available on the *National Points of Contact page* of the ATT website.

Complementing the *Guidance Document*, Project 1 has facilitated the participation of sixty NPCs in explanatory briefings. Held in Geneva in February and April 2022, alongside ATT meetings, these briefings have assisted NPCs in preparing for participation in the formal meetings.

These activities have led to increased knowledge of ATT obligations (including reporting) among ATT NPCs, increased awareness of the ATT processes, and wide dissemination of informational materials about the ATT to NPCs and beyond.

Project 2: Expert Roster (Train the Trainers)

For: Asia States, the Caribbean States, West African States, Southern and Central American States, and Southern African States.

With respect to Asian States, the ATT Secretariat conducted a regional training workshop in The Philippines from 12 — 16 December 2022

The overall objective is to build the capacity of local and regional ATT experts to provide advice and training on ATT implementation at the national and regional levels in order to reduce the reliance on international consultants and organisations, improve the quality of training and implementation assistance, and to contribute to better tailoring capacity-building efforts.

Since the project started, the focus has been on designing the train the trainer programme and developing the ATT training materials (i.e. *Manual* and *Guide*) to be used during the train the trainer's workshops. A training methodology expert in adult learning provided advice on the design of the train the trainer programme. The training programme includes ATT content on various modules such as prohibitions, exports, import and diversion as well as soft skills training.

To develop the *ATT Implementation Manual*, the project engaged subject matter experts to draft the different modules, which were then reviewed and edited by the ATT Secretariat. This was followed by a peer review process where the draft modules were reviewed by other experts who provided written comments. After the peer review process, the subject matter experts updated the draft modules accordingly.

The ATT Secretariat reviewed all updated modules before they were sent, as components of the draft manual, for copy editing, proof-reading and graphic designing. The subject matter experts who contributed to the *ATT Implementation Manual* also provided content for the *Guide for Trainers*. The *Guide* contains case studies, additional reading resources and possible exercises that can be used to train the various modules.

The *Manual* and the *Guide*, which were translated from English into five UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish), were used during the first train the trainer's regional workshop in Manila, the Philippines, from 12 to 16 December 2022. The Manila workshop brought together ten experts from the Asia region for a rigorous week of skills development and Treaty content assessment culminating in an examination overseen by the Head of the ATT Secretariat.

In 2023, workshops will be run in English, French and Spanish in the Caribbean, West Africa, Southern and Central America, and Southern Africa.

These train the trainers workshops will develop an increased number of national and regional consultants that are ATT 'experts', as endorsed by the ATT Secretariat, who can deliver quality training and implementation assistance at national local and regional level. Linked to this, a public list of consultants that are endorsed by the ATT Secretariat as capable of delivering quality ATT training and implementation assistance (expert roster) will be developed and available online on the ATT website. This list will be useful for various stakeholders, such as prospective VTF recipients who are searching for consultants or project implementing partners.

Project 3: Support for a matching and needs resources database

For global use.

The project finalised the terms of reference for the development of the envisaged database with a view to procurement and user testing in the first half of 2023.

TABLE E

Internet addresses of Member States' national websites providing national reports on arms exports**Austria**

<http://www.bmeia.gv.at>

Belgium

Brussels Capital Region: <http://du-arms.brussels/>

Flemish Region: www.fdfa.be/csg

Walloon Region: <https://gouvernement.wallonie.be/home/publications/rapport-armes.html>

Bulgaria

<https://exportcontrol.mi.government.bg/indexbg.php>

Croatia

<https://mingor.gov.hr/>

Czechia

<https://www.mpo.cz/en/foreign-trade/licence-administration/>

www.mzv.cz/kontrolaexportu

Denmark

<https://politi.dk/statistik/udfoersel-af-militaert-udstyr>

Estonia

<https://vm.ee/en/strategic-export-control>

Finland

https://www.defmin.fi/luvat_ja_asiointi/vienti-_ja_siirtoluvat/tilastot#7ff322a2

France

<https://www.defense.gouv.fr/rapport-au-parlement-2023-exportations-darmement-france>

<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/securite-desarmement-et-non-proliferation/desarmement-et-non-proliferation/commerce-transport-et-exportations-d-armes-et-materiels-sensibles/article/controle-des-exportations-de-materiels-de-guerre>

Germany

<https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/export-controls-for-military-equipment.html>

http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/Export_Control/export_control_node.html

(general information on the German export control system)

Hungary

http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/haditechnika_kulkereskeelem/6a_Jelentesek

Ireland

Information on Export Controls — DETE (enterprise.gov.ie)

Italy

<https://www.esteri.it/en/ministero/struttura/uama/>

https://www.camera.it/leg18/494?idLegislatura=18&categoria=067&tipologiaDoc=elenco_categoria

https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2017/06/legge_09_07_1990_n185.pdf

Latvia

<https://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/media/8540/download?attachment>

Lithuania

<http://eimin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/verslo-aplinka/prekyba/uzsienio-prekyba>

Malta

<http://commerce.gov.mt>

Netherlands

<http://www.government.nl/issues/export-controls-of-strategic-goods> (English)

<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/exportcontrole-strategische-goederen> (Dutch)

Poland

http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa/kontrola_eksportu/transparencja/

http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/security_policy/export_control/

Portugal

<https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/pdefesa/ii/id/tcpd/Paginas/default.aspx>

Romania

<https://www.ancex.ro/>

Slovakia

<https://www.economy.gov.sk/>

Slovenia

<https://www.gov.si/en/state-authorities/ministries/ministry-of-defence/about-the-ministry-of-defence/logistics-directorate/>

Spain

<https://comercio.gob.es/ImportacionExportacion/Regimenes/Paginas/Defensa.aspx>

Sweden

Strategisk exportkontroll 2022 — krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden — Regeringen.se

EU

<https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/74299ecd-7a90-4b89-a509-92c9b96b86ba/state/analysis>

TABLE F

European Peace Facility Assistance Measures**Overview of EPF Assistance Measures (AMs) Adopted in 2022 ⁽³³⁾****1. Assistance measure taking the form of a general programme for support to the African Union**

On 21 April 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/667 on an AM taking the form of a general programme for support to the African Union for the period 2022 — 2024 (AM/GP-AU 2022-2024), with a financial reference amount of EUR 600 million. On the basis of recommendations from the HR, the PSC approved three actions under this AM in 2022.

1.1. Support to the AU Mission in Somalia/AU Transition Mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS)

On 6 July 2022, the PSC approved an action in support of the military component of AMISOM/ATMIS for the period 1 January-31 December 2022 amounting to EUR 120 million under the AM/GP-AU 2022-2024.

The action aimed at enabling the military component of AMISOM/ATMIS to fulfil its mandate, with a focus on the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali Security Forces (SSF), in line with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2568 (2021), 2628 (2022), 2670 (2022) and the Somali Transition Plan.

Type of support: troop allowances, mission subsistence allowances for high-ranking officers, and death and disability compensation.

1.2. Support to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram

On 29 March 2022, the PSC approved an action in support of the MNJTF against Boko Haram (BH) for the period 1 July-31 December 2022 amounting to EUR 10 million under the GP-AU 2022-2024.

The objective of this action was to enhance the operational effectiveness of the MNJTF with the aim to create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of BH and other terrorist groups.

Type of support: financial support to cover personnel and operational/logistical costs, including ground and air transportation, communication equipment and medical services.

1.3. Support to the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)

On 8 September 2022, the PSC approved an action in support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) amounting to EUR 15 million under the AM/GP-AU 2022-2024.

This strand of EPF support is complementary to the ongoing EPF assistance **to the Mozambican Armed Forces** and EPF support to the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique (see below).

By providing this support, the EU joined Mozambican and international efforts to restore peace, safety and security in the North of Mozambique, protect the civilian population, and allow for the return of internally displaced persons, accountable law enforcement, state structures and services to the area.

Type of support: camp fortifications and storage containers, medical equipment, vehicles and boats, as well as technological devices.

2. Assistance measures benefiting individual African countries**2.1. Mozambique**

Following the establishment of EUTM Mozambique, the Council's approval of an urgent measure of EUR 4 million and the AM of EUR 40 million to support five military units trained by the EUTM in 2021, on 21 April 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/668 to increase the reference amount of the AM by EUR 45 million to address the needs of all eleven units to be trained. Total support to Mozambique under this AM and the urgent measure now equals EUR 89 million.

This support will allow the aforementioned units to develop the necessary and sustainable capacities to restore safety and security in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province. It consists of the provision of integrated packages of equipment and supplies in conjunction with EU training mission. The aim is to ensure that the training is as efficient and effective as possible, enabling EUTM-trained troops to be fully operational and self-sufficient upon deployment.

The AM benefiting military units trained by EUTM Mozambique is complemented by support to SAMIM (see above) and support to the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique (see below).

Type of support: personal and collective equipment, vehicles, technical devices and a field hospital.

⁽³³⁾ For details on the 2021 ams, see the 24th annual report on arms exports for 2021.

2.2. Rwanda

On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2354 on an AM to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique with a financial reference amount of EUR 20 million.

The objective of the AM is to support the continued deployment of units of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado. This deployment started in July 2021 at the request of Mozambican authorities, in response to the ongoing fight against terrorism. This AM complements EPF support to SAMIM and EPF support to military units trained by EUTM Mozambique (see above).

Type of support: personal and collective equipment, financial support to cover costs related to the **strategic airlift**.

2.3. Niger

On 18 July 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1236 on an AM to support the Nigerien Armed Forces, with a financial reference amount of EUR 25 million. ⁽³⁴⁾

The objective of the AM is to strengthen the capabilities and resilience of the Nigerien Armed Forces to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Niger and to better protect the civilian population including against the mounting terrorist threat.

The aim of the measure was to finance the establishment of an **Armed Forces Technician Training Centre** to increase the capacities of the Nigerien Armed Forces in the area of logistics support; and the construction of a **forward operating base** to reduce the vulnerability of the Armed Forces in the Tillabéri region.

Type of support: infrastructure works, training equipment.

2.4. Mauritania

On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2355 on an AM to support the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, with a financial reference amount of EUR 12 million.

The AM has two key objectives: improving the military capacities of two pre-identified battalions of the Mauritanian Armed Forces to **better respond to the security threats** Mauritania and the region are facing, and improving the in situ medical capacities of these forces on the border with Mali, Western Sahara and with Algeria.

Type of support: riverine crafts, personal protective equipment, and medical equipment.

3. Assistance measures benefiting partners in the Eastern Neighbourhood

3.1. Ukraine

- a) In response to Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Ukraine and following the Ukrainian request of 25 February 2022 for urgent assistance, on 28 February 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 on an AM for the supply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) of military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force, and Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 on an AM to support the UAF. The initial value of the two AMs was EUR 500 million in total.

On 23 March, 13 April, 23 May, 21 July, and 17 October 2022, the Council adopted Decisions amending Decisions 2022/338 and 2022/339, on each occasion raising the financial reference amount by a total of EUR 500 million. This brought the total support to Ukraine under the EPF decided in 2022 to EUR 3.1 billion ⁽³⁵⁾. Reimbursement payments are distributed over the years 2022 until 2027.

Both measures have an objective to contribute to strengthening capabilities and resilience of the UAF to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and protect the civilian population.

In the reporting period, 22 Member States (MS) — Ministries of Defence as implementing actors in most of the cases — were delivering military equipment to Ukraine under the two AMs via designated hubs or directly based on the Ukrainian priority needs, in addition to MS' military equipment deliveries outside the EPF. 24 MS contributed financially to the AM to support the UAF with military equipment, or platforms, designed to deliver lethal force. The Clearing House Cell (CHC) in the EU Military Staff supported the implementation of both AMs by matching MS' offers with priorities communicated by the UAF.

Type of support: it included weapons and ammunitions, and platforms designed to deliver lethal force as well as other military and non-military equipment, including individual first aid kits and other crucial medical equipment, personal equipment, winter equipment, generators and fuel.

⁽³⁴⁾ The measure was suspended following the coup in Niger in July 2023.

⁽³⁵⁾ Adjusted figure including additional contributions from Member States constructively abstaining from Decision 2022/338 and amendments (Austria, Ireland, Malta).

- b) On 14 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2245 to support the UAF trained by the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) with military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force, with a financial reference amount of EUR 16 million.

Type of support: ammunition, military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force to meet the operational requirements of EUMAM Ukraine; transportation of trainees, custody, maintenance and repair of the military equipment provided for the training purposes.

3.2. Moldova

On 30 June 2022, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2022/1093 on an AM to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, with a financial reference amount of EUR 40 million.

The 2022 AM will strengthen the capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces' **logistics, mobility, command and control, cyber-defence, unmanned aerial reconnaissance and tactical communications units** by providing relevant non-lethal equipment, supplies and services, including equipment-related training.

Type of support: air surveillance, logistics, mobility and transportation, command and control, and cyber defence equipment.

3.3. Georgia

On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2352 on an AM to support the Georgian Defence Forces, with a financial reference amount of EUR 20 million.

The 2022 AM will strengthen the capacities of the Georgian Defence Forces' **military medical, logistics, engineering and cyber-defence services** by providing relevant non-lethal equipment, supplies and services including equipment-related training.

Type of support: medical, and engineering equipment, ground mobility assets and cyber defence equipment.

4. Assistance measures benefiting partners in the Western Balkans

4.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH)

On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2022/2353 on an xAM to support capacity building for the Tactical Support Brigade of the AFBiH, with a financial reference amount of EUR 10 million.

The objective of the 2022 AM is to strengthen the capacities of the AFBiH by enhancing and upgrading the equipment of its tactical support brigade, improve the security and deployment conditions of the AFBiH as well as upgrade a limited number of operational capabilities, specifically in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) as well as defensive and early warning capabilities.

Type of support: field equipment, key tools for military engineering and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) materiel.

4.2. Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF)

On 9 June 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/906 on an AM to support capacity building of the BMTF, with a financial reference amount of EUR 6 million.

The objective of the AM is to strengthen military medical capabilities of the region and civilian relief efforts, and ultimately contribute to regional cooperation and cohesion. The AM will support the capacity building of the BMTF by procuring the necessary equipment and materiel for the medical units of the Armed Forces of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, participating in the BMTF.

Type of support: mobility assets, components for field hospitals at 'role 2' standards, laboratory equipment and supplies, and IT and communication equipment.

5. Assistance measure benefiting a partner in the Southern Neighbourhood

5.1. Lebanon

On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2356 on an AM to support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), with a financial reference amount of EUR 6 million.

The objective of the AM is to enhance the capabilities and the resilience of the LAF to ensure the national security and stability of Lebanon, through the enhancement of their military medical capacities, and the provision of equipment for the LAF's operational personnel.

Type of support: healthcare equipment to support military medical services, and individual equipment.

6. EPF Tables — Provision of Military Equipment in 2022 under EPF AMs

6.1. Deliveries per Beneficiary Country

(a) = number of assistance measures or actions under general programs; (b) = value of goods delivered in euros.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

		ML5
Germany	a	1
	b	381,652

Mozambique

		ML13
France	a	1
	b	191,000

6.2. Deliveries of Items on the EU Common Military List to International and Regional Organisations

Beneficiary organisation: nil

Destination Country	Exporting State	Description of goods
—	—	nil

6.3. Items on the EU Common Military List identified in the implementation phase of EPF assistance measures adopted until 31 December 2022

Reference	Beneficiary	Items on the EU Common Military List
Action under Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1210	the Somali National Army	personal protective equipment, warning equipment, imaging and countermeasure equipment, C-IED devices
Action under Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1210	the G5 Sahel Joint Force	radio, C-IED, night vision goggles
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2032	Mozambican military units trained by EUTM Mozambique	helmets, personal protective equipment
Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923	the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	land mine detectors, personal protective equipment
Council Decision (EU) 2021/2135	the Ukrainian Armed Forces	land mine detectors, individual protective equipment

Reference	Beneficiary	Items on the EU Common Military List
Council Decision (EU) 2021/2136	the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova	land mine detectors, demining protective equipment, portable jammers
Action under Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/667	the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)	vehicles, ground radars, mine detectors, counter-IED systems
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 and subsequent amendments	the Ukrainian Armed Forces	military equipment, and platforms designed to deliver lethal force
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 and subsequent amendments	the Ukrainian Armed Forces	equipment, and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1093	the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova	vehicles, command and control, cyber defence, unmanned aerial reconnaissance and tactical communications
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2352	the Armed Forces of Georgia	engineering equipment
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2353	the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	CBRN equipment
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2355	the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania	personal protective equipment, riverine embarkations, radios, UAVs, vehicles



C/2024/1146

22.2.2024

Euro-Wechselkurs ⁽¹⁾

21. Februar 2024

(C/2024/1146)

1 Euro =

Währung			Kurs	Währung			Kurs
USD	US-Dollar		1,0809	CAD	Kanadischer Dollar		1,4618
JPY	Japanischer Yen		162,12	HKD	Hongkong-Dollar		8,4544
DKK	Dänische Krone		7,4545	NZD	Neuseeländischer Dollar		1,7479
GBP	Pfund Sterling		0,85619	SGD	Singapur-Dollar		1,4524
SEK	Schwedische Krone		11,2075	KRW	Südkoreanischer Won	1 441,77	
CHF	Schweizer Franken		0,9510	ZAR	Südafrikanischer Rand	20,3446	
ISK	Isländische Krone		148,50	CNY	Chinesischer Renminbi Yuan	7,7730	
NOK	Norwegische Krone		11,3345	IDR	Indonesische Rupiah	16 889,77	
BGN	Bulgarischer Lew		1,9558	MYR	Malaysischer Ringgit	5,1818	
CZK	Tschechische Krone		25,380	PHP	Philippinischer Peso	60,480	
HUF	Ungarischer Forint		387,98	RUB	Russischer Rubel		
PLN	Polnischer Zloty		4,3165	THB	Thailändischer Baht	38,739	
RON	Rumänischer Leu		4,9760	BRL	Brasilianischer Real	5,3253	
TRY	Türkische Lira		33,5149	MXN	Mexikanischer Peso	18,4379	
AUD	Australischer Dollar		1,6486	INR	Indische Rupie	89,6320	

⁽¹⁾ Quelle: Von der Europäischen Zentralbank veröffentlichter Referenz-Wechselkurs.



AUSFÜHRLICHE SITZUNGSBERICHTE VOM 22. JUNI 2016

(C/2024/1618)

EUROPÄISCHES PARLAMENT

SITZUNGSPERIODE 2016-2017

Sitzungen vom 22. und 23. Juni 2016

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AUSFÜHRLICHE SITZUNGSBERICHTE VOM 22. JUNI 2016

VORSITZ: MARTIN SCHULZ

Präsident

(Die Sitzung wird um 15.10 Uhr eröffnet.)

1. Wiederaufnahme der Sitzungsperiode

Der Präsident. — Ich erkläre die am Donnerstag, dem 9. Juni 2016, unterbrochene Sitzungsperiode für wieder aufgenommen.

2. Erklärungen des Präsidenten

Der Präsident. — Zunächst einmal heiße ich den Präsidenten von Israel, Herrn Reuven Rivlin, herzlich im Europäischen Parlament willkommen.

3. Feierliche Sitzung – Staat Israel

Der Präsident. — Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Wir haben heute die große Ehre, Herrn Präsidenten Reuven Rivlin und seine Ehefrau Nechama Rivlin bei uns zu begrüßen. Frau Rivlin, herzlich willkommen! Sie sind heute in Begleitung Ihres Ehemanns bei uns. Vielen Dank!

Reuven Rivlin, President of the State of Israel. – Mr President, Madam Vice-President of the Commission/ High Representative of the Union, honourable Members, my wife Nechama, ladies and gentlemen, with your permission I will speak my words in Hebrew.

(Official translation of President Rivlin's speech, which was delivered in Hebrew)

A mere four hours: that is the flight time from Tel-Aviv to Brussels. I could say that four hours, and light years, separate Brussels and Tel-Aviv, but in truth there is not much difference between them, be it in awareness or in essence: two cosmopolitan cities, practically neighbours, not far from each other, both recently struck by a wave of terrorism.

Seated here are many delegates from numerous European countries. Some share the Mediterranean Sea with us, all share a rich and painful history with the Jewish People. About a month ago, the leaders of Europe marked 100 years since the Battle of Verdun, the longest battle of World War I, with 900 000 casualties, including 300 000 fatalities. Some half a million Jewish soldiers served in the armies of the countries at war, often poised against each other, firing upon each other.

But this 'patriotic bloodletting' did not bestow any privilege on the Jewish People. Quite the contrary: Jews in every country were accused of spying and treason. Germany started a 'head-count' of Jewish soldiers. In Eastern Europe, Jews were accused of Bolshevism and of Anti-Bolshevism. It is estimated that more than 170 000 Jewish soldiers were killed in World War I, and around 100 000 more were murdered in post-war pogroms.

That horrible war, World War I, was the herald of the 'Exodus' of the Jewish People from Europe. Many Jews saw in the United States of America their new home. Others, Zionist leaders, shaken and shocked from having had to face their own Jewish brothers as foes on the battlefield, took action to fulfil the dream of a national home for the Jewish People, in its ancient and eternal homeland, the Land of Israel.

From where we stand today, the Great War was but a promo to a much more horrendous war that followed suit: World War II. In World War II, the annihilation of the Jewish People was a defined target of the Axis powers headed by Nazi Germany. The second 'European Exodus' of the Jewish People occurred upon the defeat of the Third Reich. This was a traumatic emigration: one of refugees and agony, of a culture destroyed, of a people which lost one third of its sons and daughters.

Distinguished audience, even the wildest of imaginations could not have foreseen a course of events in which an ancient people returned from years of exile and rebuilt its historic homeland. A wild imagination could neither have foreseen such a convoluted historic course of events in which an utterly torn and bleeding continent, awash with the blood of war and strife, would have paved the way to a joint European parliament.

And yes, no less important are the solid, steadfast ties created between us: ties embodied today in a wide array of joint ventures and cooperation, in research and innovation, in health and the environment, education and culture and many more areas. Regardless of the perspective from which we look at this – our past, our present or the future we are awaiting – we intrinsically linked, Israel and Europe, in an unbreakable bond.

Just as humanity could not be what it is without Europe, so Europe could not be what it is without the Jewish People. It would be difficult to imagine what humanity would have been like without Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Galileo Galilei, Martin Luther or Marie Curie, just as it would be difficult to imagine what Europe would be without Maimonides, Spinoza, Freud or Einstein. Our common interests – and, moreover, our common values – dictate our present and shape our future.

Liberty, equality, justice, pluralism and religious tolerance, democracy: these are the basic tenets inscribed in Israel's Declaration of Independence. These are the constitutive values of the European Union.

The European Union, and within it this distinguished Parliament, is an audacious endeavour of politics and statehood. Tomorrow this endeavour will be put to a complex test in the United Kingdom, while, day in day out, it stands the test of refugees and migration on a historic scale. The State of Israel too is an audacious endeavour of statehood, of a people returning to its land after two thousand years of exile. And, just like you, Israel faces difficult and complex challenges. But unlike Europe, which embarked upon a process of removing partitions between nations and states, Israel wishes, and indeed must, remain first and foremost a national homeland, a safe haven for the Jewish People.

The State of Israel is by no means a compensation for the Holocaust, but the Holocaust has posited as a basic tenet the necessity and vitality of the return of the Jewish People to history, as a nation taking its fate in its own hands. I feel that the massive criticism aimed at Israel in Europe stems from, inter alia, a misunderstanding and an impatience toward this existential need of the Jewish nation and the State of Israel.

On the other hand, and much to my regret, Israel has a growing sense of impatience when it comes to Europe. There are those who feel anger and frustration toward certain European actions, vis-à-vis what they perceive as sometimes unfair criticism, sometimes even contaminated by elements of condescension and, some would say, double standards.

My European friends, we cannot agree on everything, but, as friends and as true allies, I call upon you and ask you: let us be patient. Please respect the Israeli considerations, even when different from your own. Respect Israel's sovereignty and the democratic process of its decision-making. Respect Israel's staunch commitment, indeed its very duty, to protect its citizens. For us it is the most sacred commandment of all.

A few years ago, a French friend turned to me and said: 'If we and the Germans have made peace and put an end to conflict once and for all – and, believe me, what happened between us and them overshadows any other conflict I can think of – then there is no reason for you not to succeed.' He continued: 'How long have you and the Arabs been fighting, all in all? One hundred years? Fifty years? We have been fighting for a thousand years, and now it is over, forever.' This is what he said to me.

I am standing here today and saying in no uncertain manner: from 1993, the year in which the Oslo Accords were signed, the elected Israeli leadership has been – as it still is – in support of the solution of 'two-states for two peoples'. Furthermore, being well versed in the Israeli Parliament, I know that any political agreement brought before the Israeli Knesset by an elected government will be approved. Nevertheless, and with all the difficulty and pain involved, we must look reality straight in the eye and tell the truth. Currently the practical conditions, the political and regional circumstances, which would enable us to reach a permanent agreement between us – the Israelis and the Palestinians – are failing to materialise.

First, in order to achieve a comprehensive permanent agreement, an effective leadership is required. However, the Palestinian leadership today is divided in (at least) two: the Palestinian Authority ruling over Judea and Samaria and, on the other hand, Hamas, which rules Gaza and is ideologically committed – in both its political and its military leadership – to the annihilation of Israel.

Second, in order to achieve a stable and viable agreement, a reasonable regional and economic infrastructure is required. But we are living in a reality where the plague of murderous Jihadi fundamentalism, religious fanaticism and incitement – embodied in the Islamic State and Hezbollah – are at our very borders and have not missed out Gaza and the West Bank either. We live in a reality of a chaos-stricken Middle East in which uncertainty is the only certainty.

To this worrisome picture, add the dire economic straits, poverty and lack of infrastructure in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, which in turn will continue the destabilisation and nurture violence. In this respect, Israel is making, and will continue to make, vast efforts: more than any other actor in the region, and even at the price of complex security risk-taking. But Israeli intervention alone will not suffice.

Finally, one should bear in mind the most fundamental trait of Israeli-Palestinian relations today, which is, to my deep regret, a total lack of trust between the parties on all levels; between the leaderships and the peoples.

I am afraid that, for years, the international community has been acting as a mediator between the parties based on one inflexible paradigm, that of striving to renew negotiations toward a permanent agreement. This paradigm leads to a dichotomy: 'Two states or a bi-national state', 'All or nothing', 'Here and now or nevermore'. It is, by the way, by virtue of that same paradigm that various European states opposed the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, claiming that it does not provide a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Had that concept been accepted then, imagine where we would be today. This paradigm relies on the assumption that the problem which is the crux of the matter in this bloody and painful conflict is simply the lack of good faith on both sides, and that, if only pressure is exerted on 'them' and on 'us', they will adhere to a permanent agreement and to a state of peace.

However, as years go by and rounds of negotiations fail one by one, bringing in their wake waves of murderous violence and terror, it seems that this assumption of a 'lack of good will' is proving not only to be fundamentally erroneous but also to ignore the circumstances, the capabilities, and the present situation on the ground. And that, by definition, would lead to the failure of any attempt to negotiate a permanent agreement.

Ladies and gentlemen, I speak before you today in the name of the citizens of Israel, grandfathers and grandmothers, fathers and mothers, sick and tired of this bloody vicious cycle which soaks up the blood of our loved ones, the blood of our sons and daughters. I speak before you in the name of these young men and women who wish to live in their country, and not die in their homeland. I speak to you today in the name of a nation that abhors war and desires life and peace. And, I must say, one cannot hope to achieve better results while resorting to the same outlooks and tools that have previously failed time after time.

The French initiative, adopted by the EU institutions only a few days ago, suffers from those very fundamental faults. The attempt to return to negotiations for negotiations sake not only does not bring us near the long-awaited solution, but rather drags us further away from it. This striving for a permanent agreement 'now', is the chronicle of a predictable failure, which will only push the two peoples deeper into despair. This despair is the hottest bed for extremism, and undermines the endeavours of moderates.

And this despair, ladies and gentlemen, today seizes not just members of my generation but also boys and girls growing up in this part of the world, whose worldview and awareness are shaped by the violent present. This despair is the gravest danger looming over us, Israelis and Palestinians alike.

If the international community really wishes and truly aspires to be a constructive player, it must divert its efforts away from the renewal of negotiations for negotiations sake, and toward building trust between the parties and creating the necessary terms for the success of negotiations in the future.

In the current circumstances, we must all ask ourselves 'What can be done today?' rather than 'What cannot be done?' And things can be done. This mission of creating the terms for a future agreement, creating an infrastructure for trust, and for a life of dignity for both peoples, demands of us today – the international community and Israel alike – that we invest tremendous efforts in four main avenues.

The first is harnessing the moderate powers in the region. The cooperation with Jordan and Egypt is a supreme common interest of Israel and the international community as well, with the aim of preventing military build-ups beyond our borders, and in order to eradicate extremism and preserve the stability of the region. Similarly, the involvement and effective guaranties of friendly states in the region may also reduce the violent friction and serve as a warranty for future action.

The second avenue is developing Palestinian economy and infrastructures for quality of life. One cannot speak about a future agreement when people live with a basic existential feeling of having no future, no opportunities, no hope and no horizon. With the backdrop of economic difficulties in Judea and Samaria, and the situation in Gaza, a broad economic course of action is called for. Infrastructures must be developed – gas, electricity, water, sewerage and housing – in Gaza and Judea and Samaria. At the same time, a solution must be found to the human tragedy in Gaza – whereby around 1.5 million Palestinians are held hostage by a Jihadist terrorist organisation, Hamas – just as solutions must be found to the movement of residents, the transfer of trade and the enabling the appropriate security. On this issue, the State of Israel has repeatedly stated its willingness to join hands with the international community in a joint endeavour.

Israel considers the rehabilitation of Gaza and the economic development and equalising of standards of life on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides to be both an ethical and a security interest. Sources of livelihood and employment must be developed too, as Israeli and international companies that identify the potential of investing in the human capital between the Jordan and the sea, have already begun to do. The development of a stable Palestinian economy must be carried out, laying the emphasis on developing a real, independent and vital private sector as a stabilising factor free of political interests.

Furthermore, developing the economy must take into account the need for developing infrastructures for quality of life, for a life of dignity and wellbeing. Rawabi, the first planned Palestinian city ever built in the Palestinian Authority, is a model of the power and significance of basic wellbeing in creating a breathing space and a feeling of movement and progress.

The third avenue is investing in joint ventures aimed at creating joint interests. Whether we wish it or not, we – Israelis and Palestinians – share a small and common area, with common regional resources and assets, and common regional challenges. Together, we live on what is equal to one third of Austria. In such small and crowded space, creating common interests is a crucial factor in strengthening stability, and in creating the terms needed to replace the next war with programmes benefiting both parties.

We should foster and promote joint Israeli-Palestinian development ventures in the fields of renewable energy, infrastructure and the environment, joint industrial and tourism ventures and cultural and social ventures: between Israeli and Palestinian local authorities, and between private corporations and business people on both sides. For instance, the ecological park being developed through cooperation between the regional council of Gilboa and the Palestinian city of Jenin, with the support of the international community, in which the shared Kishon River is undergoing cleaning and purification processes, with the aim of providing a solution to one of the most complex issues of the conflict – the water problem. You, ladies and gentlemen, know better than I do how joint ventures create a horizon for another reality.

Fourthly and ultimately there is the avenue of education. Increasing stability, developing infrastructures and strategic terms are essential conditions, but are not enough. Creating the conditions for any future agreement requires conditioning hearts on both sides for the possibility of living with mutual respect. Peace is made between leaders but peace is also made between peoples. Changing present trends requires addressing deep-rooted hatred and fear. Otherwise fear will have the upper hand, if only because it is, to our regret, much more tangible than hope. Building trust demands an investment in the creation of wide channels of communication, not only in security contexts but also in academic, cultural, and governance contexts – and, at the same time, educating future generations to become acquainted with our neighbours, their culture and language.

Distinguished audience, the State of Israel values the efforts invested by the international community in general, and by the European Union in particular, in seeking a peaceful future between the parties. The responsibility for building trust between us and our neighbours rests, first and foremost, on the shoulders of the two parties. But if Europe is interested in serving as a constructive factor in striving for a future agreement it will be incumbent upon you, its leaders, to focus efforts at this time in a patient and methodical building of trust: not through divestments, but through investment; not by boycotts, but by cooperation.

It is no easy task for me to stand here before you today and say that, at this time, a permanent agreement for peace between us and the Palestinians cannot be achieved – because, first and foremost, I stand before the Israeli people, before my children and grandchildren, before the Israeli and Palestinian children wherever they are. It is to them that I and we, and all of us, are to be held accountable: to ask ourselves what we have actually done to promise them, someday, another future?

I believe in the capability of both these peoples to live with each other, for the simple reason that we have no other choice. If we desire life, we must, today, invest our utmost efforts in what can be achieved, not in that which cannot – for the sake of our future, and that of our children.

I would like to thank my friend, the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, for the invitation to come here, in the same week as the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. There can be no substitute for direct and joint conversation. In this act you have taken a step, albeit small, to bolster trust between the parties.

Distinguished audience, 100 years ago the thought of a joint European Parliament was inconceivable. Cooperation in the fields of electricity, gas and coal started this miracle of a Europe living in peace with itself. Small steps created a great reality. Help us step forward, step together with us, for the sake of the possibility that one day, an Israeli President will tell another world leader: 'If we and the Palestinians have made peace and put an end to conflict once and for all, there is really no reason whatsoever that you cannot succeed. We fought for many dozens of years and now it is over, forever.'

On behalf of the people in Israel, I wish all Europe's Muslims, and the Muslim believers throughout the entire world, Ramadan Karim, Kul Am Wa Antum Bikhair.

Ladies and gentlemen, 'Pray for the peace of Jerusalem, may all who love her prosper. Peace be within thy walls and prosperity within thy palaces. For my brethren and companions' sake, I will now say, Peace be within thee.' (Psalm 122, 6-8).

God bless you all.

(Applause)

Der Präsident. — Vielen Dank, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Herzlichen Dank, Herr Staatspräsident, für Ihre Worte. Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Rede. Ich danke Ihnen für den Appell, den Sie zum Schluss an uns alle gerichtet haben.

PRESIDENZA DELL'ON. ANTONIO TAJANI

Vicepresidente

4. Genehmigung des Protokolls der vorangegangenen Sitzung

Presidente. — Il processo verbale della seduta del 9 giugno 2016 è stato distribuito.

Bruno Gollnisch (NI). – Monsieur le Président, le procès-verbal, en son point 4.6, fait état de l'adoption du règlement pour une administration ouverte, efficace et indépendante sur le projet de nos excellents collègues, M. Swoboda et M^{me} Hautala.

Il s'agit d'un texte excellent qui, malheureusement, n'a pas encore valeur totalement obligatoire pour toutes les institutions de l'Union puisque le règlement n'est pas adopté. Mais j'espère qu'il a une valeur obligatoire pour ce Parlement et qu'il s'imposera à l'administration de ce Parlement, laquelle se croit autorisée à taxer de sommes considérables des députés sans même les avoir auditionnés, sans même les avoir entendus, ce qui me paraît, quelquefois, tout à fait contraire à l'indépendance que doivent conserver les députés vis-à-vis de l'administration.

Jerzy Buzek (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Nawiązując do przemówienia, którego przed chwilą wysłuchaliśmy, chciałem Państwu przypomnieć, że w zeszłym tygodniu minęło dwadzieścia pięć lat od czasu podpisania traktatu o stosunkach dobrosąsiedzkich między Polską i Niemcami. To był owoc trudnego pojednania, które rozpoczęło się już w roku 1965, poprzez list biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich, w którym napisano to słynne zdanie: „Przebaczamy i prosimy o przebaczenie”. Podpisanie traktatu w roku 1991 było także możliwe dzięki powstaniu i zwycięstwu Solidarności, dzięki zjednoczeniu Niemiec, dzięki wysiłkom kanclerzy niemieckich, a także premierów i ministrów polskiego wolnego rządu, ale przede wszystkim dzięki wysiłkom obywateli po obydwu stronach granicy na Odrze i Nysie, którzy jednoznacznie uważali, że porozumienie, współpraca i wzajemne zaufanie jest im niezbędnie potrzebne. I dlatego mogło się zrealizować to, co tutaj, w Parlamencie Europejskim, już w roku 1988 zapowiedział w pewien sposób papież Jan Paweł II, który powiedział wtedy: „Oby Europa znowu mogła oddychać dwoma płucami”.

I jeszcze jedno. Ten traktat z 1992 r. był przełożeniem wspólnego losu Polaków i Niemców, sąsiadów od stuleci, na wspólne działania w Europie, a teraz stawia przed obydwojema narodami nowe zadanie: co my, Polacy i Niemcy, możemy dzisiaj zrobić dla wspólnej Europy?

Alojz Peterle (PPE). – Gospod predsednik, dragi kolegi in prijatelji.

V čast in veselje mi je, da vas lahko spomnim, da praznuje Slovenija ta teden 25 let svoje samostojnosti. Pred 25 leti smo na podlagi plebiscitarno in demokratično izražene volje uresničili sanje slovenskega naroda o lastni in demokratični državi.

Naj vas spomnim tudi na tragično dejstvo, da je proglasitvi neodvisnosti junija 1991 sledil napad jugoslovanske ljudske armade na Slovenijo, čeprav nam je jugoslovanska ustava zagotavljala pravico do samoodločbe in odcepitve.

Ker smo bili pripravljeni, smo zmagali vojno za Slovenijo in podrli z združeno Evropo svoj del železne zavese. Takrat je evropska in svetovna demokratična javnost stopila na stran Slovenije in podprla proces mednarodnega priznavanja nove države. Ključni pečat temu procesu je dala Evropska skupnost s priznanjem Slovenije 15. januarja 1992.

Izražam posebno zahvalo tistim, ki ste nas takrat razumeli in podprli, s tem ste podprli evropsko perspektivo Slovenije. Doživeli smo razdeljeno in združeno Evropo, imamo razloge, da praznujemo skupaj in delamo odločno za boljšo Evropo.

(Il Parlamento approva il processo verbale della seduta precedente.)

- 5. Prüfung von Mandaten: siehe Protokoll**
- 6. Zusammensetzung der Delegationen: siehe Protokoll**
- 7. Berichtigung (Artikel 231 der Geschäftsordnung): siehe Protokoll**
- 8. Unterzeichnung von nach dem ordentlichen Gesetzgebungsverfahren angenommenen Rechtsakten (Artikel 78 GO): siehe Protokoll**
- 9. Standpunkte des Rates in erster Lesung: siehe Protokoll**
- 10. Delegierte Rechtsakte (Artikel 105 Absatz 6 GO): siehe Protokoll**
- 11. Vorlage von Dokumenten: siehe Protokoll**
- 12. Übermittlung von Abkommenstexten durch den Rat: siehe Protokoll**
- 13. Anfragen zur mündlichen Beantwortung (Einreichung): siehe Protokoll**
- 14. Mittelübertragungen: siehe Protokoll**
- 15. Arbeitsplan**
- 16. Massaker im Osten des Kongo (Aussprache)**

Presidente. — Il progetto definitivo di ordine del giorno, fissato dalla Conferenza dei presidenti giovedì 9 giugno 2016 a norma dell'articolo 149, è stato distribuito.

Presidente. — L'ordine del giorno reca la discussione sulla dichiarazione del Vicepresidente della Commissione e Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza sui massacri nel Congo orientale (2016/2770(RSP)).

Tibor Navracsics, *on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*. – Mr President, this House has adopted a number of resolutions on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and more specifically on the situation in the eastern border areas, including the Kivus.

We are all aware of the shocking violence which has been reported since last autumn, especially in North Kivu. Some localities have been especially badly affected. The number of dead in Beni territory alone is estimated by civil society sources at over 550 since September 2014. In addition, tens of thousands of people have been displaced. Naturally, the EU's immediate priority is humanitarian access, and we call once again for a stop to the targeting and kidnapping of humanitarian workers. I recall, of course, that when serving the needs of afflicted populations, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) acts in accordance with the principles laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96, notably those of impartiality and non-discrimination.

The recent violence has been made possible by an ongoing absence of state control. Institutions and services to deal with the prevention and elimination of violence, and legal action against those responsible, are missing. Regrettably, state-building activities in DRC are also held back by the current uncertainty over the organisation of elections, which are due this year under the constitution. Another aspect which continues to be relevant is the exploitation by armed groups of both wildlife and mineral natural resources. The recent report by the United Nations group of experts on the DRC underlines the ongoing involvement of the Lord's Resistance Army in poaching, and also draws particular attention to the laundering by armed groups of gold into the supply chain and onto the international market. It is of some consolation that armed groups have had fewer opportunities to benefit from illegal involvement in tin, tungsten and tantalum, thanks to due diligence and traceability systems.

The EU will continue its effort to address the natural resources dimension of the Great Lake region stabilisation effort. While understanding the root causes of violence and instability is important, it does not excuse perpetrators, who must submit to the rule of law. This applies equally to incitement of violence and hate speech. It is individuals, not entire communities or ethnic groups, who must account for their actions. As has been stated many times before in this House, the activities of armed groups in eastern DRC are an affront to citizens, undermining their human and legal rights, holding back development, destroying peace of mind and, in short, making it difficult to plan ahead or to think of the future.

For armed groups to be put out of action, an effective and operational level of cooperation between the Congolese Armed Forces and the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco) is needed, and it is needed quickly. An agreement in principle was realised in February, but it needs to be put into practice. The justice angle is also important. As a supporter of both civil and military justice reform in DRC, the EU insists that those found to be assisting or conspiring with armed groups must be prosecuted. As regards serious atrocities committed in eastern DRC, we encourage the exploration of all legal options for the investigation and prosecution of those crimes. The primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting lies with the state where the crime took place or the state where the perpetrator is a national. The EU will continue to offer assistance to the DRC to assure structures are established and backed up with strong legislative frameworks in order to enable this.

I want to turn now to the broader but critical issue of governance. With elections due in only a few months, DRC finds itself at a key moment.

UN Security Council Resolution 2277 (2016) is a starting point for all of us. This resolution was adopted unanimously in March. It underlines the primary responsibility of the DRC authorities to prepare and organise elections in respect of their relevant constitutional provisions. Naturally, the EU has noted the decision of the Constitutional Court of the DRC in May this year. The EU also fully respects the sovereignty of the DRC. At the same time, and within the framework not only of the Cotonou Agreement but also the African Union Charter of democracy elections and governance, we underline that a democratic government builds its legitimacy on regular elections within the deadline set out in the constitution.

To achieve a consensus leading to elections, a political dialogue is urgently needed, but time is of the essence and the dialogue should be focused. All representative political actors should be involved. Such a dialogue can produce, as its main deliverable, a clear road map, based on a calendar and financing plan, for what needs to be done to deliver elections respecting the constitution. In this context, the EU, together with the UN, the AU and the OIF, again repeated on 6 June 2016 its support for the mission of His Excellency Edem Kodjo, the EU facilitator supported by the United Nations, to implement a successful dialogue.

Let me end by saying that successful elections will depend not only on technicalities, but also on their achieving the right climate in terms of respect for rights and freedoms. Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are the cornerstones of any democratic society. Ensuring and protecting an open political space are essential to allowing the political dialogue I have mentioned earlier to take place.

Mariya Gabriel, *au nom du groupe PPE*. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, j'ai beau chercher à commencer par les mots «démocratisation» et «processus démocratique» en parlant de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), malheureusement, les mots qui me viennent à l'esprit sont «fragilité», «volatilité» et cela entraîne vigilance et responsabilités. Nous devons, en premier lieu, condamner les massacres dans l'est de la RDC en tant que tels, mais aussi les situer dans un contexte plus général.

J'aimerais insister sur trois éléments. En premier lieu, toute la lumière doit être faite sur les massacres commis dans l'est de la RDC, et leurs auteurs doivent être traduits en justice. Il est urgent que la coopération reprenne entre les forces armées de la RDC et la Monusco et que cette dernière puisse faire plein usage de son mandat élargi. Quant à l'Union, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue la lutte contre l'impunité et veiller à ce que les réformes du secteur de la sécurité mènent enfin à des résultats. Restons fermes aussi sur les résultats nécessaires dans le système de justice.

En deuxième lieu, s'agissant du processus électoral, veillons à ce que la détérioration du contexte sécuritaire ne soit pas utilisée pour remettre davantage en cause le processus électoral, qui devrait être directement mené et vice-versa. Dans la crise de légitimité du pouvoir qui a suivi les élections de 2011, tout événement est essentiel. Dans ce contexte, la tenue d'un véritable dialogue entre opposition et gouvernement ne doit pas non plus omettre le rôle essentiel de la société civile, car le blocage politique du pays a des conséquences directes sur les citoyens. Nous attendons une déclaration claire de la CENI quant aux échéances électorales, aux fichiers qui ne doivent pas exclure les jeunes, et au budget.

Enfin, l'Union africaine a un rôle important à jouer, et je fais notamment référence au rôle du Médiateur M. Kodjo. L'Union européenne et le reste de la communauté internationale ont déjà exprimé leur soutien en faveur de cette médiation. Nous avons maintenant besoin d'une présence plus active dans l'espace public. Chaque mot pèse. De plus, l'Union africaine doit rappeler toutes les parties prenantes à leurs engagements dans l'accord-cadre d'Addis-Abeba pour la paix et la sécurité dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Aujourd'hui, donc, coordination, message clair, respect de l'actuelle Constitution, cela pourra nous permettre de ne pas avoir affaire à une crise humanitaire et sécuritaire à l'échelle du géant congolais.

Gianni Pittella, *a nome del gruppo S&D*. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, vi devo confessare che mi sono sentito spesso ripetere da esperti e analisti militari una definizione che mi ha fatto venire i brividi, e cioè che nel Nord Kivu esiste un conflitto, ma si tratta di un conflitto «a bassa tensione». Una bassa tensione che negli ultimi vent'anni ha provocato sei milioni di morti e un milione e mezzo di sfollati. Se facessimo un freddo calcolo, parleremmo di 300 000 morti l'anno, 800 morti al giorno, e questi esperti parlano di bassa tensione.

Io penso che invece di dire «bassa tensione» dovremmo dire «bassa attenzione», cioè scarsa attenzione da parte della comunità internazionale ad un dramma che è di proporzioni spaventose. Ecco perché noi ci rivolgiamo soprattutto all'alto rappresentante Federica Mogherini, che so e sappiamo sensibile a questi temi. Noi vogliamo fermare insieme l'escalation di violenza perpetrata sulla popolazione inerme da parte di milizie che hanno tutto l'interesse a controllare un territorio tra i più ricchi al mondo in quanto a risorse minerarie.

Abbiamo proposte concrete, molto chiare. Uno: chiediamo l'istituzione di una commissione d'inchiesta indipendente a livello internazionale, che faccia luce sulle cause e sui responsabili del massacro. Due: chiediamo un coinvolgimento della Corte penale internazionale rispetto a quanto accaduto a Beni. Tre: vogliamo un rapporto di valutazione delle Nazioni Unite sui risultati della missione MONUSCO e soprattutto chiediamo che il contingente ONU faccia pieno uso del mandato che gli è stato assegnato e cioè quello di intervenire a protezione dei civili. Quattro: chiediamo che l'Unione africana faccia la sua parte e investa maggiori energie per la risoluzione di tale conflitto.

Il mio gruppo, come azione autonoma dei Socialisti e Democratici, invierà nella regione del Kivu la collega Elena Valenciano, presidente della sottocommissione per i diritti umani, perché possa incontrare ed ascoltare i rappresentanti della società civile congolese e tutti gli attori presenti sul territorio, raccogliendo informazioni che, al suo ritorno, condivideremo con i colleghi del Parlamento e con i vertici istituzionali europei, a cominciare dal Presidente di questa assemblea e dall'Alto rappresentante Federica Mogherini.

La comunità internazionale si svegli! *Wake up!* Non abbandoni al proprio destino i congolese del Kivu e agisca per fermare una violenza che va avanti senza sosta da vent'anni.

Mark Demesmaeker, *namens de ECR-Fractie*. – “Congo is de grootste menselijke tragedie op aarde”. Woorden van de Britse journalist Tim Butcher die het land door en door kent en het in zijn boek omschrijft als het gebroken hart van Afrika. Ik herlas een interview van enkele jaren geleden, waarin hij er zich over beklagt dat er zo weinig aandacht is voor Congo en waarin hij de politieke elite daar omschrijft als roofdieren.

De boodschap is helaas nog altijd actueel. Het oosten van DRC is vandaag opnieuw een humanitair slagveld. Dorpelingen worden met machetes afgeslacht, vrouwen verkracht, kinderen ontvoerd, huizen geplunderd. En president Kabila ligt daar blijkbaar niet wakker van. Hij is druk bezig met het veiligstellen van zijn macht. Het is amper drie maanden geleden dat we hier de politieke en mensenrechtensituatie in Congo aan de kaak stelden, maar geen millimeter vooruitgang werd intussen geboekt. Integendeel, het nepproces tegen oppositieleider en presidentskandidaat Katumbi toont aan dat DRC verder wegzakt in een politieke crisis.

Wij hebben de plicht om alle mogelijke instrumenten aan te wenden om een nieuwe bloedige burgeroorlog te vermijden. We mogen daarbij niet uit het oog verliezen dat de crisis een regionale dimensie heeft en draait om grondstof, om mineralen. De commissaris heeft het gezegd. “De grootste vloek van Congo is haar rijkdom”, zegt Tim Butcher in hetzelfde interview terecht. Het is een stap vooruit dat de EU de handel in mineralen erkent als een van de oorzaken van het conflict. Bedrijven die bepaalde grondstoffen importeren moeten voortaan kunnen aantonen dat ze niet onrechtstreeks bijdragen tot geweld. Maar we moeten meer doen. De Unie moet onder meer ijveren voor de hervatting van de gezamenlijke operaties van Monusco, de VN-missie en het Congolese leger om de gewapende milities te neutraliseren.

Charles Goerens, *au nom du groupe ALDE*. – Monsieur le Président, nous appuyons la présente résolution qui vise à mettre fin à l'indifférence et aux drames qui se produisent régulièrement dans le nord-est du Congo. Les cinq groupes qui l'ont signée en appellent à la diplomatie, aux responsables politiques de la RDC, ainsi qu'aux parties en conflit, pour mettre fin à la barbarie dont sont victimes les populations civiles et, en premier lieu, les femmes et les enfants.

Le jugement rendu hier par la Cour pénale internationale de La Haye dans l'affaire Bemba justifie que nous invitons également tous les responsables à rassembler suffisamment de preuves pour traduire devant la justice internationale les vrais responsables des massacres en question. Aussi, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies devrait-il se saisir des événements qui se sont produits récemment encore au Nord-Kivu, notamment pour déterminer dans quelle mesure la Monusco pourrait contribuer à mieux rétablir une situation respectueuse des droits des populations civiles les plus élémentaires.

La dégradation continue de la situation en RDC interpelle également les entreprises qui acquièrent les matières premières et, notamment, les minerais rares. Seule une entrée en vigueur rapide de la réglementation sur les minerais provenant de zones de conflit pourra contribuer à mettre fin à la criminalité organisée dont se rendent coupables les prédateurs, notamment dans la province Nord-Kivu, lesquels ne reculent devant aucune bassesse.

Le principe de la non-indifférence, si chère aux Africains, devrait nous guider dans la recherche d'une solution à ce drame.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez, *en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL*. – Señor Presidente, una vez más en este Parlamento tenemos que abordar, para rechazar, la situación en la República Democrática del Congo. Esta vez, nuestra condena más firme a las masacres en la zona oriental.

Quiero manifestar nuestro apoyo a soluciones políticas y pacíficas del conflicto. Las soluciones militares acarrearán más muerte, más dolor y más violencia a la población. Queremos mostrar, también, nuestra preocupación por el refuerzo del mando militar de los Estados Unidos en África y de su papel de desestabilización en distintos países y también en la República Democrática del Congo. Pedimos el desmantelamiento y la retirada del Africom. La Unión Europea deberá también poner en marcha una investigación independiente sobre el papel de las multinacionales europeas en cuanto a la vulneración de los derechos sociales y ambientales y también de sus lazos con la financiación de grupos armados para poder seguir con la explotación del subsuelo congolés. El director ejecutivo adjunto del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente en 2015 declaraba que el 2 % de los beneficios anuales de explotar los recursos naturales iban para financiar estos grupos armados internos.

También pensamos que debe garantizarse la no injerencia y la soberanía de la República Democrática del Congo. Y, señor Comisario, respetar esta soberanía política significa que la población pueda beneficiarse de sus recursos naturales, para lo cual es necesario instaurar el control sobre las actividades de las multinacionales mediante la revisión y la derogación de todos los contratos mineros y forestales, así como respetar el derecho a la soberanía alimentaria y la anulación de la deuda, que, entendemos, son medidas imprescindibles para dar respuesta a las necesidades más básicas y urgentes de la población.

Jordi Sebastià, *en nombre del Grupo Verts/ALE*. – Señor Presidente, de nuevo nos reunimos aquí, en este hemiciclo, para condenar una situación terrible en el Congo —en este caso, las masacres que se están sufriendo en la zona del este— y comprenderá el representante de la Comisión que nos sentimos un poco frustrados, porque no hace mucho ya aprobamos otra y, sin embargo, parece que esto no tiene ninguna repercusión en la situación terrible que vive una gran parte del pueblo del Congo.

Nos congratulamos por esta Resolución común; una Resolución que nosotros firmamos en aras del consenso, pero que nos hubiera gustado que en algún punto fuera más contundente, especialmente cuando se hace una crítica al papel que está jugando la Monusco —la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo—, una misión que ha sido acusada por actores independientes de pasividad, de no hacer el papel que tiene adjudicado, que es el de defender a la población civil precisamente contra estas masacres.

Esperamos que esa investigación que pedimos también en esta Resolución se lleve a cabo y que se esclarezca exactamente si no se está cumpliendo la misión y quiénes son los responsables.

Nos congratulamos de que aparezcan algunos de los puntos clave de lo terrible que es la situación en el Congo. En primer lugar, el hecho de que las mujeres son las víctimas preferentes y de que se está utilizando la violación de mujeres y niñas como un arma de guerra masiva; que se está reclutando a niños soldados, que no tendrán ninguna oportunidad en la vida sumidos en ese horror. Y, sobre todo, que se hable del conflicto de la extracción ilegal de minerales.

Y, ahí, la Comisión tiene un papel que jugar, porque las empresas europeas tienen mucha responsabilidad en ello y sería importante que fuéramos más allá de las declaraciones y que tomáramos medidas activas de sanción, de investigación, para saber qué multinacionales europeas están involucradas en ese comercio que, al final, es la última justificación de la terrible situación que está viviendo ese territorio.

Aparece en uno de los puntos de la Resolución la posibilidad de sancionar a los que sean directamente responsables de esas masacres. ¡Que no nos tiemblen las manos! Vayamos también a por esa responsabilidad europea y demos un ejemplo de que la Unión Europea no está abandonando a la población del Congo.

Ignazio Corrao, *a nome del gruppo EFDD*. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ebbene dal 1960, dall'indipendenza ottenuta dal Belgio, di fatto il Congo è sempre stato in una spirale di violenza. La situazione non è certo migliorata negli ultimi anni, in cui il Presidente Kabila, piuttosto che pensare a risolvere i problemi legati alla violazione dei diritti umani, sembra pensare esclusivamente a come mantenere il potere in vista delle prossime elezioni.

Lo hanno già detto diversi colleghi: la situazione è tragica nelle province orientali, nel nord e nel sud del Kivu, nel Katanga. La causa è sempre la stessa, è la ricchezza di questo paese, lo sfruttamento delle risorse, delle materie prime e dei minerali.

Credo che, da parte nostra, probabilmente la cosa che possiamo fare è cercare di avere un atteggiamento più rigido nei confronti delle multinazionali europee che operano in quelle regioni, cercare appunto di portare avanti delle indagini indipendenti e chiedere conto e ragione alle Nazioni Unite su questa missione – la MONUSCO – che ha avuto appunto un mandato molto ambiguo e dei risultati che sono difficili da stabilire. Sembra strano non riuscire a capire dalla missione delle Nazioni Unite, e non riusciamo a trovare nessuna relazione sulle miniere e sul traffico di minerali di cui dovrebbero essere a conoscenza.

Questa la terza risoluzione che facciamo in giro di poco tempo sul Congo. Ritengo che sia arrivato il momento di trovare dei risultati concreti, di fare qualche passo avanti, se no ci ritroviamo a parlare sistematicamente del nulla.

Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, *au nom du groupe ENF*. – Monsieur le Président, je voudrais d'abord remercier mes collègues, une fois n'est pas coutume, pour leur pertinence dans l'analyse du Congo et, plus particulièrement, M. Pittella.

C'est un pays que j'aime beaucoup. J'ai moi-même été auprès du vice-président Zahidi Ngoma dans la période de transition et j'ai suivi cette transition en étant un des acteurs.

La difficulté de la République démocratique du Congo, c'est sa richesse. Puis-je rappeler qu'on est allé chercher Laurent-Désiré Kabila parce que l'Ouganda et le Rwanda avaient décidé, sur ordre d'une puissance extérieure – je peux donner des précisions – d'envahir le pays. Puis-je rappeler que, pendant que Laurent-Désiré Kabila envahissait le pays, un certain nombre de sociétés signaient des contrats. C'étaient des sociétés américaines. Puis-je aussi rappeler que, lorsque Laurent-Désiré Kabila se retourna en étant un patriote pour son pays, on décida, ici, à Bruxelles – j'ai eu l'information, je peux dire de qui car il est décédé depuis – de son élimination et on est allé également à Washington chercher l'ordre. Et il fut éliminé quinze jours plus tard! Puis-je rappeler aussi qu'alors, on est allé chercher Joseph Kabila en se disant qu'on manipulerait ce jeune parce qu'il était de nationalité rwandaise, et qu'on allait en faire un président.

Tout ceci est de la manipulation. Ce qu'il faut pour la République démocratique du Congo, c'est une souveraineté retrouvée, une armée qui se batte effectivement, une Monusco au service de la paix et qu'on arrête les prédateurs qui sont liés à la criminalité organisée avec des États hypocrites liés à des multinationales.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedniče, kao što je već rečeno, sukobi i nestabilnost u Kongu u velikoj mjeri je povezano uz borbu za veliko bogatstvo mineralima koje ta zemlja ima. Upravo mineralni resursi koji bi trebali činiti stanovništvo Konga bogatim, ono što bi trebalo biti spas, postalo je prokletstvo te zemlje. Više od 63% populacije Konga živi ispod granice siromaštva, oko 43% djece ispod 5 godina kronično je pothranjeno. Zato ovom prilikom želim pozdraviti proces izrade regulative EU-a uspostavljanju obveznog sustava za certificiranje odgovornih izvoznika kositra, tantala i volframa, njihovih ruda i zlata koji potječu iz sukobima pogođenih područja, a u nastojanju da se razbije poveznica između sukoba i nezakonitog iskorištavanja minerala, kao ključan element u jamčenju mira, održivog razvoja i stabilnosti. Ali nije samo borba za minerale izvor sukoba, već su tu u prvom redu i slabe institucije, korupcija, nedostatak dobre vladavine. Zato je važno da se ne manipulira i ne odugovlači s predsjedničkim izborima u Kongu. Zato također pozdravljam činjenicu da se nacionalni indikativni program za Kongo pod 11. Europskim razvojnim fondom fokusira upravo na jačanje dobre vladavine, vladavine prava, uključujući reformu pravosuđa, policije i vojske te pozivam da se jednaka strategija primijeni na ostale afričke zemlje gdje možda direktna poveznica između korupcije i demokratskog deficita kao glavnog uzroka siromaštva i nestabilnosti nije tako očigledna kao u Kongu, ali svakako postoji.

Maria Arena (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, nous sommes ici, encore une fois, pour une résolution sur la République démocratique du Congo et, comme on l'a dit, ce n'est pas la première et je crains que ce ne soit pas la dernière.

Aujourd'hui, ce qui nous amène, ce sont les massacres de Beni. Massacres de Beni qui, comme l'a dit M. Pittella, viennent s'ajouter à des millions de morts. À Beni, plus de 1 000 personnes ont été massacrées en l'espace d'un an et demi, outre les kidnappings, les maisons brûlées, les viols, les menaces, les populations massivement déplacées... C'est le drame que nous vivons aujourd'hui dans le Kivu.

Alors, on l'a dit, cette région est convoitée parce qu'il y a de l'or, parce qu'il y a du coltan. Je me félicite que, dans ce Parlement, nous ayons pris des positions en ce qui concerne la traçabilité des minerais mais je dois dire que nous l'avons fait en traînant quelque peu les pieds. Je dois dire aussi que le Conseil n'a pas toujours été très à l'écoute de ce que nous avons demandé. Manifestement, aujourd'hui, tout le monde est d'accord pour dire que nos multinationales doivent être plus attentives à ce qui se passe dans ce pays. Mais, aujourd'hui, cette instabilité est également due aux autorités congolaises. Elle est inacceptable parce qu'elle donne lieu à des crimes. Par conséquent, nous demandons que ces crimes ne restent pas impunis, qu'il y ait des enquêtes, nationales et internationales, qui permettent d'identifier les responsables et d'appliquer des sanctions à l'égard de ceux-ci.

Dans un contexte préélectoral, ce sera difficile, on le sait, et les crimes en matière de droits de l'homme sont de plus en plus importants en République démocratique du Congo. Nous devons donc en tant qu'Union européenne, en partenariat avec l'Union africaine et avec les Nations unies, nous unir pour que les élections dans ce pays puissent se passer dans la paix, dans la transparence, en respectant la Constitution, non pas uniquement parce que nous voulons respecter la Constitution, mais tout simplement parce que ce sera la seule garantie pour parvenir à la stabilité, éviter les crises qui sont des crises humanitaires et éviter, bien entendu, que les populations, qui sont les premières au front, souffrent de cette situation en République démocratique du Congo.

Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR). – Mr President, the people of Congo have to endure once more unbelievable atrocities perpetrated by armed militias in the eastern part of the country. This was made possible by the period of political uncertainty concerning the transition of power. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) constitution should be enacted as soon as possible, the free elections maintained within the country in terms of international involvement, the implementation of the March UN resolution is necessary as well as the deployment of an enhanced mandate for MONUSCO as soon as possible. I also think that in order to eradicate impunity the ICC should be involved once more.

Elnökváltás: GÁLL-PELCZ ILDIKÓ

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Hilde Vautmans (ALDE). – We spreken al zo veel jaar over de oorlog in Congo dat we bijna vergeten zijn hoe mooi het er is in tijden van vrede. Hele dorpen worden geëxecuteerd. Vrouwen worden beestachtig afgeslacht aan de poorten van de legerposten. Moeders gooien wanhopig hun kinderen over de hekken van de Monuscokampen voor ze neerge-maaid worden. Sinds 1996 wordt seksueel geweld als oorlogstactiek ingezet. Elke minuut wordt er een vrouw verkracht in Congo. We kunnen bijna spreken van een seksuele genocide en dat terwijl de internationale gemeenschap al zestien jaar aanwezig is.

Kunnen de Congolezen nog op ons vertrouwen, op Monusco? 10 000 troepen passeren en laten geen vrede maar trauma's na. We moeten nadenken over het mandaat en over de impact. En we weten het allemaal: Congo is in trek. Het is hier al gezegd: de natuurlijke rijkdommen houden het gevecht brandend. President Kabila zaait twijfel over zijn ambities voor een derde ambtstermijn. Alleen vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen vormen een deel van de oplossing. We moeten een rol spelen. Vier punten: we moeten de vredesprocessen blijven ondersteunen, het mandaat en de impact van Monusco streng bekijken, de straffeloosheid bestraffen en de daders straffen, en vooral de democratie echt laten spelen. Geef alsjeblieft Oost-Congo weer een toekomst.

Marie-Christine Vergiat (GUE/NGL). – Madame la Présidente, depuis des années, la RDC vit une situation dramatique: multiplication des groupes armés, pauvreté, déstabilisation, massacres, instrumentalisation de la question ethnique sur fond d'accaparement des ressources par le gouvernement, les pays voisins et les multinationales, notamment européennes. Conséquence: au moins 400 000 Congolais en exil, 1,5 million de déplacés internes – soit 7 % de la population –, plusieurs millions de morts dans une indifférence quasi générale.

C'est bien de génocide dont il s'agit, reconnu par l'ONU dès 2010, un des plus longs génocides de l'histoire, fût-il de basse tension comme dirait M. Pittella. La recrudescence de la violence, ces derniers mois, montre bien que rien n'est réglé. La question est donc: quand la communauté internationale va-t-elle enfin réagir face à ce qui se passe au Congo? La responsabilité des uns et des autres est lourde. Oui, il faut stabiliser le pays et ramener M. Kabila à la raison. Oui, il faut des enquêtes indépendantes, y compris sur le rôle de la Monusco. Oui, il faut mettre fin au financement des groupes armés et à l'utilisation des minerais du sang. Tant que nous fermerons les yeux sur ce qui se passe en RDC, les massacres continueront. Il y a urgence.

Michèle Rivasi (Verts/ALE). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, les atrocités commises au Congo vont en s'aggravant. Nous avons, rappelez-vous, décerné en 2014 le prix Sakharov au Docteur Mukwege pour son action auprès des femmes victimes de viols et de violences sexuelles. Mais, aujourd'hui, ce ne sont plus seulement les femmes mais aussi les enfants et les bébés qui sont les victimes des groupes armés.

La violence sexuelle a été utilisée à travers les âges parce que c'est une arme de destruction massive. L'an dernier, l'ONU a révélé un rapport accablant et a appelé à créer de nouveaux mécanismes pour briser le cercle de l'impunité. C'est un progrès d'apprendre que certains bourreaux ont été condamnés mais ce n'est pas suffisant car le pouvoir en place est complice, parce que cette barbarie est la conséquence directe de l'absence d'état de droit et du déni de justice au Congo. C'est aussi et surtout la conséquence des activités minières illégales pratiquées et protégées par des milices armées.

Nous devons faire plus et mieux pour combattre ces crimes car nous sommes tous et toutes responsables de ces minerais de sang qui finissent dans nos téléphones et autres matériels informatiques. C'est pourquoi j'apprécie que l'Europe agisse en ce sens grâce à l'accord récemment obtenu sur le règlement concernant les minerais de sang.

Joachim Zeller (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Zunächst eine gute Nachricht für Zentralafrika: Der ehemalige Vizepräsident der DR Kongo Jean-Pierre Bemba ist wegen Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit vor wenigen Tagen vom Internationalen Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag nach sechsjährigem Prozess zu 18 Jahren Haft verurteilt worden. Das bringt ein wenig Gerechtigkeit für die zahlreichen Frauen, Kinder und Männer, die von seinen Milizen grausam gefoltert, vergewaltigt, verstümmelt und ermordet wurden.

Darüber hinaus gibt es, was die aktuelle Lage in der DR Kongo anbelangt, nichts Positives zu berichten. Die politischen Spannungen innerhalb des Landes nehmen zu, seitdem der amtierende Präsident Kabila mit allen Tricks versucht, den Wahltermin im November auf unbestimmte Zeit zu verschieben und so seine Amtszeit künstlich zu verlängern, die eigentlich am Jahresende zu Ende gehen sollte. Es gibt Übergriffe auf Oppositionspolitiker, Demonstrationsverbote, auch wieder Tote. Zu allem Überflus ist auch noch eine Gelbfieberepidemie ausgebrochen, die die humanitäre Krise im Land verschärft.

Besonders zu beklagen ist aber, dass im Osten des Landes die Kämpfe zwischen Regierungstruppen und bewaffneten sogenannten Rebellen wieder an Intensität und Grausamkeit zugenommen haben. Hauptgrund dafür ist und bleibt der Kampf um den Zugriff auf wertvolle Mineralien wie Gold, Zinn, Kobalt und Tantal, die in dieser Region gefördert werden. Manche Menschen, die dort wohnen, werden vertrieben und ermordet oder zur Zwangsarbeit gezwungen. Die EU, auch dieses Parlament, hätte mit der neuen Verordnung über die Einfuhr und die Verwendung von diesen Mineralien aus Konfliktgebieten ein wichtiges Zeichen setzen können. Wir haben aber – leider Gottes – einen Verordnungstext verhandelt, der sehr unbestimmt ist und beispielsweise weit hinter dem, US-Amerikanischen Dodd-Frank Act, zurückbleibt, der beim Verbot von Einfuhr und Verwendung dieser Mineralien bereits Wirkung zeigt.

Wir können uns alle guten Reden sparen, wenn wir nicht selbst bereit sind, hier Konsequenzen zu ziehen und dement-sprechend zu handeln.

Cécile Kashetu Kyenge (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, oggi sono Beni. Perché proprio questa mattina sono andata oltre il mio percorso abituale, anziché restarmene tranquilla a casa con i miei bambini? Perché non ho chiesto a mio marito di accompagnarmi? Perché non ho deciso di fare come quegli oltre 400 000 connazionali, che hanno lasciato il paese proprio per sfuggire a queste violenze? Sì, ma per andare dove? In Europa? In Sudafrica? E se poi ci avessero rispediti indietro, dicendo che non siamo titolari di protezione internazionale, dove saremmo tornati? A Beni?

Eppure mi sentivo al sicuro qui. La sede della MONUSCO è poco distante. Loro hanno il mandato di proteggerci, è la comunità internazionale che gli ha voluti. Però in fondo è un bene che fossi sola, così la mia famiglia è al sicuro, almeno per il momento. E poi ho risparmiato loro lo spettacolo disumano. Queste bestie non si sono limitate a violentarmi, hanno infierito con lame e rastrelli e poi hanno completato l'opera, bruciandomi. Ero ancora cosciente, ma non ho avuto paura, ho pensato a voi e ai miei bambini e tutto è finito in un attimo.

Nonostante tutto sono felice. Sono felice perché non ho riconosciuto volti noti tra gli spettatori del villaggio, obbligati ad assistere a quei massacri. Sono felice perché in quest'ultima retata eravamo principalmente adulti, pochissimi bambini fortunatamente. In quell'inferno non hanno resistito molto, se ne sono andati quasi subito. Inoltre, sono felice perché nessuno vedrà le rotture del mio corpo, il mio corpo dopo ore e ore di torture. È una grande fortuna che alla comunità internazionale interessi poco quello che succede qui, nell'est del Congo, e che i media hanno altro di cui occuparsi.

Cari colleghi, da ottobre 2014 a marzo 2016 nei territori di Beni, Lubero e Butembo 1 200 persone sono state massacciate nell'indifferenza generale. Il rischio è il genocidio. È una vergogna. Nessuna impunità per i responsabili di questi massacri. A quando la giustizia per Beni?

Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Wypowiedź mojej przedmówczyni reprezentującej Włochy była bardzo poruszająca. Cóż, powiem tak: powinniśmy zrobić wszystko, aby rezolucja ONZ została wcielona w życie. Nie może być tak, że organizacja skupiająca wszystkie państwa świata wydaje rezolucję, która potem w praktyce zostaje świstkiem papieru. ONZ ma spokojne sumienie, ale nic się nie dzieje. Musimy zrobić wszystko, aby Międzynarodowy Trybunał Karny w sposób przykładowy osądzał sprawców tych zbrodni. Europa w tej sprawie nie może milczeć, jest to kwestia naszego honoru, naszych powinności, zwłaszcza tych państw, które kiedyś miały kolonie na terenach, gdzie dokonywane są dzisiaj zbrodnie i okrucieństwa.

Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra (PPE). – Señora Presidenta, rindo homenaje a Kashetu.

La República Democrática del Congo está sumida en una de las crisis humanitarias más largas de su historia. Las masacres y los ataques, especialmente en la zona oriental, están causando más de tres millones de desplazados, de los cuales medio millón ya han huido a países vecinos. Secuestros constantes, desapariciones, abusos sexuales a mujeres y niños y más de mil violaciones diarias: hablo de agresiones indiscriminadas, reclutamiento forzoso de niños.

Quiero condenar los actos tan terribles ocurridos en Beni, Lubero y Butembo, que se cobraron la vida de 1 160 personas. Quiero expresar mi solidaridad y apoyo a las víctimas y a sus familias.

Me gustaría insistir, señora, en la necesidad de la reanudación de las operaciones conjuntas entre las fuerzas armadas de la República del Congo y la Monusco porque es la única manera, a mi juicio, de contrarrestar las abominables acciones de los grupos armados, como las Fuerzas Democráticas para la Liberación de Ruanda o las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas, entre otros.

Además, es necesario que las autoridades congoleñas hagan frente cuanto antes a la explotación ilegal de recursos, tales como wolframio, estaño o tungsteno, para cortar definitivamente la fuente de financiación de los grupos armados.

En último lugar, me gustaría llamar la atención ante la necesidad de la celebración de las próximas elecciones presidenciales y legislativas, lo cual sería decisivo en el avance de la estabilidad y el progreso. Es necesario dotar al país de institucionalidad cuanto antes y reformar la justicia militar y civil para acabar con la impunidad criminal y proteger eficazmente a los ciudadanos. La condena del Tribunal de La Haya a Bemba debe ser también ejemplarizante.

Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la situazione nella provincia orientale del Congo è abbastanza chiara e le risposte fornite fino ad oggi a questa crisi sono risultate inadeguate.

Devo dire con molta sincerità che ho sentito alcune lacrime di cocodrillo in questa assemblea, da parte di chi, tra l'altro, ha ostacolato il regolamento che permette di evitare il commercio di minerali provenienti dalle zone di conflitto, e molti si sono messi di traverso, in Consiglio e in Commissione. Il Consiglio e la Commissione sono un miscuglio, da questo punto di vista, di ipocrisia e di schizofrenia e forse dovrebbero essere minimamente coerenti con le cose che vengono qui a dire.

Le cose sono chiare. Ci sono alcuni punti che dovrebbero essere definiti in una piattaforma per evitare sostanzialmente che l'Unione europea dimostri di essere impotente di fronte a quanto sta succedendo. Bisogna dire che il presidente Kabila deve andarsene. Bisogna costruire le condizioni per una transizione politica. Bisogna dire che c'è una insufficienza di risposte da parte dell'esercito regolare del Congo, in cui i soldati sarebbero rimasti in più occasioni inermi. Bisogna dire che c'è una inadeguatezza della missione ONU che opera nel paese e che, nonostante sia una delle più imponenti dispiagate, non si sta dimostrando di essere in grado di fermare la crisi.

Risulta poi singolare che due Stati che sono parte della missione, Uganda e Ruanda, sono sospettati di fornire sostegno militare a quegli stessi ribelli contro cui si combatte. Ecco, bisognerebbe dire questo, bisognerebbe dire che serve una commissione internazionale, che l'ONU deve avviare un'inchiesta proprio per realizzare gli obiettivi che ci si prefigge. Serve un forte segnale e serve soprattutto che l'Unione europea esca da questa sorta di impotenza e di incapacità a decidere.

Eduard Kukan (PPE). – Madam President, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lives in a constant state of superficial peace and superficial security. The latest outbreak of violence in the north of the country has left everyone shocked. We saw hundreds of murders, disappearances, rapes and the wiping out of crucial infrastructure. Unfortunately, we also saw only mild and slow international reaction to such armed violence. I extend my sincere condolences to the families of the victims.

In this situation, immediate violence must be ended, and all armed groups must lay down their arms. The international community, including the EU, should be more present, more vocal and more instrumental, and offer support to disarmament. MONUSCO also needs to be able to react faster in order to protect civilians.

Furthermore, due investigation into these crimes must be carried out and the perpetrators must be brought to justice. Without drawing clear responsibility for these crimes, the atmosphere of impunity will continue to poison the country and we can expect repeated outbursts of violence. I am sure that citizens of the DRC deserve better after 20 years of violence and armed conflicts.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D). – Madam President, I am extremely concerned about the deteriorating security situation in the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), by the numerous reports of massacres, the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, and widespread violence. I strongly support the call on the DRC Government and the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, to conduct an investigation into the failures of the Congolese and MONUSCO forces to protect civilians in the region of Beni. A thorough, independent and transparent investigation should be launched urgently by the international community into the massacres in order to find out who is behind these attacks, besides the allied democratic forces. The neutralisation of all armed forces, safety for all citizens and stability in the territories of Beni, Lubero and Butembo has to be our priority. Perpetrators of human rights violence, war crimes, crimes against humanity and sexual violence must be reported, identified, prosecuted and punished in accordance with national and international criminal law.

Francisco Assis (S&D). – Senhora Presidente, nas últimas décadas, a República Democrática do Congo tem estado marcada por uma história de violência que já cobrou a vida a milhões de pessoas. O cenário é muito preocupante. Há poucos dias, um grupo de especialistas da ONU alertou para a possibilidade de um processo semelhante ao que se seguiu às eleições no Burundi, com guerrilhas pró e antigo Governo a entrarem em confronto, caso se verifique o adiamento das eleições presidenciais para 2017, como, infelizmente, parece provável que venha a suceder.

Agora, chegam-nos notícias de massacres que terão vitimado soldados do exército e ex-combatentes de grupos rebeldes em centros de desmilitarização no sudeste do país. Face a tal cenário, a União Europeia tem de fazer tudo o que estiver ao seu alcance para impedir que a situação descarrile. A carnificina que ocorreu no Ruanda em 1994, perante a inação do resto do mundo, bem como as duas devastadoras guerras do Congo, devem estar sempre presentes na nossa memória.

A União Europeia tem prestado nos últimos anos uma valiosa ajuda ao Congo, quer no combate à pobreza, quer no sentido da estabilização do país e da região. A União Europeia pode e deve usar, neste momento, o seu apoio para pressionar as autoridades congoleesas a respeitarem o processo de reinserção dos ex-rebeldes e os direitos de oposição, a cumprirem o calendário eleitoral e a empenharem-se no diálogo patrocinado pela União Africana.

Franz Obermayr (ENF). – Frau Präsidentin! Sechs Millionen Tote in den letzten Jahr, Millionen auf der Flucht: Das zeigt, dass die Bekämpfung des regionalen Terrors, aber auch des islamischen Terrors in dieser Region, die Bekämpfung von Boko Haram und al-Shabaab offensichtlich gescheitert ist. Die Achse des islamischen Terrors reicht also von Somalia bis – offensichtlich – Westafrika. Unsere heutigen Worte des Bedauerns sind zwar salbungsvoll, bringen aber relativ wenig und sind somit heuchlerisch.

Europa wird aus dem großen Blabla erwachen müssen, und wir müssen zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass es offensichtlich so weitergehen wird, bis dann letztlich Ressourcen und Rohstoffe wie Coltanvorkommen in den falschen Händen sind, und dann wird auch die Industrie in Europa erwachen, und dann werden wir aufschreien und letztlich Aktionen setzen müssen.

Somit glaube ich, dass wir heute viel reden, aber offensichtlich nicht bereit sind, klare Schritte zu setzen. Ich prophezeie aber bereits: Die Industrie wird uns schon sagen, wenn wir tätig werden müssen, auch im Interesse unserer Handyproduktion.

„Catch the eye” eljárás

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, è la terza volta che ci occupiamo del Congo. La situazione resta drammatica in questo paese. Recentemente sono state scoperte fosse comuni con centinaia di corpi. Dal 2014 oltre 850 uomini, donne e bambini sono stati uccisi a colpi di machete, scuri e coltelli e altre hanno subito torture di ogni tipo. Ogni minuto una donna è violentata. Si contano poi più di 1 500 persone sequestrate. La popolazione è vittima di massacri, provocati da invasioni di bande armate che stanno mettendo in atto un vero e proprio genocidio. I missionari e religiosi, insieme a Rete Pace per il Congo, chiedono un'inchiesta internazionale su quanto sta accadendo nel Nord Kivu, la regione al confine col Ruanda.

Ora più che mai è necessario l'intervento della comunità internazionale e dell'Unione europea per porre fine alle stragi, occorre rispondere all'appello delle associazioni presenti nell'aria e l'ONU deve istituire una commissione d'inchiesta internazionale per porre fine a questo dramma.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία του Κονγκό είναι η μεγαλύτερη χώρα της Κεντρικής Αφρικής και συνάμα μια από τις πλουσιότερες σε ορυκτά. Δυστυχώς όμως εκεί οφείλεται σε μεγάλο βαθμό και η έξαρση βίας που γνωρίζει η χώρα αυτή. Τον περασμένο Δεκέμβριο υπερψηφίσαμε πρόταση που καταδίκασε τις παράνομες δραστηριότητες εξόρυξης που βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη στο Εθνικό Πάρκο Βιρούνγκα, ένα πάρκο με τη μεγαλύτερη βιοποικιλότητα στην Αφρική και παγκόσμια κληρονομιά της UNESCO.

Οι βιαιοπραγίες στην περιοχή του Βόρειου Κίβου ξεκινάνε περίπου την ίδια περίοδο που διεξάγονται οι πρώτες σεισμολογικές έρευνες, στο τέλος του 2014. Σχεδόν δύο χρόνια αργότερα μετράμε ήδη περισσότερους από εξακόσιους νεκρούς. Αποτρόπαιες σφαγές στην περιοχή Μπένι τον Μάιο, με ύματα εγκύους, μικρά παιδιά και ηλικιωμένους.

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση οφείλει όχι μόνο να καταδικάσει αυτές τις απάνθρωπες πράξεις, αλλά και να λάβει αυστηρά μέτρα για να σταματήσει οποιαδήποτε ανάμιξη ευρωπαϊκών πολυεθνικών στις παράνομες δραστηριότητες που λαμβάνουν χώρα στο ανατολικό Κονγκό. Ιδιαίτερα, πρέπει να εξετάσει τις καταγγελίες συνεργασίας πολυεθνικών εταιρειών με ομάδες ενόπλων με στόχο την τρομοκρατία και τον διωγμό των ντόπιων πληθυσμών.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjednice, nažalost Demokratska Republika Kongo je jedan od najboljih primjera kada bogatstvo postane prokletstvo, kada bogatstvo koje jedna država ima ne stigne do njenih građana nego ostaje limitirano u političkoj eliti, u onom uskom krugu ljudi koji upravljaju bogatstvom te države. Zato, želim potpuno jasno predložiti da u ovom slučaju trebamo učiniti najmanje dvije stvari. Istina, ovo je već treća rezolucija o kojoj raspravljamo s nekim rezultatima koji su i postignuti, ali trebamo učiniti dvije stvari. Haški sud treba donositi jasne odluke kao što je nedavno učinio jer to je odličan put kako bi se neke stvari napokon mogle završiti. Govorim i s nekakvim iskustvom s područja bivše Jugoslavije gdje su se vodili ratovi i gdje su zločinci završili na Haškom sudu. I drugo, treba kazniti one multinacionalne kompanije, pogotovo europske, koje i dalje krše one propise koje smo mi donijeli, a to je da se ne koriste minerali i rudna bogatstva s područja koja su u ratnim sukobima.

A „catch the eye” eljárás vége

Tibor Navracsics, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I think it has been a very useful exchange and I thank the honourable Members for the clarity of their interventions. Some of the honourable Members of the European Parliament missed the repercussions of the EP Resolutions and the Commission's measures, how the EU adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 May Council conclusions on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that show a remarkable convergence with the EP resolution on the DRC of 10 March, including language on the individual responsibility of those responsible for the security and justice sector. In the Council conclusion of 23 May we made it clear that we will react to any downturn in the political situation and we will review the use of all the tools at our disposal.

Elnök asszony. - Hét állásfoglalásra irányuló indítványt juttattak el hozzám.

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), per iscritto. – La situazione in Congo, nonostante gli sforzi del governo, rimane drammatica. Vengono perpetrate gravi violazioni dei diritti umani, crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità. Il conflitto in corso sta inoltre costringendo la popolazione a fuggire, minacciata da un numero sempre crescente di gruppi armati che controllano diversi villaggi. La zona nord-orientale del paese, in particolare modo, continua ad essere la più colpita. In più occasioni sono stati denunciati massacri, reclutamento di minori e violenze sessuali. In alcune zone vi sono restrizioni all'accesso finanche per gli aiuti umanitari. Inoltre, il tutto si sta consumando nell'indifferenza della comunità internazionale e nel quasi totale silenzio dei media. Bisogna avviare un'indagine approfondita e predisporre sanzioni mirate ed efficaci, mettendo fine all'indifferenza che, fin ora, ha caratterizzato il conflitto.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), per iscritto. – È sotto gli occhi di tutti noi il dato drammatico per il quale la situazione nella Repubblica democratica del Congo continua a peggiorare nella parte nordorientale del paese, dove decine di gruppi armati rimangono attivi e sono sistematicamente denunciati massacri e ogni sorta di crimini di guerra, tra cui violenze sessuali e di genere, nonché episodi di reclutamento e impiego di minori da parte dei gruppi armati. L'Unione europea deve adoperarsi in maniera concreta per porre fine all'escalation di violenza perpetrata sulla popolazione inerme da parte di milizie che hanno interesse a controllare un territorio tra i più ricchi del mondo. Anzitutto, tramite l'istituzione immediata di una commissione di inchiesta indipendente a livello internazionale che operi concretamente per attuare il principio per il quale nessuna violazione dei diritti possa rimanere impunita, men che meno la commissione di veri e propri crimini di guerra. Inoltre, vogliamo un rapporto di valutazione delle Nazioni Unite sui risultati della missione MONUSCO e soprattutto chiediamo che il contingente ONU faccia pieno uso del mandato che gli è stato assegnato e cioè quello di intervenire a protezione dei civili. Questa missione ha avuto un mandato molto ambiguo e dei risultati che sono difficili da stabilire.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Politické napätie, vnútorné ozbrojené konflikty, korupcia, porušovanie ľudských práv, priepastné rozdiely medzi bohatými a chudobnými a neexistencia strednej vrstvy, to všetko spojené s hladom a nedostatkom základných potrieb pre väčšinu obyvateľstva tvorí dnešný obraz Demokratickej republiky Kongo. Paradoxne ide o krajinu, na území ktorej sa nachádzajú obrovské zásoby nerastného bohatstva. Pritom 75 % obyvateľov žije z príjmu menej než 1 USD denne. 60 % všetkých minerálov na svete tvoria práve minerály z Konga. Pritom len 30 % diamantu a tantalu sa vyváža riadnou obchodnou cestou, so zvyškom sa obchoduje nelegálne, z čoho sa potom financuje aj ozbrojovanie rôznych vzájomne bojujúcich skupín. Podporujem návrh, aby Európska únia využila všetko diplomatické a obchodné úsilie o dosiahnutie a zabezpečenie vnútornej stability v Kongu, nastolenia a rozvoja demokracie a princípov právneho štátu a politikami rozvojovej spolupráce pomohla odstrániť korupciu a nelegálne obchodovanie s nerastným bohatstvom tejto krajiny.

Urmas Paet (ALDE), in writing. – In less than two years more than 1 160 people have been killed. That is two people per day. Almost the same number of people have been abducted. Over 400 000 people have had to flee the country, 1.5 million are internally displaced and 7.5 million people are in need of assistance. Rape and sexual violence is widely used by both armed groups and government forces. Humanitarian workers can only offer limited help, since they and their convoys are being attacked themselves. And the security situation in the north-eastern part of DRC continues to deteriorate: massacres occur and children are recruited by the armed groups. To stop this horror, all parties to the conflict must be brought together to try to work out a solution. Abuses must be examined and, where needed, must be brought to the ICC. MONUSCO must become more effective in protecting the civilians and must be more rapid in its reactions where needed. The safety of humanitarian workers must be guaranteed.

(Az ülést néhány pillanatra felfüggesztik.)

17. Vorbeugung gegen eine zu gewaltbereitem Extremismus und Terrorismus führende Radikalisierung (Aussprache)

Elnök asszony. - A következő pont a Tanács és a Bizottság nyilatkozata az erőszakos szélsőségekhez és terrorizmushoz vezető radikalizálódás megakadályozásáról (2016/2795(RSP)).

Bert Koenders, President-in-Office of the Council. – Madam President, President, Mr Commissioner, honourable Members, I think we all felt the same sorrow and outrage when we learned about the attack on the nightclub in Orlando or the killing of a police chief and his wife in their home in Paris. Once more, innocent people have become victims of an act of terrorism in a place no one expected. Of course, we have seen this kind of horrendous violence before in our European cities, in Turkey, in Lebanon, in Tunisia, the United States, the Middle East and all over the world. It is a most distressing fact that these attacks were aimed at innocent civilians while they were having a drink in their neighbourhood bar, ready to go on a well-deserved holiday, buying their daily groceries, when they were at home with their family. The attack against a nightclub bringing together homosexuals was the last shocking event that took place in the United States. Another worrying fact is that most of these atrocities were executed by citizens who grew up in our own cities, among us, in our midst, sometimes in a process of self-radicalisation. We are faced with individuals who turned their back on our societies and the universal values of freedom, equality and free speech. It is no use talking only about foreign terrorist fighters. Foreign is now also in our own society, and if we truly want to stop terrorism in its tracks we need to show persons on the brink of radicalisation that their society, our society, offers better alternatives.

So we are faced with a tremendous task to step up our efforts to prevent radicalisation, to counter violent extremism, to stop hate speech and fight discrimination. Of course we are fully committed to that cause. The European Union, its Member States, we are engaged in a balancing act between repression and prevention and to ensure that we understand really what is going on. The Heads of State and Government already highlighted the importance of preventing radicalisation and safeguarding our values in their statements of February 2015. Since then the European Union has not been sitting on its hands, how could we? We are currently implementing a range of measures to prevent radicalisation with a specific focus on detecting and removing internet content promoting terrorism, for instance.

Let me give you a number of examples. The Europol Internet Referral Unit works together with internet companies to remove terrorist material from the internet, very important. Second, the European Union Internet Forum facilitates a dialogue with the private sector to combat illegal online hate speech. I think we cannot do without this cooperation of all actors, including the private sector. Certainly we work on the development of communication strategies to promote tolerance, non-discrimination, fundamental freedoms and solidarity throughout the Union.

Then we have the Radicalisation Awareness Network supporting Member States with expertise and helping them to develop prevention programmes. We have the Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team which is helping, assisting, working with Member States, to develop counter narratives against Da'esh. Another example that the EU is working on is rehabilitation for foreign fighter returnees and the prevention of radicalisation in prisons. A ministerial conference took place in October 2015 and is now being followed up with the support of funding from the Commission.

Next to countering the hateful narratives of extremists, our efforts on prevention are also directed at strengthening the resilience of our communities. Maybe that is even the most important. That requires a much more holistic but at the same time effective approach involving different policy areas and many different actors.

Educational citizenship, universal values and mutual respect must start at an early stage. Our young people are the ones most vulnerable and the ones who need to stay on board and it is our responsibility to give them the civic, social and cultural competence they need in our societies. This was also underlined in a joint declaration of the EU Ministers for Education and yourself, Mr Commissioner. Very important, building on this declaration, the Council adopted conclusions on developing media literacy and critical thinking and the role of youth policy in the fight against radicalisation. Following the first fundamental rights colloquium last year the Commission has appointed coordinators on anti-Islam hatred, on anti-Semitism and on tolerance to engage with all the relevant stakeholders. An advisor on religious freedom has also been appointed. Also, this is important in the context of promoting intra- and interfaith dialogue.

Honourable Members, terrorism is in nature global and it does not stop at the EU borders. In complementarity with the work we are doing within the European Union, there is of course a continuous need to work together with our international partners to combat and prevent radicalism and terrorism. Let me give you also a few examples of our activities. In the Middle East and North Africa the European Union is supporting several projects on prevention of radicalisation, countering terrorism financing and working on judicial capacity. The European Union has developed on the Slovenian lead a so-called Western Balkans Counterterrorism Initiative and we also work with the Radicalisation Awareness Network in third countries like Tunisia, like Turkey, with first-line practitioners to prevent radicalisation. Also the global Counterterrorism Forum is an excellent example of a multilateral effort of countries around the world coming together and joining their efforts to combat and prevent terrorism in a very concrete plan of action. We have expended the network of our security and CT experts in the European Union delegations to work in the field and with civil society on preventing radicalisation and countering threats of terrorism.

So, to summarise, combating and preventing terrorism is at the top of the European agenda. We are and we will remain fully committed to preventing radicalisation, countering violent extremism, stopping hate speech and fighting discrimination. I know there is a very strong will also among you and in this Parliament to make progress on de-radicalisation and countering violent extremism measures. We welcome in particular your Resolution of November 2015 as an important contribution. We share this determination and we look forward to working with you in order to advance as quickly as we can.

Tibor Navracsics, *Member of the Commission*. – Madam President, the recent horrendous attacks in Europe remind us that terrorism is global and yet extremely local, as a majority of recent perpetrators have been our own citizens: born and raised on our territories, educated in our schools, now radicalised and inspired by an ideology of destruction, given into propaganda of hate and turning against their own fellow citizens and our common values.

The fact that these Europeans were radicalised into violent extremism on our soil says something about the social fabric of our societies and the need to strengthen its resilience.

Our response needs to be holistic. This is the approach you expressed in the reports prepared by your colleagues Julia Ward and Rachida Dati, and we have taken in our most recent communication on supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

It is part of our larger Commission effort to implement the European agenda on security and it builds on existing capabilities and efforts. We have put forward an ambitious set of initiatives ranging from research and evidence-building to countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online, addressing prison radicalisation, promoting inclusive education and reaching out to young people in general.

And since violent extremism has no borders and several third countries face very similar challenges, we also foresaw measures to support third countries in their endeavour.

We have several operational as well as security tools at hand. While prevention has to be our first priority, our security approach needs to be reinforced at the same time. We need to enhance our capability to disrupt terrorist activity, stem the flow of finance, prevent access to weapons and disrupt terrorist travel.

Those returning to Europe from conflict areas are a particular concern. That is why we will propose a review of the Schengen Information System and why we have proposed systematic checks at the external borders for everyone entering and exiting the EU whether they are EU or non-EU citizens.

Then there is the internet, which certainly appears to be accelerating the radicalisation process and where our young people are exposed to the poisonous and barbaric rhetoric of violent extremists. Recent investigations also demonstrate how the internet is playing a more prominent role in attacks themselves. This is precisely why we launched the EU Internet Forum in December 2015. We brought together ministers, Europol and high-level representatives of major internet companies. We agreed on two key objectives: that we must reduce accessibility to terrorist content online; and that we must empower civil society partners to increase the volume of positive alternative narratives online.

In addressing the first objective an Internet Referral Unit has been established at Europol. In addition to providing substantive operational support to Member States, in just under a year it has referred over 8 000 pieces of terrorist content to the companies. In the vast majority of cases the material has been swiftly removed.

We are now taking this one step further through a joint referral mechanism which is being developed by the internet companies to improve the speed and volume of referrals and prevent removed material from being re-uploaded elsewhere. In addressing the second objective, namely to create positive alternative narratives to that of the violent and divisive terrorist narrative, we have committed EUR 10 million to help equip civil society partners with the technical skills and training that they require to ensure their voices are seen and heard online.

Those efforts start primarily at local level. Police officers, youth counsellors, prison and probation staff, and teachers are the practitioners best placed to identify the early warning signs of radicalisation. But they are also brought together at the European level through the Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence. Through this network of networks more than 2 400 local practitioners from all over Europe are working together. We committed a budget of EUR 25 million for the next four years to help the network fulfil its mission, while under our internal security funds over EUR 314 million is available for anti-radicalisation projects for the period 2014-2020.

Let me now turn to another key pillar of prevention – education. Education, both inside and outside the classroom, and youth activities in general, are crucial for this comprehensive approach. Education plays a vital role in the socialisation of children, in developing social and emotional skills. Fundamental values can be best internalised from an early age. We need solid foundations which help young people to be resilient against extremist ideologies and violence, and have a common sense of belonging. That is why, in cooperation with France, I called for an extraordinary meeting of the education ministers in Paris in March 2015 and we together adopted the Paris Declaration. On that basis we proposed a series of concrete measures to reach out to teachers, educators, youth workers and, most importantly, young people on the ground. We are working towards a comprehensive policy framework in the form of a Council recommendation to promote inclusion and fundamental values in education. It will offer policymakers and practitioners concrete policy guidance and facilitate mutual learning, building on research evidence of what works.

We are mobilising the Erasmus+ programme where we are making available this year EUR 400 million for transnational cooperation projects. Projects aiming at inclusion and fundamental values will be given priority. In addition, with EUR 13 million we will upscale and disseminate successful grassroots initiatives. Horizon 2020 will also be further mobilised to support research into violent radicalisation.

Teachers and trainers are key and we will step up our efforts to support them. e-Twinning, the world's biggest teachers' network, which is supported by the Erasmus+ programme, enables 300 000 teachers across the EU to run joint projects and link pupils from different countries and backgrounds. We will extend e-Twinning further to selected neighbourhood countries so that pupils and classrooms can better know and understand each other from an early age.

We will also set up a network to encourage direct contact between young people and positive role models, for instance, entrepreneurs, artists, sports persons and even formerly radicalised people. They will be selected at local level and invited to visit schools, youth clubs, sports clubs and prisons to share their experiences.

Finally, we will set up Erasmus+ virtual exchanges between young people both within and outside the EU. Our aim is to bring 200 000 of them together through structured and moderated online discussions by 2020 to raise empathy and promote intercultural dialogue.

Honourable Members, resilience against violent radicalisation will come through a combination of these actions and partners. The Commission is determined to help and support in every way we can in order to find a holistic solution to this urgent challenge we are all faced with.

Together with all my fellow Commissioners, I stand ready to work with you in the European Parliament, with Member States and civil society to implement these measures. I trust that I can count on your support.

Monika Hohlmeier, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Minister, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zunächst einmal darf ich mich dafür bedanken, dass wir diese Debatte heute führen, denn ich glaube, das Thema Radikalisierung und Deradikalisierung ist einer der wichtigen Bausteine, um den Terrorismus, der derzeit die Europäische Union in Beschlag nimmt, zu verringern beziehungsweise ihm vielleicht auch ganz den Boden entziehen zu können.

Wir sehen derzeit bei den stattfindenden Attentaten, dass wir es mit neuen Formen der Radikalisierung zu tun haben, neben den bereits bekannten älteren Formen der Radikalisierung. Ich glaube, dass wir dem Ganzen mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken müssen. Ich denke an Bereiche, die man nicht so oft diskutiert. So müssen die Mitgliedstaaten beispielsweise im Bereich der Gefängnisse ernsthaft Maßnahmen ergreifen, um Radikalisierung in den Gefängnissen zu vermeiden, damit diejenigen, die mit kleinen Straftaten beginnen, nicht am Ende als Attentäter – gut rekrutiert durch terroristische Netzwerke – innerhalb der Europäischen Union zu operieren beginnen.

Zweitens ist auch in den letzten Attentaten sehr deutlich geworden, dass wir es mit neuen Formen der Selbstradikalisierung zu tun haben, das heißt, mit Menschen, die über Internetprogramme, die ganz gezielt von der Propagandamaschinerie des IS ins Netz gestellt werden, Anleitung erhalten, wie man Schwerstverbrechen begehen kann, und dementsprechend muss man sowohl diese Propagandamaschinerie bekämpfen als auch entsprechende Strafen sehr strenger Art für diejenigen aussprechen, die diese Propagandamaschinerie in Gang setzen. Außerdem muss man Hilfen anbieten für diejenigen, die bereits in die Netzwerke hineingeraten sind, und auch eine Löschung von Seiten veranlassen, die junge Menschen dazu bewegen könnten, sich an einem solchen Netzwerk zu beteiligen, weil sie dort regelrecht als Helden dargestellt werden – was wir in unserem Strafgesetzbuch als Terrorismus bezeichnen.

Des Weiteren ist es ganz wesentlich, dass man die neuen Plattformen umgekehrt auch zum Positiven nutzt. Das Internet kann nicht nur zum Negativen, sondern von uns aus auch zum Positiven genutzt werden. Das heißt, wir müssen eine ganz klare Gegenstrategie entwickeln gegen diese Art von Propaganda, wie sie der IS oder Al-Kaida betreiben. Ich glaube, dass die Kommission hierzu auch wichtige Maßnahmen ergriffen hat im Rahmen der *Internet Referral Unit* und im Rahmen des EU Internet Forums, und auch die Zusammenarbeit mit privaten Unternehmen in diesem Sektor ist außerordentlich wichtig. Darüber hinaus dürfen wir aber nicht übersehen, dass IS und andere terroristische Organisationen versuchen, auch in den sozialen Raum einzudringen und junge Menschen anzusprechen, die sich in der Gesellschaft unsicher fühlen, nicht akzeptiert und nicht angenommen fühlen. Wir müssen dafür Sorge tragen, dass die Mitgliedstaaten die besseren Gegenangebote bieten beziehungsweise soziale Organisationen so stützen, dass sie tatsächlich auch jungen Menschen gute Angebote machen können.

Ana Gomes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhora Presidente, de facto, em novembro, o Parlamento aprovou um relatório sobre este tema com medidas concretas, a par da cooperação, na coordenação, na partilha de informação entre forças de segurança e de informação, que apontavam justamente para a importância de medidas na prevenção da radicalização nas prisões e nos nossos guetos, nos Moolenbeeks que vão por essa Europa fora. Mas, em vez disso, acabamos com o PNR europeu que foi apresentado como uma bala mágica contra o terrorismo, que está esburacado contra voos charter e privados, ilustrando, portanto, a inconsistência de políticas ditas securitárias que, realmente, não dão segurança nenhuma, e nem vou falar do que se passa no financiamento do terrorismo.

Acresce que continuamos a pagar o preço da falta da Europa na descoordenação, na inação, nas contradições na nossa política externa e nas contradições relacionadas com a nossa segurança interna face a conflitos: Síria, Iraque, Líbia, Turquia, Ucrânia e outros na nossa vizinhança.

A nossa segurança depende de um combate ideológico e político dentro e fora das nossas fronteiras, mas não saberemos travá-lo se continuarmos a deixar espaço para que a extrema-direita fascista e nazi insuffle os ventos da xenofobia e do ódio contra refugiados e migrantes, e se continuarmos a negação falando de *foreign fighters* quando são, na verdade, jovens europeus, nossos, nascidos, criados e empurrados para a pequena criminalidade e radicalizados nas nossas prisões, quem nos tem atacado, como atacam outros povos nas fileiras do Daesh, porque alimentam ressentimentos contra as sociedades em que cresceram, sentindo-se excluídos e discriminados.

Falta aos nossos Governos, ao Conselho e à Comissão reconhecer que as políticas neoliberais falharam miseravelmente e fomentaram insegurança e populismo na Europa ao criar desemprego, guetos, exclusão, mais desigualdades e injustiça social, criando condições para que os Estados islâmicos e os grupos de *hooligans* nazis fascistas venham recrutar os nossos jovens e transformá-los em lobos assassinos.

Foram estas mesmas políticas que cortaram em capacidades e no treino das nossas forças de defesa e de segurança, que cortaram nas capacidades de reabilitação das nossas prisões, deixando que se transformassem em centros de radicalização, e que nunca, de facto, investiram em programas de prevenção da radicalização.

Agora, a Comissão vem falar nisto. Muito bem! São precisos então recursos, mas também políticas sociais inteligentes, que envolvam estruturas municipais, escolas, clubes, organizações não governamentais, sector privado, e que impliquem ativamente nesse esforço as famílias e as comunidades religiosas, em especial as muçulmanas europeias que sofrem a dobrar o efeito devastador do ataque e do comportamento terroristas.

Temos que impedir reacções de curto prazo como as que sugerem a retirada da nacionalidade a suspeitos de terrorismo ou a criminalização do uso da Internet. É preciso...

(A Presidente retira a palavra à oradora)

Helga Stevens, namens de ECR-Fractie. – Radicalisatie is een grensoverschrijdend fenomeen en dat gebeurt overal. In de 28 EU-lidstaten zouden er volgens experts minstens 6 000 geradicaliseerde moslims zijn. Het is daarbij zeker fout om de oorzaak enkel bij sociale achterstelling te leggen. De motieven zijn zeer divers, waaronder een afkeer van het Westen en iets te willen betekenen. Indien dergelijke personen grijpen naar geweld en hier aanslagen willen plegen, eventueel na terugkeer uit conflictgebieden, dan wordt de situatie kritiek. Individen die het nodig vinden om met bruut geweld een ander staatsmodel op te leggen, moeten wij bestrijden. En met wij bedoel ik alle burgers van goede wil, inclusief rechtgeaarde moslims. Samen moeten wij strijden voor de gelijkheid van man en vrouw, de rechten van homokoppels en andere verlichtingswaarden.

Terroristen bestrijden is voorts niet enkel politiewerk. Het RAN-antiradicaliseringsnetwerk bijvoorbeeld kan als Europees project ook toegevoegde waarde bieden. Dit netwerk brengt eerstelijns werkers bij elkaar die elke dag werken met geradicaliseerde personen of personen met een gevoelig profiel. Cipiers, gezondheidswerkers en anderen delen hun ervaringen via dat netwerk. Zij beschikken over alle cruciale informatie die de veiligheidsdiensten kan helpen bij vroegtijdige detectie.

Een OCMW-medewerkster bijvoorbeeld kan bij een intakegesprek een verdachte thuissituatie opmerken. Een man bijvoorbeeld die weigert de vrouwelijke medewerkster een hand te geven of leerkrachten die merken dat jonge kinderen door imams tijdens weekendlessen islam worden gedwongen de ramadan te volgen. Die medewerkers kunnen dan de informatie doorgeven aan de politiediensten. Terreur bestrijden is een zaak van ons allemaal.

Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, en nombre del Grupo ALDE. – Señora Presidenta. Gracias a los representantes de la Comisión y del Consejo, queridos colegas. Guardo el *selfie* del asesino de Orlando en el despacho y me preguntan por qué. No quiero olvidar el rostro de la banalidad y de la crueldad en estos tiempos en internet.

Yo no creo que nadie tenga dudas sobre la necesidad de impedir y detener la capacidad de acción y expansión de las organizaciones terroristas. Ahora bien, para vencer al terrorismo y los distintos fanatismos violentos de estos tiempos, la prevención es tan importante como la inteligencia policial o la actividad judicial. Debemos ser capaces de cuestionar eficazmente una lógica política que camina sobre el sufrimiento humano y para ello lo más importante en el largo plazo es desactivar el odio, la deshumanización y la legitimación de la crueldad.

Por otra parte, la ideología que recluta a los fanáticos también genera otras formas de odio. Por tanto, combatir los delitos y conseguir la prevención resulta crucial, y no es fácil.

Los jóvenes necesitan obtener ideas que prevengan la legitimación de la violencia contra los demás. Necesitan prevenir la tentación de odiar a otros colectivos humanos, sean estos inventados o reales; prevenir la tentación de ver como enemigos a los propios vecinos, a su propia familia.

En este mundo globalizado, bajo el dominio de las tecnologías de la comunicación, ha cambiado nuestra forma de percibir la realidad. Especialmente las nuevas generaciones deben desarrollar una visión propia pero coherente de lo que significa la dignidad y humanidad de cada persona.

Por eso, agradecemos las nuevas medidas de la Comisión, puesto que la estrategia de la Unión Europea aprobada en el año 2005 había quedado obsoleta y los yihadistas europeos están estadísticamente sobrerrepresentados entre los que van a entrenarse desde cualquier sitio del mundo.

Los expertos insisten en relacionar los estudios de calidad sobre el fenómeno de la radicalización violenta con la elaboración de políticas públicas. Los expertos, las autoridades locales y los ciudadanos nos piden que no nos quedemos en una retórica de limitada efectividad.

Quienes aspiran a la desintegración moral de nuestras sociedades para doblegarnos e imponernos sus obsesiones sexuales deben saber que vamos a vencerlos con la ley y con el respeto de los derechos fundamentales.

Barbara Spinelli, a nome del gruppo GUE/NGL. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, in Francia come in Nord America siamo di fronte a una mutazione del terrorismo e della radicalizzazione. Spesso l'ISIS ci mette il cappello, ma gli atti che subiamo nascono in casa, sono concittadini a deciderli, soli.

La scelta dell'assassino di Joe Cox di difendere le proprie idee col coltello è stoffa delle nostre città, della nostra cultura. La partecipazione politica è giudicata strumento morto, la violenza diventa un male banale. «Avevo bisogno di riconoscimento» ha detto l'assassino dei poliziotti a Magnanville.

Dobbiamo cercare di capire come avviene questo passaggio, senza concentrarci ossessivamente su singoli fattori scatenanti: Internet, le prigioni, le scuole. Ancora più deleterio è rispondere con democrazie sempre più sorvegliate, con l'islamofobia e con le guerre a violenze che non sono belliche, ma legate a sradicamenti individuali o sociali difficilmente decifrabili.

L'omicidio di Joe Cox ricorda l'assassinio dell'arciduca Francesco Ferdinando nel 1914: lo sparo contro un impero multi-etnico non cade dal cielo, è il risultato di decenni di diserzione politica delle élites. Se al terrorismo si risponde con la politica della paura, avendo paura dei conflitti, sarà il terrorismo a vincere.

Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE). *im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion.* – Frau Präsidentin! Meine Damen und Herren, ich möchte hier noch einmal, wie wir es auch zu Beginn dieser Sitzung heute gemacht haben, meinen Schock, meine Trauer und meinen Zorn aussprechen über das Attentat in Orlando vor etwas mehr als einer Woche, wo 49 Menschen brutal umgebracht wurden, mindestens noch einmal so viele verletzt wurden und Hunderte von Angehörigen, von Freunden und Freundinnen trauern und nicht verstehen, wie das sein konnte. Aber auch über Frau Jo Cox, die, bevor sie Abgeordnete wurde, hier in diesem Haus arbeitete, sozusagen eine von uns war, und die ebenfalls brutal ermordet wurde, auch über das Polizistenehepaar in Frankreich vor kurzem – all die, deren wir heute zu Beginn dieser Sitzung gedacht haben. Wie kann es sein, dass Menschen so einen Hass entwickeln und irgendwohin gehen und losschießen oder Menschen erstechen, die einfach andere Werte vertreten, die für Vielfalt eintreten, für gleiche Rechte – egal, ob es Migranten und Migrantinnen sind, egal welcher Hautfarbe, egal welcher sexuellen Orientierung –, Menschen, die sich einfach ihres Lebens, ihrer Liebe freuen wie in Orlando in der Lesben- und Schwulenbar? Das war ein klar homophobes Attentat unter dem Namen des IS.

Heute geht es darum, wie wir verhindern können, dass Menschen, die sich radikalieren, dann zu gewaltbereiten Extremisten werden. Das bedarf zum einen Bildung, Beschäftigung, Inklusion, denn ganz oft liegen die Ursachen darin, dass es keinen Sinn im Leben gibt, keine Arbeit, keinen Job, keine Hoffnung. Menschen wieder Chancen und Freude am Leben zu geben, das Gefühl, ich kann etwas tun in meinem Leben, das ist notwendig.

Und ein Zweites – das wurde zum Teil schon angesprochen: Die Arbeit in Jugendzentren, in Schulen, aber auch in Gefängnissen, wo oft junge Menschen hinkommen aufgrund von kleineren oder größeren Delikten und dort die Gefahr besteht, dass sie radikalisiert werden und dann auch gewaltbereit werden.

Ich möchte zwei Beispiele kurz ansprechen, die genau das machen: Den Europäischen Bürgerinnenpreis 2015 hat für Österreich das Netzwerk sozialer Zusammenhalt gewonnen, dessen Mitarbeiter in Gefängnisse gehen und dort erfolgreich arbeiten, um Jugendliche, junge Leute, aber auch ältere zu deradikalisieren. Und ein anderes Beispiel, ganz aktuell: Gestern gab es hier in Molenbeek ein Zusammentreffen zwischen einem Kampfsportzentrum aus Wien mit Kampfsport-Champions und Leuten aus Molenbeek. Sie wurden eingeladen, hier zu zeigen, was sie in dem Zentrum in Wien machen. Über Kampfsport, der sehr oft junge Menschen anzieht, die sich sozusagen austoben wollen – in diesem Umfeld wird Neues geschaffen. Das muss gefördert werden, das sind positive Beispiele. Wenn die zusammenarbeiten und sagen „IS steht nicht im Koran“, wenn Muslime die Hand gegen den IS heben, auch im Sport – das sollten wir weiter fördern, und dann wird es hoffentlich weniger dieser Attentate geben.

Kristina Winberg, *för EFDD-gruppen.* – Fru talman! Hur ska vi förhindra radikalisering? Ja, det är en extremt viktig och högaktuell fråga. Men mycket mer angeläget är att prata om varför problemet har uppstått.

Jag vill börja med att rikta hård kritik till kommissionen som under 2014-2015 lät miljontals migranter ta sig in i EU utan att i princip ha någon kontroll alls på vilka som besteg europeisk mark. Det är ju ingen hemlighet att många jihadister kom med flyktingbåtarna; det har vi sett många bevis på.

Tusentals jihadister finns redan i EU idag vad vi vet, och det finns säkert många fler som vi inte känner till. Vi har ju hört talas om en mobilisering av sovande celler, som verkar vakna upp lite här och där. Och med tanke på att många av detta avskum beträder europeisk mark är det ju inte förvånande att de försöker locka över nya mördare i våra medlemsstater. Dessutom åker många från Europa för att strida för islamismen; bara den senaste veckan har vi hört rapporter om många som har anslutit sig till terrornätverk.

Inom kort kommer säkerligen de styrande att beordra medlemsstaterna att öppna upp sina gränser igen. Vad händer då?

Jag tycker att det är bra att det tas fram ett EU-direktiv som riktar in sig specifikt på att stoppa terrorism, istället för dumma förslag som att förbjuda innehav av vapen för jägare och sportskyttar. Äntligen ett förslag som angriper problemet från rätt håll.

Jag kommer att arbeta i detta parlament för att tre steg ska genomföras: Kontroll av våra gränser, hårdare straff för dem som har utfört eller planerat terrordåd och framtagna av medborgarskap i samband med terrorresor.

Det måste vara slut på daltandet och snacket om att om vi bara får fler fritidsgårdar och mer pengar till utanförskapsområdena så löser vi nog problemet med radikalisering. Det är dags att vi tänker på våra egna medborgare i EU.

Steeve Briois, *au nom du groupe ENF*. – Madame la Présidente, avec Charlie Hebdo, Le Bataclan, Bruxelles, Orlando et maintenant Magnanville, la liste des attentats perpétrés par l'État islamique ne cesse de s'allonger. Si les peuples d'Europe ont raison de rendre hommage aux victimes, les politiques, eux, doivent agir. Or, à ce jour, les actions engagées contre le terrorisme islamiste ne brillent pas par leurs résultats, au contraire. Malgré les niveaux d'alerte, que l'on dit pourtant élevés, il est toujours possible de prendre l'avion à Bruxelles sans être contrôlé, comme j'ai pu moi-même le constater la semaine dernière. Même chose pour les contrôles aux frontières nationales qui n'existent toujours pas. Bref, les terroristes djihadistes peuvent circuler en toute quiétude dans cette belle Europe.

Pour terrasser la menace, il faut d'abord avoir le courage de la nommer. Or, en programmant aujourd'hui un débat que vous intitulez «Prévenir la radicalisation conduisant à l'extrémisme violent et au terrorisme», vous pratiquez la politique de l'autruche car vous niez volontairement le terme d'«islamistes». C'est la preuve, non seulement, de votre naïveté mais aussi de votre peur et de votre faiblesse parce que notre modèle de civilisation n'est pas négociable.

Nous devons tourner le dos au laxisme et mettre aujourd'hui en œuvre des mesures fortes et fermes. Tout d'abord, suspendre immédiatement Schengen, renforcer les effectifs et les moyens des forces de sécurité et, enfin, déchoir de leur nationalité les binationaux faisant l'apologie du terrorisme.

Dans cette affaire, nous n'attendons rien de la Commission européenne, si ce n'est qu'elle fiche la paix aux États seuls légitimes capables de combattre efficacement l'État islamique.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, ένα από τα πιο σοβαρά προβλήματα τα οποία ταλαιπωρούν τις ευρωπαϊκές κοινωνίες είναι η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση των νέων, δηλαδή η τάση τους να ανατρέψουν με βίαιο τρόπο τα υφιστάμενα δεδομένα για να επιλυθούν τα προβλήματα. Η αντιμετώπιση αυτού του προβλήματος γίνεται όμως με εσφαλμένο τρόπο. Αντί να δώσουμε παιδεία στους νέους, διδάσκοντας τους την ιστορία, τη θρησκεία, τον πολιτισμό, τις αρχές και τις αξίες των χωρών τους, ανεχόμαστε την οικονομική εξαθλίωση και την καταστροφή της μεσαίας τάξεως, πράγμα το οποίο μάς γυρίζει εξήντα χρόνια πίσω, οπότε η παιδεία ήταν προνόμιο μόνο των πλουσίων.

Τα σκληρά μέτρα λιτότητας που έχουν επιβληθεί σε πολλές χώρες και ιδίως στην Ελλάδα υποχρεώνουν πολλά παιδιά να εγκαταλείψουν το σχολείο και, μέσα σε μια λαίλαπα ανεργίας, να προσπαθήσουν να βρουν μια οποιαδήποτε δουλειά, προκειμένου να επιβιώσουν. Με αυτό τον τρόπο όμως οι νέοι απομονώνονται, περιθωριοποιούνται, δυστυχούν και μισούν την κοινωνία, η οποία τούς έχει στερήσει κάθε ελπίδα για το μέλλον. Έτσι, λοιπόν, γίνονται εύκολα θύματα εξτρεμιστικών προπαγανδών και κυρίως του φανατικού ισλαμισμού και της τρομοκρατίας. Επίσης, ορισμένες χώρες παραβιάζουν βασικές αρχές της δημοκρατίας.

(Η Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον ομιλητή)

Roberta Metsola (PPE). – Allow me first to add my voice in tribute to Jo Cox, a tough mother of two who got into politics to make a difference for all the right reasons, and who was so brutally killed while doing her duty. I know all of us here would want to ensure that her legacy in fighting hate is preserved.

We must do what we can to find the right balance between allowing our freedoms and ensuring citizens' safety. One of the hardest lessons learned from the attacks in Europe was that our information-sharing capabilities are still not being fully utilised. Europe cannot afford to play catch-up. Radicalisation, whether online or on land, is one of the toughest challenges our enforcement agencies face. We need Europol to have the resources it needs, and we need to come down harder on those who preach hate and use religion as a disguise for their message of evil.

It is not only law enforcement. We also need a new approach to integration in our societies, where we see this as a two-way process of respect for people's rights but also respect for European values. Work to overcome obstacles to revoking passports of so-called 'foreign fighters' – particularly dual nationals who travel to conflict zones before coming back to Europe to radicalise and recruit – must continue. They do not deserve any protection an EU passport may give them.

If the horrific attack in Orlando showed anything it is that terrorism knows no borders, no nations. It is a global struggle that requires a global partnership for its defeat. Notwithstanding the horror of the crime in Florida, the worst of times brought out the best in people who stood up, scared but undeterred, and shouted that while today we mourn, in the end, love always wins over hate, and those voices echoed around the world. It is this that will be the lasting tribute to the victims of terror everywhere.

Terrorism may well still cast its shadow on our lives. It will not however define us. It is the determination to continue to live our lives as we see fit, despite apprehension, that will show the true character of Europe.

Tanja Fajon (S&D). – Hvala, predsedujoča, spoštovani plenum!

Jo Cox je minuli teden umrla zaradi prepričanj in načel, v katera je verjela. Verjela je v to, da nas različnost lahko združuje. Verjela je v vrednote, ki bi človeštvu, če bi vanje verjeli vsi, prinesle mir in sožitje.

Radikalisti so pripravljeni umirati za ideje, v katere verjamejo. A njihove ideje so nasprotne osnovnim človekovim pravicam in evropskim vrednotam, saj temeljijo na povečevanju enih na račun drugih.

Evropska unija se v luči terorističnih napadov in groženj trenutno ukvarja s problemom radikalizacije ljudi, posebej mladih, ki se pridružujejo islamskim skrajnežem in njihovim idejam. In ja, to je nujno, potrebujemo evropsko sodelovanje in izmenjavo informacij med organi kazenskega pregona, da bi se borili proti nevarnostim radikalizacije in terorizma. A sami dobro veste, da je radikalizacija možna še na številnih drugih poljih. Zato ne smemo pozabiti, da se v kriznem času, v katerem živimo, sočasno in kaj hitro lahko odvije tudi radikalizacija drugih skupin. Delno se to že izkazuje v odnosu določenih skupin do LGBTI, priseljencev, beguncev, posameznih verskih skupin, Romov, invalidov itd.

Da bi preprečili radikalizacije, bi morali največ pozornosti posvetiti prvič: naslavljanju vzrokov zanje in reševanju socialno-ekonomske situacije ter, drugič, dialogu z državljanji in boju proti sovražnemu govoru – zlasti na spletu.

Na to je politična skupina socialistov in demokratov posebej poudarjala in poudarjamo še danes. Pisanje in širjenje informacij po spletu, kot da se je prelevilo v novo evropsko svobščino, ki pa je popolnoma neregulirana. A države članice nujno potrebujejo ukrepe, s katerimi bodo lahko omejile in kaznovale sovražni govor in nestrpnost, rak rano razdora v družbi.

Države članice oz. Svet Unije moramo pozvati, naj takoj prenehajo blokirati direktive o boju proti diskriminaciji. Tudi tu žal kažemo, da ne govorimo z enim glasom, kar je nevzdržno. Jutri bo rezultat referendum, ne glede na to, kakšen bo, bo dobra šola, da ugotovimo, kam pelje precej razcefrana politika Evropske unije.

James Nicholson (ECR). – Madam President, I personally did not know Jo Cox, but I want to say how grateful I am that the President today took the opportunity to pass sympathy. As I come from Northern Ireland, I went through 40 years of this type of terrorism, and I know that today we have a husband left without a wife, and two children without a mother. I do not think any words can actually say how terrible that is to the family.

I feel that every time we meet in this Parliament to debate this topic, atrocities have happened in the intervening period. They have all been referred to, be it in Orlando, be it in this city, be it in Paris or wherever. And quite clearly the terrorists involved and the terrorist attacks in those cities by the so-called Islamic State are not simply a foreign policy problem, it is often a home-grown problem, often involving troubled young individuals radicalised in the countries they mercilessly attack. We need to strengthen the preventive strategies in our prisons, as well as engage in civil society, religious leaders and local communities. Radicalisation towards any terrorist group or violent activity regardless of religion or ideology is unacceptable.

Petr Ježek (ALDE). – Madam President, since I have been shadowing the directive on combating terrorism and have gathered more and more information, I am afraid a terrorist threat is even more worrying than I thought before. Also the recent terrorist attacks showed how easy it can be to conduct them, and to become radicalised is even easier, regardless of the nature of the radicalism, and there are numerous types of terrorism and radicalisation. Especially, religiously-inspired terrorists have continued to demonstrate their intent and capacity to conduct violent acts.

The terrorist threats from those groups is increasingly acute. There were around 5 000 Europeans fighting alongside ISIS and 30% of them have returned to their countries of departure after having gained combat experience. This poses a risk in the sense that they may have the intention to carry out terrorist attacks, but also because of the possibility that they will initiate or engage in recruitment cells. We need to be prepared for this, and in order to adopt efficient measures we must be aware of the magnitude of the problem. To prevent radicalisation leading to violent extremism is an enormous task, particularly when it comes to effective action. The Commission made a step in the right direction and ... *(President cut off the speaker)*

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, si se combina la radicalización yihadista con el odio hacia la comunidad musulmana o con la islamofobia, se tiene un cóctel explosivo. Los antecedentes están ahí para no repetirlos: la desestabilización de la zona por razones geopolíticas de control de los hidrocarburos, que algunos de nuestros aliados utilizan —o nosotros mismos utilizamos—; el «divide y vencerás», lanzando unas comunidades contra otras... Por no hablar de alguno de nuestros aliados, como Arabia Saudí, que practica una difusión sistemática y sostenida del wahabismo, doctrina radical emparentada con el takfirismo que profesan Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra o el mal llamado Estado Islámico.

Arabia Saudí, además, tiene bula: de 2008 a 2011, 17 300 millones en exportación de armas por parte de la Unión Europea. Soluciones: cortar financiación, cortar el suministro de armas, ahondar en las soluciones negociadas con los actores regionales en el marco de la ONU —es decir, la no injerencia—, y combatir, además, con planes reales la pobreza y la exclusión social en nuestros barrios, convertidos en guetos donde los wahabistas o los takfiristas encuentran el caldo de cultivo.

Beatrix von Storch (EFDD). – Frau Präsidentin! Heute hörten wir eine Stellungnahme der Kommission zum Thema Radikalisierung und Terrorismus. Maßnahmen dagegen müssen vor Ort getroffen werden, wo die Menschen leben: in Brüssel oder München. Sie leben nicht „in der EU“.

Wir haben in Brüssel gesehen, dass Parallelgesellschaften islamische Brutstätten und Rückzugsräume für Terroristen sind, weil sie abgeschottet sind und weil dort vor unseren Gesetzen die Scharia gilt.

Die Alternative für Deutschland hat ganz konkrete Forderungen dazu formuliert: Auslandsfinanzierungen von Moscheen müssen verboten werden, Imame müssen bei uns ausgebildet werden – keine Salafistenprediger mit Petrodollars aus Saudi-Arabien! Alle Islamverbände müssen sich bedingungslos von rechtsrelevanten Teilen der Scharia distanzieren und verfassungsfeindlichen Vereinen muss Bau und Betrieb von Moscheen untersagt werden.

Erdoğan hat gesagt, die Moscheen seien seine Kasernen und die Gläubigen seine Soldaten. Räumen wir Erdoğan's Kasernen auf, wenn sie Kasernen sind, und entwaffnen wir seine Soldaten, wenn sie Soldaten sind!

Marcel de Graaff (ENF). – De EU is de een na grootste financier van de Palestijnse Autoriteit, een instituut van Jodenhaters en terroristen. Het Europees Parlement nodigt holocaustontkenner en terreurbeloner Abbas uit. Deze man geeft vaste maandsalarissen aan daders van terreur tegen Joden. Joods bloed kleeft aan zijn handen en de heer Schulz zal deze handen morgen hartelijk schudden. De EU financiert Palestijnse radicalisering. Palestijnse kinderen leren Joden te haten en terreur te verheerlijken en de taal van de Palestijnse Autoriteit is de taal van geweld. Het is een schande en in de EU heerst een welkomscultuur. Moskeeën worden als kazernes volgeladen met oorlogswapens. Honderden, zo niet duizenden terroristen bereiden hier aanslagen voor. Ik zeg deze commissie: stop islamisering, stop met geld sturen naar Abbas en Erdoğan, sluit de nationale grenzen.

Ελισάβετ Βόζεμπεργκ-Βρυωνίδη (PPE). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, το θέμα που εξετάζουμε σήμερα, για μια ακόμη φορά, συναρτάται με τα απανωτά χτυπήματα, τα τρομοκρατικά χτυπήματα που λαμβάνουν χώρα στην Ευρώπη και σε όλο τον κόσμο. Οι τελευταίες έρευνες στην Ευρώπη έχουν δείξει μια δραματική αύξηση της εγκληματικότητας των εφήβων και νέων ανθρώπων. Θα πρέπει να μας απασχολήσει γιατί συμβαίνει· είναι άνθρωποι απελπισμένοι, άνθρωποι περιθωριοποιημένοι, άνθρωποι που δεν έχουν καμιά ελπίδα, και σ' αυτό οφείλονται κάποιες πολιτικές που έχουν ασκηθεί τα τελευταία χρόνια. Οι νέοι άνθρωποι, όταν δεν έχουν ελπίδα, δεν έχουν θέσεις εργασίας, δεν έχουν προοπτική, προτυποποιούν τους εγκληματίες και αισθάνονται ήρωες, όταν προκαλούν το μίσος και τον πανικό.

Θα πρέπει να μας απασχολήσει πώς εξελίσσεται αυτό το φαινόμενο, πού ριζοσπαστικοποιούνται οι νέοι άνθρωποι. Ένας δρόμος είναι οι φυλακές, τα καταστήματα κράτησης, όπου, σε μεγάλο βαθμό, μόνο σωφρονισμός δεν γίνεται και άλλη οδός είναι το Διαδίκτυο, όπου δυστυχώς είναι ανεξέλεγκτες οι οδοί, ανεξέλεγκτοι μέχρι στιγμής οι έλεγχοι και οι τρόποι με τους οποίους αυτοί οι άνθρωποι εξελίσσονται μαζικά, οπλίζονται με μίσος και στρέφονται κατά της κοινωνίας.

Φίλες και φίλοι, η απάντηση σ' αυτούς τους ανθρώπους, που θέλουν να προκαλέσουν τον θάνατο συνανθρώπων τους, σ' αυτούς τους ανθρώπους που κατατράχονται από μίσος και από οργή, είναι περισσότερος ανθρωπισμός, περισσότερη αλληλεγγύη, επιτέλους ανάληψη ευθυνών απ' όλους μας, που οδηγεί σε μια καλύτερη Ευρώπη.

Θα ήθελα να μοιραστώ μαζί σας την εμπειρία μιας ρητορικής που πρέπει να αλλάξει σ' αυτή την αίθουσα: «Δεν υπάρχουν αθώα θύματα». Όλα τα θύματα της τρομοκρατίας είναι αθώα. Ένοχα θύματα δεν υπάρχουν, κι αυτή η ρητορική ενός διαχωρισμού αντιλαμβάνεστε ότι οπλίζει χέρια και αφυπνίζει εσφαλμένες νοσηρές συνειδήσεις που τροφοδοτούν το χέρι του τρομοκράτη. Η απάντηση στο μίσος και στον φόβο είναι αγάπη και περισσότερη Ευρώπη.

Kati Piri (S&D). – Niemand wordt op een dag wakker als radicale salafist die zijn huis en familie achterlaat en naar het strijdveld in Syrië vertrekt om zich bij IS te voegen. Daar gaat een proces aan vooraf. Radicalisering voltrekt zich in onze woonwijken. Dat betekent dat het signaleren en het aanpakken ervan juist op dat lokale niveau moet beginnen bij de buurtbewoners, de leraren, de ouders, de imams en de jeugdwerkers.

Niet iedere moslim die arm is en zich gediscrimineerd voelt, wordt een jihadist of een terrorist. De oorzaken van radicalisering zijn niet alleen sociaaleconomisch van aard. Radicalisering is ook een religieuze ontsporing en dat feit wordt in dit Parlement nog te vaak ontkend. En waarom is het een Europees probleem en moeten wij hier in het Europees Parlement ook aandacht aan besteden? In een Europese Unie zonder interne grenzen is radicalisering in Den Haag, Molenbeek of de banlieues van Parijs een probleem voor ons allemaal, en met meer dan 4 000 Europese jihadstrijders, de recente terroristische aanslagen in Parijs en Brussel is het duidelijk dat we een ernstig probleem hebben.

Het is van groot belang dat alle lidstaten die met radicaliserende jongeren te maken hebben, ook daadwerkelijk een gemeenschappelijke strategie hebben en uitvoeren. Het moet afgelopen zijn met de vrijblijvendheid voor Europese regeringen om radicalisering effectief aan te pakken. Op dit moment worden Europese landen nog te weinig aangesproken op deze verantwoordelijkheid. Hetzelfde geldt ook voor het uitwisselen van informatie en inlichtingen tussen de nationale veiligheidsdiensten. Er zijn tal van databases opgericht die ervoor moeten zorgen dat iemand die door een land als gevaar wordt gezien voor de samenleving niet zomaar kan afreizen naar een andere lidstaat, waar hij niet in een database staat. Maar helaas worden deze middelen nog onvoldoende gebruikt en blijkt het veel te eenvoudig voor geradicaliseerde jongeren, maar ook voor bijvoorbeeld haatpredikers, om tussen Europese landen heen en weer te reizen.

Daarom is het in ons gezamenlijk belang dat elk Europees land haar deradicaliseringsprogramma op orde heeft. En laat ik hier nog zeggen: het blind blokkeren van websites zonder tussenkomst van een rechter is wat mij betreft dan ook een schijnmaatregel die wel een ernstige inperking van onze vrijheid betekent. Die kant moeten we niet opgaan en ook in de strijd tegen terrorisme: laten we zuinig zijn op onze vrijheid.

Czesław Hoc (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! W zasadzie każdy kraj ma swoją tożsamość narodową, bogatą i dumną historię i tradycje narodowe. I każdy kraj chroni te wartości. Obecnie Europa i świat przeżywają dramatyczny czas: niepohamowana migracja, radykalny ekstremizm, terroryzm. Bardzo wielu ludzi traci życie. Bardzo wielu ludzi cierpi. Ale musimy mieć też świadomość, że integracja mieszkańców Europy z uchodźcami nie jest możliwa, jeśli nie ma chęci asymilacji i adaptacji ze strony uchodźców. Integracja bez asymilacji to czysta utopia, to pobożne życzenia. Ponadto nawet miliony przyjętych do Europy uchodźców nie rozwiążą tego dramatycznego problemu. Zatem Europa musi pomagać u źródła konfliktu, a więc świadczyć pomoc finansową, żywnościową, społeczną, prawną, pomoc w budowie szkół, szpitali, infrastruktury itd. Ponadto należy pamiętać o zasadzie *ordo caritatis* – najpierw zapewnić pomoc, bezpieczeństwo i miłosierdzie swojej rodzinie, potem swojej ojczyźnie, a następnie innej wspólnocie.

Laura Agea (EFDD). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ogni volta che accade un fatto tragico, come Orlando e l'omicidio della deputata Cox, ci troviamo qua a parlare. Ci troviamo qua a parlare e ci troviamo, magari in commissione, anche a lavorare sui documenti sul contrasto al terrorismo.

Mentre noi cerchiamo di curare gli effetti di quello che è un fenomeno estremamente più alto, ci dimentichiamo che prima vanno affrontate le cause, bisognerebbe comprendere le cause. Ne vorrei citare alcune: abbiamo la povertà, il disagio sociale, l'emarginazione, la mancanza di prospettive lavorative, l'alienazione culturale, i legami familiari spezzati. Queste sono le cause che creano il terreno fertile per la radicalizzazione.

Non dimentichiamoci che molti dei nuovi terroristi, di quelli che si formano attraverso un *social media*, sono persone nate e cresciute nel nostro continente, sono persone che sono vissute ai margini, perché oggi non sappiamo affrontare una crisi, un'emergenza sociale che pesa in questa Europa e non solo sui cittadini europei, ma anche su quelli che sono arrivati e che noi non abbiamo saputo integrare e, a volte, non abbiamo neanche voluto integrare.

Quindi dobbiamo ricordarci sempre quali sono le cause, perché solo capendo le cause curiamo gli effetti. Oggi è importante, oggi continuiamo a parlare, risolviamo le cause della povertà, perché solo attraverso lo smantellamento della povertà, la presa in carico dei poveri, di tutti i poveri, si può affrontare il problema della radicalizzazione.

PRÉSIDENTE DE MME SYLVIE GUILLAUME

Vice-présidente

Mario Borghezio (ENF). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, quando molti anni fa noi lanciavamo l'allarme per il pericolo di un'immigrazione sconsiderata, di apertura a tutti e di espansione in tutta l'Europa di una predicazione islamista radicale che era politica, che non aveva niente a che fare col Corano, ma aveva molto a che fare con l'odio verso la nostra civiltà, ci beccavamo solo processi, accuse di razzismo e xenofobia.

Adesso, finalmente, sentiamo la Commissione e il Consiglio dire che si sono accorti che c'è un pericolo, c'è addirittura l'«uberizzazione» del terrorismo, in mezzo alle nostre case, sparano ai poliziotti, sparano persino ai gay.

Ci sarebbe da essere tranquilli ascoltando le voci della Commissione, che ci dice che stanno esaminando il modo con cui prevenire il terrorismo. Quando però si leggono le parole che ha pronunciato addirittura il coordinatore antiterrorismo UE, Gilles De Kerchove, che ha detto testualmente, a proposito dei *foreign fighters*, che dovremmo inevitabilmente poterli reintegrare, perché non possiamo chiuderli tutti nelle carceri, che bisognerà offrire loro una nuova alternativa di vita... Siamo matti! Qui in Europa non si hanno le idee chiare, bisogna buttarli fuori dall'Europa...

(La Presidente interrompe l'oratore)

Axel Voss (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Die jüngsten Anschläge in Orlando aber auch in Paris haben mehrere Auffälligkeiten gezeigt. Das eine ist, dass wir es auf einmal mit einem ganz individuellen Terrorismus hier zu tun haben. Sie haben gezeigt, dass die Anschläge massiv mit Schusswaffen vorgenommen werden. Sie haben gezeigt, dass diese individuelle Selbstradikalisierung durchs Internet oder im Gefängnis stattfindet, und es ist eben auch auffällig, dass es sich hier um heimische Terroristen handelt, weil sie auch Bürger unserer Mitgliedstaaten sind. Deshalb müssen wir auf diesen verschiedenen Ebenen auch entsprechend vorgehen. Da geht es zum einen – und das ist in den letzten Debatten auch schon oftmals erwähnt worden – um die Bekämpfung der illegalen Waffen und des Waffenschmuggels.

Zweitens – und das hatten Sie auch erwähnt, Herr Kommissar – geht es um die Frage, wie wir über das Internet und die sozialen Medien entsprechend eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit der Wirtschaft hinbekommen und herausfinden, wie wir diese Radikalisierung dort runterfahren können. Wir bräuchten drittens aber auch eine Art Programm für die Gefängnisse, um das dort besser in den Griff zu kriegen. Es ist ja kaum verständlich, dass die sich dort noch weiter radikalisierten können.

Dann müssen wir meines Erachtens mehr Aufklärungsarbeit insbesondere für die Lehrkräfte leisten, und auch das hatten Sie schon angesprochen. Die Lehrkräfte an den Schulen werden hier eine Schlüsselrolle spielen. Wir bräuchten vielleicht eine Art einheitliche Meldestelle für Auffälligkeiten, auch für die Familienmitglieder. Dann bräuchten wir – das wurde in den letzten Diskussionen in Straßburg auch erwähnt – die Interoperabilität von Datenbanken, die sich auch auf biometrische Daten bezieht. Dazu vielleicht auch wieder eine Änderung des Schengener Grenzkodexes, aber darüber hinaus eben auch das zügige Aufbauen des PNR-Systems, die Überprüfung von Koranschulen oder auch der Bezahlung von Imamen aus dem Ausland.

Josef Weidenholzer (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin! Vor zwei Wochen war ich im Sindschar-Gebirge im Nordirak, wo die Jesiden monatelang dem Ansturm der IS-Terroristen standgehalten haben. Inmitten dieser zerstörten Landschaft zeigte uns ein Soldat auf seinem Handy Dokumente erschossener *foreign fighters*, darunter ID, Sozialversicherungs-ID und Führerschein eines Landmannes, eines Österreichers, eines dreiunddreißigjährigen Kranführers. Seither lässt mich die Frage nicht mehr los, was diesen Mann getrieben hat. Offensichtlich hat er sich freiwillig dazu entschlossen, es musste irgendein Ereignis gegeben haben, das ihn dazu brachte. Jemand muss ihn rekrutiert und nach Syrien geschleust haben, und mit ziemlicher Sicherheit musste er zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits eine Reihe von Verbrechen und Gräueltaten begangen haben.

Es handelt sich um keinen Einzelfall, es handelt sich um ein Massenphänomen. Nur wenn wir diese Fragen beantworten können, dann können wir auch dem Phänomen Einhalt gebieten. Es ist ein komplexes Problem, weil die Terroristen vor nichts zurückschrecken und wie es Rückschläge geben wird, die unsere Geduld herausfordern werden. Ich begrüße die Initiative der Kommission, weil sie nicht im symbolischen Handeln stecken bleibt, sondern versucht, die Probleme an der Wurzel zu lösen.

Eine nachhaltige Lösung des Problems erfordert Weitsicht, Differenzierungsvermögen und Kombination von militärischen, nachrichtendienstlichen, polizeilichen, sozialarbeiterischen und erzieherischen Maßnahmen. Die Strategie der Kommission baut auf bewährten Instrumenten auf, RAN wird erwähnt, auch die Internetbeobachtungsstelle, die wir bei Europol eingerichtet haben. Das ist sehr wichtig, aber wir brauchen auch besonderes Augenmerk auf eine internationale grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit, daran mangelt es. Wir sollten auch nicht vergessen, dass die Rekrutierung von *foreign fighters* besonders leicht vor sich geht, wo die Lebensumstände schlecht sind. Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, schlechte Wohnbedingungen sind Inkubatoren für die *foreign fighters*.

Ελένη Θεοχάρους (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η βίαιη ριζοσπαστικοποίηση είναι πρόκληση που απαιτεί ευρείες δράσεις, αναφορικά με ζητήματα ασφάλειας και αντιμετώπισης των γενεσιουργών παραγόντων. Όπως καθορίζεται και στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ατζέντα για την Ασφάλεια, πρέπει να δοθεί απόλυτη προτεραιότητα στην πρόληψη και στην παρεμπόδιση της διάδοσης της τρομοκρατικής ισλαμικής προπαγάνδας και της ρητορικής του μίσους. Η παιδεία και η πολιτική αγωγή πρέπει να βρίσκονται στην πρώτη γραμμή της άμυνας και προστασίας των ευρωπαίων πολιτών. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση πρέπει, εντός των ορίων και των αρμοδιοτήτων της, να βοηθήσει τις εθνικές δράσεις να παρέχουν πραγματική προστιθέμενη αξία in situ.

Δυστυχώς, κύριε υπουργέ, η Τουρκία δεν βρίσκεται στην πρώτη γραμμή για την αντιμετώπιση της τρομοκρατίας, γιατί ασκεί η ίδια κρατική τρομοκρατία και, δυστυχώς, η Τουρκία ιδρύει σε ευρωπαϊκά εδάφη, και συγκεκριμένα στα κατεχόμενα εδάφη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, τζαμιά φονταμενταλιστών και ισλαμικά σχολεία που αποτελούν θερμότητα ισλαμικής τρομοκρατίας και εξτρεμισμού. Αυτό πρέπει να προσεχθεί πάρα πολύ. Πιστεύω ότι είναι μεγάλης σημασίας η προστασία.

Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra (PPE). – Señora Presidenta, dos palabras iniciales: solidaridad y rechazo. Solidaridad con las víctimas de Magnanville, del Reino Unido —nuestra amiga Jo Cox—, y con las víctimas de Orlando. Y rechazo. Rechazo sin paliativos a cualquier forma de terror.

Aplaudo y agradezco la Comunicación publicada por la Comisión el 14 de junio sobre la prevención de la radicalización. Nos encontramos ante una amenaza nueva y muy compleja. Lamentablemente, los últimos atentados nos han demostrado la facilidad que tienen estos individuos para formarse a través de las redes sociales y la agilidad y velocidad de la difusión de la propaganda terrorista en línea.

Por eso, yo, como ponente de Europol, y junto con todo el Parlamento, hemos dotado a la IRU de la base jurídica necesaria para el desarrollo de su actividad. Pero, además, quiero decir que considero necesaria la realización de investigaciones continuadas sobre las causas y las formas de este fenómeno para que podamos actuar coherentemente y, sobre todo, rápidamente.

Apoyo la necesaria interoperabilidad de los sistemas de información, dando acceso con debidas garantías a las fuerzas y los cuerpos de seguridad del Estado, en especial, revisando cuanto antes el Sistema de Información Schengen. Debemos aprovechar más la SRS —la Red para la Sensibilización frente a la Radicalización— y dotarla de mayores competencias y medios, mejorar la formación del personal de los centros penitenciarios, tanto para identificar y prevenir como para contribuir a la reintegración de los presos, promover y animar una mayor coordinación y cooperación entre todos los Estados miembros, especialmente con Europol y Eurojust, y mejorar la inclusión social y los valores de la Unión.

Por ello, señor Comisario, apoyo la propuesta de la Comisión para la utilización de Erasmus+, la educación y los foros juveniles de debate intercultural. En conclusión, la Unión y todos los Estados deben reforzar y mejorar todas las herramientas necesarias en la lucha y prevención contra cualquier forma de radicalización.

Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D). – Madam President, while 9/11/2001 was the work of teams of Al-Qaeda operatives sent to the United States, today most acts of terrorism are the result of radicalised nationals who one day decide to kill as many people around them as possible. Why and how do they get radicalised and, even more important, how can we prevent that radicalisation?

However, let us not forget that radicalisation does not come out of the blue, usually it is the result of increasing pressure exerted through siren calls and propaganda instigating hate and praising mass killing as a pressure-release, using in most cases the relative anonymity of the net.

Some people, usually from outside our countries, are doing that and we must, apart from countering their narrative and even discrediting it, find those people and deal with them according to our laws. Because letting those people get radicalised and not interfering with that and concentrating our efforts on preventing them from committing the horrible crimes they are determined to commit is not enough. Sooner or later they will find a way. But if we actively engage in dismantling those sources of radicalisation both in mosques and on the net, in cooperation with the Muslim communities themselves, and engage in the active countering of their narratives of hate for a long period to come, then we stand the chance to do away with this phenomenon.

After all, some years ago a well-known author of espionage books, Tom Clancy, if I am not mistaken, described exactly such a case when a recruiter of Jihadists was discredited in the eyes of his followers ended up being captured. His imaginary plot has become reality today, why not his recipe?

Richard Sulík (ECR). – Frau Präsidentin! Die Europäische Kommission nimmt offenbar an, dass die Terroristen zuerst einen Psychotest absolvieren, sich dann den Waffenschein besorgen, die Einkaufsgenehmigung, dann die Waffe kaufen und von der Polizei registrieren lassen, um danach einen Terrorangriff zu verüben. Und darum haben die Genies von der Kommission vorgeschlagen, den legalen Waffenbesitz massiv zu beschränken. Unter dem Vorwand „Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“ werden anständige Menschen ihrer Freiheiten beraubt. Und dann wundern sich die Damen und Herren von der Kommission, dass die EU immer weniger Zustimmung findet.

Frau Kommissarin Bieńkowska behauptet sogar, die EU muss dies tun, weil jährlich hunderttausend Menschen mit legalen Waffen getötet werden. Das ist nicht wahr. Die wirkliche Zahl liegt bei circa 1500 für ganz Europa. Ich fordere daher die Kommission auf, diese Novelle der Schusswaffenrichtlinie ganz zurückzuziehen. Sie hilft im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus kein bisschen.

Carlos Coelho (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, Senhor Ministro, Senhor Comissário, saúdo a Comissão pelo documento apresentado na semana passada sobre a prevenção da radicalização, respondendo assim aos apelos deste Parlamento.

Esta comunicação torna claro que a radicalização não é o resultado de um único fator. É um fenómeno complexo, a que a sociedade da informação veio acrescentar ainda mais elementos.

Temos, por isso, de abordar este fenómeno na sua totalidade. Ou seja, olhando para a prevenção, para o sancionamento e para a reintegração. Mas também desenvolvendo um conjunto de medidas transversais, em vários domínios, e cuja eficácia será maior quanto maior for a proximidade aos cidadãos: seja por regiões, câmaras, escolas ou centros comunitários.

Neste quadro, as prisões são um elemento central. Não queremos que as prisões se tornem nem nas universidades do crime nem nos novos centros de radicalização. Sabemos que se trata de competências iminentemente nacionais, mas a União tem de apoiar medidas destinadas à prevenção no sistema prisional e investir numa reinserção com mais sucesso. E a União também deve apoiar políticas de longo prazo, nomeadamente no âmbito educativo.

Como é evidente, a radicalização conducente ao fundamentalismo violento tem também de ser sancionada, responsabilizando-se os culpados e dissuadindo potenciais instigadores. A proposta de alteração do SIS II, do Sistema de Informação de Schengen, a apresentar no final deste ano, deverá introduzir um conjunto de melhorias que permitam ao SIS contribuir para uma ação mais concertada e eficaz dos Estados-Membros, tanto ao nível preventivo como sancionatório.

Por último, não descuremos a reintegração. Desde crianças expostas a ambientes radicalizados até adultos condenados, necessitamos de procurar a sua reintegração, devolvendo-os à sociedade, reaproximando-os dos seus valores fundamentais. Por isso, o Parlamento e a Comissão podem e devem trabalhar em conjunto. Apresentei em sede de Orçamento para 2016 propostas para um projeto-piloto no âmbito da desradicalização de crianças e jovens. Espero que tenha sucesso.

(O orador aceita responder a uma pergunta «cartão azul» (n.º 8 do artigo 162.º)).

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), Kékkártyás kérdés. – Tisztelt Képviselő Úr! Nem lesz abban vitánk, hogy valóban közös európai fellépésre van szükség. Sőt, még abban is mérhetetlenül egyetértek, hogy bizony az oktatásnak, a nevelésnek rengeteg szerepe van ebben az egész kérdéskörben. Épp ezért kérdezem: mikor jön el az a pillanat Önöknél, az Európai Néppártban, hogy szóvá teszik azt a végtelenül undorító propagandát, amit az Orbán-kormány, a magyar kormány csinál, és minden terrorizmust a migrációra vezet vissza?

Carlos Coelho (PPE), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Falando em termos pessoais e falando em termos de PPE, nunca confundimos imigração com terrorismo. Antes pelo contrário, dissemos sempre que a nossa resposta para a imigração obrigava a dois pontos: primeiro, a tentar solucionar os problemas na origem; segundo, a termos uma resposta humanitária. Confundir as duas coisas é um discurso que não pode deixar de merecer a nossa reprovação.

Mirosław Piotrowski (ECR). – W opublikowanym ostatnio komunikacie Komisji Europejskiej, który dotyczy zapobiegania radykalizacji prowadzącej do ekstremizmu połączonego z przemocą, formuluje się wiele zaleceń. Duży nacisk kładzie się na edukację w Unii Europejskiej, bazującą na wspólnych wartościach. Obok wskazówek dotyczących wychowywania dzieci w duchu różnorodności nauczyciele mieliby wychwytywać pierwsze oznaki radykalizacji wśród uczniów. Celem jest wpajanie młodzieży wspólnych wartości, ale niestety nie jest to wystarczająco doprecyzowane.

O ile Komisja Europejska dostrzega *iunctim* pomiędzy radykalizacją postaw a ostatnimi zamachami terrorystycznymi, to jednak nie mówi wprost, że dokonywane są one przez islamskich ekstremistów. Komisja Europejska powinna lepiej zdiagnozować sytuację, odzegnując się od złe pojmowanej politycznej poprawności, i wrócić do korzeni Europy, czyli wartości chrześcijańskich, i głośno je artykułować.

Milan Zver (PPE). – V evropskih družbah je svoboda najbolj zaščitena vrednota.

Enako ne bi mogli zaključiti za neko drugo vrednoto, ki je usodno povezana s svobodo in ki postaja vse bolj pomembna za Evropejce, in, zgodovinsko gledano, rekordno dolgo živijo v miru, govorim seveda o varnosti.

Na žalost se je v zadnjih letih močno povečal občutek ogroženosti. Svobodo in evropski način življenja ogroža mnogo dejavnikov, tako imenovana hibridna vojna, vse nasilnejši ekstremisti, negotove varnostne situacije z begunci in migranti, radikalizacija. Med vsemi nas najbolj ogroža terorizem – ne samo uvoženi, ampak tudi domači.

Evropa je torej varnostno ranljiva, od hladne vojne naprej živi v nekem varnostnem vakuumu. Zato potrebuje novo koherentno varnostno strategijo, učinkovitejšo uporabo varnostnih in obrambnih potencialov, predvsem pa več proračunskih sredstev domala v vseh državah članicah.

Tukaj ne gre le za naložbe v varnostne in obrambne strukture, ampak tudi v kakovostno vzgojo in izobraževanje, ter druga področja, ki omogočajo boljšo družbeno integracijo, še posebej mladih.

Čestitam komisarju Navracsicsu, ki je v izjavi Evropske komisije podal konkretne ukrepe, podprte tudi s finančnimi sredstvi. Sedaj so na vrsti države članice.

Na področju varnosti bo torej EU pokazala svojo učinkovitost, ko bo razbila teroristične mreže in organizacije, 4.000 naj bi jih bilo v Evropski uniji, ko se bo učinkoviteje soočila s sovražno propagando, ko bo uspela zaščititi svoje zunanje meje, ko bo zagotovila mir in varnost v svojem sosedstvu, ko bo široko zastavila koncept deradikalizacije v vseh evropskih družbah, ne samo na internetu in v zaporih.

Naj zaključim, ne moremo se trajno zanašati na pomoč drugih, ko govorimo o varnosti, čas je, da Evropejci zanj prispevamo več kot doslej.

Ангел Джамбазки (ЕСР). – Г-жо Председателстващ, уважаеми колеги, нищо сложно няма в борбата с радикализацията, но едно е ясно: тя не се бори с празни приказки и с хубави лозунги. Причината за радикализацията и основите ѝ са много простички, те са две. На първо място някой трябва да плаща за нея и на второ място трябва да има кой да се радикализира. Кой плаща за нея? Саудитска Арабия, Катар, Турция – държави, които изповядват радикален ислям, които плащат за салафистки крайни радикални организации.

Кой се радикализира? Тези, които са отишли в европейските държави и там са били посрещнати по погрешен начин. Било им е казано: „Вашата различност е много ценна. Бъдете си различни. Стойте си заедно, стойте на едно място. Изповядвайте своите ценности.“ Това е грешката.

На тези хора трябва да се каже: „Ако искате да дойдете в Германия, ще правите като германците. Ако искате да отидете в Полша – ще правите като поляците“. А останалото са празни приказки и едно много сериозно дълго и празно говорене и политическо лицемерие.

Teresa Jiménez-Becerril Barrio (PPE). – Señora Presidenta, de nuevo, en los minutos de silencio, las velas, el llanto y la rabia ante este terrorismo que nos azota sin descanso y del que debemos defendernos sin saber realmente cuándo volverá a golpearnos. Ayer fueron los jóvenes en Orlando o una pareja de policías que cumplían con el deber de protegernos. A todos ellos quiero darles un enorme «gracias» porque han dado sus vidas para que yo pueda ejercer mi libertad.

Los terroristas quieren atemorizarnos. Lo sabemos bien aquí, en Bruselas, cuando repiten sus amenazas y no sabemos dónde estaremos seguros. No podemos renunciar a nuestro modo de vida, porque eso sería lo mismo que decirles que han ganado esta nueva guerra que es el terrorismo.

Pero para que los europeos podamos seguir viviendo en un espacio de libertad y seguridad, necesitamos tomar medidas para prevenir el terrorismo y combatir la radicalización. Tenemos que hacerlo sin complejos, como lo hace el Partido Popular, que ha hecho de la lucha contra el terrorismo una prioridad, contrariamente a quienes aquí en esta Cámara parecen no comprender que, en el terrorismo, la prevención es importantísima, pero también lo son las medidas de seguridad, el intercambio de información y el defendernos, con todos los medios permitidos por la ley, de quienes solo tienen en mente acabar con nosotros.

Necesitamos combatir el reclutamiento por internet de aquellos que se unen al ISIS; también la radicalización en las cárceles; y necesitamos potenciar la educación. Pero, sobre todo, necesitamos unidad y voluntad política para luchar eficazmente contra el terrorismo, esa voluntad que se desvanece rápidamente después de un atentado, poniendo en riesgo la seguridad de los europeos.

Termino recordando a todas las víctimas europeas, dentro y fuera de nuestras fronteras y pidiendo a la Comisión lo que llevo pidiendo desde hace siete años: una directiva europea sobre víctimas de terrorismo, porque las víctimas del terrorismo son asesinadas para atemorizar a toda la sociedad. Todos somos víctimas del terrorismo.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). – Paní předsedající, radikalizace, stejně jako terorismus nebo extremismus, nezná hranic. A právě všechny tyto tři fenomény jsou pro nás velkou a nepředvídatelnou hrozbou. V boji proti nim je úloha Evropské unie důležitá a nebojím se říct, že nezastupitelná. Důležitější je totiž než kdykoli předtím. Jejím úkolem a úkolem jejích agentur musí být propojit jednotlivé členské státy, informace a složky.

Bohužel to v minulosti, jak jsme mohli vidět při útocích v Paříži nebo v Bruselu, prostě nefungovalo. A nejen uvnitř Evropské unie samotné, ale také ve spolupráci se třetími zeměmi. Propojujme a spolupracujme se zeměmi z Afriky, spolupracujme s Tureckem, spolupracujme s dalšími státy na boji proti radikalizaci, extremismu a násilí.

Boj proti radikalizaci samotné není tak jednoduchý. Podle mého názoru vyplývá především z nezvládnuté integrace a dlouhodobé frustrace a ze ztráty nebo úplné absence evropských hodnot. Je tedy nadmíru důležité adresovat právě tyto příčiny, a tím zabránit dalšímu šíření radikalismu. Především se musíme zaměřit na mladé lidi, jak už řekli moji předchůdci z Evropské lidové strany: my máme určitý plán a Evropská lidová strana chce aplikovat svoji strategii, kterou přijala nedávno při svých zasedáních.

Pokud zde totiž role Evropské unie selže, budeme v budoucnu svědky událostí jako v minulých měsících a nebudeme nikdy schopni mít radikalizaci a s tím spojený terorismus nebo extremismus pod kontrolou. Proto vyzývám ke společné spolupráci. V tom je alfa i omega veškerého úspěchu s radikalizací.

Elmar Brok (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, Herr Ratspräsident! Ich stimme dieser Mitteilung der Kommission zu und halte es für wichtig, dass wir in Europa, zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, vor Ort in den Schulen – da ist wahrscheinlich das Entscheidende zu machen –, sowie international gegen die Radikalisierung und gegen Extremismus arbeiten. Aber geben Sie mir auch die Gelegenheit, dies zu sagen: Das ist vor allem auch eine Aufforderung an uns selbst und unser Beispiel, das wir geben. Ich habe vorhin in einer Rede von der Rechten gehört, dass man über andere Menschen als Abschaum sprach. Wenn solche Reden aus unseren Reihen heraus gehalten werden, ist das schon der Beginn der Radikalisierung.

Wir als Politiker haben ein Beispiel zu geben, dass wir demokratische Prozesse erleben wollen, und dass wir in diesen Prozessen die Meinung des Anderen akzeptieren. Die Freiheit der anderen Meinung als eine Selbstverständlichkeit, ohne den anderen zu diskriminieren und als Persönlichkeit anzugreifen, ist ein Beispiel, das wir unserer Gesellschaft geben können. Was heute in diesen Tagen in politischen Äußerungen läuft, was in Medien läuft, ist eine Aufforderung zur Radikalisierung in manchen Bereichen. Und ich glaube, wir werden dies nur hinbekommen, wenn wir in der Lage sind, diesem zu widerstehen und zur Normalität auch in unserer Sprache zurückzukommen.

Das ist eine Frage, die wir uns innerhalb Europas stellen müssen, das ist aber auch eine Frage – das sage ich als Vorsitzender des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten – zwischen Völkern. Diese Generalisierung „das andere Volk ist faul“, „es sind Muslime, und deswegen ist es generell eine schlechte Angelegenheit!“ – diese Art von Generalisierung mit Vorwürfen transportiert Radikalisierung in unsere eigene Gesellschaft und Radikalisierung zwischen Religionen, zwischen Staaten und Völkern. Und es ist auch ein wichtiger Punkt, dass wir ein besseres Beispiel geben, als es in mancher Debatte zum Ausdruck gekommen ist. Und deswegen ist die Vermeidung von Radikalisierung auch eine Forderung an die Politik.

Interventions à la demande

Michaela Šojdrová (PPE). – Paní předsedající, radikalismus a násilí není nic nového, ale to, co je nové, je jeho četnost a brutalita a také to, že jej páchají lidé, kteří v zemích Evropské unie vyrůstali a v Evropské unii, kde stavíme na hodnotách lidskosti, byli vychováni.

Důvodem, bylo to tady již zmíněno, je frustrace mladých lidí, kteří nemají perspektivu a podléhají propagandě, fanatickým ideologiím. A řešení, pan komisař správně navrhoval posílit společnost, jistě, musíme k tomu mít nástroje, ať už tady bylo zmíněno: Internal security fund, práce ve věznicích a tak dále. Nástroje na úrovni EU i členských zemí.

Ale já se domnívám, že klíč je v řešení, v posilování osobnostní a sociální výchovy. Klíč je v posilování sebedůvěry mladých lidí, kteří musí mít perspektivu a pozitivní hodnoty. Jsem také ráda, že pan komisař pro tyto hodnoty má pochopení a má pochopení pro jejich podporu.

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gli attentati di Parigi e Bruxelles ripropongono in modo drammatico il problema del reclutamento di cittadini europei da parte di organizzazioni terroristiche e la necessità di prevenire i fenomeni di radicalizzazione. Si tratta di uomini e donne, spesso giovani, che hanno in comune un sentimento di rottura con la società e che rappresentano una minaccia per la sicurezza, in Europa e nei paesi vicini.

Ma, per difenderci da questo fenomeno, oltre alla repressione dobbiamo mettere in campo efficaci politiche di prevenzione, rafforzando il dialogo interculturale con tutte le comunità religiose, potenziando lo scambio di informazioni tra i paesi dell'Unione e naturalmente smantellando le reti del terrorismo, puntando a colpire il riciclaggio del denaro che, come è noto, finisce per finanziare queste reti. Insomma, una strategia per contrastare l'estremismo e la radicalizzazione potrà funzionare solo se sviluppata parallelamente ad una strategia di integrazione e di inclusione sociale.

Νότης Μαρτιάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, τα αίτια της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης έχουν πολιτικό και κοινωνικό πρόσημο. Στο πολιτικό πεδίο η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση των μουσουλμανικών πληθυσμών ενισχύεται από τις επεμβάσεις της Δύσης στον αραβικό κόσμο. Ενισχύεται από την Τουρκία, τη Σαουδική Αραβία και το Κατάρ, που χρηματοδοτούν τους τζιχαντιστές.

Στο κοινωνικό πεδίο, η φτώχεια και ο κοινωνικός αποκλεισμός αποτελούν λίπασμα για τους τζιχαντιστές και, ενώ η Κομισιόν προτείνει μέτρα για το χτύπημα της ισλαμικής ριζοσπαστικοποίησης, ταυτόχρονα έρχεται να προτείνει την κατάργηση της βίζας για το Κόσοβο· μια περιοχή η οποία έχει διαβρωθεί κυριολεκτικά από την Τουρκία και τη Σαουδική Αραβία· μια περιοχή στην οποία η βίαιη ισλαμική ριζοσπαστικοποίηση οδήγησε, σύμφωνα με την ίδια την τοπική αστυνομία, στην ταυτοποίηση 314 Κοσοβάρων τζιχαντιστών, μεταξύ των οποίων δύο βομβιστές αυτοκτονίας και 44 γυναίκες.

Κύριε Επίτροπε, κύριε Navracsics, στην Κομισιόν επιδιώκετε αντιφατικές πολιτικές, αλλιώς δεν εξηγείται από τη μια να λέτε ότι θα χτυπήσετε την τρομοκρατία και από την άλλη να ανοίγετε την πόρτα στους κοσοβάρους τζιχαντιστές. Δέστε το αυτό το θέμα, γιατί είναι σοβαρό.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospodo predsjednice, zastrašujući je niz terorističkih napada: Pariz, Orlando, Bruxelles. Možemo nabrajati puno gradova u zapadnom dijelu europske civilizacije, možemo nabrajati u mnogim drugim gradovima i državama na Bliskom istoku i drugdje. Međutim, ja bih okrenuo priču. Da, trebaju nam obavještajne informacije, trebamo sprječavati zastrašujuće stvari na internetu, trebamo učiniti puno represivnoga, ali ja se pozivam na stotine, tisuće, stotine tisuća sjajnih primjera tolerancije, sjajnih primjera ljudi koji žive zajedno, koji su primili imigrante, na vjerske zajednice koje žive zajedno, jezične zajednice koje žive zajedno. Imamo fantastičnih primjera. Pokažimo to! Pokažimo to i povedimo na taj način politiku u Europskoj uniji.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF). – Madame la Présidente, les attentats de Paris et de Bruxelles ont montré la défaillance de votre Europe; votre idéologie vous aveugle. L'Union européenne, Monsieur Brok, est devenue une passoire. Il faut prendre des mesures et ces dernières sont simples: il faut rétablir les frontières nationales et les contrôles aux frontières. La sécurité, Monsieur Brok, est la première des libertés.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, πριν προσπαθήσουμε να λύσουμε το πρόβλημα της τρομοκρατίας και του εξτρεμισμού στην Ευρώπη, ας κοιτάξουμε καλύτερα τα του οίκου μας: φήμωση ευρωβουλευτών με απαγόρευση εκδηλώσεων, έλεγχοι ευρωπαϊκών εθνικιστικών κομμάτων με σκοπό τη διάλυσή τους, παράβαση των κανονισμών και αποβολή ευρωβουλευτών από την Ολομέλεια για να μην ψηφίσουν, χλευασμός δηλώσεων και συμπεριφορών συγκεκριμένων ευρωβουλευτών. Αν αυτό δεν είναι πολιτικός εξτρεμισμός και τρομοκρατία, τότε τι είναι; Με πρόφαση τη δημοκρατία και φορέα την κοινή σας συμμαχία προσπαθείτε να εξολοθρεύσει τα εθνικιστικά κινήματα.

Δυστυχώς, οι βαθιές αγκυλώσεις σε φιλοχρήματες πολιτικές, οι προτεραιότητες σε συστήματα εις βάρος ανθρωπίνων θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων και η προσκόλληση πολιτικών ομάδων για χρόνια στην εξουσία οδήγησαν στη ριζοσπαστικοποίηση της σημερινής πολιτικής που πραγματοποιείται σε αυτό το Κοινοβούλιο. Όμως αυτό πρέπει να σταματήσει. Καλώ τους συναδέλφους που τοποθετούν την πατρίδα τους πάνω από τα οικονομικά συμφέροντα, που αντιστέκονται στην αλλοίωση των εθνών, που σέβονται την Ιστορία και πιστεύουν στον Θεό, να σταθούν απέναντι σε αυτή την πολιτική τρομοκρατία.

(Fin des interventions à la demande)

Tibor Navracsics, *Member of the Commission*. – Madam President, let me first thank you, honourable Members of the European Parliament, for that interesting and very constructive debate. It was good to feel your unanimous support for the communication, almost all elements of the communication, and it was good to feel your support for the security policy measures.

But I would like to emphasise now my particular happiness about your support for prevention, because education is the most efficient area and platform in prevention. We can educate good practices, good examples for peaceful coexistence just as Mr Jakovčić mentioned. We can show our power and the communities' power and we can concentrate on the local specialties in education as well, because I think the local level is decisive in prevention. That is why we support role models. That is why we support NGOs and local projects and that is why we support reintegration and integration projects in prisons, for instance.

We have very good plans for developing new programmes in education, in vocational education, in prisons and outside the prisons, in local communities, in schools and beyond schools, in sports clubs, youth centres and all other platforms where young people live and where they socialise. So thank you for your support and I rely on you in our further work and I hope that we will be successful in tackling radicalisation in Europe.

Bert Koenders, *President-in-Office of the Council*. – Madam President, thank you very much and thank you honourable Members for a very constructive and interesting debate. Let me just repeat that I am grateful for the Parliament's and support and for your contribution. I think we share the same objectives in our common fight against radicalisation and violent extremism. We must live up to the expectations of our citizens to improve their safety.

Fighting terrorism, preventing radicalisation and increasing the resilience of our societies requires a long-term approach, strong commitment and a sustained effort from the European Union and its Member States. So it is something that we have to do every day. It is work in progress, but we have no time to lose because our enemies are very quickly, if we do not watch out, in front of us.

That means we have to be innovative. I have heard many contributions on the different levels of the debate both in the analysis and in the prescriptions. In the analysis, most of you have mentioned both social as well as religious and criminal sources for this process of a radicalisation, and I think you are right. It is a multi-faceted problem of which you have different characteristics and we have to make sure that we have tailor-made prevention and repressive measures to deal with this very complex issue. We cannot wait. The paper is always very patient but we need to act, and I feel very much the support in this Parliament for these actions taken by the Council and others.

We simply cannot allow those who want to hurt our system or our way of living to win. In the end, democratic societies will always win against terror and extremists. It is, in the end, believing in your values and defending them. What terrorists want is, in the end, to instil fear by violence, and our vulnerability to that fear is the determining factor, and I think that is something that we have to realise every day we are dealing with this issue. With every step we take, every measure we adopt, it is important that we strike the right balance between security on the one hand and protecting our freedoms and the rule of law on the other. That is sometimes a precarious balance, but I think we have kept our values straight, including the rule of law, while being effective in the struggle against radicalisation. We must be strong and continue to repeat that same message over and over again. Our basic freedoms will not be compromised by terrorism nor by individuals with guns. The Council is determined to reach tangible results in the coming weeks and months.

La Présidente. — Le débat est clos.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE), *in writing*. – We all feel the same sorrow and outrage in wake of the horrific attacks in Orlando and Paris. Innocent lives have become victims of an act of terrorism, and this horrific violence has become almost commonplace recently all over the world. We are faced with the great task of improving our efforts to prevent radicalisation and counter violent extremism. The fact that many of these attacks are conducted by European radicals show that radicalisation is easier and more of a threat than ever. The return of radicalised Europeans from conflict areas in Africa and the Middle East pose a significant risk to Europe. We need to adopt effective measures and we must be aware of the magnitude of the situation. The Commission has made great progress on this issue in its security policy measures. We must educate our population and highlight the many examples of peaceful coexistence, tolerance, and the large numbers of cultures that live together in harmony. This fight requires a long-term approach with commitment from the European Union and the Member States. In the end, democratic societies will always win against terror and extremism.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Après les attentats de Charlie Hebdo ou du Bataclan en France, ceux de Bruxelles ou d'Orlando aux États-Unis, l'UE en est toujours à se contenter de déclaration et de belles résolutions sur la radicalisation ou le terrorisme. Or, face au danger qu'est l'islamisme radical et face aux menaces grandissantes envers nos nations, nous devons réagir sans plus attendre. Nous devons refuser ce laxisme ambiant qui s'installe au nom de «l'humanisme européen» et engager des mesures fortes dès aujourd'hui: suspension de Schengen, redonner aux États leur souveraineté en matière d'immigration et de sécurité, rétablir les effectifs de nos polices ou de nos armées nationales mais surtout oser nommer l'ennemi contre lequel nous nous battons, l'extrémisme islamiste.

Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, nous devons être en mesure d'expulser de nos États tous les terroristes et criminels qui sont autant de menaces permanentes sur le sol européen. Seules les Nations peuvent tenter de garantir notre sécurité face à la menace terroriste; l'UE, elle, a déjà lamentablement échoué.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Soledad Cabezón Ruiz (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia

antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Kinga Gál (PPE), írásban. – Becslések szerint jelenleg 4000 kiképzett, a Közel-Keleten radikalizálódott harcos tartózkodik jelenleg Európában. Az elmúlt napok hírei szerint pedig ezek száma folyamatosan nő. Ez pedig azt jelenti, hogy napról napra nő az európai állampolgárok fenyegetettsége, hogy esetleges terrortámadások, erőszakos cselekmények áldozataivá váljanak. Mindennek pedig a kiindító oka a radikalizálódás, különösképpen a másod-, harmadgenerációs bevándorló fiatalok körében. Határozottan fel kell lépünk ez ellen a jelenség ellen. Üdvözlöm a bizottsági közleményt ebben a tárgyban, hiszen meghatároz hét olyan konkrét területet, ahol közös uniós fellépéssel csökkenthető a radikalizáció mértéke. Úgy gondolom, hogy a jelenség ellen csak átfogó stratégiával lehet hatékonyan fellépni.

Legfontosabb teendő a radikalizálódott egyének azonosítása és kiemelése közösségeikből, hogy ne terjeszthessék gyilkos eszméiket, és vissza kell őket küldeni származási országukba. Ehhez elengedhetetlen a megfelelő, uniós szintű információcsere. Másrészt szükséges a radikalizáció megelőzése például az oktatás, a társadalmi ellenállóképesség megerősítése terén, illetve megfelelő lépéseket kell tenni a deradikalizáció és rehabilitáció terén is. Elsődleges feladatunk, gyermekeink iránti felelősségünk, hogy visszaadjuk állampolgárainknak a biztonságérzetüket. Ehhez pedig mindent meg kell tennünk, hogy sikerrel vívjuk meg a radikalizáció elleni küzdelmet.

Iratxe García Pérez (S&D), por escrito. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos -nacidos y criados en los Estados Miembros- que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, tal y como contiene la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados Miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por esta razón, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados Miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D), por escrito. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), por escrito. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento

presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Ramón Jáuregui Atondo (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Benedek Jávor (Verts/ALE), *in writing*. – It is of utmost importance to treat radicalisation and violent extremism as social phenomena and not as problems of a single religion or ideology; therefore, I believe that we should treat the real root causes behind radicalisation, namely marginalisation, discrimination and inequality. The EU and the Member States should focus on local capacity-building, awareness raising, integration and education instead of expanding their surveillance measures or deciding to build walls. Moreover, I cannot emphasise enough not to link the recent influx of asylum seekers with the extremist attacks that took place: asylum seekers more often than not have been forced to flee from the same kind of people that carried out these horrendous crimes, and the purpose of these attacks is to divide our societies.

Last but not least, I would also like to highlight the gender perspective of the issue. Recent research not only underlines the trend of extremist groups creating targeted propaganda to attract women, but also emphasises the underestimated role women can play in tackling extremism in their families and local communities, which was also enshrined in the Resolution on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations adopted last November by the European Parliament.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento

en forma de terrorismo.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Még ha félelemmel is tölt el annak a gondolata, hogy a terrorizmus egy állandóan aktuális téma, fontos, hogy ezt mindannyian tudatosítsuk, mert csak így tudunk időben reagálni a felmerülő kihívásokra. Most a terrorizmus egyik legkegyetlenebb eszközével, a radikalizálódással kell felvennünk a küzdelmet. Az orlandói mészárlás is megerősítette, hogy ez a jelenség nem csak a külföldről érkezőket, de ugyanúgy az Európában és Amerikában született állampolgárokat is érinti. Különös veszélyt jelent a mára óriási méretű öltölt internetes radikalizálódás, amin keresztül a terrorista csoportok emberek ezreit érik könnyedén utol. Szem előtt kell tartanunk a terrorizmus elleni fellépés három alapfázisát: a megelőzést, a harcot és a deradikalizálódást, majd ezekre megfelelő eszközöket kialakítanunk.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – Los recientes ataques terroristas en Europa han puesto de relieve la urgente necesidad de abordar la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento y al terrorismo. La mayoría de los presuntos terroristas implicados en los ataques eran ciudadanos europeos, nacidos y criados en los Estados miembros, que se radicalizaron y se conjuraron contra sus conciudadanos para cometer atrocidades. La prevención de la radicalización es una parte clave de la lucha contra el terrorismo, como se destacó en la Agenda Europea de Seguridad. El diseño e implementación de las medidas de lucha contra la radicalización recae principalmente dentro de la competencia de los Estados miembros. La UE ha apoyado su trabajo en este ámbito desde hace más de una década. En 2005, la estrategia antiterrorista de la UE identificó la prevención como uno de los cuatro pilares de sus acciones. Esta última Comunicación también complementa el Plan de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir el extremismo violento presentado en enero de 2016. Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha lanzado esta Comunicación que aborda la contribución de la UE para apoyar a los Estados miembros en la prevención de la radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento en forma de terrorismo.

18. Zusammensetzung der Ausschüsse: siehe Protokoll

19. Mehrjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen (Aussprache)

La Présidente. — L'ordre du jour appelle le débat sur la déclaration de la Commission sur le plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks (2016/2780(RSP)).

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, *Member of the Commission*. –Madam President, Honourable Members, on behalf of the European Commission and of course Commissioner Karmenu Vella who is responsible for the file. In the college? I would like to thank the rapporteur, shadow rapporteur and the Committee on Fisheries for all the hard work they have done to enable agreement to be reached for the multiannual plan for the management of the stock of cod, herring and sprout and fisheries in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic plan is the first of its kind; a landmark. It is the first of a new generation of multi-annual plans. These are important tools for the further implementation of our reformed common fisheries policy and for implementing its most ambitious element, the obligation to end wasteful discarding of fish and land all catches. In addition, these multiannual plans provide an important framework for the development of a more decentralized way of fisheries management, which what we called regionalisation.

With regionalisation in mind, I would also like to take the opportunity to needed to state formally our declaration in relation to regional cooperation. When proposing and adopting delegated acts under their regionalisation provisions of this plan, the Commissioner will comply with the framework set out in the basic regulation, in particular Article 18, and the practice established under the basic regulation implementing the regionalisation process will continue as it has since 2014.

The Baltic plan is the culmination of a process that has involved many players working together to reach consensus across many interests of involved parties. This process has included the Baltic fishing industry and the fishery ministers of concerned countries as well as the legislators of course, and their interests. The outcome is a balanced regulation that has incorporated the key concerns raised throughout the process. The agreement of both legislators has provided the blueprint for this new generation of multi-annual plans. This is very important for other marine regions for which the development of these plans will allow for sustainable long-term management.

I will look forward to cooperating with you as we present the next set of proposals for further fisheries management plans for your careful consideration.

Jarosław Wałęsa, *on behalf of the PPE Group*. – Madam President, this first fisheries management plan under the new common fisheries policy (CFP) was hard fought and was the result of very difficult, long negotiations, in which Parliament had to make many concessions. We did it in the trust that the provisions included would be enough to uphold sustainable fisheries in the Baltic Sea. This new plan must be put into action as soon as possible for setting total allowable catches (TACs) and quotas for the year 2017. It is crucial that the EU institutions act responsibly and show, now, that commitment to the principles is still alive.

Parliament has shown its commitment to sustainable fishing in the EU and to the future of the industry, and I must ask the Commission and the Council to do the same. That is why I have two questions: will the proposals from the Commission for next year's total allowable catch in the Baltic be based on the scientific advice and the rules established in this new management plan; and is there any scenario where this new management plan and the rules within it to settle catches could not be used?

It is crucial to use the new rules immediately, as the scientific advice regarding the western cod stock is very alarming. The stock has been under too much stress for a very long time, and so far the Council has failed to follow the scientific advice. The results of this failure have now led to a piece of advice from the scientists more or less closing this fishery. Luckily, the new Baltic management plan has some new rules in place and safeguards to deal with such situations.

After 10 months of difficult negotiations with the Council and the Commission, these negotiations gave us a plan that upholds and respects the objectives of the basic regulations. In the end, this plan will ensure that fishing activities in the Baltic are conducted in a sustainable, reasonable and economically viable way, which will not put unnecessary strain on the environment – and now we will closely monitor the implementation of the plan.

Ulrike Rodust, *im Namen der S&D-Fraktion*. – Frau Präsidentin! Es waren intensive, lange Verhandlungen. Der morgen zur Abstimmung stehende Text zum ersten Mehrjahresplan gemäß der reformierten gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik ist das Ergebnis von acht Trilogien. Es bedurfte einiger Energie, um die Wogen zwischen Rat und uns als Parlament zu glätten. Wogen, die meiner Meinung nach gar nicht so hoch hätten sein müssen, hätte man sich gleich strikt an die Reform gehalten. Ich möchte dem Berichterstatter Herrn Wałęsa für seine Arbeit und Vorgehensweise danken. Diese hat dazu geführt, dass sich die Position des Parlaments hinreichend wiederfindet.

Das Parlament, die Kommission und der Rat waren sich in fast zehn Monaten andauernden Verhandlungen insbesondere in Bezug auf die Festsetzung der Fischereierblichkeiten nicht einig. Das Parlament ist mit klarer Botschaft in die Verhandlungen gegangen: Die Vorgaben der Grundverordnung müssen umgesetzt werden. Der Rat lehnte dies ab und beharrte auf Flexibilität. Herausgekommen ist am Ende ein Kompromiss. Was die Wertebereiche für die Fischereierblichkeit angeht, sind wir dem Rat entgegengekommen. Flexibilität besteht nun unter bestimmten Bedingungen. Dafür hat das Parlament auf striktere Sicherheitsmechanismen gepocht.

Nach einer positiven Abstimmung morgen muss aus unserer Sicht dieser Mehrjahresplan bei der Festsetzung der Fangmöglichkeiten im Oktober greifen. Das heißt, der Rat muss in den nächsten Tagen die formelle Abwicklung erledigen, damit dieses Gesetz spätestens im August im Amtsblatt erscheint. Denn der Ostseemanagementplan wird sogleich seine erste Feuertaufe haben. Dem westlichen Dorsch in der Ostsee geht es sehr schlecht, und so auch den Fischern. Nur der neue Ostseemanagementplan wird helfen können, und deshalb muss er Grundlage für die Quotenentscheidung im Oktober sein. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Situation in der Ostsee bin ich froh, dass wir in dem vorliegenden Plan eine Unterstützung für eine vorübergehende Einstellung von Fischereitätigkeiten durch den EMFF aufgenommen haben.

Ich sehe diesen Ostseeplan als Blaupause für nachhaltiges Fischereimanagement. Nachhaltig im Sinne von ökologisch, wirtschaftlich und sozial. Es ist gut, dass wir im jetzigen Text nun sichere Grenzen setzen, an die sich die Fischereiminister halten müssen. Das sichert die ökologische Nachhaltigkeit. Langfristig ist ein ökologisches Vorgehen auch ein Garant für wirtschaftliche und soziale Nachhaltigkeit. Für mich stellt dieser Plan einen entscheidenden Schritt zur Implementierung der Fischereireform dar. Dafür bin ich sehr dankbar.

Czesław Hoc, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Wieloletni plan zarządzania stadami dorsza, śledzia i szprota to dokument kluczowy dla przyszłości ponad 94% zasobów ryb odławianych w regionie. To pierwszy wieloletni plan w Unii Europejskiej stworzony w oparciu o nową wspólną politykę rybołówstwa. Główną dobrą nowością jest tak zwane zarządzanie wielogatunkowe, które bierze pod uwagę interakcje pomiędzy poszczególnymi rodzajami ryb. To bardzo dobrze. Wszyscy wiemy, że obecnie istnieje pilna potrzeba biologicznej odbudowy bogactwa Bałtyku i że obecny system musi być efektywny. Zarządzanie musi mieć charakter zrównoważony, oparty na wiarygodnej wiedzy naukowej. Oto kilka moich uwag: należy uwzględnić konieczność podejścia regionalnego w formułowaniu przepisów wykonawczych do planu, utrzymać obszar zamknięty dla rybołówstwa w celu ochrony tarlisk i siedlisk narybku w oparciu o uaktualnioną wiedzę naukową, a także określić źródła finansowania w razie czasowego zaprzestania połowów, jeśli takie rozwiązania ochronne będą miały zastosowanie; po czwarte, należy wyraźnie ograniczyć tak zwane połowy paszowe, czyli przemysłowe, i po piąte – przynajmniej w Polsce – jeśli mają być budowane farmy wiatrowe na Bałtyku, to nie można tego czynić w miejscach najlepszych łowisk i tarlisk oraz w miejscach rozrodu ryb. Dziękuję. Pragnę pogratulować generalnie bardzo dobrego sprawozdania.

Nils Torvalds, för ALDE-gruppen. – Fru talman! Det var meningen att det här skulle vara en enkel match. Det blev allt annat än en enkel fråga, men jag vill ändå inleda med ett speciellt tack till två personer.

För det första till Jarosław Wałęsa. Han har visserligen gått för att titta på fotboll tror jag, men han lyssnar på oss i de avgörande ögonblicken, och därför kom vi fram till ett någorlunda hyggligt resultat.

Den andra jag ville speciellt tacka var Ulrike Rodust för hennes insats alldeles under det första skedet när vi försökte genomföra den nya politiken för europeiskt fiskeri. Hon var en central figur och ett stöd och en stötta för mig under de avgörande förhandlingarna. Vielen Dank!

Varför var det så svårt? Det var svårt av den orsaken att Östersjön är ett svårt innanhav. Det är lätt nedsmutsat, medeldjupet är mindre än i något annat stort fiskeområde, vi har en låg salinitet där och vi har många stater med olika intressen längs Östersjöns stränder. Det var dessutom första gången, och alla vi som är någorlunda fullvuxna vet att första gången alltid är svårare än den andra gången.

Det finns alltså olika intressen, det fanns tekniska svårigheter och fisken har en underlig förmåga att inte alltid följa våra instruktioner eller direktiv. Ett av problemen vi hade var att skarpsillen och strömmingen numera går i samma stim i delar av Östersjön. Det gör det svårt för fiskarna att fiska något som är viktigt för deras näring. Men vi har kommit fram till ett mål och vi hoppas att det här målet ska hålla också för de andra regionala planerna.

Vi vet att det under förhandlingen alltid fanns osynliga närvarande. Andra fiskeintressen som gjorde det ganska svårt att komma fram till målet, men ännu en gång tack.

Anja Hazekamp, namens de GUE/NGL-Fractie. – Niemand kan volgens mij echt blij zijn met dit meerjarenplan voor de Oostzee want dit plan beschermt de vissers niet en dit plan beschermt de vissen niet. Dit plan verhoogt de *maximum sustainable yield*, het punt waarop wateren maximaal worden bevestigd. En *maximum sustainable yield* is dus niets anders dan in beleid gegoten hebbucht. De beschikbare voorraad vis zoveel mogelijk plunderen. En we hebben het hier niet over strijkijzers, we hebben het hier over levende wezens die pijn en angst kunnen voelen.

En zelfs het maximale uit de zee vissen is nog niet genoeg. Dit plan gaat nog een flinke stap verder: het verhogen van de *maximum sustainable yield*, en daarvoor heb ik maar één woord: overbevissing. En daarmee verzwakt dit Oostzeeplan het hele gemeenschappelijke visserijbeleid. En daarmee wordt ook de deur opengezet om andere wateren, zoals de Noordzee, structureel te blijven leegvissen. Een groot deel van u heeft zich samen met mij verzet tegen dit overbevissingplan. En ik ben dan ook verbaasd dat u vandaag dit plan verdedigt. Ik kan dat in elk geval niet. De rapporteur heeft ons morgen uitgenodigd voor een glas champagne en, collega's, ik vraag u: kunt u morgen met opgeheven hoofd het glas heffen? Als dit het maximale is wat Europa wil doen, dan zal de overbevissing pas stoppen als de zeeën echt leeg zijn, en helaas zullen de meesten van ons dat nog moeten meemaken. En voorts ben ik van mening dat de Europese landbouw- en visserijsubsidies moeten worden afgeschaft.

Linnéa Engström, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Fru talman! Jag vill börja med att tacka kollegan Wałęsa och hans team för det arbete som ni har lagt ner på att slutföra förhandlingarna. Östersjöplanen är den första förvaltningsplanen där parlamentet och ministerrådet gemensamt sätter en gräns för hur mycket vi får fiska.

Förhandlingarna har varit hårda och jag är besviken för att vi inte nådde hela vägen fram med att försvara parlamentets ambitiösa position som skulle ha inneburit ett stopp för överfisket inom EU.

Ett hav är ju inget akvarium där alla faktorer går att kontrollera. I vårt känsliga innanhav Östersjön är situationen dessutom ytterligt svår. Denna osäkerhet kräver säkerhetsmarginaler när vi bestämmer ett maximalt hållbart uttag av fisk.

För att nå målet om att Östersjön ska vara ett friskt hav med livskraftiga fiskbestånd kan vi inte hela tiden fiska på maxgränsen för vad som är hållbart - FMSY. Vi måste ligga på en lägre nivå så att fiskbestånden kan återhämta sig.

Istället för att bestämma hur mycket under FMSY vi ska fiska kom förhandlingarna att handla om i vilka situationer man får fiska över FMSY och hur mycket över FMSY.

Därför kan jag tyvärr inte rekommendera min grupp att rösta för den här överenskommelsen. Den håller sig inte inom det mål som anges i grundförordningen för EU:s fiskeripolitik.

Vi lyckades i alla fall få med ett antal skyddsmekanismer i planen. Nu kommer ett första test: för tre veckor sedan kom en alarmerande rapport om tillståndet för torsken i västra Östersjön som hotas av kollaps på grund av dålig föryngring.

Bollen ligger nu hos kommissionär Vella. Kommissionen ska nu ta fram ett förslag för nya fiskekvoter utifrån Östersjöplanen. För att skydda torsken i västra beståndet förväntar jag mig att kommissionen föreslår kvoter som är i enlighet med de skyddsåtgärder som beskrivs i planen.

Vi har allt att vinna på att sätta ett stopp för utfiskningen av europeiska vatten, och från ett medborgarperspektiv är det viktigt att EU:s institutioner respekterar och följer de beslut vi tar och inte urholkar dessa genom att driva igenom motstridiga beslut. Att säga att vi ska skydda våra hav från överfiske och samtidigt tillåta det, är hyckleri. Det, om något, undergräver förtroendet för politiken och det europeiska samarbetet.

Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señora Presidenta, señora Comisaria, frente a algunas intervenciones catastrofistas que hemos escuchado, a mí me gustaría destacar que en los últimos años estamos dando pasos fundamentales en la Unión Europea para garantizar una gestión más sostenible y eficaz de nuestros mares y de nuestra actividad pesquera.

El Acuerdo que debatimos hoy no es solo importante para asegurar un buen plan plurianual de gestión pesquera del bacalao, arenque y espadín en aguas del norte de Europa: estamos ante un Acuerdo que va a servir de ejemplo y de base para elaborar otros planes de gestión regionales, que aprobaremos en el futuro, para poblaciones de peces en diferentes zonas del continente.

Y en este plan, hemos hablado de muchas cosas —de rango de mortalidad por pesca, de biomasa; también después de los TAC y de cuotas pesqueras—, pero hemos hablado sobre todo de competencias. Y ahí quiero resaltar la competencia que tiene cada una de las instituciones y que tenemos que ser estrictamente respetuosos con ello.

Por tanto, el objetivo es establecer planes plurianuales que tengan en cuenta todos los aspectos que rodean la gestión de esta actividad, garantizando, por un lado, una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las poblaciones de peces, pero a la vez que protegemos la actividad de nuestros pescadores, también muy importante.

Ricardo Serrão Santos (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, gostaria de felicitar os relatores que representaram o Parlamento neste processo. O Sr. Walesa, a Sra. Rodust e, certamente, os restantes relatoressombra arguíram durante muitos meses para que a posição do Parlamento fosse, tanto quanto possível, espelhada na versão final deste regulamento. Enquanto autor de algumas alterações mais «controversas», admito que a solução encontrada poderá contribuir para «manter as unidades populacionais das espécies exploradas a níveis de biomassa que possam gerar o rendimento máximo sustentável».

A abordagem utilizada poderá agora inspirar os planos nas restantes zonas geográficas. Mas, mais do que encerrar o processo com esta redação, penso que deveremos verificar, em permanência, se esta se ajusta aos objetivos da nova Política Comum de Pescas.

Apesar deste passo positivo, tenho que enfatizar que, para além do autêntico descalabro que se passa no Mediterrâneo, muitas das restantes pescarias europeias não estão saudáveis. Há que garantir a robustez das populações exploradas e promover também a resiliência dos seus habitats e das suas cadeias alimentares. Para isso, é urgente implementar verdadeiras áreas marinhas protegidas. A introdução de quotas para os recursos marinhos explorados é um instrumento necessário, mas inconsequente na ausência de uma política preventiva e mitigadora de efeitos negativos nos ecossistemas.

Peter van Dalen (ECR). – Eindelijk hebben we dan nu overeenstemming over een visserijplan voor de Oostzee. Het ontwerpplan werd in oktober 2014 gepresenteerd, in mei 2015 begonnen de onderhandelingen, en dan nu na anderhalf jaar ligt er eindelijk een wetgevend akkoord. Het was een lange weg en het meerjarenplan werd eigenlijk ook voor dit Parlement een meerjarenplan. Ik verwacht dat de behandeling van andere meerjarenplannen, met name dat van de Noordzee, nu een stuk sneller kan gaan.

De kaders zijn immers duidelijk: we hebben gekozen voor bandbreedtes, waarbinnen de lidstaten vangstquota mogen vaststellen. Deze bandbreedtes zijn vooral voor de Noordzee hard nodig want daar kennen we veel gemengde visserij. En met die bandbreedtes kunnen we de maximale duurzame opbrengst bereiken en ook alle visbestanden kunnen daar dan van genieten. En dat is immers de doelstelling van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid. Ten slotte wil ik collega Wałęsa en zijn team hartelijk bedanken. Het waren pittige onderhandelingen. Maar we zijn er met elkaar goed uitgekomen.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE). – Señora Presidenta, quiero felicitar al señor Wałęsa y al equipo negociador por su empeño en sacar adelante este plan plurianual para el bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico, el primero tras la reforma de la PPC. Espero que, de una vez, la transparencia y la objetividad sean la clave en la fijación de las cuotas pesqueras. La resistencia del Consejo a aceptar que el Parlamento tiene codecisión en este terreno bloqueó ya tres planes plurianuales, el de la anchoa, del que fui ponente, el del jurel y el de la merluza.

Esta actitud de los Estados miembros, que incumple el Tratado de Lisboa, ha permitido mantener la opacidad en la determinación de las cuotas pesqueras y en la adjudicación de las mismas. Métodos incompatibles con la objetividad que defendemos y con la actual reforma pesquera. Las víctimas han sido los profesionales del mar y en no pocas ocasiones el estado de las pesquerías. Por eso, estamos a favor de que se generalice este sistema de planes de gestión a largo plazo. Es mejor para el mar y su equilibrio y para quienes viven de lo que pescan en él.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, es un avance que analicemos la situación de la pesca en el mar Báltico de manera conjunta y no por especies, porque eso es cierto que ayuda a buscar soluciones para mejorar la biodiversidad. Pero queremos recalcar que es fundamental que todas estas regulaciones respondan realmente a las especificidades de los territorios y de sus gentes porque, desgraciadamente, las necesidades de los pescadores no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la Unión.

Nuestros pescadores y, sobre todo, las artes de pesca de bajo impacto deben estar en el centro de estas políticas. Por eso es imprescindible respetar su modo de vida y su cultura. No se pueden hacer políticas pesqueras sin contar con la gente de la mar para asegurar su presente y su futuro.

Creemos que es necesario dar un paso más hacia la gestión de un modelo más sostenible dentro de los propios Estados. Debemos ser vigilantes con el reparto de los cupos de pesca asignados para impedir que los grandes buques, que destruyen los recursos marítimos, pesquen a sus anchas y, sobre todo, para conseguir que quienes de verdad respetan la mar puedan vivir dignamente de la pesca, que son las y los pescadores.

Werner Kuhn (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich möchte mich auch bei allen Beteiligten und Verhandlern bedanken für ihre Beharrlichkeit und dafür, dass eine praktikable Lösung mit dem Mehrarten-Mehrjahresplan für die Ostsee geschaffen worden ist. Er bringt auch Planungssicherheit für die Fischereien direkt, und in schwierigen Situationen – wir haben es vorhin gehört – auch Möglichkeiten eines finanziellen Ausgleichs.

FMSY – der maximal mögliche Dauerertrag: Ein Dauerertrag zieht sich über mindestens fünf, sechs oder auch zehn Jahre eines biologischen Zeitablaufs hin. Und da muss es möglich sein, dass man eben auch mit ganz bestimmten Kriterien wie der Laicherbiomasse hier für die Fischereien eine vernünftige Planungssicherheit bieten kann.

Zum anderen bin ich froh darüber, dass auch einige Dinge geändert worden sind, die eigentlich viel Bürokratie mit sich gebracht haben: die Ein-Netz-Regel zum Beispiel, der Wegfall der Seetage, die Dokumentation des fischereilichen Aufwands und die Möglichkeit, bei Stilllegungszeiten dann tatsächlich auch den Fischern einen finanziellen Ausgleich zu zahlen.

António Marinho e Pinto (ALDE). – Senhor Presidente, congratulo-me com este plano, já que o último fora aprovado nos idos de 2008, e felicito todos aqueles que trabalharam para a sua conceção, nomeadamente o relator e os relatores adjuntos.

Entendo, porém, que a Comissão Europeia devia ter sido mais ambiciosa na sua proposta, pois está em causa o declínio continuado dessas espécies: do bacalhau, do arenque e da espadilha, no Mar Báltico.

A Política Comum de Pescas deve contribuir para a preservação de todas as espécies exploradas, mas também para a proteção do ambiente marítimo, pois só assim se logrará a realização do primeiro grande objetivo dessa política que é o rendimento máximo sustentável.

Para um país como Portugal, em que largos sectores da população vivem do mar, nomeadamente a comunidade de pescadores, todas as medidas que contribuam para a proteção da qualidade da vida dos oceanos são sempre bem-vindas!

Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL). – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Mit dem Mehrjahresplan für die Ostsee erhalten endlich auch Fischer in meinem Wahlkreis Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Schleswig-Holstein Planungssicherheit. Es wird eine ausgewogenere und nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung der Fischbestände im Sinne der gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik möglich.

Als Linke unterstützen wir ausdrücklich das Ziel, eine langfristige, ökonomische und ökologische Verträglichkeit von Fischfang und Aquakultur sicherzustellen. Der Internationale Rat für Meeresforschung schlägt eine Reduzierung der Fangquoten für den Dorsch in der westlichen Ostsee um mindestens 85 Prozent vor. Damit kann die jahrelange falsche Praxis, Fangquoten entgegen den wissenschaftlichen Empfehlungen festzulegen, beendet werden, und ich meine, mit einer tatsächlichen Umsetzung des Mehrjahresplanes sollte es das künftig nicht mehr geben.

Wir setzen endlich das viel und lang diskutierte Ziel um, nach dem nur so viel gefischt wird wie nachwachsen kann. Der soziale Aspekt sollte auch beachtet werden. In der jetzigen Form sieht der Mehrjahresplan ausdrücklich Möglichkeiten der Unterstützung vor, und sie sind im Sinne von Beschäftigung an der Küste unkompliziert anzuwenden.

Interventions à la demande

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'accordo sul piano pluriennale per il Baltico pone le basi per una gestione sostenibile dei più importanti stock ittici nel Mar Baltico. È il primo piano del suo genere dopo la riforma della politica comune della pesca e penso che il piano sia coerente e pienamente in linea con i principi della riforma. Sottolineo l'importanza di garantire che la gestione degli stock ittici nel Mar Baltico sia basata su dati scientifici aggiornati; è essenziale infatti che il nuovo piano si avvalga del contributo di coloro che conoscono meglio la regione, in quanto saranno in grado di adattare le misure a livello regionale alla specificità dell'attività di pesca.

L'accordo in questione apre la strada all'elaborazione di analoghi piani pluriennali con lo stesso modello per la pesca in altre zone geografiche. I piani di gestione pluriennale si sono rivelati molto utili per la gestione sostenibile delle risorse alieutiche, perché stabiliscono regole chiare per lo sfruttamento degli stock ittici, basato sull'approccio precauzionale e sul principio del rendimento massimo sostenibile, garantendo in tal modo condizioni di stabilità e prevedibilità.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η ολλανδική Προεδρία κατέληξε στις 15 Μαρτίου του 2016 σε μια προσωρινή συμφωνία με την οποία επιδιώκεται η θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου για την αλιεία βακαλάου, ρέγγας και σαρδελόρεγγας, που αποτελούν σημαντικά είδη αλιείας στη Βαλτική Θάλασσα. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με γνωμοδοτήσεις του Διεθνούς Συμβουλίου για την εξερεύνηση της θάλασσας, οι σημερινοί ρυθμοί εκμετάλλευσης ορισμένων αποθεμάτων δεν συνάδουν με την επίτευξη μέγιστης βιώσιμης ανάπτυξης. Επομένως, είναι αναγκαίο η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να λάβει άμεσα μέτρα, ώστε τα αποθέματα αυτών των τριών ειδών στη Βαλτική να αλιεύονται σύμφωνα με την αρχή της μέγιστης βιώσιμης απόδοσης.

Ταυτόχρονα όμως, κυρία Bienkowska, κυρία Επίτροπε, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση θα πρέπει να κοιτάξει και στον Νότο και να λάβει μέτρα οικονομικής ενίσχυσης των ελλήνων αλιέων, που έχουν φτωχοποιηθεί από την τρόικα και τα μνημόνια. Σας μεταφέρω, κυρία Bienkowska, την κραυγή διαμαρτυρίας των ελλήνων αλιέων, που δεν αντέχουν άλλο την φοροεπιδρομή της τρόικας, τη διάλυση του πρωτογενούς τομέα και τη μερκελική λιτότητα.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospodo predsjednice, htio bih svakako na početku čestitati kolegicama i kolegama koji su uspjeli nakon osam trijaloga doći do zajedničkog dogovora i uskladiti višegodišnje planove za izlov bakalara, haringa i papalina u Baltičkom moru. I to je dobar primjer, to je dobar put. Baltik je zatvoreno more i trebamo imati višegodišnje planove. Ali, želim istaknuti hitnu potrebu da se sličan višegodišnji plan za izlov razne riblje biomase u Jadranskom moru učini čim prije. Neki su rekli da je trebalo zabraniti izlov nekih riba u Baltičkom moru, da je to govorila znanstvena zajednica. Možda je već kasno za neke riblje vrste u Jadranskom moru. Molim vas, krenimo kao komisija, kao zastupnici, počnimo čuvati Jadransko more.

(Fin des interventions à la demande)

Elżbieta Bienkowska, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, first, of course, I want to thank the honourable Members for all their comments and contributions and I will pass all of the information and questions to Commissioner Vella and they will be answered in detail.

But let me just shortly, very shortly, touch upon two points. First I would like to reiterate that the Baltic multiannual plan is the first of the new generation of such plans. And as we will present the next set of proposals for fisheries soon, and as you all know it is a legal obligation of the Commission to draft the proposals on the basis of the existing law, it has to be said that the proposal for fishing opportunities in the Baltic Sea is usually adopted by the Commission at the end of August / beginning of September, in order to prepare in a timely manner the discussion and agreement at the fisheries Council in October. If the new multiannual management plan is in force by then – and it is currently under the co-responsibility of the co-legislators – then our proposal will be based on this plan. So I do hope this will be the case, and strongly encourage Parliament and Council to organise formal signature to make this possible.

And the second point, on the safeguards in the plan, I want to assure you know that the Commission will make appropriate use of the provisions in force such as targets and safeguards. So from my side, this is everything.

La Présidente. — Le débat est clos.

Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Dorsz, śledź i szprot są podstawowymi gatunkami poławianymi w warunkach naturalnych i stanowią istotne elementy ekosystemu Morza Bałtyckiego. Jak wynika z badań naukowych, istnieją między nimi silne interakcje biologiczne. Dlatego popieram bardziej elastyczne podejście do zasobów. Polska od kilku lat opowiadała się za koniecznością opracowania wielogatunkowego planu zarządzania zasobami w Morzu Bałtyckim. Ponieważ podczas połowów dorsza, rybołówstwo ma wpływ na zasoby ryb płaskich, uważam, że prawidłowe jest włączenie w ramy planu możliwości reagowania na pogorszenie się stanu zasobów ryb płaskich. Sygnały płynące ze środowiska rybackiego są alarmujące, szczególnie katastrofalnie wygląda sytuacja dorsza. Niezwykle szkodliwe są tutaj połowy paszowe. Dlatego szczególnie krytykuję przepisy artykułu 13, pozostawiające zbyt szeroką tolerancję dla połowów pelagicznych na dużą skalę, w tym połowów przemysłowych. Konieczne jest zwiększenie ich przejrzystości oraz podjęcie takich działań, aby ich wpływ na środowisko morskie Bałtyku był jak najmniejszy. Komisja musi brać pod uwagę wspólne rekomendacje państw regionu Morza Bałtyckiego. Działania Komisji muszą być zgodne z przepisami rozporządzenia nr 1380/2013 dotyczącego WPRyb oraz wynikami prac międzyinstytucjonalnej grupy roboczej do spraw planów długoterminowych. Analizie prawnej i merytorycznej powinien być poddany zakres uprawnień Komisji do wydawania aktów delegowanych z traktatowym podziałem kompetencji w UE oraz zawartymi w rozporządzeniu nr 1380/2013 przepisami dotyczącymi regionalizacji.

20. Auswirkungen der US-Sanktionen auf die Geschäfte von EU-Unternehmen mit dem Iran (Aussprache)

La Présidente. — L'ordre du jour appelle le débat sur la question orale à la Commission sur les répercussions des sanctions américaines sur les activités commerciales de l'Union européenne en Iran, de Bernd Lange et Marietje Schaake, au nom de la commission du commerce international (O-000082/2016 — B8-0706/2016) (2016/2677(RSP)).

Bernd Lange, Verfasser. – Frau Präsidentin! Entschuldigung, aber ich hatte die Information, dass wir 16 nach 7 mit der Debatte starten. Frau Präsidentin, Frau Kommissarin, in der Tat, die Anfrage betrifft die Auswirkungen der Sanktionen der Vereinigten Staaten gegenüber dem Iran auf europäische Unternehmen. Wir haben ja glücklicherweise den sogenannten Atomdeal mit Iran erreicht und damit auch das Aufheben von Sanktionen verhandelt. Es ist gut, dass das Atomprogramm des Iran auf einen vernünftigen Weg gebracht wird und im Gegenzug die wirtschaftlichen Erholungsprozesse eingeleitet werden.

Wir haben allerdings das Problem, dass viele US-Sanktionen schon vor der Diskussion über den Atomweg Irans verhängt worden sind, 1979 schon. Diese Sanktionen sind nicht aufgehoben worden, und sie haben natürlich in gewisser Weise auch eine extraterritoriale Wirkung auf europäische Unternehmen. Insofern gilt es noch einmal der Frage nachzugehen, wie die europäischen Firmen damit umzugehen haben. Es hat nachweislich Probleme bei einigen Unternehmen gegeben. Einige andere haben nach heftigen Diskussionen mit den amerikanischen Behörden eine Ausnahmeregelung bekommen, aber nichtsdestotrotz wird hier einer Ungleichbehandlung zwischen amerikanischen und europäischen Unternehmen Tür und Tor geöffnet.

Deswegen ist es wohl umso wichtiger, hier wirklich mal Klarheit in das Feld der extraterritorial wirkenden Sanktionen zu bringen. Insbesondere gilt das für den Bankensektor für den Zugang zu Finanzmitteln. Es kann nicht sein, dass hier europäische Firmen von einer vernünftigen Finanzierung ihrer Projekte ausgeschlossen sind. Wir alle wissen, wie viel die neuen Möglichkeiten mit dem Iran bedeuten gerade für die Stabilisierung dieser Region und auch für die Entwicklung der iranischen Gesellschaft, und insofern haben wir als Handelsausschuss entsprechend die Fragen formuliert, wie die Kommission, Frau Kommissarin, wie Sie die konkrete Situation beurteilen und welche entsprechenden Maßnahmen Sie ergriffen haben, um die Implementierung der *commitments* wirklich sicherzustellen.

Wie gedenken Sie insbesondere gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten nochmals klarzumachen, dass diese extraterritoriale Betroffenheit eben nicht Auswirkungen auf die europäischen Firmen haben darf? Eine weitere Frage ist, ob Sie schon mal mit den Amerikanern geredet haben und was die Antwort der Amerikaner gewesen ist, und wie Sie letztendlich in Zukunft die Aktivitäten europäischer Unternehmen in diesem Kontext sicherstellen wollen.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, *Member of the Commission*. – Madam President, honourable Members, five months after the lifting of UN, EU and US economic sanctions in return for the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitment, it is really timely to debate the impact of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the relations between Iran and EU businesses. This is really important.

Let me first of all stress that the lifting of sanctions was a key element of the nuclear agreement and an effective implementation of the sanctions lifting is a condition for sustainability and success of the plan. It is in our interests, and Iran can reap the economic benefits of it. It is undeniable that we are at a very critical juncture where we need to make sure that all remains on track during the visit of the High Representative and seven other commissioners, including myself, to Tehran in April. We could witness the domestic debate in the country about the merits of the plan, and international engagement is still vital.

Successful implementation of the deal is also a key here in the EU. The EU continues to be closely engaged, including through the High Representative's coordinating role of the Joint Commission overseeing the implementation of the deal.

Let me assure you that we have faithfully met our commitments, as agreed under the plan of action, by lifting the sanctions and publishing guidance on implementation day, providing clarity on the subject. But we have also engaged with the private sector to provide clarity and reassure operators wanting to go back to Iran.

Let us be clear, there are still challenges we need to overcome. The financial and banking issues we are experiencing should not be underestimated, but they should be put into perspective. Iran has been isolated from the world economy for more than 10 years. Iranian banks have been cut off from the international financial system for the same period of time. We have always known that the full reintegration of Iran into the world economy would not happen overnight, but I am confident it will succeed. There are other elements that banks take into consideration in their assessment: the full and correct comprehension of the scope of US sanctions, as well as Iran's banking regulations and anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing controls.

We are engaging very actively on both fronts: the EU with the Member States has been holding regular consultation with Washington since 16 January this year; the US has updated twice its guidance, publishing additional frequently asked questions. This has demonstrated ongoing commitment to provide clarity to business operators and to keep the guidance a living document. We also invited the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control to inform our finance ministers and encourage him to further reach out to the private sector. In addition, we are planning to hold a symposium in Brussels on the lifting of sanctions for business operators, with contributions from both EU and US experts.

In the same spirit, the High Representative chaired a ministerial meeting on 19 May 2016 with the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, the UK and US. The release of the joint statement on post-JCPOA business with Iran was a clear signal to reassure financial operators and to encourage them to engage with Iran.

Let me also take this opportunity to share with you how appreciative we are of the US efforts to provide clarity about the scope of the remaining US primary sanctions and to reach out to the banking sector in Europe. In addition, it is important that Iran takes the necessary steps on the regulatory framework and business environment. Companies are concerned about these issues, in particular on anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism and of course, more needs to be done. Cooperation and consultations in the Financial Action Task Force framework should be treated as a priority. Our visit to Iran has served as an opportunity to establish the basis for cooperating and providing assistance in these domains.

Despite all the challenges, the results of the plan are already positive, with a 22% growth in trade between the EU and Iran in the first quarter of 2016, compared to the same period last year. Thirty-three Iranian banks have been reconnected to SWIFT so far. More recently, it was reported that 200 small and medium-sized international banks, including European ones, have started correspondent relationship with Iranian banks. Major banks are becoming more comfortable as they start to comprehend the new rules in practice. To enhance the economic dialogue and cooperation, in October we are planning a European economic mission to Iran with representatives of European SMEs and businesses. As an element of the trade promotion role of the Member States, another promising avenue is the use of national credit insurance companies, which could provide cover and additional reassurance to investors.

All of these issues together form the complex reality. It will still require, of course, some time as the international business community needs to adjust to the new reality of the post-implementation deal. While we cannot force banks or other businesses to take certain decisions in commercial matters, we will continue to be committed to ensuring that Iran can reap the benefit of the plan of action. With that in mind, we can better continue our consultations with the US in order to get as much clarity as possible, continue reaching out to the European business community and provide assistance to Iran's banking and financial system. Dialogue and persistence are the way forward.

Victor Boştinaru, *on behalf of the S&D Group*. – Madam President, I would like to tell the Commissioner how glad I was, one year ago, to see a breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear deal after difficult and long negotiations. The EU played a crucial role in this success, and as I said at that time, the deal has to be beneficial to all parties involved. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, adopted in October, can be a significant step forward for the security, stability and development of the entire region. But it remains extremely important that it is implemented thoroughly and in good faith by all partners and all sides as soon as possible.

We should not forget that the significance of this deal extends beyond its technical details: it has been celebrated by the Iranian people, following its conclusion, with the hope that it will improve their living standards. It is essential that we deliver on that. Only successful implementation will allow us to show the benefits of diplomacy and negotiation over the politics of obstructionism and confrontation.

In spite of the partial lifting of sanctions, EU companies still face substantial difficulties in accessing the Iranian market, and this is mostly due to the fact that many US financial sanctions are still in place and have an extra-territorial impact. Much as we are aware of some of the remaining US and regional partners' concerns on issues such as security, in particular, and the use of ballistic weaponry, it is important to use all our channels of cooperation with the USA in order to remove, or at least find a temporary solution to, the difficulties faced by European companies and to ensure in the long term, together with our Iranian partners, the security and legal certainty of European investments in Iran.

Finally, the Commission should explore, as soon as possible, the adoption of new mechanisms and measures to lessen the dependence of European companies on US credit and insurance institutions.

Jan Zahradil, *za skupinu ECR*. – Vážená paní předsedající, já se obávám, že máme k Íránu pořád ambivalentní postoj. V mém výboru INTA je mnoho poslanců, kteří se zabývají stavem lidských práv v různých zemích a jsou ochotní podporovat nejrůznější sankce nebo ekonomická opatření vůči zemím, které porušují lidská práva, ale mám pocit, že u Íránu to neplatí a že bohužel podstatu tohoto teokratického diktátorského režimu stále podceňujeme. Tam dochází k posunu ve společnosti, který není ještě reflektován v těch vládnoucích kruzích. Je to teokratická diktatura, je to součást antizápadní koalice společně s Ruskem, s Asadem a hnutím Hizballáh, například v Sýrii. Je to stát, který usiluje o regionální hegemonii, což by bylo zcela jistě nevýhodné pro Evropu, pokud by se něco takového stalo, a je to stát, který nikdy neopustil své jaderné ambice. Takže já bych doporučoval, abychom byli k Íránu i po ekonomické a obchodní stránce velmi ostražití.

Marietje Schaake, *on behalf of the ALDE Group*. – Madam President, Commissioner and colleagues, this debate is about creating more clarity for EU-based companies looking to trade with or invest in Iran after the lifting of sanctions as a result of the nuclear deal. But ongoing as well as new US-based sanctions for human rights violations or to deter Iran's missile programme – regardless of the validity of those goals, and I think they are valid – have led to uncertainty for European companies. As a result of the extraterritorial impact, an estimated half of interested companies are holding back. The need for financing, insuring and transporting products going to Iran can lead to a chain reaction where banks do not trust that their services, even if fully legal in Europe, will not be punished in the US or by the US: not only billion-dollar fines, but also new visa requirements that hinder access, or undermine trust in being able to access, the US after doing business with Iran.

Since we requested this debate, Secretary Kerry has met with EU-based banks and the question is this: has this sufficiently clarified their concerns, according to the Commission? And what has the Commission or the External Action Service done to address these concerns with US officials to get more predictability and clarity for European companies? And have you engaged in the underlying problem and addressed it with the Iranian authorities – namely the fact that a significant role for the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian economy hinders the emergence of a truly private sector, and also risks that the benefits after the deal will go to a few and not to the many. Does the current situation of uncertainty jeopardise the deal at all?

Key for our group, and key for the EU to be effective and credible is for us to be able to make our own policies – in tandem with the US when needed, as we successfully did to bring Iran back to the negotiating table – but always independently, based on our own assessments and decisions of which foreign policy tools benefit our interests and, most importantly, our values.

IN THE CHAIR: MAIREAD McGUINNESS

Vice-President

Javier Couso Permuy, *en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL*. – Señora Presidenta, la Unión Europea sigue siendo rehén de los intereses estadounidenses y se encuentra, una vez más, supeditada a sus políticas exteriores y económicas. Las sanciones estadounidenses restringen el espacio político y comercial de la Unión Europea y afectan a sus intereses. Unas sanciones que son contrarias al Derecho internacional y que atentan, sobre todo, contra la población. Como pasó con las sanciones contra Irak en 1990, que, según la Organización de Naciones Unidas, causaron más de medio millón de niños muertos.

Desde la aprobación del plan de acción integral conjunto, la Unión Europea anunció que levantaría las sanciones económicas, incluyendo el embargo del crudo y la prohibición para el comercio y el transporte. Pero las empresas europeas siguen teniendo dificultades para acceder al mercado iraní como consecuencia del impacto extraterritorial de las acciones estadounidenses. Muchas empresas, que también desarrollan actividades empresariales en los Estados Unidos, pueden ser acusadas de violar las sanciones estadounidenses con consecuencias negativas. ¿Dónde está la soberanía de Europa?

Klaus Buchner, *im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion*. – Frau Präsidentin! Wir haben jetzt eine historische Chance, die jahrzehntelange Isolation des Iran zu beenden und in Kontakt mit dem Land zu kommen. Das ist dringend nötig, wenn wir dort die Menschenrechtslage verbessern wollen, wenn wir auch die Situation des Terrorismus im Nahen Osten beeinflussen und verbessern wollen.

Die Gesellschaft im Iran braucht die Aufhebung der Sanktionen, denn dort gibt es Arbeitslosigkeit, dort leben viele Menschen unterhalb der Standards, die wir für nötig halten. Das kann sich nur ändern, wenn durch Handel, durch Aufhebung der Sanktionen die wirtschaftliche Lage im Land verbessert werden kann. Deswegen ist es, auch um den Trend zum Terrorismus innerhalb des Landes, sprich zu den radikaleren Strömungen, zu stoppen, unbedingt nötig, den Lebensstandard im Land zu verbessern. Deswegen bleibt uns gar nichts anderes übrig, als jetzt die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zu verstärken und die Sanktionen aufzuheben, mögen sie auch aus Sicht der USA aus historischer Entwicklung heraus berechtigt sein.

Trotzdem meine ich, dass es nicht tragbar ist, wenn sich deutsche, europäische Unternehmen an die Sanktionen der USA halten müssen. Das ist ein fundamentaler Widerspruch zur Souveränität der Europäischen Union.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *blue-card question*. – Do you not think that the Commission should address the extra-territorial impact of US sanctions with the American officials and make sure that EU companies can do business, in line with EU policies, without fear of violating US sanctions and of possible fines?

Klaus Buchner (Verts/ALE), – *Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“*. – Ja, ich meine natürlich, dass diese Sanktionen in Verhandlungen geklärt werden müssen, in Verhandlungen zwischen der EU und den USA selbstverständlich. Ich stimme dem voll zu.

Tiziana Beghin, *a nome del gruppo EFDD*. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la mia domanda è: ma chi decide le regole per le imprese europee? Siamo noi o è Washington? Dall'ottobre 2015 la Commissione europea ha progressivamente rimosso le sanzioni e permette di nuovo alle nostre imprese di commercializzare con l'Iran, mentre gli Stati Uniti non hanno ancora rimosso le loro sanzioni e, oltre a vietare alle loro imprese di fare affari in Iran, stanno multando in modo salato le imprese europee che ne fanno, in virtù di una legge che permette agli Stati Uniti un'applicazione extraterritoriale delle loro sanzioni. Questo perché il governo americano ritiene che chiunque usi il dollaro nelle transazioni riconosca implicitamente la sua sovranità.

È ovvio che l'Iran ha ancora molta strada da fare, soprattutto per quanto riguarda il rispetto dei diritti umani, ma da quando le sanzioni non bloccano più il commercio le imprese europee stanno velocemente riempiendo i vuoti lasciati nel mercato iraniano da anni di embargo e trovo quanto meno ridicolo che, dopo aver ricevuto l'autorizzazione dei vari governi europei, le nostre imprese siano bloccate da quello americano.

Per quanto riguarda l'Italia, per adesso solo una grande banca italiana è stata colpita dalle multe americane, mentre un'altra grande banca sta ancora aspettando il responso e un'impresa italiana è stata investigata dagli USA ma senza ricevere multe. Lo stesso però non si può dire per altre imprese europee che dovranno pagare. La procedura per chiedere a Washington una deroga a queste sanzioni è lunga e molto complessa, non facilmente accessibile, soprattutto per le piccole e medie imprese.

Quindi non voglio negare, lo ribadisco, che la strada dell'Iran dal regime a democrazia sia ancora molto lunga, ma questa strada passa anche per una progressiva integrazione nel sistema commerciale internazionale e soprattutto, se l'Europa ha deciso di dare il via libera agli investimenti delle nostre imprese in Iran, l'ultima parola non deve certo spettare agli Stati Uniti.

Mario Borghesio, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, alla vigilia del voto su Brexit di domani ci si sarebbe aspettati una posizione più energica da parte dell'Unione europea, almeno su questi temi, quando si tratta di difendere le imprese europee, ma non abbiamo nemmeno chiaro quali siano le sanzioni contro l'Iran che gli Stati Uniti hanno tolto.

È una situazione di completa incertezza, anche nelle parole della Commissione, mentre da parte dall'Iran si ripetono gli inviti alle imprese europee ad entrare in quel mercato che è spettacolare, specialmente per un paese come il mio, l'Italia, che era il primo dei partner prima delle sanzioni. A Genova, ci dicono i trasportatori, ci sono decine di migliaia di container fermi, pronti per partire con merci, che potrebbero sollevare notevolmente la nostra economia.

È incredibile che l'Unione europea si fermi, si mostri così debole, così incerta, di fronte a un problema di questo genere, che è, direi a colpo d'occhio, collegato con un interesse diffuso delle nostre imprese e quindi anche dei nostri lavoratori. Il Parlamento, a differenza della Commissione, si mostri unito e parli chiaro sull'abolizione di queste sanzioni e dei rischi di ammezzate sulle nostre imprese da parte degli organi di controllo americani.

Bruno Gollnisch (NI). – Madame la Présidente, je suis ravi de ce débat sur la répercussion des sanctions américaines contre les activités des entreprises européennes en Iran parce que, d'abord, j'ai posé moi-même, il y a deux mois, une question écrite en ce sens à la Commission, dont j'attends toujours la réponse; ensuite, parce que l'actualité de ces derniers jours montre que l'administration américaine favorise ses entreprises nationales contre leurs concurrentes européennes. L'administration américaine a levé les sanctions pour les entreprises américaines et elle maintient la menace pour les entreprises européennes. Voilà la réalité.

Le secrétaire d'État, John Kerry, proclame partout que les Européens peuvent faire des affaires en Iran mais Airbus, par exemple, attend depuis cinq mois le feu vert de l'OFAC, l'Office of Foreign Assets Control, pour pouvoir concrétiser la vente d'avions conclue en janvier. Sans ce feu vert, aucune banque, échaudée par l'amende faramineuse imposée à la banque BNP Paribas – ce ne sont pas des millions de dollars, ce sont des milliards de dollars, neuf milliards pour la seule banque BNP Paribas dans l'indifférence complète de la Commission et de toutes les autorités européennes. C'est une honte, c'est un véritable scandale qui révèle l'état de vassalité dans lequel vous êtes à l'égard des autorités de Washington.

Damiano Zoffoli (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gli accordi di Vienna e il conseguente e progressivo ritiro delle sanzioni che, ricordiamolo, hanno contribuito a diminuire del 70 %, dal 2005 ad oggi, l'interscambio commerciale fra l'Iran e l'Unione europea, aprono nuove opportunità per le aziende europee in un paese di 80 milioni di abitanti, che rappresenta la più grande attrazione per gli investimenti internazionali dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino.

Penso alla meccanica, ai trasporti, al campo dell'ambiente, alla lotta all'inquinamento e alla fornitura di tecnologie per lo sfruttamento delle rinnovabili. Il cammino è stato tracciato, ora tutti gli attori coinvolti in questo processo – Unione europea, Stati Uniti, Iran – devono percorrerlo insieme, per costruire rapporti solidi basati sulla fiducia reciproca e non solo sul rispetto degli accordi sottoscritti.

Dall'Iran ci si aspettano segnali concreti di apertura e cambiamento, a partire dal tema fondamentale dei diritti umani, mentre sul fronte economico è indispensabile lavorare soprattutto sul sistema bancario, ancora oggi poco trasparente, anche alla luce delle raccomandazioni della *task force* di azione finanziaria, per evitare il riciclaggio di denaro e contrastare il finanziamento delle attività terroristiche.

L'Unione europea chiede d'altra parte agli Stati Uniti d'America di favorire la possibilità di investimenti in Iran; ad oggi è impossibile per qualsiasi azienda con almeno il 10 % di azionariato statunitense fare affari commerciali con l'Iran, a causa delle sanzioni ancora in essere che limitano la libertà di azione.

Chiediamo quindi con forza alla Commissione che si faccia portatrice di questo messaggio nei confronti delle autorità americane. È indispensabile che i tanti memorandum d'intesa fino ad oggi sottoscritti da aziende pubbliche e private europee si trasformino in contratti e in azioni concrete.

Николай Барексов (ECR). – Както знаете, г-жо Председателстващ, аз отговарям за Иран в делегацията, както и в комисията по енергетика. Европа е длъжна да се възползва икономически и политически от договора за ядрената програма. Европейският бизнес географски и икономически е най-близко до възобновяване на връзките с иранския бизнес, особено в областта на енергетиката.

Трябва да регламентираме тези отношения в триъгълника Америка – Европа – Иран. Това е работа на Европейската комисия. Има оставащи неясноти, които са със срока на прекратяването на санкциите, както с този срок, така и с допълнителните финансови санкции от страна на Съединените Щати.

По искане на Европейския съюз България прекрати своята ядрена програма за втора централа. Българската държавна компания беше осъдена миналата седмица за близо 650 милиона евро от руската държавна компания. Появи се предложение на българския премиер правителството да продаде руския ядрен реактор на Иран.

И тук задавам въпроса: Ще имаме ли подкрепата на Европейската комисия, като се има предвид, че иранското правителство очевидно не бърза с демократизацията на страната и все още има пречки за пълното покриване на капацитета на отношенията Иран – Съединени Щати?

Pavel Telička (ALDE). – Madam President, today the Commissioner has given us an answer to the question, which I would say was twofold.

Commissioner, you have given us an answer on the efforts that you personally, the Commission, your colleagues and also Member States' representatives are making vis-à-vis Iran. I think that it was rich in information. I am sure that you are making an effort. I think that we have a double agenda there. We have got an economic agenda and we still have an agenda that has to do with the quality of 'democracy' in Iran, human rights abuse, etc. On that part I must say that I found your response satisfactory.

To be absolutely frank with you, I do have difficulties with the second part of the twofold answer, namely with the US part. You also took somewhat less time in answering that question. You said that there is progress on getting clarity on the guidelines and that there is an effort on the US side. I am sure that this is the case, but the fact is that we do have cases which have concrete implications. I am Czech. I do not come from a country where Airbus would have a production line, but I think that is one really flagrant case, Airbus versus Boeing. Boeing, which clearly started negotiations with Iran much later than Airbus, has signed a deal – I think it was last week – while Airbus has now been waiting for five months for US Treasury clearance. I think that is unacceptable. So we do not just need to hear what efforts are taking place, but we really need results. Tell us how we can assist you, but let us be more concrete on those issues in the future.

Beatrix von Storch (EFDD). – Frau Präsidentin! Der Iran hat den Atomdeal unterschrieben und deswegen haben die EU und die USA die Sanktionen gegen den Iran aufgehoben, wie wir gehört haben, aber nur zum Teil. Die USA machen wieder Handel mit dem Iran und General Electric beispielsweise könnte Geschäfte mit den Persern machen, wenn aber Siemens das gleiche tut, drohen Sanktionen durch die USA.

Also Handel mit dem Iran oder mit den USA. Das ist die aktuelle Position der USA, und Sie haben, wie es gerade schon angemerkt worden ist, im Prinzip nichts dazu gesagt, wie Sie daran arbeiten wollen. Ich frage mich, warum die Amerikaner machen das, und was tun Sie? Das amerikanische Ölonternehmen ExxonMobile kann im Iran einkaufen, und jedes andere Unternehmen, das das tut, verbaut sich damit den amerikanischen Markt.

Die USA sind für Freihandel, wir sind für Freihandel, also schlage ich vor, dass die USA aufhören, den freien Handel zu bestrafen, sonst verfestigt sich nur der Eindruck, dass sie nur Freihandel sagen, letztlich aber ihre eigene Vormachtstellung auf Kosten aller anderen verteidigen, so wie beim TTIP.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF). – Madame la Présidente, l'Iran a donné toutes les garanties exigées par le traité du 14 juillet 2015 en ce qui concerne son programme nucléaire. En contrepartie, les sanctions européennes ont donc été levées en janvier 2016. Plus rien ne devrait théoriquement s'opposer à la reprise de relations commerciales normales entre l'Iran et le reste du monde.

Les banques européennes hésitent toutefois à financer les projets commerciaux avec l'Iran, car elles craignent de se voir infliger des amendes par les États-Unis. C'est ainsi que le contrat de vente de 118 Airbus, signé récemment par les présidents français et iranien, est paralysé. Les États-Unis doivent s'engager par écrit à ne plus infliger de telles amendes et à rompre ainsi avec leurs pratiques antérieures à 2015. L'Union européenne doit, pour une fois, prendre son courage à deux mains et exiger des États-Unis cet engagement écrit. À défaut, la France devra prendre son destin en main et demander à sa banque centrale de financer les projets français en Iran.

Zoltán Balczó (NI). – Elnök Asszony! 2015 júliusában megállapodás született a nemzetközi közösség és Irán között. Irán korlátozta és ellenőrizhetővé tette atomprogramját, cserében pedig elvileg feloldották az ellene irányuló szankciókat. Azért csak elvileg, mert az Egyesült Államok mindent megtett azért, főleg a bankszektorban, hogy a szankciók fönnyadjanak. Az EU-nak alapvető érdeke, és nem csak gazdaságilag, a migráns ügy kapcsán is, a jó, kiegyensúlyozott kapcsolat Iránnal és az egész térségnek a stabilitása. Ehhez az Egyesült Államoknak valóban meg kell szüntetnie a szankciókat, és nyomást kell gyakorolnia kiemelt partnerére, Szaúd-Arábiára. Mert Szaúd-Arábia jelenleg Jemenben háborús bűnöket is elkövetve avatkozik be, és ennek kapcsán tovább nő a feszültség Iránnal, és ennek a feszültségnek az enyhítése, megszüntetése az EU-nak is az alapvető érdeke.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospodo predsjednice, ovaj slučaj dobro opisuje delikatnu poziciju Europske unije u globalnim diplomatskim, vojnim i trgovinskim odnosima. Mi smo ključan partner Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i zbog toga smo dugi niz godina, pa čak i desetljeća, uživali određene povlastice, no to partnerstvo može imati i negativnih strana kao u slučaju poslovanja naših tvrtki u Iranu u trenutku kad SAD još uvijek nije u potpunosti ukinuo sankcije toj zemlji.

Neki kolege će ovo iskoristiti kako bi propitkivali partnerstvo s Amerikom, a ja mislim da je to pogrešno. Ovo je situacija na kojoj treba graditi novu poziciju Europske unije kao snažnog samostalnog aktera na globalnoj razini koji uživa povjerenje svojih američkih partnera, a u očima istočnih sila im dodaje potrebnu dobronamjernost i vjerodostojnost.

Isprepletenost europskih i američkih vrijednosti i interesa je konstanta koju nema smisla nijekati, ali to ne znači da Europa ne može igrati konstruktivniju ulogu i u određenim slučajevima biti ta koja udara tempo i određuje smjer politike Zapada.

Marcus Pretzell (ENF). – Frau Präsidentin, meine Damen und Herren! Das ist wieder mal ein wunderbares Beispiel dafür, dass in der Europäischen Union und im Übrigen auch in der US-amerikanischen Administration zwar sehr gern über den freien Handel geredet, aber ganz wenig dafür unternommen wird. Die Kommission sieht dabei zu.

Während Banken aus Europa weiterhin fürchten müssen, Finanzierungen von Deals im Iran durchzuführen, weil sie mit Sanktionen in den USA zu rechnen haben, und damit praktisch für alle kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen Geschäfte im Iran unmöglich gemacht werden, erleben wir jetzt, dass das Ganze auch im großen Spiel funktioniert. Airbus wartet seit Januar auf eine Freigabe für einen Deal mit dem Iran und heute – nein, gestern – gibt die Firma Boeing einen 25-Milliarden-Dollar-Deal mit dem Iran bekannt. Es ist vollkommen offensichtlich, was hier passiert: Das ist ein Wirtschaftskrieg der Amerikaner, nicht gegen den Iran, sondern gegen die Europäische Union, und die Kommission sieht dabei tatenlos zu.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής συνειδητά επιλέγουν να εμποδίζουν τις ευρωπαϊκές επιχειρηματικές δραστηριότητες στο Ιράν. Ο λόγος είναι προφανής και φυσικά δεν έχει τίποτα να κάνει με δήθεν ανησυχίες για το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα του Ιράν. Το βασικότερο που τους απασχολεί είναι η προώθηση των αμερικανικών εμπορικών συμφερόντων στη χώρα αυτή. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα είναι η περίπτωση της Airbus, που όπως γνωρίζετε έχει κλείσει συμφωνία με την κρατική IranAir για την προμήθεια 118 αεροσκαφών από τα τέλη Ιανουαρίου. Λόγω όμως της χρήσης κάποιων υποσυστημάτων αμερικανικής προέλευσης, απαιτείται έγκριση από την αμερικανική κυβέρνηση για την πώληση των αεροσκαφών, η οποία, πέντε μήνες μετά, δεν έχει δοθεί ακόμα. Φυσικά, η κωλυσιεργία αυτή ωφέλησε την αμερικανική Boeing που πριν από λίγες ημέρες ολοκλήρωσε τις διαπραγματεύσεις με το Ιράν για την προμήθεια 100 δικών της αεροσκαφών.

Με αυτές τις επιδείξεις συμμαχικής αλληλεγγύης και εμπορικών συναλλαγών, όπως τις εννοούν οι Αμερικανοί, φροντίζουν να ξεκαθαρίζουν κάθε φορά το ποιος έχει το πάνω χέρι σε αυτή τη συμμαχία.

Αυτό ας το λάβουν υπόψη τους οι θιασώτες των συμφωνιών τύπου TTIP, για το ποιο θα είναι το μέλλον της Ένωσης, διότι θέματα όπως του Ιράν είναι απλά μία εικόνα από το διατλαντικό εμπόριο, μέλλον που κάποιοι εδώ πέρα υποστηρίζουν.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gli effetti extra-territoriali delle sanzioni adottate dagli Stati Uniti nei confronti dell'Iran continuano a creare difficoltà alle imprese europee nell'accesso al mercato iraniano. A seguito delle sanzioni tra il 2012 e il 2013, le importazioni totali dell'Unione europea dall'Iran sono diminuite dell'86 % e il totale delle esportazioni è diminuito del 26 %.

I paesi europei hanno dato seguito agli impegni previsti dal piano d'azione congiunto globale, ora spetta agli Stati Uniti revocare le misure restrittive. Dopo l'impegno iraniano ad adoperare il nucleare solo per scopi civili occorre consolidare i segnali di apertura che giungono da Teheran e indirizzarli verso un dialogo costruttivo a livello internazionale, che apra la strada ad una piena reintegrazione dell'Iran nella comunità internazionale. È del tutto evidente, infatti, che riallacciare i rapporti commerciali con una parte importante del mondo arabo ha una valenza fondamentale per la stabilizzazione dell'area e per un miglioramento dei diritti umani.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, οι περισσότερες ευρωπαϊκές επιχειρήσεις δεν αποτολμούν να ανοίξουν δουλειές με το Ιράν, παρά τη συμφωνία του περασμένου χρόνου για το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα της Τεχεράνης. Αυτό συμβαίνει επειδή φοβούνται ότι θα τους επιβληθούν πρόστιμα από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες για παραβίαση των αμερικανικών κυρώσεων στο Ιράν, που συνεχίζουν να βρίσκονται σε ισχύ. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση οφείλει να δώσει λύση σε αυτό το μείζον ζήτημα, που περιορίζει την ανάπτυξη διμερών εμπορικών σχέσεων του Ιράν με κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης.

Η χώρα αυτή των 80.000.000 κατοίκων βρίσκεται σε κατασκευαστικό οργασμό. Στα άμεσα σχέδια είναι η κατασκευή επτά αεροδρομίων τα επόμενα χρόνια, ενώ οκτώ πόλεις γνωρίζουν ραγδαία επέκταση. Αυτό το γεγονός ανοίγει τον δρόμο και μπορεί να αποτελέσει ανάσα επιβίωσης, τόσο για τις κατασκευαστικές από την Ελλάδα, που έχουν πληγεί από τις πολιτικές της τρόικας, όσο και για ελληνικές εταιρείες προμήθειας στον χώρο τεχνολογιών αιχμής, των φαρμάκων, των παραφαρμακευτικών προϊόντων αλλά και των ιατρικών ειδών. Αναμένουμε, κυρία Bienkowska, τη δράση της Κομισιόν.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjednice, kada sam svojedobno posjetio Iran sankcije su još uvijek bile na snazi, ali uvjerio sam se koliko je iranskom gospodarstvu stalo do suradnje s europskim gospodarstvom, koliko je iransko gospodarstvo u prilici da pruži mnoge mogućnosti za ulaganje u europsko gospodarstvo. I zato sam uvjeren da je ova situacija u kojoj se sad nalazimo ništa drugo nego jedna igra s Europskom unijom od strane naših američkih prijatelja. To upravo pokazuje događaj oko Boeinga i prodaja Boeinga, iako je Airbus također bio u prilici da napravi dobar posao, ali on ga neće napraviti.

Ja zato kažem da ovdje imamo dvije situacije: imamo ekonomski interesantnu situaciju za Europsku uniju i politički interesantnu situaciju za Europsku uniju. Iskoristimo obje situacije jer nam idu u prilog.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα σφάλματα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως είναι η απόλυτη και ανεξήγητη σύμπλευσή της με εκείνη των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών. Η εμμονή αυτή έχει δημιουργήσει πολλά προβλήματα σε χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως και έχει στραφεί πολλές φορές και εναντίον των συμφερόντων της Ενώσεως. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα αυτής της κατάστασεως είναι τα προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζουν οι εταιρείες των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών που δραστηριοποιούνται στο Ιράν, εξαιτίας των κυρώσεων που δεν έχουν άρει ακόμα οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες για τη χώρα αυτή.

Έτσι δημιουργείται μια κατάσταση αθέμιτου ανταγωνισμού για τις ευρωπαϊκές εταιρείες και παράλληλα, εάν αυτές έχουν συναλλαγές και με τις ΗΠΑ, κινδυνεύουν να υποστούν κυρώσεις, δηλαδή να δεχθούν πρόστιμα. Αυτό είναι μια απαράδεκτη κατάσταση και πρέπει οπωσδήποτε η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να απαλλαγεί τάχιστα από αυτή την άτυπη κηδεμονία, για να μπορούν οι ευρωπαίοι επενδυτές να δραστηριοποιηθούν στην ιρανική αγορά αλλά και στον τομέα της ενέργειας.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, I think this was a very useful exchange and I want to thank all Honourable Members for the clarity of their interventions. I assure you that we are analysing all of the subjects, especially particular cases. Later on I will refer to Airbus-Boeing very briefly. But as far as this debate is concerned, I conclude that we share a common interest in ensuring that the plan of action works for all participants, especially for European companies and businesses, and leads to Iran's reintegration into the world economy. Let me again reiterate that the EU is fully committed to providing all necessary assistance and the necessary references to the private sector on the lifting of sanctions, both business opportunities in Iran and, of course, defending the interests of European companies.

On Airbus, I can only say that Airbus signed a deal months ago. At the end of January, during the visit of the Iranian President to France, it signed a deal with Iran on 28 January for the export of aircraft. As for Boeing, they only signed a memorandum of understanding, so not a contract, also for the export of aircraft, very recently. So the situation of both companies is almost the same, but with Airbus it is a deal and with Boeing it is just a memorandum of understanding. Of course, we all know that the implementation is an ongoing task and we need to be diligent with our joint efforts, but I will of course pass all of your concerns and your comments to High Representative Mogherini. Again I want to thank you for bringing the topic to the agenda. Hopefully we will also discuss it in the future because it is really important for our European economy.

President. — The debate is closed.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), par écrit. – Je soutiens la réintégration de l'Iran dans la communauté internationale et leur demande d'adhésion à l'OMC. Il est fondamental que les Iraniens constatent que l'accord fonctionne. Par conséquent, nous devons travailler à l'élimination de toutes les barrières des deux côtés afin de lever les sanctions établies par le plan d'action global conjoint.

Nicola Danti (S&D), per iscritto. – Nell'ottobre 2015 l'Unione europea, le Nazioni Unite e gli Stati Uniti siglavano un accordo di portata storica con l'Iran e adottavano un piano d'azione congiunto globale (PACG). Il suddetto piano comprendeva un impegno in base al quale il programma nucleare iraniano avrebbe avuto unicamente scopi pacifici, in cambio della revoca progressiva delle sanzioni contro Teheran. Un nuovo capitolo delle relazioni internazionali che apriva ad un dialogo costruttivo tra l'Unione europea e l'Iran, con il positivo risultato di dare sicurezza alle imprese europee che intendono investire in quel paese e consentire condizioni favorevoli per la stabilizzazione e lo sviluppo sociale ed economico della società iraniana. Questo processo di ricostruzione delle relazioni commerciali e del dialogo con l'Iran è oggi ostacolato dalle mancata revoca delle sanzioni finanziarie da parte degli Stati Uniti; un impegno politico finora disatteso che ha un impatto extraterritoriale grave sulle imprese europee, che non soltanto affrontano un difficile accesso al mercato iraniano ma spesso sono costrette a subire ammende o addirittura il divieto di operare liberamente. Sono dunque convinto che nei prossimi mesi l'Unione europea debba agire attivamente per garantire che anche gli Stati Uniti applichino in pieno quanto previsto nel PACG.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk (ALDE), in writing. – In January 2016 the Council lifted all nuclear related economic and financial EU sanctions against Iran. This follows verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the same date that Iran had implemented the agreed nuclear-related measures as set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU has been joined by the US and the UN which also lifted their sanctions against Iran upon verification. However, the US has suspended not terminated its nuclear-related sanctions on Iran while at the same non-nuclear US economic sanctions remain in place, notably the ban on US citizens and companies trading with Iran. Recently, the US imposed fresh sanctions on Iran over an Iranian ballistic missile test. Continuing US sanctions represent a real trade barrier for

many European companies which want to access the Iranian market especially since many of them have business activities in the US. The EU should discuss this issue with our American partners in order to find a working solution that will benefit all sides. Trade with Iran is important for the EU, but a transatlantic partnership with the US is vital for the Union and its Member States since it is the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world.

21. Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrechts - Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften (Aussprache)

President. — The next item is the joint debate on

Jean-Marie Cavada, rapporteur. – Madame la Présidente, on m'avait annoncé six minutes, je vais essayer de respecter votre temps. Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, la mobilité des citoyens de l'Union européenne n'est pas une illusion. Elle est réelle et c'est pourquoi l'Union européenne compte en effet seize millions de couples qui sont multinationaux ou internationaux.

Ces couples possèdent des biens – c'est-à-dire voiture, maison – ou bien sont titulaires de comptes bancaires dans divers pays. En cas de problème, c'est, jusqu'à présent, un vrai parcours du combattant pour trouver une juridiction qui soit efficace et acceptée et, d'autre part, pour aboutir à un juste partage des responsabilités.

Ces deux règlements vont mettre fin aux incertitudes juridiques que ces couples rencontrent avec, naturellement, les frais que les procédures de divorce et les séparations entraînent ou en cas de décès et, surtout, vont mettre fin aux décisions conflictuelles qui découlent parfois de ces difficultés judiciaires.

Ces textes s'appliqueront aussi bien aux couples mariés qu'à ceux ayant conclu un partenariat enregistré. Il était très difficile pour ces couples de savoir quelle juridiction allait être compétente pour régler les litiges concernant leurs biens situés dans un autre État membre, les règles variant beaucoup d'un pays de l'Union à l'autre. C'est la raison pour laquelle, lorsque ces règlements seront adoptés, les époux ou bien les partenaires pourront choisir, sous certaines conditions, la juridiction qui sera appelée à se prononcer. Il pourra s'agir du droit du pays de résidence ou bien du pays dont les couples ou les partenaires ont la nationalité. Ceci est une disposition très claire en même temps qu'elle est très souple. Le droit qui aura été choisi sera celui qui s'appliquera pour l'ensemble des biens, même s'ils sont situés dans des pays différents. Cependant, j'insiste bien sur le fait que ces règles juridiques de chaque pays seront bien appliquées et que le principe de subsidiarité sera bien respecté.

En effet, ces deux règlements ne concernent pas la définition du mariage ou bien la définition du partenariat, et les droits et obligations découlant d'un mariage ou d'un partenariat enregistré continueront à être régis par le droit national. C'est ainsi qu'un État membre qui ne reconnaît pas le partenariat enregistré sera tout à fait libre de ne pas juger un litige qui surviendrait sur son sol et, notamment, au vu des conséquences liées à une séparation ou à un décès de partenaires enregistrés. Il pourra donc confier l'affaire aux tribunaux d'un autre État membre qui, lui, reconnaît leur partenariat.

Les négociations sur ces deux règlements ont été très délicates, vous le savez bien. L'accord entre les États membres devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, il a fallu, pour débloquer cette situation qui faisait souffrir beaucoup de gens, avoir recours à la procédure de la coopération renforcée.

Je vous annonce, ou plutôt, je vous confirme que dix-huit États membres ont accepté d'instaurer et d'appliquer entre eux ces différentes dispositions. Le Parlement a donné son approbation lors de la dernière plénière, en juin 2016, à la décision d'utiliser la coopération renforcée pour ces deux règlements.

Les deux règlements, c'est-à-dire régimes matrimoniaux et partenariat enregistré, ont, quant à eux, été votés à une large majorité la semaine passée en commission des affaires juridiques. Il n'y avait donc aucune difficulté majeure. Il y a un amendement qui est un peu cosmétique, qui demande à ce que la définition initiale des États membres soit complétée et devienne «les États membres participant à la coopération renforcée». C'est une précision qui n'aura pas d'effet juridique. En tout cas, cet ajout est à mon avis quelque peu inutile et superflu mais, de toute façon, il n'influence pas la décision de fond.

En conséquence, je vous informe que mon groupe et moi-même recommandons et avons décidé de voter contre cet amendement car il nous paraît essentiel de ne pas mettre en cause l'intégralité de l'accord négocié difficilement par ces dix-huit États-membres qui participent à la coopération renforcée.

En conclusion, Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, je voudrais dire que le vote de demain en faveur de ces deux règlements est absolument important, car il permettra de tenir le calendrier prévisionnel, afin que les textes puissent être adoptés au niveau du Conseil par les États membres qui participent à cette collégialité de la coopération renforcée dans les meilleurs délais.

Madame la Présidente, chers amis, chers collègues, n'oubliez pas qu'il s'agit d'un certain nombre de couples, c'est-à-dire environ seize millions de couples, ce qui fait 32 millions de personnes; si l'on compte deux parents pour chacune de ces 32 millions de personnes, vous voyez un peu le nombre de familles et de personnes concernées.

Tibor Navracsics, *Member of the Commission*. – Madam Chair, honourable Members, as European cities ask to make use of their right to free movement, the number of international couples increases. Today, as Mr Cavada mentioned, there are an estimated 60 million international couples in the Union. Currently, these couples face difficulties when managing their property or, in cases of divorce or death, when having to divide it.

These new rules in relation to the property regimes of international couples, covering both marriages and registered partnerships, aim to remove such difficulties. These rules will provide international families with legal certainty and will reduce the costs associated with proceedings when things go wrong. Couples will know, with clarity, which courts will deal with matters concerning their property and which national law should apply to such matters.

These new rules also complete the programme on mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters adopted by the Council on 30 November 2000, and fill an important gap in the field of Union family law.

I would like to thank the rapporteur, Mr Cavada, for his excellent cooperation in pushing forward this difficult file. I also wish to thank the Dutch Presidency for treating enhanced cooperation in this area as a priority. We would all have wished that these important matters could have been addressed with all Member States taking part, but it is important that we move forward now with those who can. And, of course, the enhanced cooperation system always remains open to other Member States to join, if and when they feel ready to participate. In the meantime, the enhanced cooperation rules contain provisions ensuring that agreements on property regime matters concluded between Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation and those not participating will remain unaffected.

It is important that these new rules apply for people in both marriages and registered partnerships, but I wish to reassure Parliament that the draft regulations also contain safeguards aimed at respecting the legal traditions of all Member States. They do not require recognition of marriages or registered partnerships concluded in another Member State.

This is a good example of how, by working together constructively, we can make life simpler for citizens throughout the EU.

Axel Voss, *im Namen der PPE-Fraktion*. – Frau Präsidentin, sehr geehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zunächst einmal auch meinen Dank an den Berichtersteller und die Vorgängerin, die dieses ganze Dossier sehr gut behandelt haben.

Es ist eigentlich kaum zu fassen, dass wir erst heute mit solchen Dingen hantieren, auch als Gesetzgebung, weil wir ja die Freizügigkeit nun schon um einiges länger haben. Deshalb ist es unbedingt notwendig, dass wir das jetzt haben. Ich glaube schon, dass der eine oder andere sich sehr alleingelassen gefühlt hat. Wenn man in einer solchen Situation ist und sehen muss, wie man im internationalen Privatrecht irgendwie zu einer Gütertrennung kommt, ist das hochkompliziert. Deshalb ist es sehr schön, dass wir darüber jetzt auch eine Regelung vorfinden werden.

Auch die Abstimmung morgen über die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit einiger Mitgliedstaaten in diesen Fragen des Güterrechts, sowohl für Ehen als auch für eingetragene Partnerschaften, ist deshalb ein wichtiger Schritt am Ende von mehrjährigen Verhandlungen. Und wir brauchen eben dringend diese Regelungen, auch in unserem Interesse als Ko-Gesetzgeber.

Dass wir dieses Dossier nun entsprechend im Plenum abschließen können, freut mich. Wir befinden uns ja lediglich, ich sag mal, im Verfahren der Anhörung hier. Ich möchte deshalb betonen und mich auch bedanken dafür, dass der Rat eben doch die ganzen Anregungen des Europäischen Parlaments weitgehend übernommen hat und wir deshalb mit unserer Position am Ende sehr zufrieden sein können. Wir haben das auch – das wurde schon erwähnt – selbst im Ausschuss entsprechend angenommen.

Wir haben natürlich – ein Glück – auch dafür gesorgt, dass es keinerlei rechtliche Auswirkungen hat hinsichtlich der Anerkennung von Formen des Zusammenlebens, die manche Staaten so noch nicht kennen. Das hätte wohl höchstwahrscheinlich zu weiteren Blockaden geführt. Insofern ist es auch gut, dass der Text zu den eingetragenen Partnerschaften eine *Ordre-public*-Klausel enthält. Ich glaube, wir sind hier insgesamt auf einem sehr guten Weg. Ich bedanke mich bei allen Beteiligten.

Evelyne Gebhardt, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Ich freue mich sehr, dass wir heute endlich die Diskussion um dieses Verfahren hier zum Abschluss bringen können. Ich war in der letzten Legislaturperiode die Berichterstatterin, in dieser Legislaturperiode Schattenberichterstatterin, und das war ein sehr langwieriger Prozess, um auch wirklich dafür zu sorgen, dass für die Bürger und Bürgerinnen eine Lösung gefunden wird, die ihnen in der Internationalität, in der sie leben, auch hilft, wirklich vernünftig leben zu können.

Nach dem Sorgerecht bei gescheiterten Ehen, nach den Fragen des Erbschaftsrechtes haben wir jetzt das Güterrecht, und ich denke, dass damit wieder ein Schritt vorwärts gemacht wird, indem wir eine Hilfe geben, gerade den Menschen, die es sich zum Ziel gemacht haben, die einfach gesagt haben: „Wir leben dieses Europa, so wie es ist, in der ganzen Internationalität.“ Das ist eine gute Sache.

Dem Europäischen Parlament war es von Beginn an ganz wichtig, auch dafür zu sorgen, dass die zwei Gesetzesvorschläge, die vorliegen – nämlich zum einen für die eingetragenen Partnerschaften, zum anderen für die Ehen –, beide im Grundsatz die gleichen Rechte beinhalten, aber gleichzeitig – und das ist immer ganz wichtig gewesen – die unterschiedlichen Traditionen und Kulturen in den Mitgliedstaaten respektieren. Deswegen ist eben gerade diese Klausel, dass kein Staat gezwungen wird, zum Beispiel eingetragene Partnerschaften einzuführen – wenn es die in seinem Land nicht gibt – oder anzuerkennen, eine richtige und wichtige Formel.

In dem Zusammenhang dieses Gesetzes war es uns als Sozialdemokraten auch immer wichtig zu sagen, wir müssen auch dafür sorgen, dass es kein *Forum Shopping* gibt. Wir haben allzu häufig in diesen Bereichen gesehen, dass der stärkere, der reichere der beiden Partner – wenn es ein Problem gab oder eine Scheidung oder Trennung – sich hat durchsetzen können und der schwächere das Nachsehen hatte. Auch das musste man verhindern, und ich glaube, mit diesem Recht ist uns das gelungen. Da gebe ich meinen Vorrednern auch recht. Es ist uns gelungen, ein Recht zu schaffen, in dem sowohl die Europäische Kommission wie auch der Rat den Vorschlägen des Europäischen Parlaments gefolgt ist. Deswegen ist es mir gar nicht mehr so wichtig, dass wir nur noch angehört werden, denn schließlich haben wir dann doch mitbestimmt, was in diesem Gesetz steht. Ich denke, mit diesem Stück Arbeit haben wir erneut dafür gesorgt, dass wir für tatsächliche Probleme, die Menschen haben, auch wirklich vernünftige Lösungen finden können.

Ангел Джамбазки, от името на групата ECR. – Г-жо Председателстващ, уважаеми г-н Комисар, уважаеми колеги, уважаеми колега Кавада, семейното право е чувствителна тема и винаги трябва да се разглежда по начин, предвиждащ възможно най-голяма грижа и внимание и възможно най-голяма деликатност към тази обществена сфера, която обикновено се регулира от местните обичаи, от местните традиции.

През последните няколко години сме свидетели на усилено сътрудничество в много правни сфери. Една от тях е свързана с трансграничните аспекти на правните спорове, породжани от семейни двойки или съжителства от различни държави. Националните разпоредби по отношение на семейното право често се различават. Например концепцията за партньорство без брак не е известна и не е част от правната система на част от държавите членки, като Италия, Полша, Румъния и България.

Често се срещахме със случаи на конфликтни разпоредби, които могат да доведат до допълнителна правна врата и могат да доведат до още повече главоболия. Има силни политически течения при такива правни спорове и предупреждавам, че тези предложения могат да доведат до съществени разлики в правната уредба на държавите членки. Аз съм застъпник за по-добро сътрудничество в много отношения, но не трябва да забравяме и принципа на субсидиарността.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος, *εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL*. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, δίνουμε σήμερα την έγκρισή μας για τη θέσπιση ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας στους τομείς της διεθνούς δικαιοδοσίας, του εφαρμοστέου δικαίου και της αναγνώρισης και εκτέλεσης αποφάσεων στα ζητήματα περιουσιακών σχέσεων συζύγων και καταχωρημένων συντρόφων. Οι νέοι κανόνες μεταξύ των 18 κρατών μελών που συμφώνησαν να συμμετάσχουν στο καθεστώς ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας αναμένεται να διευκολύνουν την καθημερινή ζωή ζευγαριών υπηκόων διαφορετικών κρατών μελών με την επιλογή ενός νομοθετικού πλαισίου που θα εφαρμόζεται στα περιουσιακά τους στοιχεία, καθώς και με την καθιέρωση της αμοιβαίας αναγνώρισης των αποφάσεων που εκδίδονται σε διαφορετικά κράτη μέλη.

Είναι πραγματικά λυπηρό ότι η αρχική πρόταση της Επιτροπής το 2011 δεν προχώρησε λόγω έλλειψης ομοφωνίας στο Συμβούλιο, με αποτέλεσμα να έχουμε καθυστερήσει πέντε χρόνια να θεσπίσουμε τις απαραίτητες διαδικασίες. Επίσης λυπηρό είναι ότι το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο παρέχει απλώς τη γνώμη του στα ζητήματα οικογενειακού δικαίου, όπως αυτό που συζητούμε σήμερα και που έχει άμεσες επιπτώσεις σε χιλιάδες ζευγάρια σε όλη την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Νομοθετικές πρωτοβουλίες για ανάλογα ζητήματα θα έπρεπε να εμπίπτουν στον τομέα της συναπόφασης, ώστε να μπορεί το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, ως ο άμεσος εκπρόσωπος των ευρωπαίων πολιτών, να έχει λόγο σαν ισότιμος εταίρος στη νομοθετική διαδικασία και να επηρεάζει αποφασιστικά τις εξελίξεις.

Terry Reintke, *on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group*. – Madam Chair, Commissioner, how can we tolerate a situation in which families – parents with their beloved children, or partners who have promised to be there for each other for the rest of their lives – lose their rights in relation to one another if they move to another European Union country?

How can we tolerate a situation where parents cannot sit next to their children's hospital beds after they have had an accident, just because they have crossed borders? And how can we tolerate families losing their property rights just because some Member States still do not understand that family and couples and love know many different forms?

We need to change all of this, and I believe that this proposal is a tiny first step in that direction. Rainbow families and same-sex couples can no longer be treated like second-class citizens in the European Union. We deserve full rights and equal protection. We want to be free to move within the European Union to work and to study wherever we want, and to be protected from discrimination. That is not too much to ask: it is a right granted to all EU citizens.

Let us end the discrimination that same sex couples are still facing. Let us end legal uncertainties for rainbow families and for such couples. Let us create a European Union that gives support and protection to all families.

The current proposal is one piece of a much bigger puzzle in the effort to make this a reality. Let us take this as a starting point for creating a European Union where all families and all couples can live the life they want, can be free to move and to live wherever they want, and have equal rights in this European Union.

Beatrix von Storch, *im Namen der EFDD-Fraktion*. – Frau Präsidentin! Wir sprechen über zwei brisante Vorlagen, in denen es um die Definition von Ehe und Familie geht. Schon Ende letzten Jahres hat der Ministerrat eine Verordnung vorgelegt, um Vermögensfragen für Ehepartner zu regeln – genauer: für homosexuelle Ehepartner. Ungarn und Polen haben das blockiert, weil es dort diese Ehen nicht gibt und sie die auch nicht wollten. Aber das ist das Technokratenprinzip: Über die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Personenstandsdokumenten soll die Homo-Ehe durch die Hintertür europaweit eingeführt werden. Acht Mitgliedstaaten hatten in ihren Verfassungen geregelt, dass die Ehe aus Mann und Frau besteht. Die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Personenstandsurkunden sollte durch die EU die nationalen Verfassungen aushebeln. Das ist genau das EU-Prinzip, das immer mehr Menschen ablehnen und nicht mehr wollen. Hier in Europa werden Werte definiert, die dann alle akzeptieren und anerkennen sollen. Und wenn Staaten das nicht wollen, dann werden sie beschimpft, und die EU kommt durch die Hintertür.

Genau deswegen gibt es jetzt eine europaweite, eine europäische Bürgerinitiative. Sie heißt „Mutter-Vater-Kinder“, und sie sammelt europaweit Unterschriften, damit auch in der EU die Institutionen gezwungen werden, die Ehe nur als Ehe zu verstehen. Die eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft besteht aus zwei Männern oder aus zwei Frauen, und die Ehe besteht aus Mann und Frau – um genauer zu sein: aus einem Mann und einer Frau. Hören Sie auf, das als Diskriminierung zu beschimpfen oder zu verunglimpfen oder als krank, als Phobie. Akzeptieren Sie, dass die Ehe etwas anderes ist als eine eingetragene Partnerschaft. Sie ist nicht besser oder schlechter, sie ist etwas anderes.

Allen, die Ehe und Familie schützen wollen, sage ich: Bleiben Sie wachsam, bleiben Sie engagiert! Von dieser EU und von dieser Kommission können wir nichts Gutes erwarten. Die Institutionen der EU sind mächtig, aber die Bürger sind am Ende mächtiger.

Gilles Lebreton, *au nom du groupe ENF*. – Madame la Présidente, selon la Commission de Bruxelles, il existe près de 16 millions de couples internationaux au sein de l'Union européenne. Quoi qu'il en soit réellement, l'Union en prend prétexte pour s'immiscer à deux reprises dans le droit de la famille.

Un premier texte concerne la loi applicable et la reconnaissance des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux. Mais il existe déjà, en la matière, la convention de La Haye du 14 mars 1978. Il vaudrait mieux inciter les États à la ratifier plutôt que de la concurrencer avec un règlement européen.

Le second texte concerne la reconnaissance des décisions en matière de partenariats enregistrés. Or, il pose un problème de fond, car chaque État a sa propre conception des partenariats au sein d'un couple. Vouloir imposer la reconnaissance des partenariats étrangers équivaudra donc, tôt ou tard, à contourner les règles nationales dans ce domaine. C'est pourquoi 10 États sur 28 ont refusé d'accepter ces deux textes, et c'est pourquoi je voterai contre eux.

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE). – Señora Presidenta, efectivamente debatimos un tema de especial importancia. Quería dar la enhorabuena a su *rapporteur*, el señor Cavada.

Ha habido muchas dificultades prácticas y jurídicas, cuando ha habido una pareja internacional y se ha producido una separación por fallecimiento o porque ha habido una separación o un divorcio, por la disparidad de normativas que existen en este momento en la Unión.

De hecho, hubo un acuerdo en el año 2015, y una de las prioridades para la Unión tenía que ser el tratamiento de estos regímenes matrimoniales o «unidades» registradas. No hubo unanimidad, y eso condujo a que posteriormente diecisiete Estados miembros pidieran una cooperación reforzada para facilitar básicamente la vida de los ciudadanos. Y es lo que debatimos hoy: dos Reglamentos que pretenden clarificar jurídicamente el tema, establecer quién tiene la competencia, quién es el órgano competente judicialmente, cuál es la ley aplicable. Y, luego, también, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de todas las resoluciones.

Si hay una organización, se facilita la libre circulación de los ciudadanos, que es una de las prioridades de la Unión. Se hace también más fácil la vida de los ciudadanos; el procedimiento es mucho más rápido y mucho más seguro.

Sin duda, la Unión Europea es un espacio de libertad, de seguridad y de justicia, dentro del respeto a los derechos humanos y, por supuesto, a los distintos sistemas jurídicos de los Estados miembros. Se pondrá fin a muchos casos de confusión y a muchos casos de dificultades jurídicas.

Esta cooperación reforzada es voluntaria; en cualquier momento, cualquier otro Estado miembro podrá adherirse, y, por lo tanto, se trata de facilitar la vida a todos los ciudadanos de la Unión.

En realidad, es un instrumento de Derecho internacional privado que viene a completar los muchísimos instrumentos que existen hoy en el Derecho civil y, especialmente, en el Derecho de familia, y, sobre todo, un tema muy importante que es otro de los valores de la Unión: conseguimos, de alguna manera, asegurar el principio de no discriminación.

Branislav Škripek (ECR). – Manželstvo jedného muža a jednej ženy považujem za najpodstatnejší zväzok, na ktorom musí stavať každá spoločnosť. Ochrana a posilnenie tohto inštitútu by malo byť naším politickým a legislatívnym cieľom. Môžeme tak vyslať občanom Európskej únie – mužom a ženám – dôležitý signál, že ženiť sa, vydávať sa, zakladať rodiny a mať deti je správne, zdravé, a my ako poslanci Európskeho parlamentu vás v tom budeme vždy podporovať. Ale bolo by zlé, keby sme sa snažili cez európske nariadenia prepašovať do členských krajín nepriechodnú legislatívu, ako napr. registrované partnerstvá osôb rovnakého pohlavia, pretože viaceré krajiny to zatiaľ neprijímajú. Bolo by to zhubné. Zvýšený nárast extrémizmu a skepsy voči Únii je priamym následkom takýchto krokov. Občania sa cítia pod-

vedení a nevypočutí. Podobný prípad predstavuje ratifikácia Istanbulskeho dohovoru. Európska únia ho chce schváliť *en bloc*, a tak bude len ďalšou ranou pre dôveru občanov v spoločný európsky projekt. Počúvajte hlas občanov, lebo len vďaka nim tu sme. Vypočujte hlas členských štátov, pretože ony tvoria toto spoločenstvo a nie zopár osôb na predsedníckych stoličkách.

(Rečník súhlasil s tým, že odpovie na otázku položenú zdvihnutím modrej karty (článok 162 ods. 8 rokovacieho poriadku).)

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), ceist “cárta gorm”. – Ba mhaith liom an cheist a chur. Is cearta daonna atá i gceist anseo agus tá tusa ag rá nár chóir go mbeadh na cearta seo deimhnithe ag rialacháin ón Aontas Eorpach agus go bhfuil sé suas ansin do gach aon Bhallstát a chearta féin a chur san áireamh, cé go bhfuil sé go huile agus go hiomlán ag imeacht i gcoinne cearta daonna. Ní aontaím leis an méid atá ráite agat agus ní dóigh liom go bhfuil sé sásúil gur chóir dúinn glacadh leis an méid atá ráite agat. Cad a déarfá mar gheall ar chearta daonna?

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *odpoveď na otázku položenú zdvihnutím modrej karty*. – Pani kolegyňa, určite vám nie je neznáme, že práve táto oblasť spadá v rámci subsidiarity do rozhodovania jednotlivých členských štátov – takisto môjho vlastného štátu. O akom ľudskom práve hovoríte? Všetci máme rovnaké ľudské práva. Žiadne iné práva na základe cítení sa nedajú vymyslieť.

Pavel Svoboda (PPE). – Paní předsedající, dovolu mi především poděkovat panu Cavadovi za práci odvedenou na obou návrzích. Navržená spolupráce, posílená spolupráce se mi jeví jako účelná.

Podle Komise například v roce 2007 bylo z 2,4 milionu nových manželství uzavřených v Evropské unii celých 13 % s mezinárodním prvkem. Je proto vhodné těmto občanům zajistit přehledná přeshraniční práva. Toto zpřehlednění může také podle Komise ušetřit ročně až 1,1 miliardu eur, která je dnes vydávána na paralelní soudní řízení v různých členských státech.

Domnívám se také, že obavy členských států o nenarušení jejich vnitrostátních úprav v dané oblasti jsou ošetřeny, a to hned dvojmo.

Zprvée: účelem dokumentu není harmonizovat hmotné právo členských států týkající se majetkových poměrů mezinárodních párů. Návrhy neříkají, že registrované partnerství je totéž jako manželství. Účelem návrhu je pouze zajistit jednotná pravidla pro správu majetku mezinárodních párů nebo pro případ dělení tohoto majetku. Návrh je tedy v souladu s principem subsidiarity.

Zadruhé: součástí úpravy je pro jistotu i doložka veřejného pořádku. Ta v každém případě dovolu zúčastněnému státu navrženou úpravu neaplikovat, pokud na jeho straně vznikne konkrétní důvod veřejného pořádku, například rozdíl v koncepci registrovaného partnerství.

Volný pohyb v rámci Evropské unie vnímám jako největší pozitivum samotné Unie, ale musí nám jít nejenom o to, nekomplikovat prohlubování tohoto pohybu mezivládní spoluprací, ale vytvářet skutečný společný prostor se společnými pravidly, například jako jsou ta, která projednáváme.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ringrazio anch'io il collega Cavada per il lavoro e soprattutto il consenso raggiunto in seno alla commissione giuridica su questo dossier.

Approvando questo regolamento si compie finalmente un passo in avanti, come hanno detto i colleghi, per i diritti reali. Questo regolamento, infatti, dà una risposta finalmente concreta ai bisogni di certezza del diritto e di semplificazione a circa sedici milioni di coppie europee che vivono in situazioni transfrontaliere. Sarà finalmente più facile conoscere la legge, applicare la giurisdizione competente e le modalità di applicazione dei diversi regimi di proprietà esistenti.

L'auspicio è che ora, dopo l'entrata in vigore del regolamento nei diciotto Stati che hanno sostenuto la cooperazione rafforzata, se ne possano aggiungere altri, in modo da rendere ancora più efficace e coerente l'ordinamento europeo.

Ringrazio infine la Presidenza olandese per esser riuscita a chiudere in modo positivo il negoziato e invito in questo senso la futura Presidenza slovacca a lavorare per estendere il consenso all'intero Consiglio su questa riforma.

Therese Comodini Cachia (PPE). – Madam President, only in the last plenary this Parliament voted in favour of decreasing bureaucracy for Union citizens, especially when exercising their right to free movement and establishment, when we voted in a system of recognition of public documents. Tomorrow, with Parliament's vote – I hope in favour – on Mr Cavada's reports, international couples in the EU will obtain a clearer framework within which they can manage their property. To date, international couples at their most vulnerable moments in their personal lives – that is upon the demise of a spouse or partner, or the dissolution of their marriage or partnership – have been burdened even further by complex legal rules regulating which courts could determine issues relating to their property regimes and which law should apply. Often, after obtaining a decision on divorce, separation or dissolution of a partnership, the couple have needed to institute separate and distinct proceedings in another jurisdiction to have issues related to their property regime determined.

These two proposals for Council regulations on enhanced cooperation will ensure clarity and certainty. Couples will enjoy simplified procedures so that if they are involved in divorce, separation or succession proceedings, it will be the same court ruling on these proceedings that will determine issues related to their property regimes. Couples will no longer need to institute proceedings in different states and get embroiled in complex legal issues to obtain justice. Laws should be there to assist citizens in obtaining access to a remedy and to a judicial determination. These proposals will ensure just that.

Victor Negrescu (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, prezentele propuneri de regulament al Consiliului privind regimurile matrimoniale și efectele patrimoniale sunt rezultatul unor discuții instituționale ce datează deja de prea mult timp.

Cu toate că regretăm blocajul negocierilor între statele membre, ne bucurăm că aceste propuneri revin la Parlament sub forma unei cooperări consolidate, ce conține numeroase modificări propuse de legislativul european.

Regulamentul va fi un instrument foarte util pentru cuplurile internaționale din Uniunea Europeană și ne referim aici la peste 16 milioane de cupluri, stabilind în mod clar care este instanța competentă să se pronunțe cu privire la cererile în materie de regimuri matrimoniale.

Cu toate acestea, aceste drepturi trebuie extinse în toate statele membre pentru a asigura un tratament egal pentru familii, oriunde în Europa. Din păcate am întâlnit multe cupluri formate și din cetățeni români, care au întâmpinat astfel de dificultăți din cauza diferențelor de legislație. Astfel, acest regulament va permite eliminarea a numeroase cazuri de confuzie și dificultăți de ordin juridic, ajutând cuplurile și familiile internaționale să beneficieze de o protecție clară și, de ce nu, de un sprijin în plus pentru mobilitatea în spațiul european.

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Rozmawiamy dzisiaj na bardzo ważny temat. Wydawałoby się, że jest on – przynajmniej w porównaniu z ogromem problemów, z którymi boryka się Unia Europejska, kryzysów, które nami targają, jutrzejszego referendum w Wielkiej Brytanii – marginalny, ale uważam, że jest on jednak zasadniczy. Pokazuje on bowiem właściwie, czym jest Unia Europejska i w którym kierunku idzie, oraz jaka będzie w przyszłości. Wspólnota, która chwali się i szczyci na całym świecie, że jest tak humanistyczna, i która mówi, że jej fundamentem jest równość i tolerancja, dochodzi do takiego dnia jak dzisiaj, kiedy cieszymy się, że jutro być może przegłosujemy oczywistość, która dawno w Unii Europejskiej powinna obowiązywać: Właściwie po co istnieją umowa społeczna, która powołała państwa, oraz te państwa, które później – w procesie rozpoczętym sześćdziesiąt lat temu – powołały Unię Europejską? Istnieją po to, żeby dawać ludziom przynajmniej szansę na szczęście. Do tej pory w wielu zakresach działalności, nie tylko publicznej, ale i życia prywatnego, tych szans nie dajemy, albo je ograniczamy. Przepisy, o których dzisiaj mówimy, i – mam nadzieję – rozstrzygnięcia, które jutro przyjmujemy, są niewielkim, ale ważnym i potrzebnym krokiem na drodze do budowania takiej relacji między państwem a obywatelem, między Unią Europejską a społeczeństwem europejskim, gdzie to obywatel jest podmiotem, a Unia Europejska i państwa członkowskie są instytucjami, które mają mu służyć i służyć temu, żeby był szczęśliwy.

Dlatego też kończąc, pani Przewodnicząca, zwracam się z apelem do tych wszystkich państw, które tych rozstrzygnięć – drobnych przecież, ale koniecznych i potrzebnych dla szczęścia ludzi – do tej pory nie chcą przyjąć, przyjęły je.

Liliana Rodrigues (S&D). – Senhora Presidente, esta proposta é de facto uma mais-valia para cerca de 13 % de casais da União Europeia, segundo dados de 2007. Passados nove anos, pressuponho e imagino que serão bem mais esses casais. Se aos casamentos juntarmos os divórcios, mais ainda serão as situações que determinavam a existência de um conjunto de regras que fossem claras em relação aos direitos de propriedade para os casais da União Europeia, ficando, como já aqui foi dito, o direito de família salvaguardado, bem como os regimes matrimoniais não sendo afetados na sua matéria de fundo.

Neste sentido, o reconhecimento desses direitos é um instrumento importante. Trata-se de justiça civil, dos bens patrimoniais de casais, inclusive casais em união de facto comprovada, que assegurará a livre circulação das decisões judiciais e o reconhecimento dessas decisões nos países da União.

Lamento, no entanto, que o bom senso e, acima de tudo, a justiça não tenham vingado no Conselho a ponto de conseguir uma decisão que fosse unânime, que fosse desejável e que tenha havido a necessidade de recorrer à cooperação reforçada. Apenas dezassete de nós confiaram entre si.

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE). – Paní předsedající, já velmi podporuji tento materiál. Stejně jako moji kolegové, kteří mluvili z mé frakce přede mnou, trochu lituji toho, že ten materiál je schvalován víceméně pět či šest let od doby, kdy začal být projednáván v Radě.

Bohužel si pamatuji, tehdy jsem zastupoval Českou republiku na Radě ministrů spravedlnosti a už tehdy se ukazovalo, že bude dlouhá cesta k tomu, než materiál nakonec bude přijat. Snad konečně zítra zvítězí zdravý rozum a my tento materiál přijmeme, byť se bohužel týká pouze 18 zemí, ne celé Evropské unie, a tedy logicky jeho efektivita bude územně omezena pouze na část našeho Společenství. Je třeba tady říci, že tento materiál opravdu nijak neomezuje suverenitu členských států. Neovlivňuje jejich rodinné právo, nezasahuje do toho, zda některá země uznává či neuznává registrované partnerství. A to je třeba tady říci, protože bohužel někteří předřečníci trošičku posouvali význam toho, co dnes projednáváme.

Jedná se o soubor kolizních norem, o mezinárodní právo soukromé a o mezinárodní právo procesní. Po přijetí tohoto materiálu bude zjevné, jaké konkrétní soudy v dané kauze u mezinárodního páru, který řeší majetkové spory, budou rozhodovat. Tedy řešíme soudní příslušnost a vedle toho bude určeno jedno rozhodné právo. A jako praktik jasně říkám, že to v praxi výrazně pomůže, protože jsem měl celou řadu klientů, lidí, kteří byli z mezinárodního svazku, a jaksí byl velký problém toho, že jejich majetek byl řešen různými právními režimy. A toto mi tady dneska odstraňujeme. Tedy je to věc, která občanům objektivně pomáhá. Nechápu tedy, že někdo může být proti úpravě, která je objektivně ve prospěch našich občanů, není to žádná regulace z Bruselu, která naše občany omezuje. Takže já jsem velmi rád, děkuji panu zpravodaji, podporuji ten materiál a doufám, že zítra bude přijat, byť, jak už jsem řekl, byl bych rád, kdyby platil pro celé území Evropské unie.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Νότης Μαρτιάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η διαχείριση και η εκκαθάριση των περιουσιακών στοιχείων των διεθνών ζευγαριών, λόγω χωρισμού του ζεύγους ή θανάτου ενός εκ των συζύγων, εμπίπτει αρχικά στην αποκλειστική εθνική δικαιοδοσία. Όμως το Συμβούλιο προτείνει την αλλαγή αυτής της κατάστασης. Θέλει να δημιουργήσει ένα ενιαίο καθεστώς, ώστε το ζήτημα των περιουσιακών στοιχείων των διεθνών ζευγαριών να υπάγεται σε ένα διεθνές δίκαιο. Όμως έτσι ο υπό ψήφιση κανονισμός ακυρώνει τα εθνικά δίκαια· ακυρώνει τους κανόνες του ιδιωτικού διεθνούς δικαίου που ισχύουν μέχρι σήμερα σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη και εφαρμόζονται χωρίς ιδιαίτερα προβλήματα και στο τέλος οδηγούν στη δημιουργία ενός διεθνούς δικαίου.

Η ρήτρα δημόσιας τάξης αντιμετωπίζει μεν το πρόβλημα που έχει σχέση με τη μη αναγνώριση ορισμένων σχέσεων συμβίωσης σε ορισμένες χώρες, δεν θεωρώ όμως ότι επιλύει τα νέα προβλήματα που δημιουργεί ο νέος κανονισμός, αφού παραβιάζει την αρχή της επικουρικότητας και δεν σέβεται τις πολιτισμικές παραδόσεις των κρατών μελών της Ένωσης. Επομένως, θεωρώ ότι ο κανονισμός δημιουργεί περισσότερα προβλήματα από όσα επιλύει.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjednice, konačno dobra vijest za čak 16 milijuna građana Europske unije. Zaista, predugo je trajala pravna neizvjesnost za tako veliki broj građana koji imaju registrirano partnerstvo ili su bračni parovi iz različitih zemalja. Nedopustivo je da još deset članica, deset zemalja Europske unije ne prihvata ovaj prijedlog Komisije i našega izvijestitelja gospodina Cavade. Neprihvatljivo je zato što neovisno o tome što je ljubav najljepša stvar na svijetu i što ja volim reći ljubav nema alternative, ipak se događaju razvodi, događaju se nesreće, ljudi umiru i trebamo omogućiti takvim građanima pravnu sigurnost. Nema nam druge jer ako to ne učinimo, ne znam na kojim vrijednostima ćemo onda do kraja izgraditi Europsku uniju.

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la crescente mobilità delle persone in uno spazio senza frontiere interne ha portato ad un aumento significativo delle unioni tra cittadini di Stati membri diversi. Ben sedici milioni di coppie internazionali sono costrette ad affrontare difficoltà tanto nella gestione quotidiana dei loro beni, quanto al momento della divisione del patrimonio in seguito a separazione personale o morte del partner. Le difficoltà spesso derivano dalla grande disparità tra le norme applicabili, sia di diritto sostanziale che di diritto internazionale privato, in materia di effetti patrimoniali del matrimonio.

Ben venga quindi una regolamentazione che affermi, in modo unitario e rispettoso delle scelte degli Stati membri, le delicate questioni riguardanti la capacità dei partner, la validità o il riconoscimento di un'unione, le obbligazioni alimentari e la successione del partner premorto.

Il grande passo avanti è il principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile, che prevede che il diritto dei regimi patrimoniali tra i coniugi si applichi alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'Unione, ovunque essi si trovino. È necessaria, insomma, una regolamentazione omogenea che sia di reale aiuto allo sviluppo dei temi della famiglia.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission. – Madam Speaker, after several years of complex negotiations 18 Member States have expressed their wish to participate in the enhanced cooperation. I trust that more will join. I would like to invite the Parliament to give its positive opinion on the two regulations implementing the enhanced cooperation. We are removing legal complications, making the lives of EU citizens simpler. International couples in the Union, whether in a marriage or a registered partnership, will benefit from Union common rules in handling their property matters.

I would also like to invite Member States who have not yet done so to join the enhanced cooperation, because the more Member States that join, the greater number of citizens will benefit from the regulations.

Jean-Marie Cavada, rapporteur. – Madame la Présidente, je ne sais pas si ce sera le dernier mot, mais en tout cas pour ce soir, probablement, sur ce sujet. Je veux remercier publiquement le Conseil, ses services et ceux de la Commission européenne d'avoir mis un terme à six ans – je dirais – d'inégalités.

Pourquoi est-ce que j'emploie ce terme? Si 18 pays ont accepté de souscrire à une sorte de pacte – le même règlement en tout cas – pour des couples ou des «partenaires enregistrés» – comme on dit pudiquement –, c'est-à-dire soit des couples homme-femme non mariés soit des couples homosexuels vivant ensemble, c'est bien parce qu'ils ont constaté une demande dans leur pays, et parce qu'on ne pouvait pas laisser ces citoyens hors-la-loi et, qui plus est, en conflit avec des systèmes internationaux dont aucune personne toute seule, même avec un bon avocat, ne peut venir à bout, parce que c'est extrêmement compliqué d'être enfermé dans cette souffrance.

Les 16 millions de couples dont je parlais tout à l'heure représentent 32 millions d'individus mariés ou enregistrés, et en réalité 64 millions de personnes – parce que chacun a deux parents – qui sont projetées dans le monde de Kafka, car on ne peut pas en venir à bout ou très difficilement. Je suis donc très reconnaissant de la volonté politique que les deux institutions ont mise à nous aider – les rapporteurs fictifs et moi-même – à faire aboutir un texte qui n'a que trop traîné.

Pourquoi n'a-t-il que trop traîné? Parce qu'il est assez étrange – et d'ailleurs quelques-uns l'ont dit tout à l'heure – que l'Union européenne, en se réclamant de valeurs – comme vous l'avez dit, cher collègue –, ait davantage favorisé la libre circulation, la libre protection, la libre défense devant les tribunaux des capitaux, des biens et des services que des situations des individus. Nous n'avons que trop traîné et je veux remercier ceux qui ont eu le courage politique de forcer les obstacles pour aboutir à cet accord.

Je terminerai en disant deux petites choses. Premièrement, ce texte remet-il en cause la subsidiarité? Mais absolument pas puisque, au contraire, il est exclusif: ceux qui ne veulent pas souscrire à ce texte ne sont pas dans les dix-huit qui l'ont accepté. Mieux encore, ceux qui ont des citoyens dans leur pays qui veulent avoir recours à un tribunal pour régler leur situation internationale, mais vivent dans un pays qui ne veut pas modifier le droit de la famille seront quand même protégés en s'adressant au tribunal d'un autre pays. C'est pourquoi mes collègues, moi-même et les deux institutions avons pu aboutir à un texte qui, en réalité, est d'une grande simplicité humaine, parce qu'il protège enfin une minorité qui a été saccagée par la volonté d'ignorance des États.

Quant aux dix qui n'en veulent pas, ils auront la latitude de regarder si cela est bénéfique pour les citoyens qui ont l'obligation de s'en servir, ou bien de le refuser.

President. — The debate is closed.

Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D), na piśmie. – Duża mobilność obywateli Unii sprawia, że znacznie częściej wchodzą oni w związki małżeńskie w innych krajach członkowskich z osobami z innego kraju niż własny. Komisja uznała brak pewności w zakresie praw majątkowych par międzynarodowych za jedną z głównych przeszkód, jakie obywatele UE nadal napotykać w życiu codziennym, kiedy pragną skorzystać z przysługujących im praw poza granicami swojego kraju. Celem niniejszego wniosku jest przede wszystkim ustanowienie w Unii jasnych ram prawnych, regulujących warunki określania sądu właściwego do rozpatrywania sporów par międzynarodowych, prawa regulującego stosunki majątkowe oraz ułatwienie przepływu orzeczeń i dokumentów urzędowych pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi. Podsumowując, powyższe rozporządzenie obejmujące jurysdykcję i prawo właściwe oraz uznawanie i wykonywanie orzeczeń sądowych w zakresie małżeńskich ustrojów majątkowych, będzie użytecznym instrumentem, kładącym kres licznym nieporozumieniom i trudnościom prawnym, jakie mogą napotkać pary międzynarodowe.

Емил Радев (PPE), в писмена форма. – Уважаеми колеги, в Европа има около 16 милиона международни двойки, които са женени или живеят в регистрирано партньорство, а бракът или партньорството на поне 650 000 от тях се разпадат всяка година. Ето защо решенията по въпросите, свързани с имуществения режим при съпружи и имуществените последици на регистрираните партньорства, са от изключително значение за европейските граждани. Понастоящем за международните двойки е много трудно да разберат кои са компетентните съдилища и кое е приложимото право към личното им положение и имущество. Правилата се различават значително в различните държави и понякога водят до конфликтни ситуации. Засегнатите от делби на общо имущество международни двойки са изправени пред сложни въпроси, по-специално по отношение на приложимото право, избора на съд, признаването и изпълнението на съдебни решения.

С приемането на този регламент ще се избегнат правните разлики между 18-те държави членки, които участват в засиленото сътрудничество. Така европейските граждани няма да се изправят пред правна несигурност и да понасят съпътстващите разходи, когато поделят имуществото си в случай на развод, раздяла или смърт. Решението на държавите членки да влязат в това засилено сътрудничество е особено навременно и се радвам, че то съдържа голяма част от препоръките на ЕП от 2013 г., най-вече що се отнася до регулаторната сигурност и яснота.

Tadeusz Zwiefka (PPE), na piśmie. – Żadne rozstanie nie jest łatwe. Obojętnie, jakie są przyczyny, jest to swoistego rodzaju osobista porażka. Decyzja o rozwodzie to dopiero pierwszy krok. Później, gdy dochodzi do podziału majątku, zaczynają się ogromne problemy prawne, zwłaszcza dla par międzynarodowych. Oba rozporządzenia mają poprawić tę sytuację, regulując przepisy dotyczące jurysdykcji, uznawania i wykonywania orzeczeń sądów w sprawach podziału majątku. I, szczerze mówiąc, nie ważne, czy to są pary heteroseksualne czy nie – każdy ma prawo dostępu do wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Te rozporządzenia nie wprowadzają tylnymi drzwiami uznawania takiej czy innej definicji małżeństwa czy instytucji związku partnerskiego. Jedyna ewentualna konsekwencja to wykonanie wyroku wydanego w jednym państwie na terytorium drugiego państwa członkowskiego. I to również obwarowane jest w tekście klauzulą porządku publicznego. Dlatego szkoda mi obywateli tych państw członkowskich, które nie przystąpiły do wzmocnionej współpracy, np. Polski. Będą oni w gorszej sytuacji, nie będą mogli skorzystać z jasnego zestawu przepisów, przez co postępowania sądowe będą dłuższe i bardziej kosztowne.

22. Folgemaßnahmen zum strategischen Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung (ET2020) (Aussprache)

President. — The next item is the report by Zdzisław Krasnodębski, on behalf of the Committee on Culture and Education, on follow-up of the Strategic Framework for European cooperation in education and training (ET2020) (2015/2281(INI)) (A8-0176/2016).

Zdzisław Krasnodębski, sprawozdawca. – Pani Przewodnicząca! W trakcie przygotowania tego sprawozdania przeprowadziliśmy konsultacje z Dyrekcją Generalną Kultury i Edukacji Komisji, z europejskimi stowarzyszeniami reprezentującymi różne jednostki zajmujące się procesami edukacji, z narodowymi organizacjami, także takimi, które działają na poziomie lokalnym. Przeprowadzaliśmy również konsultacje z ministerstwami edukacji kilku państw. Starałem się uwzględnić w tym sprawozdaniu również wyniki ewaluacji, które były zlecone przez Komisję Europejską, i różne *position papers* opublikowane przez organizacje. W związku z tym – aby to sprawozdanie nie było sprawozdaniem o wszystkim – postanowiłem skoncentrować się na trzech głównych punktach. Jak państwo zauważą, sprawozdanie to ma trzy części. Jedna dotyczy pewnych propozycji sposobu organizacji tych ram współpracy w dziedzinie edukacji. Druga część dotyczy jakości wykształcenia i szkoleń. I wreszcie trzecia dotyczy bardzo aktualnego, ale też nie ukrywam – o tym jeszcze powiem parę słów – kontrowersyjnego tematu: migracja a kształcenie i szkolenia.

Ja bym chciał podkreślić teraz tylko parę punktów, które wydają mi się bardzo istotne w tym sprawozdaniu, i warte są podkreślenia. Dla mnie one są szczególnie ważne. Po pierwsze, zwracamy uwagę w tym sprawozdaniu na rolę rodziny w edukacji. To, jak się wydaje, jest oczywistość, ale oczywistość, która dzisiaj jest często zapomniana, mianowicie że te wszystkie dane pokazują, jak wielkie znaczenie ma środowisko domowe dla rozwoju podstawowych umiejętności dziecka, potem komunikacja między szkołą a rodzicami, również mająca znaczenie w takich sprawach jak kształtowanie postaw obywatelskich czy zapobieganie radykalizacji.

Innym aspektem, o którym tu jest mowa, jest podejście do edukacji oparte na roli wspólnoty, tzw. *community based approach*, a więc podkreślenie znaczenia wszystkich lokalnych organizacji i aktorów. Niestety nie przeszła pewna poprawka kompromisowa, w której chcieliśmy włączyć również organizacje religijne, lokalne organizacje pozarządowe. No i jeszcze raz podkreślaliśmy właśnie rolę rodziców, ich obowiązków oraz konieczność zagwarantowania wpływu na proces edukacji dzieci. To jest o tyle ważne, że w grupach roboczych, które zostały już powołane, nie ma do tej pory członków europejskich organizacji reprezentujących rodziców.

Wreszcie innym aspektem jest docenienie wszelkich sukcesów polityki europejskiej w tym względzie, takich jak proces boloński, jak program mobilności studentów czy kadry nauczające. Chciałem zwrócić uwagę w tym sprawozdaniu – i to zdanie zostało też podzielone przez kontrsprawozdawców – na pewne słabości tego procesu, mianowicie w środowisku akademickim panuje poczucie ignorowania zastrzeżeń nauczycieli akademickich związanych z procesem bolońskim. W związku z tym zalecamy większe zaangażowanie społeczności uniwersyteckiej w cykl prac w ramach ET 2020. Potrzebna jest większa elastyczność w wykorzystaniu modułów czy systemu punktów ECT oraz – co najważniejsze – należy również opierać wyniki mobilności także na wskaźnikach jakościowych, nie tylko ilościowych.

No i wreszcie sprawa migrantów. Bardzo krótko zwracam też na to uwagę. My skupiamy się na imigrantach z zewnątrz Europy, ale wszystkie dane pokazują, że również dzieci migrantów wewnątrz europejskich mają wielkie trudności w adaptowaniu się do społeczeństwa, i tutaj systemy edukacyjne mają ogromne znaczenie. My postulujemy też włączenie nauczycieli pochodzących z migracji w system edukacji, oczywiście w wymianę praktyk, ale również pomoc dla migrantów, również wewnątrz europejskich w dostosowaniu się do wymogów i standardów nauczania w kraju przyjmującym. Dziękuję bardzo pani przewodniczącej. Czekam na opinię kolegów.

Tibor Navracsics, *Member of the Commission*. – Madam President, I wish to thank the Culture and Education Committee and especially the rapporteur Mr Krasnodębski for his excellent report which follows up on the Joint Council and Commission report regarding the strategic framework for European cooperation in Education and Training 2020. Education and Training 2020 is important: it is the umbrella under which all EU-level policy exchanges on education and training between Member States take place. It covers learning in all contexts, whether formal or non-formal, and at all levels, from early childhood education and schools through to higher education, vocational education and training, and other learning.

Thanks to the joint report which the Commission and Council adopted last November, we defined our new common priorities in the field of education and training, which all contribute to the current top priorities of the EU. We now have a much more focused agenda which concentrates on key issues, namely the provision of relevant and high-quality knowledge, the recognition and transparency of skills, inclusive education including the promotion of civic competences, the promotion of innovative approaches fully embracing the digital era, strong support for our teachers and, last but not least, sustainable investment in education and training.

We have made sure that Education and Training 2020 is firmly embedded in the Union's overall political priorities and actively contributes to the development of skills and employability. The New Skills Agenda, which the Commission adopted on 10 June, underscores this point and announces a series of actions at EU-level in which education cooperation plays a key role. Education and training are not only important for acquiring skills for jobs: education is equally important to ensure social inclusion and to make certain that our human and civic values are safeguarded and passed on to future generations. These elements have been much reinforced in the new priorities under Education and Training 2020. I am proud to announce that one of the working groups is specially dedicated to the follow-up of the Paris Declaration, and we play a key role in exchanging with Member States on how to strengthen inclusive education and our common values – a very relevant development in the light of the recent action plan for the integration of migrants, and the new Commission communication to support the prevention of violent extremism, which were adopted some days ago, both highlighting this dimension.

I am very pleased that the European Parliament is strongly supporting this increased attention to social inclusion, civic competences and common values in our work with Member States. Your voice will be important to further develop this dimension.

Your report also highlights a number of problematic issues on the European education scene. We have taken good note of your concern about a brain-drain and imbalanced mobility, for example. Of course, there are larger structural issues behind this which go beyond the education dimension, such as varying employment opportunities across Europe. The Bologna Process, which supports the provision of high-quality education in all Member States, makes a positive contribution to addressing these challenges. Also the new Education and Training 2020 working group on the modernisation of higher education will address the issues of internationalisation, recognition and mobility in a balanced perspective. Let me end by once again thanking Parliament and the rapporteur, Mr Krasnodębski, for your very valuable input and your strong support for our joint efforts in this field. I am now looking forward to what will surely be an interesting debate.

Michaela Šojdrová, *za skupinu PPE*. – Paní předsedající, v úvodu chci upřímně poděkovat zpravodaji této zprávy kolegovi Krasnodebskému, který ji uchopil systematicky a napsal ji s velkým pochopením pro hodnotu vzdělávání.

Proto také zpráva zdůrazňuje to, že vzdělávání a odborná příprava jsou hodnotou samy o sobě a neměly by být orientovány pouze na naplňování potřeb trhu práce. Zpráva respektuje subsidiaritu. Kompetence, které na úrovni EU máme, jsou relativně omezené, ale stále více se od vzdělávání očekává. Od boje proti radikalizaci až po ekonomický růst a snižování chudoby. Je to tím, že my víme, že nastavení vzdělávacích cílů a nástrojů rozhoduje o tom, jak budou naše děti v budoucnu připravené a úspěšné a zda budeme schopni zajistit jejich spokojenost a ekonomický růst v EU.

Proto se Evropský parlament hlásí k návrhu Evropské komise, která zúžila rámec ze třinácti na šest priorit, a členské státy si podle svých rozdílných situací z nich vyberou.

Za prvé je to relevance a kvalita dovedností, za druhé vzdělávání podporující začleňování, dále inovativní vzdělávání, silná podpora pro učitele, uznávání výsledků neformálního vzdělávání a efektivita vzdělávání. Považuji za důležité to, že zpráva zdůrazňuje nutnost podpory učitele, dodávám, že na úrovni EU by tím nástrojem měl být program ERASMUS.

Zpráva také zdůrazňuje roli předškolního a základního vzdělávání pro celoživotní učení, zaměření na dostupnost a kvalitu, stejně jako kvalitu odborného vzdělávání a rozšíření jazykových výukových programů.

V souvislosti s hodnocením zpráva upozorňuje na riziko testování. Také zpráva realisticky hodnotí Boloňský proces a vyzývá k jeho naplnění.

Právě ve spojení s nárůstem radikalizace Evropský parlament vyzývá k průzkumu toho, jak vzdělávací systémy začleňují do svých vzdělávacích programů výuku etiky a osobnostní a sociální výchovu jako nástroj, který se v řadě škol osvědčil. Dodávám jako prevence pro vytváření dobrých mezilidských vztahů a opatření proti šikaně a násilí. Tato zpráva stojí za přečtení, ale především dobré bude se k ní vracet a naplňovat její doporučení.

Puhetta johti ANNELI JÄÄTTEENMÄKI

varapuhemies

Silvia Costa, *a nome del gruppo S&D*. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, io penso che questo aggiornamento della strategia ET2020 per l'educazione e la formazione abbia effettivamente messo a punto dei nuovi obiettivi e si sia fatto carico delle nuove sfide che l'Europa ha.

Si parlava prima del tema non solo della radicalizzazione ma proprio anche di un'educazione che si faccia carico di almeno due sfide: l'inclusione sociale – noi abbiamo ancora troppe differenze nei panorami educativi – e una maggiore attenzione alla qualità dei sistemi educativi, da un lato, e, dall'altro, la capacità di creare le cosiddette competenze informali di cittadinanza, competenze chiave trasversali che servono anche per attivare quel dialogo interculturale, quella capacità di essere cittadini non solo europei ma anche del mondo che ormai è assolutamente necessaria.

Ringrazio molto il collega Krasnodębski per questa relazione, che mette anche in evidenza come dopo la dichiarazione di Parigi, richiamata anche dal Commissario, del marzo 2015, dopo questi fatti gravissimi, si è ricalibrata in qualche modo l'attenzione dell'intera Commissione, supportando di più quella centralità dell'educazione che finora non abbiamo visto molto forte nel programma di Juncker. Ci rendiamo conto che oggi il tema strategico dell'educazione e dell'investimento culturale è un tema che riguarda il futuro dell'Europa.

È importante che sia stata annunciata questa comunicazione sull'ammodernamento dell'istruzione superiore, anche per rendere più efficace il sistema della confrontabilità dei titoli, dei crediti e anche del processo di Bologna, che ancora ha diverse difficoltà. Penso che sia assolutamente giusto, come ha detto il relatore, sostenere anche i docenti. Penso che forse andrebbe meglio sottolineare il problema del sostegno ai docenti e che sia assolutamente necessario, per esempio, utilizzare di più il piano di investimenti EFSI per piattaforme europee che aiutino anche nel campo della scuola e dell'educazione, per esempio con riferimento all'adeguamento al digitale dei profili e dei contenuti educativi.

Resta il problema di troppe differenze che ancora ci sono in Europa per quanto riguarda la differenza di accesso, la povertà educativa, i risultati di apprendimento e la prospettiva di studio per le persone immigrate. Credo però che questa iniziativa, insieme con quella che è stata presentata dalla Commissaria Thyssen insieme con il Commissario Navracsics sull'agenda per le nuove *skills*, possa costruire finalmente una maggiore centralità delle politiche educative europee.

Νότης Μαριάς, *εξ ονόματος της ομάδας ECR*. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, ανάμεσα στους κύριους στόχους του στρατηγικού πλαισίου της Ένωσης «Εκπαίδευση και κατάρτιση 2020» είναι η βελτίωση της ποιότητας του εκπαιδευτικού συστήματος των κρατών της Ένωσης, καθώς και η προώθηση της ισότητας σε όλα τα επίπεδα εκπαίδευσης και κατάρτισης. Η στάση, βέβαια, της Ένωσης δεν φαίνεται να ενισχύει τη στρατηγική αυτή. Οι πολιτικές λιτότητας που έχει επιβάλει η τρόικα σε ορισμένα κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης έχουν οδηγήσει τις χώρες αυτές σε περικοπές δαπανών στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης.

Συγκεκριμένα στην Ελλάδα, σύμφωνα με τον κρατικό προϋπολογισμό του 2017, οι δαπάνες για τον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης θα ανέρχονται σε 4,2 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ, ενώ από το 2009 έχουν μειωθεί κατά 35,6%. Παράλληλα, ο έλληνας πρωθυπουργός, Αλέξης Τσίπρας, τόλμησε να μιλήσει περί δήθεν δίκαιης ανάπτυξης και για αξιοπρεπώς αμειβόμενες θέσεις εργασίας, τη στιγμή που στην Ελλάδα το πρώτο τρίμηνο του 2016 το ποσοστό ανεργίας έφτασε στο 24,9%, το υψηλότερο στην Ευρώπη. Αν η Ένωση θέλει πράγματι να πετύχει τους στόχους της στρατηγικής της, θα πρέπει να εγκαταλείψει τις πολιτικές λιτότητας και να ενισχύσει τις επενδύσεις στην εκπαίδευση, την καινοτομία και την ανάπτυξη.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk, *on behalf of the ALDE Group*. – Madam President, European cooperation in the field of education and training is voluntary but essential. Cooperation and, in particular, exchanges of best practice have proved to be very useful. Yet very little is communicated within the Member States and the various bodies participating in the framework strategy. We should encourage and further support Member States in order to ensure coherent, transparent and inclusive education providing an appropriate response to the needs of the current diverse groups of learners in both formal and non-formal educational settings.

Creating alternative ways of learning and facilitating the recognition of learning are vital means of widening access to educational opportunities. Better cooperation between Member States is needed on the establishment of new, innovative and interactive methods of teaching, training and learning, where individuals are active participants in the educational process. That will increase the attractiveness and effectiveness of the educational process and will enhance the development of students' creativity.

Further efforts are needed with regard to improving early childhood education and fostering its modernisation, and there is also an urgent need for reinforcement of the renewed European agenda for adult learning. Better cooperation between the EU and the national authorities is required in order to find the right approach to swiftly, fully and sustainably integrating refugees, migrants and asylum seekers into education and training systems and ensuring that those who have already obtained qualifications get proper recognition for them.

To conclude, I would underline the importance of better monitoring in order to implement education and training strategies successfully.

Νικόλαος Χουντής, *εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL*. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η στρατηγική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης είναι στην ουσία συνεργασία στην αποδιάρθρωση, στην υποβάθμιση και τον κατακερματισμό της εκπαίδευσης στην Ευρώπη. Είναι συνεργασία για την εμπορευματοποίηση της γνώσης και την ιδιωτικοποίηση του εκπαιδευτικού συστήματος. Είναι μηχανισμός αναπαραγωγής του στρεβλού προτύπου της απλήρωτης, επισφαλούς εργασίας χωρίς δικαιώματα. Η νεοφιλελεύθερη αντίληψη έχει αλλοιώσει την ίδια την έννοια της εκπαίδευσης. Αντί να προάγει ολοκληρωμένη γνώση, δημιουργεί αποστειρωμένα τεμάχια γνώσεων, έτοιμα για συναρμολόγηση, ανάλογα με τις εκάστοτε επιταγές της αγοράς και των κυρίαρχων οικονομικών συμφερόντων.

Την όλη κατάσταση επιδεινώνουν και οι πολιτικές λιτότητας. Ειδικά σε χώρες όπως η Ελλάδα, που βρίσκονται σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, η παιδεία έχει δεχτεί τεράστιο πλήγμα. Η υποχρηματοδότηση και οι περικοπές των δημοσίων δαπανών για την εκπαίδευση απαξιώνουν τα εκπαιδευτικά συστήματα και σε συνδυασμό με την αποεπένδυση οδηγούν σε υψηλά ποσοστά μακροχρόνιας ανεργίας μέχρι και 40% στους νέους, με αποτέλεσμα την απορρύθμιση των εργασιακών σχέσεων και την όξυνση του φαινομένου της διαρροής εγκεφάλων.

Αν θέλουμε μια παιδεία υψηλού επιπέδου, όπως αξίζει στη νεολαία μας, η στρατηγική της ευρωπαϊκής συνεργασίας στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης πρέπει να αλλάξει ριζικά. Για τους νέους της Ευρώπης το μέλλον δεν μπορεί να είναι η ημιμάθεια, η ανεργία, η μερική και η επισφαλής εργασία και η μετανάστευση. Η παιδεία αποτελεί κοινωνικό αγαθό, οφείλουμε να τη διαφυλάττουμε, ενισχύοντας το δημόσιο, δωρεάν και κοινωνικό χαρακτήρα της σε όλες τις βαθμίδες.

Ernest Maragall, *en nombre del Grupo Verts/ALE*. – Señora Presidenta, yo lo siento, señor Navracsics, pero no, *it's not an excellent report*. No tanto por lo que dice como por lo que no dice, por lo que calla o por lo que no desarrolla. En una estrategia europea que revisamos, este Parlamento debería jugar un rol de estímulo, de exigencia positiva en relación con las actuaciones del Comisión Europea, y no es así.

Este informe se queda corto en contenido y aún más en ambición estratégica, por debajo de la propuesta inicial de la Comisión. Por ejemplo, hemos tenido que batallar para incluir referencias explícitas a la cuestión de los refugiados, como contra una especie de alergia incomprensible a la mera expresión del concepto. Como si no hablar de refugiados o de demandantes de asilo los hiciera desaparecer de nuestra realidad, y aún ahora, mañana tendremos que trabajar en los [*ininteligible*] para defender su presencia en el informe.

Lo más grave es la renuncia a considerar esta estrategia desde su posible valor añadido en términos europeos, no desde una perspectiva de simple mejora de coordinación entre Estados miembros. Familias, padres, comunidades religiosas, atención a la radicalización. No, señor Krasnodębski. Podemos entender su inquietud, procedente de contradicciones de la política nacional en su país, pero no podemos admitir que intente trasladar esa lógica a un debate propiamente europeo sobre alguna de sus estrategias centrales.

El informe formula críticas excesivas, quizá, al proceso de Bolonia, pero trata de un modo insuficiente cuestiones tan importantes como la educación preescolar, la promoción de competencias digitales, el abandono prematuro del proceso formativo y otras del mismo calibre. En todas ellas el informe expresa el correspondiente *wishful thinking*, buenas intenciones, pero no identifica puntos críticos ni ofrece líneas claras de mejora.

La educación y la formación no son instrumentos al servicio de la economía y el crecimiento. Son mucho más que eso. Son parte del ser o no ser de Europa. Son el molde común donde debe aparecer la natural diversidad y donde podamos aprender unos de otros para compartir, para construir, para ser país y para ser Europa, sin miedo ni suspicacia mutua.

Isabella Adinolfi, *a nome del gruppo EFDD*. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, le politiche di austerità hanno prodotto effetti devastanti, che hanno investito appieno anche il settore dell'istruzione, minandone la qualità, le condizioni dei docenti, delle famiglie, degli studenti e l'accesso alle opportunità di formazione.

Purtroppo in questa relazione non abbiamo avuto il coraggio di denunciare che la riduzione marcata dei finanziamenti e, più generalmente, l'accentuarsi delle problematiche del settore dell'istruzione e della formazione sono una diretta conseguenza delle politiche di austerità che la Commissione continua a imporre ai cittadini europei.

Dall'inizio della crisi si è riscontrato che le scelte dei modelli adottati a livello dell'Unione europea, piuttosto che far convergere verso la riduzione delle disuguaglianze, hanno drammaticamente accentuato le disparità e le discriminazioni fondate sul possesso economico. Il fatto poi che il quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione sia dichiaratamente funzionale all'attuale modello economico dell'Unione, che ingloba anche il piano Juncker, è l'ennesima conferma di una cinica volontà di proseguire su un percorso che già si è dimostrato fallimentare e deleterio.

È da inizio legislatura che come Movimento 5 Stelle siamo chiedendo delle azioni tangibili finalizzate al rafforzamento della dimensione sociale dell'istruzione e della formazione. È da inizio legislatura che come Movimento 5 stelle siamo chiedendo di dimostrare una reale volontà votata all'abbattimento delle gravissime problematiche socio-economiche che affliggono la vita dei cittadini e l'accesso in condizioni di parità alle opportunità educative e formative.

Occultare la realtà servirà soltanto a essere travolti come un fiume in piena quando sarà troppo tardi. Non possiamo limitarci a sterili dichiarazioni di intenti, non possiamo continuare a vendere come panacea modelli di *governance* economica, austerità, iniziative e piani che hanno già creato dei disastri in mezza Europa. Per le persone che vivono in un angolo buio di dolore sociale e marginalità, a cui è negato di fatto anche il libero accesso al sapere e alla conoscenza, le vuote chiacchiere della politica risultano un esercizio insopportabile e crudelmente beffardo. Continuerò a denunciare senza sosta questa situazione assurda e a battermi affinché il cambiamento possa avere luogo quanto più rapidamente possibile.

Dominique Bilde, *au nom du groupe ENF*. – Madame la Présidente, je suis ravie que soient mentionnées les grandes différences de situations auxquelles font face les États membres. J'approuve la nécessité de revaloriser le statut des enseignants et des professeurs, ainsi que leur salaire, vu la pression insupportable des politiques d'austérité imposées par Bruxelles. Idem pour le développement de politiques d'apprentissage de qualité ou le fait de mieux répondre aux besoins spécifiques des personnes en situation de handicap.

Quant à l'intégration des migrants par l'éducation, je rappelle que la vraie posture humanitaire, c'est de ne pas pénaliser les pays subissant l'émigration des ressources humaines et économiques. On pourrait créer des partenariats dans le domaine de l'éducation avec des États ou des pays limitrophes ou des zones de conflit. Par exemple, établir des couloirs éducatifs afin de permettre aux étudiants en provenance des zones de guerre de pouvoir continuer à étudier au plus près de chez eux.

Malgré ces points divergents, je salue le rapporteur en citant son honorable compatriote Saint Jean-Paul II: «L'éducation est plus qu'un métier, c'est une mission qui consiste à aider chaque personne à reconnaître ce qu'elle a d'irremplaçable et d'unique afin qu'elle grandisse et s'épanouisse».

(L'oratrice accepte de répondre à une question «carton bleu» (article 162, paragraphe 8, du règlement))

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), *otázka položená zvednutím modré karty*. – Paní poslankyně, mám na Vás jenom krátký, stručný dotaz. Můžete nám, prosím Vás, uvést k tomuto plenárnímu zasedání, co nám v oblasti vzdělávání diktuje takzvaný Brusel, jak jste zmínila ve Vašem projevu? Rád bych si rozšířil své obzory.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *réponse «carton bleu»*. – ... *(inaudible)* mais je peux vous dire qu'en France, Bruxelles nous dicte beaucoup de choses, notamment dans le domaine de l'éducation ou dans l'économie de nos pays, puisque vous savez que systématiquement, vous avez, par exemple – je ne vais pas parler des travailleurs détachés –, des lois qui sont faites et qui sont contraires à ce que l'on voudrait.

Vous savez que nos pays ne sont pas tous égaux. Nous n'avons pas la même façon d'apprendre, nous n'avons pas le même apprentissage, nous sommes différents sur beaucoup de choses. Vouloir mettre tout le monde dans le même panier pose de graves problèmes, et c'est précisément Bruxelles qui nous dicte ces problèmes.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Pan prof. Krasnodębski mówił słusznie, że trzeba zwiększyć wpływ rodziców na edukację. Ale jest tylko jeden sposób, żeby go zwiększyć, mianowicie oddać rodzicom pieniądze – wszystko jedno: w gotówce czy w bonie edukacyjnym – po to, aby oni płacili za prywatną szkołę, bo tylko wtedy szkoła będzie robiła to, czego chcą rodzice. Póki za szkołę płaci państwo, póty będzie robiła ona to, czego domagają się biurokracja i związki zawodowe nauczycieli, a potrzeby ucznia będą kompletnie niezauważane. Poza tym czytałem kiedyś książkę o szkolnictwie w Szwajcarii, której autorka powiedziała, że w państwie tym szkoły są zróżnicowane: dwu-, trzy- i czteroletnie, z różnymi językami itd., a mimo to szkolnictwo szwajcarskie jest najlepsze na świecie. Tej idiotce nie przyszło do głowy, że jest ono najlepsze dlatego, że jest różnorodne, i Unia – chcąc nie chcąc – będzie tę różnorodność zabijała. Zresztą pani Costa powiedziała wyraźnie, że w Europie jest za duża różnorodność.

Chciałbym rozwiać złudzenia: im więcej pieniędzy jest przeznaczanych na edukację, tym gorzej. Przypominam, że najlepszy poziom był podczas okupacji narodowosocjalistycznej, kiedy szkolnictwo było tajne, przeznaczano na nie bardzo mało pieniędzy, a poziom był wtedy bardzo wysoki.

A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska musi być zniszczona.

Therese Comodini Cachia (PPE). – Il-Gvernijiet sikwit jiftahru biż-żidiet fil-baġits annwali għall-edukazzjoni, li huwa tajjeb, iżda nafu li l-iżjed aspett importanti tal-edukazzjoni hija l-kwalità tat-tagħlim. L-għalliema jahdmu f'ambjent li jirrifletti d-diversità tas-soċjetà tal-lum bl-isfidi li għorri magħha. Ċertament, il-maġġorparti tal-għalliema, huma silent driving force li tindirizza dawn l-isfidi u jghinu fit-tishih ta' soċjetà aktar ġusta u Ewropa iżjed b'saħħitha. Għaldaqstant min qed jiffoka fuq kif se jipprovdi lill-għalliema b'dak li jehtieġu? Ir-rispett, il-fiduċja, l-appoġġ u l-iżvilupp professjonali kontinwu tagħhom.

Kemm qed ninvestu fl-għalliema tagħna, fis-setturi kollha tal-edukazzjoni u tul il-karriera professjonali tagħhom? Nehduha *for granted* li l-għalliema se jikkowpjaw, iżda għandna ninvestu aktar fl-għalliema tagħna sabiex ikunu frontrunners fit-tweqqi ta' soċjetà u Ewropa li qed naspiraw għaliha.

L-aspett ewlieni tal-Istrateġija għall-Edukazzjoni u t-Taħriġ, m'għandhiex tkun biss fuq l-impjiegi u l-impjegabilità tal-persuni. Għandha tiffoka wkoll dwar kif tagħti appoġġ lill-għalliema. Irridu nhallu lill-għalliema jkunu għalliema. Irridu nagħtu s-setgħa lill-għalliema biex ikunu kreattivi, innovattivi u professjonali f'xogħolhom.

Fl-istrateġija, l-Unjoni Ewropea għandha timbotta 'l quddiem lill-Istati Membri biex:

1. jipprovdu taħriġ kontinwu ta' kwalità lill-għalliema,
2. jgħolqu strutturi li jagħtu l-appoġġ meħtieġ lill-għalliema u jafdawhom biex jindirizzaw b'mod xieraq id-diversità tal-hiliet u l-abilitajiet li l-istudenti tagħhom jipprezentawhom,
3. inehhu l-burokrazija amministrattiva sabiex l-għalliema jkunu jistgħu jiffokaw l-enerġija tagħhom biex jgħallmu,
4. jipprovdu lill-għalliema bil-mezzi u l-materjal edukattiv li b'mod effettiv jiffacilita t-tagħlim,
5. u jirrikonoxxu li għalliem jahdem oltrè l-hin fil-klassi.

L-aktar importanti huwa li nirrikonoxxu li l-għalliema huma msieħba ewlenin fl-investment tal-kapital uman, l-edukazzjoni, u li lkoll naqblu li huwa l-aħjar investment għal soċjetà aktar ġusta u Ewropa iżjed b'saħħitha.

Liliana Rodrigues (S&D). – Senhora Presidente, este relatório, sendo fundamental, não deixa, no entanto, de apresentar imprecisões na linguagem da investigação e educação e parece-me pouco ambicioso no que diz respeito à educação do século XXI.

Reparem que toca apenas uma vez nas questões de género. Numa Europa unida na diversidade, não faz sentido defendermos processos de aculturação. Faz sentido a defesa da inclusão social e cultural.

A tónica colocada no ensino e não na aprendizagem é sintoma disso. A relação subliminar entre a inovação pedagógica e as tecnologias de informação e comunicação também solidificam a minha perspetiva. A inovação pedagógica não se compadece do uso de instrumentos informáticos. As tecnologias de informação e comunicação são meros materiais pedagógicos, como a máquina de escrever já o foi no passado.

Do ponto de vista europeu, parece-me que há, em alguns momentos, uma clara cisão entre o que propomos e os resultados. De facto, é bastante positivo desejarmos que 40 % dos jovens europeus tenham um diploma de ensino superior. Mas, sejamos honestos, há em muitos Estados-Membros dificuldades imensas para a nova geração de licenciados. No meu país, Portugal, esta geração é conhecida pela geração dos 500 €.

Não tenho dúvidas da importância das ciências sociais e humanas, mas até onde está a Europa empreendedora disponível para atender o pensamento especulativo e crítico? Não foi por acaso que se deu a fuga de cérebros em alguns países. No caso de Portugal, este fenómeno foi gritante por consequência de quatro anos de duríssima austeridade. Falarmos de mobilidade desequilibrada é, para mim, um eufemismo de imigração forçada.

A desmotivação no campo da educação generalizou-se: temos professores e educadores que foram atingidos na sua dignidade por avaliações injustas e cortes salariais absurdos que tiveram a bênção da União Europeia.

Se a educação é um bem público e comum, então que não se sugira, como aparece neste relatório, que seja a banca a assegurar o futuro dos nossos jovens.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL). – A Uachtaráin, ar an gcéad dul síos cuirim fáilte roimh ghnéithe áirithe den tuarascáil seo, go háirithe an tagairt do chiorruithe san oideachas mar aon le moltaí chun coinníollacha oibre do mhúinteoirí a fheabhsú.

É sin ráite, ceann de na gnéithe atáim buartha mar gheall air ná an tagairt d'iasachtaí do scoláirí. Tá sé fiorthábhachtach go mbeadh airgead ar fáil ar ndóigh do scoláirí maidir lena gcuid staidéar ach ní dóigh liom gur chóir a bheith ag cur ualach trom iasachtaí airgid ar ár scoláirí agus iad ag tosú amach ar a saol proifisiúnta tar éis dóibh coláiste a chríochnú.

Tá sé riachtanach go mbeadh scéim níos fearr againn maidir le scoláireachtaí agus deontais chun tacú le scoláirí agus iad i mbun a gcuid staidéar agus iad ag freastal ar an tríú leibhéal. Tá taiscí do chóiríocht, cíós, bia, leabhair agus ábhar ar chuid de na costais atá i gceist maidir le cur chun cinn an oideachais. Agus tá an táille chlárúcháin de EUR 3 000 in Éirinn in aghaidh na bliana ar cheann de na táillí is airde san Eoraip. Bíonn amanna ann a mbíonn ar scoláirí cinneadh a dhéanamh idir bia a cheannach agus iad féin a chothú nó ábhair agus leabhair ar chúrsaí atá riachtanach dá gcuid oideachais a cheannach. Mar sin, tá sé suas chugainne mar reachtóirí rochtain ar oideachas a chinntiú do gach duine agus ní díreach dóibh siúd a bhfuil an cumas airgid acu.

Josep-Maria Terricabras (Verts/ALE). – Señora Presidenta, la revisión del marco estratégico es de particular importancia, ya que con él las instituciones de la Unión Europea pueden establecer nuevas prioridades políticas.

Pero para el aprendizaje permanente no solo es importante el prisma del crecimiento económico y de la generación de ocupación: solo a partir de estrategias integrales conseguiremos resultados en términos de empleo, de inclusión social y de participación ciudadana, incluyendo, al mismo tiempo, dimensiones importantes como la tolerancia y el diálogo intercultural.

El informe que estamos debatiendo hoy no cumple con esta perspectiva ni con la ambición necesaria. Cuestiones como el bajo rendimiento de los estudiantes en algunos campos, el alto porcentaje de adultos sin posibilidades debido a la falta de competencias, la alta tasa de abandono escolar que conduce a la exclusión social, la baja participación ciudadana y la empleabilidad de los graduados: estas son las cuestiones que quería abordar nuestro Grupo.

El informe es insuficiente: hay temas clave que no aparecen o que son totalmente subestimados. Por ello, no podemos apoyar el informe.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). – Paní předsedající, já chci být ve svém projevu pozitivní. Osobně vnímám vzdělání každého občana Evropské unie jako důležité pro získání znalostí a odborných schopností. Díky tomu získává přístup na trh práce, a stává se tak konkurenceschopným. Vzdělání má však i jinou úlohu než čisté nabývání znalostí a dovedností. Jeho úkolem je rozvíjet u lidí odpovědnost, nezaujatost, kritické myšlení, zvědavost, ale také empatii. A to jsou dovednosti takzvané emocionální inteligence.

Díky spolupráci mezi členskými státy a mezi jednotlivými vzdělávacími institucemi mají mladí lidé možnost si rozšířit své obzory a získat jedinečné zkušenosti v zahraničí. Musíme tady říct otevřeně, že programy ERASMUS a ERASMUS+ jsou velkými úspěchy evropské integrace.

Dámy a pánové, evropské vzdělávací systémy mají však řadu nedostatků a musíme to připustit. A musíme se snažit adresovat právě ve strategickém rámci evropské spolupráce vzdělávání a odborné přípravy nápravu těchto chyb. Především se jedná o problémy způsobené zvýšenou mobilitou i současnou uprchlickou krizí. Tyto dva fenomény často mění strukturu vnitrostátních vzdělávacích systémů, které ale zároveň vykazují nedostatečnou flexibilitu. Jak reagujeme na uprchlickou krizi v rámci vzdělávacích programů?

Pokud se mnou souhlasíte, že nikoliv, musíme to změnit. Proto se domnívám, že vzdělávání je vedle svých hlavních funkcí i klíčem k integraci. Integraci, kterou Evropská unie tak nutně potřebuje ke snižování kulturních rozdílů, boji se segregací, radikalizací, extremismem a konečkonců i terorismem.

Victor Negrescu (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, cadrul strategic pentru cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației și formării profesionale trebuie reformat. Este nevoie de o nouă listă de priorități, care să țină seama de provocările generate de noile tehnologii și de rata ridicată a șomajului în rândul tinerilor. De aceea, mesajul acestui raport trebuie să fie clar: educația și formarea profesională nu sunt un cost, sunt o investiție; o investiție în viitor, în capitalul uman european, în productivitatea și competitivitatea Europei. De aceea subliniez patru elemente pentru realizarea acestui obiectiv: creșterea alocărilor bugetare pentru educația formală și non-formală, dar și pentru pregătirea cadrelor didactice, extinderea programului Erasmus pentru a include învățământul preuniversitar și profesional, dar și consolidarea aptitudinilor transversale, dezvoltarea competențelor digitale și includerea noilor tehnologii în programele educaționale sau combaterea abandonului școlar prin programe coerente și reducerea inegalităților de acces la capitalul cultural, prin introducerea unui sistem de tichete culturale pentru tineri.

Trebuie să construim o Uniune a educației, iar primul pas este să trecem peste diferențe și să utilizăm constructiv punctele forte ale fiecărui sistem educațional din statele membre.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, este informe, en mi opinión, no aporta nada o casi nada, solo palabras para maquillar una realidad, que es la de la idea de una educación mercantilizada. Se habla en este informe de mejorar la formación de los docentes y las docentes, cuando vemos que buena parte de nuestros investigadores e investigadoras se van al extranjero. Se habla de aplicar programas adaptados a migrantes, a clases bajas para fomentar la cohesión social, y al mismo tiempo, se obliga, como, por ejemplo, en mi país, en España, a recortar 8 000 millones en educación. Se habla de la importancia de reconocer los títulos, pero no se critica que hay titulaciones, como las de los técnicos sanitarios en España, que siguen sin homologarse.

Y, por último, me gustaría recordar que los problemas de la baja absorción laboral de los titulados no están tanto en un sistema educativo que es cada vez más rígido y orientado a la lógica de lo que se empeñan en llamar el mercado de trabajo, sino que son la escasa diversificación de la economía y la reducción pública en investigación y desarrollo en los principales problemas.

Es indudable que la orientación en la educación necesita un cambio profundo, tanto en Europa como en mi país, en España.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Henna Virkkunen (PPE). – Arvoisa puhemies, vaikka on niin, että koulutus on jokaisen jäsenvaltion omalla vastuulla ja kuuluu sen päätösvaltaan, on tärkeää, että Euroopan tasolla on kuitenkin asetettu tavoitteita koulutuksen laadulle ja määrälle ja että näitä tavoitteita vertaillaan ja että pyritään vaihtamaan parhaimpia käytäntöjä eri jäsenvaltioiden välillä ja ennen kaikkea varmistamaan se, että myös eurooppalaisten vapaa liikkuvuus voisi toteutua siten, että opiskelijavaihto on aktiivista ja myöhemmin opiskelijoilla olisi mahdollisuus hakeutua työhön myös muualle Eurooppaan kielitaitonsa ja kulttuurituntemuksensa ansiosta.

Kun haluamme rakentaa parempaa Eurooppaa, hyvä, laadukas koulutus on ilman muuta avain parempaan tulevaisuuteen jokaiselle ihmiselle itselleen ja koko Euroopalle. Erityisesti näinä taloudellisesti tiukkoina aikoina on huolehdittava siitä, että koulutuksen laadusta ei tingitä. Yksi seikka, millä kaiken parhaiten voidaan varmistaa koulutuksen hyvä laatu, ovat nimenomaan hyvät, pätevät opettajat. Toisin sanoen on olemassa yksi tapa varmistaa hyvä koulutus: varmistaa, että meillä on ammattitaitoiset, osaavat opettajat, joiden työolosuhteista pidetään huolta.

Kyse ei ole pelkästään palkkauksesta, vaikka palkkatasokin on tärkeä tekijä. On tärkeää, että opettajilla on hyvät työ-
kentelyolosuhteet ja heillä on myös mahdollisuus täydennyskoulutukseen ja oman osaamisensa kehittämiseen. Tiedämme, että jokaisen lapsen kannalta on erittäin tärkeää, että hänellä on innostunut, motivoitunut ja osaava opettaja, joka osaa kannustaa lapsia eteenpäin, ja sillä on vaikutus kymmenien, satojen ja tuhansien lasten tulevaisuuteen.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospođo predsjednice, nekad su učitelji bili jedan od glavnih stupova društva, cijenjeni zbog svoje važne uloge u prenošenju znanja s generacije na generaciju. Danas ih sustav javnog obrazovanja nažalost prečesto tretira kao obične birokratske ispostave i ubija im motivaciju i kreativnost.

Nekim je državama članicama, uključujući Hrvatsku, prioritet zadovoljiti formu pa i nauštrb kvalitete. Ne trebaju nas onda čuditi visoke stope nezaposlenosti među mladima jer ih obrazovni sustav oblikuje sukladno političkim odlukama, a ne potrebama modernog društva i tržišta rada.

Drago mi je da izjavitelj prepoznaje ove probleme i nudi određena kvalitetna rješenja. Vrlo je važno poboljšati položaj nastavnika unutar sustava i društva općenito te im olakšati stjecanje novih kompetencija, osobito u području komunikacijskih i informacijskih tehnologija, kako bi naša djeca u budućnosti imala najbolje obrazovanje i bila globalno konkurentna.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjednice, htio bih istaknuti tri područja iz ovoga Okvira za europsku suradnju u području obrazovanja i treninga. Naime, prvo je pitanje mobilnosti mladih i mogućnosti razmjene iskustava kroz razne programe. Razvio se svakako jedan odličan program, ali ističem još jedan – Euroodiseja – možda malo manje poznat, ali koji je polučio sjajne rezultate, gdje je mladim ljudima, zahvaljujući ulogama koje lokalne i regionalne zajednice imaju u Europskoj uniji, zaista omogućena razmjena iskustava i novih znanja, a time i bolje i lakše zapošljavanje u gospodarstvu.

Drugo što želim istaknuti je uloga regionalnih i lokalnih zajednica. Pogotovo lokalnih zajednica koje često upravljaju školama i obrazovnim ustanovama i tu je naravno važan kontakt koji one onda direktno imaju i s roditeljima.

I zadnja stvar koja će možda čak biti i najvažnija pitanje je obrazovanja djece migranata i migranata samih, ali pogotovo djece migranata, kako bismo i njih integrirali u društvo da ne bi za 20, 30 ili 40 godina imali još veće probleme nego što ih imamo danas.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, first let me remind Members that this area which we are talking about belongs to the area of the principle of subsidiarity. That means that even if we can identify common goals and objectives, we have to make coalitions with the Member States. It is not the European Commission that can direct the Member States in those fields. We can generate a critical mass for change, but that is a different dynamic than in other areas. That is why I think it is very important to identify the common problems and define shared responses. That is what we are doing, and in this process the ET2020 monitoring and assessment system is a very important, highly appreciated instrument: highly appreciated by the Member States, because they take part in the working groups, they accept the results of the working groups and they follow the recommendations from the ET2020 mechanism, and that is why I think it is a very important instrument in our hands to generate change in European education and training systems. There is a consensus that European education and training systems have two objectives: to produce employable people and to produce good citizens. Both of them are equally important. We have to change our education systems in order to equip young citizens with better knowledge to make them good citizens and democrats and, at the same time, employable citizens as well. That is why we have to concentrate on all those issues which were raised here, and we have to find a good solution for that.

We have tangible and concrete proposals and actions. We are dismantling barriers between countries via the Bologna process, in the framework of Erasmus+, by eTraining systems, by online language courses, by student-mobility programs, by the European qualification framework... these are all instruments that can make the life of the European citizens easier.

We also give help to the Member States in handling the refugee crisis, with online courses, with social integration programmes, with funding for NGOs, local communities and teachers and schools. We are taking part in the refugee integration process. Of course we have a lot of problems, but together with you and the Member States I am sure that we can address all those challenges in the future.

Zdzisław Krasnodębski, sprawozdawca. – Dziękuję bardzo kolegom za bardzo ciekawą dyskusję. Mam też jeszcze prośbę, zanim państwo podejmą ostatnią decyzję, jak głosować jutro. Proszę jeszcze raz przeczytać dokładnie to sprawozdanie, bo wydaje mi się, że niektóre zastrzeżenia, które państwo zgłosili, nie znajdują pokrycia w tym sprawozdaniu. Otóż na przykład o aspektach społecznych mówimy wyraźnie w motywie Q, gdzie się mówi właśnie o zubożeniu edukacyjnym, słabej integracji osób znajdujących się w trudnej sytuacji społecznej. To samo jest w motywie D i J oraz w ustępie 42 i 41. Zatem proszę zwrócić uwagę, że ten problem jest poruszany. Również mówimy o tym, że kształcenie jest także wartością samą w sobie. Na przykład już w motywie B mówi się, że kształcenie i szkolenie nie może być ukierunkowane wyłącznie na zaspokojenie potrzeb rynku, ale powinno stanowić wartość samą w sobie. No i wreszcie te same wątki pojawiają się w motywie C i w ustępach 46, 47, 48. Proszę bardzo przeczytać to sprawozdanie troszeczkę uważniej.

Pojawia się tu trzeci punkt krytyki. O tym mówił już pan komisarz. Niektórzy mówią, że za dużo przypisujemy kompetencji Komisji Europejskiej. Z drugiej strony, kolega Maragall, który jest przecież współautorem tego sprawozdania jako kontrsprawozdawca, mówi, że nie ma tutaj dodanych wartości europejskich. Któraś pani mówiła, że to za mało ambitnie europejskie. No jednak taka jest sytuacja prawna. To jest dziedzina edukacji, nieobjęta przez traktaty europejskie. I właśnie to ET 2020 wydaje się doskonałym przykładem współpracy, w której jest jednocześnie wymiar europejski, dobrowolna, bardzo elastyczna współpraca państw członkowskich, szanująca autonomię państw członkowskich. I w zasadzie powinniśmy ten rodzaj współpracy doceniać i popierać.

President. — The debate is closed.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), raštu. – Europos Sąjunga ieško sprendimų ir būdų, kaip kovoti su nedarbu, ypač su jaunimo nedarbu. Šią problemą būtų galima sumažinti, atsižvelgus į pristatytas akademines bendruomenės ataskaitas. Jose pastebima, kad dažnai rinkai paruošiami abiturientai neatitinka darbdavių lūkesčių ir kvalifikacijos reikalavimų, todėl jie susiduria su problemomis arba negali užimti net ir laisvų darbo vietų.

Turėtume atkreipti dėmesį, kad mokymo sąlygos ir kokybė neretai prastėja, tai lemia universitetų programų išsiskaidymas bei skiriamas pernelyg didelis dėmesys kompetencijai siauroje žinių srityje.

Darbdaviai skundžiasi absolventų įgūdžiais ir kritiškai vertina naują laipsnių struktūrą bei pažymi, kad studijų bakalauro laipsniui įgyti trūkė netinkama darbo rinkos poreikiams užtikrinti. Taip pat specialistų įsidarbinimui problemą sukelia nepakankamas bakalauro laipsnio profesinės kvalifikacijos pripažinimas ir milžiniškas taisyklių skaičiaus taikymas sprendimui.

Taigi, turime raginti Komisiją imtis visų būtinų priemonių ir teikti siūlymus, kurie padėtų akademinei bendruomenei tobulėti ir paruošti darbdaviams reikiamus specialistus. Taip abiturientai galėtų lengviau rasti darbą, o darbdaviai gautų norimos kvalifikacijos darbuotoją. Jau turintiems reikiamą kvalifikaciją reikėtų užtikrinti, kad profesinės kvalifikacijos pripažinimas vyktų sklandžiai bei neužimtų daug laiko.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), in writing. – Education and training are important in helping people to acquire the knowledge and professional skills they need to become competitive and innovative employees. Moreover, they could play important role in nurturing open-minded, empathic, inquiring human beings and responsible citizens with a strong sense of identity, a deep knowledge of their culture and heritage. We should welcome the fact that the Paris Declaration was reflected in the Joint Report and that the recalibration of ET2020 has been done by putting on an equal footing employability goals and the promotion of social cohesion, equality, non-discrimination and civic competences. ET2020 cooperation, while respecting the competence of Member States, should complement national actions and support Member States in their efforts to develop education and training systems. I welcome the ET 2020 stocktaking exercise. The ET 2020's four strategic objectives and current benchmarks remain valid as they were formulated in a comprehensive and forward-looking manner in the ET 2020 Council conclusions of 2009, providing a solid basis for ET 2020 activities up to 2020. However, the policy focus needs to be recalibrated to include both the pressing economic and employment challenges and the role of education in promoting equity and inclusion and in imparting common European values, intercultural competences and active citizenship.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Negli ultimi dieci anni il numero di persone che hanno avuto accesso a un'istruzione formale ha fatto registrare un sensibile incremento. Ma l'Europa è bloccata a spaventosi livelli di disoccupazione giovanile, anche tra laureati. È necessario aumentare l'efficienza dei sistemi di istruzione e formazione e i livelli generali di abilità e competenza, rafforzando il collegamento tra il mondo del lavoro a quello dell'istruzione e garantendo comunicazione efficace e sviluppo di partenariati tra i settori pertinenti di intervento e i sotto-settori dell'istruzione e della formazione. L'istruzione, così come la formazione, rappresenta la *condicio sine qua non* per una reale crescita personale e collettiva.

Un ulteriore punto della relazione sul quale vorrei porre l'accento riguarda il sostegno a favore degli educatori, individuato come uno dei nuovi settori prioritari di ET2020. La qualità della preparazione degli insegnanti e i programmi di sviluppo professionale permanente sono, purtroppo, ancora in ritardo rispetto all'aumento repentino della molteplicità e della complessità delle competenze indispensabili all'insegnamento. Sarebbe opportuno, anche alla luce dell'accelerazione ascrivibile alla mobilità intra-europea e alla persistente crisi dei rifugiati, prestare particolare attenzione alle esigenze delle varie tipologie di studente, appartenente a minoranze etniche o religiose, provenienti da famiglie a basso reddito e da immigrati.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Uplynulá dekáda znamenala v celej Európskej únii výrazný nárast počtu vysokoškolsky vzdelaných ľudí. Súčasne s tým sa počet nezamestnaných zvyšoval najviac práve v prípade mladých vysokoškolákov. Masovosť vysokoškolského vzdelávania išla, bohužiaľ, v mnohých prípadoch na úkor jeho kvality. Jasným merítkom sú reakcie zamestnávateľov. Hovoria o nepostačujúcej úrovni vedomostí a zručností absolventov univerzít. Upozorňujú na významné rozdiely medzi ich potrebami a odbornou prípravou na vysokých školách. Nesúladi medzi vzdelávaním a požiadavkami praxe má negatívny vplyv na uplatniteľnosť a schopnosť mladých ľudí konkurovať na trhu práce. Vyhnúť sa musíme aj umelému vynucovaniu si vysokoškolského vzdelania. Existuje veľké množstvo profesií, pri ktorých je podmienka získania diplomu skutočne navyše. Stojí nás to pritom nemalé peniaze z verejných zdrojov. Úspechom v rámci európskej spolupráce medzi vysokými školami je výmenný program Erasmus. Ako problematická sa však niekedy ukazuje motivácia študentov ísť na zahraničný výmenný pobyt. Dôkazom je aj neúmerne vysoká obľúbenosť niektorých južných krajín.

Ivana Maletić (PPE), *napisan*. – Obrazovanie i osposobljavanje imaju važnu ulogu u razvoju građanskih vrlina i jačanju demokratskih načela na kojima se temelji EU i ne bi trebali biti usmjereni samo na zadovoljavanje potreba tržišta rada. Povećanjem mogućnosti pristupa cjeloživotnom učenju mogu se otvoriti nove mogućnosti za niskokvalificirane i nezaposlene, osobe s posebnim potrebama, starije i migrante. Budući da se sve države članice ne suočavaju s istom razinom problema, predložene preporuke za obrazovanje i osposobljavanje trebale bi biti fleksibilne i uzeti u obzir nacionalne, ekonomske, socijalne i druge faktore, s ciljem poboljšanja stanja u cijelom EU-u.

Države članice moraju poboljšati veze između visokoškolskog obrazovanja i strukovnog obrazovanja i osposobljavanja, istraživačkih institucija i gospodarskog sektora, zajamčiti uključivanje socijalnih partnera i civilnog društva, kako bi pojačale učinak programa ET 2020. i važnost sustava učenja za povećanje inovativnog kapaciteta Europe. Potrebno je bolje iskoristiti potencijale digitalizacije, informacijskih i komunikacijskih tehnologija kako bi se poboljšala kvaliteta i dostupnost učenja i u tom smislu treba poticati razmjenu najboljih praksi i pojačanu prekograničnu suradnju. Obrazovanjem i osposobljavanjem u Europi treba se doprinijeti strategijama i inicijativama EU-a, strategiji Europa 2020., inicijativi za jedinstveno digitalno tržište, Europskom programu sigurnosti i planu ulaganja za Europu, stoga sam podržala ovo izvješće.

Момчил Неков (S&D), *в писмена форма*. – Приветствам приемането на доклада относно проследяването на стратегическата рамка за европейско сътрудничество в областта на образованието и обучението („Образование и обучение 2020“). Смятам, че той правилно поставя фокус върху ключовата роля на учителя в образователния процес и на необходимостта от предприемане на мерки за повишаване на привлекателността и статуса на учителската професия. Живеем в епоха, в която постоянно нарастващата нужда от нови умения вследствие на променящите се нужди на пазара на труда изисква повече от всякога инвестиции в програми за продължаващо професионално развитие на учителите.

Споделям виждането, че за да модернизираме образованието са нужни не само технологични, но и педагогически иновации. На всички ни е повече от ясно, че учебните заведения имат крещяща нужда от адекватно оборудване. Освен на инвестициите в инфраструктура, трябва да обърнем внимание и на необходимостта от повишаване на цифровите умения на преподавателите, за които дигиталната революция също е голямо предизвикателство. Нашите учители трябва не само да могат да си служат с новите технологии в класната стая, но и да умеят да ги преподават.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. – Europe needs skills and strategic thinking more than ever. Our future, but also our present, belongs to those with the right capabilities, to the innovation- and knowledge-based industries. It is therefore crucial to have an overarching EU-wide strategic framework for cooperation in education and training.

The Education and Training 2010 work programme provided a good basis that ET2020 can continue to build on. I particularly support the inclusive model, focused on exchanges of best practice, mutual learning, gathering and dissemination of information and evidence of what works, as well as advice and support for policy reforms. The effective application of this strategy would not only allow us to devise policies advancing the social and professional fulfilment of all citizens, but also to progress further towards sustainable economic prosperity and employability.

Fulfilling the four key objectives of ET2020 is instrumental in achieving this vision we have set ourselves. As a Member of the European Parliament working towards enhancing Europe's innovation and entrepreneurial potential, I am glad to see that ET2020 has as one of its key aims enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training. We must indeed boost creativity and innovation, which are crucial for enterprise development and to Europe's ability to compete internationally.

Laurențiu Rebegea (ENF), *în scris*. – Consider că Europa are prea puțină grijă de resursele de care dispune deja în propria curte. Există o preocupare excesivă și ostentativă pentru integrarea școlară imediată a copiilor refugiaților. Desigur, copiii nu au nicio vină și grija față de copii trebuie să fie deasupra oricăror considerații politice. Problema е că elevii din statele membre mai sărace nu sunt încurajați în aceeași măsură să се интегрире в системата на образованиета в западната Европа.

Cu ce sunt mai преjos elevii din statele europene mai sărace față de имигранти? De ce се дorește с orice претъ introductione, в пространството на Европа, на някои култури, които нарушават еднородността на ЕС? Европа трябва да си създаде, в първия ред, професори и учители, а не да се занимава с въвеждане в образователния процес, веднага след като те са влезли в образователната система.

Sunt multe tratate vechi care trebuie reformate și rediscutate. Din cauza acestor tratate, necorespunzătoare cu realitatea europeană, не афлăm с тоții într-un impas istoric al Uniunii. Sunt surprinsi de faptul că проблематиката на имигрантите се regăsește в toate subiectele discutate și votate în plen, în timp ce acele acorduri care au dus de fapt la această криза са постоянно пренебрегвани или игнорирани от Европейския парламент.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Ugyan az oktatáspolitikai tagállami kompetencia, az EU mégis aktív szerepet játszik az európai oktatási és képzési rendszerek fejlesztésében, támogatva a tagállamokat e téren például az Oktatás és képzés 2020 (ET2020) program keretében. Az ET2020 keretprogram, illetve az oktatás és képzés területére irányuló további bizottsági célkitűzések alapján a tagállami kormányok alapvetően azt gondolhatnánk, hogy mind érdekelt egy modern oktatási és képzési rendszer létrehozásában. Sajnos azonban nem minden tagállam esetében van ez így. Magyarországon hónapok óta mindhiába követelik az Orbán-kormánytól a pedagógus-szakszervezetek, a tanár- és diáktársadalom, valamint a szülők a bizonyítottan káros központosított oktatási rendszer átalakítását. A kormány politikai okokból nem hajlandó a szakemberekkel, érintettekkel konzultálni.

Ebből az következik, hogy a magyar kormány szándékosan hozott létre egy olyan oktatási rendszert, amely kizárja a független oktatási szakértőket, szegregált iskolákat tart fenn és tömegével ontja a korai iskolaelhagyókat. Ezért is hívom fel a Bizottság figyelmét arra, hogy szükséges lehet megvizsgálni például Magyarországon az ET2020, illetve más oktatási és képzési irányuló európai program keretében kapott pénzeszközök felhasználását, valamint azok hatékonyságát.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Strateški okvir ET 2020 smo si zastavili z namenom reševanja izzivov v sistemih izobraževanja in usposabljanja. Vendar se na tem področju še vedno soočamo z velikimi težavami.

Ko govorimo o kakovosti in dostopnosti izobraževanja, je na evropski in nacionalnih ravneh potrebno sprejeti ambicioznejše, bolj usklajene in tudi bolj učinkovite ukrepe.

Menim, da je potrebna posodobitev sistemov izobraževanja. Že v zgodnje izobraževanje moramo vključiti učenje splošnih osnovnih spretnosti, digitalne pismenosti, matematike, tujih jezikov, saj se bodo mladi s pridobitvijo širokega nabora znanj in veščin lažje prilagodili spreminjajočemu trgu dela.

Poudariti želim tudi pomembno vlogo programov za mobilnost, kot je Erasmus+, ki spodbujajo razvoj spretnosti in kompetenc mladih, hkrati pa jim pomagajo, da postanejo bolj samostojni, odgovorni in iznajdljivi.

Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), *na piśmie*. – W czasach wysokiej stopy bezrobocia młodzieży, dotyczącej również absolwentów uczelni wyższych, za kluczową uznaję potrzebę przeglądu strategicznych ram europejskiej współpracy w dziedzinie kształcenia i szkolenia (ET 2020) w celu optymalizacji ich skuteczności. Dokonana przez Komisję Europejską w 2014 roku ewaluacja przedstawiła szereg zaleceń KE i Rady nakierowanych na krytyczną analizę złożonego podłoża dla funkcjonowania i zarządzania ET 2020. Podobnie w dyskutowanym dzisiaj sprawozdaniu PE nakreślono szereg rekomendacji i politycznych priorytetów, by wymienić tylko potrzeby wielopoziomowej koordynacji i zarządzania ET 2020, podniesienia poziomu jakości kształcenia i szkoleń oraz odpowiedzi na wyzwania, z jakimi borykają się europejskie systemy kształcenia w związku z przepływami migracyjnymi wewnątrz Europy i spoza niej. W obliczu wzrastającej w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu liczby osób podejmujących kształcenie formalne, w szczególności w odniesieniu do uczestnictwa w kształceniu wyższym, przy jednocześnie wzrastających nierównościach w systemach kształcenia, za niezwykle ważną uznaję potrzebę krytycznej ewaluacji strategicznych ram kształcenia i szkolenia oraz dążenia do osiągnięcia poziomów odniesienia w kategoriach wykształcenia, którym powinno jednak towarzyszyć również zdecydowane dążenie do poprawy jakości kształcenia na wszystkich poziomach.

23. Ausführungen von einer Minute zu Fragen von politischer Bedeutung

President. — The next item is the one-minute speeches on matters of political importance (Rule 163).

Daniel Buda (PPE). – Doamnă președintă, atrag atenția asupra unei situații inacceptabile din Marea Britanie, unde doi copii aparținând familiei Barbu, cetățeni români, au fost luați de la părinții lor printr-o decizie a unei instanțe pe care nu o comentăm. Dar, prin încălcarea Convenției cu privire la drepturile copilului, aceștia au fost dați spre adopție unei familii compuse din persoane de același sex, în condițiile în care, în România, nu ar fi fost posibil acest lucru. S-a încălcat, astfel, articolul 20 din Convenție, unde se arată în mod expres faptul că, în alegerea unei soluții de protejare a copilului, se va ține seama de originea sa etnică, religioasă, culturală și lingvistică, dar și articolul 21, unde se arată clar că adopția internațională este posibilă doar dacă, în țara de origine, nu poate fi încredințat spre plasament familial sau spre adopție. Ori, în România era și este posibil acest lucru.

Statul britanic trebuie să înțeleagă că drepturile copilului nu pot fi călcate în picioare, așa cum a făcut cu copiii familiei Barbu, fără să suporte consecințele.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η Κύπρος θρηνεί εδώ και τέσσερις μέρες. Μία πύρινη λαίλαπα, ένας εφιάλτης, κατέκαψε τεράστια έκταση δασικής γης και γεωργικές καλλιέργειες. Λόγω των πυρκαγιών, δύο θαρραλέοι δασοφυλάκες σκοτώθηκαν εν ώρα καθήκοντος και άλλοι έξι είναι σοβαρά τραυματισμένοι. Για να κατανοήσει κάποιος την καταστροφή αυτή για την Κύπρο, συγκρίνεται σε έκταση με την έκταση που κατέκαψε η Τουρκία σε δασική γη το 1974, κατά την τουρκική εισβολή. Είναι περίπου το 10% του δασικού μας πλούτου! Το ανάλογο για τη Γερμανία θα ήταν, σε δασική έκταση, 1.140.000 εκτάρια.

Είναι αδύνατο λοιπόν να επωμιστεί ένα μικρό κράτος όλο αυτό το οικονομικό κόστος. Υπάρχουν μηχανισμοί στήριξης, αλλά καλούμε την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να συνδράμει ένα μικρό κράτος, όπως την Κύπρο, το οποίο μόλις πριν ένα μήνα βγήκε από τον μηχανισμό στήριξης.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, πέρασαν ήδη πέντε χρόνια εφαρμογής του μνημονίου στην Ελλάδα. Πέντε πέτρινα μνημονιακά χρόνια, που διέλυσαν τη χώρα. Πέντε χρόνια κοινωνικού Αρμαγεδδώνα, που γέμισαν την Ελλάδα με στρατιές ανέργων και φτωχών. Με το μνημόνιο τελικά αυξάνεται το δημόσιο χρέος ως ποσοστό του ΑΕΠ. Από το 123% του ΑΕΠ το 2010 θα φτάσει στο 200% στα τέλη του τρίτου μνημονίου το 2018, σύμφωνα με το ίδιο το ΔΝΤ. Ταυτόχρονα, η τρόικα μείωσε τους μισθούς και τις συντάξεις, επέβαλε φορομνημονιακό ρεσάλτο στις τσέπες και στις περιουσίες του ελληνικού λαού και υποθήκευσε τη δημόσια περιουσία για 99 χρόνια, δρομολογώντας το ξεπούλημά της αντί πινακίου φακής. Και σαν να μην έφταναν αυτά, τώρα η τρόικα επιχειρεί να διαλύσει τις εργασιακές σχέσεις, δημιουργώντας μια σύγχρονη εργασιακή ζούγκλα.

Όμως ο ελληνικός λαός δεν πρόκειται άλλο να ανεχτεί την τρόικα και τους δανειστές και σύντομα θα τους πετάξει έξω από την πατρίδα μας, για να ξαναπάρουμε πίσω την Ελλάδα. Ο αγώνας συνεχίζεται.

Jozo Radoš (ALDE). – Gospodo predsjednice, pred nama su i godine pojačane ovisnosti o uvozu plina. Zato je važna strategija o ukapljenom prirodnom plinu i skladištima plina koja je na dnevnom redu Europskog parlamenta. I jedno i drugo, i ukapljeni plin i skladišta plina omogućit će sigurnu opskrbu plinom i različitost te opskrbe koja će onda dovesti do toga da ćemo imati veći utjecaj na tržište, što onda treba uzrokovati i sniženje cijena. Time bi se postiglo to da se teška fosilna goriva mogu zamijeniti s ukapljenim prirodnim plinom, što naravno treba dovesti do pozitivnog učinka na okoliš.

Dakle, višestruke su prednosti korištenja ukapljenog prirodnog plina i stoga očekujem skoro usvajanje strategije i jednako tako stvaranje zajedničke energetske unije, koja će dovesti, naravno, do zajedničke europske politike o korištenju ukapljenog prirodnog plina.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL). – A Uachtaráin, níl aon cheist ann ach go bhfuil conspóid ann maidir le tuirbíní gaoithe ar fud na hÉireann. Tá buarthaí agus ceisteanna ann faoin bhfothrom agus faoin mbagairt don fhiadhúlra, faoi chúram sláinte agus faoin gcuma atá orthu maidir lenár dtírdhreach álainn.

Cé go dtacaíonn Sinn Féin go huile agus go hiomlán leis an úsáid is mó a bhaint as foinsí fuinnimh nua agus gan a bheith ag brath ar bhreoslaí iontaise, ní mór dúinn a chinntiú go bhfuil aon fhorbairt a dhéantar ar thionscal an fhuinnimh, cosúil le muilte gaoithe, déanta i gcomhpháirtíocht le pobail áitiúla. Caithfear próiseas trédhearcach agus comhairliúchán oscailte poiblí a chur mar thosaíocht ar gach céim d'aon fhorbairt bhonneagair – go háirithe agus sinn ag caint ar ár dtimpeallacht.

Ní tharlaíonn sé seo, is baolach, agus tá sé sin feicthe agam féin i mo thoghcheantar féin mar shampla nuair a thug Comhairle Chontae Chorcaí cead pleanála do thuirbíní gaoithe i gceantar go bhfuil aitheantas faoi leith tugtha dó mar limistéar caomhantais speisialta. Níl sé seo sásúil in aon slí. Ba chóir úinéireacht a roinnt, ar a laghad leis an bpobal, agus gurb é an pobal áitiúil atá ag baint brabúis agus tairbhe fóna as an saghas seo forbairtí. Agus níos tábhachtaí fós, go bhfuil an chumhacht ag an bpobal a bheith bainteach le haon phleanáil.

Jordi Sebastià (Verts/ALE). – Señora Presidenta, hace unas semanas celebramos en este mismo Parlamento unas jornadas cruciales para dos de las formaciones que yo represento aquí: la Chunta Aragonesista y el Partido Castellano. Cruciales, porque trataban de un tema fundamental para la supervivencia de sus territorios: la despoblación, la terrible despoblación que ha hecho perder al medio rural castellano el 75 % de su población en cien años o que ha provocado que muchas comarcas de Aragón tengan una densidad de población inferior a tres habitantes por kilómetro cuadrado, lo que según los estándares internacionales equivale a un desierto.

¿Es que Castilla y Aragón no merecen futuro? ¿Es que no son Europa?

El Estado español ha recibido más de 300 000 millones de euros para fondos de desarrollo rural y de cohesión, y no han servido para nada, se ha despreocupado de su deber y ha condenado a Castilla y Aragón a una sangría permanente de sus gentes, sin esperanza ni proyecto de vida en su tierra.

Pido a la Comisión que asuma este problema, que refuerce y vigile el uso de esos fondos, y que lo haga rápido, antes de que buena parte de Europa se convierta en un territorio fantasma.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Będę mówił w sprawie referendum, które odbędzie się jutro w Wielkiej Brytanii. Z punktu widzenia Polski byłoby oczywiście niedobrze, gdyby Wielka Brytania wyszła z Unii, bo tylko razem z Wielką Brytanią możemy blokować co głębsze pomysły państw osi, czyli Niemiec, Paryża i Berlina. Natomiast doskonale rozumiem, że Brytyjczycy będą kierowali się własnym interesem, a ponieważ dla Wielkiej Brytanii bezdyskusyjnie lepiej jest wyjść spod okupacji Unii Europejskiej, to nie zmartwię się, jeżeli oni to zrobią, bo ich interes jest ważniejszy niż mój interes. A więc to, że Polska nadal jest w Unii Europejskiej, nie znaczy, że inni też muszą to jarzmo dalej znosić.

A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska powinna zostać jak najszybciej zniszczona.

Michaela Šojdřová (PPE). – Madam President, today I will be speaking about the British referendum, so I will speak in English. Tomorrow, the United Kingdom is going to decide about itself, not about the European Union. But if somebody leaves a community, it has some impact. That impact will of course be economic, but also political. Together, we are bigger, stronger and more stable. I agree that that the European Union has to be more effective and more flexible. The four British suggestions for reforming the EU agreed on by the European Council represent steps in the right direction. So if the United Kingdom remains inside our Union, I look forward to cooperation on shaping a better Europe. Before 1989, in my country, people were suffering and dreaming to be free and to be part of free society under the European Union.

Let us recall that we have a new example of sacrifice. Today, Jo Cox, the victim of the hate campaign of Brexit, would have had her 42nd birthday. So, along with our respected Czech theologian Professor Tomáš Halík, let me call on citizens of Britain to 'opt boldly to reject the temptation to betray Europe, our common homeland'.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D). – Señora Presidenta, quiero denunciar ante este Pleno la situación de aislamiento en las comunicaciones ferroviarias que vive mi provincia y el suroeste de mi región, Andalucía. En mi provincia, en Granada, en el sur de España, desde el 7 de abril del pasado año —15 meses— se cerraron las conexiones, todas las conexiones ferroviarias por las obras de la alta velocidad a Granada. Previsto inicialmente para seis meses, continúa cerrado sin fecha por parte del Gobierno español. Les hablo de un proyecto financiado con fondos europeos, cuyos tramos fueron modificados por el Gobierno del Partido Popular en estos cuatro años. Tras los cambios de los proyectos, pasando de una conexión con las características de la alta velocidad a una conexión convencional, al cierre de las conexiones durante quince meses y a quedarnos fuera del corredor mediterráneo.

Esta situación ha sido provocada en estos cuatro años del Partido Popular en España, con la inestimable colaboración del alcalde de Granada. El daño que está causando a los ciudadanos y a los sectores económicos granadinos y andaluces es absolutamente incalculable. Este hecho lo vamos a denunciar hoy aquí, en el Pleno, pero también ante la Comisión Europea, porque estamos hablando de fondos europeos.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospodo predsjednice, veliki broj građana Europske unije živi od turizma. Imamo ogroman broj malih i srednjih poduzeća koja posluju na području turizma. Još veći broj građana koristi turističke usluge. I tu dolazimo do problema. U korištenju turističkih usluga nemamo zajedničke, jedinstvene standarde u Europskoj uniji. Veliki problem je na primjer standardizacija hotelske turističke usluge ili usluge u auto-kampovima. Imamo zajedničku oznaku od 2, 3, 4 i 5 zvjezdica kvalitete, ali nemamo istu kvalitetu u državama članicama. Gotovo da je pravilo da je u starim zemljama članicama, u osnivačicama, kvaliteta hotelskog smještaja niža nego u novim zemljama članicama, a imamo iste zvjezdice za hotelsku uslugu. To sigurno nije dobro, jer imamo jedinstveno tržište. To je na neki način pomalo i prevara potrošača, odnosno korisnika usluge. U tom kontekstu očekujem da će turizam, i da će povjerenica zadužena za turizam, zaista izaći s prijedlogom kako standardizirati turističke usluge u Europskoj uniji.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL). – Paní předsedající, věřím, že britský lid zítra rozhodne v souladu se svým nejlepším vědomím a svědomím, ale musím říct, že jsem zklamaná, jak kampaň ve Velké Británii probíhala. Docházelo ke lžím, manipulacím a bohužel také k násilí. Nejvíce mě ovšem zarazil výrok Nigela Farage, který označil pracovníky z východní Evropy za méně schopné naučit se anglicky, pochopit obecné právo a cítit sounáležitost s Británií.

Lidé ze střední a východní Evropy nejsou žádný necivilizovaný domorodý kmen. Jsou to lidé, kteří ve Velké Británii staví domy, hlídají děti, pracují v průmyslu a službách. Migrace z těchto zemí Británii ekonomicky pomáhá a jen blázen by to popíral. Jejich děti sní, že budou hrát fotbal jako Rooney, či zpívat jako Adele. Vážený pane Faragi, přestaňte urážet ty, kteří roky odvádí do britského systému daně a dělají poctivou práci.

Arne Lietz (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin! Als Mitglied der Israel-Delegation des Europäischen Parlaments verfolge ich mit großer Sorge die Maßnahmen der israelischen Regierung, die sich gegen einen Teil der Zivilgesellschaft im eigenen Land richten. Mit einem sogenannten Transparenzgesetz will die Regierung NGOs – die Nichtregierungsorganisationen – in ihrer Arbeit einschränken. Kritisch ist hierbei die klare Ausrichtung auf einen Teil der Zivilgesellschaft im Land. So sind Menschenrechtsorganisationen überproportional von diesem Gesetz betroffen, aber auch ein Teil der deutschen politischen Stiftungen würde durch übermäßige Ausweis- und Berichtspflichten behindert. Im Ergebnis würde die Pluralität im Land in Gefahr geraten.

Zusammen mit anderen Europaabgeordneten habe ich mich bereits mit einem Brief an die israelische Regierung gewandt, um meine Bedenken mitzuteilen. Ein weiteres Beispiel für den zunehmenden Druck auf die israelische Zivilgesellschaft ist der Gerichtsprozess gegen die NGO „Breaking the Silence“. Diese Organisation veröffentlicht anonymisierte Aussagen von Armeeingehörigen über ihren Einsatz in den palästinensischen Gebieten. Sollte sich der israelische Staatsanwalt mit seiner Forderung durchsetzen, dass die Organisation die Identität ihrer Quellen offenlegen muss, so würde diese Arbeit von „Breaking the Silence“ de facto unmöglich gemacht.

Die Europäische Union setzt sich im Dialog mit Israel dafür ein, dass die dortigen Zivilgesellschaften frei von unnötigen Restriktionen agieren müssen, damit Israel auch in Zukunft eine Vorreiterrolle für Pluralität und Demokratie im Nahen Osten spielen wird.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, quiero traer aquí la lucha de los trabajadores y trabajadoras de las empresas Lauki y Dulciora de Valladolid, que este Parlamento reconozca a los que luchan por sus derechos, por su trabajo y por su dignidad frente a las grandes multinacionales.

Lauki y Dulciora son dos empresas propiedad de las compañías Lactalis y Mondelez (antigua Kraft), empresas que amenazan con deslocalizar su producción pese a la rentabilidad de sus operaciones con el único fin de aumentar sus beneficios y su control sobre el mercado. Con estos cierres están en riesgo industrias ligadas al territorio: naves, marcas y conocimiento acumulados durante años de producción.

No saldremos de la crisis sin apoyar nuestro tejido industrial.

Pido desde aquí a las administraciones públicas, empezando por la Unión Europea, que faciliten la continuidad de la producción de Lauki y Dulciora más allá de los intereses de sus actuales propietarios, y para que impidan también despidos masivos en empresas rentables como los facilitados por la reforma laboral del Partido Popular, especialmente cuando se pone en riesgo toda una economía regional. Lauki y Dulciora no se cierran.

Olga Sehnalová (S&D). – Paní předsedající, v poslední době jsem obdržela od autodopravců z České republiky několik rozhořčených reakcí na opatření, která se zdůvodněním nastavení rovných pravidel v oblasti silniční nákladní dopravy zavádí některé členské státy, například Německo či Francie, a další země o jejich zavedení uvažují.

Nastavení rovných pravidel nesmí znamenat a vést ve svém důsledku k roztržtění vnitřního trhu na dvacet osm různých národních úprav doprovázených naprosto nepřiměřenou administrativní zátěží dopadající zejména na malé a střední podniky. Využívám tedy této příležitosti, abych tlumočila jejich obavy, a současně vyzývám Komisy k reakci, která vyjasní pravidla pro provozování mezinárodní silniční dopravy, a k tomu, aby zabránila pokračující fragmentaci vnitřního trhu.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, en la lucha contra el cambio climático debemos estar todos en el mismo barco y avanzando en la misma dirección. Debemos ir hacia un modelo energético libre de CO₂ y de contaminación, pero la transición debe hacerse de manera ordenada, inteligente y sobre todo, respetando los derechos humanos.

La Unión Europea pretende acabar con las ayudas del carbón europeo, argumentando que es más caro que el proveniente del exterior. Se le olvida valorar el coste que el carbón importado tiene respecto al trabajo esclavo, el trabajo infantil, el coste ecológico del transporte hasta Europa y el riesgo que genera de dependencia energética, así como el intervencionismo por parte de los países que subvencionan la extracción y el coste socioeconómico de dejar a miles de familias afectadas por la pérdida de empleos directos e indirectos, sin su plan adecuado de reestructuración.

Exijo a la Comisión Europea que ponga énfasis en los proyectos de investigación de captura y almacenamiento de CO₂ y que elabore un plan de reestructuración laboral adecuado para el sector del carbón. También exigimos a nuestro Gobierno que respete los acuerdos que ha firmado hasta 2018 y que participe en la propuesta de futuros programas de apoyo más allá de esa fecha. Tenemos que dedicarnos a pensar más en las personas y en los trabajadores y dejar de favorecer intereses privados y negocios privados.

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, una recente ricerca svolta dal Garante dell'infanzia e dell'adolescenza della Regione Campania ha rilevato oltre duecento casi di maltrattamenti e violenza su minori. La relazione di accompagnamento alla ricerca riporta che ci sono intere zone, in quartieri molto critici, in cui l'abuso sessuale e l'incesto sono elevati a normalità. Tutti i mezzi di informazione hanno parlato di questa ricerca, a volte anche a sproposito. Non è certo un fenomeno di costume, ma sono storie di povertà, isolamento, degrado ed esclusione sociale. Si tratta di quartieri disperatamente abbandonati a loro stessi, dove la malavita gestisce il territorio e le attività illecite sono le uniche fonti di guadagno. Ho voluto prendere la parola questa sera perché le istituzioni tutte hanno il dovere di accendere i riflettori su questo fenomeno orribile e vergognoso, perché non sia solo oggetto di studi e approfondimenti, ma soprattutto oggetto di politiche di prevenzione e di contrasto. Dobbiamo fare di più e agire in modo più efficiente ed efficace per aiutare i cittadini più vulnerabili. Occorre che la Commissione lavori in maggiore raccordo con gli Stati membri per mettere in campo strumenti più efficaci per garantire crescita e lavoro, per tutelare i soggetti che hanno maggiormente bisogno di protezione e per rafforzare il sistema di garanzia dei diritti dei minori.

Victor Negrescu (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, Brexit, un cuvânt scurt care, din păcate, poate suna interesant pentru cei care nu vor să intre în detalii. Dar trebuie să înțelegem că o eventuală decizie de ieșire din Uniunea Europeană nu mai oferă posibilitatea unei căi de întors pentru Marea Britanie. Îi invit, astfel, pe cetățenii britanici de origine română să înțeleagă importanța acestui vot și să susțină rămânerea în Uniunea Europeană, pentru ca țara lor de adopție să rămână în continuare aproape de țara lor de origine, într-o Europă unită.

De asemenea, îi rog pe cei peste 150 000 de români, care trăiesc și lucrează legal în Regatul Unit, să își invite prietenii și rudele să-i susțină pe britanicii care vor să rămână în Uniunea Europeană. De votul celor apropiați lor depinde dreptul la muncă, dreptul la taxe reduse de școlarizare, dreptul la creditare, dreptul la beneficii sociale sau chiar la recunoașterea vechimii în muncă în Europa, dar și Marea Britanie.

Prin participarea lor activă, mâine pot combate mesajele extremiste împotriva mobilității forței de muncă în Uniunea Europeană, pot arăta că cetățenii români acționează civic, conform principiilor democratice și, mai ales, pot demonstra, încă o dată, că românii care trăiesc în Marea Britanie le pasă de soarta acestei țări și și-o doresc puternică, în Uniunea Europeană, alături de România.

Puhemies. — Kohdan käsittely on päättynyt.

24. Tagesordnung der nächsten Sitzung: siehe Protokoll

25. Schluss der Sitzung

(Istunto päättyi klo 22.05)

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Legende der verwendeten Zeichen

*	Konsultationsverfahren
***	Zustimmungsverfahren
***I	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, erste Lesung
***II	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, zweite Lesung
***III	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, dritte Lesung

(Das angegebene Verfahren entspricht der von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Rechtsgrundlage.)

Abkürzungen der Ausschüsse

AFET	Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
DEVE	Entwicklungsausschuss
INTA	Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
BUDG	Haushaltsausschuss
CONT	Haushaltskontrollausschuss
ECON	Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Währung
EMPL	Ausschuss für Beschäftigung und soziale Angelegenheiten
ENVI	Ausschuss für Umweltfragen, öffentliche Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit
ITRE	Ausschuss für Industrie, Forschung und Energie
IMCO	Ausschuss für Binnenmarkt und Verbraucherschutz
TRAN	Ausschuss für Verkehr und Fremdenverkehr
REGI	Ausschuss für regionale Entwicklung
AGRI	Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und ländliche Entwicklung
PECH	Fischereiausschuss
CULT	Ausschuss für Kultur und Bildung
JURI	Rechtsausschuss
LIBE	Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres
AFCO	Ausschuss für konstitutionelle Fragen
FEMM	Ausschuss für die Rechte der Frau und die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter
PETI	Petitionsausschuss
DROI	Unterausschuss Menschenrechte
SEDE	Unterausschuss Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Abkürzungen der Fraktionen

PPE	Fraktion der Europäischen Volkspartei (Christdemokraten)
S&D	Fraktion der Progressiven Allianz der Sozialdemokraten im Europäischen Parlament
ECR	Fraktion der Europäischen Konservativen und Reformer
ALDE	Fraktion der Allianz der Liberalen und Demokraten für Europa
GUE/NGL	Konföderale Fraktion der Vereinigten Europäischen Linken/Nordische Grüne Linke
Vers/ALE	Fraktion der Grünen/Freie Europäische Allianz
EFDD	Fraktion Europa der Freiheit und der direkten Demokratie
ENF	Fraktion Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit
NI	Fraktionslos



AUSFÜHRLICHE SITZUNGSBERICHTE VOM 23. JUNI 2016

(C/2024/1619)

EUROPÄISCHES PARLAMENT

SITZUNGSPERIODE 2016-2017

Sitzungen vom 22. und 23. Juni 2016

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AUSFÜHRLICHE SITZUNGSBERICHTE VOM 23. JUNI 2016

VORSITZ: RAINER WIELAND

Vizepräsident

1. Eröffnung der Sitzung

(Die Sitzung wird um 9.00 Uhr eröffnet.)

2. Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ - Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz (Aussprache)

Der Präsident. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die gemeinsame Aussprache über

— den Bericht von Paloma López Bermejo im Namen des Ausschusses für Industrie, Forschung und Energie über den Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ (2016/2041(INI)) (A8-0196/2016) und

— den Bericht von Markus Pieper im Namen des Ausschusses für Industrie, Forschung und Energie über den Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz (2012/27/EU) (2015/2232(INI)) (A8-0199/2016).

Paloma López Bermejo, ponente. – Señor Presidente, señor Comisario, estimados ponentes alternativos, estimados diputados y diputadas, han pasado poco más de dos meses desde que presentamos el primer borrador de informe de situación en materia de energías renovables en la Unión Europea, y quisiera agradecer a los otros Grupos y a la Secretaría su celeridad y su disposición para que fuera posible el voto de hoy.

Celebro el alto grado de consenso que alcanzamos en muchos de los puntos del informe, aunque el acuerdo no pudiera ser completo en la votación final de la comisión.

El Parlamento debe orientar a la Comisión en su evaluación de aquellos Estados que incumplirán, de no cambiar sus políticas, los objetivos de desarrollo de las renovables para el año 2020, pero debe ayudar también a preparar la propuesta para una nueva Directiva de renovables hasta 2030 que mantenga los objetivos vinculantes y los refuerce para poder cumplir los compromisos de lucha contra el cambio climático adquiridos en la COP 21.

La misma proposición de futuro aparece en el informe Pieper de eficiencia energética. No es casualidad, toda vez que el desarrollo de las renovables tiene el mismo objetivo que las propuestas de ahorro y eficiencia energética, y encuentra los mismos obstáculos en los Estados miembros. Y ese objetivo es el de contribuir a una transición energética hacia un modelo más soberano, más ecológico y más democrático frente a los intereses de los oligopolios que dominan, hoy por hoy, el sector de la energía. No hace falta que recuerde al Comisario, señor Arias Cañete, qué políticas han afectado más negativamente al desarrollo de las renovables, pues las llevó a cabo el Gobierno del que él formó parte.

En primer lugar, debemos asegurar que los sistemas de apoyo a las renovables son estables en el largo plazo y sirven de contrapeso al mercado en el desarrollo de energías renovables más eficientes y sostenibles. La eliminación retroactiva de estos modelos de apoyo no puede sino asestar un duro golpe a las nuevas inversiones en generación y distribución energética.

El trato preferente a las renovables no puede cuestionarse, pues descontadas las externalidades ambientales de otras energías —y especialmente de las alternativas promovidas por la Unión Europea como la nuclear o el gas—, se trata de una apuesta eficiente y competitiva.

En segundo lugar, debemos favorecer los mecanismos de generación que favorezcan el control democrático de la energía frente a los grandes oligopolios energéticos. Para ello, debemos apoyar el derecho al autoconsumo y fortalecer los mecanismos de participación y planificación pública en el desarrollo de las renovables, así como los sistemas colectivos de generación, distribución y eficiencia en el consumo energético, tanto en la electricidad como en los sistemas de calefacción y la refrigeración.

Creemos que en el pasado la Directiva ha sido un instrumento útil, si bien con algunos efectos indeseados que deberían corregirse. Uno de ellos: los efectos negativos sobre la sostenibilidad global que ha tenido el desarrollo acelerado de la bioenergía, sea biomasa para quemar o biocombustible para el transporte. Este es un claro ejemplo de que el mercado no siempre es un buen mecanismo para asegurar la buena utilización de los recursos, como se ve en la competencia por el suelo agrícola o el desacoplamiento progresivo de las redes de transporte y producción del consumo final.

Finalizo. La transición energética no es solo un reto tecnológico, es también un reto social. Como defendemos en una enmienda, que confiamos que sea aprobada, no podemos permitir que una transición desorganizada disminuya los estándares laborales o desaproveche el potencial de creación de empleo en el sector de las energías. Por ello, como hemos remarcado en el informe, es importante avanzar de la mano de los interlocutores sociales en la definición de un nuevo modelo energético.

Igualmente, las renovables deben ser una oportunidad para aliviar la pobreza energética, adaptando las normas del mercado y ofreciendo garantías sociales para esos hogares que no pueden acceder a un derecho básico como es el de la energía.

Confío en que el debate permita volver a tender puentes y fortalecer el apoyo a un informe de indudable importancia.

Markus Pieper, Berichterstatter. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar! Es ist ein denkwürdiger Tag heute: britisches Referendum. Es geht übrigens auch da um Subsidiarität, um Bürokratieabbau, und das werden wir heute sicherlich hier auch noch zu diskutieren haben. Verbesserung der Energieeffizienz ist eine Win-win-Situation. Für die Umwelt heißt mehr Energieeffizienz: mit gleichem Energieinput weniger Ausstoß an Schadstoffen und CO₂ und für die Verbraucher heißt mehr Energieeffizienz: weniger Kosten, für die Energiesicherheit heißt mehr Energieeffizienz mehr Versorgungssicherheit. Insofern ist die Energieeffizienzrichtlinie eine Investition in Europas Zukunft, wenn man es richtig anpackt.

Das Ergebnis stimmt bislang. Wir werden bis 2020 20 Prozent Energieeinsparung erreichen, allerdings nicht nur wegen europäischer Regulierung, die ist ja gar nicht überall richtig umgesetzt, sondern auch wegen des Eigeninteresses der Unternehmen und der Verbraucher an weniger Energieverbrauch. Dafür vielen Dank an die Bürger und Unternehmen Europas. Die europäische Umweltbilanz überhaupt ist eine Erfolgsstory. Wir sind Weltmeister in Sachen CO₂-Einsparung, beim Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien und bei der Energieeinsparung. Dafür zahlen aber die Verbraucher und Unternehmen auch einen hohen Preis.

Erstens: Die Strompreise für gewerbliche und private Kunden gehören zu den höchsten in der Welt. Hier zeigen jahrzehntelange überhöhte Einspeisevergütungen in vielen Mitgliedstaaten ihre Wirkung. Zweitens: Die energieintensiven Industrien kämpfen in Europa ums Überleben. Neu investiert wird schon lange nur noch außerhalb der EU. Drittens: Die Bürokratie ufert aus, – Ökodesign-Labeling, Immissionsschutzgesetze, ETS, Abgasreduzierung, Gebäuderichtlinie und so weiter. Natürlich, jede Gesetzgebung hat ihre Berechtigung, wir vernachlässigen aber die Wechselwirkungen, übrigens auch mit den nichtabgestimmten nationalen Energiepolitiken.

Im Ergebnis entsteht viel Bürokratie, es entsteht aber auch Einfluss etwa auf die Zertifikatspreise im Emissionshandel. Wir beklagen deren Verfall und bestrafen dann für die Fehler, die wir gemacht haben, auch die Unternehmen mit immer neuen Kosten. Das geht so nicht weiter. Ich habe das am Beispiel der Energieeffizienzrichtlinie aufgegriffen und bin dankbar, dass viele Punkte auch im Bericht geblieben sind, nämlich, dass wir uns mehr in Richtung Innovation für Effizienz bewegen müssen und nicht nur auf den Einsparzwang setzen, dass die Flexibilität der Richtlinie bleibt, damit die Mitgliedstaaten Anreize für neue Maßnahmen haben. Auch die Berichtsbürokratie und Notwendigkeit einer kohärenteren Gesetzgebung wird zumindest im Bericht angedeutet.

Bis dahin sind wir uns mit der Mehrheit im Parlament einig. Was wir – oder was ich als Berichterstatter – aber auf gar keinen Fall unterstützen, ist eine 40-prozentige Einsparverordnung, also Einsparverpflichtungen für den Energieverbrauch. Es geht ja hier gar nicht um Effizienz, es geht um ein Verbrauchsverbot von Energie. Das könnten wir machen, wenn Europa schlecht dastünde, aber die Fakten sprechen doch eine andere Sprache. Die Treibhausgasemissionen wurden seit 1990 um gut 25 Prozent reduziert, gleichzeitig hat sich das europäische Brutto sozialprodukt um fast 50 Prozent erhöht. Mit 25 Prozent weniger Schadstoffen haben wir 50 Prozent mehr erwirtschaftet. Wenn das keine effiziente Bilanz ist! Wer also jetzt 40 Prozent Verbrauchsverbot will, der verdrängt absolut die Realitäten.

Deshalb noch mal meine Bitte, meine dringende Bitte an die Kollegen bei der S&D und bei den Liberalen: Unterstützen Sie unseren Änderungsantrag mit dem wir einen Zielkorridor von 30 bis 40 Prozent anstreben, aber nicht als Zwang, sondern als Orientierung. Sollten wir den Weg verfehlen, dann kann man mit gesetzlichen Maßnahmen immer noch nachsteuern, zunächst aber möchten wir den Menschen und den Betrieben wieder einen Vertrauensvorschuss geben: Die EU ist Umweltweltmeister, und wir alle wollen helfen, diese Position auszubauen!

Miguel Arias Cañete, *Miembro de la Comisión*. – Señor Presidente, Señorías, es una satisfacción estar hoy, una vez más ante ustedes, para participar en este debate dedicado a dos de los pilares más importantes de la unión energética: la eficiencia energética y las energías renovables. Además, abordarlas al mismo tiempo refleja el importante papel que ambas juegan a la hora de cumplir los ambiciosos compromisos climáticos alcanzados durante la pasada Cumbre de París. Y el debate tiene lugar en un momento muy apropiado, cuando estamos ultimando la revisión de la legislación de eficiencia energética y de energía renovable, que verá la luz en la segunda mitad del año.

Permítanme comenzar agradeciendo a los dos ponentes su magnífico trabajo en estos importantes informes de iniciativa. Comenzaré por el informe del señor Pieper sobre la aplicación de la Directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética. Como saben, estamos preparando las revisiones de las Directivas de eficiencia energética y de eficiencia energética en los edificios. El propósito es establecer los objetivos de eficiencia energética para 2030 y asegurarnos de que tenemos a nuestra disposición el marco y las medidas adecuados para alcanzarlos y, al poner el foco en los edificios en particular, estamos dando prioridad a los sectores que tienen un mayor potencial de ahorro energético. El informe llega a una serie de conclusiones que tendremos en cuenta en la preparación de las revisiones que acabo de mencionar.

Estoy plenamente de acuerdo con la conclusión del informe Pieper sobre la necesidad de incluir sistemáticamente el principio de eficiencia energética primero en nuestras políticas energéticas y climáticas. Déjenme decirles también que Europa necesita un objetivo explícito para 2030 que esté integrado en la legislación. Será importante a la hora de mandar una señal positiva a los inversores y a los legisladores y para potenciar las inversiones a largo plazo que necesitamos para cumplir con nuestros objetivos. Pero la revisión de nuestra legislación energética necesita ir mucho más allá de un objetivo final. Necesitamos tomarnos en serio el cumplimiento y la aplicación de la legislación.

En este sentido, permítanme subrayar el hecho de que la revisión de la Directiva de eficiencia energética abordará el artículo séptimo, obligaciones de ahorro energético. La reciente evaluación mostró que los Estados miembros se han tomado esta política en serio, han tomado medidas necesarias y establecido sistemas de control y verificación para alcanzar los ahorros necesarios para 2020. Se espera que para 2020 este artículo pueda aportar cerca de la mitad del ahorro de la Directiva de eficiencia energética. Podemos afirmar que ha sido un instrumento efectivo, pero necesitamos ahora alinearlos en consonancia con el marco general para 2030, de modo que pueda contribuir a los ambiciosos objetivos de reducción de emisiones definidos en el Consejo Europeo en octubre de 2014. Será importante también fomentar la inversión privada en nuestros edificios, sector con enorme potencial de ahorro, sector clave no solo para alcanzar nuestras metas de eficiencia energética, sino también para abordar la pobreza energética, reducir las altas facturaciones energéticas y disminuir los riesgos para la salud. La revisión de la Directiva de eficiencia energética en los edificios pondrá especial atención a estos objetivos. Quiero, una vez más, agradecer al ponente haber incorporado a su informe estos importantes asuntos, y tenemos que trabajar estrechamente en estas propuestas legislativas.

Naturalmente, esto es también válido para la revisión de la Directiva sobre energía procedente de fuentes renovables. Esta es una directiva que ha funcionado bien. Con una cuota de renovables del 16 % del consumo final de la energía en 2014, la Unión Europea y una mayoría de Estados miembros avanzan bien hacia los objetivos de 2020. Todos los países menos uno van por delante de su trayectoria indicativa y nueve ya han alcanzado sus objetivos de 2020. Esto nos ha permitido recortar nuestras importaciones de combustibles fósiles, reducir emisiones y desarrollar una industria de renovables competitiva. Sin embargo, algunos Estados miembros necesitan aumentar sus esfuerzos para estar a la altura de la intensa trayectoria que necesitamos mantener en los próximos años. Por eso, estamos plenamente concentrados en la implementación de la Directiva de energías renovables y sé que esto es fundamental para el Parlamento Europeo.

Pero, como bien subraya el informe, también necesitamos mirar hacia el periodo posterior a 2020. La revisión de la Directiva de energías renovables será el pilar central de estos esfuerzos y vendrá reforzada por el rediseño del mercado eléctrico y la iniciativa sobre gobernanza de la Unión de la Energía. Como muchos de ustedes han pedido, queremos poner sobre la mesa un marco legal robusto que dé estabilidad a los inversores y ayude a alcanzar nuestros objetivos de forma eficiente. Nuestra ambición es que la revisión de la Directiva de renovables, el nuevo diseño del mercado eléctrico y el reforzado sistema de comercio de emisiones sean motores fundamentales para potenciar nuevas inversiones en renovables que ayuden a Europa a convertirse en número uno en este sector.

En la revisión de la Directiva de energías renovables pretendemos abordar muchas de las preocupaciones reflejadas en sus enmiendas. Por ejemplo, cómo aprovechar mejor el potencial de la energía renovable en el sector de la calefacción y la refrigeración y cómo incentivar el papel del consumidor. También estamos ocupándonos de eliminar las barreras administrativas e institucionales que retrasan inversiones en Europa. Déjenme que les dé una idea de los elementos que estamos considerando.

En primer lugar, sobre objetivos necesitamos aprovechar los progresos alcanzados para 2020. Por eso, estamos explorando establecer los objetivos nacionales de 2020 como un punto de partida. En segundo lugar, la Directiva se concentrará en tres sectores que nos ayudarán a alcanzar nuestros objetivos: electricidad, calefacción y refrigeración, y transporte. En concreto, compartimos su preocupación sobre el lento progreso en el sector del transporte. En tercer lugar, otro punto fundamental será el papel de los esquemas de apoyo a renovables. En nuestra propuesta consolidaremos el cambio hacia un sistema basado en el mercado para mecanismos de apoyo a las renovables y hacia la convergencia de esquemas de apoyo nacional. Como ya he mencionado, planeamos avanzar hacia un mejor diseño del mercado, que, junto a un sistema de comercio de emisiones reforzado, facilite a los generadores de energía renovable que el máximo beneficio provenga del mercado.

Y por último, hemos visto en este informe que el asunto sobre los criterios de sostenibilidad de la bioenergía despierta un interés considerable. La Comisión está trabajando en una política de sostenibilidad mejorada para biocombustibles y biomasa. La biomasa es la principal fuente de energía renovable en la Unión Europea y estamos buscando un enfoque pragmático que garantice ahorros considerables de emisiones, que evite riesgos de impactos medioambientales significativos y evite cargas administrativas innecesarias, sobre todo para pequeñas plantas de energía y propietarios de pequeños bosques.

Señorías, permítanme concluir subrayando la importancia que para mí tiene este debate y la aportación del Parlamento Europeo en la preparación de las futuras propuestas legislativas. Quisiera mencionar un último aspecto que me parece de gran importancia para alcanzar los objetivos que nos hemos marcado. Me estoy refiriendo a la necesidad de movilizar inversiones en estos sectores. El Fondo Europeo para Inversiones Estratégicas nos ha abierto la puerta a nuevas posibilidades que debemos aprovechar con inteligencia, y quisiera hacer un llamamiento a autoridades locales, regionales y nacionales para que hagan un mayor uso de este instrumento.

Finalizaré diciendo que la Comisión agradece enormemente estos dos informes. Les aseguro que en las próximas propuestas legislativas seremos ambiciosos y garantizaremos que eficiencia energética y energías renovables sean los motores clave de nuestros compromisos de París y de nuestra transición hacia la descarbonización de nuestro sistema energético, y espero colaborar estrechamente con el Parlamento Europeo para hacer esta noble causa posible.

Marijana Petir, *izvjestitelj za mišljenje Odbora za okoliš, javno zdravlje i sigurnost hrane*. – Gospodine predsjedniče, čestitam izvjestiteljici na izvješću i zahvaljujem joj na suradnji. Europska unija i države članice na dobrom su putu da ostvare obvezujući cilj ostvarivanjem udjela obnovljive energije u konačnoj bruto potrošnji od 20% do 2020. godine. Očekivani napredak postiže se u sektoru grijanja i hlađenja, ali zabrinuta sam zbog nedovoljnog napretka u sektoru prometa.

Izostanak napretka u tom području uzrokovan je nesigurnošću ulaganja u proizvodnju biogoriva, stoga od Komisije očekujem da novim zakonodavnim prijedlogom o obnovljivim izvorima energije za razdoblje nakon 2020. godine da jasnu perspektivu proizvođačima naprednih biogoriva.

Žalim što u završno izvješće nije ušao stav Odbora za okoliš o potrebi provedbe ocjene pozitivne uloge europskih šuma kao ponora ugljika te punog potencijala tog sektora u ostvarivanju budućih ciljeva. Iskorištavanje punog potencijala poljoprivrednog i šumarskog sektora kroz ulaganja u proizvodnju naprednih biogoriva može doprinijeti otvaranju 146 000 stalnih te još 162 000 privremenih radnih mjesta što bi bitno doprinijelo oživljavanju naših ruralna područja i ostanku ljudi na selu.

Younous Omarjee, *rapporteur pour avis de la commission du développement régional*. – Monsieur le Président, la COP21 a mis en évidence le rôle fondamental des régions et des villes dans la transition vers des sociétés à faibles émissions de carbone. Pour notre commission du développement régional, les fonds de la politique de cohésion peuvent contribuer plus encore à la réalisation des objectifs fixés en matière de développement des énergies renouvelables.

Notre commission regrette principalement que la mobilisation des fonds de la politique de cohésion pour les énergies renouvelables ne soit passée que de 1,1 %, sur la période 2007-2013, à 1,4 % pour la période 2014-2020. C'est pourquoi nous appelons les villes et les régions européennes à mobiliser tous les instruments et à redoubler d'efforts.

S'agissant des régions ultrapériphériques, nous pensons qu'il est possible de fixer un objectif ambitieux d'autonomie énergétique.

Peter Liese, *Verfasser der Stellungnahme des mitberatenden Ausschusses für Umweltfragen, öffentliche Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit*. – Herr Präsident! Vielen Dank an Markus Pieper und alle, die mitgeholfen haben, diesen Bericht zu erarbeiten. Wir haben viele Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen ITRE und ENVI. Wir wollen Flexibilität, insbesondere bei den Maßnahmen in Artikel 7, wir wollen Planungssicherheit. Die wesentlichen Bestandteile der Richtlinie müssen nicht nur bis 2030, sondern darüber hinaus verlängert werden.

Große Diskussionen gab es in beiden Ausschüssen über das Ziel. Beide Ausschüsse haben sich mit Mehrheit für die 40 % ausgesprochen. Persönlich werbe ich für einen Kompromiss, den die EVP eingereicht hat. Die 40 % habe ich selber mal unterstützt, aber ich glaube, die sind nicht mehr realistisch. Die EVP verlangt aber ganz klar mindestens 30 %, und da, glaube ich, müssen wir an die Kommission appellieren. Ich höre, dass es in der Kommission Diskussionen gibt, ob man denn über 27 % hinausgehen soll. Ich höre sogar, dass der Kommissionspräsident nicht dafür ist. Das kann nicht sein! Jean-Claude Juncker hat hier im Europäischen Parlament vor der Wahl versprochen, dass er für mindestens 30 % ist. Was man vor der Wahl gesagt hat, muss auch nach der Wahl gelten!

Bendt Bendtsen, *for PPE-Gruppen*. – Hr. formand! Min tale drejer sig om betænkningen og statusrapporten om vedvarende energi. Jeg vil sige tak til López Bermejo for et godt og konstruktivt samarbejde i forhandlingerne, som ikke har været lette. Der nogle tydelige skillelinjer mellem de politiske grupper i denne sag. På den ene side er der den mere realistiske fløj, som anerkender, at målsætninger skal kunne gennemføres, ellers er de intet værd. På den anden side er der de urealistiske, som blot ønsker højere mål for enhver pris og tror, at en initiativbetænkning fra Europa-Parlamentet vil rykke ved de vedtagne målsætninger.

Jeg synes, vi bør anerkende, at stats- og regeringscheferne har sat sig nogle fornuftige, slagkraftige målsætninger, som de har forpligtet sig til at gennemføre. Jeg kunne have ønsket det højere, men de 27 % vedvarende energi i 2030 er en flot forpligtigelse og viser vores investorer, at EU og medlemslandene har ambitioner og vil levere på dem. Dette håber jeg, at mine kolleger i Europa-Parlamentet på tværs af politiske grupper vil huske, når der skal stemmes om sagen i dag.

Jeg vil gerne understrege, at PPE bakker fuldt op om diversificering af EU's energikilder med vedvarende energi centralt placeret for at opnå et mere bæredygtigt energimiks i Europa og levere på vores vedtagne målsætninger. Vi anerkender og støtter vedvarende energi som en forudsætning for at opnå bæredygtighed, vækst, konkurrenceevne og at skabe flere europæiske jobs. I PPE synes vi, at det er vigtigt at finde langsigtede og holdbare løsninger. Vi arbejder for, at vedvarende energi kommer til at fungere på markedsvilkår, og vi reducerer omkostningerne ved vedvarende energi. Det er nødvendigt for at bringe energipriserne ned, gavne europæiske virksomheder og energiforbrugere.

Med tilfredshed har jeg noteret mig, at vi har fået dækket en række af PPE's prioriteter i betænkningen. Det gælder bl.a. respekten for medlemslandenes kompetencer til at fastsætte energimiks samt behovet for omkostningsreduktion og fornuftige markedsvilkår, herunder gradvis udfasning af statsstøtte til markedsmodne teknologier. Der er stadigvæk en håndfuld elementer i betænkningen og nogle ændringsforslag, som både er urealistiske og uhensigtsmæssige. Jeg håber, at vi kan få vedtaget nogle gode målsætninger med denne betænkning i dag.

Miroslav Poche, za skupinu S&D. – Pane předsedající, já bych chtěl poděkovat kolegovi Pieperovi za vynikající spolupráci při revizi, nebo zpráve o revizi směrnice o energetické účinnosti.

Ta současná směrnice je dobrým základem pro dosažení našich energetických i klimatických cílů, včetně těch ambiciózních závazků z Paříže. Toho ovšem dosáhneme pouze za předpokladu, že se odstraní některé její nedostatky, z mého pohledu především přílišná flexibilita. Výsledkem současného stavu je, že zaostáváme za plněním stanovených cílů a pokud se nic nezmění, nebudeme schopni dosáhnout do roku 2020 energetické účinnosti o 20 procent. Domnívám se, že poslanci v rámci výboru ITRE dali jasně najevo, že je zapotřebí efektivnějšího rámce.

Rád bych zmínil alespoň několik bodů, které považuji za důležité v této zprávě. V první řadě je to otázka závazného čtyřicetiprocentního cíle v otázce energetické účinnosti. Jsem přesvědčen, že Parlament by měl opakovaně a jasně podpořit tento závazek, neboť pokud z něj slevíme, uzavřeme si tak cestu k vyšším úsporám, k podpoře inovací a také k posílení naší nezávislosti na dovozu fosilních paliv.

Za druhé bych rád zmínil otázku energetické chudoby, kterou původní návrh prakticky opomíjel. Jsem rád, že ve zprávě je nyní energetické chudobě věnována velká pozornost. Zpráva apeluje nejen na Komisi, ale i na členské státy, neboť jak Komise, tak členské státy se dosud k této problematice stavěly velmi odtažitě. V tomto smyslu požadujeme posílení článku 7 a dále navrhuje, aby byly stanoveny jasné cíle ve vnitrostátních akčních plánech energetické účinnosti.

Na závěr bych chtěl ještě zmínit důležitou otázku odporujících si právních předpisů. Parlament aktuálně projednává revizi systému obchodování s emisemi (ETS), který je s legislativou k energetické účinnosti i další legislativou propojen a kde v současné době dochází k významným překryvům. Místo konkurence mezi těmito předpisy musí fungovat jakási synergie, protože za všemi stojí jeden společný cíl. Považuji v tomto ohledu za naprosto zásadní, aby došlo k analýze vzájemných dopadů a aby Komise přišla s návrhem, který bude tuto situaci efektivně řešit.

(Řečník souhlasil s tím, že odpoví na otázku položenou zvednutím modré karty (čl. 162 odst. 8 jednacího řádu).)

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), ερώτηση με γαλάζια κάρτα. – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, αυτές τις μέρες πραγματικά είμαι προβληματισμένος κατά πόσον οι κλιματολογικοί, περιβαλλοντολογικοί στόχοι είναι ταυτόσημοι και με τους ενεργειακούς.

(Ο ομιλητής διακόπτεται λόγω προβλήματος του μικροφώνου)

— Είμαι πεπεισμένος ότι οι κλιματικοί, περιβαλλοντολογικοί στόχοι είναι ταυτόσημοι με τους ενεργειακούς. Δεν μπορούμε να επικεντρωνόμαστε μόνο στα ενεργειακά θέματα και να αφήνουμε έξω το περιβάλλον, και επειδή η πατρίδα μου αυτές τις μέρες υπέστη μια άνευ προηγουμένου οικολογική, περιβαλλοντολογική καταστροφή από ανεξέλεγκτες πυρκαγιές, με αποτέλεσμα να χαθούν και ανθρώπινες ζωές δασοπουροσβεστών που έπεσαν την ώρα του καθήκοντος, πρέπει οπωσδήποτε να υπάρξει...

(Ο Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον ομιλητή)

President. – You used a blue card and you really should put a question to the speaker. But you have only 30 seconds and you have already exceeded that.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), ερώτηση με γαλάζια κάρτα. – Πώς μπορούμε εμείς να κινητοποιήσουμε, ως Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, και τα ταμεία αλλά και τους στόχους της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, ώστε μαζί με τους ενεργειακούς στόχους να υλοποιούμε και τους περιβαλλοντολογικούς και να μπορούμε να προστατεύουμε τα δάση μας αλλά και να τα αποκαθιστούμε, όταν υφίστανται ζημιές, όπως έγινε αυτή τη στιγμή με την Κύπρο;

Miroslav Poche (S&D), odpověď na otázku položenou zvednutím modré karty. – Já jsem o tom mluvil a myslím, že to zmínil i pan komisař Cañete, součástí našeho boje s klimatickými změnami musí být i investice v rámci Evropského fondu investičního. A právě ten závazný cíl čtyřicetiprocentní by měl přispět k tomu, aby se více využívaly obnovitelné zdroje. Nevím ale, co to má společného s požáry na Kypru.

Anneleen Van Bossuyt, namens de ECR-Fractie. – Vandaag stemmen we over twee belangrijke energieverlagen. Enerzijds het verslag over energie-efficiëntie en anderzijds het verslag over hernieuwbare energie. Terwijl de lidstaten het eens zijn over de te bereiken doelstellingen dreigen we met het Europees Parlement onrust te scheppen door de lat onrealistisch hoog te leggen.

In de eerste plaats is het belangrijk dat we trachten om het met minder energie te doen. En hier ligt nog heel veel potentieel in de Europese Unie. Bijna de helft van onze energie gaat naar verwarming en koeling. Maar deze energie gaat nog veel te vaak verloren, letterlijk langs ramen en deuren. Door in de eerste plaats in te zetten op energie-efficiëntie, zorgen we er bovendien voor dat de burger zelf de vruchten kan plukken van de investeringen die ze op milieuvlak doen.

Wat hernieuwbare energie betreft, moeten we als Parlement geen doelen stellen die onhaalbaar zijn. Ja, we moeten ambitieus zijn, maar laten we ook realistisch blijven. De bindende nationale doelstellingen die door de rapporteur op het vlak van hernieuwbare energie worden voorgesteld, zijn dit niet. Het is duidelijk dat bepaalde lidstaten buiten de eigen grenzen zullen moeten kijken om hun doelstellingen inzake hernieuwbare energie te bereiken. En waarom dan pleiten voor bindende nationale doelstellingen? Laat ons hier vooral Europees samenwerken.

Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, let me start with two energy reports that were published recently. The first one says wind and solar are crushing fossil fuels, and it says that in 2015 energy investments in renewables were twice as much as in fossil fuels. Two huge energy bids in Mexico and Morocco were won by renewable programmes – not because they were renewable, but because they promised the cheapest energy, and that was renewable.

The other report says that Europe is losing its reputation as a renewable energy leader, and that is a very, very worrying report. Last year, investments in renewable energy in Europe plummeted by 21%, while spending in the rest of the world boomed. That is what this report is saying and that is extremely worrying. What we are witnessing in the world is a global race for cheap and secure energy, and that is renewable energy. The wonderful side-effect of that global race is that it is also clean. A wonderful side-effect. But the main focus is to get cheap and clean renewable energy.

The last thing that we need here is conservatism. We need a much stronger European focus with ambitious, binding targets and I am calling upon the Commission, when it is working on its proposals for September, please come with very strong, ambitious, binding targets.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), pakėlus mėlynąją kortelę pateiktas klausimas. – Iš tikrųjų manau, kad kolega labai teisingai sakė apie tai, kad turi būti reglamentuojama. Bet, iš kitos pusės, šiandien žinome, kad lygiagrečiai vyksta projektas „Nord Stream II“ ir, praktiškai, kuometoliau, tuo jis daugiau išsibėgėja. Ir šiandieną skaičiau, kad A. Merkel lyg tai pritaria tam projektui. Tai ar nebus taip, kad gražios mūsų svajonės liks tikrai gražiose protokoluose? O kai ateis „Nord Stream II“ projektas į Europą, tai apie atsinaujinančius kalba bus labai nežymi.

Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE), *blue-card answer*. – Mr President, I totally agree with my colleague. I don't think that Nord Stream is a very smart project to undertake, but what is even more worrying is that progress towards a true European energy union is being slowed down by our Member States. We have 28 energy unions today. We need one energy union – one combined focus on the transition towards cheap, secure and clean energy, and that is the main focus we should have in Europe.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga, *en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL*. – Señor Presidente, Señorías, señor Comisario, antes de hablar de energía, voy a decir que es una grata sorpresa tenerle hoy aquí, en este Pleno, el mismo Pleno al que últimamente es tan difícil hacer que venga; el mismo Pleno en el que la «gran coalición» le permite no tener que explicar por qué su nombre aparece cada vez en más casos de puertas giratorias, de fraude fiscal, de corrupción... Un largo etcétera al que, por desgracia, el Partido Popular, su partido, nos tiene acostumbrados.

La próxima vez que venga a este Pleno, por favor, haga el favor de venir a una rendición de cuentas abierta y responder a las preguntas de los Grupos, porque comparecer a puerta cerrada con las preguntas revisadas no disipa ninguna duda, al contrario —y esto es un consejo—: las aumenta.

Menos mal que este domingo, en el Estado español, vamos a dar otro paso para que la gente sin cuentas en Panamá y sin cuñados en petroleras gobierne al fin. Y ¿por qué? Porque necesitamos una actuación en el marco de la energía realmente ambiciosa y a la altura de la urgencia climática a la que nos enfrentamos.

Por eso, la eficiencia energética debería ser una prioridad vinculante para todos los Estados. Por eso, también, necesitamos una Directiva de renovables que permita crear un marco estable y propicio para el desarrollo de esta energía, al contrario de lo que hace el Gobierno de mi país con su impuesto al sol, que criminaliza la inversión, como ayer se denunciaba en la Comisión de Peticiones de esta Cámara.

Necesitamos una regeneración democrática tanto como una transición energética.

(Die Aussprache wird unterbrochen.)

3. Begrüßung

Der Präsident. – Ich möchte die erste Gruppe des *Sacharow-Fellowships* bei uns begrüßen. Das *Sacharow-Fellowship* wurde vom Europäischen Parlament ins Leben gerufen. 14 Menschenrechtsverteidiger nehmen an diesem Programm teil und besuchen unsere heutige Plenarsitzung. Diese Fellows kommen aus verschiedensten Ländern, wie zum Beispiel Weißrussland, der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, Guatemala, Iran, Jordanien oder Kasachstan. Sie folgen einem zweiwöchigen Intensivkurs in Menschenrechten im Europäischen Parlament in Brüssel und am European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation in Venedig.

(Beifall)

Dieses neue Programm wird vom Sacharow-Netzwerk organisiert und zielt darauf, die Fähigkeiten von Menschen zu erweitern, die sich für Menschenrechte einsetzen.

Herzlichen Glückwunsch an Sie alle! Ich hoffe, die Zeit im Europäischen Parlament stellt für Sie eine wertvolle Erfahrung dar.

4. Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ - Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz (Fortsetzung der Aussprache)

Der Präsident. – Wir setzen nun unsere gemeinsame Aussprache über den Bericht von Paloma López Bermejo (A8-0196/2016) und den Bericht von Markus Pieper (2012/27/EU) (A8-0199/2016) fort.

Benedek Jávör, *on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group*. – Mr President, first of all I have to say thank you to both rapporteurs for those files. We have had important and difficult discussions regarding the renewable energy progress report and the energy efficiency implementation report. To be honest, in the end, I believe that what we achieved at the level of the ITRE committee is really promising, and I can support the report as it was voted in the ITRE committee.

Of course, there are a lot of important issues, and some of them have already been mentioned by the rapporteur, Mr Pieper, and my colleagues as shadows. I agree with them regarding the importance of the full implementation of the existing current legislation, and also better reporting from the Member States, the importance of research and innovation, a consumer-centric approach, and so on. But instead of going through all the relevant issues, I would like to point out only one very important topic: the question of targets. I believe that what has really happened in Europe and what we have achieved in Europe in renewable energy and energy efficiency in the last couple of years has absolutely been the consequence of ambitious binding targets. If we lose this framework from the energy market in Europe for the climate policy in Europe, for energy efficiency and renewable energy in Europe, then anything which is said about our goals regarding renewables, energy efficiency and climate are nothing but wishful thinking. It is not a programme, it is not a European contribution to the global effort, it is just wishful thinking. So, what we need is ambitious binding targets on the EU level for energy efficiency, and also targets on the national level. Without them, we cannot achieve what we have to achieve according to the Paris Agreement.

Dario Tamburrano, *a nome del gruppo EFDD*. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, oggi inizierò raccontandovi una storia inedita in queste aule.

Dieci anni fa, a Roma, al primo gruppo di quello che poi è diventato il Movimento 5 Stelle si era dato un nome: «Utopia e realtà». In Italia ci prendevano tutti in giro, dicendo; «non ce la farete mai, senza soldi, senza giornali...»; tutto e tutti erano contro di noi. Eppure in Italia, dopo solo dieci anni, gli stessi ora ci dicono: «avevate ragione, tenete duro, continuate, rappresentate la speranza». Il vento del cambiamento che, allora, coraggiosi proponevamo ora soffia forte nel nostro paese. Forse lo avete percepito anche voi. Ma noi, cari colleghi, non vogliamo fermarci all'Italia, vogliamo portare l'utopia del cambiamento anche in Europa, in queste aule, in tutti i Paesi membri.

L'energia è il tema di oggi. Noi desideriamo che l'Unione fissi obiettivi vincolanti al 40 % per l'efficienza energetica e almeno al 30 % per le rinnovabili, tradotti in specifici obiettivi nazionali. Noi desideriamo che venga identificato un capitolo sui *prosumer*, che non li lasci più in balia degli umori ballerini dei vari governi, individuando una definizione condivisa del termine, i diritti di autoproduzione, autoconsumo, stoccaggio e vendita dell'energia in eccesso, forme di supporto, di investimento e di eliminazione dei principali ostacoli amministrativi e di mercato.

Noi semplicemente desideriamo che l'unione dell'energia abbia davvero al suo centro i cittadini e che permetta agli europei di sottrarsi per sempre alle costrizioni della geopolitica dell'energia. Noi vogliamo rispettare gli accordi di Parigi e lasciare sotto terra i carburanti fossili, unica garanzia per evitare la catastrofe climatica.

Nessuno di noi può prevedere il voto di oggi e soprattutto il nostro futuro, ma sappiamo per certo che la natura ci sta dando dei segnali: inondazioni, siccità, migrazioni, competizione per le risorse. Saranno l'innovazione tecnologica e l'innovazione sociale a portare i cambiamenti necessari. La politica e l'economia dovranno, volenti o nolenti, prima o poi piegare la testa al cambiamento e adeguarsi ai fatti. Questa è una certezza, perché è sempre andata così. Ma non vogliamo, come Europa e come umanità, arrivare in ritardo. Dobbiamo essere il volano, il volano umano...

(Il Presidente interrompe l'oratore)

Barbara Kappel, *im Namen der ENF-Fraktion*. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar Cañete! Es ist natürlich klar, dass der Vorredner gerade zum Ergebnis in Rom und in Italien sehr viele Dinge zu bereden hat, aber die Dinge, die wir heute zu besprechen haben, sind genauso wichtig, nämlich die zwei vorliegenden Berichte, die den Umsetzungsstand im Bereich erneuerbare Energie und Energieeffizienz aufzeigen sollen. Dieser Umsetzungsstand ist ziemlich unterschiedlich.

Wenn nämlich die Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich der Erneuerbaren auf einem guten Weg sind, die 2020-Ziele – mit einem Anteil 2014 von 15,3 Prozent – zu erreichen, ist der Umsetzungsstand bei der Energieeffizienz weniger gut. Hier sehen wir, dass 27 von 28 Mitgliedstaaten ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren anhängig haben, dass der Umsetzungsstand in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten sehr unterschiedlich ist und dass die 2020-Ziele im Bereich der Energieeffizienz wahrscheinlich nicht erreicht werden können.

Ob es vor diesem Hintergrund zielführend war, die Flexibilisierung, wie sie in Artikel 7 vorgesehen ist, etwas zu reduzieren, weiß ich nicht. Die Mitgliedstaaten konnten ihren Maßnahmenmix im Bereich der Energieeffizienz früher frei wählen, das ist jetzt in dem Ausmaß nicht mehr möglich. Ausnahmen sollen quantifiziert werden, Phasing-in- und Early-action-Maßnahmen sollen nicht mehr gültig sein. Auch dass das Effizienzziel auf 40 Prozent erhöht werden soll, halte ich für unrealistisch. Besser ist es, diesen Änderungsantrag mitzunehmen und dann den Korridor vorzusehen. Wir sollten uns keine unrealistischen Ziele setzen. Dass die Mitgliedstaaten nach wie vor nicht aufgefordert werden, mit gleichen Mitteln und gleichen Datenerhebungsverfahren zu rechnen, ist ebenso eine Schwachstelle.

Ein weiterer Punkt: Auch die verpflichtende Sanierung aller öffentlichen Gebäude, nämlich nicht nur der Regierungsgebäude, halte ich für unrealistisch. Wir sollten realistisch bleiben, die Energieeffizienz ist wichtig, der Realismus aber auch.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, το 1968, πριν ακόμα γίνει ένα μικρό βήμα για τον άνθρωπο και ένα μεγάλο βήμα για την ανθρωπότητα, ερευνητές προειδοποιούσαν το Αμερικανικό Ινστιτούτο Πετρελαίου ότι οι εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα από τα ορυκτά καύσιμα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν σε παγκόσμιες περιβαλλοντικές αλλαγές. 48 χρόνια αργότερα και, ενώ η επιστήμη και η τεχνολογία έχουν κάνει άλματα, ακόμη δεν εφαρμόζονται κατάλληλες τεχνολογίες για τη βέλτιστη αξιοποίηση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Αναρωτηθήκαμε γιατί; Η συνειδητή απόκρυψη επιστημονικών ευρημάτων, η συγκάλυψη πληροφοριών και η εσκεμμένη παραπλάνηση της κοινής γνώμης επέβαλαν την κοντόφθαλμη πολιτική της προσωρινής κερδοφορίας των μεγάλων εταιριών εις βάρος αντίστοιχων βιώσιμων επιλογών.

Πετρελαϊκοί γίγαντες και εμπορικοί όμιλοι δαπανούν 115 εκατομμύρια δολάρια ετησίως, μπλοκάροντας κλιματικές πολιτικές. Ταυτόχρονα, ασκούν πιέσεις, ώστε το φυσικό αέριο να αναδειχθεί ως η βασική τεχνολογία με την οποία η Ευρώπη θα μειώσει οικονομικά τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα, και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αντιμετωπίζει την κατάσταση θέτοντας χαμηλούς στόχους και ασκώντας μετριοπαθείς πολιτικές. Εγκληματούμε όχι μόνο εις βάρος του περιβάλλοντος αλλά κυρίως εις βάρος των παιδιών μας. Μην επιτρέπετε να γίνει η πολιτική υποχρέωση των κέντρων οικονομικής εξουσίας και αισχρής κερδοφορίας. Αρχικά πρέπει να ζητηθεί μία συγγνώμη. Στηρίξτε ουσιαστικά την ανάπτυξη και εφαρμογή των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας και τιμωρήστε τους υπαίτιους.

Jerzy Buzek (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Dwa sprawozdania, dwie dyrektywy – bardzo poważny problem globalny. Gratuluję tych sprawozdań, bo są to sprawozdania implementacyjne. Powinniśmy mieć coraz więcej takich sprawozdań, gdyż musimy wiedzieć, co się dzieje z postanowieniami, które uchwalamy. Klimat to problem globalny i tak należy na to spojrzeć. Uważam, że obecne podnoszenie celów klimatycznych przez Unię Europejską oraz wyznaczanie nowych wiążących celów jest kontrproduktywne. Dlaczego? Dlatego, że powoduje napięcia wewnętrzne pomiędzy krajami członkowskimi, pomiędzy nami, a my mamy wielkie zadanie do wykonania. Mianowicie chcielibyśmy, aby zobowiązania paryskie były wykonane w skali świata. One dzisiaj nie mają międzynarodowej podstawy prawnej, a więc trzeba monitorować ich wykonanie. Na tym powinna się mocno skupić Unia jako całość. Nie powinniśmy powodować wewnętrznych napięć dotyczących naszych celów klimatycznych, które i tak są najbardziej ambitne na świecie.

Jedna uwaga na temat OZE (odnawialnych źródeł energii). Rzeczywiście są kraje, które nie przykładają odpowiedniej wagi do pomocy dla energetyki odnawialnej, do wsparcia i także do energetyki pro-konsumenckiej. Należy to wyraźnie wskazać, ale myślę, że na cztery lata przed wyznaczonym terminem osiągnięcia naszego celu na rok 2020 wskazywanie konkretnych krajów, bez pełnego uzasadnienia, jest chyba przedwczesne. Natomiast uważam, że to, co robimy w tym zakresie, jest obecnie najważniejsze dla Unii Europejskiej.

(Μόwca zgodιίλ σι έδποwιέδιέι na pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki (art. 162 ust. 8 Regulaminu))

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *Kékkártyás kérdés.* – Tisztelt Képviselő Úr! Ön hosszasan elemezte a kötelezettségvállalásnak a kérdéskörét. Valóban vannak a párizsi kötelezettségvállalások, vannak az európai uniós kötelezettségvállalások és a nemzeti kötelezettségvállalások. De vajon nem lenne-e értelmesebb ezt a retorikát azzá változtatni, hogy nem kötelezettségekről beszélünk, hanem esélyekről az innovációra?

Jerzy Buzek (PPE), *odpowiedź na pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki.* – Nie mam nic przeciwko, żeby w taki sposób mówić. Zgadzam się z panem całkowicie. Ja tylko podkreślam, że Unia Europejska dzisiaj ma najdalej idące cele, jeśli chodzi o skalę światową, globalną, bo problem jest globalny. A najważniejsze dzisiaj jest, żeby patrzeć na to, jak realizowane to jest w skali świata. My na pewno, jestem przekonany, zrealizujemy swoje cele do roku 2020, i do roku 2030. Mamy wewnętrzne zobowiązania między krajami członkowskimi i trzymamy się tego, ale w skali świata wiemy, jak było z protokołem z Kyoto. Byliśmy praktycznie samotni. Chodzi o to, żeby w skali międzynarodowej naprawdę starać się o to jako jeden organizm, 28 krajów, aby inni także dotrzymali swoich zobowiązań paryskich.

Csaba Molnár (S&D). – Elnök Úr! Norvégia, a világ egyik legnagyobb kőolaj- és gázkincsével rendelkező országa bejelentette, hogy 2025-től betiltják a dízel és a benzines autók használatát. Szaúd-Arábia, ahol a világ legnagyobb olajkincse van, jelenleg a világ legambiciózusabb napenergia-programját hajtja végre. Nem nehéz tehát látni, hogy milyen irányba halad előre a világ. Nem kell fanatikus környezetvédőnek lennünk ahhoz, hogy értsük, hogy miért van szükség megújuló energiákra Európában. Nem kell ezt szeretni, de kell szeretni azt a gazdasági növekedést, ami a megújuló energiák miatt Európában végbemegy. Lehet szeretni azt a több millió új munkahelyet, ami ebben az iparban létrejött, és kell szeretni természetesen azt a technológiai innovációt, vagy energiafüggetlenséget, amit a megújuló energiák hoznak Európának.

Ezért időszerű a megújuló energiákkal kapcsolatos európai politikák előrehaladásáról beszélni. De mivel úgy látjuk, és ebben egyetértés volt már a teremben, hogy a 2020-as célokat minden bizonnyal el fogjuk érni, hiszen jól haladunk, ezért érdemes már inkább 2020 utánra nézni. Ezért javasoltuk azt, hogy 2020 után is ne csak európai, hanem tagállami szinten is tartsuk fenn a kötelező megújulóenergia-célszámokat, hiszen ez az egyetlen, ami az iparnak kiszámíthatóságot jelent, és ezzel párhuzamosan az egyetlen olyan eszköz, aminél bebizonyosodott, hogy ha van ilyen, akkor el fogjuk érni az ezzel kapcsolatos céljainkat. És a másik nagyon fontos dolog, hogy minden akadályt el kell görgöztetnünk a megújulóenergia-beruházások elől. Elképesztő mennyiségű adminisztratív, bürokratikus akadály van ma Európában. A Parlamentnek az a feladata, hogy javasolja a tagállamoknak ezeknek a bürokratikus akadályoknak az eltörlését.

Muszáj ebben a változásban Európának élen járnia. Ahogy a 20. században váltotta a kőolaj és a földgáz a korábbi kőszén világát, úgy váltja a megújuló energia világa a fosszilis energia és az atomenergia világát. Európának ebben élenjárónak kell lennie.

Ashley Fox (ECR). – Mr President, Conservative MEPs support increasing the amount of energy coming from renewable sources. We want to do this in a way that does not unduly burden consumers and businesses and export jobs outside of Europe. Contrary to the Commission's 2015 renewable energy progress report, I am happy to note that the UK is ahead of our mid-term target and that we remain on track to reach our goal of 30% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020.

We recognise the importance of energy efficiency both for reducing dependence on imports as well as for overall consumption. We do not support the rapporteur's desire to see an increased role for the Commission in monitoring Member States' action via enhanced oversight. We do not support binding efficiency and renewable targets. These skew investment decisions and are not the best way for Member States to spend taxpayer money effectively. These reports seek to enhance the role of the Commission and the EU, and for those reasons we shall vote against both of them.

Morten Helveg Petersen (ALDE). – Hr. formand! Energieeffektivitet kan være til gavn for os alle. Vi kan reducere afhængigheden af fossile brændsler, reducere afhængigheden af import fra Rusland og skaffe billigere energi til forbrugere og virksomheder.

Rapporten viser dog, at mange medlemsstater ikke har taget de nødvendige skridt. Det er ikke i tråd med målsætningerne for energiunionen, og vi skal vise verden og ikke mindst EU, at vi går sammen om bæredygtige løsninger, og at EU skal være førende, både når det drejer sig om energieffektivisering og vedvarende energi.

Jeg er glad for, at vi fik indført et punkt i betænkningen om at lægge sig op ad de allerede aftalte mål fra COP21, og jeg synes, det er vigtigt at slå fast, at den grønne omstilling ikke behøver at hæmme hverken økonomi eller industri. Se bare store gode virksomheder som Danfoss, Vestas, Velux og Grundfos, der er store virksomheder, der alle er baseret på grønne ambitioner og på innovation. De bringer penge til mit hjemland med deres store eksport og gør samtidig energi billigere for forbrugeren. Og de erfaringer viser altså, at energieffektivisering både er økonomisk holdbar og grønnere og billigere til gavn for os alle.

Derfor ser jeg frem til den revision af direktivet, vi står overfor, og jeg håber på og vil arbejde for nogle meget ambitiøse og bindende målsætninger herfor.

Νεοκλής Συλικιώτης (GUE/NGL). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, αρχικά θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω την εισηγήτρια για την πολύ καλή δουλειά που έχει κάνει. Στην έκθεση πολύ σωστά τονίζεται πως η ανάπτυξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας πρέπει να αναγνωριστεί ως θεμελιώδης πυλώνας της ενεργειακής μας πολιτικής. Πράγματι, εάν είμαστε ειλικρινείς στους στόχους που θέτουμε για την καταπολέμηση της κλιματικής αλλαγής, για την αντιμετώπιση της ενεργειακής φτώχειας καθώς και για την ανάπτυξη ενός παραγωγικού ενεργειακού μοντέλου προς όφελος της κοινωνίας, είναι πολύ σημαντικό να προωθηθεί μια φιλόδοξη και ρεαλιστική ολοκληρωμένη στρατηγική για τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας. Μονάχα έτσι θα πετύχουμε τους σχετικούς στόχους που έχουμε θέσει για το 2020 και για το 2030.

Για να δημιουργήσουμε όμως ένα ενεργειακό μοντέλο που να στηρίζεται στις αναγνωρίσιμες πηγές ενέργειας, είναι σημαντικό να ενισχύσουμε τις δημόσιες επενδύσεις για την προώθηση των απαραίτητων υποδομών. Εξίσου σημαντικό είναι να προωθήσουμε μέσα στήριξης των μικρών παραγωγών των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας καθώς και μέτρα για τη διασφάλιση της ώθησης των ανανεώσιμων πηγών με το μικρότερο δυνατό κόστος για τους καταναλωτές. Στη διαδικασία αυτή ο δημοκρατικός έλεγχος και η συλλογική διαχείριση, όπως σωστά ζητείται στην έκθεση, είναι στοιχεία αναγκαία ώστε να διασφαλιστεί η καλύτερη εξυπηρέτηση των αναγκών και το συμφέρον της κοινωνίας, ώστε η ενέργεια να διασφαλιστεί ως κοινωνικό αγαθό στο οποίο όλοι οι λαοί να έχουμε ισότιμη και φθηνή πρόσβαση.

Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, I will concentrate on the renewables report, which is a good report apart from one bad sentence in paragraph 9. The question is that wind and solar have become much cheaper and more mature. Does that mean that we can invest in renewable energy without any support? That depends on the markets and the status of the markets. Today we have, because of the failure of EU ETS, very low CO₂ prices, which means that we have a huge overcapacity in Europe given that the coal power plants remain in the market. How can wind and solar be invested in if power prices are, in large parts of Europe, at EUR 20-25 per megawatt-hour? And do not forget that as long as we have not made major changes to market design, each time the wind blows and the sun shines wind and solar will cost less than the average power prices. So please vote with the Greens on our split vote on paragraph 9. We cannot make renewable investments without having a revenue stream for renewables in this market.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD). – Šiandien, kalbėdamas apie atsinaujinančių išteklių energijos naudojimo pažangos ataskaitą, aš turėčiau akcentuoti, kad investicijos į atsinaujinančią energetiką yra nepakankamos. Dar daugiau, pastaraisiais metais jos turi tendenciją mažėti. Penkioliktais metais, lyginant su keturioliktais, jos sumažėjo beveik penktadaliu.

Parama vietos, regioninio, nacionalinio, Europos lygmenimis šioms investicijoms yra akivaizdžiai per maža. Visų su tuo susijusių suinteresuotų subjektų, tarp jų ir politikų, dalyvavimas yra nepakankamas. Taip pat renovacijos apimtys turėtų būti gerokai didesnės. Ir galimybės elektros energijos gamybai panaudojant vėją Šiaurės jūroje ar Šiaurės jūros regione taip pat menkai išnaudojamos.

Neturėsimė jokios pažangos naudojant atsinaujinančių išteklių energiją, jeigu Europos energetikos strategija veiksmais, o ne žodžiais, iš esmės nebus įtvirtinta vieninga energetikos politika ir dėl jos nebus kalbama vienu balsu.

Ponai, ką mes norime apgauti – ar save, ar visuomenę? Kai iš ryto kalbame apie atsinaujinančią energetiką, o po pietų pritariame ir linksime galvomis iškastinio kuro lobistams, atėjusiems proteguoti vieną kitą projektą?

Ir dar viena pastaba. Iš atsinaujinančių išteklių gaunamos energijos kaina galutiniam vartotojui turi būti ne gerokai brangesnė, bet pigesnė, dalį tos kainos subsidijuojant.

Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (ENF). – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, c'est en tant que militant des économies d'énergie et des énergies nouvelles que j'ai été, très jeune, en 1980, nommé, pour mon premier poste de fonctionnaire, chef de service de l'énergie régionale en Alsace. Je parlerai donc en technicien.

Des objectifs, nous pouvons nous en donner, mais des objectifs de 20, 30, 40 % ne servent à rien s'il n'y a pas les moyens. Aussi bien la Commission que le rapport ne mettent pas le doigt sur les moyens. Ce qu'il faut, c'est une politique volontariste, effectivement, avec une politique publique, car le marché ne voit pas à long terme sur les 10 à 15 ans. Ce qu'il faut, ce sont des financements à long terme. 10 % simplement d'économies d'énergie sur les importations représentent à peu près, avec un retour d'investissement sur 10 ans, 400 milliards d'investissements. Si vous rajoutez ce qui doit être fait pour les énergies nouvelles ou le transfert, comptez 500 milliards. Vous ne donnez pas de réponse sur les moyens.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Czytam sprawozdania, słucham tego, co mówi pan Komisarz, słucham tej wypowiedzi na sali i ogarnia mnie przerażenie. Są Państwo kompletnymi dyletantami. Przeciętny, dowolny człowiek pracujący w energetyce ma znacznie więcej wiedzy od nas. Wygadujecie kompletne bzdury! Ludzie pracujący w energetyce jądrowej, kopalnej lub innej wyłażą ze skóry, żeby robić wszystko jak najtaniej i jak najlepiej, bo konkurencja ich do tego zmusza. Wszelka ingerencja polityków może im tylko w tym zaszkodzić. To, co robimy, szkodzi energetyce. Powiem raz jeszcze: demokratycznie to sobie możemy kontrolować pogłowie surykatek w Kongo, być może to się uda, natomiast łapy precz od energetyki. Tak ważna dziedzina jak energetyka nie może być kontrolowana demokratycznie, bo politycy i biurokraci nie mają pojęcia o tym, jak naprawdę to działa. Dziękuję za uwagę.

A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska powinna być zniszczona, bo robi właśnie rzeczy złe dla energetyki.

Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE). – Señor Presidente. Comisario, bienvenido una vez más de las muchas ocasiones en las que ha podido participar y debatir con nosotros en el Pleno y también en las Comisiones de Energía y de Medio Ambiente. Así que no se podrá decir nunca que no es usted una persona absolutamente disponible para todos los debates que están en el ámbito de su competencia.

A partir de aquí, yo quería celebrar que hayamos tenido la oportunidad de estos dos debates y de todo este proceso en el Parlamento —no solamente hoy—, tanto en lo que se refiere a eficiencia energética como a energías renovables, dos elementos clave para conseguir los objetivos que se trazaron en París, y yo creo que lo que sustantivamente hay que hacer es conseguir esos objetivos. Estamos hablando del 20 % en lo que se refiere a energías renovables para 2020 y del 30 % en eficiencia energética. Nada produce más frustración, nada produce más desafección hacia las instituciones representativas y las instituciones políticas en general que prometer lo inalcanzable y no conseguir aquello a lo que realmente uno se ha comprometido. Así que celebro mucho que estemos en realidad en esa senda y así tenemos que seguir.

(La oradora acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul» (artículo 162, apartado 8, del Reglamento))

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), blue-card question. – Do you not think the fact that the European Council decided to abandon the binding national targets and set a relatively low target of 27% for 2030 is highly disappointing and is going to jeopardise the European Union's renewable energy progress, and that this target should have been established at 40% by the Commission?

Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Señor Frunzulică, yo lo que creo, como he dicho, es que hay que alcanzar objetivos realistas. El objetivo del 30 %, tal y como se había planteado, es un objetivo mucho más realista.

El futuro dirá qué otros objetivos se pueden trazar bastante más adelante, pero 2020 está cerca y para 2030 todavía queda un tiempo, y lo que tenemos que hacer es empeñarnos en que sea una realidad conseguir ese objetivo del 30 %.

(La oradora acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul» (artículo 162, apartado 8, del Reglamento))

Jasenko Selimovic (ALDE), *blue-card question*. – I completely agree with your ambition to have realistic goals. My problem with this is that we already have a huge amount of renewable energy that we are not transmitting and therefore not using. There is a case in Spain where we have an enormous amount of renewable energy that is not passing over the border of France. Do you not think that the Commission should put much stronger effort into transmitting renewable energy?

Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE), *respuesta de «tarjeta azul»*. – Señor Selimovic, sí, desde luego, en lo que se refiere no solamente a las energías renovables, sino a la necesidad de las interconexiones, la Comisión abandera, como no había realmente liderado nunca, la necesidad de hacer esas conexiones. En unos casos, por ejemplo, el de España y el de la península ibérica en general, a través de los Pirineos, y en otros, pues entre otros países.

Yo creo que no se puede decir que este Comisario y esta Comisión no estén a la cabeza realmente para desarrollar esas interconexiones.

Dan Nica (S&D). – Domnule președinte, domnule comisar, eficiența energetică și energiile regenerabile au declanșat multe evoluții pozitive în majoritatea statelor membre.

Aceste două componente ale uniunii energetice, energiile regenerabile, alături de eficiența energetică, reprezintă elemente esențiale pentru reducerea dependenței energetice a Uniunii Europene și pentru îmbunătățirea securității energetice. Stabilirea mixului energetic trebuie să rămână o competență națională, astfel încât fiecare stat membru să aleagă dezvoltarea propriei forme de energie regenerabilă.

În viitoarele rapoarte intermediare privind energia din surse regenerabile sper să regăsim și o evaluare a impactului acestora asupra costurilor și a prețurilor, în special a prețurilor pentru consumatorii casnici. Transparența în ceea ce privește date complete și detaliate cu privire la defalcarea costurilor și a subvențiilor pentru diversele tehnologii în sectorul energiei ar oferi o imagine mai detaliată a pieței energiei.

Consider că reducerea facturii la energie pentru consumatori ar trebui să fie, de asemenea, una din țintele obligatorii, iar transparența ar fi un pas în această direcție. Așteptăm, domnule comisar, și primele măsuri pentru alimentarea cu energie electrică a primelor automobile electrice în Uniunea Europeană.

Николай Барекков (ECR). – Г-н Комисар, добре дошъл! Знаете, че оценявам високо Вашата дейност и лично съм разговарял по тези теми. Що се отнася до възобновяемата енергия и нисковъглеродните емисии, има и случаи като България. От една страна, ние преизпълнихме отдавна процента на енергия от възобновяеми източници, а това доведе до повишаване на цената на електричеството и до западането на един традиционен за нас отрасъл – въгледобива.

Държави като тези от Източна Европа обаче изостават в енергийната ефективност. От друга страна, повишаването на процента зелена енергия в микса не реши проблема на най-бедната държава – членка на Европейския съюз – нашата енергийна зависимост от Русия. Унищожаването на въгледобивната индустрия направи още по-зависима България от Русия. Вместо твърдо гориво собствено производство или внос от Украйна внасяме повече газ само от един източник.

Дори въпросът със спирането на „Южен поток“ не реши проблема. Г-н Комисар Канете, Вие и Европейската комисия разбирате отлично нашия проблем. Но как да формулираме баланса между опазването на климата и спазването на политическата независимост на Европейския съюз от трети страни? Това е основният въпрос.

Pavel Telička (ALDE). – Mr President, I think that the political message of the report is clear. We have targets that ought to be achieved as concerns efficiency and renewables. But who will make it happen? Industry and investors. So I am quite happy that both reports focus on the question of administrative procedures, cutting red tape, and of course having regulatory stability. We need clear rules, we need stability and, in this respect, I would like to emphasise something that maybe has not been emphasised that much so far.

Where renewables are concerned, I think I would also refer to the energy market design. I think that what is absolutely clear today is that we need to integrate renewables. On subsidies, I am not a great fan of subsidies as such and I think that where subsidies for energy are concerned that applies twice over. I do understand that in order to give renewables a start, subsidies were necessary. But at the moment I think we should be phasing them out, and definitely with regard to mature technologies. My last remark would apply to EFSI. I think that some of our colleagues have already mentioned this, but if I look at the implementation of EFSI today, the one thing that I am really missing is meeting the goal of financing especially innovative projects, and that of course applies to energy as well. So I think we should have a higher share of EIB-backed investment with high risk.

Merja Kyllönen (GUE/NGL). – Arvoisa puhemies, EU:n hiilidioksidipäästöjen vähennystavoitteen saavuttaminen vaatii kaikkien energiatuotanto- ja käyttösektoreiden aktiivisuutta. Energiatехokkuus on yksi parhaimmista tavoista vähentää hiilidioksidipäästöjä. Energiatехokkuuteen tulee panostaa niin rakennusallalla, kuljetuksissa, palveluissa kuin erilaisissa tuotantomenetelmissä, energian tuotantoa unohtamatta.

Uusiutuvasta energiasta puhuttaessa on syytä painottaa, että sitä voidaan tuottaa myös kestävästi, pienimuotoisesti ja paikallisesti ja täten auttaa Eurooppaa kasvun tiellä. Tarvitaan siis lisää panostusta uusiutuvien energiavaihtoehtojen tutkimukseen ja tuotekehitykseen, jotta myös pienet ja keskisuuret yritykset voisivat niitä hyödyntää. EU:n riippuvuutta ulkopuolella tuotetusta fossiilisesta polttoaineesta on vähennettävä kaikin tavoin ja kohdennettava tukia kestäväen energian tukemiseen.

Jakop Dalunde (Verts/ALE). – Herr talman! Att ta tag i energi- och klimatfrågorna är en av de absolut viktigaste sakerna vi har att göra under den här mandatperioden.

Vi måste göra verklighet av det vi lovade varandra i Paris, och då måste vi se till att fasa ut subventionerna till den fossila energin och istället rikta in politiken på att främja en omställning till 100 procent förnybar energi.

Ett sätt att göra detta är att stärka sammanlänkningen mellan våra olika energisystem i Europa. Vi Gröna vill ta bort onödiga byråkratiska hinder som hindrar detta och göra stora starka investeringar för att nå våra sammanlänkingsmål. Och vi understryker att ett ökat regionalt samarbete kan öka kostnadseffektiviteten i systemen och bidra till att när solen inte skiner i ett land så kan vi använda energin från vindkraften i ett annat land eller vattenkraften i ett tredje.

Förnybar energi kräver ett mer decentraliserat system, och vi måste göra mer för att skapa det nu.

Franz Obermayr (ENF). – Herr Präsident! *(Das Mikrofon wird zu spät eingeschaltet.)* unglückliche Auflagen, das Wirtschaften zu erschweren, bieten neben dem Straßenverkehr Gebäude die entscheidende Möglichkeit für weitere Energieeinsparungen und zur Erreichung der Effizienzziele. Daher sollten wir Architekten und Bauherren ermutigen, statt gläserne Energievernichtungsmaschinen zu bauen, auf traditionelle, der Region und dem Klima angepasste Baukonzepte und -materialien zu setzen. Statt Regulierungswut – ich denke hier mit Schrecken an die Staubsaugerregelung – sollten Anreize statt Verboten genutzt werden. Über Jahrhunderte haben Menschen gelernt, mit der Widrigkeit der Natur zu leben und Energieverbrauch zu optimieren. Das Wissen muss also genutzt werden. Ich denke, dass hier auch moderne Elemente einfließen sollten. Zum Beispiel bieten Fassadenbegrünungen eine durchaus sinnvolle Ergänzung, wie man in Amerika sieht. Und nebenbei, meine Damen und Herren: Auch die Institutionen der Union sollten hier mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Sie sagen jetzt, bei Staubsaugern hätten wir Regulierungswut. Staubsauger verbrauchen Strom. Wie sollen wir denn anders vorgehen, als für chinesische, europäische, türkische – oder wer auch immer Staubsauger herstellt – in Europa einen Standard zu machen? Und das machen wir. Das ist die leichteste Regulierung, die man machen kann, und die ist zudem extrem wirtschaftsfreundlich, weil sie nämlich binnenmarktfreundlich ist. Ich verstehe *(Das Mikrofon wird ausgeschaltet.)*

Franz Obermayr (ENF), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Danke für die Frage, die ich natürlich akustisch verstanden habe, aber inhaltlich nicht ganz. Ich habe gesagt, es sollte nicht um die kleinen, detailverliebten Dinge in Europa gehen, sondern um die großen Dinge. Und wenn wir uns die Berichte durchlesen, wissen wir, dass es hier große Komponenten gibt – Straßenverkehr, aber auch Gebäude –, die zu sanieren, die besser auszustatten sehr viel mehr bringen würde. Und ich glaube, dass es vor allem der Industrie genützt hat, hier einheitliche Standards zu normieren.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, la discussione intorno alla produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili e all'efficienza energetica è una discussione che appassiona molti e purtroppo spesso ha un forte potenziale di decadimento retorico, per cui molti tra i miei colleghi a volte sostengono posizioni molto forti e molto legate alla tutela dell'ambiente quando parlano in quest'Aula e poi magari vengono invitati a un convegno organizzato dall'industria dell'acciaio in un paese dell'Est e in quella sede, dopo aver detto che bisogna tutelare l'ambiente, dicono che però prima di tutto vengono i posti di lavoro.

Allora bisognerebbe trovare un punto di equilibrio, un punto di equilibrio che tentativamente queste due relazioni cercano di raggiungere. Però attenzione ad alcuni rischi. Il primo: l'Europa ha storicamente raggiunto ottimi livelli di sostenibilità nell'ambito di uno sviluppo economico capace di tutelare anche l'ambiente, senza bisogno della pistola puntata alla tempia. Lo ha fatto perché è nella nostra cultura imprenditoriale – con buona pace degli avversari della cultura liberale – costruire un modello di sviluppo intorno all'uomo, certo con dei difetti, ma questa è la modalità con cui i nostri imprenditori lavorano.

Allora attenzione a porre vincoli assoluti ai singoli paesi, perché in Europa abbiamo paesi come il mio, l'Italia, che quei vincoli li possono rispettare senza problemi, ma abbiamo anche altri paesi che stanno tentando di ripartire a fatica. Allora diamo un ragionamento all'Europa che sia in grado di parlare di vera sostenibilità, cioè tenuta nel tempo degli investimenti.

(L'oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda «cartellino blu» (articolo 162, paragrafo 8, del regolamento)).

Maria Grapini (S&D), întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Stimate coleg, sinceră să fiu nu am înțeles dacă susțineți sau nu susțineți obiectivele Comisiei și ale Consiliului, dar vă întreb foarte clar: considerați că putem să întrerupem brusc producerea energiei din combustibili fosili fără a investi și că putem să spulberăm sute de mii de locuri de muncă prin lipsa unor tehnologii moderne și fără a asigura resurse din Fondul european pentru investiții strategice pentru tehnologie modernă în producerea energiei?

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), risposta a una domanda «cartellino blu». – Io ritengo che gli obiettivi che sono stati posti siano corretti, ma che a volte pecchino di scarso realismo. Le sovvenzioni che normalmente gli Stati decidono di destinare alla produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili normalmente sono buone, ma volte decadono. L'Italia, ad esempio, spende da anni sei miliardi e mezzo di euro per sostenere il fotovoltaico. Oggi quei soldi sono un costo per i cittadini, per un settore che...

(Il Presidente interrompe l'oratore)

Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D). – Mijnheer Salini, het goede nieuws is eigenlijk dat zonne-energie vandaag volledig rendabel is op zichzelf. Dat is goed dus we moeten dat ook gewoon doen. Ik denk dat het goed is om deze verslagen te hebben. Ik denk dat het belangrijk is om ook een keer te reflecteren. We hebben wetgeving, en we moeten als Parlement kijken hoe we die wetgeving toepassen. Dus ik denk dat dit twee belangrijke verslagen zijn.

Waar ik vandaag extra aandacht aan wil besteden, ligt voor de hand. Mijnheer de commissaris, we hebben elkaar in Parijs gezien, en het is belangrijk dat we bij alles wat we in de toekomst gaan beslissen over energie-efficiëntie, over hernieuwbare energie, non-ETS – die debatten komen er heel snel aan – één ding doen en dat ook goed afspreken, namelijk de doelstellingen van Parijs volledig ten uitvoer leggen. Dat betekent dat we ambitieus moeten zijn. Het hele debat over afdwingbare normen voor energie-efficiëntie wordt ontzettend belangrijk. Want als deze normen niet afdwingbaar zijn en vrijblijvend blijven, dan kunnen wij onze verplichtingen uit het akkoord van Parijs ook niet nakomen.

Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, on sanottu, että käynnissä on maailmanlaajuinen energiavallankumous, jonka myötä uusiutuvat energiat valtaavat markkinoita. Olen tyytyväinen siitä, että aurinkoenergiaan on alettu investoida ja aurinkosähköön kapasiteettia on kaksinkertaistettu myös kotimaassani Suomessa 2015. Alan yritykset ovat lupailleet kapasiteetin merkittävää lisäystä myös lähivuosina. Muutamat kaupungit ovat ottaneet asian omakseen, mutta myös yritykset, energiayhtiöt, maatilat ja omakotitaloasukkaat ovat hankkineet aurinkovoimaloita.

Olen pohtinut paljon, johtuuko hidas kehitys kohti uusiutuvia energiamuotoja siitä, että perinteisillä energiamarkkinoilla on vallinnut harvainvalta? Voidaan hyvin kysyä, ovatko poliittiset päättäjät ja isot energiatoimijat olleet liian kauan ja liian läheisessä suhteessa keskenään? Olkoon kuinka hyvänsä, tulevaisuuden energiapolitiikkaa pitää tehdä ympäristön, työpaikkojen ja kuluttajien ehdoilla.

Gunnar Hökmark (PPE). – Mr President, energy efficiency is about economic efficiency and reducing emissions, not about reducing our economies. I think it is important to remember that, because sometimes in these discussions it sounds as if we think that just by setting a target then we will solve the problem. That is not the case and that belief would undermine our ability to reach our objective. The magnitude of change lies of course in reforming our markets in order to make them open and secure so that we get new generations of technology.

I think there are some key issues that we need to think about. First of all, open markets – open for new and renewable energies, but also open for competition, pressing prices, but also securing the best way of using the energy we have. Market prices, because otherwise there will be no opportunity for the new emerging energy sources to be successful. We will need to secure economic growth to invest in new generations of technology, and we need to rely also on nuclear power. But our watchword is, of course, less fossil fuels and less heavy infrastructure investments that make, for example, natural gas cheaper than it really is, especially when it comes from monopolies. So the whole issue, Mr Commissioner, about Nordstream 2 is also part of achieving energy efficiency in the European Union and a functioning energy union.

Edouard Martin (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, les débats sur l'efficacité énergétique et l'énergie renouvelable me font penser à cette personne qui implore Dieu quotidiennement pour qu'il la fasse gagner à la loterie. Et Dieu, fatigué, finit par lui répondre: «Mais joue, au moins, si tu veux que je te fasse gagner!». C'est là notre problème: nous ne faisons que des incantations. Plus personne n'a les moyens de ses ambitions. Chacun hésite à miser sur le ticket qui sera gagnant à coup sûr. Par exemple, rien de prévu dans le plan d'investissement Juncker, et pourtant, ces ambitions sont nobles. Elles ont du sens, elles ont de l'intérêt économique. C'est bon pour les ménages, pour les entreprises, c'est bon pour l'emploi. Ces ambitions ont aussi et surtout de l'intérêt pour le bien-être de la planète, car l'énergie la moins polluante et la plus économe est celle que l'on ne consomme pas.

Alors, assez d'austérité, les investissements d'aujourd'hui seront les économies de demain! Si nous voulons gagner, misons sur l'efficacité énergétique, elle est renouvelable. Bingo!

Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE). – Domnule preşedinte, din păcate există încă politicieni care pun sub semnul întrebării efectele negative ale schimbărilor climatice. Ceea ce vedem astăzi că se întâmplă în Europa, ca fenomene climatice, ca şi în lume, ne demonstrează că nu prea mai avem timp mult pentru decarbonizarea economiei mondiale. De aceea, voi susţine ambele rapoarte, pentru că ele indică calea cea bună. Pe de o parte, dezvoltarea energiei regenerabile, pe de altă parte, economisirea energiei.

Doresc să vă spun că România deja a îndeplinit ţinta cu privire la energia regenerabilă pentru anul 2020. Doresc, de asemenea, să punctez o idee importantă: în mod normal, ar trebui restructurate imediat strategiile cu privire la investiţiile în energie, în sensul opririi investiţiilor în dezvoltarea de capacităţi de energie bazate pe combustibili fosili şi, evident, îndreptarea investiţiilor spre energie regenerabilă, dar şi spre cercetare-dezvoltare, în special în zona stocării energiei electrice. De asemenea, ar trebui renunţat la orice subvenţie pentru combustibilii fosili.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, a aposta nas energias renováveis e na eficiência energética são os dois pilares da União de Energia e, no momento em que a União Europeia parece hesitar entre liderar o novo ciclo da globalização ou fragmentar-se e tornar-se globalmente irrelevante, o debate que estamos hoje aqui a ter tem um significado prático e simbólico muito elevado. É um debate sobre a nossa capacidade de valorizar os recursos endógenos no domínio estratégico como é a energia, uma situação que é possível, como o exemplo de Portugal bem ilustra.

É fundamental termos metas ambiciosas, em linha com o Acordo de Paris, produzir mais energia limpa e renovável, porque isso significa criar riqueza, emprego, reduzir a dependência energética de fornecedores externos. Mas também é fundamental assumir metas ambiciosas na eficiência energética, porque isso melhora a competitividade das empresas, isso combate a pobreza energética das famílias, reduz emissões e gera oportunidades de novos investimentos.

Precisamos de produzir mais energias renováveis, usadas de forma eficiente no quadro de um mercado europeu interligado e transparente.

São prioridades como estas que marcam a diferença e dão sentido à nossa pretensão a um espaço político e económico comum. Um espaço que temos que consolidar...

(O Presidente retira a palavra ao orador.)

José Blanco López (S&D). – Señor Presidente, quiero expresar mi apoyo a estos dos informes, en los que defendemos una mayor ambición en los objetivos de la Unión Europea tanto en el ámbito de las renovables como en el ámbito de la eficiencia energética. En el informe Bermejo, pedimos a la Comisión que evite los cambios retroactivos en los mecanismos de ayuda a las renovables y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Esto viene al caso porque en España hay miles de familias arruinadas tras invertir en renovables, como consecuencia de medidas retroactivas adoptadas por el Gobierno. Sin ninguna compensación, contra las expectativas generadas, contra el mercado de las renovables, contra el autoconsumo, contra la seguridad jurídica y contra la legítima confianza ciudadana.

No hablamos de especuladores ni de grandes compañías eléctricas sino de ciudadanos que confiaron en instituciones que quebraron sus compromisos, y debemos hacerlos respetar. Por eso, quiero hacer un llamamiento a la Comisión, señor Comisario, y al Consejo para que atiendan las legítimas peticiones de estos ciudadanos.

Catch-the-eye-Verfahren

Henna Virkkunen (PPE). – Arvoisa puhemies, arvoisa komissaari, aivan muutama keskeinen kohta tästä uusiutuvan energian raportista. Ensinnäkin täällä ovat nousseet esiin uusiutuvalle energialle suunnatut tuet. Ne ovat aikamoinen ongelma tällä hetkellä koko Euroopan energiamarkkinoille. Energiamarkkinat ovat sekaisin ja oikeastaan kukaan ei investoi energiaan nyt ilman, että saa siihen pitkäaikaista tuotantotukea tai takuuhintaa. Tästä pitäisi päästä nyt eroon.

On perusteltua, että uusiutuvaan energian tutkimukseen, tuotekehitykseen ja investointeihin voidaan suunnata tukia, mutta jos uusiutuva energia perustuu sille, että se saa jatkuvaa tukea, se ei ole kestävällä pohjalla. Näemme, että viime vuonna Euroopassa investoitiin uusiutuvaan energiaan kaikkein vähiten yhdeksään vuoteen ja investoinnit putosivat 20 prosenttia. Se osoittaa, että meillä täytyy olla enemmän pitkäjänteisyyttä ja että investoijat myös tietävät, mihin suuntaan ollaan menossa.

Toinen kysymys liittyy kestävyyskriteereihin, joita tässä halutaan kiirehtiä biomassan osalta. On tärkeää, että hoidamme kestävästi Euroopan metsiä, mutta se ei saa tuoda lisää byrokratiaa metsänomistajille. On tärkeää, että hyödynnämme jo niitä sertifikaattijärjestelmiä, joita meillä tällä hetkellä on olemassa.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D). – Señor Presidente, mi apoyo a los ponentes de los dos informes porque coincide plenamente con la necesidad de establecer sistemas estables y rentables para apoyar las energías renovables, para atraer inversiones, y, desde luego, con que es conveniente también reducir gradualmente las subvenciones a las tecnologías renovables consolidadas.

Sin embargo, los sistemas de apoyo no pueden depender únicamente de la voluntad y la buena gestión de los Gobiernos nacionales.

Aunque la Unión en su conjunto va por buen camino para alcanzar los objetivos de 2020, algunos países no hacen sus deberes, como es el caso del Gobierno de España, el Gobierno del señor Rajoy, cuyos resultados han empeorado. Un Gobierno que ha modificado hasta en diez ocasiones los sistemas de apoyo a las energías renovables; que lo ha hecho sin consultar con las partes, con carácter retroactivo y, desde luego, rompiendo dos principios fundamentales de todo Estado de Derecho: el principio de la seguridad jurídica y de la confianza legítima en el Estado.

Y, además, ha impuesto un impuesto al sol, teniendo en cuenta que Bruselas ha tenido más capacidad de potencia fotovoltaica en 2015 que España en su conjunto.

¿Cree usted...?

(El Presidente retira la palabra a la oradora)

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η αύξηση της ενεργειακής αποδοτικότητας και των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας αποτελεί κοινωνική και οικολογική προτεραιότητα. Ωστόσο η επίτευξη των στόχων στους τομείς αυτούς δεν πρέπει να συγκρούεται με τις βασικές ανάγκες των πολιτών. Στην Ελλάδα των μνημονίων και της λιτότητας, η ενεργειακή φτώχεια πλήττει το 36% του πληθυσμού. Δυστυχώς όμως, παρά το γεγονός ότι το ελληνικό κατά κεφαλή ΑΕΠ έχει κατακυλήσει κάτω από το 60% του ευρωπαϊκού μέσου όρου, η χώρα δεν έχει απαλλαγεί από τις υποχρεώσεις που προκύπτουν από το σύστημα εμπορίας δικαιωμάτων εκπομπών αερίων.

Επιπλέον, αμφότερες οι εκθέσεις αναγνωρίζουν την ανάγκη στήριξης των οικολογικών ενεργειακών λύσεων. Ειδικά η λεηλατημένη ελληνική οικονομία έχει ανάγκη από πόρους για να γίνουν οι απαραίτητες επενδύσεις στον τομέα των ΑΕΠ. Όμως η Ελλάδα έχει αποκλειστεί από το ταμείο για τη στήριξη εκσυγχρονισμού των ενεργειακών συστημάτων και βελτίωσης της ενεργειακής απόδοσης. Γι' αυτό έχω καταθέσει σχετικές τροπολογίες στον κανονισμό 2003/87/EK και καλώ τους συναδέλφους να τις υποστηρίξουν.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE). – Señor Presidente, señor Comisario, los dos informes que debatimos esta mañana ponen de manifiesto que es urgente, también, acabar con la fragmentación del mercado de la energía en Europa y que es imprescindible disponer de un marco regulador estable y conocido para poder propiciar las inversiones con que hay que empujar el imprescindible cambio de modelo energético.

Compartimos los objetivos de ambos informes, que están plasmados en el Plan y los objetivos de la política energética vasca para la próxima década. La progresiva descarbonización, la mejora de la eficiencia energética, fomentar la generación descentralizada y la autogeneración y consolidar el liderazgo tecnológico europeo en producción de energías renovables es imprescindible para poder cumplir los acuerdos de la Cumbre de París y combatir la pobreza energética.

En ese marco, pedimos contundencia a la Comisión, señor Comisario, para reparar el daño causado en España a más de 65 000 familias, víctimas de una decisión retroactiva sobre los programas de apoyo a las renovables en dicho Estado miembro, que perjudica este objetivo europeo, tal y como los afectados lo han denunciado esta semana ante la Comisión de Peticiones de este Parlamento. Por ello, le pregunto, señor Comisario, qué piensa hacer la Comisión.

Rosa D'Amato (EFDD). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il Movimento 5 Stelle ritiene fondamentale giungere a un rapido abbandono della dipendenza da fonti fossili per agevolare una diffusa autoproduzione e un'autosufficienza energetica basate proprio sulle rinnovabili.

L'impegno assunto dall'Unione europea per l'abbattimento delle emissioni di CO₂, ma anche l'urgenza di intervenire per ridurre drasticamente in tempi rapidi il livello di inquinanti, come ad esempio i metalli pesanti e le diossine presenti nell'aria, nell'acqua e nel suolo, dovrebbero obbligare tutti gli Stati a mettere tempestivamente in pratica misure efficaci. Ne va della nostra salute e del nostro ambiente, ma ne va anche delle nostre risorse finanziarie, visti i costi sanitari e sociali di un ambiente devastato proprio dalla dipendenza da fonti fossili come petrolio, carbone e gas.

Per fare in modo che la transizione sia rapida serve un grande sforzo che può essere sostenuto dalla ricerca, dall'innovazione e da un utilizzo effettivo ed efficace di tutti i fondi europei disponibili, per incrementare l'efficienza energetica e la produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili. Uno sforzo che non dovrebbe assolutamente essere frenato, come purtroppo abbiamo avuto modo di vedere in paesi come il mio, da cosiddette riforme strutturali che si traducono di fatto in politiche di...

(Il Presidente interrompe l'oratore)

Seán Kelly (PPE). – Mr President, having attended COP 21 on behalf of Parliament, I am very pleased with the way matters are progressing and indeed with the leadership shown, in particular by Commissioner Arias Cañete since he took office. I think we are moving in a very practical and sensible manner and at the same time – as Mr Marias mentioned a few minutes ago – we can do so in an environmentally friendly way, meet our targets and, at the same time, not damage our economy.

Yesterday I had a meeting with our own new minister, Minister Naughten. I think he has a very firm grasp of what we need to do in Ireland, and I am quite sure the same applies to all other Member States.

On Tuesday night here I was at a meeting where we were discussing decarbonising the transport sector, so the market signals are quite clear. I think the industry is moving in the right direction and therefore what we have to do is to guide them along, make sure the targets are set, that there is no escape for anybody, and we can meet the COP 21 targets which we set out to do. I think the Commission is moving in the right direction and I support it in that.

Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'attuale combinazione di obiettivi nazionali vincolanti, piani di azione nazionali per le energie rinnovabili e controllo biennale ha costituito il fattore trainante per lo sviluppo delle capacità di produrre energia rinnovabile negli Stati membri.

La Commissione dovrebbe però garantire la piena attuazione degli obiettivi 2020 in materia di energia rinnovabile e dovrebbe presentare un quadro normativo ambizioso per il periodo successivo. È necessario, a questo proposito, un quadro regolamentare stabile a lungo termine, che includa obiettivi in materia di energie rinnovabili a livello nazionale e dell'Unione.

La produzione di energia elettrica da fonti rinnovabili dovrebbe essere integrata nei sistemi di distribuzione. Purtroppo in molti Stati membri le reti sono semplicemente inadatte a ricevere energia elettrica generata da fonti rinnovabili variabili. Una modernizzazione delle reti di energia è quindi essenziale. È fondamentale dunque conseguire i nostri obiettivi in materia di efficienza energetica, abbandonando le fonti energetiche fossili ed eliminando gradualmente i sussidi destinati a questi combustibili.

(Ende des Catch-the-eye-Verfahrens)

Miguel Arias Cañete, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, Members and rapporteurs, I think we must realise that in Paris we achieved an historic success, but we have a very ambitious commitment, which is to fight global warming to keep the global temperature increase to well below 2 degrees and pursue efforts towards 1.5 degrees, which is a major challenge. In order to achieve that challenge we do not have so many tools. We have to produce energy in another, different way, and that is renewables, and we have to consume less energy and that is energy efficiency. Those policies work together, and we have to deliver new policies. In the past, we had regulations in cars, we have many targets, in the past we had national binding targets. The October 2014 Council decided other things on global targets, binding targets in renewables, but at European Union level, non-binding targets in energy efficiency – so now we have to take our responsibilities and deliver the legislation to achieve our Paris objective. For that, we have work in all the areas simultaneously, and Mr Turmes was right: the first thing we must set right is a market design for electricity which is fit for renewables because the actual market side does not give price signals, it is not fit for renewables, there are not enough interconnections so we must first of all have a new market design which is fit for renewables.

Then we have to deliver a renewables legislation which is ambitious and with all the incentives for Member States to go for renewables, with all the innovation support under Horizon 2020 in order to set programmes for the European Union to deliver new technologies and higher performance. 60% of the package of renewables are made in the European Union. We have to have that leadership in technology in the future also, and we have to have ambitious governance to deliver our objectives.

In energy efficiency, directives are the most difficult to implement. It is the area in which more infringements are launched in the Commission because the first thing the Commission is doing is enforcing the actual legislation to make sure we achieve our 2020 targets. In renewables, we are achieving our targets. Many countries are in their trajectory. It is true that some countries will have to make additional efforts, but we are on track for 2020. For 2030, we have to make many additional efforts with a more difficult framework because we do not have national targets which are binding. So we will have a major challenge, and I appreciate all the support of this Parliament because the debate has been extremely constructive and the members of the Parliament are asking the Commission to deliver ambitious initiatives. The Commission will work on that pattern and I am pretty sure there will be scope for very good cooperation amongst us.

Algunos diputados españoles han abordado el tema del régimen retributivo de las renovables. El propósito de la Comisión es diseñar un régimen retributivo de las renovables más orientado al mercado, un mercado eléctrico que ve señales de precios favorables a las renovables; acceso de la producción de la energía renovable y de la producción distribuida y del autoconsumo a las redes con una buena regulación armonizada; aproximaciones a sistemas de retribución más orientados al mercado. Y, por lo tanto, trabajaremos en regímenes que sean predictibles, que den las señales a los inversores y que aseguren seguridad jurídica.

Debo decir que en el sistema actual, los Estados miembros tienen una amplia libertad para decidir cómo apoyan las renovables, siempre que cumplan con el objetivo establecido en la Directiva. La Comisión, en este momento, está finalizando su análisis de la reforma del régimen retributivo de las renovables en el caso de España y emprenderá un diálogo con las autoridades españolas si identifica un incumplimiento de la legislación europea.

En este análisis, la Comisión también está teniendo en cuenta las recientes sentencias de los Tribunales Supremo y Constitucional españoles, que han avalado las decisiones tomadas en su momento por el Gobierno.

Y respecto de las ayudas de Estado, las autoridades españolas han comunicado a la Dirección General de la Competencia tanto el antiguo como el nuevo régimen retributivo de las renovables. La Comisión tiene la obligación legal de examinar si son compatibles con las normas del mercado interior, y la Dirección General de la Competencia está, en este momento, en esa fase de análisis de la compatibilidad.

Por lo que se refiere a la intervención del señor Benito, yo debo manifestar —y lo ha dicho la señora del Castillo— que siempre he estado dispuesto a comparecer ante el Pleno, ante las comisiones, siempre y en la forma que haya sido invitado; y es verdad que la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos de este Parlamento me ha invitado el próximo día 12 de julio y estaré encantado de comparecer ante la misma.

En mi comparecencia tendré la ocasión de demostrar que las insinuaciones y afirmaciones que hace el señor Benito hacia mi persona carecen de fundamento; y le puedo asegurar al señor Benito que, en todos los cargos públicos que he ocupado, he actuado siempre con plena dedicación, con total transparencia, con respeto a la legalidad, con integridad, con independencia, defendiendo siempre el interés público y, ahora, el interés europeo, desarrollando una política climática ambiciosa con una política energética sostenible.

Paloma López Bermejo, ponente. – Señor Presidente, agradezco, una vez, más el tono del debate y las aportaciones de mis colegas. Quiero ampliar uno de los puntos de mi intervención inicial. La cuestión del desarrollo de las energías renovables es, también, una cuestión de soberanía energética. Europa no puede asumir una factura creciente por sus importaciones energéticas y expoliar los recursos fósiles del Globo. Por el contrario, debe mejorar la eficiencia y el ahorro energéticos y fomentar la producción de energía en el propio continente.

En estas circunstancias, los fósiles convencionales europeos tienen un rol de apoyo en la transición energética, pero indudablemente esta deberá pivotar sobre el desarrollo de la energía renovable. Es un reto que es también imprescindible afrontar por motivos de sostenibilidad ecológica, y a estas alturas y a estas problemáticas, bien reflejadas en el debate de hoy, intentamos dar respuesta en este informe.

Señor Comisario, discrepo de su optimismo sobre que en el año 2020 algunos países puedan alcanzar los objetivos establecidos y los objetivos fijados. Y para 2030 no renunciaremos a nada que fije el Parlamento Europeo. Entre otras cosas, porque esta Cámara es soberana respecto al Consejo. Ante todo, hemos intentado dotar de coherencia a las peticiones pasadas de este Parlamento sobre el desarrollo de las renovables con la realidad de los Estados miembros. Pero lo que no podemos tolerar es, en ningún caso, una menor ambición que la demostrada hasta ahora.

La actual Directiva sobre renovables debe implementarse en su totalidad, y para 2030 necesitamos objetivos más ambiciosos que los que plantean la Comisión y el Consejo. Además, deberán promocionarse aquellos mecanismos que han demostrado su eficiencia para facilitar la inversión en renovables y su entrada preferente en el mercado, así como una mayor democracia energética del autoconsumo de la inversión pública. Este debe ser el mensaje que salga hoy del Parlamento.

Markus Pieper, Berichterstatter. – Herr Präsident! Danke auch an die Kollegen für die sehr interessanten Beiträge. Wir wollen alle mehr Energieeffizienz. Die einen durch verstärkten Einsparzwang, die anderen durch eine Bewahrung des flexiblen Ansatzes der Richtlinie. Heute findet das Votum in Großbritannien statt, und wir wissen doch, was die Menschen an Brüssel am wenigsten mögen: Das ist eine europäische Bevormundungsbürokratie. Wenn ein 40-prozentiges Verbrauchsverbot von Energie durchkäme, wird das jeder merken nicht nur durch steigende Mieten, weil die Wohnungen für sozial Schwache dann energetisch wirklich Luxus sind.

Nein, erklären Sie mir bitte auch mal, wie wir den Wandel zur Elektromobilität hinkriegen sollen: Wir werden dafür absehbar gigantisch mehr Strom benötigen, und dieser Strom soll schon bald zum größten Teil aus erneuerbaren Energien kommen – Herr Cañete hat es ja angesprochen, wie wichtig der Ausbau ist. Wir sagen aber jetzt: Energieeinsparung auch für Energien, die gar nicht das Klima belasten. Das geht in meinen Kopf nicht rein, wie man für eine solche Linie sein kann, und wo soll denn dann der in riesigen Mengen zusätzlich benötigte Strom herkommen, zum Beispiel in Dänemark, in Schweden, wenn die auf Elektromobilität umstellen wollen? Ja, aus der Steckdose, damit kennen sich die Grünen aus, das weiß ich auch. Aber ich muss es so deutlich sagen: Wer für ein 40-prozentiges Energieverbot ist, der ist gegen Innovation, gegen Wachstum, der geht den Globalisierungskritikern auf den Leim. Deshalb hoffe ich immer noch auf entsprechende Mehrheiten, auf einen flexiblen Zielkorridor. Lassen Sie uns in Energieeffizienz investieren, mit Spaß am Projekt und nicht durch Zwang verordnet!

(Die Sitzung wird um 10.50 Uhr unterbrochen und um 11.00 Uhr wieder aufgenommen.)

Ivo Belet (PPE), schriftelijk. – Met het klimaatakkoord van Parijs hebben we met zijn allen de decarbonisering van onze economieën op de rails gezet. Energie-efficiëntie is een van de pijlers van die ambitie. Het maakt Europa competitiever, minder afhankelijk van energie-import, creëert jobs en beschermt het milieu. Vooral onze huizen en gebouwen kunnen nog verbeteren. Het isoleren en efficiënt verlichten creëert jobs en zorgt dat we minder moeten betalen aan energie. Investeren in isolatie en in energie-efficiëntie moeten we dus massaal aanmoedigen. De overheid moet die trend voluit stimuleren via fiscale maatregelen, via bredere toegang tot renovatieleningen en via de inzet van energie-efficiënte diensten. Maar ook in de transportsector moeten we grote stappen zetten. Door bijvoorbeeld CO₂-standaarden voor vrachtwagens in te voeren, kunnen we enorme besparing realiseren. De VS en Japan hebben ons dit al voorgedaan. De EU moet hierin mee het voortouw nemen, anders raken we onze koploperspositie kwijt. Door ambitieus te zijn wat betreft hernieuwbare energie en energie-efficiëntie, kunnen we de Europese industrie meer ademruimte geven om de CO₂-reductiedoelstellingen te halen. De meest efficiënte bedrijven in de EU besparen we extra klimaatkosten en we geven hun de ruimte om voluit in te zetten op schone technologie.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Πιστεύω ότι ένας τρόπος για επίτευξη αυτού του στόχου είναι και η αξιοποίηση νέων ευρωπαϊκών πηγών ενέργειας. Έτσι, εάν πραγματικά η ΕΕ εννοεί ότι διαθέτει την πολιτική βούληση και αποφασιστικότητα για να καταστεί μελλοντικά ενεργειακά αυτόνομη και ταυτόχρονα να μειώσει και τις ενεργειακές εξαρτήσεις και το ενεργειακό κόστος, έχει μονάχα ένα δρόμο να ακολουθήσει αταλάντευτα και με συνέπεια: να αξιοποιήσει και να αναπτύξει κατά προτεραιότητα τις Ευρωπαϊκές Ενεργειακές Πηγές.

Η Κύπρος και πιθανώς και άλλες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες διαθέτουν αυτή τη στιγμή ενεργειακές πηγές και ενεργειακή προοπτική. Η ΕΕ πρέπει να στηρίξει όχι μόνο θεωρητικά αλλά εμπράκτως με ενεργειακές υποδομές και επενδύσεις την Κύπρο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Αυτό θα αποβεί πρωτίστως προς όφελος της ΕΕ, των ευρωπαίων πολιτών και των ευρωπαϊκών σχεδιασμών. Η πρωώθηση των ανταγωνιστικών εναλλακτικών μορφών ενέργειας και η αξιοποίηση των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας, επικεντρωμένες στα συγκριτικά πλεονεκτήματα χωρών που διαθέτουν αυξημένη ηλιοφάνεια, αέρα, βιοκαύσιμα κ.ά. αποτελούν αποτελεσματική κίνηση με πολλαπλά οφέλη τόσο για την ενέργεια όσο και για το περιβάλλον. Με τα σημερινά δεδομένα ορισμένες μορφές ΑΠΕ προσφέρονται πλέον σε χαμηλές και ανταγωνιστικές τιμές και μπορούν να φτάσουν και στον απλό πολίτη καταπολεμώντας και την ενεργειακή φτώχεια.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Οι ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας αποτελούν μια απάντηση στην κλιματική αλλαγή. Ταυτόχρονα, η ανάπτυξη τους θα μειώσει την εξάρτηση της ευρωπαϊκής οικονομίας από τις ενεργειακές πηγές τρίτων χωρών, δημιουργώντας έτσι θέσεις εργασίας στην ευρωπαϊκή αγορά που πασχίζει να ανακάμψει από την οικονομική κρίση. Τα επόμενα χρόνια θα είναι ιδιαιτέρως κρίσιμα σε ό,τι αφορά την επίτευξη του δεσμευτικού στόχου 20% επί της τελικής ενεργειακής κατανάλωσης ως το 2020, όπως ορίζεται στην οδηγία 2009/28/ΕΚ, αλλά και του αντίστοιχου 27% ως το 2030. Επιμέρους χώρες απέχουν αρκετά από την επίτευξη του ατομικά ορισμένου στόχου τους, ενώ παρατηρούνται μεγάλες διαφορές και μεταξύ των τομέων δραστηριότητας. Έτσι, στον τομέα του ηλεκτρισμού ο στόχος χρήσης ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας φαίνεται να επιτυγχάνεται, αλλά στους τομείς θέρμανσης-ψύξης και μεταφορών επισημαίνονται καθυστερήσεις που καθιστούν αμφίβολη την επίτευξη των στόχων ως το 2020.

Προκειμένου να ανταποκριθούμε στις προκλήσεις του μέλλοντος, με σεβασμό στο περιβάλλον και ανθρωποκεντρική προσέγγιση, απαιτούνται συντονισμένες πολιτικές και αυξημένα συστήματα στήριξης, ώστε να καταστούν ανταγωνιστικές ορισμένες τεχνολογίες ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Αποτελεί πρωταρχική ανάγκη η προσπάθεια για περαιτέρω ανάπτυξη και χρήση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας, καθώς κι ένας ολοκληρωμένος σχεδιασμός που θα αντιμετωπίζει το ζήτημα της ενεργειακής φτώχειας, ώστε να ανταποκριθούμε στις διεθνείς δεσμεύσεις για μείωση των εκπομπών αερίων θερμοκηπίου.

Birgit Collin-Langen (PPE), schriftlich. – Ich habe gegen diesen Bericht gestimmt, denn leider konnte sich der erarbeitete Kompromiss mit Zielen von einer Energieeinsparung von 30-40% nicht durchsetzen. Nicht immer sind strenge Regulierungen von der EU der richtige Weg. Verbindliche Energieeinsparungen von 40%, wie Grüne und Sozialisten es verlangen, schädigen Wachstum und Innovationen in Europa. Als ehemalige Oberbürgermeisterin waren auch die neuen Vorschriften, wie z.B. die Renovierungsquote, ein Problem für mich, denn diese sind für Kommunen eine Zumutung.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), в писмена форма. – Напълно подкрепям включването на въпроса за енергийната бедност в директивата. Особено в страни като България това е основен въпрос, свързан с инфраструктурите. В същото време има препоръчителни цели, т.е. целта от 40% за възобновяеми източници и др. Необходимо е да подобряваме инфраструктурите по отношение на отоплението, електричеството и т.н., какъвто е например случаят в моята държава членка, с цел да има възможност за постигане на предварително определените цели.

Въпреки че е важно да се осигурят насоки и да се настоява за промяна, имаме нужда от по-добро регионално сътрудничество и подкрепа за борещите се с трудности региони чрез по-добро и целенасочено използване на европейските инвестиционни фондове и като цяло по-диференциран подход. Енергийната ефективност и стратегическото политическо ориентиране на политиките върви ръка за ръка. Докато някои проекти, като например „Северен поток“, са постоянно обект на дискусия, други проекти бяха изоставени изцяло, като например „Южен поток“. Страните от Източна Европа ще имат голяма полза от такива проекти и подобряване на ситуацията като цяло, не само по отношение на зависимостта от изкопаеми горива, но също така и по отношение на инфраструктурата и диверсификацията.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – O incremento da eficiência energética é uma questão candente, particularmente para países como Portugal, com um enorme défice energético e uma significativa dependência face ao exterior.

Mas esta questão não poderá ser abordada de forma profícua, em toda a sua dimensão e complexidade, no quadro estrito e redutor da chamada União da Energia e da visão liberalizadora e desreguladora que a norteia.

Uma certa evolução positiva recente, relativamente ao abrandamento das emissões de Gases de Efeito de Estufa, resulta mais da crise económica do que da necessária – mas ainda por concretizar – transição de paradigma energético.

Divergimos das abordagens de mercado e denunciámos as suas perversidades. O quadro de liberalização e privatização do setor energético trouxe consigo elevados preços da energia para os consumidores industriais médios e para as famílias, para sustentar os lucros dos monopólios e oligopólios privados do setor, comprometendo os investimentos necessários para incrementar a eficiência energética.

Sublinhamos, assim, a necessidade de controlo público e democrático do setor energético, o que significa a sua propriedade e gestão públicas, como meio imprescindível para alcançar desejados e proclamados objetivos económicos, sociais e ambientais.

Adam Gierek (S&D), na piśmie. – Jak się okazuje, optymalnym rozwiązaniem dla elektrowni wiatrowych jest ich elastyczna współpraca z wysoko efektywnymi turbinami gazowymi (nie mylić z kotłami gazowymi). Skojarzenie to w makroskali, tj. dla dużych sieci energetycznych, może wkrótce być podstawą utworzenia najbardziej perspektywicznych i efektywnych systemów produkcji prądu na świecie. Rozwiązanie to wymaga większych dostaw gazu na rynek UE, i choć zdecydowanie ogranicza emisję CO₂, to jej nie eliminuje. Niestety, technologia czysta, związana z akumulowaniem dużej ilości energii elektrycznej, nadal jest jeszcze mało efektywna. Pewną alternatywę dla dużych sieci stanowią małe, prosumenckie instalacje, pracujące głównie na potrzeby lokalne. Natomiast postęp w zakresie lepszego wykorzystania źródeł odnawialnych w autonomicznych instalacjach grzewczych i chłodniczych jest niedostateczny. Potrzebny jest bardziej intensywny rozwój techniki dobowego magazynowania ciepła i stosownych dla tego celu konstrukcji, a także instalacji „free cooling”, które byłyby dostępne na rynku. Potencjał energetyki geotermalnej oraz pomp ciepłych jest ogromny, lecz – jak sądzę – słabo wykorzystany i wymaga intensywniejszych badań służących obniżeniu kosztów tych technologii. Wymaga dostępu konsumentów do rynku stosownych urządzeń i aparatury.

Maria Grapini (S&D), *în scris*. – Energia și sursele de energie sunt teme importante. Evident că trebuie ținut cont de cum ne folosim sursele energetice naturale și cum are loc decarbonizarea. Mă bucură faptul că țara mea, România, și-a realizat obiectivele stabilite pentru 2020, aflându-se în top 3 al țărilor în ceea ce privește procentul energiei verzi în total energie. Din păcate, Comisia nu a ținut cont de realitatea fiecărei țări și a încercat să suspende atribuțiile naționale privind mixul energetic. Soluția nu este să eliminăm sursele energetice, ci să investim în tehnologii moderne, în cercetare, pentru a crește siguranța acestor surse energetice și pentru decarbonizare. Nu au fost utilizate optim FEIS și fondurile structurale în domeniul energetic, al transporturilor și al eficientizării energetice.

Nu trebuie să uităm de consumatori, care, din păcate, au preluat costurile energiei verzi și trebuie regândit sistemul de subvenții pentru producătorii de energie. Energiile regenerabile trebuie să meargă mână-n mână cu eficientizarea energetică, care să ducă la scăderea consumului și reducerea costurilor pentru consumatori.

András Gyürk (PPE), *írásban*. – Tisztelt Képviselőtársak! 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és az egyéni felhasználók az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a szén-dioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiatermelés támogatását célzó uniós irányelveknek. Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika, valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, továbbá még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ugyan a jelentés rengeteg fontos és hasznos javaslatot tartalmaz, a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági megtakarítási célkitűzés túlzó és nehezen vállalható terheket ró a tagállamokra. Nem tudom támogatni az egyébként jó jelentés irreális célkitűzését, amely a tagállami szuverenitást ilyen mértékben befolyásolja.

Robert Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (EFDD), *na piśmie*. – Szanowni Państwo! Kto z nas, mając w domu skarb pozwalający przez lata żyć dostatnio, zgodziłby się go zakopać i wziąć kredyt na życie? To w sprawozdaniu proponuje nam komisja ITRE. Zielona rewolucja to dla mojej Ojczyzny, dla Polski, wykluczenie węgla oraz przejście na odnawialne źródła energii. Tym samym zadłużenie się i wpompowanie olbrzymich środków finansowych w technologie, które do dzisiaj nie potwierdziły swojej skuteczności. Dlatego będę głosował przeciw. Tak samo jak występuję przeciw całemu pakietowi energetyczno-klimatycznemu oraz zielonej rewolucji serwowanej przez unijną biurokrację. 85% polskiej energii produkowanej jest z węgla. Nikt nie powinien nam narzucać zmiany. To nasza decyzja i tylko nasza, jako suwerennego kraju. 50 lat temu ta Unia była unią węgla i stali. Dziś w Europie prawie nie produkuje się stali, a za węgiel chce się karać państwa członkowskie. Nie ma na to zgody.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Želim naglasiti važnost obnovljivih izvora energija kao jasne budućnosti energetske neovisnosti EU-a. Cijena proizvodnje energije iz obnovljivih izvora je još uvijek previsoka i samo kontinuirana dugoročna ulaganja preduvjet su za ostvarivanje ciljeva koji su postavljeni vrlo ambiciozno. Skrećem ponovno pažnju na potencijal koji jugoistočna Europa ima u hidroenergiji i biomasi. Trebamo uključiti u sve naše planove i ovaj dio Europe koji može značajno doprinijeti stvaranju efikasnog energetskog mixa na jedinstvenom europskom energetskom tržištu.

Karol Karski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Emisje gazów cieplarnianych w UE zmniejszyły się w latach 1990-2014 o 23 %. W tym samym czasie PKB UE wzrósł o 46 %. Przy coraz mniejszym obciążeniu klimatu przedsiębiorstwa i obywatele osiągają większy wzrost gospodarczy, tworzą więcej miejsc pracy i generują dochody podatkowe.

Unia Europejska jest na dobrej drodze, aby zrealizować cele wyznaczone na rok 2020, przewidujące o 20 % mniej emisji CO₂. Dowodzi to, że nie ma potrzeby drastycznego zaostrzania polityki klimatycznej, która okazuje się przeszkodą dla reindustrializacji UE. Warto więc przypomnieć, że UE założyła, iż do 2020 r. udział przemysłu w unijnym PKB powinien wynosić 20 %. Niepokój budzi biurokratyczna sprawozdawczość w obszarze energii i wysokie ceny energii dla średnich przedsiębiorstw i prywatnych gospodarstw domowych.

Dyrektywa w sprawie efektywności energetycznej powinna odgrywać kluczową rolę w polityce energetycznej UE. Należy jednak zauważyć, że Unia Europejska zrealizowała swój cel poprawy efektywności o 20 % do 2020 r., nawet bez pełnego wdrożenia dyrektywy w większości państw członkowskich. Pokazuje to siłę rynku i zdolność kształtowania samodzielnej polityki energetycznej po stronie państw członkowskich. Unia Europejska nie powinna więc ulegać pokusie bezrefleksyjnego promowania polityki klimatycznej i energetycznej kosztem polityki przemysłowej.

Jaromír Kohlíček (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Směrnice o energetické účinnosti je postavena na zajímavé teorii. Na jedné straně předpokládá, že bez ohledu na vynaložené náklady a místní klima se všem v celé EU za všech okolností vyplatí provést maximální možná opatření na zvýšení energetické účinnosti. Neznámo proč se celá zpráva opírá o tezi „volný trh je nejlepším řešením na veškeré problémy“. Na několika místech je toto tvrzení „změkčeno“ sociálními ohledy. Značná část návrhu se zabývá zlepšením vykazování a podporou technického pokroku. V některých bodech se ovšem vyskytují velmi málo realistická tvrzení předpokládající v relativně blízké budoucnosti prakticky nulové nároky na dodávky energie u všech budov. Velmi slabým místem celého textu je předpoklad možného odstranění emisí CO₂ i u podstatné části průmyslových výroby. Což sice je teoreticky možné, ale prakticky při dnešních znalostech nejlepších technologií nerealizovatelné. Přes tyto výhrady zpráva obsahuje řadu zajímavých podnětů, které mohou významně přispět k úsporám energie. Tato kombinace nerealistických cílů v relativně blízkém horizontu, tržního fundamentalismu a sociálních prvků spolu s nerealnými očekáváními rychlého technického pokroku jsou důvodem, proč nemohu jednoznačně podpořit či zamítnout posuzované předložené návrhy.

Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), *în scris*. – Coerența dintre sistemul ETS și politicile energetice de reducere a emisiilor de dioxid de carbon trebuie să fie consolidată pentru a contribui cu adevărat la ameliorarea eficienței energetice. Fondul european pentru investiții strategice în cadrul Planului de investiții al UE este un instrument care poate să aducă o contribuție importantă pe termen scurt pentru investițiile în materie de eficiență energetică, și care ar putea avea efecte semnificative asupra pieței interne a energiei.

Fondurile structurale și Fondul de coeziune trebuie folosite pentru a stimula investițiile în eficiența energetică, în dezvoltarea tehnologiilor energetice durabile cu emisii scăzute de dioxid de carbon. Investițiile trebuie să fie pe deplin integrate în strategiile naționale în materie de eficiență energetică. Producția de energie din surse regenerabile trebuie corelată, însă, cu necesitatea de a asigura continuitatea producției convenționale de energie, ca premisă pentru sustenabilitate.

Fondul de modernizare, recent propus de Comisie, este un alt instrument care va putea fi folosit pentru modernizarea sistemelor energetice și îmbunătățirea eficienței energetice în statele membre ale UE cu venituri reduse. Este important ca acest viitor fond să aibă o structură de guvernare adecvată pentru a-i spori eficacitatea în funcție de caracteristicile specifice fiecărui stat membru.

David McAllister (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Eine nachhaltige Energiepolitik sollte auf eine wirtschaftliche und sichere Energiegewinnung setzen, die Versorgungssicherheit und Klimaschutz verbindet. Konventionelle Energieträger bleiben dabei zur Gewährleistung der Versorgungssicherheit ein wichtiger Bestandteil. Das Einsparen von Energie, die Erhöhung der Energieeffizienz und die Nutzung erneuerbarer Energien sollten die tragenden Säulen einer nachhaltigen Energiepolitik sein. Unser Ziel muss es sein, in der gesamten Europäischen Union eine verlässliche, umweltfreundliche und wettbewerbsfähige Energieversorgung zu gewährleisten. Das ist eine wichtige Voraussetzung für Wachstum und Wohlstand. Nur mit einer nachhaltigen Energieversorgung können Arbeitsplätze gesichert und die Herausforderungen unserer Zeit bewältigt werden. Eine zentrale Rolle in diesem Prozess spielt der Ausbau der Windenergie, insbesondere der Offshore-Windenergie. Um die notwendigen Milliardeninvestitionen in diese Zukunftstechnologie zu ermöglichen, muss mehr Geld in die Küstenregionen investiert werden. Dadurch könnten tausende Arbeitsplätze entstehen. Der Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien erfordert zudem den Ausbau des Verteil- und Übertragungsnetzes sowie die Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für Energiespeicher.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – Energy is the source of development. Europe needs a policy designed to ensure energy efficiency, sustainability of production and protection of disadvantaged consumers. In order to do that, we need first of all to make sure that we invest in the latest technologies that are capable of raising energy efficiency while taking care of our development needs. Furthermore we need to develop a pan-European energy production and distribution plan that takes care of the particularities of each Member State and region while at the same time focusing on job creation, training for new skills and the need to ensure energy independence for Europe.

Therefore the energy sector needs an organised investment plan that ensures the modernisation of the industry allowing prices to be kept low for consumers. The modernisation of the industry needs to be inclusive in integrating all the needs of the stakeholders and the Member States.

Pavel Poc (S&D), *písemně*. – V roce 2014 vynaložila EU 358 miliard EUR na dovoz energie. To je téměř jedna miliarda EUR denně, což je více než celkový schodek Řecka (317 miliard EUR) a téměř tolik jako celkový obrat německého automobilového průmyslu (367,9 miliardy EUR) v roce 2014. Jsme si vědomi toho, že evropské maloobchodní ceny za elektrickou energii pro malé a střední zákazníky z odvětví průmyslu a obchodu a pro soukromé spotřebitele jsou v mnohých členských státech vysoké. Víme také, že vysoké ceny energie v EU způsobují rozdíly v cenách energie mezi členskými státy a našimi hlavními konkurenty v mnoha částech světa, což představuje značnou konkurenční nevýhodu. Nikdo nepochybně, že zvýšení energetické účinnosti a energetické úspory představují důležité faktory pro ochranu životního prostředí a klimatu, posílení hospodářské konkurenceschopnosti, tvorbu pracovních míst a bezpečné dodávky energie. Přesto se od roku 2011, kdy jsem byl stínovým zpravodajem ke směrnici o energetické účinnosti, mnoho nezměnilo. Osobně jsem se například prosazoval ustanovení obsažené v článku 7, podle něhož mohou členské státy požádat, aby určitá část opatření na zvyšování energetické účinnosti byla prioritně realizována v domácnostech postižených energetickou chudobou nebo v oblasti sociálního bydlení. Bohužel tuto možnost využily zatím jen dva členské státy z 28. Je potřeba dělat víc.

Carolina Punset (ALDE), *por escrito*. – Ante el reto de descarbonización y los Acuerdos del Clima, no se puede permitir que ningún país retroceda en el camino de implementar las energías renovables. Cuando a nivel mundial se incrementa la presencia de energías renovables, en países como España se retrocede un 4 % anual. El gobierno español ha torpedeado cualquier inversión en energía renovable, con una legislación retroactiva, que arruinó a inversores, pymes e industria española del sector. Va contra el fomento de las energías renovables penalizar a los autoconsumidores, imponiendo el impuesto al Sol o prohibiendo el autoconsumo colectivo como también ocurre en España. Al actuar contra las renovables se actúa contra la independencia y seguridad energética y contra la lucha para evitar el cambio climático. Por otro lado el sector de las renovables es un sector tecnológico con trabajadores cualificados. En España su ataque ha supuesto la pérdida de más de 80 000 puestos de trabajo, y ello cuando se incrementan las oportunidades laborales en este sector en el resto del mundo. Parte de la culpa de este retroceso la tienen objetivos poco ambiciosos, por lo que lo debería revisarse los nuevos objetivos para alcanzar el 40 % de introducción de renovables en Europa de aquí al 2030.

Algirdas Saudargas (PPE), *raštu*. – Europos Sąjunga užima teisingą poziciją, kad energijos vartojimo efektyvumo didinimas ir atsinaujinančių išteklių energijos naudojimas turi eiti lygiagrečiai, nes šiandieniniame pasaulyje vienas be kito yra neįmanomi. Šį supratimą ES demonstruoja tiek globaliu lygmeniu, kai aktyviai palaikė ambicingą Paryžiaus klimato kaitos susitarimą, tiek ir savo teisės aktuose stiprindama įsipareigojimą mažinti vartojimą ir daryti jį „draugiškesnį gamtai“.

Tačiau praktikoje situacija sudėtingesnė, nes Energijos vartojimo efektyvumo direktyvos, kuria numatoma iki 2020 m. pasiekti 20 proc. efektyvumo barjerą, vis dar nėra pilnai įgyvendinta daugelyje narių ir, tikėtina, siekiamas tikslas nebus įgyvendintas. Todėl raporte pateikti siūlymai, kad atnaujinta direktyva turėtų kelti 40 proc. efektyvumo 2030-aisiais tikslą yra prasilenkianti su realybe ir gali vėl likti tik „popierinė“. Turime atsižvelgti į esamą situaciją, nes energijos efektyvumo siekis negali virsti tikslu savaime – turime išlaikyti ES konkurencingumą pasaulinėje rinkoje.

Atsinaujinančių energijos išteklių plėtra yra reikalinga ir svarbu, kad ES kelia ambicingus tikslus. Džiaugiuosi, kad į progreso šioje srityje vertinimo raportą buvo įtraukti svarbūs ELP grupės pasiūlymai, ypač susiję su energijos išteklių diversifikacija ir valstybių kompetencijos pasirinkti jai tinkamiausią naudojamų energijos išteklių paletės išsaugojimu.

Olga Sehnalová (S&D), *písemně*. – Na vysoké spotřebě energie a paliv se významně podílí sektor dopravy. Ta je dokonce jediným odvětvím v Evropské unii, ve kterém od roku 1990 stouply emise skleníkových plynů. Přijatá opatření však musí být dlouhodobě udržitelná a neměla by vytvářet jiné nežádoucí jevy – nechvalně známý je například negativní dopad prosazování biopaliv na produkci potravin. Mnohem více pozornosti musí být věnováno celkové koordinaci a plánování logistiky a jejich skutečné udržitelnosti. Tuto zprávu, která požaduje i komplexnější přístup ke zlepšení energetické účinnosti celého dopravního systému, jsem proto podpořila.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Energetický model Európskej únie si vyžaduje nový prístup. Zabrániť vážnym environmentálnym dôsledkom môžeme, ak bude prebiehať regulácia a demokratická účasť.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), *în scris*. – Creșterea eficienței energetice constituie un factor-cheie pentru protecția mediului, consolidarea competitivității economice, precum și în combaterea sărăciei energetice.

În cazul energiei regenerabile, care, în prezent, este mai ieftină decât unele surse de energie convenționale, vorbim de noi locuri de muncă, creștere economică și dezvoltarea tehnologiei. Dacă reușim să creștem eficiența energetică, vom reuși totodată să reducem dependența noastră de importurile scumpe de energie și vom contribui la protecția mediului înconjurător. Această măsură prevede flexibilitate la nivelul ofertei și sustenabilitate, ceea ce ar aduce beneficii suplimentare Uniunii Europene, în special în construcții și transport. În acest sens, consider că statele UE trebuie să depună mai mult efort în implementarea integrală a strategiei-cadru privind clima și energia pentru anul 2020, care prevede reducerea emisiilor de CO₂, creșterea ponderii surselor regenerabile de energie, precum și creșterea eficienței energetice. Totodată, este evident că, în contextul în care sărăcia energetică afectează în prezent peste 50 de milioane de cetățeni europeni, implementarea legislației trebuie să ia în considerare și nevoile acestui segment.

Îmi exprim speranța ca și România să poată participa la acest efort comun și să atingă obiectivele enunțate de Comisie.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – Le développement des énergies renouvelables requiert une nouvelle approche qui ferait d'elles la pierre angulaire du modèle énergétique de l'Union européenne. Notre responsabilité fondamentale est de combattre le changement climatique, une tâche historique dont nous devons nous acquitter. Nous devons également réduire notre dépendance à l'égard des ressources énergétiques provenant du reste du monde si nous aspirons à structurer notre modèle de production, à créer des emplois de qualité et à être le fer de lance du développement des technologies stratégiques sous-tendant notre transition énergétique.

La transition vers un modèle de production de l'énergie viable à long terme est une priorité sociale qui ne peut être confiée au seul marché. Au contraire, nous devons comprendre que la régulation et la participation démocratique sont indispensables si l'on veut éviter de graves externalités sociales et environnementales. Nous devons empêcher que des oligopoles de l'énergie puissent dicter l'avenir énergétique de l'Europe.

Indrek Tarand (Verts/ALE), *in writing*. – We should not increase our dependency on Russian gas by doubling the capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline. Doing so would be extremely detrimental to our energy security since Russia has demonstrated on countless occasions that it is not a reliable partner to the European Union, and that it does not hesitate in wielding energy as a political weapon.

Furthermore, Russia has a long history of not abiding by rules or by what has been agreed upon. The latest example of this kind of behaviour is state-sponsored doping that has led to the disqualification of the entire Russian track and field team from the Rio Olympics. On several previous occasions, Russia has demonstrated that it does not hesitate to infringe upon international law, or the territorial integrity of its neighbours, which is exactly why we cannot rely on Russia or naively believe that things have changed, at least under the current regime. We should be creating more effective energy interconnections within the EU, as well as diversifying our sources.

Jarosław Wałęsa (PPE), *na piśmie*. – Unia Europejska postawiła za cel osiągnięcie 20% udziału energii odnawialnej w odniesieniu do całkowitego zużycia energii do roku 2020. Uważam, że te państwa, które nie osiągnęły jeszcze postawionego przez Europę celu, powinny w pełni skupić się na całkowitym wprowadzeniu zalecanych przepisów UE, tak aby osiągnąć zamierzone rezultaty. Priorytetem jest przyciągnięcie inwestorów na rynek energii odnawialnej. Co więcej, trzeba zachęcić przedsiębiorstwa zagraniczne oraz krajowe, jak i władze regionalne poszczególnych państw, aby wykorzystały środki Europejskiego Funduszu Inwestycji Strategicznych. Uważam, że rynek powinien posiadać łatwo dostępny system wsparcia dla producentów paliw odnawialnych, gdyż to zmaksymalizuje korzyści. Niezwykle istotne jest wzmoc-

nienie udziału konsumentów na rynku. Powinni mieć oni większe możliwości w kwestii samodzielnego wytwarzania i korzystania z energii. Przejście z polityki oligopolistycznej na bardziej demokratyczną będzie bardziej korzystną w skutkach zmianą, gdyż zwiększy się integracja rynku, co w rezultacie przyczyni się do rozwoju energii odnawialnej i redukcji kosztów.

VORSITZ: MARTIN SCHULZ

Präsident

5. Feierliche Sitzung – Palästinensische Behörde

Der Präsident. – Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, meine Damen und Herren! Wir haben heute die große Ehre, Herrn Präsident Mahmud Abbas bei uns zu begrüßen. Sehr geehrter Herr Abbas, ich möchte mich noch einmal herzlich bei Ihnen bedanken, dass Sie der Einladung des Europäischen Parlaments heute gefolgt sind. Ich heiße Sie herzlich im Europäischen Parlament willkommen!

(Beifall)

Die guten Beziehungen zu Palästina sind für uns in der Europäischen Union von großer Bedeutung. Die EU ist Palästinas wichtigster Partner in der finanziellen, wirtschaftlichen und humanitären Zusammenarbeit. Ein stabiles und funktionierendes Palästina ist aber für uns alle auch ein moralischer Auftrag.

Lieber Herr Präsident Abbas! Sie haben Ihr Leben einem Auftrag gewidmet: dem gewaltfreien Eintreten für die Freiheit und die Anerkennung Palästinas. Sie waren einer der Architekten der Friedenskonferenz von Madrid und der Osloer Abkommen, die noch heute einen Meilenstein des Friedensprozesses im Nahen Osten darstellen. Ihre Präsenz heute, Herr Präsident, ist nach der Rede des Präsidenten von Israel, Reuven Rivlin, am gestrigen Tage hier im Hause ein starkes Signal dafür, dass der Wille für einen nachhaltigen Frieden zwischen Israel und Palästina weiterhin lebendig bleibt.

In diesem Zusammenhang würdige ich auch die unermüdliche Arbeit der Hohen Beauftragten für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und Vizepräsidentin der Kommission, Federica Mogherini, die heute Morgen, wie auch gestern, bei uns ist. Herzlich willkommen auch Ihnen, Frau Mogherini!

(Beifall)

Das Europäische Parlament hat sich im September 2015 für eine Zweistaatenlösung auf der Grundlage der Grenzen von 1967 mit Jerusalem als Hauptstadt beider Staaten ausgesprochen. In dieser Zweistaatenlösung sollen ein in Sicherheit lebender Staat Israel – das habe ich gestern hier unterstrichen – und ein unabhängiger, demokratischer, zusammenhängender und lebendiger und lebensfähiger Staat Palästina – das möchte ich heute unterstreichen – friedlich und sicher Seite an Seite leben. Um dies zu garantieren, muss es zuerst ein Ende der Gewalt geben. Kein politisches Ziel rechtfertigt blinden Hass, Hetze oder gar Terrorismus.

Das Europäische Parlament verurteilt nicht zum ersten Mal den fortgesetzten Ausbau der israelischen Siedlungen und ebenso den Raketenbeschuss israelischer Gebiete durch militante Gruppen. Es hat in seinen Entschlüssen zu einem Ende der Blockade des Gazastreifens und zu einer Aussöhnung unter den Palästinensern aufgerufen.

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident Abbas! Gerade diese Aussöhnung – die Bereitschaft zur Vergebung und Empathie sowohl unter den Palästinensern als auch zwischen den Palästinensern und den Israelis – ist ein elementarer Teil des Friedensprozesses, für den Sie sich einsetzen.

Ich heiße Sie noch einmal im Namen aller Kolleginnen und Kollegen im Europäischen Parlament herzlich willkommen und erteile Ihnen gerne das Wort. Bitte sehr, Herr Präsident!

(Beifall)

Mahmoud Abbas, *President of the Palestinian National Authority*. (The following is a transcription of the interpretation of the original speech from Arabic into English.) – Mr President, in the name of Allah, the most merciful, may I first of all thank you for this invitation to address you in your Assembly.

First of all, let me express my admiration for the democratic model you have constructed, the diversity of cultures and languages and different governments. For us, this is a mirror which reflects great civilisation, great culture and reflects the human principles represented by your European peoples.

I would like to express our respect for you and our thanks to you for the positions you have taken up which honour you. You have taken up positions which militate in favour of the restoration of justice and peace in my country, Palestine. For my people, I would like to convey their greetings, and I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to give you a number of pointers for you to think about in your various committees in this Parliament, so that you have some guidelines in thinking about our situation as we seek peace in our part of the world.

I would also like to thank you all for all the different kinds of aid you have given, aiding us in institution-building and helping us establish the bases for a democratic regime which will be stable in the future and which will be able to comply with international criteria for democracy, and in particular we want to establish a proper rule of law and proper respect for human rights.

So once again, our thanks to this Parliament for the recognition you have given our country. Thank you so much for recognising the State of Palestine. I would also like to thank all the national parliaments which, for their part, have recommended to their governments that they should recognise the State of Palestine.

I would also say this. When talking about a two-state solution, if you believe in a two-state solution you have to recognise both states and not just one of them. A hundred years have passed since the Balfour Declaration back in 1917. Sixty-eight years have passed since al-Nakbah, the catastrophe which we suffered when in 1948 the Israeli forces were guilty of slaughter and massacre in our part world, and this led to hundreds of thousands of our citizens having to migrate. This turned these hundreds of thousands of people into refugees. More than 485 of our villages were simply flattened, villages where our people were living peacefully and had lived peacefully for thousands of years.

In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza and once again, thousands of our people were forced to migrate from Gaza and from the West Bank. So the least you can say when looking at Palestine is this: Palestine as a country, and as a people, we have a history, an identity. We are a country, we are a geopolitical entity and this country has suffered a series of historic massacres. We have suffered unprecedented occupation, the sort of occupation of a country we have not seen elsewhere in the world in the 20th century or in the 21st century. And all this in full view of the international community and in full view of the international authorities.

We have been through so many black periods throughout history, and we are still going through a black period. Our Palestinian people are suffering from occupation, from suppression. We are suffering from arbitrary action by the Israelis. We are suffering from racism, hateful racism, and our people are living abroad as refugees. They are living in poverty, in a very precarious situation.

Now we have decided to resist. We have decided to remain in our country, on our land. We have decided to continue our efforts to put an end to Israeli occupation by using political, diplomatic and peaceful means. We have been successful in these efforts at international level, but we are not making progress in terms of our relations with Israel.

We have used every effort in order to implement the agreements which have been signed. We have complied with our commitments, and we are calling on the Israelis to comply with their commitments, but the Israelis refuse to respect these commitments and continue to oppress us and to dominate us in every area of life.

The Israelis are trying to change the situation in the City of Jerusalem. They are trying to change its historic identity. They are infringing holy places – Christian and Islamic and Muslim. They are continuing to build their colonies by confiscating our territory, by flattening our houses. Israel is still imprisoning thousands of our people.

Today, Israel is still a violent state. Every day we see cases of extreme violence for which the Israelis are guilty. We have seen the colonists have burned down houses only recently in which people were living. In particular, a young man died in the latest attack from the Israelis when his house was burnt down. Every day we see murders, extra-judicial killings. And this Israeli attitude, this Israeli behaviour is such that some Israeli politicians have started criticising their own government, for example, Mr Herzog, leader of the opposition, or Ya'alon, a former Army leader, and Ehud Barak, and a former head of the armed forces, and journalists. All these people – Israelis – announcing that the Israeli Government's behaviour is fascist and racist, and I am quoting them there.

Resolution 181 of the United Nations divided the historic territory of Palestine into two states in a more or less fair sharing out of the land, but since then Israel has used force of arms to occupy 78% of historic Palestinian territory. This was back in 1948, but that was not good enough for Israel. It occupied the rest of our territory in 1967. People still quote that United Nations Resolution– Resolution 181 – today and they say that this resolution should not be interpreted literally all the way through, but only certain paragraphs should be implemented. I would say that United Nations Resolution 181 has to be applied in its totality.

Despite international resolutions, United Nations resolutions and the efforts of the international community to find a solution, a two-state solution, despite all these efforts our state is still not independent, despite the fact that we are now a member state of the United Nations, and that since 2012. And we are now a member of a great number of international organisations, as well as the United Nations organisation. We have ratified a great number of international conventions, we are recognised by 138 states around the world.

In order to make progress towards peace and to put an end to our years of suffering, we have now accepted the establishment of the State of Palestine on an area which is less than a quarter of the area of historic Palestine; 22% of our historic territory. We have accepted that as a state, respecting the 1967 borders, and that is an enormous sacrifice.

Since the Madrid Conference and since the Oslo Agreements we have made no further progress. We are going round in circles in negotiations. We are just negotiating for negotiation's sake at the moment. And this is being imposed upon us by Israel. They are trying to gain time in this process so that they can change things on the ground, which will make it less and less possible for us to find a two-state solution.

Today Israel is carrying on with its colonisation. It is continuing to expropriate our land. It is building walls and all this is also being done on a racist basis. Under our other United Nations resolutions calling on Israel to put an end to colonisation, these resolutions have called on Israel to do away with colonisation, to reverse it, but nevertheless, Israel is carrying on with these projects. We are calling on Israel simply to freeze this colonisation so that negotiations can properly start, but Israel still does not stop colonising. It is carrying on.

Furthermore, over the last six years, Israel has started at least three wars in Gaza. It has killed thousands of people. Israel has killed dozens of Palestinian families. There are hundreds of families which have quite simply disappeared. There is no longer a record of them in our civil registers. These families have quite simply disappeared because of the three wars waged by Israel in Gaza in the last six years. Israel has destroyed houses. It has destroyed factories and since the occupation I can tell you this: one million Palestinians have been jailed by Israel at some time or another. At the moment we have 7 000 of our people held as prisoners of war. That is the bitter reality and the dangerous reality we are facing and is it not time to put an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestine? Why is international law not being applied?

(Applause)

Why is international law not being implemented in the case of Israel? You have here a state attacking another state. When that happens normally the whole world stands up and punishes the aggressor, except in the case of Israel. Israel seems free to attack us with impunity. Why have the United Nations resolutions been ignored in the case of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people? How long is Israel going to continue to benefit from this impunity? How long is Israel going to continue rejecting peace? How long is Israel going to continue ignoring the historic sufferings of the Palestinian people? How long is Israel going to accept the injustice it has inflicted upon the Palestinian people?

Our people want to live in peace and dignity on our territory, like any other nation in the world. Our people do not accept this colonisation. We do not accept this invasion. And we will continue to make sacrifices and to suffer until this situation is righted. That is why we are calling on you to help us. You are our friends. Help us. Help us alleviate this situation. Help us remove the desperation our people are suffering from. Help us put an end to the longest occupation in contemporary history. There are no other such lengthy occupations I am aware of. Help us put an end to this occupation.

It is so wrong that our Palestinian people – one of the most ancient peoples in the region and of the world, with its ancient culture – it is so wrong that this situation continues and that we do not have our own state. Is it not time for our people to be able to live in freedom, to live without checkpoints, to live without controls, to live without walls, to live without checkpoints again I say, the checkpoint set up by the Israeli army on an entirely arbitrary basis? It is time all this came to an end.

Israel has turned our country into an open air prison and our people are living in it. Here in this European Parliament, I would like to repeat: we do not want to wipe any other country off the map. Some people want to wipe our country off the map. This should not be allowed. No country should be allowed to wipe another country off the map. We certainly do not want to. On the other hand, all we want to do is exist, and we will not allow anybody to wipe our country off the map and confiscate our rights. We are still denied our rights, and this only serves to encourage our extremists. That leads to terrorism, that leads to violence. And this gives violent people and terrorists a pretext for doing what they do.

I appeal to you: do not make it possible for the Palestinian cause to continue to be used by these extremists and terrorists. We have to put an end to extremism. We have to encourage them to seek a way of life whereby we can all live in peace and fairness under rule of law, enjoying human rights, so I appeal to the European Parliament and to the European institutions to pursue your efforts, continue your efforts, at political and diplomatic level, so that we can come up with a fair and just solution to the problems of our region, and that means we need a two-state solution using the 1967 borders as your President suggested, and by respecting international resolutions and UN resolutions.

Israel and Palestine have both got close links with the European Union. We both have Association Agreements, we are both members of the Union for the Mediterranean, which means that the European Union is a major actor for us. And this is to the benefit of all parties, to all sides.

I want to be very frank with you. I am normally frank with whomsoever I have to deal and in being frank I would like to try and reply to some questions you may have for me. First of all, we are in favour of a two-state solution. We want to create the State of Palestine on all the territories of the West Bank, respecting the borders of 4 June 1967, with our capital being Jerusalem East, which is currently occupied. We are not against exchanging certain pieces of land as long as they are of equal value, within certain limits. There is also a need to deal with the problem of refugees and there we have to implement Resolution 194 on the basis of the Arab peace proposal, which calls for a fair, just and negotiated solution to the problem of refugees. This is an Arab country proposal which has produced a roadmap based on Resolution 1515.

Do not forget that the PLO has recognised Israel. The PLO recognised Israel back in 1993. So we want peace for everybody in our region and we have accepted that there should be a third territory between the Israeli territory and the future Palestinian territory. This would be in the interests of regional security. But we completely reject the provisional solutions which have been proposed, because we believe that they are a complete waste of time and we do not accept a Palestinian State with provisional borders. Our wish is for the Arab Peace Initiative, which was adopted in Beirut in 2002, to be implemented unamended, the Arab peace proposal.

The Israelis often talk about provocation. Well, I would say that Israeli provocation is never-ending. The colonists are still on our territory and to put an end to any provocation at all, including by extremists, we would like the Tripartite Commission involving Israel, Palestine and the United States to be brought back to life.

This Tripartite Commission was set up in Wye River in 1998 in order to resolve all the problems associated with the mutual proof of provocation on both sides and the United States were seeking to be the arbitrator. We are in favour of this Tripartite Commission being brought back to life with the membership of the European Union as a fourth member.

This would, I believe, show clearly that we are against incitation to violence, against provocation, we are against extremism. And we need somebody to arbitrate here, we think, in this particular situation. If you continue to say that the Palestinians are continuing to provoke and incite violence, we do not agree. The Israelis are doing this as well and somebody has to arbitrate and sort out these mutual accusations. The Tripartite Commission, I think, should be brought back to life and joined by the European Union.

I would also like to say that certain rabbis in Israel have said very clearly, and they have said it very clearly to their government, that our water should be poisoned in order to have Palestinians killed. Now that is provocation, that is an incitation to commit a crime. And we are against this sort of call for violence, this kind of provocation, this kind of incitation.

Mr President, I would like to say this. The Palestinian nation would like to live with full sovereignty. This could be achieved very quickly; we could put an end to the occupation very quickly, and if we can achieve this, I think that will be a very positive thing for the world community if we could establish a Palestinian state. A full, independent, unoccupied Palestinian state. We could be a responsible actor on the world stage.

We would have a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as capital. Jerusalem would be an open city, open to all faiths, especially the three major faiths in the region: Judaism, Christianity and the Muslim faith. We would all have Jerusalem as a capital, as an open city, respecting the three main religions of the region, with free expression for all of them in Jerusalem: Jerusalem which would remain a free open city.

In this way our country could be responsible for its own management, its own government, its own development, its own natural resources. But to do this, we need to regain 70% of our territory and then it will be able to exploit and use all these resources, including our human resources, as for the time being these areas, 60% of our territories, are since the Oslo Agreement inaccessible to us, that is to say we cannot do anything with it. We cannot cultivate that land, we cannot establish industry on that land, it is categorised as a 'C region' – Region C – occupied by Israel since the Oslo Agreements.

And in that region Israel has been implementing an illegal project since 1993. Now if we can get that land back, that territory back, I believe we can perform miracles in agriculture, in industry and tourism, and I am wondering why the Israelis are insisting on keeping that land; I really am.

If we could do this, we could develop industry on this territory, develop agriculture, we could create jobs for tens of thousands of young people, we could exploit our own national resources: oil, gas, for example. We could generate clean electricity. We could develop the Jordan Valley. We could develop the Dead Sea region.

We could develop tourist projects, and of course you should not forget the importance of tourism – a pilgrimage in our country, for example, to Bethlehem, to Jerusalem – and in order to do that, we do not need a lot of assistance because we would have all these assets.

And in this situation, I have to say that, so far, the European Union has assisted us, has helped us. You have helped us create an embryo Palestinian state. Now we are going to continue with our efforts to develop a Palestinian state, so that we can enjoy full self-determination and that should not depend on negotiations with Israel. The right to self-determination should not be negotiable. It is a natural right.

So we need your assistance in this situation. We have dozens of educational institutions, universities, all of which are at a very high level. And these assets will allow us to develop and to further develop basic education, organise campaigns for literacy. These institutions will help us do our own research. We can become involved in joint projects with other educational institutions and do not forget, we are a free society, where women are equal to men. They have the same rights and the same duties.

On 3 June, a ministerial meeting was held in Paris. This was on the initiative of the French Government. Twenty-eight states were involved and three international organisations. We are grateful for this noble effort and this will now lead to a further conference on international law and international equality based on the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative which was adopted at the Beirut Summit in 2002. This conference will also be using the roadmap which has been developed by the Arab Peace Initiative.

Now if this major international conference is held, there should be very clear deadlines associated with it. Negotiations cannot start without some deadlines being set, and any agreements should also be subject to a schedule, to deadlines. And then, there should be a follow-up to these agreements, a monitoring arrangement for these agreements that will be reached, similar to what happened in the case of Iran when you had the 5 Plus One Group, which solved an enormous number of problems in association with Iran.

So we would have to have a 5 Plus 2 or a 7 Plus 2 arrangement, that is to say a monitoring group to monitor the results of this major international conference which I would like to see take place with a view to achieving a settlement in the Middle East.

The European Council at its last meeting adopted a final communiqué to the conference held in Paris on 3 June. And let me say this: I and my colleagues, we support this French initiative. The President of the French Republic, Mr François Hollande, told me some days ago that France was determined to pursue its efforts so that this international peace conference can take place before the end of the year.

He said that the preparatory work should begin soon in order to make sure this international conference is a success. The civil servants and Sherpas, he said, should get to work as soon as possible, and I have to say, as a Palestinian and as an Arab, we Arabs are with you in this initiative. We are with you as well when it comes to combating terrorism and extremism. Here, we are on the same page. What is happening in the Middle East has also happened in Europe, in Brussels, in Paris, and in the United States. We are against terrorism – let me make this perfectly clear – whatever form it may take and whoever carries it out. We are against terrorism.

(Applause)

However, in order to overcome terrorism we also need to end Israeli occupation by creating a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, so that Palestine can live in peace and security, side by side with Israel, and that will be a step towards ending terrorism. If this does not happen, we will still be giving pretexts to those who commit terrorism in the name of religion, but once this occupation ends those pretexts will disappear and extremism will be overcome, as will terrorism. There will be no more terrorism in the Middle East nor elsewhere in the world.

The beginning of the problem of terrorism is the problems that exist in Palestine. So the non-existence of the Palestinian state simply perpetuates the problem and that will only play into the hands of the extremists – the violence, terrorists – and many countries in our region and elsewhere have suffered at the hands of these violent extremists.

This terrorism has given rise to a wave of refugees that have fled now to Europe. Among them there are Palestinian refugees fleeing from this situation and we would ask you to treat Palestinian refugees in the same way as you treat other refugees, those who have fled from war, massacres and terrorism, and we condemn that terrorism.

Terrorism gives rise to waves of refugees. But among those refugees there are Palestinian refugees. Of course these internal conflicts that happen in the region are not our fault but when they happen we suffer from them as well. When Palestinian refugees arrive in refugee camps they have to be given the same rights as other refugees. My question is: put yourself in the shoes of a Palestinian refugee. That refugee is the same as any other refugee. They need help and they need support.

Regarding the internal situation in Palestine, I would like to say that we would like to manage our country properly. Currently there is a blockade in Gaza. We would like to put an end to the internal Palestinian blockade and division through an international governance agreement respecting the PLO commitments and international and regional commitments that have been undertaken regarding this region. We would like to create a Palestinian government involving all stakeholders in a national unity government, with all necessary elements in place to meet the commitments we have undertaken.

We have to meet all of the commitments that have been taken on and we are willing to form a national unity government with a view to establishing legislative and then presidential elections in order to overcome the current division and I would like to take this opportunity to once again assert my thanks to the European Union and to all of its Member States for all of the help they have contributed in putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the attempts to rebuild the area.

More than 10 000 people have been killed, 100 000 people injured, many thousands of houses were destroyed during the Israeli bombings of the region and all of that was condemned here in the European Union and we have to acknowledge our thanks for that expression of support.

Please allow me to send out a message to the people of Israel from this podium, to the Israeli Government and its political parties. Our hands are extended with a desire for peace. We have the political will to achieve peace and we would ask you: do you have the same desire? Do you have the same political will to achieve peace and to acknowledge the historic injustice that your state has exacted on our country?

You have your history and we have ours. Our history has been, frankly, one of a continued existence in this territory since the dawn of civilization until now. We have constant ongoing rights in our territory, in a sacred place for Christians and Muslims alike. Peace and reconciliation will involve the acknowledgment of our rights and the need for reparation and compensation for damage.

This political struggle has been transformed into a religious struggle. That is an extremely dangerous element for our region. We have to remove religion from this conflict. It is a political struggle and the solution to it has to be political. Using a religious pretext is a genuine threat. It is a danger which we all face.

Peace is in everybody's interests and I hope that you, Israelis, neighbours, believe in that too. Let us build a peace which does not involve hegemony or colonisation or aggression. Peace and coexistence on the basis of justice, law, respect and dignity for all parties involved, on an equal footing. That peace will be a genuine guarantee of security, stability and a promising future for our generations to come.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your welcome. We are counting on your noble efforts to help us restore peace in our region. Long live Euro-Palestinian friendship that lets the holy land of Palestine be one of peace, stability and security for the Palestinians, for its neighbours and for the whole of the world.

We have a specific interest today for what is happening in Great Britain. We are very closely accompanying what is happening in Great Britain and we would express our support for that process.

(Applause)

**Disclaimer: The interpretation does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings.*

Der Präsident. – Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Herzlichen Dank, Herr Präsident Abbas! Vielen Dank für Ihre Worte. Gestern hat der israelische Staatspräsident seine Rede auf Arabisch mit einem Friedensappell beendet. Sie haben mit einem Friedensangebot heute hier geantwortet. Ich würde Ihnen beiden empfehlen, genau an dieser Stelle anzusetzen und den Dialog aufzunehmen. Was wir dafür tun können, um Sie dabei zu unterstützen, das werden wir tun. Vielen Dank!

PRZEWODNICTWO: RYSZARD CZARNECKI

Wiceprzewodniczący

6. Begrüßung

Przewodniczący. – Wznawiam posiedzenie. Witam wszystkich Państwa. Witam posłów do parlamentu ukraińskiego, Wierchownej Rady, wraz z prezesem Ukraińskiej Agencji Kosmicznej.

7. Zusammensetzung des Parlaments: siehe Protokoll

8. Abstimmungsstunde

Przewodniczący. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dnia jest głosowanie.

8.1. Ernennung der Mitglieder des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Prüfung von behaupteten Verstößen gegen das Unionsrecht und Missständen bei der Anwendung desselben im Zusammenhang mit Geldwäsche, Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung (Abstimmung)

8.2. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon (Rahmenübereinkommen) (A8-0193/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

8.3. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon, mit dem der Erweiterung von 2004 Rechnung getragen wird (A8-0194/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

8.4. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon, mit dem dem Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumäniens Rechnung getragen wird (A8-0195/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

8.5. Abkommen zwischen der EU und Monaco über den automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten (A8-0206/2016 - Andreas Schwab)

8.6. Inanspruchnahme des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (Antrag Belgiens – EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery) (A8-0207/2016 - Victor Negrescu)

8.7. Mehrjähriger Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun (A8-0367/2015 - Gabriel Mato)

COMMISSION STATEMENT

Carlos Moedas, *Member of the Commission*. – The Commission expresses concern that the limited powers delegated to it by the co-legislators may hinder the timely implementation in EU law of measures taken by ICCAT in the future that revise or update the control scheme of this Organisation. The Commission therefore declares that it considers this Regulation to be without prejudice to any future position of the institution as regards the recourse to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU for the transposition of Regional Fisheries Management Organisation measures.

The Commission furthermore reserves the right to propose amendments to the Regulation increasing the number of measures which should be adopted by delegated or implementing acts in case the transposition through the ordinary legislative procedure leads to delays which would jeopardise the EU's ability to comply with its international obligations.

8.8. Mehrjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen (A8-0128/2015 - Jarosław Wałęsa)

COMMISSION STATEMENT

Carlos Moedas, *Member of the Commission*. – When proposing and adopting delegated acts under the regionalisation provisions of this plan, the Commission will comply with the framework set out in the Basic Regulation (in particular Article 18), and the practice established under the Basic Regulation in implementing the regionalisation process will continue as it has since 2014.

8.9. Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrechts (A8-0209/2016 - Jean-Marie Cavada)

8.10. Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften (A8-0208/2016 - Jean-Marie Cavada)

8.11. Massaker im Osten des Kongo (RC-B8-0801/2016, B8-0801/2016, B8-0802/2016, B8-0804/2016, B8-0805/2016, B8-0807/2016, B8-0808/2016, B8-0809/2016)

8.12. Folgemaßnahmen zum strategischen Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung (ET2020) (A8-0176/2016 - Zdzisław Krasnodębski)

8.13. Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ (A8-0196/2016 - Paloma López Bermejo)

— Przed głosowaniem nad ustępem 86:

József Szájer (PPE). – Mr President, I would like to excuse myself. There is a mistake in the EPP voting list. In paragraph 86 all the splits are positive. That is the right answer and I am sorry for the other colleagues.

8.14. Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz (A8-0199/2016 - Markus Pieper)

Przewodniczący. — Niniejszym zamykam głosowanie.

9. Stimmerklärungen

9.1. Ernennung der Mitglieder des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Prüfung von behaupteten Verstößen gegen das Unionsrecht und Missständen bei der Anwendung desselben im Zusammenhang mit Geldwäsche, Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de la constitución de esta comisión de investigación sobre el blanqueo de capitales y la elusión y evasión fiscales, así como del nombramiento de sus miembros. Después de que hayan salido a la luz escándalos como el de los Papeles de Panamá, que han hecho pública no sólo la pasividad de los gobiernos europeos ante este tipo de prácticas, sino la implicación directa de diferentes gobernantes, este tipo de Comisión es de gran importancia si realmente existe una voluntad de revertir este tipo de situaciones.

Para esto, la comisión de investigación no puede servir únicamente para la depuración de responsabilidades políticas, sino que debe proponer medidas efectivas que permitan terminar con este tipo de delitos tanto a través de empresas offshore como en el caso de Panamá como dentro de nuestro propio continente. Por ello valoramos positivamente la creación de esta comisión y esperamos que se la permita trabajar sin restricciones y sus conclusiones sean tenidas en cuenta.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report which concerned appointments to a special Committee of Inquiry into the Panama Papers. My colleague Matt Carthy has been nominated to represent the GUE/NGL European political grouping on this Committee. This Committee of Inquiry will investigate possible contraventions and maladministration in the application of the law on money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

A number of Irish companies, business people, property developers and other individuals have been implicated in this scandal.

It is vital that this Committee has sufficient powers of inquiry to investigate the Panama Papers scandal effectively in order to identify the loopholes that need to be closed.

The Committee will have 12 months to report back.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – Depuis le 8 avril dernier, je milite pour la mise en place d'une commission d'enquête européenne pour faire toute la lumière sur ces affaires insupportables, en particulier pour les millions de citoyens qui n'arrivent pas à joindre les deux bouts et qui, eux, payent leurs impôts.

Cette commission spéciale devra amener l'Union à agir plus fermement contre les fraudeurs, l'évasion fiscale et le blanchiment d'argent. Des sanctions commerciales doivent être prises non seulement au niveau européen mais aussi au niveau mondial. Il est enfin urgent de mettre fin aux paradis fiscaux et d'instaurer une taxe sur les transactions financières pour couper l'herbe sous le pied à ces pratiques d'un autre âge.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Um die Straftaten der Geldwäsche, Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung aufzuklären, ist der neue Untersuchungsausschuss zur Prüfung ebensolcher Verstöße gegen das Unionsrecht von Nöten. Dem Vorschlag der Ernennung von 65 ordentlichen Mitgliedern habe ich somit zugestimmt.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour la désignation par le Parlement des 65 membres de la commission d'enquête sur l'évasion fiscale et le blanchiment d'argent dont fait partie Gilles Lebreton, membre du groupe ENL.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte a été approuvé sans vote du Parlement.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de la nomination des 65 membres qui composeront la commission d'enquête sur les révélations dites des «Panama Papers», en lien avec l'évasion fiscale et le blanchiment d'argent.

Je ferai partie de cette commission afin de continuer la lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent et l'évasion fiscale

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Estamos a favor de la creación de esta comisión especial, concebida a raíz del escándalo de los Papeles de Panamá para investigar posibles omisiones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros para trasponer las directivas de la Unión Europea para luchar efectivamente contra la evasión fiscal y el blanqueo de capitales. Consideramos que las informaciones contenidas en los Papeles de Panamá suponen un cuestionamiento serio de la eficacia e incluso de la voluntad de las autoridades europeas para combatir efectivamente la evasión fiscal, y estimamos que es obligación del Parlamento investigar esto hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce vote concerne la désignation des membres de la nouvelle commission d'enquête chargée d'examiner les allégations d'infraction au droit de l'Union et de mauvaise administration dans l'application de celui-ci en matière de blanchiment de capitaux, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale. Je me suis abstenue sur ce point.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Como consecuencia del escándalo provocado por la revelación de la existencia de miles de cuentas bancarias opacas con finalidad de elusión fiscal en Panamá, los socialistas europeos reclamamos la constitución de una comisión de investigación, dado que en tal entramado han participado ciudadanos europeos muy significados, y pueden además haberse dañado los intereses financieros de la Unión.

Esta Comisión investigará, entre otras cuestiones, si los Estados miembros han implementado correctamente la Directiva contra el blanqueo de dinero para evitar el lavado de dinero a través de la creación de empresas off-shore, si cooperaban en relación con el intercambio automático de información, si las legislaciones en el sector de auditoría han sido bien implementadas para evitar conflictos de intereses, y también evitar que sean involucrados en paraísos fiscales y si la legislación sobre el sector bancario (CRD IV) ha sido también bien ejecutada.

De cara a finalizar la constitución de esta Comisión de Investigación, he votado favorablemente la lista de diputados de esta casa que la integrarán, entre los que figuran, y me felicito por ello, mis compañeros Ramón Jáuregui y Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Šiuo balsavimu Europos Parlamentas paskyrė narius į savo Tyrimo komitetą įtarimams dėl Sąjungos teisės pažeidimų ir netinkamo administravimo taikant Sąjungos teisę atvejų, susijusių su pinigų plovimu, mokesčių vengimu ir slėpimu, nagrinėti.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *írásban*. – Az adókikerülés és az agresszív adótervezés visszaszorítása érdekében a tagállamok adóhatóságai közötti együttműködés fontosabb, mint valaha. Az utóbbi évek globális gazdasági és pénzügyi válsága ráirányította a nyilvánosság figyelmét a közös teherviselés fontosságára és érvényesítésére. Becslések szerint a vállalati adókikerülés miatt a tagállamok többmilliárd eurónyi bevételtől esnek el. Ezért a legutóbbi plenáris ülésen támogattam a bizottság felállítását, most pedig személyi összetételének meghatározását.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report which concerned appointments to a special Committee of Inquiry into the Panama Papers. My colleague Matt Carthy has been nominated to represent the GUE/NGL European political grouping on this Committee. This Committee of Inquiry will investigate possible contraventions and maladministration in the application of the law on money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

A number of Irish companies, business people, property developers and other individuals have been implicated in this scandal.

It is vital that this Committee has sufficient powers of inquiry to investigate the Panama Papers scandal effectively in order to identify the loopholes that need to be closed.

The Committee will have 12 months to report back.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ogni infrazione del diritto dell'Unione e ogni caso di riciclaggio o evasione fiscale va punito e sanzionato con la massima celerità. La tenuta di un sistema democratico dipende dal rispetto delle regole e dalla capacità di azione delle sue istituzioni: siamo tutti chiamati, eticamente e politicamente, ad agire perché l'Unione faccia rispettare le regole e persegua chi le infrange.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – Les Panama papers ont révélé de véritables dysfonctionnements des systèmes fiscaux européens et internationaux. Nous ne devons pas tolérer que des particuliers ou des entreprises utilisent des sociétés offshores basées dans des paradis fiscaux pour réduire leurs taxes ou pour blanchir de l'argent. Le Parlement a décidé d'enquêter sur les infractions au droit de l'Union en matière de fiscalité et de blanchiment d'argent. Les entreprises et les particuliers doivent payer leurs taxes de manière équitable. J'ai voté pour la composition des membres de cette commission d'enquête dont je suis membre suppléant.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho dato il mio voto favorevole alle nomine dei membri della commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta che avrà l'incarico di indagare sui presunti casi di infrazione e di cattiva amministrazione nell'applicazione del diritto dell'Unione in relazione al riciclaggio di denaro, all'elusione e all'evasione fiscali.

Il Parlamento Europeo ha deciso di istituire questa commissione all'indomani dello scandalo dei cosiddetti «Panama Papers», i milioni di documenti fatti trapelare sui media internazionali che svelerebbero l'esistenza di una gigantesca massa di denaro dirottata da studi legali internazionali e banche verso paradisi fiscali per conto di leader politici, criminali, funzionari d'intelligence e vip dello sport e dello spettacolo. I documenti fanno riferimento a operazioni che vanno dal 1977 fino alla fine del 2015 e, se confermata la loro veridicità, offrirebbero uno sguardo inedito sulla gestione di grandi flussi di denaro attraverso il sistema finanziario globale.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of these appointments to the European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into the revelations made in the Panama Papers leak by a whistle-blower. I am one of four GUE/NGL MEPs who have been appointed to the inquiry.

This Committee of Inquiry will investigate possible contraventions and maladministration in the application of the law on money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion. It will begin its work in September and have a year to report.

The Panama Papers revelations released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists caused shockwaves around the world, including resignations from office by political figures implicated in the scandal.

I take my appointment to this inquiry very seriously and hope we can shine a light into the secret world of tax-dodging, money laundering and criminality through the use of offshore tax havens. Most importantly, we need to identify the legal loopholes that allow this to happen in order to propose international reforms to end this activity.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the list of members who will sit on the committee tasked with investigating alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion. This committee has been set up as a response to the Panama Papers revelations. I believe that even with the tougher EU anti-money laundering laws adopted last year the manoeuvring in particular of politicians strongly suspected of corruption and money laundering would have remained undetected without the Panama Papers leak. Addressing these loopholes must be the focus of this committee.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho espresso il mio voto favorevole sulle nomine proposte per la commissione di inchiesta sui presunti casi di infrazione e cattiva amministrazione nell'applicazione del diritto dell'UE in relazione a riciclaggio di denaro, elusione e evasione fiscale.

Caterina Chinnici (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'evasione fiscale non influisce soltanto sull'ambito economico-finanziario delle nostre società: riguarda l'equità e gli equilibri politici e sociali dei nostri Paesi. Ogni anno, infatti, in Europa evasione ed elusione fiscale fanno perdere fra i 50 e i 70 miliardi di euro. I «Panama Papers» hanno consentito di fare luce sulla dimensione extra-europea del fenomeno: più di 200 mila società, 550 banche e 14.000 clienti sono sospettati di aver evaso od eluso le tasse e aver riciclato denaro. Pratiche e comportamenti di questo genere non sono più tollerabili. Da qui l'impegno del gruppo S&D per la creazione di una commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta per indagare e capire se la normativa europea vigente è adeguata a gestire il fenomeno.

Tra i compiti della commissione elaborare le raccomandazioni necessarie per migliorare il quadro legislativo esistente non solo sull'elusione fiscale ma anche sul riciclaggio di denaro, anche per capire se sarà necessario intervenire per modificare la legislazione europea. Sarà anche l'occasione per indagare se gli Stati hanno implementato le direttive esistenti e verificare come la Commissione ha agito nei confronti degli Stati UE per far rispettare efficacemente il corpus normativo esistente. Per tali motivi ho votato a favore della composizione della commissione d'inchiesta.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση και αναμένουμε την τελική έκθεση της εξεταστικής επιτροπής στο Κοινοβούλιο.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Η σημερινή ψηφοφορία σχετικά με τον ορισμό μελών της Εξεταστικής Επιτροπής για τη διερεύνηση καταγγελλόμενων παραβιάσεων και περιπτώσεων κακοδιοίκησης κατά την εφαρμογή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας σε σχέση με τη νομιμοποίηση εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες, τη φοροαποφυγή και τη φοροδιαφυγή αφορά έναν ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό τομέα. Η καταπολέμηση των αναφερόμενων ζητημάτων θα βοηθήσει στη διόρθωση των δυσλειτουργιών της Ευρώπης αλλά και στην απονομή δικαιοσύνης, κάτι που οι ευρωπαίοι πολίτες απαιτούν. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), in writing. – I supported the establishment of this committee.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Hemos votado a favor de la constitución de esta comisión de investigación sobre el blanqueo de capitales y la elusión y evasión fiscales, así como del nombramiento de sus miembros. Después de que hayan salido a la luz escándalos como el de los Papeles de Panamá, que han hecho pública no sólo la pasividad de los gobiernos europeos ante este tipo de prácticas, sino la implicación directa de diferentes gobernantes, este tipo de Comisión es de gran importancia si realmente existe una voluntad de revertir este tipo de situaciones.

Para esto, la comisión de investigación no puede servir únicamente para la depuración de responsabilidades políticas, sino que debe proponer medidas efectivas que permitan terminar con este tipo de delitos tanto a través de empresas offshore como en el caso de Panamá como dentro de nuestro propio continente. Por ello valoramos positivamente la creación de esta comisión y esperamos que se la permita trabajar sin restricciones y sus conclusiones sean tenidas en cuenta.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), per iscritto. – In risposta ai recenti scandali dei documenti Panama, la lotta all'evasione e elusione fiscali risultano essere delle battaglie prioritarie. A tal fine, è necessario adottare tutte le misure per ridurre al massimo queste situazioni e garantire una maggiore giustizia fiscale. La costituzione della commissione di inchiesta parlamentare incaricata di indagare sui presunti casi di infrazione e di cattiva amministrazione nell'applicazione del diritto dell'Unione in relazione al riciclaggio di denaro, all'elusione e all'evasione fiscali, ritengo possa contribuire a raggiungere tale fine.

Per questo motivo ho votato in favore alla sua costituzione. Tale commissione è solo uno degli strumenti a livello europeo e si affiancherà alle altre misure adottate dalla Commissione in materia fiscale. In dodici mesi produrremo un rapporto che esaminerà le denunce relative a inadempienze degli Stati membri in materia di fiscalità, aiuti di stato così come gli errori della Commissione nell'assicurare che la normativa in materia sia correttamente applicata a livello nazionale. È fondamentale che ci sia leale cooperazione tra gli Stati membri e questa commissione di inchiesta farà in modo che talune ingiustizie siano propriamente combattute.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Mając na uwadze wagę problemu – zgłosiowałem za. Należy wyjaśnić wszelkie kwestie związane z uchylaniem się od opodatkowania i unikaniem podatków.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – I voted in favour of the appointments to the Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration. It is now up to the Committee to ensure a fair process which properly addresses the allegations of maladministration of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), в писмена форма. – Подкрепих създаването на анкетна комисия за разследване на предполагаеми нарушения и лошо администриране при прилагането на правото на Съюза във връзка с изпирането на пари, избягването на данъци и данъчните измами и заявих желание да бъде неин член, тъй като се противопоставям строго на този вид престъпления. Укриването на данъци и данъчните измами са сериозен проблем за държавите членки и за ЕС като цяло, ощетявайки бюджета годишно със значителна сума пари. Средства, които могат да бъдат вложени в борба с предизвикателствата, пред които сме изправени, като мигрантската криза например. Мандатът на анкетната комисия е адекватно определен за постигане на заложените цели. Очаквам с нетърпение началото на работата на новата комисия и смятам, че за 12 месеца ще постигнем добри резултати и ще изразим становището и препоръките си за подобряване на ситуацията.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Δεν πιστεύουμε πως μπορεί να αποδώσει η επιτροπή έρευνας με τα συγκεκριμένα μέλη.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – O Parlamento Europeu decidiu criar uma comissão de inquérito para investigar alegadas contravenções ou má administração, pela Comissão ou pelos Estados-Membros, na aplicação das regras europeias relacionadas com o branqueamento de capitais e a elisão e evasão fiscais.

Fui eleito para esta Comissão de Inquérito. Os «Panamá Papers» representam uma oportunidade única para se atuar à escala da União Europeia.

Estou certo de que, nesta Comissão de Inquérito dos Papéis do Panamá, teremos uma enorme convergência por parte de todos os grupos políticos.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – A constituição de uma comissão de inquérito para investigar os escândalos revelados pelos «Panamá Papers» contou com o nosso voto favorável.

Contudo, não podemos deixar de assinalar que o passado recente, com a sucessão de escândalos fiscais, nos leva a concluir que estamos em presença de um problema estrutural e não apenas conjuntural.

Esta comissão, independentemente do apuramento dos factos sobre os protagonistas destas práticas, sejam eles empresas de consultadoria, multinacionais ou governos nacionais, deve suscitar uma ampla reflexão sobre as causas mais profundas que criaram as condições para estas práticas, que são comuns e se generalizam à maioria das grandes multinacionais, com a conivência de vários Estados-Membros da UE.

E estas causas profundas estão naturalmente associadas à desregulamentação do sistema financeiro e ao levantamento de todas as restrições à circulação do capital.

É de esperar que estas matérias não venham a ser objeto do trabalho desta comissão. Lamentamos que o mandato da comissão não reflita esta necessidade.

Tendo viabilizado a constituição desta comissão, denunciamos o que nos parecem ser os seus limites e, de certa forma, alguma perversidade que lhe pode estar associada: dar a ideia de que se faz algo para que algo mude, ficando, na verdade, tudo na mesma.

Assim aconteceu com a comissão relativa ao escândalo Luxleaks.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), γραπτώς. – Δεν πιστεύω πως μπορεί να αποδώσει η επιτροπή έρευνας με τα συγκεκριμένα μέλη και καταψηφίζω τον ορισμό τους.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – After the scandal of the Panama Papers, Parliament decided to set up a committee of inquiry in order to investigate the alleged failure of the Commission and the Member States regarding the application of several legislations in the field of taxation and money laundering. Parliament will now vote on the composition of this committee of inquiry.

In addition, Parliament is due to finalise its work on the TAXE 2 Committee in July 2016 and outstanding issues remain unanswered. The Council and the Commission have not delivered the documents requested, ministers have not all had the opportunity to answer before the Committee and revelations related to, amongst other matters, the Panama Papers have raised further questions which require political dedication and further technical investigation, all of which the mandate of the Panama Committee of Inquiry would be responsible for. I am in favour of continuing the work on taxation issues, and I therefore voted in favour.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ringrazio il Gruppo S&D e tutti i colleghi per la fiducia che hanno voluto accordarmi proponendo il mio nominativo come componente della nuova commissione straordinaria d'inchiesta incaricata di esaminare le denunce di infrazione in materia di riciclaggio di denaro, elusione fiscale ed evasione fiscale. Sarà mio impegno assicurare un approfondimento adeguato delle vicende note come «Panama Papers», nell'obiettivo di garantire la massima trasparenza sui fatti avvenuti e di prevenire il ripetersi di nuovi episodi di elusione ed evasione ai danni dei cittadini e della crescita.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für die Ernennung der Mitglieder des „Untersuchungsausschusses zur Prüfung von behaupteten Verstößen gegen das Unionsrecht und Missständen bei der Anwendung desselben im Zusammenhang mit Geldwäsche, Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung“ gestimmt, da ich jede Maßnahme unterstütze, die für mehr Steuergerechtigkeit und Transparenz im Sinne unserer Bürger und Familien kämpft.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Estamos a favor de la creación de esta comisión especial, concebida a raíz del escándalo de los Papeles de Panamá para investigar posibles omisiones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros para trasponer las directivas de la Unión Europea para luchar efectivamente contra la evasión fiscal y el blanqueo de capitales. Consideramos que las informaciones contenidas en los Papeles de Panamá suponen un cuestionamiento serio de la eficacia e incluso de la voluntad de las autoridades europeas para combatir efectivamente la evasión fiscal, y estimamos que es obligación del Parlamento investigar esto hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour. It was decided to set up a committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Στην προηγούμενη Ολομέλεια υπερψηφίσαμε τη σύσταση εξεταστική επιτροπής του Κοινοβουλίου για τη διερεύνηση καταγγελλόμενων παραβιάσεων και περιπτώσεων κακοδιοίκησης σε σχέση με τη νομιμοποίηση εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες, τη φοροαποφυγή και τη φοροδιαφυγή. Στην παρούσα υπερψηφίσαμε τα μέλη της εξεταστικής επιτροπής. Το ζητούμενο είναι το θέμα να εξεταστεί σε όλο του το βάθος και προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση θα εργαστούμε ως ομάδα στα πλαίσια της εξεταστικής επιτροπής.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported the appointments put forward by all political groups to the new Committee of Inquiry into the alleged maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion. It is vital that elected representatives have an opportunity to evaluate the tax practices of large multinationals and wealthy individuals to see if they paid the appropriate amount of tax on their earnings within the EU. It is also of vital importance to the integrity of the EU institutions that an investigation into the application of European Union law by the Commission and Member States is undertaken. Citizens need assurances that tax administrations correctly apply tax levels. Likewise, if tax rates are not being correctly applied this needs to be reviewed as tax not collected by administrations is funding lost for vital public services in local communities.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za imenovanja za istražno Povjerenstvo radi istrage navodnih kršenja i nepravilnosti u primjeni zakonodavstva Unije u području pranja novca, izbjegavanja poreza i utaje poreza jer držim da navedeno Povjerenstvo treba započeti s radom čim prije.

Istražno Povjerenstvo broji 65 članova, te ima mandat od 12 mjeseci nakon kojih treba podnijeti svoje završno izvješće. Smatram da je dano dovoljno vremena kako bi se ustanovilo je li došlo do propusta od strane Europske komisije i država članica. Iznimno je važno utvrditi što omogućuje, i na koji način, pranje novca, izbjegavanje poreza i utaju poreza kako bi se ubuduće prevenirale i spriječile takve prakse, te stoga podržavam imenovanja i početak rada Povjerenstva.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de la nomination de 65 députés européens pour constituer la commission d'enquête «Panama Papers». Cette commission a été mis en place pour enquêter sur les allégations d'infractions au droit de l'Union en matière de blanchiment de capitaux, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale.

Face à ce scandale fiscal mondial qui a secoué l'Europe, il est essentiel que le Parlement apporte une réponse forte et fasse toute la lumière sur les infractions commises.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. — I strongly support the initiative of Parliament to appoint a committee of inquiry to examine contraventions and maladministration on issues related to tax fraud and money laundering. The Panama Papers and other related leaks that we have experienced in the near past dictate that we act promptly and protect the fiscal capacity of the EU as well as the citizens who find themselves entrapped by the constant tax base erosion.

Constance Le Grip (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen a nommé les 65 membres de sa commission d'enquête sur les révélations dites des Panama Papers, en lien avec l'évasion fiscale et le blanchiment d'argent, après avoir approuvé son mandat le 8 juin. J'ai voté en faveur de cette désignation qui entérine le début des travaux de la commission d'enquête dont je suis désormais membre.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je soutiens la désignation des membres de la commission d'enquête chargée d'examiner les allégations d'infraction au droit de l'Union et de mauvaise administration dans l'application de celui-ci en matière de blanchiment de capitaux, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale. Le groupe ENL y sera représenté par Gilles Lebreton, Barbara Kappel et Mario Borghezio. Nous avons également désigné Bernard Monot, Lorenzo Fontana et Marcus Pretzell comme membres suppléants.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de la constitución de esta comisión de investigación sobre el blanqueo de capitales y la elusión y evasión fiscales, así como del nombramiento de sus miembros. Después de que hayan salido a la luz escándalos como el de los Papeles de Panamá, que han hecho pública no sólo la pasividad de los gobiernos europeos ante este tipo de prácticas, sino la implicación directa de diferentes gobernantes, este tipo de Comisión es de gran importancia si realmente existe una voluntad de revertir este tipo de situaciones.

Para esto, la comisión de investigación no puede servir únicamente para la depuración de responsabilidades políticas, sino que debe proponer medidas efectivas que permitan terminar con este tipo de delitos tanto a través de empresas offshore como en el caso de Panamá como dentro de nuestro propio continente. Por ello valoramos positivamente la creación de esta comisión y esperamos que se la permita trabajar sin restricciones y sus conclusiones sean tenidas en cuenta.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Šī gada 8. jūnijā Parlamentā notika balsojums, kurš izveidoja Izmeklēšanas komiteju EP ietvaros, kuras biedri sīki izanalizēs gan pēdējā laika finansiālos skandālus (piem., *LuxLeaks* un "Panamas papīri"), gan jebkurus citus iespējamus pārkāpumus un administratīvas kļūmes Savienības tiesību aktu piemērošanā attiecībā uz nelikumīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizāciju, izvairīšanos no nodokļu maksāšanas un nodokļu nemaksāšanu.

Visai cerams, ka mani kolēģi, kas tika šodien iecelti savos amatos šajā izveidotajā komitejā, pēc iespējas aktīvāk un produktīvāk strādās nepieciešamajos virzienos un gada laikā sagatavos ziņojumu, kas palīdzēs ne tikai skaidrāk saprast minēto un pārējo skandālu un esošās politikas un likumdošanas trūkumu specifiku, bet arī pienācīgi realizēt jau daudz plašāka mēroga pasākumus attiecībā uz šādiem noziedzīgajiem darījumiem.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), *γραπτώς*. – Ψηφίζω υπέρ του ορισμού μελών της Εξεταστικής Επιτροπής για τη διερεύνηση καταγγελλόμενων παραβιάσεων και περιπτώσεων κακοδιοίκησης κατά την εφαρμογή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας σε σχέση με τη νομιμοποίηση εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες, τη φοροαποφυγή και τη φοροδιαφυγή.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – A favore delle «Nomine per la commissione di inchiesta incaricata di indagare sui presunti casi di infrazione e di cattiva amministrazione nell'applicazione del diritto dell'Unione in relazione al riciclaggio di denaro, all'elusione e all'evasione fiscali».

Si tratta certamente di una delle priorità cui l'Unione europea non può prescindere che riguarda la tutela di tutti quei cittadini che rispettano i regolamenti ed i pagamenti in fatto di tassazione.

Poter individuare casi di cattiva amministrazione riduce sprechi, aumenta l'efficienza del sistema e infonde fiducia nei nostri cittadini europei, ed è proprio questo l'obiettivo.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi apoyo a la propuesta con los nombres de las personas que formarán parte de la comisión de investigación que decidimos crear hace unas semanas para determinar si ha habido infracción de la legislación comunitaria sobre evasión y blanqueo en relación a los conocidos como «Papeles de Panamá».

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – Esta comissão de inquérito pode vir a ter grande importância no combate ao branqueamento de capitais, à elisão fiscal e à evasão fiscal.

É com grande espírito de missão que vou participar como membro efetivo nesta comissão, onde tudo farei para contribuir para o sucesso desta comissão.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of these appointments and I am proud to form part of the Committee. It is critical to have a comprehensive and dedicated team of MEPs to examine violations of European Union law and alleged corrupt practices uncovered in several information leaks known as the 'Panama Papers'.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – A vizsgálóbizottság föllállításáról, hatásköréről és megbízatásának időtartamáról a Parlament június 8-i plenáris ülésén döntött. Az akkor elfogadott határozat értelmében a vizsgálóbizottság 65 tagból áll. A Parlament most az előterjesztett javaslatok alapján a vizsgálóbizottság tagjairól döntött. Az előterjesztést megszavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le groupe ENL comptera 3 membres titulaires et trois suppléants, ce qui lui donnera une présence satisfaisante au sein de la nouvelle commission, forte de 65 membres. La composition peut être votée en l'état.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – A comissão de inquérito sobre o denominado «Panama Papers» para a investigação de alegadas contravenções ou má administração na aplicação do Direito da União relacionadas com o branqueamento de capitais, a elisão e a evasão fiscais tem um trabalho fundamental para garantir a confiança dos cidadãos nas instituições.

A União Europeia deve pautar-se pelo escrupuloso cumprimento das normas vigentes e deverá efetuar todas as diligências necessárias para garantir uma política de transparência e de combate à elisão e à evasão fiscal.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de la composition de la commission d'enquête mise en place après le scandale des Panama papers. Le mandat de cette commission avait été voté à l'occasion de la première séance plénière de juin 2016.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the establishment of the Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report which concerned appointments to a special committee of inquiry into the Panama Papers. My colleague Matt Carthy has been nominated to represent the GUE/NGL European political grouping on this Committee.

This Committee of Inquiry will investigate possible contraventions and maladministration in the application of the law on money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

A number of Irish companies, business people, property developers and other individuals have been implicated in this scandal.

It is vital that this Committee has sufficient powers of inquiry to investigate the Panama Papers scandal effectively in order to identify the loopholes that need to be closed.

This committee will have 12 months to report back.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Izbjegavanje plaćanja poreza neminovno utječe na povjerenje građana Europske unije u ispravno funkcioniranje pravnih institucija, kako na nacionalnoj tako i na europskoj razini. Ne možemo pobjeći od činjenice da su malverzacije u području poreznog sustava čest način bezobzirnog iskorištavanja nedovoljne kontrole ili pravnih praznina u sustavu te čine direktnu štetu svakom njezinom građaninu koji uredno izvršava svoje obveze. Međutim, namjerno kršenje nacionalnih zakona i pravila putem pranja novca, izbjegavanja poreza i utaje poreza te kršenje i nepravilnosti u primjeni zakonodavstva Unije kod prosječnog poreznog obveznika ostavlja gorak okus te si s pravom postavlja pitanje zbog čega pravila za nekoga vrijede, a za nekog drugog ne. Otkrivanje 11.5 milijuna dokumenata s detaljnim povjerljivim informacijama za 214.418 *off-shore* kompanija nažalost je samo djelić onoga što se u stvarnosti događa. Otkriveni slučajevi prijevара moraju se strogo sankcionirati, a rupe u postojećim zakonima i pravilima zatvoriti.

Podržala sam osnivanje i imenovanja članova ovog istražnog povjerenstva te im želim uspješan rad. Samo poštení odnos vlasti prema svakom poreznom obvezniku učvrstit će povjerenje građana, kako u nacionalne, tako i u europske institucije. A povjerenje nam je danas prijeko potrebno ako želimo nastaviti graditi Uniju na zdravim temeljima.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), *písemně*. – Vítám, že se Evropský parlament rozhodl vytvořit vyšetřovací výbor, který by měl zjistit pravdu ohledně podezření, že Komise a členské státy neaplikovaly potřebnou legislativu v oblasti daňových úniků a praní špinavých peněz. Parlament tímto aktivně reaguje na kauzu tzv. Panama Papers. Parlament dnes hlasoval o složení tohoto výboru, nad čímž panoval všeobecný konsensus.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – Dans la continuité du vote en session plénière du début du mois de juin 2016, j'ai renouvelé mon soutien à la constitution d'une commission d'enquête suite aux révélations dites des «Panama Papers». Fonctionnant sur le même modèle que la commission d'enquête sur les émissions de véhicules (EMIS), dont je suis membre, cette commission devra enquêter sur les éventuelles infractions ou la mauvaise administration de l'application des législations européennes portant sur le blanchiment d'argent et l'évasion fiscale. Les 65 députés européens membres sont désormais nommés et la commission aura douze mois pour présenter son rapport final.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Suite aux révélations dites des «Panama Papers» sur les sociétés offshores et leurs bénéficiaires, le Parlement européen soutient par son vote de ce midi, la formation d'une commission d'enquête.

Cette commission (PANA) sera chargée d'enquêter sur les allégations d'infraction et de mauvaise administration dans l'application par la Commission européenne ou les États membres de la législation européenne sur le blanchiment d'argent, l'évasion et l'évitement fiscal.

Selon le Consortium international pour le journalisme d'investigation (ICIJ), les premières révélations concernant les «Panama Papers» impliquent au moins 12 chefs d'État et de gouvernement dans le monde (dont six encore en activité) et 128 politiciens ou fonctionnaires haut placés. Ces révélations montrent également l'implication de grandes banques dans la création de sociétés offshores dans des paradis fiscaux.

Des données complémentaires devraient être publiées par l'ICIJ ultérieurement afin de faciliter les recherches du Parlement européen concernant ces activités. Pour rappel, le Parlement européen estime que l'évasion fiscale et l'évitement coûtent à l'Union européenne entre 50 et 70 milliards d'euros par an.

Robert Rochefort (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Tout comme je me suis félicité de la mise en place le 8 juin dernier de cette commission d'enquête qui fait suite aux révélations des «Panama Papers», je me félicite de la nomination de ses 65 membres dans la mesure où cela signifie que le travail parlementaire de notre Assemblée va pouvoir débuter sur ce sujet. Cette commission aura pour mission d'enquêter sur les allégations d'infraction ainsi que de mauvaise administration dans l'application des législations européennes en matière de blanchiment d'argent, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale. Mes 65 collègues auront douze mois pour présenter leur rapport, et je les encourage à faire toute la lumière sur les responsabilités en cause face à ces pratiques inacceptables.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – Como consecuencia del escándalo conocido como *PanaLeaks*, que reveló la existencia de miles de cuentas bancarias opacas con finalidad de elusión fiscal en Panamá, los socialistas europeos reclamamos la constitución de una comisión de investigación, dado que en tal entramado han participado ciudadanos europeos muy significados, y pueden además haberse dañado los intereses financieros de la Unión.

Esta Comisión investigará, entre otras cuestiones, si los Estados miembros han implementado correctamente la Directiva contra el blanqueo de dinero para evitar el lavado de dinero a través de la creación de empresas off-shore, si cooperaban en relación con el intercambio automático de información, si las legislaciones en el sector de auditoría han sido bien implementadas para evitar conflictos de intereses, y también evitar que sean involucrados en paraísos fiscales y si la legislación sobre el sector bancario (CRD IV) ha sido también bien ejecutada.

De cara a finalizar la constitución de esta Comisión de Investigación, he votado favorablemente la lista de diputados de esta casa que la integrarán, entre los que me felicito, figuran mis compañeros Ramón Jáuregui y Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen a nommé les 65 députés qui constitueront la commission d'enquête sur le scandale «Panama Papers» qui a mis en lumière l'ampleur des avoirs cachés à l'étranger à l'aide de montages de sociétés.

Contrairement à la commission spéciale sur les rescrits fiscaux (TAXE2), il ne s'agira pas que d'eurodéputés de la commission des affaires économiques du Parlement, mais également des membres de la commission des affaires juridiques, par exemple. Lors de sa première réunion, en principe en juillet, la commission d'enquête nommera son président et ses vice-présidents.

Cette commission entend faire la lumière – bien nécessaire – sur des manquements présumés au droit européen en ce qui concerne le blanchiment d'argent, l'évasion et l'évitement fiscaux. Elle sera sur pied pour une durée d'un an.

Bronis Ropé (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Institucija ilgu pavadinimu – Tyrimo komitetas įtarimams dėl Sąjungos teisės pažeidimų ir netinkamo administravimo taikant Sąjungos teisę atvejų, susijusių su pinigų plovimu, mokesčių vengimu ir slėpimu, nagrinėti – labai svarbi ES kovos su finansiniais nusikaltimais struktūra. Todėl privalome užtikrinti, jog jos nariai būtų nepriekaištingos reputacijos. Ne mažiau svarbu ir jų ekspertiniai gebėjimai finansų srityje. Esu įsitikinęs, jog visos politinės grupės į jį delegavo geriausiai savo atstovus, nors, tiesą pasakius, taip ir neteko pamatyti, jog ši reputacija ir ekspertiniai gebėjimai būtų kaip nors įrodyti. Taip pat pasigendu ir visų valstybių narių atstovavimo principo laikymosi – kai kurių šalių atstovų komitete taip ir nėra.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – À semelhança do apoio que dei à decisão do Parlamento Europeu de criar uma comissão de inquérito para investigar alegadas contravenções ou má administração na aplicação do Direito da União relacionadas com o branqueamento de capitais e a elisão e evasão fiscais, à composição numérica e à duração do mandato, também concordei com as nomeações dos 65 membros que irão levar a cabo esta missão de apresentar, no prazo de 12 meses, um relatório completo sobre esta matéria.

Saliento ainda o facto de, neste leque de parlamentares, se encontrarem três eurodeputados eleitos por Portugal, sendo que dois fazem parte do meu grupo político, possuindo reconhecida capacidade e comprovada experiência nesta matéria.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Estamos a favor de la creación de esta comisión especial, concebida a raíz del escándalo de los Papeles de Panamá para investigar posibles omisiones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros para trasponer las directivas de la Unión Europea para luchar efectivamente contra la evasión fiscal y el blanqueo de capitales. Consideramos que las informaciones contenidas en los Papeles de Panamá suponen un cuestionamiento serio de la eficacia e incluso de la voluntad de las autoridades europeas para combatir efectivamente la evasión fiscal, y estimamos que es obligación del Parlamento investigar esto hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru colegii noștri care vor investiga acuzațiile de spălare de bani, evitarea obligațiilor fiscale și evaziunea fiscală.

Mă bucur că această comisie a fost instituită și am încredere că va face o treabă bună.

Cetățenii au nevoie de mai multă transparență din partea instituțiilor UE și de asigurări că banii contribuabililor sunt corect folosiți.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de la constitución de esta comisión de investigación sobre el blanqueo de capitales y la elusión y evasión fiscales, así como del nombramiento de sus miembros. Después de que hayan salido a la luz escándalos como el de los Papeles de Panamá, que han hecho pública no sólo la pasividad de los gobiernos europeos ante este tipo de prácticas, sino la implicación directa de diferentes gobernantes, este tipo de Comisión es de gran importancia si realmente existe una voluntad de revertir este tipo de situaciones.

Para esto, la comisión de investigación no puede servir únicamente para la depuración de responsabilidades políticas, sino que debe proponer medidas efectivas que permitan terminar con este tipo de delitos tanto a través de empresas offshore como en el caso de Panamá como dentro de nuestro propio continente. Por ello valoramos positivamente la creación de esta comisión y esperamos que se la permita trabajar sin restricciones y sus conclusiones sean tenidas en cuenta.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Vyhybanie sa daňovým povinnostiam a daňové úniky je nutné prešetriť a následne vyvodiť dôsledky z daných činov. Podporujem vymenovanie nových členov, ktorí posilnia Vyšetrovací výbor a pomôžu odhaliť tieto trestné činy.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za seznam članov preiskovalnega odbora o domnevnih kršitvah evropske zakonodaje o pranju denarja, izogibanju davkom in davčnih utajah. Preiskovalni odbor bo raziskoval, ali so lastniki podjetij v davčnih oazah kršili evropsko davčno zakonodajo.

Pozdravljam imenovanje članov preiskovalnega odbora, ki bo z močnim mandatom in polnimi pooblastili raziskal vse razsežnosti afere Panama Papers. Upam oziroma verjamem, da bo preiskovalni odbor prinesel konkretne rezultate ter da bomo na ta način končali z nepoštenimi davčnimi praksami.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Η επιλογή προσώπων για επιτροπές εξέτασης και ελέγχου του ενωσιακού συμφέροντος θα πρέπει να βασίζεται στην ακεραιότητα του χαρακτήρα τους και στην αποδεδειγμένη δραστηριότητά τους όσον αφορά στην προστασία δημόσιου, υπό την ευρεία έννοια, χρήματος.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a pénzmosásra, adókerülésre és adókijátszásra vonatkozó uniós jog alkalmazásával kapcsolatos állítólagos jogsértések és hivatali visszaélések kivizsgálásával foglalkozó vizsgálóbizottság tagjainak kinevezését. EP-képviselőként már a megelőző plenáris ülésen megszavaztam a Panama-papírokkal kapcsolatos vizsgálóbizottság felállítását, amely az offshore cégeket és azok hasznélvezőit fogja kutatni, valamint a tagállamok és az Európai Bizottság által a pénzmosásra, adókijátszásra és adóelkerülésre vonatkozó uniós jog állítólagos megsértését, illetve vissza alkalmazását szándékozik vizsgálni.

A testület most megválasztott 65 tagja, valamint a pótagok igen nagy felelősséggel járó munkát kaptak. 12 hónapunk lesz arra, hogy feltárjuk és jelentést készítsünk a feltételezett mulasztásokról és visszaélésekről, amelyek utat nyitottak, illetve jelentősen megkönnyítették egyes vállalatok és magánszemélyek számára az adófizetés alól való kibújást. A pénzmosás, adókerülés és adókijátszás társadalomra és gazdaságra gyakorolt hatása rendkívül negatív. Amennyiben azonban a jelenlegi rendszereink még segítik és bátorítják is ezeket az illegális tevékenységeket, végzetes károkkal számolhatunk. A bizottsági tagok vizsgálódásának eredménye remélhetőleg számos kérdésre ad majd választ és hozzájárul a pénzmosás, adókerülés és adókijátszás visszaszorításához az EU-ban.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai bien sûr voté en faveur de la désignation des membres de la commission d'enquête chargée d'examiner les allégations d'infraction au droit de l'Union et de mauvaise administration dans l'application de celui-ci en matière de blanchiment de capitaux, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale. Faire la chasse aux fraudeurs et aux tricheurs doit être une priorité absolue.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the appointment of 65 members who will make up the Committee of Inquiry into the Panama Papers scandal, which revealed the scope of assets hidden overseas through corporate structures.

I am confident that my ANO colleague Petr Ježek will do an excellent job for our Group on this important committee. The Committee intends to shed light on the presumed shortcomings in EU law regarding money laundering and tax evasion and avoidance. It will be in place for one year.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Sklep o imenovanju članov preiskovalnega odbora za preučitev domnevnih kršitev in nepravilnosti pri uporabi prava Unije, povezanih s pranjem denarja, izogibanjem davkom in davčno utajo sem podprla.

Potrebno je raziskati, kako so Komisija in države članice izvajale in uveljavljale direktivo o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma ter, ali so organi držav članic uporabili upravne kazni in druge upravne ukrepe v primerih ustanov, za katere je bilo ugotovljeno, da so odgovorne za hudo kršenje nacionalnih določb, povezanih z omenjeno direktivo.

Prav tako pomembna je izmenjava informacij s področja obdavčevanja. Komisija naj razišče domnevo, da organi držav članic niso bili dosledni pri sporočanju davčnih informacij drugim državam članicam na lastno pobudo, če obstajajo razlogi za domnevo, da gre morda za izgubo davka.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Estamos a favor de la creación de esta comisión especial, concebida a raíz del escándalo de los Papeles de Panamá para investigar posibles omisiones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros para trasponer las directivas de la Unión Europea para luchar efectivamente contra la evasión fiscal y el blanqueo de capitales. Consideramos que las informaciones contenidas en los Papeles de Panamá suponen un cuestionamiento serio de la eficacia e incluso de la voluntad de las autoridades europeas para combatir efectivamente la evasión fiscal, y estimamos que es obligación del Parlamento investigar esto hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – I support the institution of the Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion.

The Panama leaks and scandal must be investigated and we should make sure these abuses are not repeated. Parliament has its role to play as we represent the European citizens that are the victims of these frauds as most of them pay their taxes according to the law. It is morally wrong to avoid and evade taxes in a period when many European citizens, SMEs and most big companies pay their fair share of taxes and respect the rules.

I am proud to be part of the Panama inquiry. My work will focus on all actions to combat economic fraud, capital outflow and money laundering.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Estamos a favor de la creación de esta comisión especial, concebida a raíz del escándalo de los Papeles de Panamá para investigar posibles omisiones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros para trasponer las directivas de la Unión Europea para luchar efectivamente contra la evasión fiscal y el blanqueo de capitales. Consideramos que las informaciones contenidas en los Papeles de Panamá suponen un cuestionamiento serio de la eficacia e incluso de la voluntad de las autoridades europeas para combatir efectivamente la evasión fiscal, y estimamos que es obligación del Parlamento investigar esto hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the appointments to the Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of European Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion. I voted in favour because I believe that setting up a committee of inquiry into the 'Panama Papers' revelations of detailed information on offshore companies and their ultimate beneficiaries is of crucial importance.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mediante estos nombramientos este Parlamento manifiesta su voluntad de luchar contra estas prácticas. Es importante que los ciudadanos europeos nos vean como parte de la solución y no como parte del problema, por lo que creo conveniente votar a favor de esta decisión.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de la constitución de esta comisión de investigación sobre el blanqueo de capitales y la elusión y evasión fiscales, así como del nombramiento de sus miembros. Después de que hayan salido a la luz escándalos como el de los Papeles de Panamá, que han hecho pública no sólo la pasividad de los gobiernos europeos ante este tipo de prácticas, sino la implicación directa de diferentes gobernantes, este tipo de Comisión es de gran importancia si realmente existe una voluntad de revertir este tipo de situaciones.

Para esto, la comisión de investigación no puede servir únicamente para la depuración de responsabilidades políticas, sino que debe proponer medidas efectivas que permitan terminar con este tipo de delitos tanto a través de empresas offshore como en el caso de Panamá como dentro de nuestro propio continente. Por ello valoramos positivamente la creación de esta comisión y esperamos que se la permita trabajar sin restricciones y sus conclusiones sean tenidas en cuenta.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Ik heb voor de samenstelling van deze parlementaire onderzoekscommissie gestemd omdat ik verder onderzoek nodig vind in de malafide toepassing van Europees recht of zelfs overtredingen ervan in de "Panamazaak" om belastingen te ontduiken en geld wit te wassen. Het Europees Parlement moet hierover gedegen onderzoek uitvoeren om dit in de toekomst uit te kunnen sluiten.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Bei dieser Abstimmung ging es um die Ernennung der Mitglieder der einzelnen Fraktionen für den neuen Untersuchungsausschuss zur Prüfung von behaupteten Verstößen gegen das Unionsrecht und Missständen bei der Anwendung desselben im Zusammenhang mit Geldwäsche, Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung.

Iuliu Winkler (PPE), *în scris*. — PE trebuie să preia inițiativa în crearea unui mediu de afaceri mai transparent care să limiteze excesul de speculație și lăcomia care au dus la criza financiară globală din 2008.

Efectele acestei crize se resimt până astăzi, iar noi, în PE, trebuie să ne concentrăm pe inițiative legislative, dar și pe acțiuni menite să contribuie la schimbarea mentalităților. Este adevărat că domeniul fiscal este în competența exclusivă a statelor membre, dar prin acțiuni de cooperare a autorităților de reglementare și control precum și prin exemplul pe care PE îl promovează chiar prin activitatea comisiei de anchetă nou-create vom reuși să impunem un model de conduită.

Transparența este un element cheie în protejarea intereselor cetățenilor, de aceea PE este îndreptățit să se impună ca un inițiator în acest domeniu.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de la creación de esta Comisión de Investigación, de la cual voy a ser miembro, sobre los llamados papeles de Panamá ya que supone un paso más del Parlamento Europeo hacia una mayor transparencia y rendición de cuentas con respecto al blanqueo, la evasión y la elusión fiscal.

Como miembro de esta comisión, me gustaría alegar que es una excelente oportunidad para demostrar al ciudadano europeo que sus representantes, es decir, nosotros, queremos ser parte de la solución y no parte del problema.

Junto a mis 64 compañeros restantes, trabajaremos conjuntamente para detectar los errores que se hayan podido cometer tanto por acción como por omisión.

Muchas gracias.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), *por escrito*. – Votei a favor das nomeações da comissão de inquérito por parte do Parlamento Europeu para investigar alegadas contravenções ou má administração na aplicação do Direito da União relacionadas com o branqueamento de capitais, a elisão e a evasão fiscais, por concordar com a lista de nomes proposta.

Realço o facto de o Parlamento Europeu ser o órgão democrático por excelência das instituições europeias, pelo que tem o dever de investigar o que se passou e apurar porque é que as medidas de elisão e evasão fiscais atuais não foram eficazes.

Sublinho que, no cumprimento deste mandato, o Parlamento deve ainda propor, no seu relatório final, medidas que evitem a repetição de processos como o dos Panamá Papers.

Para além do reforço da regulação interna desta matéria, é também essencial encorajar países terceiros a aplicar normas mínimas de boa governação em matéria fiscal e de planeamento fiscal agressivo.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Podprl sem imenovanje članov preiskovalnega odbora o domnevnih kršitvah evropske zakonodaje o pranju denarja, izogibanju davkom in davčnih utajah.

Menim, da bo ustanovitev preiskovalnega odbora pripomogla k odkrivanju domnevnih kršitev in nepravilnosti povezanih s pranjem denarja, izogibanjem davkom in davčno utajo v zadevi panamski papirji.

9.2. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon (Rahmenübereinkommen) (A8-0193/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Considerando il processo d'associazione della Repubblica del Libano all'Unione Europea, il Parlamento si è pronunciato per la conclusione di un protocollo, volto a facilitare la partecipazione del partner ai programmi europei.

In armonia con le politiche di vicinato, il testo si propone di porre in essere tutte le misure necessarie per sostenere il Libano nel raggiungimento degli obiettivi e degli standard previsti in Unione.

Instaurando una proficua cooperazione col Libano, l'UE potrà assistere il nuovo partner nel processo di transizione ed armonizzazione.

Per questi motivi, ho votato favorevolmente.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes portent sur l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations entre l'UE et le Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. J'ai voté contre ces textes qui constituent une ingérence de l'Union européenne dans les affaires d'un État ayant déjà à faire face à l'arrivée massive de réfugiés, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique ou encore la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite du pays. L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this vote which was on a framework agreement between the EU and Lebanon through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). This agreement promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 countries to the EU's south. It seeks greater integration within the region and is linked to the European neighbourhood policy which is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette recommandation. L'Union européenne entretient des relations stratégiques avec le Liban. Nous soutenons la stabilité de ce pays et sa sécurité dans une région du monde en proie à de fortes turbulences. La participation du Liban à des programmes de l'UE est un moyen de soutenir concrètement ces objectifs stratégiques.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Η παρούσα σύσταση, την οποία και υπερψήφισα, αφορά το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για συμφωνία-πλαίσιο μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου σχετικά με τις γενικές αρχές που διέπουν τη συμμετοχή της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης. Αναμένουμε τώρα να κοινοποιηθεί το πρωτόκολλο στην Επιτροπή, το Συμβούλιο, τις εθνικές κυβερνήσεις των κρατών μελών και τη Δημοκρατία του Λιβάνου.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Im Zuge der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) wird Ländern, die keine Beitrittsperspektive haben, eine stärkere wirtschaftliche, politische und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit mit der EU ermöglicht. So sollen Anreize zur Modernisierung ihrer Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft gegeben werden.

Das Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zur Gründung einer solchen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und der Libanesischen Republik trat am 1. April 2006 in Kraft. Libanon leistet somit einen finanziellen Beitrag zum Gesamthaushalt der EU, dessen Höhe sich nach den spezifischen Programmen richtet, an denen Libanon teilnimmt.

Ziel des Protokolls ist nun, eben diese finanziellen und technischen Regeln zu definieren, die Libanon die Teilnahme an bestimmten EU-Programmen erlauben.

Um die ENP mit Libanon weiterhin aufzuhalten, habe ich dem Protokoll zugestimmt.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le texte proposé constitue l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Il concerne les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires. La subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, j'ai voté contre le protocole.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cet accord, actualisation du volet Sud de la politique de voisinage, concerne les relations entre l'UE et le Liban. J'ai voté contre ce texte, estimant que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international, à plus forte raison lorsqu'il s'agit d'un pays dont la situation est menacée par les événements actuels (afflux de réfugiés syriens) et que l'ingérence bruxelloise ne peut que déstabiliser plus gravement encore.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai approuvé ce protocole à l'accord-cadre UE-Liban qui fixe les règles financières et techniques permettant au Liban de participer à certains programmes de l'UE dans le cadre de la politique européenne de voisinage, notamment en matière de coopération économique, financière et technique.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Mănescu che approva il protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea, con i suoi Stati membri, e la Repubblica libanese. Si tratta di un testo importante che definisce un accordo quadro tra l'UE e Libano sui principi generali della partecipazione della Repubblica libanese ai programmi dell'Unione.

Con questo voto si rafforza la politica di vicinato, rispondendo a due esigenze: da un lato si verrà incontro alla richiesta del 2013 dello stato mediorientale di avere legami più stretti con l'Unione, dall'altro si rafforzeranno i processi di riforma e la stabilità di un paese che, occupando una posizione strategica in una zona estremamente a rischio, rappresenta un alleato fondamentale nella lotta a Daesh e al terrorismo di matrice islamica.

L'accordo quadro definisce nello specifico un insieme di regole tecniche e finanziarie per garantire l'accesso del Libano ad una vasta gamma di programmi UE.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanía de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cette recommandation concerne le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban, et notamment son accord-cadre. Il constitue l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage.

Actuellement, le Liban connaît une déstabilisation avec une arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens (plus d'1,5 million) en plus des réfugiés palestiniens. De plus, les incursions répétées de l'État Islamique et la marginalisation de la minorité sunnite en cours ne sont pas des signes encourageants.

L'UE n'a pas à se mêler de conflits de ce type bafouant encore la souveraineté des États européens pour tenter de faire croire à une diplomatie européenne qui doit relever uniquement des politiques nationales. J'ai donc voté contre ce texte.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Trovo la relazione Manescu poco equilibrata e non condivisibile, non ho quindi inteso supportarlo col mio voto.

Malin Björk (GUE/NGL), *skriftlig*. – Jag har lagt ner rösten om ramavtalet mellan Europeiska unionen och Republiken Libanon.

Å ena sidan handlar det om att en del av programmen kan ge Libanon ett meningsfullt utbyte. Det är jag positiv till. Men i förlängning finns målet om ett frihandelsavtal. Jag är motståndare till hur EU utformar dessa avtal idag gentemot tredje länder, då de inte gynnar ekonomisk utveckling och social rättvisa. Därför väljer jag att lägga ned rösten.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se crea una Asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, relativo a un Acuerdo marco entre la Unión Europea y la República Libanesa sobre los principios generales para la participación de la República Libanesa en los programas de la Unión. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo siekiama nustatyti finansines ir technines taisykles, siekiant Libano Respublikai sudaryti sąlygas dalyvauti tam tikrose Europos Sąjungos programose. Protokolu nustatytoje horizontalioje sistemoje išdėstyti ekonominio, finansinio ir techninio bendradarbiavimo principai ir pagal ją Libano Respublika iš Sąjungos pagal tas programas gali gauti paramą, įskaitant ir finansinę paramą. Ta sistema taikoma tik toms Europos Sąjungos programoms, kuriose atitinkamais steigiamaisiais teisės aktais numatoma Libano Respublikos dalyvavimo galimybė. Todėl Protokolo sudarymu nesuteikiami pagal programas vykdomos įvairių krypčių sektorių politikos įgaliojimai, kuriais naudojamosi nustatant programas.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió bővítése megköveteli, hogy az érvényben levő megállapodások tükrözzék a valós helyzetet, ezért szavazatommal támogattam a kiegészítés elfogadását.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Liban n'a pas besoin de l'UE pour se mêler de ses affaires; il connaît suffisamment de problèmes liés à l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens.

Il s'ajoute à cela que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I abstained on this vote which was on a framework agreement between the EU and Lebanon through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). This agreement promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 countries to the EU's south. It seeks greater integration within the region and is linked to the European neighbourhood policy which is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Aiuti economici in cambio di riforme democratiche e progresso civile è uno degli strumenti maggiormente utilizzati dalla UE nei suoi rapporti di vicinato e di partenariato coi Paesi terzi. Un modo di rapportarsi che ha spesso prodotto risultati positivi per i cittadini di entrambe le parti e ha aumentato il *range* di influenza del *soft power* dell'Unione europea.

Il Libano, in particolare, è uno dei pochi Paesi del Vicino Oriente in cui il sistema sociale e politico regge nonostante gli enormi problemi a cui è esposto: un caso eccezionale di accoglienza e tenacia che guarda all'Occidente e allo sviluppo dello stato di diritto nonostante le ancora gravi carenze strutturali, i propri problemi sociali interni, il rapporto difficoltoso con le minoranze e le milizie jihadiste ancora attive in molte aree del Paese.

Complessivamente l'Europa può guardare alla Repubblica del Libano come ad una democrazia amica, presente in un'area chiave, che dobbiamo sostenere, assicurandone l'integrità territoriale e la sopravvivenza politica, e consentendole di stabilizzarsi in condizioni adeguate, e di inserirsi progressivamente nell'area di collaborazione comune e di cogestione della crisi mediorientale.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport vise à actualiser les accords euro-méditerranéens, ratifiés dans le cadre de la politique de voisinage de l'Union européenne. Le Liban est actuellement en proie à de graves troubles intérieurs notamment engendrés par l'arrivée massive de migrants syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens. Le pays du Cèdre subit également les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique. Or, l'Union européenne a démontré par le passé qu'elle n'avait aucune légitimité et crédibilité pour s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures dans un pays tiers. D'une part, l'Union doit respecter le principe de non-ingérence; d'autre part, la politique extérieure reste une compétence exclusive des États membres. C'est la raison pour laquelle je me suis opposé à ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Implicarea țărilor partenere în cadrul politicii europene de vecinătate se transpune și prin diverse acorduri-cheie. Interesul manifestat de Republica Libaneză de a participa la programele și agențiile Uniunii deschise statelor partenere la politica europeană de vecinătate s-a materializat printr-un protocol cu dispoziții standard ce conține un acord-cadru privind principiile generale de participare a Libanului.

Protocolul la Acordul euro-mediteraneeen de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, referitor la un acord-cadru între Uniunea Europeană și Republica Libaneză privind principiile generale de participare a Republicii Libaneze la programele Uniunii are ca obiectiv stabilirea reglementărilor de ordin financiar și tehnic și, totodată, măsurile de cooperare economică, financiară și tehnică.

M-am exprimat în favoarea instituirii acestui acord, deoarece consider că reprezintă un pilon de consolidare a politicii europene de vecinătate, având o contribuție importantă în extinderea relațiilor externe și în facilitarea unei modernizări a țărilor vecine cu Uniunea Europeană.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *în scris*. – Începând cu 2004, UE a dezvoltat politica europeană de vecinătate (PEV) pentru a preveni apariția unor noi linii de diviziune între noua Uniune extinsă și vecinii săi, precum și pentru a consolida prosperitatea, stabilitatea și securitatea acestora. Din 2006, Libanul este unul dintre cei 16 vecini parteneri cu care UE, în cadrul Uniunii pentru Mediterana, stabilește o politică bilaterală bazată pe valorile democrației, pe preeminența legii și pe respectul drepturilor omului.

Prin protocolul la Acordul euro-mediteraneeen dintre UE și Liban se urmărește stabilirea normelor financiare și tehnice prin care Libanul poate participa la anumite programe ale Uniunii, considerate relevante pentru acest stat mediteraneeen, precum cooperarea economică și asistența financiară.

Libanul găzduiește aproximativ 1,1 milioane de refugiați sirieni, ceea ce constituie o povară economică și administrativ-tehnică pentru acest stat cu o populație de abia 4 ori mai mare. În contextul deteriorării situației refugiaților sirieni, acest protocol vine să ușureze procedura tehnică de oferire a asistenței financiare de către UE, ținând seama și de faptul că, pentru anul 2016, Comisia Europeană alocă 87 de milioane EUR pentru asistență umanitară în Liban.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della raccomandazione in questione poiché ritengo importante stabilire norme finanziarie e tecniche che consentano alla Repubblica libanese di partecipare concretamente ai programmi dell'Unione.

Il quadro orizzontale stabilito dal protocollo enuncia principi per la cooperazione economica, finanziaria e tecnica e consente alla Repubblica libanese di ricevere dall'Unione europea assistenza tecnica, in particolare assistenza finanziaria, a norma dei programmi dell'UE. Tale quadro si applica unicamente ai programmi dell'Unione i cui relativi atti giuridici istitutivi prevedono la possibilità di partecipazione della Repubblica libanese.

Evidenzio, inoltre, che le condizioni standard che figurano nel protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra l'UE e i suoi Stati membri, da una parte, e la Repubblica libanese, dall'altra, dovrebbero essere applicate a tutti i paesi partner della politica europea di vicinato con cui devono essere conclusi protocolli simili.

In virtù del protocollo in questione, i rappresentanti del Libano possono partecipare, in veste di osservatori e per i soli punti che riguardano il loro Paese, ai comitati di gestione preposti al monitoraggio dei programmi dell'Unione ai quali la Repubblica libanese contribuisce finanziariamente.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this vote which was on a framework agreement between the EU and Lebanon through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). This agreement promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 countries to the EU's south. It seeks greater integration within the region and is linked to the European neighbourhood policy which is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I gave my consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon. It contains principles and standards in financial and technical fields that apply to the Member States and other participating EU neighbourhood policy partners. This Agreement provides Lebanon with an easier access to take part in certain EU programmes and activities as well as receiving financial support. Both the EU and Lebanon will benefit from further cooperation and a strengthened partnership.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – La procedura ha in oggetto il consenso del Parlamento alla conclusione di un protocollo all'accordo di associazione già in vigore tra UE e Libano volto a consentire la partecipazione del Libano ai programmi dell'Unione Europea. Si tratta di uno strumento volto a favorire il raggiungimento degli obiettivi dell'accordo euromediterraneo e a favorire lo sviluppo e la stabilità di uno dei paesi limitrofi all'Unione che riveste un ruolo chiave nella politica di vicinato. La misura è pertanto del tutto condivisibile con le nostre posizioni. Pertanto ho espresso il mio voto favorevole.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε τη συμφωνία και θεωρούμε ικανοποιητικά τα αποτελέσματα των διαπραγματεύσεων μεταξύ Επιτροπής και Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε ως προς τη σύσταση σχετικά με το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη συμφωνία-πλαίσιο μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου σχετικά με τις γενικές αρχές που διέπουν τη συμμετοχή της κράτους αυτού σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης. Η προσπάθεια προσέγγισης και αμοιβαίων προσπαθειών σύνδεσης των δύο μερών είναι θετική. Εν τούτοις η αποκλειστική στόχευση σε ζητήματα οικονομικά δεν υπηρετεί τα συμφέροντα των πολιτών και για αυτό απείχα από την ψηφοφορία.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Sono d'accordo che l'Unione europea aiuti finanziariamente la Repubblica libanese: si tratta di un Paese che sta soffrendo molto a causa dei continui scontri armati che si stanno verificando all'interno del Paese e questo fenomeno va soprattutto a colpire moltissimi cittadini innocenti che vivono lì e non hanno la possibilità di spostarsi. Ritengo dunque giusto da parte dell'Unione europea destinare una parte dei suoi fondi per contribuire alla sicurezza dei cittadini che vivono in Libano. Pertanto ho votato a favore di questa proposta che pone le basi per una maggiore collaborazione tra l'Europa e la Repubblica libanese stipulando un programma di cooperazione ben definito.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this Protocol, which contains a Framework Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Lebanon in European Union programmes.

Javier Couso Permuý (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il Parlamento europeo ha approvato il protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo che stabilisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea e gli Stati membri e la Repubblica libanese, nell'ambito di un accordo quadro tra l'Unione europea e la Repubblica libanese sulla partecipazione della Repubblica libanese a programmi dell'Unione.

Ho votato in favore della conclusione di questo protocollo, perché ritengo che fornisca un quadro fondamentale in materia finanziaria e tecnica per permettere al Libano di partecipare ai programmi comunitari e, come tale, di ricevere assistenza finanziaria da parte dell'Unione. Infatti, il protocollo sancisce regole chiare in materia di cooperazione economica, finanziaria e tecnica, in merito ai programmi UE che consentono la partecipazione del Libano.

Questo protocollo rafforza la cooperazione tra l'UE e il Libano, già partner commerciali e partner in materia di diritti umani, democrazia, dialogo politico, cooperazione per la lotta al terrorismo e riciclaggio di denaro.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Republica Libaneză reprezintă un important partener strategic al Uniunii Europene și al statelor membre, care a demonstrat în repetate rânduri seriozitate în respectarea angajamentelor asumate la nivel internațional, în special în cadrul politicii europene de vecinătate (PEV).

Prin proximitatea geografică, dar și culturală, pe care o are cu Siria, Republica Libaneză reprezintă principala destinație a refugiaților sirieni. Astfel, conform declarației Înaltului Reprezentant al Uniunii pentru afaceri externe și politică de securitate, Federica Mogherini, din 11 mai 2016, în Republica Libaneză se află peste 1,5 milioane de refugiați pentru o populație estimată la 4,5 milioane. În acest context, guvernul de la Beirut a fost nevoit să ia măsuri pentru ca solicitanții de azil să poată fi primiți, găzduiți, să aibă acces la educație, la sistemul de sănătate și la piața muncii.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, întrucât consider că este necesară stabilirea principalelor măsuri de cooperare economică, financiară și tehnică în vederea acordării asistenței tehnice acestui partener cu care împărtășim o relație de prietenie de lungă durată.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Zalecenie w sprawie projektu decyzji Rady w sprawie zawarcia Protokołu do Układu eurośródziemnomorskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Wspólnotą Europejską i jej państwami członkowskimi, z jednej strony, a Republiką Libańską, z drugiej strony, dotyczącego umowy ramowej między Unią Europejską a Republiką Libańską w sprawie ogólnych zasad udziału Republiki Libańskiej w programach unijnych. Dwustronna wymiana handlowa między UE a Libanem stale wzrasta, ze średnim rocznym przyrostem o 12,7% od 2008 roku i całkowitym obrotem około 6,9 mld euro w 2014 roku. Unia Europejska jest pierwszym partnerem handlowym Libanu, a roczne obroty z nią stanowią około jednej trzeciej całej libańskiej wymiany handlowej. Chcąc podtrzymać taki stan rzeczy, zagłosowałem za przyjęciem projektu.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – I voted in favour of giving consent to the conclusion of the Protocol since this provides the right tools for the EU to reform, modernise and promote a seamless transition in the European Union's neighbourhood and for Lebanon to participate in Community agencies and Community programmes. The aim of the European neighbourhood policy to achieve political and economic integration with the southern and eastern countries is crucially important. It is very important that Lebanon is given support through a strengthened relationship with the European Union.

Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), în scris. – Deoarece Libanul este un partener-cheie al Uniunii în Orientul Mijlociu, susțin ideea că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să se angajeze mai activ în promovarea stabilității în această țară.

Michel Dantin (PPE), par écrit. – Ce rapport est une recommandation du Parlement européen sur le projet du Conseil de conclure l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre l'Union européenne et la République libanaise. Ce protocole contient un accord-cadre établissant les principes généraux, les règles financières et techniques permettant à la République libanaise de participer aux programmes de l'Union. L'objectif de ce protocole consiste à définir à certains programmes de l'Union. Considérant que la coopération de l'UE avec le Liban est indispensable, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), par écrit. — J'ai voté en faveur de la conclusion du protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. En tant que pays partenaire de la politique européenne de voisinage depuis 2004, le Liban participera aux programmes de l'Union et bénéficiera d'une assistance de l'Union. L'objectif de ce protocole est de promouvoir les réformes et la modernisation au Liban.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), par écrit. – Ce texte relatif aux relations UE-Liban participe à l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Ces derniers constituent le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Le Liban est déstabilisé par l'arrivée d'environ 1,5 million de réfugiés syriens en plus des réfugiés palestiniens. À cela s'ajoutent les incursions sanglantes des djihadistes du groupe état islamique. Non seulement la complexité des enjeux libanais et du contexte politique de ce pays semble échapper à l'oligarchie européenne, mais il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas vocation à jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale. Pour ces raisons, j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), в писмена форма. – Гласувах в подкрепа на препоръката относно проекта на решение на Съвета относно сключването на Протокол към Евро-средиземноморското споразумение за асоцииране между Европейските общности и техните държави членки, от една страна, и Република Ливан, от друга страна, относно Рамково споразумение между Европейския съюз и Република Ливан за общите принципи на участие на Република Ливан в програми на Съюза. Ливан е част от Евро-средиземноморското партньорство, което насърчава икономическата интеграция и демократичната реформа сред 16 държави от Северна Африка и Близкия Изток. Европейската политика за съседство дава възможност на ЕС да предложи на своите съседи привилегирани отношения, като се опира на взаимен ангажимент към общи ценности, като демокрация и човешки права, върховенство на закона, добро управление, принципи на пазарната икономика и устойчиво развитие. Двустранната търговия между ЕС и Ливан се увеличава постоянно, като постепенната либерализация на търговията между двете страни на споразумението ще подпомогне икономиката на Ливан и ще доведе до необходимите сигурност, стабилност и просперитет.

Γεώργιος Επιτῆδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιβούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote contre: il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Pretende-se que o Parlamento Europeu dê o seu consentimento à conclusão do protocolo para o Acordo Euro-Mediterrâneo.

O Líbano tem importância estratégica para a UE no contexto do Médio Oriente, no que respeita à questão da segurança e da defesa. O relatório refere que a UE se quer proteger de novas ameaças, como o terrorismo. Precisa também de mais um país que sirva de tampão à chegada de mais refugiados à Europa.

O Acordo consiste numa proposta de associação entre a Comissão Europeia e a República do Líbano para que se preste apoio técnico e financeiro ao país, possibilitando que este participe em determinados programas europeus como o Horizonte 2020, Cosme, Europa Criativa.

Para a UE, pouco importa haver um Líbano em colapso. O país tem recebido milhares de refugiados, existem os problemas com a fronteira da Síria, com Israel, com a presença do autoproclamado Estado Islâmico.

O objetivo principal da dita parceria Euro-Mediterrânica é a integração económica e a relação privilegiada destes países com a UE, sendo inseparável de objetivos de domínio económico e colonização de mercados.

O acordo abre portas a acordos de livre comércio. Insere-se na agenda política e económica da UE para o Médio Oriente. Estas são razões para a nossa oposição.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del progetto di decisione del Consiglio relativo all'accordo Euromed sulla partecipazione della Repubblica libanese ai programmi dell'Unione. La nostra politica di vicinato consente di stabilire relazioni privilegiate con il Medio Oriente, incrementando un commercio bilaterale proficuo per tutti gli Stati membri dell'UE. L'Unione europea è il primo partner commerciale per il Libano, coprendo circa un terzo di tutto il commercio libanese, ragion per cui è necessario mantenere e incentivare tale partenariato, al fine di perseguire una maggiore integrazione economica con impegni e guadagni reciproci.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – Abstained. No opinion.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Predmetný protokol upravuje vzťah a participáciu Libanonskej republiky na programoch Európskej únie.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτως*. – Είμαι αντίθετος στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας. Επομένως η ψήφος μου είναι αρνητική.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Lebanon is a key partner for the EU in the Middle East. The country faces a fragile security environment, being at the forefront of the Syrian civil war, with over a million refugees out of four million of a total of the population. The EU must value strategic relations with Lebanon, and supports the country's stability and security in a turbulent part of the world. To foster stability in Lebanon, developing capabilities and promoting people-to-people contacts and the transfer of the expertise is in our interest. The participation of Lebanon in the EU's programmes is a way to tangibly support these strategic objectives. I support the Agreement as I believe we must engage with Lebanon more actively.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Egyetértek a Libanoni Köztársaság és az EU közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyv megkötésével, ezért megszavaztam azt. Ez lehetőséget biztosít a 2004 után csatlakozott országoknak, köztük Magyarországnak, hogy csatlakozzon a jegyzőkönyvhöz.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della raccomandazione concernente il progetto di decisione del Consiglio relativa alla conclusione del protocollo dell'accordo euro mediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea e i suoi Stati membri, da una parte, e la Repubblica libanese, dall'altra, riguardante un accordo quadro tra l'Unione europea e la Repubblica libanese sui principi generali della partecipazione del Libano ai programmi dell'Unione.

L'obiettivo del protocollo è infatti quello di definire le regole finanziarie e tecniche che permettano alla Repubblica libanese di partecipare ad alcuni dei programmi dell'Unione e di consolidare la cooperazione finanziaria, sociale e culturale e il dialogo politico tra le due sponde del Mediterraneo.

Le relazioni tra l'Ue il Libano sono sicuramente uno dei capisaldi della politica estera del piccolo paese del Vicino Oriente. Il paese, a seguito di una drammatica guerra civile durata sedici anni, svolge un ruolo importante nel complesso quadro del Medio Oriente ed è fondamentale garantire la vicinanza politica, economica e culturale dell'Unione europea tutta per favorire un pieno processo di transizione democratica e per resistere alle istanze islamiste che provocherebbero ancora agitazioni e tensioni in un paese che si regge su un fragile equilibrio governativo.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für das Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon (Rahmenübereinkommen) gestimmt, da ich als Koordinator meiner Fraktion für die AKP-Delegation eine gute und enge Partnerschaftspolitik auf Augenhöhe im Mittelmeerraum für wichtig und unverzichtbar halte.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich unterstütze die Teilnahme Libanons an Programmen der EU. Das Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon enthält nun ein Rahmenabkommen über die allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Teilnahme Libanons an den Programmen der Union. Vor allem dient es dazu, die finanziellen und technischen Regeln festzulegen.

Michela Giuffrida (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore di questa relazione perché sono assolutamente favorevole ad un accordo che includa e dia l'accesso al Libano a tutti i programmi dell'Unione europea. Il Libano è un paese straordinario, un partner strategico fondamentale, un Paese che sta dimostrando molta più forza e tenuta dell'Unione europea nella gestione dell'emergenza umanitaria che lo coinvolge e travolge.

Il Libano accoglie 1,5 milioni di rifugiati dalla Siria che vivono in una condizione di miseria assoluta. Il Paese non è in grado di fornire assistenza economica o garantire condizioni adeguate di accoglienza. La maggior parte dei campi profughi sono spontanei non ci sono strutture.

Il Libano ha bisogno dell'Europa ed è insieme, attraverso una efficace collaborazione che si possono trovare soluzioni ad una situazione di violenza che costringe migliaia di persone alla fuga. Dalla Siria prima in Libano, poi in Turchia per arrivare all'Europa, tutto pur di scappare dall'Isis. È proprio perché siamo tutti coinvolti che la cooperazione e il dialogo devono essere costanti.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour. The framework agreements established an association between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Lebanon in European Union programmes.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτως*. – Οι 3 εκθέσεις αφορούν το πλαίσιο συνεργασίας ΕΕ και Λιβάνου και τη συμμετοχή του τελευταίου σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης. Τηρήσαμε θέση αποχής, γιατί από τη μια αυτή είναι η θέληση των αρχών του Λιβάνου αλλά από την άλλη αυτές οι συμφωνίες οδηγούν σε συμφωνίες ελεύθερου εμπορίου με όλες τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις που αυτές επιφέρουν στους λαούς και με τις οποίες φυσικά διαφωνούμε.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported this framework agreement between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon. This will now allow the Republic of Lebanon to participate in certain European Union programmes after the Commission determines the specific terms and conditions. Such actions are vital for economic, financial and technical cooperation, while it allows the Republic of Lebanon to receive assistance, in particular financial assistance, from the European Union pursuant to those programmes.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this agreement as I had no objections to its final terms.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *in writing*. – Lebanon is a crucial partner for the EU in the Middle East. Having taken over a million refugees from the Syrian civil war, with a population of only four million, Lebanon is struggling. The EU needs to aid in stabilising the situation and engage more actively with Lebanon.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za nacrt zakonodavne rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o nacrtu odluke Vijeća o sklapanju Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Republike Libanona, s druge strane, o okvirnom sporazumu između Europske unije i Republike Libanona o općim načelima sudjelovanja Republike Libanona u programima Unije jer se time osnažuje suradnja između EU-a i Libanona te se povećava utjecaj Unije na Bliskom istoku.

Sudjelovanjem u programima Unije, Libanonu se omogućuje napredovanje u pojedinim područjima, te se dodatno promiču vrijednosti i načela Unije u strateškom dijelu jugozapadne Azije. Važno je naglasiti također da Libanon mora financijski doprinijeti proračunu EU-a za specifične programe u kojima sudjeluje. Stoga, podržavam sklapanje ovog Protokola.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes constituent l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban subit aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite. Ce pays n'a pas besoin de l'ingérence de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire. Je me suis porté contre ces trois textes relatifs au protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce protocole qui permettra au Liban de conclure des accords de participation aux nouveaux programmes communautaires adoptés parallèlement au cadre financier pluriannuel de l'Union pour la période 2014-2020.

Grâce à ce protocole, le Liban pourra participer à certains programmes communautaires (recherche, innovation, soutien aux PME, environnement) dans les mêmes conditions que les États Membres de l'UE.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted for the report of the colleague as I see that cooperation between the regions is of the utmost importance for the well-being of the people and it will only help in the procedure of modernisation and reform of the state.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Při schvalování protokolu k Evropsko-středomořské dohodě mezi EU a Libanem jsem se zdržela hlasování. Liban je členem Evropsko-středomořského partnerství, které si klade za cíl především hlubší ekonomickou spolupráci s šestnácti státy sousedícími s EU v Severní Africe a na Středním východě. Účelem hlasování bylo vyslovit souhlas či nesouhlas Parlamentu s protokolem k dohodě mezi EU a Libanem a zároveň v dohodě provést některé formální změny v souvislosti s přistoupení nových států do EU po jejím uzavření.

Vzhledem k tomu, že dohoda obecně směřuje k postupnému vytvoření volného trhu mezi Libanem a EU, což by pro Liban mohlo mít některé nepříznivé ekonomické důsledky, nemohla jsem návrh podpořit. Podle mého názoru je obecně při uzavírání dohod o ekonomické spolupráci nutné vzít v úvahu negativní dopady, které smlouvy mohou mít například na zemědělství či průmysl v zemi, a snažit se je maximálně omezit. Je také nutné ve smlouvách stanovit pravidla pro dodržování lidských práv a upravit sankce za jejich porušování. Žádná takováto ustanovení v dohodě nenajdeme.

Na druhou stranu uznávám, že vůle uzavřít dohodu a postupně prohlubovat ekonomickou spolupráci mezi EU a Libanem vzešla přímo od libanonských státních autorit, které si prohlubování spolupráce přejí.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. — Der Berichterstatter verknüpft im vorliegenden Bericht die Migrationskrise mit der Forderung, Länder zu stärken, um Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen. Dies ist zu begrüßen, allerdings sollte diese Hilfe an klare und eindeutige Verpflichtungen zur Rückübernahme von Migranten geknüpft werden. Da dies im vorliegenden Bericht nicht der Fall ist, stimme ich dem Bericht nicht zu.

Béla Kovács (NI), *írásban*. - Libanon valaha a Közel-Kelet Svájca volt, ahol meglehetősen jómódban és nagyfokú vallási tolerancia közepette élt a lakosság. Ez az idilli állapot azonban bizonyos erőeknek nem felelt meg, így az ország 1975-1990 között polgárháborúba és káoszba sülyedt. Az ősi keresztény kultúrák egykori élettere lassan kilábalóban van e nehéz időszakából, bízom benne, hogy ebben segítheti az euro-mediterrán egyezményről szóló tanácsi döntés, az EU és tagországai, valamint Libanon közötti együttműködés, az ország részvétele az uniós programokban.

Андрей Ковачев (PPE), *в писмена форма*. — Подкрепям споразумението между Европейския съюз и Ливан и протокола, който съдържа рамковото споразумение за общите принципи на участие на Ливан в програми на ЕС. Като част от страните – партньори по Европейската политика за съседство, смятам, че споразумението ще повлияе положително на Ливан и чрез помощта от ЕС ще допринесе за по-голяма стабилност, демократични институции, политическа отвореност и икономическо развитие на страната. Поради непосредствените предизвикателства от въздействието на кризата в Сирия, трябва да се положат основите, които да помогнат за дългосрочен просперитет на страната.

Партньорството с ЕС ще допринесе за задълбочаването на демокрацията и зачитането на върховенството на закона, правата на човека и основните свободи. Също ще допринесе и за развитието на устойчива и приобщаваща икономика, която намалява социалните и регионалните неравенства, създава работни места и подобрява жизнения стандарт на населението, увеличава производителността и осигурява защита на природната среда.

Трябва да се отбележи, че Ливан при мирни условия и стабилност има много добри перспективи за икономическо развитие, тъй като има добро разположение по отношение на достъпност на вода и плодородна почва, освен това притежава висок процент обработваема земя, както и квалифицирана работна ръка.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Il Protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo tra l'UE e il Libano contiene delle previsioni che vanno applicate e fatte rispettare da tutti i paesi partner della politica europea con i quali tali protocolli devono essere conclusi. L'obiettivo che si prefigge, è quello di assicurare l'adeguatezza delle norme finanziarie che permettono alla Repubblica del Libano di poter aderire ad alcuni programmi dell'Unione europea.

Il programma contenuto nel protocollo, definisce, dunque, i principi per la cooperazione economica, finanziaria e tecnica permettendo alla Repubblica del Libano di poter ricevere assistenza, in particolar modo assistenza finanziaria da parte dell'Unione, nell'ambito di tali programmi. Tuttavia ritengo che la raccomandazione del Parlamento sia da valutare positivamente e da adottare, e dunque mi esprimo favorevolmente nel sostenerla.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre ce protocole car j'estime que l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre le Protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Le pays du Cèdre connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite qui n'augure rien de bon. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires, la subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, comme en témoigne la dernière séance de la sous-commission Sécurité et Défense. De plus, il convient de rappeler que l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Liban, depuis la guerre civile (1975-1990), tente difficilement de se relever. De nouveaux facteurs compliquent son redressement, notamment l'arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) en plus des réfugiés palestiniens et des attaques sanglantes de l'État islamique. De ce fait, l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens par l'Union européenne ne lui est d'aucun secours, le fonctionnement subtil de l'équilibre politique libanais échappant aux élites européennes. Il est préférable de freiner toute intention d'ingérence de la part de l'UE, qui n'a pas à se substituer aux États membres en matière de politique internationale. J'ai donc voté CONTRE.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del protocolo porque el objetivo de los tres Protocolos de Acuerdo Euro Mediterráneo entre la UE y el Líbano es establecer normas financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report that lays down a framework and rules for the Republic of Lebanon and its participation in certain EU programmes.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem proti. Jsem pro dohody o volném obchodu a spolupráci. Nesouhlasím ovšem se zapojováním Libanonské republiky do programů Evropské unie. Nejlepším způsobem, jak nechat chudší země zbohatnout, je uvolnit obchodní bariéry, a nikoliv posílat dotace z kapes evropských daňových poplatníků.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Šī protokola pieņemšana un stāšanās spēkā atvērs durvis Libānas Republikas līdzdalībai dažādās Eiropas Savienības programmās Eiropas un Vidusjūras reģiona valstu partnerības ietvaros. Protokols kā tāds specifificē šādas turpmākās sadarbības finansiālos un tehniskos noteikumus, pieliekot primāro atspērienu uz ekonomikas jomu, kas pašreizējās reģionālās situācijas dēļ ir īpaši svarīgs, jo satur skaidru un tiešu ietekmi uz visām parējām sfērām.

Esmu pārliecināts, ka Protokola slēgšana palīdzēs arvien aktīvāk un produktīvāk attīstīt saiknes starp ES un Libānu, līdz ar ko visai apšveicu pozitīvos balsojuma rezultātus.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), *γραπτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω τη σύσταση σχετικά με το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για συμφωνία-πλαίσιο μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου σχετικά με τις γενικές αρχές που διέπουν τη συμμετοχή της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης, διότι δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ces trois rapports.

Trois rapports sont soumis au vote du Parlement européen.

Ces textes sont la traduction concrète de la politique euro-méditerranéenne de l'Union européenne. En l'occurrence, nous nous opposons à toute ingérence dans les affaires de l'État libanais. Outre le principe même de non intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un État souverain, ce pays connaît actuellement une situation de grande instabilité, en raison, d'une part, de l'immigration massive de réfugiés syriens et palestiniens et, d'autre part, des attaques récurrentes de l'État islamique.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi apoyo a la recomendación que apoya la celebración del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se crea una Asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, relativo a un Acuerdo marco entre la Unión Europea y la República Libanesa sobre los principios generales para la participación de la República Libanesa en los programas de la Unión.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Hier geht es um den Abschluss des Protokolls zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zur Gründung einer Assoziation zwischen der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits, und dem Libanon andererseits.

Im Rahmen der ENP ist die schrittweise Öffnung für bestimmte Programme und Einrichtungen der Union für die ENP-Partnerstaaten vorgesehen. Hierzu benötigt der Rat die Zustimmung des Europäischen Parlaments. Andererseits wurde dieses Assoziationsabkommen nicht mit einem Immigranten/Asylanten-Rückübernahmeabkommen verbunden. Dieses wäre jedoch meines Erachtens nach essentiell. Daher habe ich hier negativ abgestimmt.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Liban connaît de nos jours de graves difficultés intérieures. À la venue d'un million et demi d'exilés syriens s'ajoutent le nombre de réfugiés palestiniens déjà présents. Je crois que ce pays n'a pas besoin dans ses affaires de l'Union européenne, qui n'a pas de légitimité dans un rôle de politique étrangère. Par ailleurs, la compréhension très restreinte de l'Union quant aux phénomènes se produisant dans cet État prête à une réserve justifiée sur cet accord.

En conséquence j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – O objetivo do presente Protocolo é estabelecer as regras financeiras e técnicas que permitam à República do Líbano participar em determinados programas da UE. O quadro horizontal criado pelo Protocolo define os princípios para a cooperação económica, financeira e técnica e permite à República do Líbano receber assistência técnica, em especial assistência financeira, da União Europeia, em conformidade com os programas da União Europeia.

Esse quadro aplica-se unicamente aos programas cujos atos jurídicos constitutivos preveem a possibilidade de participação da República do Líbano. Por conseguinte, a celebração do Protocolo não implica o exercício de competências ao abrigo das várias políticas setoriais previstas nos programas, que são exercidas quando se estabelecem os programas. Daí o meu parecer favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this Protocol because of the inclusive practices that are established in this framework. Participation by the Republic of Lebanon in European Union programmes will have benefits in terms of economic development in both the EU and Lebanon.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. — J'accueille favorablement la conclusion d'un protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre l'Union européenne et ses États membres d'un côté et le Liban de l'autre concernant un accord-cadre relatif aux principes généraux de la participation de ce pays aux programmes de l'Union. Cet accord rentre dans le cadre de la politique européenne de voisinage (PEV) et de l'ouverture progressive de certains programmes européens aux pays faisant partie de la PEV. Le protocole définit par exemple des règles de coopération économiques, financières et techniques qui permettront au Liban de participer aux programmes importants de l'Union ainsi que de bénéficier d'une assistance technique et financière européenne. Le Liban est un pays avec lequel on doit coopérer et que l'on se doit de soutenir à plus d'un titre. Rappelons-nous que le Liban accueille plus d'un million de réfugiés pour une population d'approximativement 6 millions d'habitants. Je soutiens cette initiative permettant au Liban de participer au large éventail de programmes ouverts aux pays partenaires de la PEV. Cela va renforcer et améliorer nos relations politiques internationales avec ce pays sur des thèmes comme la stabilité économique ou la sécurité.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report because Lebanon is a key partner for the EU in the Middle East. The country faces a fragile security environment, being at the forefront of the Syrian civil war, with over a million refugees out of four million of a total of the population. The EU is interested in fostering stability in Lebanon, developing capabilities and promoting people-to-people contacts and the transfer of expertise.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – A Tanács határozattervezetet fogadott el az egyrészt az Európai Közösség és tagállamai, másrészt a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt, a Libanoni Köztársaság uniós programokban való részvételét szabályozó általános elvekre vonatkozó, az Európai Unió és a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti keretmegállapodásról szóló jegyzőkönyv megkötéséről. A határozat elfogadásához meg kell szereznie a Parlament egyetértését is. A Külügyi Bizottság jelentésében azt ajánlja, hogy a Parlament a jegyzőkönyv megkötésével értsen egyet. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – O presente projeto de protocolo ao Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que estabelece uma associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano, por outro, relativo a um Acordo-Quadro entre a União Europeia e a República do Líbano sobre os princípios gerais que regem a participação da República do Líbano em programas da União merece o meu voto favorável.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer. Je vote contre ce texte.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui donne l'approbation du Parlement pour la conclusion d'un accord-cadre entre l'Union européenne et la république libanaise relatif aux principes généraux de la participation du Liban à certains programmes de l'Union, dans le cadre de la politique européenne de voisinage qui a pour but de favoriser les relations entre l'UE et des pays n'ayant pas vocation à y entrer sur des thèmes tels que la sécurité, la stabilité et l'économie;

Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Considerati i legami storici e i valori comuni all'origine della vicinanza e dell'interdipendenza esistenti tra l'Unione europea e il Libano, tenuto presente che gli Stati membri e il Libano desiderano consolidare tali legami e instaurare relazioni durature basate sulla reciprocità, sulla solidarietà, sul partenariato e sulla partecipazione allo sviluppo, accolgo favorevolmente il progetto di decisione del Consiglio relativa alla conclusione del protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea e i suoi Stati membri da una parte, e la Repubblica libanese dall'altra.

Il Libano è un partner di strategica importanza per l'Unione europea nel Medio Oriente. Il Paese presenta attualmente condizioni di sicurezza precarie, trovandosi coinvolto all'interno della guerra civile siriana, con oltre un milione di rifugiati su una popolazione totale di quattro milioni. Sostengo in questo senso la necessità di supportare l'impegno dell'Unione europea di promuovere stabilità, prosperità e sicurezza in Libano, in un dialogo continuativo tra le parti che cercherà di trovare nuove forme di cooperazione per il conseguimento di obiettivi comuni.

Le relazioni tra le parti, infatti, si fondano sul rispetto dei principi democratici e dei diritti umani fondamentali enunciati nella dichiarazione universale dei diritti dell'uomo, che costituisce un elemento essenziale del presente accordo.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Támogatom az Európai Unió és a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyv elfogadását. Az európai szomszédságpolitika célja elősegíteni a gazdasági és politikai fejlődést az Európát körbeölelő országokban, ezzel biztosítva stabilitásukat. Ennek fontosságát különösen érzékeljük most, a migránsválság idején. A szomszédságpolitika keretein belül kötött egyezménynek köszönhetően Libanon olyan európai uniós programokban vehet részt, amelyek nagyban hozzájárulnak az ország területén végbemenő reformok és modernizáció sikeréhez.

Tavaly zárult le például az a program, ami elsősorban a libanoni intézmények befogadóképességének válsághelyzetekben való megnövelésére irányult, különös hangsúlyt fektetve a menekülteket befogadó alap-, és középiskolákra. Mint minden esetben, a programok hatékony működéséhez most is le kell fektetnünk a szükséges pénzügyi és technikai szabályokat, amire ez a jegyzőkönyv nagyszerű lehetőséget kínál.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Union aims to establish a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. I voted for this recommendation that will update the Euro-Mediterranean agreement between the EU and Lebanon by taking into account the enlargement of the EU.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I abstained on this vote which was on a framework agreement between the EU and Lebanon through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). This agreement promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 countries to the EU's south. It seeks greater integration within the region and is linked to the European neighbourhood policy which is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Trotz der prinzipiell richtigen Idee, Fluchtursachen vor Ort zu lösen, fehlt es an einer eindeutigen Selbstverpflichtung zur Rückübernahme von Migranten. Dementsprechend habe ich mich gegen den Bericht ausgesprochen.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – In merito alla proposta della collega Mănescu, ho ritenuto opportuno votare positivamente. Oggigiorno, una politica di vicinato dell'Unione europea realmente funzionante richiede l'apertura graduale di alcuni programmi e agenzie dell'UE ai Paesi partner interessati da tale politica. Pertanto, credo che il protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo rappresenti un passo significativo in tale direzione, in quanto regola gli aspetti finanziari e tecnici che permettono alla Repubblica libanese di beneficiare dell'assistenza soprattutto finanziaria dell'UE e di partecipare ai programmi dell'Unione. Pertanto, ho votato a favore.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. — The Lebanese economy remains fragile. Regulatory inefficiency and uncertainty exacerbated by political instability and ongoing security threats by violent extremists continue to undermine private-sector activity and development. The horizontal framework established by the Protocol sets out principles for economic, financial and technical cooperation and allows the Republic of Lebanon to receive assistance from the European Union pursuant to those programmes. EU development aid goes to 150 countries around the world and I believe Lebanon should be one of them. Hence, I supported the report.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Europska politika susjedstva stvarana je ne samo kako bi pripomogla u ostvarivanju tješnje suradnje između zemalja članica Europske unije i njezinih najbližih susjeda, već i kako bi pridonijela jačanju demokracije, vladavine prava i poštovanja ljudskih prava u zemljama u kojima se provodi, kao i njihovom gospodarskom i socijalnom rastu i razvoju. Političke, gospodarske i socijalne reforme pritom su temelj na kojemu se ta politika i dobra suradnja zasniva. Libanon je u posljednje vrijeme prošao kroz turbulentno razdoblje u kojemu smo nedavno svjedočili i terorističkim napadima, koji predstavljaju prijetnju i za Libanon i za cijeli svijet. Stoga ovaj Sporazum i daljnje približavanje Libanona Europskoj uniji te međusobnu suradnju smatram dobrim potezom na putu ka daljnjoj stabilizaciji zemlje, stvaranju reformi koje su potrebne, ali i osnaživanju Libanonske Republike podrškom Europske unije.

Ovim Protokolom utvrdit ćemo pravila koja će Libanonu omogućiti sudjelovanje u akcijskim planovima kreiranim specifično za potrebe Libanona i njegovih stanovnika. Protokol donosi standardna pravila koja vrijede za sve zemlje potpisnice sporazuma u okviru Europske politike susjedstva. On doprinosi boljitku zemalja potpisnica, ali i građana Europske unije.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Libanon je ključni partner za EU na Bliskom istoku. Zemlja se suočava s krhkim sigurnosnim okruženjem, posebice zbog sirijskog rata, s više od milijun izbjeglica na 4 milijuna koliko broji ukupno stanovništvo.

EU je zainteresiran za poticanje stabilnosti u Libanonu, razvijanje sposobnosti i promicanje direktnih kontakata i prijenosa znanja. Priključujem se već širokom konsenzusu na razini odbora o potrebi da se dodatno uključe u naporima da pomognu Libanonu. Ujedno podržavam ovo izvješće.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), *písemně*. – Libanon je strategický partner EU v oblasti Blízkého východu. Země se potýká především s ohroženími v oblasti bezpečnosti s ohledem na své sousedství se Sýrií zmítanou válkami. Aktuálně Libanon poskytl azyl cca 1 milionu uprchlíků, kterým se EU snaží pomáhat prostřednictvím nově vzniklých trustových fondů. Je proto v nejvyšším zájmu EU posílit stabilitu v zemi a rozvoj kapacit pro zvládnání těžké současné situace. Jsem rád, že ohledně zprávy došlo k širokému konsensu ohledně nutnosti posílit spolupráci a podporu Libanonu.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Tra le numerose misure della politica europea di vicinato (PEV) intese a promuovere le riforme e la modernizzazione negli stati limitrofi dell'Unione europea, figura l'apertura graduale di determinati programmi e agenzie dell'Unione alla partecipazione dei paesi partner interessati. Finora sono stati firmati protocolli con Armenia, Georgia, Israele, Giordania, Moldavia, Marocco e Ucraina.

Nel dicembre 2013 la Repubblica libanese si è detta interessata a partecipare all'ampia varietà di programmi aperti ai paesi partner della politica europea di vicinato. Il protocollo contiene un accordo quadro sui principi generali della partecipazione del Libano ai programmi dell'Unione. A norma dell'articolo 218, paragrafo 6, del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea, il Consiglio deve ottenere il parere conforme del Parlamento europeo prima di concludere il presente protocollo.

Ho votato a favore dell'approvazione da parte del Parlamento europeo affinché si possa rafforzare la cooperazione tra l'Ue e il Libano.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce protocole contenant un accord-cadre relatif aux principes généraux (essentiellement des règles techniques et financières) de la participation du Liban à différents programmes de l'Union européenne, dans le cadre notamment de la politique européenne de voisinage.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se crea una Asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, relativo a un Acuerdo marco entre la Unión Europea y la República Libanesa sobre los principios generales para la participación de la República Libanesa en los programas de la Unión. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce protocole contient un accord-cadre relatif aux principes généraux de la participation du Liban aux programmes de l'Union. Il comprend des conditions types destinées à être appliquées à l'ensemble des pays partenaires concernés par la politique européenne de voisinage avec lesquels de tels protocoles doivent être conclus. L'objectif du protocole consiste à définir les règles financières et techniques permettant à la République libanaise de participer à certains programmes de l'Union. Le cadre horizontal créé par le protocole énonce les principes de la coopération économique, financière et technique et autorise la République libanaise à bénéficier d'une assistance de l'Union, en particulier d'une assistance financière, au titre desdits programmes.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Libanas – svarbus Europos Sąjungos partneris tiek prekybos, tiek, kas dar svarbiau, saugumo užtikrinimo srityje. Pamatinis Europos Sąjungos principas – saugumą kurti per įtraukimą. Todėl Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolo dėl Europos Sąjungos ir Libano Respublikos bendrojo susitarimo, kuriuo nustatomi Libano Respublikos dalyvavimo Sąjungos programose bendrieji principai, patvirtinimas sudarys daug geresnes sąlygas ES ir Libano suartėjimui, tarpusavio supratimo gerinimui ir jei ne saugumo regione stiprinimui, tai bent jau ilgalaikiai krizių prevencijai.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – No âmbito da Política Europeia de Vizinhança (PEV), a abertura progressiva de programas e agências da União Europeia (UE) a países parceiros nela integrados constitui uma das muitas medidas para promover as reformas, a modernização e a transição nesses países.

Em 18.06.2007 a Comissão lançou negociações para a assinatura de acordos-quadro com os países parceiros no âmbito da PEV. Até à data, foram assinados Protocolos com a Arménia, a Geórgia, Israel, a Jordânia, a Moldávia, Marrocos e a Ucrânia.

Em Dezembro de 2013, o Líbano expressou o seu interesse em participar no vasto leque de programas abertos a estes países parceiros.

O Protocolo em causa inclui um Acordo-Quadro sobre os princípios gerais que regem a participação da República do Líbano em programas da UE, contendo ainda disposições normalizadas, iguais às aplicadas a todos os outros países parceiros abrangidos.

Tendo como principal objetivo o estabelecimento de regras financeiras e técnicas que permitam ao Líbano participar em determinados programas da UE, o quadro horizontal criado pelo Protocolo define princípios para a cooperação económica, financeira e técnica, permitindo que o Líbano receba assistência da UE, em especial no domínio financeiro, em conformidade com os programas estabelecidos.

Em face do exposto, votei a favor do presente relatório.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui donne l'approbation du Parlement à la conclusion par le Conseil d'un protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen UE-Liban. Ce protocole contient un accord-cadre sur les principes généraux de la participation du Liban aux programmes de l'Union. Il comprend des conditions types et définit les règles financières et techniques permettant au Liban de participer à certains programmes de l'Union.

Par ce vote, le Parlement permet au Liban de disposer des conditions s'il souhaite participer à des programmes de l'Union tels qu'Horizon 2020, par exemple.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della raccomandazione relativa alla conclusione del protocollo dell'accordo quadro tra Unione europea e la Repubblica libanese. L'accordo si inserisce nell'ambito della politica di vicinato, uno dei pilastri dell'UE nelle sue relazioni con i Paesi terzi. Spesso descritta come potenza civile debole sul piano internazionale, l'Europa ha dimostrato nel corso del tempo la bontà della propria politica estera, capace di instaurare rapporti amichevoli e duraturi con i Paesi vicini.

Questi infatti possono beneficiare di un'assistenza, finanziaria nel caso del Libano, da parte dell'Europa, nel rispetto delle condizioni previste dai programmi europei in questione. Ricordiamo che attualmente il Libano fa fronte a una crisi migratoria ben più grave di quella europea, con flussi migratori tre volte superiori rispetto a quelli riversatisi in Europa. Per la sua posizione geografica questo Paese rappresenta la meta di milioni di rifugiati siriani che, a causa della guerra, vi cercano riparo.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanía de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru recomandarea raportoarei Ramona Mănescu, referitoare la proiectul de decizie a Consiliului privind încheierea unui protocol la Acordul euro-mediteraneeu de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele sale membre, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, pentru a ține seama de aderarea la Uniunea Europeană a Republicii Cehe, a Republicii Estonia, a Republicii Cipru, a Republicii Letonia, a Republicii Lituania, a Republicii Ungare, a Republicii Malta, a Republicii Polone, a Republicii Slovenia și a Republicii Slovace.

Aceasta modificare era necesară și mă bucur că a fost realizată.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für die „Empfehlung zu dem Entwurf eines Beschlusses des Rates über den Abschluss des Protokolls zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Assoziationsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Libanesischen Republik andererseits über ein Rahmenabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Libanesischen Republik über die allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Teilnahme der Libanesischen Republik an Programmen der Union“ gestimmt, da es einerseits wichtig ist, derartige Partnerschaften zu stärken, und gleichzeitig feste Regeln aufzustellen.

Alle Drittstaaten müssen Regeln für die wirtschaftliche, finanzielle und technische Zusammenarbeit folgen, um somit Unterstützung – unter anderem auch finanzieller Natur – von der EU und ihren Programmen zu erhalten.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

He votado en contra del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para las clases populares de los países y Estados afectados.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Il Libano é un membro del Partenariato Euro-Mediterraneo (Euromed) che promuove l'integrazione e le riforme democratiche nei 16 paesi confinanti del Nord Africa e Medio Oriente con l'Unione Europea. Dal momento che i rapporti commerciali tra il Libano e l'UE stanno crescendo con una media del 12,7% dal 2008 e considerando che la Politica di Vicinato europea prevede relazioni privilegiate con i membri dell'Euromed, ho deciso di votare a favore di questa raccomandazione che permette alla Repubblica libanese di partecipare ai programmi dell'Unione europea.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *písomne*. – Hlasoval som za toto uznesenie. Tento protokol sa snaží definovať finančné a technické pravidlá umožňujúce Libanonu účasť na niektorých programoch EÚ. Horizontálny rámec stanovený týmto protokolom stanovuje zásady pre opatrenia v oblasti hospodárskej, finančnej a technickej spolupráce a umožňuje Libanonu prijímať technickú pomoc a najmä finančnú pomoc z Európskej únie na základe programov Európskej únie.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Euro-stredomorskú dohodu medzi EÚ a Libanonom som podporila, keďže ide najmä o ujasnenie technických a finančných pravidiel súvisiacich s účasťou Libanonu na programoch Únie. Dohoda je súčasťou európskej susedskej politiky (ENP), v rámci ktorej je partnerským krajinám umožnený prístup k programom a agentúram EÚ. Ide o jeden z nástrojov, ktorým EÚ podporuje reformy a modernizáciu vo svojom susedstve. Podobné dohody sú už od roku 2007 prerokúvané s viacerými krajinami a doteraz boli protokoly podpísané s Arménskom, Gruzínskom, Izraelom, Jordánskom, Moldavskom, Marokom a Ukrajinou. Libanon vyjadril svoj záujem pristúpiť k týmto programom v roku 2013. Libanon tak bude mať prístup k technickej a finančnej asistencii, ktorá by krajine mala umožniť zlepšiť svoje verejné politiky. Keďže je Libanon v súčasnosti zmietaný nestabilitou svojho regiónu, dohoda s EÚ by mohla priniesť podporu, ktorú krajina potrebuje.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Euro-stredomorská dohoda medzi EÚ a Libanonom je pre EÚ dôležitá, pretože poskytnie vhodný rámec na politický dialóg medzi severom a juhom, ktorý zabezpečí postupnú liberalizáciu obchodu v stredomorskom priestore.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Glavni cilj Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum između EU-a i Libanona (okvirni sporazum) jest utvrditi financijska i tehnička pravila koja Republici Libanonu omogućuju sudjelovanje u određenim programima Europske unije. Horizontalni okvir uspostavljen Protokolom navodi načela gospodarske, financijske i tehničke suradnje te Republici Libanonu omogućuje primanje tehničke pomoći, osobito financijske, koju će Unija pružiti u skladu sa svojim programima. Ovaj se okvir primjenjuje samo na one programe EU-a za koje je u relevantnim osnivačkim pravnim aktima predviđena mogućnost sudjelovanja Republike Libanona. Slijedom navedenog podržavam ovo izvješće.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Europski parlament dao je suglasnost za sklapanje Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, o okvirnom sporazumu između Europske unije i Libanonske Republike o općim načelima sudjelovanja Republike Libanona u programima Unije. Prilikom davanja suglasnosti u obzir je uzeta i preporuka Odbora za vanjske poslove.

Podržavam donošenje ovog protokola jer smatram da će se na ovaj način poboljšati odnosi između Europske unije i Republike Libanona.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani o okvirnem sporazumu med Evropsko unijo in Libanonsko republiko o splošnih načelih za sodelovanje Libanonske republike v programih Unije.

Podpiram sodelovanje Libanona v več programih Unije. V sporazumu je potrebno opredeliti finančni prispevek Libanona, postopke poročanja in vrednotenja, ter sodelovanje kot opazovalci pri točkah, ki zadevajo Libanon ter v programih, h katerim Libanon finančno prispeva.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραφτως*. – Πρέπει να επιδιώκονται συμφωνίες μεταξύ της ΕΕ και τρίτων χωρών οι οποίες να προωθούν την ανάπτυξη των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, χωρίς να θίγονται τα εθνικά και οικονομικά τους συμφέροντα.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a kiegészítő jegyzőkönyv jóváhagyásáról szóló indítványt, mert ezzel hozzá kívántam járulni ahhoz, hogy a Libanon és az Európai Közösségek közötti korábbi megállapodás jogi keretének lényegében több mint két éve kidolgozott módosítása mielőbb életbe léphessen. Az Európai Unió és Libanon közötti együttműködés jogalapjának korszerűsítése, ezen belül a libanoni fél számára az uniós programokba való bekapcsolódás lehetőségének a jelen körülményekhez adaptált jogi szabályozása szerintem különösen fontos egy olyan időszakban, amikor a térségben Libanon kiemelt szerepet vállal az Európába irányuló migráció, illetve a menekültválság kezelésre irányuló nemzetközi erőfeszítések terén.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), *în scris*. – Uniunea Europeană pune un accent deosebit pe consolidarea și dezvoltarea relațiilor cu țările din bazinul Mării Mediterane. Această direcție a devenit evidentă odată cu desfășurarea revoluțiilor din cadrul așa-numitei „Primăveri arabe”, în perioada 2011-2012.

Relațiile cu Libanul datează cu mult dinaintea acestor evenimente, existând o cooperare strânsă între cele două părți și o asistență constantă oferită de UE în contextul eforturilor de reconstrucție a statului libanez după deceniile de război civil.

În mod natural, statul libanez a fost inclus, încă de la început, în rândul țărilor partenere din cadrul Acordului euro-mediterranean, dar și în rândul țărilor din cadrul politicii europene de vecinătate pe dimensiunea sudică de cooperare.

În contextul în care relațiile dintre UE și Liban au ajuns într-o nouă etapă istorică, caracterizată de o cooperare economică și politică consolidată și de cooperarea în domeniul combaterii terorismului islamic și migrației ilegale, este momentul pentru semnarea Acordului de asociere a acestui stat la Uniunea Europeană. Documentul respectiv va determina continuarea normalizării situației interne din Liban, inclusiv reconcilierea între toate grupurile etnice și religioase, precum și accelerarea procesului de reconstrucție a țării și gestionarea adecvată a problemei refugiaților palestinieni.

Consider că este o măsură necesară și susțin adoptarea acestei recomandări.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – Je me suis prononcé en faveur du projet de décision du Conseil relative à la conclusion du protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la République libanaise, d'autre part, concernant un accord-cadre entre l'Union européenne et la République libanaise relatif aux principes généraux de la participation de la République libanaise à des programmes de l'Union.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – In 2013, Lebanon expressed its interest in participating in the broad range of programmes open to partner countries of the European neighbourhood policy. The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, which is a response to this expression of interest, establishes an association between the EU, its Member States and Lebanon and aims to define the financial and technical rules permitting Lebanon to participate in certain EU programmes. I voted in favour of this Protocol, as I believe that Lebanon is a key partner of the European Union in the region. Promoting dialogue, cooperation and exchange with our Lebanese counterparts will hopefully improve diplomatic relations between our citizens, contribute to the development of Lebanon, and increase the chances for peace in this very fragile region.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Glasovala sam za nacrt odluke Vijeća o sklapanju Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, o okvirnom sporazumu između Europske unije i Republike Libanona o općim načelima sudjelovanja Republike Libanona u programima Unije. Cilj Protokola je utvrditi financijska i tehnička pravila koja Libanonskoj Republici omogućuju sudjelovanje u određenim programima Unije.

Budući da Horizontalni okvir uspostavljen Protokolom navodi načela gospodarske, financijske i tehničke suradnje te Libanonskoj Republici omogućuje primanje pomoći, osobito financijske pomoći koju pruža Unija u okviru tih programa, taj okvir se primjenjuje samo na one programe Unije za koje je u relevantnim osnivačkim pravnim aktima predviđena mogućnost sudjelovanja Libanonske Republike.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Priporočilo o sklenitvi protokola k evro-mediteranskemu sporazumu o partnerstvu in sodelovanju med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Republiko Libanon na drugi strani o okvirnem sporazumu med Evropsko unijo in Republiko Libanon o splošnih načelih za sodelovanje Republike Libanon v programih Unije sem podprla.

Protokol vsebuje okvirni sporazum o splošnih načelih za sodelovanje Libanona v programih Unije. Vsebuje standardne pogoje, ki jih je potrebno uporabiti za vse partnerske države evropske sosedске politike, s katerimi se bodo tovrstni protokoli sklenili. Cilj protokola je določiti finančne in tehnične predpise, ki Republiko Libanon omogočajo sodelovanje v določenih programih Unije.

Horizontalni okvir, ustanovljen s protokolom, določa načela za gospodarsko, finančno in tehnično sodelovanje, ki Republiko Libanon omogoča prejemanje pomoči, zlasti finančne pomoči iz Unije v skladu s temi programi.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanía de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce protocole car l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international et car les subtilités du jeu politique libanais échappent complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A dokumentum az Európai Közösség és tagállamai, másrésről a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt, a Libanoni Köztársaság uniós programokban való részvételét szabályozó általános elvekre vonatkozó, az Európai Unió és a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti keretmegállapodásról szóló jegyzőkönyv tervezetére vonatkozik. Szavazatommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanía de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Lebanon on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Lebanon in Union programmes. The horizontal framework established by the Protocol sets out principles for economic, financial and technical cooperation and allows the Republic of Lebanon to receive assistance, in particular financial assistance, from the European Union pursuant to the programmes.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. — El objetivo principal de este protocolo es el de establecer las reglas técnicas y financieras que permitan a la república del Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la UE. Mediante este acuerdo marco se sientan los principios de cooperación económica, financiera y técnica, permitiendo a la república del Líbano recibir asistencia de la UE, especialmente en el ámbito financiero. Es de vital importancia establecer acuerdos de este tipo que ayuden al desarrollo económico en la cuenca del mediterráneo, por lo que considero necesario votar a favor de este protocolo.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Ik heb voor dit verslag over het framework agreement gestemd omdat ik vind dat de EU wel degelijk nauwer moet samenwerken met Libanon om verdere radicalisering en migratie te helpen ontmoedigen.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Bei dieser Empfehlung geht es thematisch um das Rahmenabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Libanesischen Republik bezüglich der allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Teilnahme der Libanesischen Republik an Programmen der Union.

Dabei geht es auch um die Bekämpfung von Fluchtursachen vor Ort, ein Bestreben, welches durchaus meine Unterstützung findet. Wenn jedoch, wie hier seitens der EU, Zugeständnisse gemacht werden, ohne dass selbige an Verpflichtungen zur Rücknahme illegaler Migranten gebunden sind, dann halte ich dies für verantwortungslos.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Υπερψήφισα τη σύσταση της Επιτροπής Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων που εγκρίνει τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συνεργασίας με τον Λίβανο. Τα μέλη της αρμόδιας επιτροπής έλαβαν υπόψη το σχέδιο της απόφασης του Συμβουλίου και υποστήριξαν την συγκεκριμένη πρωτοβουλία με μεγάλη πλειοψηφία.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani o okvirnem sporazumu med Evropsko unijo in Libanonsko republiko o splošnih načelih za sodelovanje Libanonske republike v programih Unije.

Menim, da bo Evro-mediterranski sporazumu med EU in Libanonom prinesel pozitivne rezultate in okrepi sodelovanje med EU in Libanonom.

9.3. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon, mit dem der Erweiterung von 2004 Rechnung getragen wird (A8-0194/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ai sensi dell'art. 218 TFUE, per la conclusione di accordi d'associazioni tra UE, Stati membri e paesi terzi, il Parlamento deve prestare il proprio consenso.

L'accordo euro-mediterraneo tra Unione europea e Libano rappresenta uno strumento indispensabile per la realizzazione di una politica di vicinato coerente ed innovativa, che miri a rafforzare prosperità, stabilità e sicurezza dei paesi limitrofi.

Si stabilisce, così, un dialogo politico rivolto non solo a temi economici, quali appalti pubblici e aiuti di stato, ma anche a tematiche sociali, quali rispetto dei diritti umani, accesso ai servizi e normative sul lavoro.

Confidando nel valore di una simile cooperazione politica e sociale, ho espresso voto favorevole.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes portent sur l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations entre l'UE et le Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. J'ai voté contre ces textes qui constituent une ingérence de l'Union européenne dans les affaires d'un État ayant déjà à faire face à l'arrivée massive de réfugiés, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique ou encore la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite du pays. L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – Similar to the previous framework vote, this vote concerned greater economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European neighbourhood policy. The European neighbourhood policy is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

This vote was on a legal text to add the names of those countries that joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement to the official documents.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette recommandation. L'Union européenne entretient des relations stratégiques avec le Liban. Nous soutenons la stabilité de ce pays et sa sécurité dans une région du monde en proie à de fortes turbulences. La participation du Liban à des programmes de l'UE est un moyen de soutenir concrètement ces objectifs stratégiques.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Η παρούσα σύσταση, την οποία και υπερψήφισα, αφορά το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση της Τσεχικής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας, της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λετονίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λιθουανίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Ουγγαρίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Μάλτας, της Δημοκρατίας της Πολωνίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Σλοβενίας και της Σλοβακικής Δημοκρατίας. Αναμένουμε την κοινοποίησή της στα αρμόδια θεσμικά όργανα και τις κυβερνήσεις.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le texte proposé constitue l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Il concerne les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires. La subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, j'ai voté contre le protocole.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cet accord, actualisation du volet Sud de la politique de voisinage, concerne l'élargissement des relations UE-Liban aux différents pays récemment entrés dans celle-là. J'ai voté contre lui, estimant que rien n'autorise l'Union à dicter leur politique étrangère aux États membres. De plus, je ne saurais accepter qu'un accord dont je dénonce les effets néfastes à la fois pour le Liban et pour mon pays soit élargi à d'autres pays.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce protocole visant à inclure les 10 États membres de l'élargissement de 2004 à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Étant membres à part entière de l'Union, il est logique que la République tchèque, l'Estonie, Chypre, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Hongrie, Malte, la Pologne, la Slovénie et de la Slovaquie rejoignent cet accord.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Mănescu che approva un protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea, con i suoi Stati membri, e la Repubblica libanese. Si tratta di un testo importante che consente di tener conto dell'allargamento del 2004 dell'UE, che ha portato all'ingresso nell'Unione della Repubblica ceca, della Repubblica di Estonia, della Repubblica di Cipro, dell'Ungheria, della Repubblica di Lettonia, della Repubblica di Lituania, della Repubblica di Malta, della Repubblica di Polonia, della Repubblica di Slovenia e della Repubblica slovacca.

Con l'accordo si rafforza la politica di vicinato, rispondendo a due esigenze: da un lato si verrà incontro alla richiesta del 2013 dello stato mediorientale di avere legami più stretti con l'Unione, dall'altro si rafforzeranno i processi di riforma e la stabilità di un paese che, occupando una posizione strategica in una zona estremamente a rischio, rappresenta un alleato fondamentale nella lotta a Daesh e al terrorismo di matrice islamica.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cette recommandation concerne le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban pour faire suite à l'élargissement de 2004 et aux 8 nouveaux pays entrants à l'époque: Chypre, Malte, Estonie, Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie et Slovénie.

Comme pour la recommandation précédente, l'UE n'a pas de rôle international à avoir et la politique étrangère doit relever des États. Le Liban n'a pas besoin de l'ingérence européenne dans ses problèmes nationaux. J'ai donc voté contre.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – In questa relazione vi sono dei passaggi poco condivisibili che mi hanno spinto ad esprimermi con un'astensione.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión a la Unión Europea de la República Checa, la República de Estonia, la República de Chipre, la República de Letonia, la República de Lituania, Hungría, la República de Malta, la República de Polonia, la República de Eslovenia y la República Eslovaca. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu patvirtinamas Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolą, siekiant atsižvelgti į Čekijos Respublikos, Estijos Respublikos, Kipro Respublikos, Latvijos Respublikos, Lietuvos Respublikos, Vengrijos, Maltos Respublikos, Lenkijos Respublikos, Slovėnijos Respublikos ir Slovakijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió bővítése megköveteli, hogy az érvényben levő megállapodások tükrözzék a valós helyzetet, ezért szavazatommal támogattam a kiegészítés elfogadását.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Liban n'a pas besoin de l'UE pour se mêler de ses affaires; il connaît suffisamment de problèmes liés à l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens.

Il s'ajoute à cela que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — Similar to the previous framework vote, this vote concerned greater economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European neighbourhood policy. The European neighbourhood policy is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

This vote was on a legal text to add the names of those countries that joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement to the official documents.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – È corretto che anche la Repubblica ceca, la Repubblica di Estonia, la Repubblica di Cipro, l'Ungheria, la Repubblica di Lettonia, la Repubblica di Lituania, la Repubblica di Malta, la Repubblica di Polonia, la Repubblica di Slovenia e la Repubblica Slovacca, ora che sono pienamente parte dell'Unione Europea, partecipino degli accordi globali di partenariato e/o di cooperazione che la UE sigla con gli Stati esteri. Lo riteniamo un atto dovuto.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport vise à actualiser les accords euro-méditerranéens, ratifiés dans le cadre de la politique de voisinage de l'Union européenne. Le Liban est actuellement en proie à de graves troubles intérieurs notamment engendrés par l'arrivée massive de migrants syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens. Le pays de Cèdre subit également les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique. Or, l'Union européenne a démontré par le passé qu'elle n'avait aucune légitimité et crédibilité pour s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures dans un pays tiers. D'une part, l'Union doit respecter le principe de non-ingérence; d'autre part, la politique extérieure reste une compétence exclusive des États membres. C'est la raison pour laquelle je me suis opposé à ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Implicarea țărilor partenere în cadrul politicii europene de vecinătate se transpune și prin diverse acorduri-cheie. Interesul manifestat de Republica Libaneză de a participa la programele și agențiile Uniunii deschise statelor partenere prin politica europeană de vecinătate s-a materializat printr-un protocol cu dispoziții standard ce conține un acord-cadru privind principiile generale de participare a Libanului.

Protocolul la Acordul euro-mediteraneean de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, referitor la un acord-cadru între Uniunea Europeană și Republica Libaneză privind principiile generale de participare a Republicii Libaneze la programele Uniunii are ca obiectiv stabilirea reglementărilor de ordin financiar și tehnic și, totodată, măsurile de cooperare economică, financiară, tehnică.

Prezentul raport are scopul de a ține seama de aderarea la Uniune a Republicii Cehe, a Republicii Estonia, a Republicii Cipru, a Republicii Letonia, a Republicii Lituania, a Republicii Ungare, a Republicii Malta, a Republicii Polone, a Republicii Slovenia și a Republicii Slovace.

Consider esențială participarea egală și oferirea unor premise echitabile de implicare în acțiunile Uniunii tuturor statelor membre, motiv pentru care am votat favorabil acest raport.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho espresso voto favorevole in merito alla raccomandazione in questione perché credo sia necessaria la presenza di un protocollo aggiuntivo all'accordo euromediterraneo che tenga in debita considerazione l'allargamento dell'Unione europea del 2004.

Tale protocollo costituisce un adeguamento all'accordo di associazione tra l'UE e i suoi Stati membri, da un lato, e la Repubblica del Libano dall'altro. Con il suddetto adeguamento si vuole porre l'accento sull'adesione della Repubblica ceca, della Repubblica di Estonia, della Repubblica di Cipro, dell'Ungheria, della Repubblica di Lettonia, della Repubblica di Lituania, della Repubblica di Malta, della Repubblica di Polonia, della Repubblica di Slovenia e della Repubblica slovacca all'Unione europea.

Il rispetto dei principi democratici e dei diritti fondamentali costituisce un elemento essenziale dell'accordo di associazione in questione e del protocollo.

Al di là del carattere bilaterale e delle peculiarità di ciascuno Stato partner, l'accordo di associazione e il relativo protocollo, riflettono uno schema analogo e si prefiggono, così, di promuovere un dialogo periodico in materia politica e di sicurezza, per favorire la reciproca comprensione, la cooperazione, le iniziative comuni, la cooperazione economica, commerciale e finanziaria. Il protocollo mira, soprattutto, a favorire la progressiva liberalizzazione degli scambi, lo sviluppo sostenibile e gli investimenti.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – Similar to the previous framework vote, this vote concerned greater economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European neighbourhood policy. The European neighbourhood policy is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

This vote was on a legal text to add the names of those countries that joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement to the official documents.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I gave my consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon on the principles and standards for the participation of Lebanon in certain EU programmes in order to take into account the 2004 enlargement of the EU. I welcome this Agreement which will be of benefit to both sides.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo di associazione tra UE e Libano volto a sancire l'adesione di tutta una serie di Stati oggi membri dell'UE, quali: Repubblica Ceca, Estonia, Cipro, Ungheria, Lettonia, Lituania, Malta, Polonia e Repubblica slovacca. L'accordo in questione rappresenta uno strumento fondamentale della politica europea di vicinato la cui adesione da parte di tutti gli Stati membri è indispensabili ai fini della buona riuscita degli obbiettivi della cooperazione con il Libano.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζουμε τη συμφωνία και θεωρούμε ικανοποιητικά τα αποτελέσματα των διαπραγματεύσεων μεταξύ Επιτροπής και Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Η ψηφοφορία για τη σύσταση σχετικά με το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου αφορά τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου σύνδεσης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση κρατών στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση μετά τη διεύρυνση του 2004. Η συζήτηση αυτή εντάσσεται στο πλαίσιο ευρύτερης συνεργασίας της ΕΕ με το κράτος του Λιβάνου και, καθώς στοχεύει κατά κύριο λόγο σε ζητήματα οικονομικά, θεωρώ πως δεν έχει σε πρώτο πλάνο τα συμφέροντα των πολιτών. Γι' αυτό και απείχα από την ψηφοφορία.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), per iscritto. – Sono d'accordo con questa proposta che rappresenta semplicemente l'adesione di dieci Paesi dell'Unione all'accordo stipulato con la Repubblica libanese. Infatti, i negoziati sono iniziati nel 1998, e tali Paesi non erano ancora entrati a far parte dell'Unione europea. Ritengo quindi giusto che essi, con l'adesione all'Unione europea, vengano inclusi anche negli accordi stipulati con i Paesi terzi.

A mio parere è molto importante salvaguardare la sicurezza dei cittadini libanesi che si trovano a dover affrontare molte minacce e pertanto i Paesi che ancora non fanno parte dell'accordo dovrebbero essere inclusi. Per questi motivi ho votato a favore della proposta.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), in writing. – I supported this Protocol, which contains a Framework Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Lebanon in European Union programmes.

Javier Couso Permuý (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), per iscritto. – L'adesione di dieci nuovi Stati all'UE nel 2004 ha avuto effetti anche sul protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo tra la Comunità europea e gli Stati Membri e la Repubblica libanese. Il Parlamento europeo, prendendo atto di questo cambiamento, ha emanato una risoluzione relativa alla conclusione del suddetto protocollo, alla quale ho inteso dare la mia approvazione tramite il mio voto a favore.

Andi Cristea (S&D), în scris. – Republica Libaneză este un important partener al Uniunii Europene în zona Mării Mediterane, reprezentând un punct de legătură esențial între statele europene și Orientul Mijlociu. Relațiile de prietenie, îndelungata cooperare culturală, politică și economică, alături de angajamentele asumate în vederea consolidării democrației, statului de drept și a respectării drepturilor omului fac ca acest parteneriat să fie unul de succes.

Deoarece consider că este important ca toate statele membre să beneficieze de acest acord, am votat în favoarea recomandării referitoare la proiectul de decizie a Consiliului privind încheierea unui protocol la Acordul euro-mediteranean de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele sale membre, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, pentru a ține seama de aderarea la Uniunea Europeană a Republicii Cehe, a Republicii Estonia, a Republicii Cipru, a Republicii Letonia, a Republicii Lituania, a Republicii Ungare, a Republicii Malta, a Republicii Polone, a Republicii Slovenia și a Republicii Slovace.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Zalecenie w sprawie wniosku dotyczącego decyzji Rady w sprawie zawarcia Protokołu do Układu eurośródziemnomorskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Wspólnotą Europejską i jej państwami członkowskimi, z jednej strony, a Republiką Libańską, z drugiej strony, w celu uwzględnienia przystąpienia Republiki Czeskiej, Republiki Estońskiej, Republiki Cypryjskiej, Republiki Łotewskiej, Republiki Litewskiej, Węgier, Republiki Malty, Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Republiki Słowenii i Republiki Słowackiej do Unii Europejskiej. Liban jest państwem członkowskim Partnerstwa Euro-śródziemnomorskiego (Euromed), które wspiera integrację gospodarczą i reformy demokratyczne we wszystkich szesnastu krajach sąsiadujących z UE od południa, tj. w Afryce Północnej i na Bliskim Wschodzie. Partnerstwo jest zasadniczym narzędziem budowania większej integracji gospodarczej w regionie. Osobiście popieram integrację gospodarczą oraz partnerstwo we wszelkich obszarach UE, dlatego też zagłosowałem na tak.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of giving consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to include the 10 new Member States (2004 enlargement) in the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon, taking into account the changes outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Protocol reflects the EU's commitment to support Lebanon in sustainably addressing the consequences of regional instability, a refugee crisis and a presidential vacuum.

Nicola Danti (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Tra il 1998 e il 2005 l'Unione europea ha stipulato degli accordi di associazione euromediterranei con nove paesi del Mediterraneo per sostituire gli accordi di cooperazione degli anni '70. Le disposizioni di questi accordi di associazione, che regolano le relazioni bilaterali, variano da un partner mediterraneo all'altro.

Tali accordi infatti attribuiscono un'adeguata disciplina al dialogo politico tra nord e sud e fungono da base alla progressiva liberalizzazione degli scambi nello spazio Mediterraneo, stabilendone le condizioni della cooperazione in ambito economico, sociale e culturale tra l'Unione europea e i paesi partner.

Lo scopo di questi accordi, e in particolare in questa raccomandazione con il Libano (il cui accordo è entrato in vigore il 1° aprile 2006), è quello di rendere il Mediterraneo uno spazio comune di prosperità, pace e stabilità, grazie alla cooperazione economica, sociale, culturale e finanziaria, e al rafforzamento del dialogo politico e sulla sicurezza.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport est une recommandation du Parlement européen sur le projet du Conseil de conclure un accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union Européenne et la République libanaise. Ce protocole vise à tenir compte de l'adhésion de la République tchèque, de la République d'Estonie, de la République de Chypre, de la République de Lettonie, de la République de Lituanie, de la Hongrie, de la République de Malte, de la République de Pologne, de la République de Slovénie et de la République slovaque à l'Union Européenne. Considérant la coopération de l'UE avec le Liban est indispensable et qu'il convient de tenir compte de l'élargissement de 2004, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. — J'ai soutenu le rapport sur le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban visant à inclure les 10 États membres de l'élargissement de 2004. La République tchèque, l'Estonie, Chypre, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Hongrie, Malte, la Pologne, la Slovénie et la Slovaquie doivent être intégrés à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte relatif aux relations UE-Liban participe à l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Ces derniers constituent le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Le Liban est déstabilisé par l'arrivée d'environ 1,5 million de réfugiés syriens en plus des réfugiés palestiniens. À cela s'ajoutent les incursions sanglantes des djihadistes du groupe État islamique. Non seulement la complexité des enjeux libanais et du contexte politique de ce pays semble échapper à l'oligarchie européenne, mais il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas vocation à jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale. Pour ces raisons, j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Подкрепих препоръката относно проект за решение на Съвета относно сключването на протокол към Евро-средиземноморското споразумение за асоцииране между Европейската общност и нейните държави членки, от една страна, и Република Ливан, от друга страна, за да бъде взето предвид присъединяването на Чешката република, Република Естония, Република Кипър, Република Латвия, Република Литва, Република Унгария, Република Малта, Република Полша, Република Словения и Словашката република към Европейския съюз. Протоколът представлява допълнение към Рамковото споразумение между Европейския съюз и Ливан, което подкрепих, за включване на държавите – членки на ЕС, които се присъединиха след 2004 г.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – Este Protocolo cria uma associação entre a Comunidade Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano, por outro, a fim de ter em conta a adesão da República Checa, da República da Estónia, da República de Chipre, da República da Letónia, da República da Lituânia, da República da Hungria, da República de Malta, da República da Polónia, da República da Eslovénia e da República Eslovaca à União Europeia. Votei a favor.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je vote contre: il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este relatório - que não se reveste de carácter apenas técnico - refere-se à inclusão no Protocolo do Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico UE-Líbano dos países do alargamento de 2004.

O Líbano tem importância estratégica para a UE no contexto do Médio Oriente, no que respeita à questão da segurança e da defesa. O relatório refere que a UE se quer proteger de novas ameaças, como o terrorismo. Precisa também de mais um país que sirva de tampão à chegada de mais refugiados à Europa.

Para a UE, pouco importa haver um Líbano em colapso. O país tem recebido milhares de refugiados, existem os problemas com a fronteira da Síria, com Israel, com a presença do autoproclamado Estado Islâmico.

O objetivo principal da dita parceria Euro-Mediterrânica é a integração económica e a relação privilegiada destes países com a UE, sendo inseparável de objetivos de domínio económico e colonização de mercados.

O acordo abre portas a acordos de livre comércio. Insere-se na agenda política e económica da UE para o Médio Oriente. Estas são razões para a nossa oposição.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del progetto di decisione del Consiglio relativo all'accordo Euromed sulla partecipazione della Repubblica libanese ai programmi dell'Unione. La nostra politica di vicinato consente di stabilire relazioni privilegiate con il Medio Oriente, incrementando un commercio bilaterale proficuo per tutti gli Stati membri dell'UE. L'Unione europea è il primo partner commerciale per il Libano, coprendo circa un terzo di tutto il commercio libanese, ragion per cui è necessario mantenere e incentivare tale partenariato, al fine di perseguire una maggiore integrazione economica con impegni e guadagni reciproci. Inoltre, ritengo necessario ratificare il protocollo che tiene conto dell'allargamento dell'Unione europea nel 2004.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained. No opinion.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Hlavným predmetom predmetnej dohody medzi Európskou úniou a Libanomom je zohľadniť prístupenie Českej republiky, Estónskej republiky, Cyperskej republiky, Lotyšskej republiky, Litovskej republiky, Maďarskej republiky, Maltskej republiky, Poľskej republiky, Slovinskej republiky a Slovenskej republiky k Európskej únii.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in oggetto.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), γραπτώς. – Είμαι αντίθετος στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας. Επομένως η ψήφος μου είναι αρνητική.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Lebanon is a key partner for the EU in the Middle East. The country faces a fragile security environment, being at the forefront of the Syrian civil war, with over a million refugees out of four million of a total of the population. It is in the EU's interest to foster stability in Lebanon, to develop capabilities and to promote people-to-people contacts and the transfer of expertise.

The vote updates the agreement by taking account of the enlargement of the EU. I voted in favour.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Egyetértek a Libanoni Köztársaság és az EU közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyv megkötésével, ezért megszavaztam azt. Ez lehetőséget biztosít a 2004 után csatlakozott országoknak, köztük Magyarországnak, hogy csatlakozzon a jegyzőkönyvhöz.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für das „Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon, mit dem der Erweiterung von 2004 Rechnung getragen wird“ gestimmt. Es ist ein technisches Protokoll, das für eine gute und wichtige Kooperation der EU mit den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes steht.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich befürworte die Zustimmung zum Abschluss des Protokolls. Die Kooperation zwischen der EU und der Libanesischen Republik ist wichtig und der Abschluss des Protokolls wurde durch den Beitritt der Tschechischen Republik, der Republik Estland, der Republik Zypern, der Republik Lettland, der Republik Litauen, Ungarns, der Republik Malta, der Republik Polen, der Republik Slowenien und der Slowakischen Republik zur Europäischen Union notwendig.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour. It established the partnership between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon as well as took into account the enlargement of the European Union which happened in 2004 when 10 at that time new Member States joined the EU.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφικώς*. – Οι 3 εκδόσεις αφορούν το πλαίσιο συνεργασίας ΕΕ και Λιβάνου και τη συμμετοχή του τελευταίου σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης. Τηρήσαμε θέση αποχής, γιατί από τη μια αυτή είναι η θέληση των αρχών του Λιβάνου αλλά από την άλλη αυτές οι συμφωνίες οδηγούν σε συμφωνίες ελεύθερου εμπορίου με όλες τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις που αυτές επιφέρουν στους λαούς και με τις οποίες φυσικά διαφωνούμε.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – After having supported the Framework Agreement between the EU and Lebanon, which will allow for greater financial and technical cooperation between the regions, I decided to support this resolution in order to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this Protocol as I had no problems with the final arrangements.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted for engaging more actively with Lebanon, regarding the Council's decision on the conclusion of a Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, having regard to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za nacrt zakonodavne rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o nacrtu odluke Vijeća o sklapanju Protokola uz Euro-mediterranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Češke Republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Cipra, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, Mađarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije i Slovačke Republike Europskoj uniji jer se time daje suglasnost za sklapanje sporazuma. Radi se o proceduri tehničke naravi koja proizlazi iz članstva gore navedenih država u Europskoj uniji, što predstavlja prirodno i dosljedno postupanje, te stoga podržavam ovu Preporuku.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes constituent l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban subit aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite. Ce pays n'a pas besoin de l'ingérence de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire. Je me suis porté contre ces trois textes relatifs au protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui vise à faire en sorte que le protocole à l'accord d'association euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union et le Liban tienne compte de l'adhésion de la République tchèque, de l'Estonie, de Chypre, de la Lettonie, de la Lituanie, de la Hongrie, de Malte, de la Pologne, de la Slovénie et de la Slovaquie.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted for the report of the colleague as I see that cooperation between the regions is of the utmost importance for the well-being of the people and it will only help in the procedure of modernisation and reform of the state.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der Berichterstatter verknüpft im vorliegenden Bericht die Migrationskrise mit der Forderung, Länder zu stärken, um Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen. Dies stellt eine prinzipiell sinnvolle Idee dar. Allerdings sollte diese Hilfe an klare und eindeutige Verpflichtungen zur Rückübernahme von Migranten geknüpft werden. Da dies im Bericht nicht der Fall ist, stimme ich diesem nicht zu.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Lo scopo della presente raccomandazione risulta essere quello di concludere, a nome dell'Ue e degli Stati membri, il protocollo dell'accordo euromediterraneo il quale istituisce un'associazione tra l'UE e i suoi Stati membri da una parte, e dall'altra, per tenere conto della partecipazione della Repubblica Ceca, Estonia, Cipro, Lettonia, Lituania, Ungheria, Malta, Polonia, Slovenia e Slovacchia, all'Ue. Il protocollo in questione, definisce gli aspetti principali per la cooperazione economica, finanziaria e tecnica, i quali garantiscono la possibilità di ricevere assistenza laddove fosse necessario. Pertanto, in considerazione delle motivazioni che inducono il Parlamento ad approvare la presente raccomandazione, esprimo il mio consenso favorevole nel sostenerlo.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Ce volet prend en compte l'élargissement de l'Union européenne de 2004. Le pays du Cèdre connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite qui n'augure rien de bon. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires. La subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, comme en témoigne la dernière séance de la sous-commission Sécurité et défense. De plus, il convient de rappeler que l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'objectif de ce rapport est d'intégrer les nouveaux États membres aux accords euro-méditerranéens qui unissent l'Union européenne et le Liban. Bien que le texte soit la continuité logique du processus d'intégration, j'estime que l'UE n'a pas à se substituer aux États membres en matière de politique internationale. Le pays du Cèdre subit de fortes déstabilisations, comme les arrivées massives de migrants syriens (1,5 millions) en plus des réfugiés palestiniens et les attaques sanglantes et inopinées de l'État islamique, et n'a pas besoin d'une nouvelle ingérence européenne. Je me suis prononcé CONTRE.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. U přistoupení nových členských států ke stávající dohodě se zdržuji.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Līdzīgi vairākiem citiem nolīgumiem un to protokoliem, arī Protokola Eiropas un Vidusjūras reģiona valstu Nolīgumam starp ES un Libānu gadījumā bija nepieciešams pielāgot to Savienības teritoriālas paplašināšanas faktam, lai sadarbība varētu vispusīgi un pilnvērtīgi notikt starp visām ES dalībvalstīm un trešo valsti. Konkrēti šī balsojuma ietvaros runa gāja par 2004. gada paplašināšanos, kad veselas 10 valstis pievienojās Eiropas Savienībai.

Ņemot vērā balsojuma specifiku, viennozīmīgi nobalsoju pozitīvi. Paralēli gribētos uzsvērt, ka ir nepieciešams, lai attiecīgs balsojums pēc iespējas drīzāk notiktu arī attiecībā uz Horvātijas pievienošanos Savienībai 2013. gadā.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), *γραπτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω τη σύσταση σχετικά με το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση της Τσεχικής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας, της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λετονίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λιθουανίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Ουγγαρίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Μάλτας, της Δημοκρατίας της Πολωνίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Σλοβενίας και της Σλοβακικής Δημοκρατίας, διότι δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ces trois rapports.

Trois rapports sont soumis au vote du Parlement européen. Ces textes sont la traduction concrète de la politique euro-méditerranéenne de l'Union européenne. En l'occurrence, nous nous opposons à toute ingérence dans les affaires de l'État libanais. Outre le principe même de non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un État souverain, ce pays connaît actuellement une situation de grande instabilité, en raison, d'une part, de l'immigration massive de réfugiés syriens et palestiniens et, d'autre part, des attaques récurrentes de l'État islamique.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *in writing*. — Regarding the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and Lebanon (2004 enlargement), I voted in favour of it, as the enlargement of the Protocol will certainly benefit all parties. Since 2004, the successful implementation of the Protocol has ensured its necessity and feasibility. The enlargement is a natural consequence and with the accession of more countries, the Protocol's merit will be enlarged, and will eventually yield benefits to all countries.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi voto a favor de la recomendación sobre el proyecto de Decisión del Consejo relativa a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión a la Unión Europea de la República Checa, la República de Estonia, la República de Chipre, la República de Letonia, la República de Lituania, Hungría, la República de Malta, la República de Polonia, la República de Eslovenia y la República Eslovaca.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Hier geht es um den Abschluss des Protokolls zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zur Gründung einer Assoziation zwischen der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits, und dem Libanon andererseits.

Im Rahmen der ENP ist die schrittweise Öffnung für bestimmte Programme und Einrichtungen der Union für die ENP-Partnerstaaten vorgesehen. Hierzu benötigt der Rat die Zustimmung des Europäischen Parlaments. Andererseits wurde dieses Assoziationsabkommen nicht mit einem Immigranten/Asylanten-Rückübernahmeabkommen verbunden. Dieses wäre jedoch meines Erachtens nach essentiell. Daher habe ich hier negativ abgestimmt.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), par écrit. – Le Liban connaît de nos jours de graves difficultés intérieures. À la venue d'un million et demi d'exilés syriens s'ajoutent le nombre de réfugiés palestiniens déjà présents. Je crois que ce pays n'a pas besoin dans ses affaires de l'Union européenne, qui n'a pas de légitimité dans un rôle de politique étrangère. Par ailleurs, la compréhension très restreinte de l'Union quant aux phénomènes se produisant dans cet État prête à une réserve justifiée sur cet accord. En conséquence j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), por escrito. – O objetivo do presente Protocolo é estabelecer as regras financeiras e técnicas que permitam à República do Líbano participar em determinados programas da UE. O quadro horizontal criado pelo Protocolo define os princípios para a cooperação económica, financeira e técnica e permite à República do Líbano receber assistência técnica, em especial assistência financeira, da União Europeia, em conformidade com os programas da União Europeia.

Esse quadro aplica-se unicamente aos programas cujos atos jurídicos constitutivos preveem a possibilidade de participação da República do Líbano. Por conseguinte, a celebração do Protocolo não implica o exercício de competências ao abrigo das várias políticas setoriais previstas nos programas, que são exercidas quando se estabelecem os programas.

Tem em conta o alargamento de 2004 da República Checa, da República da Estónia, da República de Chipre, da República da Letónia, da República da Lituânia, da República da Hungria, da República de Malta, da República da Polónia, da República da Eslovénia e da República Eslovaca à União Europeia.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), in writing. – I am in favour of this Protocol which establishes an association between the EU community and the Republic of Lebanon, as a well-defined framework for said association is necessary for both parties to work with each other to achieve goals of development and a more interconnected world.

Louis Michel (ALDE), par écrit. — Je me félicite de l'adoption de la proposition législative de 2007 de la Commission visant à la conclusion d'un protocole euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et le Liban, d'autre part. Cet accord a pour but de tenir compte de l'adhésion des 10 États membres de l'élargissement de 2004 à l'accord entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Il est en effet nécessaire que ces États membres fassent partie intégrante de l'accord euro-méditerranéen afin de faciliter au mieux la coopération administrative et douanière avec le Liban. De plus, l'intégration de ces États membres au protocole euro-méditerranéen représente, à mon sens, une étape importante étant donné que celle-ci permettra l'application conforme des normes relatives aux preuves d'origine conférant un traitement tarifaire préférentiel aux échanges UE-Liban.

La prise en compte de l'adhésion de ces 10 États membres dans cet accord permettra donc une uniformisation des règles de transit des marchandises circulant entre l'Union et le Liban. J'accueille donc positivement la proposition de la Commission d'inclusion des nouveaux États membres de 2004 dans l'accord euro-méditerranéen et suis favorable à la conclusion de cet accord au nom de l'Union européenne.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), in writing. – I voted in favour of the report because Lebanon is a key partner for the EU in the Middle East. The country faces a fragile security environment, being at the forefront of the Syrian civil war, with over a million refugees out of four million of a total of the population. The EU is interested in fostering stability in Lebanon, developing capabilities and promoting people-to-people contacts and the transfer of expertise. There was broad consensus at committee level on the necessity to engage Lebanon more actively. The vote updates the Agreement by taking account of the enlargement of the EU.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Unió 2014-es bővítése után az egyrésről az Európai Közösség és tagállamai, másrésről a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodásban figyelembe kellett venni, hogy a Ciprusi Köztársaság, a Cseh Köztársaság, az Észt Köztársaság, a Lett Köztársaság, a Litván Köztársaság, Magyarország, a Máltai Köztársaság, a Lengyel Köztársaság, a Szlovák Köztársaság és a Szlovén Köztársaság csatlakozott az Európai Unióhoz. A Tanács határozattervezetet fogadott el az erről szóló jegyzőkönyv megkötéséről, a határozat elfogadásához azonban meg kell szereznie a Parlament egyetértését is. A Külügyi Bizottság jelentésében azt ajánlja, hogy a Parlament a jegyzőkönyv megkötésével értsen egyet. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – O presente projeto de Protocolo ao Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma associação entre a Comunidade Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano, por outro, a fim de ter em conta a adesão da República Checa, da República da Estónia, da República de Chipre, da República da Letónia, da República da Lituânia, da República da Hungria, da República de Malta, da República da Polónia, da República da Eslovénia e da República Eslovaca à União Europeia merece o meu voto favorável.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer. Je vote contre ce texte.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui proposait l'adhésion de la République tchèque, de la République d'Estonie, de la République de Chypre, de la République de Lettonie, de la République de Lituanie, de la Hongrie, de la République de Malte, de la République de Pologne, de la République de Slovénie et de la République slovaque à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et la République libanaise. En tant que pays membres de l'Union européenne, ces États s'ajoutent naturellement à l'accord.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Az egyrésről az Európai Unió, másrésről a Libanoni köztársaság közötti egyezményhez csatolt jegyzőkönyv meghatározza annak feltételeit, hogy az európai szomszédságpolitikában részt vevő országok bekapcsolódhassanak az EU által kínált programokba. Elfogadtuk, hogy Libanon is beállhasson azoknak az államoknak a sorába – Örményország, Grúzia, Izrael, Jordánia, Moldova, Marokkó és Ukrajna – melyekkel az EU-nak ilyen jegyzőkönyve már van. Az Európai Unióhoz 2004-ben tíz új tagállam csatlakozott, melyek szerződésbe foglalása magától értetődő. Így aztán támogatom a jelentést, ahogy azt is, hogy Szlovákia és a többi kilenc tagállam része legyen ennek a megállapodásnak.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Union aims to establish a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. I voted for this recommendation that will update the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and Lebanon by taking into account the enlargement of the EU.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — Similar to the previous framework vote, this vote concerned greater economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European neighbourhood policy. The European neighbourhood policy is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its Eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

This vote was on a legal text to add the names of those countries that joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement to the official documents.

As this agreement is foreseen to lead to future trade agreements, I was against it in principle. However, as the Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Prinzipiell sinnvolle Idee, Länder zu stärken - allerdings muss Hilfe an klare und eindeutige Selbstverpflichtungen zur Rückübernahme von Migranten geknüpft werden, was hier nicht der Fall ist.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerando che la proposta della collega in merito alla conclusione di un protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea e i suoi Stati membri, da una parte, e la Repubblica del Libano, dall'altra, tiene conto dell'adesione di diversi Stati all'Unione europea ed è conforme a quanto previsto dall'articolo 217 e dall'articolo 218 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea, ho ritenuto opportuno esprimermi a favore. Pertanto, ho votato positivamente.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan.* – Budući da je Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane potpisan 2002. godine, važno je i zemlje članice koje su se nakon potpisivanja tog sporazuma pridružile EU-u uključiti u sporazum kao ravnopravne partnere, kao punopravne članice EU-a, a na korist svih potpisnika. Deset zemalja koje su se pridružile EU-u 2004. godine u najvećem proširenju tako će postati dio sporazuma koji pokriva trgovinu proizvodima te stremi ka daljnjoj poboljšanoj suradnji na području Mediterana. Liberalizirana trgovina poljoprivrednim proizvodima omogućit će svim stranama da na efikasniji i kvalitetniji način plasiraju svoje poljoprivredne proizvode, a to će imati pozitivan učinak na gospodarstvo zemalja potpisnica.

Jednaka pravila za sve u tržišnom natjecanju omogućiti će pravedne i jednake uvjete za poduzeća, a istovremeno osigurati inovacije, jedinstvene standarde i razvoj malih poduzeća. Javnom nabavom također se otvaraju prilike poduzećima, čime se potiču privatna ulaganja i pridonosi rastu te otvaranju novih radnih mjesta. Konačno, javna nabava ima važnu ulogu pri usmjeravanju europskih strukturnih i investicijskih fondova. Zbog pogodnosti koje donosi te ojačavanja suradnje EU-a s Libanom, podržala sam ovu preporuku o sklapanju protokola koji Sporazumu pridružuje deset članica pridruženih EU-u 2014. godine.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan.* – Libanon je ključni partner za EU na Bliskom istoku. Zemlja se suočava s krhkim sigurnosnim okruženjem, posebice zbog sirijskog rata, s više od milijun izbjeglica na 4 milijuna koliko broji ukupno stanovništvo.

EU je zainteresiran za poticanje stabilnosti u Libanonu, razvijanje sposobnosti i promicanje direktnih kontakata i prijenosa znanja. Priključujem se već širokom konsenzusu na razini odbora o potrebi da se dodatno uključe u naporima da pomognu Libanonu. Ujedno podržavam ovo izvješće obzirom da se radi o tehničkom ažuriranju postojećeg ugovora koje uzima u obzir proširenje EU-a iz 2004. godine.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit.* – J'ai voté pour cet ajustement technique qui permet de tenir compte de l'adhésion, en 2004, de plusieurs États à l'Union européenne, et de leur permettre ainsi de s'inscrire dans le cadre de coopération de l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union et le Liban.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito.* – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una asociación entre las Comunidades Europeas y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión a la Unión Europea de la República Checa, la República de Estonia, la República de Chipre, la República de Letonia, la República de Lituania, Hungría, la República de Malta, la República de Polonia, la República de Eslovenia y la República Eslovaca. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit.* – J'ai voté en faveur de cette recommandation. L'objectif du projet de décision du Conseil consiste en effet à conclure, au nom de l'Union européenne et de ses États membres, le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et le Liban, d'autre part, visant à tenir compte de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne de la République tchèque, de l'Estonie, de Chypre, de la Lettonie, de la Lituanie, de la Hongrie, de Malte, de la Pologne, de la Slovénie et de la Slovaquie.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu.* – Šis klausimas nereikalauja didelių diskusijų. 2004 m. Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir dešimties naujų valstybių narystė ES šiek tiek pakeitė mūsų prekybos susitarimus su Libanu. Šiandien mes tiesiog įteisiame naujai susiformavusią padėtį. Kiek žinau, mūsų prekybos partneriai taip pat yra patenkinti pateiktu pasiūlymu, todėl vienareikšmiškai balsuoju „už“ tai, kad ES prekyba su svarbiu mūsų partneriu Libanu ir toliau laisvai plėtotųsi, taip prisidedama prie gerovės ir stabilumo zonos kūrimo Europos kaimynystėje.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – No seguimento da adesão à União Europeia em 2004 da República Checa, da Estónia, de Chipre, da Letónia, da Lituânia, da Hungria, de Malta, da Polónia, da Eslovénia e da Eslováquia, havia que atualizar o Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma Associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e o Líbano, por outro (assinado em Junho de 2002, no Luxemburgo).

Este texto visa tão-somente formalizar este processo de alargamento através da inclusão dos 10 novos Estados-Membros que aderiram em 2004 à União Europeia no texto do Acordo, pelo que votei a favor do presente projeto de decisão do Conselho.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte qui permet de tenir compte de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne de 2004 dans l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Par ce vote, le Parlement européen approuve la décision du Conseil d'inclure la République tchèque, l'Estonie, Chypre, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Hongrie, Malte, la Pologne, la Slovénie et la Slovaquie dans le cadre des relations de l'Union européenne avec le Liban.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della raccomandazione relativa alla conclusione di un protocollo all'accordo euro mediterraneo con la Repubblica del Libano, che tenga anche conto dell'adesione di alcuni Stati membri dell'Unione europea. Gli accordi di associazione euro mediterranei sono uno strumento molto importante a cui l'Europa ricorre dal 1998 per regolare i suoi rapporti con i Paesi limitrofi.

Questi accordi permettono di disciplinare in maniera adeguata il dialogo politico tra nord e sud, fungono da base alla progressiva liberalizzazione degli scambi tra i Paesi interessati e stabiliscono le condizioni per una cooperazione non solo economica ma anche sociale e culturale tra le parti in causa.

La conclusione di tale accordo e la sua estensione ai Paesi dell'UE che ancora non vi avevano aderito potrà contribuire alla promozione di un dialogo proficuo e duraturo con il Libano, Paese fortemente colpito dalla crisi migratoria scatenata dalla guerra nella vicina Siria.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für die „Empfehlung zu dem Entwurf eines Beschlusses des Rates über den Abschluss des Protokolls zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Assoziationsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Libanesischen Republik andererseits anlässlich des Beitritts der Tschechischen Republik, der Republik Estland, der Republik Zypern, der Republik Lettland, der Republik Litauen, Ungarns, der Republik Malta, der Republik Polen, der Republik Slowenien und der Slowakischen Republik zur Europäischen Union“ gestimmt, da unsere eigenen Fortschritte zu überwachen und dahingehend Verbesserungen zu treffen eine wichtige Aufgabe der EU ist.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

He votado en contra del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para las clases populares de los países y Estados afectados.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Il protocollo sull'accordo euro-mediterraneo prende in considerazione l'adesione della Repubblica ceca, della Repubblica di Estonia, della Repubblica di Cipro, dell'Ungheria, della Repubblica di Lettonia, della Repubblica di Lituania, della Repubblica di Malta, della Repubblica di Polonia, della Repubblica di Slovenia e della Repubblica slovacca all'Unione europea. Dal momento che ritengo importante che tutti gli attuali membri sottoscrivano questo protocollo, ho deciso di votare a favore.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *pisomne*. – Hlasoval som za toto uznesenie. Tento protokol sa snaží definovať finančné a technické pravidlá umožňujúce Libanonu účasť na niektorých programoch EÚ. V tomto uznesení týkajúcom sa daného protokolu ide o zohľadnenie prístúpenia niektorých krajín k Európskej únii okrem iného aj Slovenskej republiky v roku 2004.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *pisomne*. – Euro-stredomorskú dohodu medzi EÚ a Libanom som podporila, keďže ide najmä o ujasnenie technických a finančných pravidiel súvisiacich s účasťou Libanonu na programoch Únie. Dohoda je súčasťou európskej susedskej politiky (ENP), v rámci ktorej je partnerským krajinám umožnený prístup k programom a agentúram EÚ. Ide o jeden z nástrojov, ktorým EÚ podporuje reformy a modernizáciu vo svojom susedstve. Podobné dohody sú už od roku 2007 prerokúvané s viacerými krajinami a doteraz boli protokoly podpísané s Arménskom, Gruzínskom, Izraelom, Jordánskom, Moldavskom, Marokom a Ukrajinou. Libanon vyjadril svoj záujem prístupit' k týmto programom v roku 2013. Libanon tak bude mať prístup k technickej a finančnej asistencii, ktorá by krajine mala umožniť zlepšiť svoje verejné politiky. Keďže je Libanon v súčasnosti zmietaný nestabilitou svojho regiónu, dohoda s EÚ by mohla priniesť podporu, ktorú krajina potrebuje. Súhlasila som taktiež s rozšírením tohto protokolu na krajiny, ktoré pristúpili k EÚ v roku 2004.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *pisomne*. – Rozšírenie EÚ treba aktualizovať, a preto je potrebné jednoznačne zohľadniť prístúpenie krajín z roku 2004.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Podržao sam sklapanje sporazuma uzimajući u obzir nacrt Protokola uz Euro-mediterranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Češke Republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Cipra, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, Mađarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije i Slovačke Republike Europskoj uniji. Kako su navedene države postale članice 2004. godine podržavam sklapanje ovog Sporazuma.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Europski parlament dao je suglasnost za sklapanje sporazuma uzimajući u obzir nacrt Protokola uz Euro-mediterranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Češke Republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Cipra, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, Mađarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije i Slovačke Republike Europskoj uniji.

Podržavam sklapanje ovog Sporazuma jer smatram da takvo nešto prirodno proizlazi iz činjenice da su navedene države članice Europske unije.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani zaradi upoštevanja pristopa Češke republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Cipra, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, republike Mađarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije in Slovaške republike k Evropski uniji.

Ta odobritev protokola, ki je predvsem tehnične narave, prinaša vključitev še preostalih držav, ki so se Evropski uniji priključili v letu 2004 in niso bile podpisnice prvotnega sporazuma.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραπτώς*. – Πρέπει να επιδιώκονται συμφωνίες μεταξύ της ΕΕ και τρίτων χωρών οι οποίες να προωθούν την ανάπτυξη των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και χωρίς να θίγονται τα εθνικά και οικονομικά τους συμφέροντα.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam az Európai Közösségek és Libanon közötti korábbi megállapodás jogalapjának régóta aktuális korszerűsítését, illetve a kibővített EU körülményeihez való alkalmazkodást jelentő kiegészítő jegyzőkönyvről szóló előterjesztést. Az Unió és tagállamai, valamint Libanon közötti kapcsolatok jogalapjának rendezését annál is inkább indokoltnak tartom, mert Libanon az utóbbi időben az Európába irányuló migrációs hullám, illetve a menekültválság kezelése terén rendkívüli terheket vállalt és a térségben az EU kiemelt partnerévé lépett elő.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour le projet de décision du Conseil relative à la conclusion d'un protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la République libanaise, d'autre part, visant à tenir compte de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne de la République tchèque, de la République d'Estonie, de la République de Chypre, de la République de Lettonie, de la République de Lituanie, de la Hongrie, de la République de Malte, de la République de Pologne, de la République de Slovénie et de la République slovaque.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishes an association between the EU, its Member States and Lebanon, and aims to define the financial and technical rules permitting Lebanon to participate in certain EU programmes. I voted in favour of the Protocol's recognition of the accession of the countries that joined the EU in 2004, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Only by involving all the members of the EU in this cooperation can we ensure that these efforts will positively affect the lives of both Lebanese and Europeans.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Vijeće je 10. veljače 2004. godine u ime Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica ovlastilo Komisiju da otvori pregovore s Libanonskom Republikom s ciljem prilagodbe Euro-mediteranskog sporazuma o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje novih država članica Europskoj uniji.

Budući da su pregovori dovršeni na zadovoljstvo Komisije, podržala sam Protokol uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Češke Republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Cipra, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, Mađarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije i Slovačke Republike Europskoj uniji.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Namen sklepa Sveta je v imenu Evropske unije in njenih držav članic skleniti protokol k evro-mediteranskemu sporazumu o partnerstvu in sodelovanju med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani in Republiko Libanon na drugi strani o upoštevanju pristopa Češke republike, Estonije, Cipra, Latvije, Litve, Madžarske, Malte, Poljske, Slovenije in Slovaške k Evropski uniji.

Zato sem podprla priporočilo o sklepu Sveta o sklenitvi omenjenega protokola.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. –

Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce protocole car l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international, et car les subtilités du jeu politique libanais échappent complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A dokumentum az Európai Közösség és tagállamai, másrésről a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt, a Ciprusi Köztársaság, a Cseh Köztársaság, az Észt Köztársaság, a Lett Köztársaság, a Litván Köztársaság, Magyarország, a Máltai Köztársaság, a Lengyel Köztársaság, a Szlovák Köztársaság és a Szlovén Köztársaság Európai Unióhoz való csatlakozása figyelembevételével céljából készült jegyzőkönyv tervezetére vonatkozik. Voksommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Palaikau ši pasiūlymą.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of a Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union. The objective of the Protocol is to lay down the financial and technical rules enabling the Republic of Lebanon to participate in certain EU programmes. I believe that the participation of the 2004 enlargement countries in this Agreement is a natural consequence of their EU accession.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mediante este protocolo se incorporan al acuerdo Euromediterráneo entre la Unión Europea y el Líbano la República Checa, Estonia, Chipre, Letonia, Lituania, Hungría, Malta, Polonia, Eslovenia y Eslovaquia por parte de la UE. Por ello creo necesario votar a favor de esta decisión.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Na de uitbreiding van de EU met de tien lidstaten diende het protocol met Libanon ook deze tien lidstaten als ondertekenende partijen op te nemen; ook hier stemde ik dus mee in.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Hier geht es thematisch um das Rahmenabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Libanesischen Republik bezüglich der allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Teilnahme der Libanesischen Republik an Programmen der Union. Im Speziellen behandelt die Empfehlung die Erweiterung auf die 2004 beigetretenen Mitgliedsstaaten. Dabei geht es auch um die Bekämpfung von Fluchtursachen vor Ort, ein Bestreben, welches durchaus meine Unterstützung findet. Wenn jedoch, wie hier seitens der EU, Zugeständnisse gemacht werden, ohne dass selbige an Verpflichtungen zur Rücknahme illegaler Migranten gebunden sind, dann halte ich dies für verantwortungslos.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφτως*. – Υποστήριξα την παρούσα πρωτοβουλία, το περιεχόμενο της οποίας έχει εγκριθεί από την αρμόδια επιτροπή και αφορά την ευρωμεσογειακή συνεργασία μεταξύ του Λιβάνου και των κρατών μελών που εντάχθηκαν στην ΕΕ με τη διεύρυνση του 2004.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediteranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani zaradi upoštevanja pristopa Češke republike, Republike Estonije, Republike Ciper, Republike Latvije, Republike Litve, republike Madžarske, Republike Malte, Republike Poljske, Republike Slovenije in Slovaške republike k Evropski uniji.

Odobritev protokola omogoča pristop k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu med EU in Libanonom državam, ki so se Evropski uniji priključile v letu 2004 in niso bile podpisnice prvotnega sporazuma.

9.4. Protokoll zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Abkommen zwischen der EU und Libanon, mit dem dem Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumäniens Rechnung getragen wird (A8-0195/2016 - Ramona Nicole Mănescu)

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – La realizzazione di un accordo euro-mediterraneo, volto a favorire le politiche di vicinato, rappresenta per l'Unione europea una priorità. Rafforzare non solo i rapporti economici e commerciali, ma la stabilità e la sicurezza stesse di alcuni Stati limitrofi, permetterà di estendere la portata degli obiettivi e delle strategie europee.

La risoluzione presentata mira a tener conto, nell'ambito del processo di adesione del Libano, anche della futura associazione all'Unione europea delle repubbliche di Bulgaria e di Romania.

Ho espresso, così, voto favorevole poiché ritengo che, la cooperazione tra l'UE ed i suddetti Stati, potrà estendere l'applicazione delle tutele e garanzie europee, soprattutto in materia di democrazia, Stato di diritto e diritti umani.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes portent sur l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations entre l'UE et le Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. J'ai voté contre ces textes qui constituent une ingérence de l'Union européenne dans les affaires d'un État ayant déjà à faire face à l'arrivée massive de réfugiés, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique ou encore la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite du pays. L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This particular vote was on a legal text to add the names of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in 2009, to the official documents. I had concerns with this report as one of its aims is to increase economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

However, as Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette recommandation. L'Union européenne entretient des relations stratégiques avec le Liban. Nous soutenons la stabilité de ce pays et sa sécurité dans une région du monde en proie à de fortes turbulences. La participation du Liban à des programmes de l'UE est un moyen de soutenir concrètement ces objectifs stratégiques.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Η παρούσα σύσταση, την οποία και υπερψήφισα, αφορά το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση της Δημοκρατίας της Βουλγαρίας και της Ρουμανίας. Αναμένουμε την κοινοποίησή της στα αρμόδια θεσμικά όργανα και κυβερνήσεις.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le texte proposé constitue l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Il concerne les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires. La subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, j'ai voté contre le protocole.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cet accord, actualisation du volet Sud de la politique de voisinage, concerne l'élargissement des relations UE-Liban aux différents pays récemment entrés dans ce carcan. J'ai voté contre ce texte, estimant que rien n'autorise l'Union à dicter leur politique étrangère aux États membres. De plus, je ne saurais accepter qu'un accord dont je dénonce les effets néfastes à la fois pour le Liban et pour mon pays soit élargi à d'autres pays.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce protocole visant à inclure la Bulgarie et la Roumanie à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Étant membres à part entière de l'Union, il est logique que la Bulgarie et la Roumanie rejoignent cet accord.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Mănescu che approva un protocollo all'accordo euromediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra la Comunità europea, con i suoi Stati membri, e la Repubblica libanese. Si tratta di un testo importante che consente di tener conto dell'allargamento del 2007 dell'UE che ha portato all'ingresso nell'Unione della Romania e della Bulgaria. Con l'accordo si rafforza la politica di vicinato, rispondendo a due esigenze: da un lato si verrà incontro alla richiesta del 2013 dello stato mediorientale di avere legami più stretti con l'Unione, dall'altro si rafforzeranno i processi di riforma e la stabilità di un paese che, occupando una posizione strategica in una zona estremamente a rischio, rappresenta un alleato fondamentale nella lotta a Daesh e al terrorismo di matrice islamica.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cette recommandation concerne le protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban pour faire suite à l'adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'UE en 2007.

Comme pour la recommandation précédente, l'UE n'a pas de rôle international à avoir et la politique étrangère doit relever des États. Le Liban n'a pas besoin de l'ingérence européenne dans ses problèmes nationaux. J'ai donc voté contre.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – In questo testo permangono dei passaggi che ritengo poco condivisibile e che mi hanno spinto verso un voto di astensione.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una Asociación entre la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión de la República de Bulgaria y de Rumanía a la Unión Europea. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu patvirtinamas Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolą, siekiant atsižvelgti į Bulgarijos Respublikos ir Rumunijos įstojimą į Sąjungą.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *íráshan*. – Az Európai Unió bővítése megköveteli, hogy az érvényben levő megállapodások tükrözzék a valós helyzetet, ezért szavazatommal támogattam a kiegészítés elfogadását.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Liban n'a pas besoin de l'UE pour se mêler de ses affaires; il connaît suffisamment de problèmes liés à l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens.

Il s'ajoute à cela que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This particular vote was on a legal text to add the names of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in 2009, to the official documents. I had concerns with this report as one of its aims is to increase economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

However, as Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – È corretto che anche la Repubblica di Bulgaria e la Repubblica di Romania, ora che sono pienamente parte dell'Unione Europea, partecipino degli accordi globali di partenariato e/o di cooperazione che la UE sigla con gli Stati esteri. Lo riteniamo un atto dovuto.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport vise à actualiser les accords euro-méditerranéens, ratifiés dans le cadre de la politique de voisinage de l'Union européenne. Le Liban est actuellement en proie à de graves troubles intérieurs notamment engendrés par l'arrivée massive de migrants syriens qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés palestiniens. Le pays du Cèdre subit également les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique. Or l'Union européenne a démontré par le passé qu'elle n'avait aucune légitimité et crédibilité pour s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures dans un pays tiers. D'une part, l'Union doit respecter le principe de non-ingérence; d'autre part, la politique extérieure reste une compétence exclusive des États membres. C'est la raison pour laquelle je me suis opposé à ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Implicarea țărilor partenere în cadrul politicii europene de vecinătate se transpune și prin diverse acorduri-cheie. Interesul manifestat de Republica Libaneză de a participa la programele și agențiile Uniunii deschise statelor partenere la politica europeană de vecinătate s-a materializat printr-un protocol cu dispoziții standard ce conține un acord-cadru privind principiile generale de participare a Libanului.

Protocolul la Acordul euro-mediteranean de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, referitor la un acord-cadru între Uniunea Europeană și Republica Libaneză privind principiile generale de participare a Republicii Libaneze la programele Uniunii are ca obiectiv stabilirea reglementărilor de ordin financiar și tehnic și, totodată, măsurile de cooperare economică, financiară, tehnică.

Prezentul raport are scopul de a ține seama de aderarea la Uniune a României și a Bulgariei. Consider esențială participarea egală și oferirea unor premise echitabile de implicare în acțiunile Uniunii tuturor statelor membre, motiv pentru care am votat favorabil acest raport.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della raccomandazione in questione perché reputo necessaria, a seguito dell'adesione della Repubblica di Bulgaria e della Romania all'Unione europea, l'adozione dell'adeguamento all'accordo di associazione tra l'UE e i suoi Stati membri, da un lato, e la Repubblica del Libano dall'altro.

Il 23 ottobre 2006, il Consiglio ha autorizzato la Commissione, a nome della Comunità europea e dei suoi Stati membri, a negoziare i protocolli che modificano gli accordi conclusi tra la Comunità europea e i suoi Stati membri e i paesi terzi, tra cui l'accordo euromediterraneo in questione.

I negoziati, tuttavia, sono stati ritardati dalle difficoltà riscontrate dal governo libanese e dal fatto che, prima di dare il suo accordo di massima sul testo, quest'ultimo ha chiesto chiarimenti che esulano dal campo di applicazione del protocollo.

Nel corso dei suddetti negoziati si è deciso di non aggiungere all'accordo d'associazione esistente nessuna ulteriore concessione commerciale relativa ai settori dell'agricoltura, dei prodotti agricoli trasformati e dei prodotti ittici.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – Similar to the previous framework vote, this vote concerned greater economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Neighbourhood Policy which is aimed at offering its neighbours a privileged relationship. In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

This particular vote was on a legal text to add the names of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in 2009, to the official documents.

As Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I gave my consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon on the principles and standards for the participation of Lebanon in certain EU programmes. The purpose is to include Bulgaria and Romania in the agreement given their accession into the European Union. They will certainly benefit from further cooperation and strengthened partnership with Lebanon.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε τη συμφωνία και θεωρούμε ικανοποιητικά τα αποτελέσματα των διαπραγματεύσεων μεταξύ Επιτροπής και Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε ως προς τη σύσταση που αφορά τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση της Δημοκρατίας της Βουλγαρίας και της Ρουμανίας. Η συζήτηση αυτή εντάσσεται στο πλαίσιο ευρύτερης συνεργασίας της ΕΕ με το κράτος του Λιβάνου και καθώς στοχεύει κατά κύριο λόγο σε ζητήματα οικονομικά, θεωρώ πως δεν έχει σε πρώτο πλάνο τα συμφέροντα των πολιτών. Γι' αυτό και απείχα από την ψηφοφορία.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Sono favorevole a questa proposta che rappresenta solamente l'adesione della Bulgaria e della Romania all'accordo stipulato tra l'Unione Europea ed il Libano quando ancora i due Paesi non facevano parte dell'Unione Europea. Ritengo opportuno che i Paesi sopra citati, dal momento che sono entrati a far parte dell'Unione, debbano aderire anche agli accordi da essa stipulati con Paesi terzi. Per questo motivo ho deciso di votare a favore della proposta.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this Protocol, which is to have the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, approved on behalf of the Union and its Member States to take account of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Tenendo conto dell'adesione all'UE della Repubblica di Bulgaria e Romania, il Parlamento europeo ha emanato una risoluzione legislativa sul progetto di decisione del Consiglio per la conclusione di un protocollo di accordo euromediterraneo tra la Comunità europea e gli Stati membri e la Repubblica libanese. Ho votato in favore di questa risoluzione, confermando il mio sostegno all'accordo euromediterraneo tra UE e Libano, nell'ambito di un accordo quadro tra l'Unione europea e la Repubblica libanese sulla partecipazione della Repubblica libanese a programmi dell'Unione.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Republica Libaneză este un adevărat mozaic din punct de vedere cultural, etnic și religios, cu o populație de aproximativ 4,5 milioane de locuitori, ce reușește să fie un model de respect pentru diversitate, toleranță și stabilitate. Prin participarea sa la politica europeană de vecinătate, Republica Libaneză a reușit să pună în aplicare un important număr de reforme în vederea democratizării, consolidării statului de drept și a protecției drepturilor și libertăților fundamentale ale cetățenilor.

De asemenea, Republica Libaneză reprezintă un important partener strategic în domeniul mobilității, migrației și securității, întrucât împărtășește o mare parte a vulnerabilităților și amenințărilor ce caracterizează astăzi flancul sudic al Uniunii. Un exemplu al acestui puternic parteneriat este reprezentat de vizita de lucru și documentare pe linia gestiunii frontierelor a unor înalți oficiali libanezi în octombrie 2015 în România, în cadrul programului Uniunii Europene *Integrated Border Management*.

Am votat în favoarea acestei recomandări, dorind să reiterez importanța aprofundării cooperării economice, politice și culturale între statele europene și Republica Libaneză.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Zalecenie w sprawie projektu decyzji Rady w sprawie zawarcia Protokołu do Układu eurośródziemnomorskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie pomiędzy Wspólnotą Europejską i jej państwami członkowskimi, z jednej strony, a Republiką Libańską, z drugiej strony, w celu uwzględnienia przystąpienia Republiki Bułgarii i Rumunii do Unii Europejskiej. Europejska polityka sąsiedztwa UE oferuje swoim sąsiadom możliwość zawierania stosunków dwustronnych o charakterze uprzywilejowanym, opartych na wzajemnym przywiązaniu do wspólnych wartości, takich jak demokracja i prawa człowieka, praworządność, zasady dobrego zarządzania, prawa gospodarki rynkowej i zrównoważonego rozwoju. Chcąc podtrzymywać wyżej wskazane stosunki w Bułgarii oraz Rumunii, zagłosowałem za omawianym projektem.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of giving consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to include Bulgaria and Romania in the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon. I believe that the aim of the European Neighbourhood policy to achieve political and economic integration with the southern and eastern countries is extremely important.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport est une recommandation du Parlement européen sur le projet du Conseil de conclure l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre l'UE et la République libanaise. Ce protocole vise à tenir compte de l'adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne. Considérant que la coopération de l'Union Européenne avec le Liban est indispensable et qu'il convient de tenir compte de l'élargissement de 2007, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. — J'ai apporté mon soutien à la conclusion du protocole de l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban, prenant en compte l'adhésion à l'Union européenne de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie. Ayant adhéré à l'Union européenne en 2007, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie doivent être intégrées à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte relatif aux relations UE-Liban participe à l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens. Ces derniers constituent le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Le Liban est déstabilisé par l'arrivée d'environ 1,5 million de réfugiés syriens en plus des réfugiés palestiniens. À cela s'ajoutent les incursions sanglantes des djihadistes du groupe état islamique. Non seulement la complexité des enjeux libanais et du contexte politique de ce pays semble échapper à l'oligarchie européenne, mais il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas vocation à jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale. Pour ces raisons, j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Гласувах в подкрепа на препоръката относно проекта на решение на Съвета за сключване на протокол към Евро-средиземноморското споразумение за асоцииране между Европейската общност и нейните държави членки, от една страна, и Република Ливан, от друга страна, за да се вземе предвид присъединяването на Република България и на Румъния към Европейския съюз. Рамковото споразумение създава благоприятен климат за икономически връзки между Европейския съюз и Ливан, по-специално в сферата на търговията и инвестициите. От особено значение за изпълнението на Рамковото споразумение и постигането на целите, заложили в него, е включването на всички пъленправни членки на Европейския съюз, в т.ч. България и Румъния.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – O presente Protocolo ao Acordo Euro Mediterrânico cria uma associação entre a Comunidade Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano, por outro, a fim de ter em conta a adesão da República da Bulgária e da Roménia à União Europeia. Votei a favor.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote contre: il convient de rappeler que l'UE n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este relatório - que não se reveste de caráter apenas técnico - refere-se à inclusão no Protocolo do Acordo Euro-Mediterrâneo UE-Líbano da Bulgária e da Roménia (alargamento de 2007).

O Líbano tem importância estratégica para a UE no contexto do Médio Oriente, no que respeita à questão da segurança e da defesa. O relatório refere que a UE se quer proteger de novas ameaças, como o terrorismo. Precisa também de mais um país que sirva de tampão à chegada de mais refugiados à Europa.

Para a UE, pouco importa haver um Líbano em colapso. O país tem recebido milhares de refugiados, existem os problemas com a fronteira da Síria, com Israel, com a presença do autoproclamado Estado Islâmico.

O objetivo principal da dita parceria Euro-Mediterrânica é a integração económica e a relação privilegiada destes países com a UE, sendo inseparável de objetivos de domínio económico e colonização de mercados.

O acordo abre portas a acordos de livre comércio. Insere-se na agenda política e económica da UE para o Médio Oriente. Estas são razões para a nossa oposição.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del progetto di decisione del Consiglio relativo all'accordo Euromed sulla partecipazione della Repubblica libanese ai programmi dell'Unione. La nostra politica di vicinato consente di stabilire relazioni privilegiate con il Medio Oriente, incrementando un commercio bilaterale proficuo per tutti gli Stati membri dell'UE. L'Unione europea è il primo partner commerciale per il Libano, coprendo circa un terzo di tutto il commercio libanese, ragion per cui è necessario mantenere e incentivare tale partenariato, al fine di perseguire una maggiore integrazione economica con impegni e guadagni reciproci. Inoltre, ritengo necessario ratificare il protocollo che tiene conto dell'allargamento dell'Unione europea nel 2007, con adesione di Bulgaria e Romania all'Unione europea.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained. No opinion.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Hlavným predmetom predmetnej dohody medzi Európskou úniou a Libanom je zohľadniť prístúpenie Bulharska a Rumunska k Európskej únii.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in oggetto.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Είμαι αντίθετος στην ενίσχυση τρίτων χωρών μέσω προνομιακών εμπορικών συμφωνιών, όταν οι λαοί πολλών εκ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ (ιδίως αυτά της Νότιας Ευρώπης) διαβιούν σε συνθήκες οικονομικής εξαθλίωσης αγγίζοντας τα όρια της φτώχειας. Επομένως η ψήφος μου είναι αρνητική.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Lebanon is a key partner for the EU in the Middle East. The country faces a fragile security environment, being at the forefront of the Syrian civil war, with over a million of refugees out of 4 million total population. It is in the EU's interest to foster stability in Lebanon, to develop capabilities and to promote people-to-people contacts and the transfer of expertise. The vote updates the agreement by taking account of the enlargement of the EU. I voted in favour.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Egyetértek a Libanoni Köztársaság és az EU közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyv megkötésével, ezért megszavaztam azt. Ez lehetőséget biztosít a 2004 után csatlakozott országoknak, köztük Magyarországnak, hogy csatlakozzon a jegyzőkönyvhöz.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für dieses vor allem technische Protokoll gestimmt, da es für eine gute und wichtige Kooperation der EU mit den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes steht.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich befürworte die Zustimmung zum Abschluss des Protokolls. Die Kooperation zwischen der EU und der Libanesischen Republik ist wichtig, und der Abschluss des Protokolls wurde durch den Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumäniens zur Europäischen Union notwendig.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Beata Gosiewska (ECR), *na piśmie*. – W sprawie projektu decyzji Rady w sprawie zawarcia Protokołu do Układu euro-śródziemnomorskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Wspólnotą Europejską i jej państwami członkowskimi, z jednej strony, a Republiką Libańską, z drugiej strony, w celu uwzględnienia przystąpienia Republiki Bułgarii i Rumunii do Unii Europejskiej.

Popieram protokół o stowarzyszeniu pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Republiką Libańską. Liban jest państwem członkowskim Partnerstwa euro-śródziemnomorskiego, które wspiera integrację gospodarczą i reformy demokratyczne w państwach sąsiadujących z Unią Europejską od południa. Dwustronna wymiana handlowa z Libanem stale wzrasta, a rynek unijny stanowi 1/3 całej libańskiej wymiany handlowej.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour. The agreement established partnership between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon and highlighted the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Οι 3 εκθέσεις αφορούν το πλαίσιο συνεργασίας ΕΕ και Λιβάνου και τη συμμετοχή του τελευταίου σε προγράμματα της Ένωσης. Τηρήσαμε θέση αποχής, γιατί από την μια αυτή είναι η θέληση των αρχών του Λιβάνου αλλά από την άλλη αυτές οι συμφωνίες οδηγούν σε συμφωνίες ελεύθερου εμπορίου με όλες τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις που αυτές επιφέρουν στους λαούς και με τις οποίες φυσικά διαφωνούμε.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported this recommendation, as did the majority of the Parliament. Like the previous votes on the Framework Agreement between the EU and Lebanon, which I supported and which are vital for economic, financial and technical cooperation between the two regions, account needed to be taken of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this protocol as I had no concerns with its final format.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted for this recommendation on the draft Council decision regarding the stabilisation of Lebanon, having regarded the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za nacrt zakonodavne rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o nacrtu Odluke Vijeća o sklapanju Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Republike Bugarske i Rumunjske Europskoj uniji jer se time daje suglasnost za sklapanje sporazuma. Radi se o proceduri tehničke naravi koja proizlazi iz članstva gore navedenih država u Europskoj uniji, što predstavlja prirodno i dosljedno postupanje, te stoga podržavam ovu Preporuku.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces textes constituent l'actualisation des accords euro-méditerranéens qui sont le volet sud de la politique de voisinage. Ils concernent les relations UE-Liban pour le premier et l'élargissement de celles-ci aux différents pays entrants pour les deux autres. Le Liban subit aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite. Ce pays n'a pas besoin de l'ingérence de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire. Je me suis porté contre ces trois textes relatifs au protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui vise à faire en sorte que le protocole à l'accord d'association euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union et le Liban tienne compte de l'adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'UE.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. — I have voted for the report of the colleague as I see that cooperation between the regions is of the utmost importance for the well-being of the people and it will only help in the procedure of modernisation and reform of the state.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Dieser Bericht ist rein technischer Natur und betrifft ein Zusatzprotokoll zwischen der Europäischen Union und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und dem Libanon andererseits, anlässlich des Beitritts der Republik Bulgarien und der Republik Rumänien zur Europäischen Union. Daher stimme ich für den vorliegenden Bericht.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Come per le due relazioni precedenti, lo scopo del progetto in esame è quello di definire l'accordo euro mediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra l'UE ed i suoi Stati membri da una parte, e la Repubblica libanese dall'altra, in modo da tenere in considerazione l'adesione della Repubblica di Bulgaria e della Romania all'Unione europea. Il Parlamento dà la sua approvazione alla conclusione del menzionato protocollo. Quest'ultimo definisce tutti gli aspetti volti a garantire collaborazione finanziaria, economica e tecnica, in grado di fronteggiare le difficoltà che sopraggiungeranno. Ritengo che la raccomandazione del Parlamento vada approvata, e pertanto mi esprimo in maniera favorevole nel sostenerla.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre le Protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Ce volet prend en compte l'adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne en 2004. Le pays du Cèdre connaît aujourd'hui de nouvelles déstabilisations avec l'arrivée en masse de réfugiés syriens (1,5 million) s'ajoutant aux réfugiés palestiniens, les incursions sanglantes de l'État islamique et la marginalisation en cours de la minorité sunnite qui n'augure rien de bon. Il n'a pas besoin de l'Union européenne comme problème supplémentaire pour se mêler de ses affaires, la subtilité du jeu politique libanais échappant complètement à l'oligarchie communautaire, comme en témoigne la dernière séance de la sous-commission Sécurité et Défense. De plus, il convient de rappeler que l'Union européenne n'a pas à avoir de rôle international.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'objectif de ce rapport est d'intégrer la Bulgarie et la Roumanie aux accords euro-méditerranéens qui unissent l'Union européenne et le Liban. Il s'agit donc de la suite du processus d'intégration de ces nouveaux États membres à l'ensemble des accords et traités européens. Cependant j'estime que l'UE n'a pas à se substituer aux États-membres en matière de politique internationale. Le pays du Cèdre subit de fortes déstabilisations, comme les arrivées massives de migrants syriens (1,5 million) en plus des réfugiés palestiniens, et les attaques sanglantes et inopinées de l'État islamique, et n'a pas besoin d'une nouvelle ingérence européenne. Je me suis prononcé contre.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. U přistoupení nových členských států ke stávající dohodě se zdržuji.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Līdzīgi vairākiem citiem nolīgumiem un to protokoliem, arī Protokola Eiropas un Vidusjūras reģiona valstu Nolīgumam starp ES un Libānu gadījumā bija nepieciešams pielāgot to Savienības teritoriālas paplašināšanas faktam, lai sadarbība varētu vispusīgi un pilnvērtīgi notikt starp visām ES dalībvalstīm un trešo valsti. Konkrēti šī balsojuma ietvaros runa gāja par 2007. gada paplašināšanos, kad Bulgārija un Rumānija pievienojās Eiropas Savienībai.

Ņemot vērā balsojuma specifiku, viennozīmīgi nobalsoju pozitīvi. Paralēli gribētos uzsvērt, ka ir nepieciešams, lai attiecīgs balsojums pēc iespējas drīzāk notiktu arī attiecībā uz Horvātijas pievienošanos Savienībai 2013. gadā.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), *γραπτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω τη σύσταση σχετικά με το σχέδιο απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου της ευρωμεσογειακής συμφωνίας σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Λιβάνου, αφετέρου, για να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση της Δημοκρατίας της Βουλγαρίας και της Ρουμανίας, διότι δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ces trois rapports.

Trois rapports sont soumis au vote du Parlement européen.

Ces textes sont la traduction concrète de la politique euro-méditerranéenne de l'Union européenne. En l'occurrence, nous nous opposons à toute ingérence dans les affaires de l'État libanais. Outre le principe même de non intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un État souverain, ce pays connaît actuellement une situation de grande instabilité, en raison, d'une part, de l'immigration massive de réfugiés syriens et palestiniens et, d'autre part, des attaques récurrentes de l'État islamique.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *in writing*. — Regarding the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and Lebanon (accession of Bulgaria and Romania), I voted in favour of it. The accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the Protocol will enhance the European Community's cohesion and enlarge its impact, and more opportunities will be provided to these countries as well. The accession is a win-win strategy, and there is no controversy for this implementation.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. — Mi apoyo a la recomendación sobre el proyecto de Decisión del Consejo relativa a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una Asociación entre la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión de la República de Bulgaria y de Rumanía a la Unión Europea.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. — Diese Abstimmung ist rein formaler Natur. Sie ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass Bulgarien und Rumänien nach ihrem EU-Beitritt in das Protokoll miteinzubeziehen sind. Daher habe ich mich der Stimme enthalten.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. — Le Liban connaît de nos jours de graves difficultés intérieures. À la venue d'un million et demi d'exilés syriens s'ajoutent le nombre de réfugiés palestiniens déjà présents. Je crois que ce pays n'a pas besoin dans ses affaires de l'Union européenne, qui n'a pas de légitimité dans un rôle de politique étrangère. Par ailleurs, la compréhension très restreinte de l'Union quant aux phénomènes se produisant dans cet État prête à une réserve justifiée sur cet accord.

En conséquence j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. — O objetivo do presente Protocolo é estabelecer as regras financeiras e técnicas que permitam à República do Líbano participar em determinados programas da UE. O quadro horizontal criado pelo Protocolo define os princípios para a cooperação económica, financeira e técnica e permite à República do Líbano receber assistência técnica, em especial assistência financeira, da União Europeia, em conformidade com os programas da União Europeia.

Esse quadro aplica-se unicamente aos programas cujos atos jurídicos constitutivos preveem a possibilidade de participação da República do Líbano. Por conseguinte, a celebração do Protocolo não implica o exercício de competências ao abrigo das várias políticas setoriais previstas nos programas, que são exercidas quando se estabelecem os programas. Tem em conta a adesão da Roménia e da Bulgária à União Europeia.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. — I voted in favour because the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania enhances the internal market and renews movement towards better trade relations between Member States and associated members.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. — Je suis favorable à la conclusion d'un protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la République libanaise, d'autre part, visant à tenir compte de l'adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne. Pour une intégration cohérente et une Union unie et forte, il est important de faciliter l'adhésion des nouveaux adhérents à l'Union européenne aux traités et accords internationaux propres à l'Europe et qui forment les acquis communautaires. Ce projet ne modifie en rien la substance de l'accord euro-méditerranéen avec le Liban. Je pense qu'il est essentiel de permettre à la Roumanie et à la Bulgarie d'accéder à cet accord car c'est l'essence même de l'Union européenne. Nous avons déjà pris cette décision quand nous avons signé l'accord d'adhésion de ces deux pays à l'Union européenne, la suite s'inscrit dans cette logique.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the report, which calls on establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, which is important with regard of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Unió 2014-es bővítése után az egyrészt az Európai Közösség és tagállamai, másrészt a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodásban figyelembe kellett venni, hogy a Ciprusi Köztársaság, a Cseh Köztársaság, az Észt Köztársaság, a Lett Köztársaság, a Litván Köztársaság, Magyarország, a Máltai Köztársaság, a Lengyel Köztársaság, a Szlovák Köztársaság és a Szlovén Köztársaság csatlakozott az Európai Unióhoz. A Tanács határozattervezetet fogadott el az erről szóló jegyzőkönyv megkötéséről, a határozat elfogadásához azonban meg kell szereznie a Parlament egyetértését is. A Külügyi Bizottság jelentésében azt ajánlja, hogy a Parlament a jegyzőkönyv megkötésével értsen egyet. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – O presente projeto de Protocolo ao Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma associação entre a Comunidade Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano, por outro, tendo em conta a adesão da República da Bulgária e da Roménia à União Europeia merece o meu voto favorável.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'UE n'a pas de rôle international à jouer. Je vote contre ce texte.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui proposait l'adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et la République libanaise. En tant que pays membres de l'Union européenne, la République de Bulgarie et la Roumanie s'ajoutent naturellement à l'accord.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – A csatlakozási feltételek teljesítése után, 2007-ben, Bulgária és Románia az Európai Unió tagállamaivá váltak, ami magával vonta a harmadik országokkal kötött megállapodásokban való részvételt is. Szavazatommal is kifejeztem azt, hogy természetesnek tartom az EU és Libanon közötti társuláshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyv két új tagállammal való kiegészítését.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Union aims to establish a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. I have voted for this recommendation that will update the Euro-Mediterranean agreement between the EU and Lebanon by taking into account of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — This particular vote was on a legal text to add the names of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in 2009, to the official documents. I had concerns with this report as one of its aims is to increase economic integration between the EU and Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In practice however, this policy has been criticised hugely for its eurocentricity, hypocritical attitude towards some of the conditionality requirements and damage that can be done to indigenous sectors.

However, as Lebanese authorities have taken the decision themselves to enhance cooperation, I abstained on the final vote.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Hier handelt es sich um eine rein technische Abstimmung, Bulgarien und Rumänien sollen nach ihrem EU-Beitritt in das Protokoll miteinbezogen werden.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerato il progetto di decisione del Consiglio e quanto indicato nella raccomandazione della commissione per gli affari esteri. Considerato che l'adesione della Repubblica di Bulgaria e della Romania all'Unione europea prevede che la conclusione di accordi tra l'UE e i Paesi terzi coinvolgano tutti gli Stati membri dell'Unione, ho ritenuto doveroso pronunciarmi a favore. Pertanto, ho votato positivamente.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Euro-mediterranski sporazum između država članica Europske unije, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, potpisan 2002. godine, prije svega stvara okvir za politički dijalog, postavlja uvjete za liberalizaciju trgovine na mediteranskom području u skladu s pravilima Svjetske trgovinske organizacije, potiče trgovinu i širenje gospodarskih odnosa među zemljama potpisnicama, te promiče ekonomsku, socijalnu, kulturnu, finansijsku i monetarnu suradnju Europske unije i mediteranskih zemalja te je doprinos osiguranju mira, stabilnosti, gospodarskoga i društvenog razvoja te tehnološkog napretka. Ovaj je sporazum važan za razvoj redovitoga političkog dijaloga o bilateralnim i međunarodnim pitanjima te za razvoj bliskih odnosa u pitanjima od zajedničkog interesa.

Budući da su Republike Bugarska i Rumunjska od 1. siječnja 2007. godine članice Europske unije te punopravni dionici njezine politike, podržala sam ovaj Protokol kako bi se bolje i efikasnije uredili odnosi između Bugarske i Rumunjske, kao država članica Europske unije, i Republike Libanona, kao jedne od strana potpisnica Euro-mediteranskog sporazuma. Usvajanjem ovog Protokola, Republikama Bugarskoj, Rumunjskoj i Libanonu omogućit će se uspostavljanje učinkovitijih partnerstava, širenje skladnih gospodarskih i društvenih odnosa te će suradnja biti od velikog značaja kako za uvoz industrijskih proizvoda, tako i za trgovinu poljoprivrednim i ribljim proizvodima.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Libanon je ključni partner za EU na Bliskom istoku. Zemlja se suočava s krhkim sigurnosnim okruženjem, posebice zbog sirijskog rata, s više od milijun izbjeglica na 4 milijuna koliko broji ukupno stanovništvo.

EU je zainteresiran za poticanje stabilnosti u Libanonu, razvijanje sposobnosti i promicanje direktnih kontakata i prijenosa znanja. Priključujem se već širokom konsenzusu na razini odbora o potrebi da se dodatno uključe u naporima da pomognu Libanonu. Ujedno podržavam ovo izvješće obzirom da se radi o tehničkom ažuriranju postojećeg ugovora koje uzima u obzir proširenje EU-a iz 2007. godine.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour cet ajustement technique qui permet de tenir compte de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie en 2007, et de leur permettre ainsi de s'inscrire dans le cadre de coopération de l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union et le Liban.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución mediante la cual el Parlamento Europeo concede su aprobación a la celebración de un Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo por el que se establece una Asociación entre la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República Libanesa, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión de la República de Bulgaria y de Rumanía a la Unión Europea. Con este acuerdo, y los dos protocolos que se han votado en este pleno, se establecen normas económicas, financieras y técnicas que permitan a Líbano participar en ciertos programas de la Unión Europea. Los términos y las condiciones específicas para la participación del Líbano en cada programa concreto se determinarán por la negociación de acuerdos entre la Comisión y las autoridades competentes en Líbano.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette recommandation. Le projet de décision du Conseil vise en effet à faire en sorte que le protocole à l'accord d'association euro-méditerranéen établissant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la République libanaise, d'autre part, soit approuvé au nom de la Communauté européenne et de ses États membres, afin de tenir compte de l'adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Šis klausimas nereikalauja didelių diskusijų. Bulgarijos ir Rumunijos narystė ES šiek tiek pakeitė mūsų prekybos susitarimus su Libanu. Šiandien mes tiesiog įteisiname naujai susiformavusią padėtį. Kiek žinau, mūsų prekybos partneriai taip pat yra patenkinti pateiktu pasiūlymu, todėl vienareikšmiškai balsuoju „už“ tai, kad ES prekyba su svarbiu mūsų partneriu – Libanu ir toliau laisvai plėtotųsi, taip prisidedama prie gerovės ir stabilumo zonos kūrimo Europos kaimynystėje.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – Tendo em conta a adesão da República da Bulgária e da Roménia à União Europeia em 2007, este projeto de decisão do Conselho diz respeito à atualização do Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico com o Líbano (que tinha sido assinado em 2002), dada a adesão dos referidos Estados-Membros à União Europeia.

Este Acordo cria uma associação entre a Comunidade Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República do Líbano por outro. À semelhança da recomendação tomada neste mesmo sentido relativamente à adesão em 2004 por parte de outros 10 Estados-membros, e não tendo razões para objetar à decisão do Conselho, votei a favor desta recomendação.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte qui permet de tenir compte de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne de 2007 dans l'accord euro-méditerranéen entre l'Union européenne et le Liban. Par ce vote, le Parlement européen approuve la décision du Conseil d'inclure la Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le cadre des relations de l'Union européenne avec le Liban.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Questa è la terza raccomandazione che punta alla conclusione di un protocollo all'accordo euro mediterraneo che istituisce un'associazione tra l'UE e il Libano. In questo caso specifico il testo si riferisce in particolar modo all'estensione dell'accordo a Bulgaria e Romania, due Paesi che sono entrati a fare parte dell'UE nel 2007. Ho dato il mio voto a favore della raccomandazione, consapevole dell'importanza e del valore degli accordi di associazione che l'Unione europea stipula nella regione del Mediterraneo.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru proiectul de raport al doamnei Mănescu referitor la proiectul de decizie a Consiliului privind încheierea unui protocol la Acordul euro-mediterranean de instituire a unei asocieri între Comunitatea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de o parte, și Republica Libaneză, pe de altă parte, pentru a ține seama de aderarea Republicii Bulgaria și a României la Uniunea Europeană.

România a avut întotdeauna relații bune cu Libanul și această modificare a protocolului, pentru a include România și Bulgaria, era necesară.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für die „Empfehlung zu dem Entwurf eines Beschlusses des Rates über den Abschluss des Protokolls zum Europa-Mittelmeer-Assoziationsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Libanesischen Republik andererseits anlässlich des Beitritts der Republik Bulgarien und Rumäniens zur Europäischen Union“ gestimmt, da es wichtig ist, unsere Fortschritte zu dokumentieren, um in Zukunft weiterhin für eine bessere Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und der Libanesischen Republik zu arbeiten.

Hier überschauen wir unsere Zusammenarbeit mit unseren neuen Mitgliedsstaaten und dem Libanon, um Verbesserungen einleiten zu können, wenn sie nötig sind.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

He votado en contra del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para las clases populares de los países y Estados afectados.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Il protocollo sull'accordo euro-mediterraneo, prende in considerazione l'adesione della Repubblica di Bulgaria e della Romania all'Unione europea. Considero importante che tutti gli attuali membri sottoscrivano questo protocollo e per tale motivo ho deciso di votare a favore.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *písomne*. – Hlasoval som za toto uznesenie. Tento protokol sa snaží definovať finančné a technické pravidlá umožňujúce Libanonu účasť na niektorých programoch EÚ. V tomto uznesení týkajúcom sa daného protokolu ide o zohľadnenie prístupu Bulharskej republiky a Rumunska k Európskej únii.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Euro-stredomorskú dohodu medzi EÚ a Libanom som podporila, keďže ide najmä o ujasnenie technických a finančných pravidiel súvisiacich s účasťou Libanonu na programoch Únie. Dohoda je súčasťou európskej susedskej politiky (ENP), v rámci ktorej je partnerským krajinám umožnený prístup k programom a agentúram EÚ. Ide o jeden z nástrojov, ktorým EÚ podporuje reformy a modernizáciu vo svojom susedstve. Podobné dohody sú už od roku 2007 prerokúvané s viacerými krajinami a doteraz boli protokoly podpísané s Arménskom, Gruzínskom, Izraelom, Jordánskom, Moldavskom, Marokom a Ukrajinou. Libanon vyjadril svoj záujem prístupit' k týmto programom v roku 2013. Libanon tak bude mať prístup k technickej a finančnej asistencii, ktorá by krajine

mala umožnit' zlepšit' svoje verejné politiky. Keďže je Libanon v súčasnosti zmietaný nestabilitou svojho regiónu, dohoda s EÚ by mohla priniesť podporu, ktorú krajina potrebuje. Súhlasila som taktiež s rozšírením tohto protokolu na Bulharsko a Rumunsko, ktoré pristúpili k EÚ v roku 2007.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Pristúpenie Bulharska a Rumunska k Európskej únii je nutné ratifikovať aj vzhľadom na medzinárodné dohody, ako je aj Európsko-stredomorská dohoda.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Suglasan sam sa sklapanjem Sporazuma uzimajući u obzir nacrt Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Republike Bugarske i Rumunjske Europskoj uniji. Nadalje, ovakvu odluku podržao sam s obzirom na stav Odbora za vanjsku trgovinu imajući na umu da su Bugarska i Rumunjska postale članice Unije 2007. godine.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Europski parlament dao je suglasnost za sklapanje Sporazuma uzimajući u obzir nacrt Protokola uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Republike Bugarske i Rumunjske Europskoj uniji. Suglasnost je dana i na temelju preporuke Odbora za vanjsku trgovinu.

Podržavam sklapanje ovog Sporazuma jer smatram da takvo nešto prirodno proizlazi iz činjenice da su navedene države, članice Europske unije.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediteranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani zaradi upoštevanja pristopa Republike Bolgarije in Romunije k Evropski uniji.

Ta odobritev protokola, ki je predvsem tehnične narave, prinaša vključitev še Bolgarije in Romunije, ki sta se zadnji pridružili Evropski uniji in tako nista bili podpisnici prvotnega sporazuma.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραπτώς*. – Πρέπει να επιδιώκονται συμφωνίες μεταξύ της ΕΕ και τρίτων χωρών οι οποίες να προωθούν την ανάπτυξη των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, χωρίς να θίγονται τα εθνικά και οικονομικά τους συμφέροντα.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a kiegészítő jegyzőkönyv jóváhagyásáról szóló indítványt, mert ezzel hozzá kívántam járulni ahhoz, hogy a Libanon és az Európai Közösségek közötti korábbi megállapodás jogi kerete a Bulgária és Románia EU-csatlakozását követő jogi környezetnek megfelelően módosításra kerülhessen. Az Európai Unió és Libanon közötti együttműködés jogalapjának korszerűsítése, a jelen körülményekhez adaptált szabályozása megítélésem szerint különösen indokolt a jelenlegi időszakban, amikor a közel-keleti térségen belül Libanon az EU fontos partnerévé lépett elő azáltal, hogy kiemelt terheket vállalt az Európába irányuló migráció, illetve a menekültválság kezelésére irányuló nemzetközi erőfeszítésekben.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour le projet de décision du Conseil relative à la conclusion d'un protocole à l'accord euro-méditerranéen instituant une association entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la République libanaise, d'autre part, visant à tenir compte de l'adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – Cooperation with partner countries in the European Neighbourhood can only be successful if all the European Member States are involved. This is why I voted in favour of the recognition of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU by the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. This agreement establishes an association between the EU, its Member States and Lebanon, in view of increasing cooperation projects between the EU and Lebanon to foster stronger ties between Europeans and Lebanese and contributing to the continued development of Lebanon.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Glasovala sam za Protokol uz Euro-mediteranski sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske zajednice i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Libanonske Republike, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Republike Bugarske i Rumunjske Europskoj uniji.

S obzirom na sve goru situaciju u susjednoj Siriji, Europska unija podržava jedinstvo, stabilnost, neovisnost, suverenost i teritorijalni integritet Libanona.

U Libanonu koji ima 4,4 milijuna stanovnika trenutačno boravi oko 1,1 milijun registriranih sirijskih izbjeglica te je stoga Komisija osigurala više od 550 milijuna eura na ime humanitarne pomoći i potpore za razvoj i stabilizaciju Libanona, uz redovnu predviđenu suradnju.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Namen sklepa Sveta je oblikovanje protokola k evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu o partnerstvu in sodelovanju med Evropskimi skupnostmi in njihovimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Republiko Libanon na drugi strani, odobrenega v imenu Unije in njenih držav članic, zaradi upoštevanja pristopa Republike Bolgarije in Romunije k Evropski uniji.

Zato sem podprla priporočilo o sklepu Sveta o sklenitvi omenjenega protokola.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A dokumentum az Európai Közösségek és tagállamaik, másrésről a Libanoni Köztársaság közötti társulás létrehozásáról szóló euro-mediterrán megállapodáshoz csatolt, a Bolgár Köztársaság és Románia Európai Unióhoz történő csatlakozásának figyelembevételére céljából készült jegyzőkönyv tervezetére vonatkozik. Voksommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Nos abstenemos en esta votación al considerar que, si bien este tipo de Acuerdos pretenden avanzar en una integración eminentemente económico-mercantil que excluye dimensiones fundamentales de la integración (como el respeto a los derechos humanos en general y los derechos laborales y de la mujer en particular, la libre movilidad humana, el reconocimiento de títulos académicos, el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales de interés común, y otras), son las ciudadanías de los Estados los que deben elegir el tipo y grado de asociación que desean mantener con la UE.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *rástu*. — Palaikau šia mintį.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of a Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union. The horizontal framework established by the Protocol sets out principles for economic, financial and technical cooperation and allows the Republic of Lebanon to receive assistance, in particular financial assistance, from the European Union pursuant to the programmes. I believe that the participation of Bulgaria and Romania in this agreement is a natural consequence of their EU accession.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mediante este protocolo se incorporan al acuerdo Euromediterráneo entre la Unión Europea y el Líbano Bulgaria y Rumanía por parte de la UE. Por ello creo necesario votar a favor de esta decisión.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El Acuerdo Euromediterráneo (Euromed) promueve la integración económica y la reforma de 16 países vecinos de la UE, en el Norte de África y Oriente Medio. Esta asociación tiene como objetivo una mayor integración económica en la región y afirma que la UE puede ofrecer a sus vecinos una relación privilegiada que beneficie a ambas partes.

Se pedía al Parlamento adoptar tres protocolos, principalmente técnicos, con el fin de dar su consentimiento para la aprobación del Protocolo del Acuerdo Euromediterráneo y para añadir en los documentos oficiales el nombre de los países de la ampliación de 2004 y Bulgaria y Rumanía desde su integración.

No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque este tipo de acuerdos llevan a la instauración de acuerdos de libre comercio a los que nos oponemos por todas sus desastrosas consecuencias para la mayoría de la población pero, por otro lado, reconozco la voluntad de las autoridades libanesas, y respeto la decisión de un país soberano.

Por esto, he votado abstención.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Hetzelfde protocol met Libanon moest de laatste uitbreidingsgolf van de EU vermelden (Roemenië en Bulgarije) en dit kon mijn goedkeuring wegdragen.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Eine Empfehlung zum Rahmenabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Libanesischen Republik bezüglich der allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Teilnahme der Libanesischen Republik an Programmen der Union. Im Speziellen geht es um die Erweiterung bezüglich der Mitgliedstaaten Rumänien und Bulgarien.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Ενέκρινα με τη θετική μου ψήφο τη σύσταση για τη σύναψη πρωτοκόλλου που αφορά τις σχέσεις Λιβάνου, Βουλγαρίας και Ρουμανίας, στο πλαίσιο της ευρωμεσογειακής συνεργασίας. Το κείμενο που έχει κατατεθεί έχει υποστηριχτεί από τις περισσότερες πολιτικές δυνάμεις.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za priporočilo o osnutku sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi Protokola k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu o pridružitvi med Evropsko skupnostjo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Libanonsko republiko na drugi strani zaradi upoštevanja pristopa Republike Bolgarije in Romunije k Evropski uniji.

Odobritev protokola omogoča pristop Bolgarije in Romunije k Evro-mediterranskemu sporazumu med EU in Libanonom.

9.5. Abkommen zwischen der EU und Monaco über den automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten (A8-0206/2016 - Andreas Schwab)

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Principato di Monaco e Unione europea hanno siglato, nel 2005, un accordo sulla fiscalità che mette fine al segreto bancario, prevedendo uno scambio automatico delle informazioni finanziarie. L'accordo, riferito ai conti finanziari dei residenti, comincerà ad esplicare i suoi effetti a partire dal 1° gennaio 2017.

Se, comunque, possono apprezzarsi gli sforzi ed i progressi compiuti, è altrettanto vero che il testo presenta ancora delle lacune e dei vuoti normativi, facilmente aggirabili, soprattutto in tema di trasparenza.

Considerando l'importanza che la lotta all'evasione, alla frode e all'elusione riveste nelle politiche europee, ho deciso di astenermi, auspicando un intervento più incisivo in materia.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un avance indispensable en el intercambio de información fiscal con el Principado de Mónaco. Si bien el intercambio de información ha demostrado no ser suficiente para que los estados miembros emprendan acción contra los principales evasores y elusores fiscales del continente es un paso importante para que los estados puedan identificar dichos capitales y sus propietarios. Es por esto que las disposiciones recogidas en este acuerdo suponen una mejora objetiva del funcionamiento de los intercambios de información con Mónaco. Pese a que este tipo de medidas no persigue la prohibición del uso de paraísos fiscales por parte de capitales europeos es un importante avance para poder llevar a cabo medidas más radicales para hacer pagar impuestos a los capitales donde la riqueza es generada. Es por esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cet accord entre l'UE et Monaco visant à accroître la coopération contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales. Comme pour ceux avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin, je soutiens ce type d'accord prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations portant sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et les produits de cession d'actifs dans l'objectif d'éradiquer l'évasion et la fraude fiscales aux portes de l'Europe.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, which has the overall aim of reducing tax avoidance and evasion. Sinn Féin have been very active in Europe on the issue of tax avoidance and closing the loopholes which permit multinationals to engage in widespread tax avoidance and evasion. From playing an active role on TAXE and now on the Panama Papers, Sinn Féin will continue to ensure that multinationals are obliged to pay the taxes which they owe.

This particular report approves the agreement that has been negotiated by the EU and Monaco on the automatic exchange of financial account information between EU Member States and Monaco relating to accounts of each other's residents.

Automatic exchange of information will take place from 2018 on information collected since the start of next year.

Under the agreement, Monaco will apply measures equivalent to the EU's on reporting the taxation of savings income, and come into line with the OECD's 2014 standards. (There was a previous agreement on this in 2004 which Monaco is updating to current standards adopted in the EU in December 2014).

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Υπερψήφισα την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη, εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, του τροποποιητικού πρωτοκόλλου της συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και του Πριγκιπάτου του Μονακό που προβλέπει μέτρα ισοδύναμα με τα θεσπιζόμενα στην οδηγία 2003/48/EK του Συμβουλίου. Η παρούσα συμφωνία αφορά την αυτόματη ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών περί χρηματοοικονομικών λογαριασμών και σκοπό έχει τη βελτίωση της συνεργασίας και της συμμόρφωσης στον διεθνή φορολογικό τομέα.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Die EU und Monaco haben ein Abkommen über den automatischen Austausch von Informationen über Finanzkonten ausgehandelt, um so die internationale Zusammenarbeit in Steuerangelegenheiten und Steuerehrlichkeit bei internationalen Sachverhalten zu verbessern.

Das Abkommen stellt einen bedeutenden Schritt in den laufenden Bemühungen um die Bekämpfung von Steuerbetrug und Steuerhinterziehung dar und ist daher wünschenswert.

Dem Abkommen habe ich zugestimmt. Es soll ab dem 1. Januar 2017 bereits Anwendung finden.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, dans le cadre de la série d'accords entre l'UE et les États voisins visant à accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales. Ces accords étaient une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans. Il fallait en effet éviter de laisser subsister des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE, où pouvaient se réfugier les fraudeurs. L'échange automatique d'information portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et les produits de cession d'actifs. J'ai voté favorablement à ce rapport

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce protocole concerne l'accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers signé le 22 février dernier entre l'UE et la Principauté de Monaco; il s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une série d'accords entre l'UE et les États voisins visant à accroître la coopération contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales.

Pour mémoire, ces accords étaient une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans. Il fallait en effet éviter de laisser subsister des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE, ou en son sein, où pourraient se réfugier les fraudeurs. J'avais soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin: j'ai donc voté en faveur de ce rapport.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté cet accord européen avec Monaco, visant à rendre plus difficile pour les citoyens européens d'échapper au fisc en cachant de l'argent liquide sur des comptes bancaires. Dans le cadre de l'accord, l'Union européenne et Monaco échangeront automatiquement des informations sur les comptes bancaires de leurs résidents à partir de 2017.

L'Union européenne et Monaco ont signé un accord le 22 février 2016 pour lutter contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales. Les informations qui seront échangées concernent les revenus, tels que les intérêts et les dividendes, mais également les soldes des comptes et les bénéfices de la vente des actifs financiers.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La cooperazione in ambito fiscale costituisce una delle priorità dell'agenda europea, una necessità che ha fatto sì che la Commissione e il governo del Principato di Monaco concludessero, nel febbraio di quest'anno, un nuovo accordo su questa materia. Il testo firmato costituisce un considerevole passo avanti negli sforzi in atto per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscale e rappresenta un evidente miglioramento rispetto al precedente accordo del 2004, che già garantiva l'applicazione, da parte di Monaco, di misure equivalenti a quelle contenute nella direttiva UE relativa alla tassazione dei redditi da risparmio.

Ho votato a favore della relazione Schwab perché condivido il contenuto dell'accordo e ritengo che esso possa rappresentare un utile strumento per rafforzare l'azione dell'Unione contro i reati fiscali. Le disposizioni sullo scambio di informazioni con Monaco saranno adattate alle nuove normative UE e saranno conformi alle procedure per lo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali promosse dallo standard globale dell'OCSE del 2014. L'evasione fiscale sarà individuata con più facilità e si eviteranno indagini superflue.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, mediante el cual la UE y Mónaco acuerdan intercambiar información sobre las cuentas financieras en los respectivos territorios, con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de la autoridad fiscal para identificar a los contribuyentes, aplicar la ley fiscal en situaciones transfronterizas, e identificar posibles casos de evasión fiscal.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), *por escrito*. – Creo que este es un acuerdo en la dirección adecuada para combatir el fraude y la evasión fiscal y el lavado de dinero. La situación geográfica de Mónaco, un estado de sus características incrustado en la unión hacía incomprensible que se mantuviese cualquier forma de secreto bancario para los miembros de la Unión. Es importante que la información que se va a intercambiar automáticamente afecte a todos los conceptos bancarios del titular de activos en bancos monegascos como los saldos en cuenta o los ingresos derivados de la venta de activos financieros.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport concerne un accord entre l'Union européenne et Monaco prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Cet accord signé en février dernier vise à accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales.

Cet accord était une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans pour éviter que ne subsistent des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE même si de nombreux paradis existent encore au sein même de l'UE, et les différents scandales médiatiques nous le prouve régulièrement.

L'échange automatique d'information portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et les produits de cession d'actifs. Nous avons soutenu précédemment les accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin, il est donc évident de soutenir symboliquement celui-ci qui entrera en vigueur le 1^{er} janvier 2017. J'ai donc voté pour.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Il testo che analizza le modifiche all'accordo tra UE e Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie, è ben strutturato e condivisibile, l'ho quindi sostenuto col mio voto.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Parlamentas pritaria Europos Sąjungos ir Monako susitarimui dėl susitarimo dėl automatinio keitimosi finansinių sąskaitų informacija, siekiant gerinti tarptautinį bendradarbiavimą ir atitiktį mokesčių srityje.

Šis susitarimas yra svarbus žingsnis šiuo metu vykstančioje kovoje su mokestiniu sukčiavimu ir mokesčių slėpimu. Pagal naująjį susitarimą nuo 2018 m. ES valstybės narės ir Monakas automatiškai keisis nuo 2017 m. sausio 1 d. renkama informacija apie finansines sąskaitas, kurias jų teritorijose turi ES valstybių narių ir Monako rezidentai. Siekiama reaguoti į tuos atvejus, kai mokesčių mokėtojas bando nuslėpti kapitalą, kurį sudaro pajamos ar turtas, už kuriuos nebuvo sumokėti mokesčiai.

Susitarimu siekiama užtikrinti, kad Monakas taikytų griežtesnes priemones, kurios yra lygiavertės ES teisinei tvarkai ir kad laikytųsi automatinio finansinių sąskaitų informacijos mainų procedūrų, rekomenduojamų pagal 2014 m. EBPO pasaulinį standartą. Taip pat, kad būtų keičiamasi ne tik informacija apie tokias pajamas kaip palūkanos ir dividendai, bet ir apie sąskaitų likučius ir finansinio turto pardavimo pajamas.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'UE et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord, le 22 février 2016, sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, et ce pour accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales.

Tout comme nous l'avons fait pour la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Sain-Marin, il convient de soutenir cet accord symbolique. Par conséquent, je vote POUR cet accord avec Monaco.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report, which has the overall aim of reducing tax avoidance and evasion. Sinn Féin have been very active in Europe on the issue of tax avoidance and closing the loopholes which permit multinationals to engage in widespread tax avoidance and evasion. From playing an active role on TAXE and now on the Panama Papers, Sinn Féin will continue to ensure that multinationals are obliged to pay the taxes which they owe.

This particular report, approves the agreement that has been negotiated by the EU and Monaco on the automatic exchange of financial account information between EU Member States and Monaco relating to accounts of each other's residents.

Automatic exchange of information will take place from 2018 on information collected since the start of next year.

Under the agreement, Monaco will apply measures equivalent to the EU's on reporting the taxation of savings income, and come into line with the OECD's 2014 standards. (There was a previous agreement on this in 2004 which Monaco is updating to current standards adopted in the EU in December 2014).

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Lo scambio di informazioni finanziarie tra diverse entità politiche costituisce uno dei presupposti fondamentali per lottare in maniera efficace contro fenomeni di portata transnazionale quali la frode e l'evasione fiscale.

In quest'ottica, il nuovo accordo tra l'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco rappresenta un importante dispositivo capace di velocizzare l'individuazione e facilitare il contrasto di eventuali casi di frode fiscale. Più specificamente, l'accordo in questione, rafforzando il patto già stipulato nel 2004, istituisce lo scambio automatico di informazioni riguardanti gli interessi, i dividendi, i saldi dei conti correnti e i prodotti derivati dalla vendita di attivi finanziari di cittadini e imprese delle due rispettive aree, favorendo l'applicazione, anche all'interno del Principato di Monaco, di misure rinforzate equivalenti a quelle ad oggi esistenti nell'Unione europea.

Per tutti questi motivi, auspico una rapida conclusione, ratifica ed entrata in vigore dell'accordo.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, dans le cadre d'une batterie d'accords entre l'Union et les États voisins visant à renforcer la lutte contre l'évasion fiscale. Cet accord était d'ailleurs une condition posée par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire. Cet échange automatique d'informations porte sur les revenus financiers ainsi que sur les produits de cession d'actifs. Nous considérons que ces accords vont dans le bon sens. Non seulement ils contribuent efficacement à lutter contre l'évasion fiscale mais ils respectent la souveraineté des États membres. C'est la raison pour laquelle j'ai approuvé ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare reprezintă o metodă importantă de combatere a fraudei și evaziunii fiscale transfrontaliere, având la bază cooperarea și consolidarea relațiilor între administrațiile fiscale la nivel mondial, asigurându-se, totodată, o transparență fiscală.

Protocolul de modificare a Acordului dintre UE și Monaco referitor la schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare are rolul de a alinia măsurile prevăzute cu cele similare din Directiva 2003/48/CE a Consiliului, având la bază cele mai recente evoluții la nivel internațional cu referire la schimbul automat de informații, și anume standardul global pentru schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare în chestiuni fiscale elaborat de Organizația pentru Cooperare și Dezvoltare Economică.

Așadar, acest protocol de modificare transpune standardele globale între statele membre și Monaco în vederea consolidării luptei împotriva fraudei și a evaziunii fiscale.

Consider că transparența în schimbul de informații din domeniul fiscal este o condiție obligatorie în vederea combaterii formelor de evaziune fiscală, motiv pentru care m-am exprimat în favoarea acestui raport.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *în scris*. – Negocierile dintre Uniunea Europeană și Monaco, cu scopul de a îmbunătăți cooperarea în domeniul fiscal și respectarea normelor fiscale la nivel internațional, s-au încheiat prin semnarea unui nou acord în baza căruia se asigură faptul că Monaco aplică măsuri consolidate, echivalente celor prevăzute de cadrul juridic al UE, actualizat în decembrie 2014.

Protocolul de modificare a Acordului dintre Comunitatea Europeană și Principatul Monaco implementează standardul global pentru schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare în chestiuni fiscale elaborat de Organizația pentru Cooperare și Dezvoltare Economică (OCDE), în acord și cu legislația Uniunii.

Susțin raportul PE referitor la propunerea de decizie a Consiliului privind încheierea, în numele Uniunii Europene, a Protocolului de modificare a Acordului dintre Comunitatea Europeană și Principatul Monaco de stabilire a unor măsuri similare celor prevăzute de Directiva 2003/48/CE a Consiliului, deoarece consider că acest aranjament reprezintă un pas important în vederea consolidării luptei împotriva fraudei și a evaziunii fiscale.

UE trebuie să adopte o politică clară și coerentă față de țările terțe, pentru a putea să promoveze standardele sale la nivel internațional și să asigure condiții de concurență echitabilă.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai approuvé le protocole à l'accord entre l'Union européenne et Monaco prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Cet accord constitue un nouveau succès en termes de transparence fiscale. Il doit permettre aux administrations fiscales des États membres et de Monaco de renforcer leur coopération. Elles gagneront ainsi en efficacité dans la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales. À la suite de la conclusion du nouvel accord, les administrations fiscales auront la capacité d'identifier les contribuables concernés, de faire respecter leur législation fiscale dans des situations transfrontières, et d'évaluer la probabilité d'une évasion fiscale.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Con il voto espresso sulla relazione in questione ho dato il mio parere favorevole alla sottoscrizione dell'accordo raggiunto tra l'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali, inteso a migliorare la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale a livello internazionale.

Tale accordo rappresenta un importante passo in avanti negli sforzi in atto per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscali e migliora l'accordo del 2004 che garantiva l'applicazione da parte di Monaco di misure equivalenti a quelle contenute nella direttiva UE relativa alla tassazione dei redditi da risparmio.

Lo scopo dell'intesa è quello di garantire che Monaco applichi misure rafforzate equivalenti a quelle previste dal quadro giuridico dell'UE quale aggiornato nel dicembre 2014, e si conformi alle procedure per lo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali promosse dallo standard globale dell'OCSE del 2014.

L'UE e Monaco hanno convenuto che l'accordo entri in vigore il 1° gennaio 2017, ove necessario sotto forma di applicazione provvisoria, previo espletamento delle rispettive procedure interne per la conclusione e la ratifica.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, which approves the agreement that has been negotiated by the EU and Monaco on the automatic exchange of financial account information between EU Member States and Monaco relating to accounts of each other's residents.

The purpose is to reduce tax avoidance and evasion. Automatic exchange of information will take place from 2018 on information collected since the start of next year.

Under the agreement, Monaco will apply measures equivalent to the EU's on reporting the taxation of savings income, and come into line with the OECD's 2014 standards. There was a previous agreement on this in 2004 which Monaco is updating to current standards adopted in the EU in December 2014.

As the general aim is to reduce tax avoidance and evasion I was happy to vote in favour.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report that approves the conclusion of the Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the EU and Monaco. This Protocol will enable automatic information exchange of financial accounts between the two parties in order to fight tax fraud and tax evasion through transparent policies and in line with EU legislation. I welcome this development, which will surely enhance and develop our cooperation in this area.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – L'accordo sullo scambio automatico delle informazioni finanziarie ai fini fiscali ha come obiettivo quello di incrementare gli sforzi per combattere la frode, l'elusione e l'evasione fiscale da parte dei cittadini dell'UE. Nonostante l'accordo UE-Monaco sia più avanzato rispetto a gli accordi della stessa specie già conclusi dall'UE con Svizzera, Liechtenstein, San Marino e Andorra, sono purtroppo presenti numerosi vuoti normativi facilmente aggirabili. Per queste ragioni ho deciso di astenermi durante il voto in Plenaria.

Caterina Chinnici (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Nell'attuale sistema economico basato su una assoluta mobilità dei capitali, lo scambio d'informazioni tra autorità nazionali risulta lo strumento più efficace per contrastare la frode e l'evasione fiscale transfrontaliera. A seguito all'adozione della direttiva europea cosiddetta «direttiva sulla tassazione dei redditi da risparmio» e per mantenere condizioni di concorrenza leale tra gli operatori economici, l'Unione europea ha firmato in data 22 febbraio 2016 un accordo con il Principato di Monaco che prevede l'introduzione di misure equivalenti a quelle stabilite nella direttiva ed entrerà in vigore il 1° gennaio 2017. Tra le informazioni che saranno scambiate tra le autorità competenti, quelle relative ai conti correnti intestati a soggetti non residenti che serviranno ad identificare coloro che cercano di occultare capitali sui quali non siano state pagate imposte.

Mi sono associata al voto dell'aula che ha dato la sua approvazione al Consiglio per la conclusione del Protocollo con il Principato di Monaco che auspico possa essere ratificato al più presto.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση, καθώς θεωρούμε πως η εν λόγω συμφωνία συνιστά σημαντικό βήμα στις συνεχιζόμενες προσπάθειες για πάταξη της φοροαπάτης και της φοροδιαφυγής.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε σήμερα σχετικά με την πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη τροποποιητικού πρωτοκόλλου της συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και του Πριγκιπάτου του Μονακό και προβλέπει μέτρα ισοδύναμα με τα θεσπιζόμενα στην οδηγία 2003/48/EK του Συμβουλίου. Θεωρώ πως οποιαδήποτε προσπάθεια ενίσχυσης και βελτίωσης των διαδικασιών ανταλλαγής πληροφοριών σχετικά με οικονομικά δεδομένα βοηθά στην αποτροπή έγκομων ή παρασκηνιακών δραστηριοτήτων και ως εκ τούτου προστατεύει τα συμφέροντα των ευρωπαίων πολιτών. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – La lotta all'evasione fiscale è un tema molto delicato. Le istituzioni europee da anni ormai stanno combattendo contro questo fenomeno che ogni anno arricchisce alcune società a discapito di migliaia di cittadini. Attraverso accordi in materia di scambio di informazioni finanziarie con altri Paesi è possibile, potendo identificare correttamente i contribuenti interessati, limitare in parte questo fenomeno. Sono dunque contento di questo accordo che sancisce la buona relazione tra l'Unione europea ed il Principato di Monaco e amplia il bacino di informazioni disponibili all'Unione per la lotta contro la frode fiscale. Dal mio punto di vista questa collaborazione rappresenta un grande passo in avanti per la lotta contro questo fenomeno e perciò non potevo che votare a favore.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information.

Javier Couso Permuý (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un avance indispensable en el intercambio de información fiscal con el Principado de Mónaco. Si bien el intercambio de información ha demostrado no ser suficiente para que los estados miembros emprendan acción contra los principales evasores y elusores fiscales del continente es un paso importante para que los estados puedan identificar dichos capitales y sus propietarios. Es por esto que las disposiciones recogidas en este acuerdo suponen una mejora objetiva del funcionamiento de los intercambios de información con Mónaco. Pese a que este tipo de medidas no persigue la prohibición del uso de paraísos fiscales por parte de capitales europeos es un importante avance para poder llevar a cabo medidas más radicales para hacer pagar impuestos a los capitales donde la riqueza es generada. Es por esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo approva la ratificazione dell'accordo raggiunto tra l'Unione Europea e il Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni in materia fiscale e finanziaria. Con il mio voto a favore della Risoluzione, ho inteso supportare l'accordo UE-Principato di Monaco perché rappresenta un importante passo in avanti per la lotta alla frode e all'evasione fiscale e al tempo stesso costituisce un importante miglioramento dell'accordo preesistente che risale al 2004. Con il nuovo accordo, l'Unione Europea e il Principato di Monaco faciliteranno lo scambio automatico di informazioni relative ai conti dei cittadini a partire dal 2018. In questo modo il Principato di Monaco avrà delle regole in materia fiscale equivalenti a quelle applicate nell'UE e si limiteranno situazioni in cui un contribuente cerca di nascondere capitali sui quali non sono state pagate tasse.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – În februarie 2016, reprezentanții Comisiei Europene și ai Principatului Monaco au parafat Acordul de stabilire a unor măsuri în vederea schimbului automat de informații cu privire la conturile financiare, cu scopul de a îmbunătăți cooperarea în domeniul fiscal și respectarea normelor fiscale la nivel internațional. Astfel, începând cu 1 ianuarie 2017, va fi posibilă combaterea fraudei și a evaziunii fiscale prin dezvoltarea unui instrument comun ce va permite autorităților fiscale să identifice, să evalueze și să investigheze potențialele riscuri, iar în cazul comiterii unor infracțiuni se autorizează administrarea și punerea în aplicare a legislației fiscale în situații transfrontaliere.

Dorind să reafirm necesitatea transparenței în ceea ce privește chestiunea taxelor, atât la nivelul Uniunii Europene, cât și în relațiile întreprinse cu statele terțe, am votat în favoarea proiectului de rezoluție legislativă a Parlamentului European referitoare la propunerea de decizie a Consiliului privind încheierea, în numele Uniunii Europene, a Protocolului de modificare a Acordului dintre Comunitatea Europeană și Principatul Monaco de stabilire a unor măsuri similare celor prevăzute de Directiva 2003/48/CE a Consiliului.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – UE i Monako będą automatycznie wymieniać się informacjami finansowymi dotyczącymi rezydentów drugiej strony, zgodnie z uaktualnionymi wymogami określonymi w dyrektywie w sprawie współpracy administracyjnej (DAC2) i z globalnymi standardami OECD. UE i Monako będą wymieniać się informacjami od 2018 r., a od 1 stycznia 2017 r. rozpoczną gromadzenie informacji. Celem jest zaradzenie sytuacjom, w których podatnik usiłuje ukryć kapitał stanowiący dochód lub aktywa, od których nie są odprowadzane podatki. Podobne aktualizacje dotyczą umów ze Szwajcarią, Lichtensteinem, San Marino i Andorą.

Z zadowoleniem przyjmuję tę aktualizację, ponieważ umowa jest zgodna z obowiązującym prawodawstwem UE i z globalnymi standardami OECD. Pozwoli to na uniknięcie w przyszłości stosowania podwójnych standardów. W rezultacie, państwa członkowskie i Monako będą poprawnie identyfikować podatników, zarządzać przepisami podatkowymi w sytuacjach transgranicznych, oceniać prawdopodobieństwo uchylania się od opodatkowania oraz unikać niepotrzebnych postępowań. Wymieniane informacje będą dotyczyć nie tylko dochodu takiego jak odsetki i dywidendy, ale także sald rachunków i wpływów ze sprzedaży aktywów finansowych. Z uwagi na powyższe, zagłosowałem za.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of giving consent to the conclusion of the Protocol to the agreement between EU and Monaco to provide the automatic exchange of financial account information. I believe that this is an important step forward when taking into account the importance of automatic exchange of information as a means of combating cross-border tax fraud and tax evasion, an issue that has also been recognised at the international level.

Nicola Danti (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Con il voto positivo di oggi, il Parlamento europeo conferma l'accordo sancito il 22 febbraio 2016 tra la Commissione europea e il governo del Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali.

Un passaggio normativo importante che aggiorna il precedente accordo del 2004 e garantisce l'applicazione da parte del Principato di Monaco di misure equivalenti a quelle previste dal quadro giuridico dell'UE – aggiornato nel dicembre 2014 con la modifica della direttiva sulla cooperazione amministrativa.

L'accordo che ho sostenuto oggi migliora la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale, attraverso lo scambio automatico di informazioni tra le autorità amministrative e finanziarie: una misura necessaria per identificare correttamente ed inequivocabilmente i contribuenti interessati, valutare con più precisione la probabilità di evasione fiscale e evitare indagini superflue.

Sono convinto che l'accordo sancito con il Principato di Monaco, parte di un approccio più ampio dell'UE con i paesi terzi, sia un passo in avanti per aumentare la trasparenza in materia di cooperazione amministrativa e confermare l'impegno concreto dell'UE nella lotta contro la frode fiscale.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport est une recommandation sur le projet du Conseil de conclure l'accord entre l'UE et la principauté de Monaco, prévoyant des mesures équivalentes à celles prévues dans les directives européennes. L'objectif est de veiller à ce que la principauté continue d'appliquer des mesures équivalentes à celles de l'Union européenne. Dans le cadre de l'accord, l'Union européenne et Monaco échangeront automatiquement des informations sur les comptes bancaires de leurs résidents à partir de 2017. Les informations qui seront échangées concernent les revenus, tels que les intérêts et les dividendes, mais également les soldes des comptes et les bénéfices de la vente des actifs financiers. Considérant que l'Union Européenne doit durcir ses règles en matière de lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales et que la coopération avec nos plus proches voisins est indispensable pour rendre cette lutte plus efficace, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Il s'agit d'accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales. Pour mémoire, ce type d'accord constituait une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire, il y a deux ans. L'échange automatique d'informations portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et sur les produits de cession d'actifs. Après avoir soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin, j'ai soutenu en toute logique cet accord qui entrera en vigueur au 1^{er} janvier 2017.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Приветствам проектодоклада за споразумението с Монако, защото по този начин още една вратичка за прикриване на данъци, и то в големи размери, ще бъде затворена. Това показва ясни стъпки към желанието на Съюза да ограничи тези престъпни действия спрямо Общността. Но трябва да отбележа, че ние започнахме да работим по такива споразумения едва след като станаха известни фактите по т.нар Люксембург лийкс.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – A União Europeia e o Mónaco negociaram um acordo sobre a troca automática de informações de contas financeiras destinado a melhorar a cooperação fiscal e o cumprimento das obrigações fiscais internacionais e que representa um progresso importante no contexto dos esforços que estão a ser desenvolvidos para combater a fraude e a evasão fiscais.

Em virtude do novo Acordo, as administrações fiscais dos Estados-Membros e do Mónaco poderão identificar de forma correta e inequívoca os contribuintes em causa, aplicar e executar as suas leis tributárias em situações transfronteiras, avaliar a probabilidade de ocorrência de evasão fiscal e evitar novas investigações desnecessárias.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je vote pour: nous avons déjà soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – O acordo assinado este ano sobre a troca automática de informações sobre contas financeiras, que visa melhorar a cooperação fiscal internacional, representa um passo nos esforços em curso para lutar contra a fraude e a evasão fiscais.

Com o novo acordo, os Estados-Membros e o Mónaco irão trocar automaticamente as informações sobre as contas financeiras detidas nos seus territórios por residentes de cada país, começando em 2018 para obter informações recolhidas a partir de janeiro de 2017.

O objetivo é abordar situações em que um contribuinte procura esconder rendimentos ou bens de capital relativamente aos quais não foram pagos impostos.

O acordo tem por objetivo assegurar que o Mónaco aplique medidas equivalentes ao quadro jurídico da UE, tal como atualizado em dezembro de 2014 (com a alteração à Diretiva de Cooperação Administrativa, «DAC2»), e esteja em conformidade com os procedimentos para a troca automática de informações sobre contas financeiras promovidos pela OCDE a nível global.

Como resultado do novo acordo, prevê-se que as administrações fiscais dos Estados-Membros e do Mónaco sejam capazes de:

- Identificar correta e inequivocamente os contribuintes em causa;
- Administrar e aplicar as suas leis fiscais em situações transfronteiras;
- Avaliar a probabilidade de evasão fiscal;
- Evitar novas investigações desnecessárias.

Votámos favoravelmente.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – L'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco hanno negoziato un accordo sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali, inteso a migliorare la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale a livello internazionale. L'accordo rappresenta un importante passo avanti negli sforzi in atto per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscali ed è inteso a garantire che Monaco applichi misure rafforzate equivalenti a quelle previste dal quadro giuridico dell'UE, conformandosi, in tal modo, alle procedure per lo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali promosse dallo standard globale dell'OCSE del 2014. Per i suddetti motivi ho deciso di esprimere il mio voto favorevole al protocollo dell'accordo tra UE e Monaco in materia di scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour because as a result of the new agreement, tax administrations in the Member States and in Monaco will be able to:

- identify correctly and unequivocally the taxpayers concerned.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Európska únia sa dlhodobo prostredníctvom prijímanej legislatívy snaží aktívne bojovať proti daňovým podvodom a daňovým únikom. Cieľom tejto dohody medzi Európskou úniou a Monakom je zlepšenie medzinárodnej spolupráce v predmetnej oblasti a zabezpečenie, aby Monako uplatňovalo opatrenia rovnocenné s tými, ktoré sa stanovujú v smernici Európskej únie o zdaňovaní príjmu z úspor. Nové ustanovenia predmetnej dohody majú zabezpečiť, aby sa vymieňané informácie týkali nielen príjmov, ako sú úroky a dividendy, ale aj stavu na účtoch a výnosov z predaja finančných aktív.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Voto a favore della relazione per una maggior trasparenza per quanto riguarda lo scambio automatico delle informazioni allo scopo di evitare la frode e l'elusione delle tasse.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτως*. – Υπερψηφίζω τη συμφωνία αυτή, καθώς συνιστά σημαντικό βήμα στις συνεχιζόμενες προσπάθειες για πάταξη της φοροαπάτης και της φοροδιαφυγής.

Το Πριγκιπάτο του Μονακό αποτελεί γνωστό φορολογικό παράδεισο και κατά συνέπεια η ανταλλαγή φορολογικών πληροφοριών εξυπηρετεί τη διεθνή φορολογική συνεργασία και τη συμμόρφωση με τις σχετικές διατάξεις.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Union and Monaco have negotiated an agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information, aimed at improving international tax cooperation and compliance. The agreement represents an important step in on-going efforts to clamp down on tax fraud and tax evasion and upgrades the 2004 agreement that ensured that Monaco applied measures equivalent to those in an EU directive on the taxation of savings income.

I believe that this agreement is in line with the need for more transparency on tax issues in the EU and in its relations with third countries. The EU Member States and Monaco will automatically exchange information on the financial accounts held on their territories by each other's residents, starting in 2018 for information collected since 1 January 2017. I support its aim to address situations where a taxpayer seeks to hide capital representing income or assets for which taxes have not been paid.

Furthermore, in line with that OECD standard, I welcome the further provisions in the agreement which aim at securing that exchanged information concerns not only income such as interest and dividends, but also account balances and proceeds from the sale of financial assets.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió és Monaco a pénzügyi számlainformációk automatikus cseréjével kapcsolatos tárgyalásainak célja a nemzetközi adóügyi együttműködés és a szabályok betartásának javítása. A megállapodás fontos lépést jelenthet az adócsalás és adókijátszás elleni fellépésre irányuló erőfeszítések terén, és naprakésszé teszi azon múltbéli megállapodást, amely biztosítja, hogy Monaco a megtakarításokból származó kamatjövedelem adóztatásáról szóló uniós irányelvvel egyenértékű intézkedéseket alkalmazzon. A cél az olyan helyzetek kezelése, amikor az adóalanyok olyan jövedelmet vagy vagyont megtestesítő tőke elrejtésére törekcszenek, amelyre vonatkozóan az adót még nem fizették meg.

Az OECD-szabványokkal összhangban a megállapodás további rendelkezéseinek célja annak biztosítása, hogy a megosztott információk ne csak olyan bevételekre vonatkozzanak, mint a kamatok és az osztalékok, hanem a számlaeigenlegekre és a pénzügyi eszközök értékesítéséből származó bevételre is kiterjedjenek. A feltétel nélküli információcserét az új megállapodás értelmében kérésre biztosítani kell az OECD és az Unió e tekintetben végzett munkája legújabb fejleményeinek megfelelően.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione del Parlamento europeo relativa all'accordo fra l'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali, volto a migliorare la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale e internazionale, poiché l'accordo rappresenta un importante passo avanti negli sforzi in atto per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscale.

L'accordo, che entrerà in vigore nel 2017, costituisce un notevole passo in avanti rispetto all'accordo del 2004, attualmente in vigore, poiché quest'ultimo si limita a garantire l'applicazione di misure equivalenti da parte di Monaco, rispetto alla lotta contro la frode e l'evasione fiscale. Il nuovo accordo migliora l'accordo del 2004 e soprattutto è in linea con lo standard dell'OCSE. Infatti, ai sensi dell'accordo, gli Stati membri dell'UE e Monaco procederanno a uno scambio automatico e incondizionato di informazioni sui conti detenuti sui territori dai rispettivi residenti.

Col nuovo accordo, le amministrazioni fiscali degli Stati membri e di Monaco saranno in grado di identificare correttamente ed inequivocabilmente i contribuenti interessati, applicare e far osservare la propria normativa fiscale in situazioni transfrontaliere e valutare la probabilità di un'evasione fiscale e evitare ulteriori indagini superflue.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für das Abkommen zwischen der EU und Monaco über den automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten gestimmt. Gerechtigkeit und Transparenz im Finanzmarkt ist ein Punkt, für den meine Familien-Partei seit langem einsteht – im Sinne von Bürgern, Familien und Mittelstand. Dafür kämpfe ich als Europaabgeordneter.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich unterstütze das Abkommen zwischen der EU und dem Fürstentum Monaco, da durch den automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten fairere Wettbewerbsbedingungen gewährleistet werden.

Sylvie Goddyn (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne a signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers avec la Principauté de Monaco. Il s'agit là d'un des mécanismes instaurés par l'Union européenne et les États voisins, afin de coopérer dans le cadre de la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales.

Ces accords permettront de partager avec ces États des données concernant les revenus de comptes, leurs soldes, mais aussi les produits de cession d'actifs.

Dans la continuité de mes votes en faveur de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales, j'ai voté pour cette coopération avec la Principauté de Monaco.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, mediante el cual la UE y Mónaco acuerdan intercambiar información sobre las cuentas financieras en los respectivos territorios, con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de la autoridad fiscal para identificar a los contribuyentes, aplicar la ley fiscal en situaciones transfronterizas, e identificar posibles casos de evasión fiscal.

Beata Gosiewska (ECR), *na piśmie*. – W sprawie wniosku dotyczącego decyzji Rady w sprawie zawarcia, w imieniu Unii Europejskiej, protokołu zmieniającego do Umowy między Wspólnotą Europejską a Księstwem Monako ustanawiającej środki równoważne do tych, które zostały przewidziane w dyrektywie Rady 2003/48/WE. Popieram umowę pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Księstwem Monako w sprawie automatycznej wymiany danych finansowych.

Umowa ta jest niezwykle istotna dla prowadzonych obecnie działań na rzecz walki z oszustwami podatkowymi i uchylaniem się od opodatkowania oraz aktualizuje umowę z 2004 r. przewidującą stosowanie przez Monako środków równoważnych środkom przewidzianym w unijnej dyrektywie w sprawie opodatkowania dochodów z oszczędności.

Na mocy nowej umowy państwa członkowskie UE i Monako będą, począwszy od 2018 r., automatycznie wymieniać informacje finansowe dotyczące rezydentów drugiej strony na ich terytoriach, a dotyczy to informacji zgromadzonych od dnia 1 stycznia 2017 r. Celem tej umowy jest zaradzenie sytuacji, w których podatnik usiłuje ukryć kapitał stanowiący dochód lub aktywa, od których nie odprowadzono podatków.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. This is an important partnership agreement which allows to exchange financial account information with an important financial partner of EU – Monaco. The agreement ensures the efficiency of the information flow between two parties as well as transparency of financial account.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφώς*. – Πάγια μας θέση είναι ότι οποιαδήποτε συμφωνία έχει στόχο την αντιμετώπιση της φοροδιαφυγής και φοροαποφυγής είναι προς τη θετική κατεύθυνση και γι' αυτό υπερψηφίσαμε το πρωτόκολλο συμφωνίας μεταξύ ΕΕ και Μονακό για την αυτόματη ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών περί χρηματοοικονομικών συναλλαγών.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported the EU- Monaco agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information because I believe that it will be an important step in ongoing efforts to clamp down on tax fraud and tax evasion. In the wake of the Panama Papers scandal this agreement will allow the EU Member States and Monaco to automatically exchange information on the financial accounts held on their territories by each other's residents. I was happy to note that the agreement will be in line with the 2014 OECD Global standard and provides for further provisions which aim at securing exchanged information concerns such as interest and dividends, and also account balances and proceeds from the sale of financial assets. I also believe that this agreement will improve international tax cooperation and compliance.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report as I had no objections to its final arrangement.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan.* – Glasao sam za Izvješće o prijedlogu odluke Vijeća o sklapanju, u ime Europske unije, Protokola o izmjeni uz Sporazum između Europske zajednice i Kneževine Monaka o mjerama istovrijednima onima koje su utvrđene u Direktivi Vijeća 2003/48/EZ (COM(2016)0201 – C8-0157/2016 – 2016/0109(NLE)), s obzirom da je taj sporazum važan korak u aktualnim nastojanjima da se suzbiju porezne prijevare i utaja poreza te predstavlja nadogradnju prijašnjeg sporazuma iz 2004.

Ovime će države članice EU i Monako automatski razmjenjivati informacije o financijskim računima koje imaju građani države koja predstavlja drugu stranu u Sporazumu, i to počevši od 2018. godine za informacije prikupljene od 1. siječnja 2017.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit.* – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, dans le cadre de la série d'accords entre l'UE et les États voisins. Cette série visait à accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscale. Pour mémoire, ces accords étaient une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans. Il fallait en effet éviter de laisser subsister des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE, où pouvaient se réfugier les fraudeurs. L'échange automatique d'informations portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et les produits de cession d'actifs.

Le groupe ENL a soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin. Celui avec Monaco est à l'évidence symbolique, et il convenait de le soutenir également, d'où mon vote en sa faveur.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit.* – J'ai voté en faveur de ce protocole qui vise à mettre en œuvre, entre l'Union et Monaco, les normes mondiales de l'OCDE, spécifiquement celles en matière de fiscalité des revenus de l'épargne sous forme de paiement d'intérêts ainsi que d'échange automatique d'informations fiscales entre l'UE et Monaco. Cela permettra de renforcer la lutte contre l'évasion fiscale au sein de l'UE.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing.* — In the line of previous similar agreements we welcome the regime established between EU and the Principality of Monaco regarding the automatic exchange of information on issues related to taxation, money flows and bank savings reporting.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich.* – Dieses Abkommen stellt einen bedeutenden Schritt in den laufenden Bemühungen um die Bekämpfung von Steuerbetrug und Steuerhinterziehung dar und ist eine Aktualisierung des Abkommens von 2004, durch das sichergestellt wurde, dass Monaco Regelungen anwendet, die denen in der einschlägigen EU-Richtlinie über die Besteuerung von Zinserträgen gleichwertig sind. Das Abkommen ist zu begrüßen und zu unterstützen, da es die Transparenz in Steuerangelegenheiten und die Steuerehrlichkeit fördert. Daher stimme ich für den vorliegenden Bericht.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně.* – Monako je považováno za jeden z několika daňových rájů na světě. Daňový systém v Monaku takřka postrádá daně z příjmu FO, majetkové daně, daně z nemovitosti, pozemkové daně či daně z kapitálových výnosů. Jedinou přímou daní je daň z příjmu PO, a to 33,33 % ze zisku, ovšem i ta je vcelku benevolentní na daňové poplatníky.

Je třeba bojovat proti daňovým rájům a daňovým podvodům, proto jsem podpořila dohodu mezi EU a Monakem v oblasti automatické výměny informací o finančních účtech. Tato dohoda pomůže zamezit daňovým poplatníkům skrývat svůj kapitál v zahraničí, ale také zlepšit mezinárodní spolupráci v oblasti daní a dodržování příslušných předpisů. Podle nové dohody si země EU a Monako budou moct automaticky vyměňovat informace o finančních účtech, které na jejich území mají občané opačné strany. Také se zintenzivní výměna informací o finančních účtech mezi zeměmi EU a Monakem a bude snazší identifikovat finanční podpory.

Béla Kovács (NI), *írásban.* - Továbbra is minden olyan kezdeményezést támogatok, amely az adócsalás és adókijátszás elleni fellépésre irányul. Monaco is az adóparadicsomok egyike, így a pénzügyi számlainformációk automatikus cseréjére vonatkozó megállapodás is hatékonyan szolgálja az adott célokat. A jelentés helyesen tartalmazza, hogy ezáltal naprakészé sikerül tenni a korábbi, 2004-es megállapodást is, mely a megtakarításokból származó kamatjövedelmek adóztatásáról szól.

Андрей Ковачев (PPE), *в писмена форма*. – Подкрепих споразумението за автоматичен обмен на информация за финансови сметки, тъй като то представлява още една стъпка в посока подобряване на международното сътрудничество в областта на данъчното облагане и спазването на данъчното законодателство. Настоящото споразумение гарантира, че Монако ще прилага , равностойни на тези в Директивата на ЕС относно данъчното облагане на доходи от спестявания, и ще ограничи данъчните измами и отклонението от данъчно облагане. Основната му цел е да се предприемат механизми срещу положения, при които данъчно задължено лице се опитва да укрие капитал, представляващ доход или активи, за които не са платени данъци. Обменът на информация ще засяга не само приходите, като лихви и дивиденди, но и салдата по сметките и постъпленията от продажба на финансови активи. В съответствие с най-актуалните тенденции в работата на ОИСР на ЕС се обезпечава безусловен обмен на информация при поискване.

Благодарение на приетото споразумение, данъчните администрации в държавите членки и Монако ще бъдат в състояние да идентифицират правилно и недвусмислено съответните данъкоплатци, да администрат и прилагат своите закони за данъчно облагане в трансграничен план и да оценяват вероятността от отклонение от данъчно облагане.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — La presente relazione analizza l'accordo negoziato tra l'UE e il Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali e la previsione di un miglioramento degli obblighi in ambito fiscale a livello internazionale. Il medesimo realizza un progresso perché in grado di combattere meccanismi di evasione fiscale e di frode, già previsti con il precedente accordo del 2004 il quale prevedeva l'applicazione, da parte dello Stato di Monaco, di misure equivalenti a quelle che già erano contenute nella direttiva UE corrispondente alla tassazione dei redditi da risparmio. L'obiettivo che la presente relazione auspica di raggiungere è quello di far fronte alle situazioni in cui il contribuente cerca di dissimulare capitale derivante da redditi o da evasione fiscale. Per tali ragioni si chiede infatti che lo Stato di Monaco applichi misure rafforzate volte a prevenire tali omissioni. Per tali ragioni, sostengo la relazione del collega Schwab.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour cet accord avec Monaco car il vise à accroître la coopération dans la lutte contre l'évasion fiscale.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour l'accord entre l'Union européenne et Monaco prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, dans le cadre de la série d'accords entre l'UE et les États voisins visant à accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales.

Pour mémoire, ces accords étaient une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans. Il fallait en effet éviter de laisser subsister des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE, où pouvaient se réfugier les fraudeurs. L'échange automatique d'informations portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et les produits de cession d'actifs.

Le Front National a soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin. Celui avec Monaco est à l'évidence symbolique, et il convient de le soutenir également.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – En 2014 ont été conclus des accords avec les pays membres pour mettre un terme au secret bancaire, dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales. Les textes prévoyaient de mettre en place d'autres accords avec les États voisins, pour établir des liens de coopération et d'échanges automatiques des informations relatives aux comptes financiers, conformément aux conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche. Après la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin, l'UE conclut un accord avec Monaco, qui est soumis à l'approbation du Parlement européen par le présent rapport. Je soutiens cette politique de transparence en votant POUR.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un avance indispensable en el intercambio de información fiscal con el Principado de Mónaco. Si bien el intercambio de información ha demostrado no ser suficiente para que los estados miembros emprendan acción contra los principales evasores y elusores fiscales del continente es un paso importante para que los estados puedan identificar dichos capitales y sus propietarios. Es por esto que las disposiciones recogidas en este acuerdo suponen una mejora objetiva del funcionamiento de los intercambios de información con Mónaco. Pese a que este tipo de medidas no persigue la prohibición del uso de paraísos fiscales por parte de capitales europeos es un importante avance para poder llevar a cabo medidas más radicales para hacer pagar impuestos a los capitales donde la riqueza es generada. Es por esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – Este acuerdo representa un importante paso en la lucha emprendida contra el fraude y la evasión fiscal.

En virtud del mismo conseguiremos que los Estados Miembros de la Unión y Mónaco intercambien automáticamente información sobre las cuentas financieras de los respectivos países, de manera que se evite que el contribuyente pueda ocultar un patrimonio que represente ingresos o activos sobre los cuales no se hayan pagado impuestos.

Con este informe se pretende conseguir que Mónaco aplique medidas reforzadas equivalentes a las previstas en el marco jurídico de la Unión Europea y que dichas medidas se ajusten a los procedimientos de intercambio automático de información. Y aquí, ya no hablamos solo de ingresos tales como intereses o dividendos, sino también saldos en cuentas e ingresos derivados de la venta de activos financieros.

Por lo anteriormente expuesto y porque considero que debemos hacer cumplir la legislación tributaria en situaciones transfronterizas, voto favorablemente para la aprobación de este informe.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I support this report that updates the EU's agreements with Monaco.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Finanšu kontu informācijas automātiska apmaiņa ir viens no labākajiem veidiem garantēt maksimāli efektīvu starptautisku sadarbību nodokļu jomā un tādējādi minimizēt iespējas izvairīties no to maksāšanas.

Nepieciešams atzīmēt, ka šāda automātiska apmaiņa sāksies no 2018. gada sākuma un attiecināsies uz datiem, kas būs savākti no 2017. gada 1. janvāra. Kā zināms, neieskaitot Monako līdzīgi nolīgumi tika parakstīti arī ar Šveici, Andoru, Lihtenšteinu un Sanmarīno. Pēdējo dažu gadu laikā nolīgumi tika atjaunoti ar mērķi adaptēt tos starptautiskajiem jauninājumiem šajā jomā.

Ņemot vērā nodokļu jomas principiālo svarīgumu un turpmākas pēc iespējas efektīvākas cīņas ar nodokļu nemaksāšanu nepieciešamību, nobalsoju pozitīvi.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), *písomne*. – Podporujem uzavretie tejto dohody, ktorá umožní od roku 2018 prostredníctvom výmeny informácií o účtoch efektívnejšie odhaľovať daňové podvody a úniky. Dohoda sa bude uplatňovať na informácie zozbierané od 1. 1. 2017 a umožní zmluvným stranám presadzovať a kontrolovať dodržiavanie zákonov v cezhraničných situáciách.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), *γραφώς*. – Ψήφισα υπέρ της έκθεσης σχετικά με την πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου που αφορά τη σύναψη, εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, του τροποποιητικού πρωτοκόλλου της συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και του Πριγκιπάτου του Μονακό που προβλέπει μέτρα ισοδύναμα με τα θεσπιζόμενα στην οδηγία 2003/48/EK του Συμβουλίου, διότι είναι επαρκώς τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Ces accords s'inscrivent dans la droite ligne d'accords similaires signés avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint-Marin. La signature d'un accord portant sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers par Monaco constituait une condition de levée du secret bancaire posée du Luxembourg et de l'Autriche il y a deux ans. En son absence, la Principauté de Monaco se serait imposée comme destination phare de l'évasion fiscale en Europe.

Nous ne pouvons que soutenir l'objet de ce rapport, qui vise à une transparence financière accrue. En outre, notre vote est cohérent avec notre vote sur les précédents rapports susvisés.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *in writing*. — Regarding the EU-Monaco agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information, I voted in favour of it. This agreement is an imperative and indispensable step for abrogating tax fraud and tax evasion, and will guarantee that Monaco's procedures are identical to the EU framework. The implementation of this will also forestall additional investigations and strengthen cross-border tax laws.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi voto a favor de la recomendación a favor del acuerdo entre la UE y Mónaco relativo al intercambio automático de información sobre cuentas financieras con miras a mejorar la cooperación fiscal y el cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias internacionales.

Este acuerdo representa un importante paso en la lucha emprendida contra el fraude fiscal y la evasión fiscal y actualiza el Acuerdo de 2004, que garantizó la aplicación por parte de Mónaco de medidas equivalentes a las previstas en la Directiva de la Unión en materia de fiscalidad de los rendimientos del ahorro.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Europäische Union und Monaco haben ein Abkommen über den automatischen Austausch von Informationen über Finanzkonten ausgehandelt, mit dem die internationale Zusammenarbeit in Steuerangelegenheiten und die Steuerehrlichkeit bei internationalen Sachverhalten verbessert werden sollen. Das Abkommen stellt einen bedeutenden Schritt in den laufenden Bemühungen um die Bekämpfung von Steuerbetrug und Steuerhinterziehung dar und ist eine Aktualisierung des Abkommens von 2004, durch das sichergestellt wurde, dass Monaco Regelungen anwendet, die denen in der einschlägigen EU-Richtlinie über die Besteuerung von Zinserträgen gleichwertig sind. Hier kann ich nur zustimmen.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Monaco et l'Union européenne ont signé fin février dernier un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, afin d'accroître leur coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscale. Cette démarche s'inscrit dans le même sens que ce qui s'est fait auparavant pour Saint-Marin, Andorre, la Suisse et le Liechtenstein. En conséquence, j'ai voté pour.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – Voto a favor do Protocolo de Alteração do Acordo entre a Comunidade Europeia e o Principado do Mónaco, que prevê medidas equivalentes às estabelecidas pela Diretiva 2003/48/CE do Conselho.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I am in favour of this agreement as it aims to bolster international tax cooperation and combat tax evasion. This agreement seeks an efficient upholding of the current international tax system, and therefore does not damage SMEs.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. – L'évasion fiscale, les paradis fiscaux doivent appartenir au passé. Nous devons lutter contre l'érosion de la base d'imposition et le transfert de bénéfices. Cela doit faire partie des priorités pour garantir la pérennité de notre modèle social. Pour cela, une mesure phare est de mettre fin au secret bancaire dans les pays tiers. La priorité de l'UE est de s'attaquer aux systèmes opaques des autres pays européens. Après la Suisse, c'est au tour de Monaco. Je félicite donc la Commission européenne pour les efforts qu'elle a déployés afin de permettre la signature de cet accord relatif à l'échange automatique d'informations concernant les comptes déclarables. Il s'agit là d'une grande avancée dans la lutte contre l'évasion fiscale.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. – Cieľom dohody o automatickej výmene informácií o finančných účtoch dohodnutej medzi členskými štátmi Európskej únie a Monakom je zlepšovať medzinárodnú spoluprácu a dodržiavanie predpisov v oblasti daní. Dohoda je významným krokom v rámci pretrvávajúceho úsilia zameraného na obmedzenie daňových podvodov a daňových únikov a dopĺňa dohodu z roku 2004, ktorou sa zabezpečilo, že Monako uplatňuje opatrenia rovnocenné s tými, ktoré sa stanovujú v smernici Európskej únie o zdaňovaní príjmu z úspor. Monako by malo uplatňovať prísnejšie opatrenia, ktoré budú rovnocenné s právnym rámcom Únie. Ďalšie ustanovenia dohody majú zabezpečiť, aby sa vymieňané informácie týkali nielen príjmov, ako sú úroky a dividendy, ale aj stavu na účtoch a výnosov z predaja finančných aktív. Na základe novej dohody sa tiež musí na požiadanie zabezpečiť bezpodmienečná výmena informácií. Vzhľadom na uvedené podporujem predložený návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the EU-Monaco agreement because this agreement is in line with the need for more transparency on tax issues in the EU and in its relations with third countries.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – A Tanács határozattervezetét fogadott el az Európai Közösség és a Monacói Hercegség közötti, a 2003/48/EK tanácsi irányelvben meghatározott szabályokkal egyenértékű rendelkezések megállapításáról szóló megállapodást módosító jegyzőkönyvnek az Európai Unió nevében történő megkötéséről. A határozat érvénybe lépéséhez azonban meg kell szereznie a Parlament jóváhagyását. A Gazdasági és Monetáris Bizottság jelentésében azt ajánlja, hogy a Parlament a jegyzőkönyv megkötését hagyja jóvá. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Cet accord, qui scelle l'échange automatique d'informations entre les pays de l'UE et la Principauté de Monaco en matière fiscale, est la poursuite des efforts en vue de la fin du secret bancaire. Monaco est une place particulièrement complaisante pour les capitaux d'origine douteuse, aussi est-il d'autant plus nécessaire de soutenir la mise en place rapide de cet accord. Le groupe ENL a soutenu les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Saint-Marin et Andorre.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – Com vista a melhorar a cooperação fiscal e o cumprimento das obrigações fiscais internacionais, a União Europeia e o Mónaco negociaram um acordo sobre a troca automática de informações de contas financeiras.

O Acordo revela um progresso importante nas diligências de combate à fraude e à evasão fiscais e atualiza o Acordo de 2004, que garantia que o Mónaco aplicaria medidas equivalentes às previstas na diretiva da UE, relativa à tributação dos rendimentos da poupança.

Ao abrigo do novo Acordo, a partir de 2018, os Estados-Membros da UE e o Mónaco procederão a uma troca automática das informações recolhidas de 1 de janeiro de 2017 em diante sobre as contas financeiras detidas nos seus territórios pelos residentes da outra Parte.

O objetivo desta troca consiste em prevenir as situações em que um contribuinte tente ocultar capitais correspondentes a rendimentos ou ativos relativamente aos quais não foram pagos impostos.

Pelo exposto, o presente relatório merece o meu voto favorável.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte est utile à la lutte contre l'évasion fiscale, et est donc bénéfique aux budgets des États membres. Je vote pour.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport relatif à l'accord UE/Monaco prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, afin d'éviter au maximum la dissimulation financière. Au moment où, selon les estimations de la Commission, la fraude fiscale et l'évitement fiscal font perdre chaque année jusqu'à 1000 milliards d'euros au préjudice des contribuables européens, nous devons tout mettre en place pour lutter contre ce phénomène.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Az átláthatóbb nemzetközi adóügyi együttműködés és a szabályok betartásának javítása érdekében a megállapodás megkötése az Európai Unió és a Monacói Hercegség között elengedhetetlen. Nagyon fontosnak tartom, hogy a pénzügyi számlainformációk automatikus cseréje mihamarabb elinduljon. A megállapodás értelmében pontosabb információk fognak a rendelkezésünkre állni, és az adókijátszásokot majd könnyebben tudjuk megakadályozni. Ehhez kívántam szavazatommal hozzájárulni.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Union and Monaco have negotiated an agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information, aimed at improving international tax cooperation and compliance. I have voted for this report that will start in 2018 an automatic exchange of financial account information held on each other's territories.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am susținut prin vot acest raport deoarece consider că, în actualul context economic, trebuie să devenim din ce în ce mai activi în vederea combaterii fraudei și evaziunii fiscale. În acest sens, raportul votat astăzi încurajează schimbul de informații privind conturile financiare dintre Uniunea Europeană și Principatul Monaco, fapt ce va da mai multă transparență activității bancare monegasce și va facilita combaterea fraudei pe teritoriul european.

În același timp, mesajul pe care îl transmitem lumii întregi este că UE nu mai este tolerantă cu paradisurile fiscale și sper că va urma acest deziderat și în viitor, impunând din ce în ce mai multe restricții companiilor și cetățenilor ce se folosesc de aceste spații pentru a evita plata de taxe și impozite.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report, which has the overall aim of reducing tax avoidance and evasion. Sinn Féin have been very active in Europe on the issue of tax avoidance and closing the loopholes which permit multinationals to engage in widespread tax avoidance and evasion. From playing an active role on TAXE and now on the Panama Papers, Sinn Féin will continue to ensure that multinationals are obliged to pay the taxes which they owe.

This particular report, approves the agreement that has been negotiated by the EU and Monaco on the automatic exchange of financial account information between EU Member States and Monaco relating to accounts of each other's residents.

Automatic exchange of information will take place from 2018 on information collected since the start of next year.

Under the agreement, Monaco will apply measures equivalent to the EU's on reporting the taxation of savings income, and come into line with the OECD's 2014 standards. (There was a previous agreement on this in 2004 which Monaco is updating to current standards adopted in the EU in December 2014).

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der automatische Informationsaustausch betreffend Finanzinformationen ist zu begrüßen.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariau susitarimui tarp Europos Sąjungos ir Monako dėl susitarimo dėl keitimosi finansų sąskaitų informacija.

Visų pirma bus sudarytos sąlygos gerinti tarptautinį bendradarbiavimą ir atitiktį mokesčių srityje. Pažymėtina, kad susitarimu prisidedama siekiant plėtoti mokestinių sukčiavimų prevenciją. Taip pat vienas iš svarbiausių susitarimo aspektų yra tas, kad nuo šiol mokesčių administratoriai galės administruoti savo mokesčių įstatymus bei užtikrinti jų laikymąsi tarpvalstybiniais atvejais. Susitarimas reikšmingas ir tuo, kad Monako Kunigaikštystė taikys griežtesnes priemones, kurios yra lygiavertės ES teisinei tvarkai.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerato che il nuovo accordo tra l'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni di natura finanziaria prevede misure rafforzate per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscale; considerato che l'accordo, una volta entrato in vigore, permetterebbe alle autorità nazionali di accedere alle necessarie informazioni finanziarie dei contribuenti e di vigilare sul corretto rispetto della normativa fiscale nei rispettivi territori; considerato, infine, che lo scambio di informazioni promosso dal testo è conforme alle procedure standard dell'OCSE del 2014, ho ritenuto necessario esprimermi a favore.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. — Automatic exchange of financial information is essential for combating money laundering and tax evasion. Moving towards greater tax transparency is essential for the sustainability of European economy and I take the chance to vote in favour and support the report as it stands.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Značaj automatske razmjene informacija o financijskim računima kao sredstva za borbu protiv prekogranične porezne prijevare i prekogranične porezne utaje na međunarodnoj razini je velik. Upravo zato je razvijen i u srpnju 2014. objavljen jedinstveni globalni standard za automatsku razmjenu informacija.

Smatram da je širenje obvezne automatske razmjene informacija među nadležnim poreznim upravama Unije, a u skladu s globalnim standardom, potrebno i poželjno. S obzirom da je „Direktiva o oporezivanju štednje” stavljena izvan snage i da se primjenjuje Direktiva 2014/107/EU o izmjeni Direktive 2011/16/EU u pogledu obvezne automatske razmjene informacija u području oporezivanja, potrebno je izmijeniti postojeće sporazume o oporezivanju štednje sa Švicarskom, Andorom, Lihtenštajnom, Monakom i San Marinom.

U tom kontekstu, podržala sam ovo izvješće i Prijedlog odluke Vijeća o sklapanju, u ime Europske unije, Protokola o izmjeni uz Sporazum između Europske zajednice i Kneževine Monaka. Protokolom o izmjeni provodit će se globalni standard između država članica i Monaka, a to će svakako doprinijeti transparentnosti poreznog i financijskog sustava Unije.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – EU i Monako postigli su sporazum o automatskoj razmjeni informacija o financijskim računima, čiji je cilj unapređivanje porezne suradnje i izvršavanje poreznih obveza na međunarodnoj razini.

Taj je sporazum važan korak u aktualnim nastojanjima da se suzbiju porezne prijevare i utaja poreza te predstavlja nadogradnju sporazuma iz 2004., kojim se jamči da Monako primjenjuje mjere istovrijedne onima iz Direktive EU-a o oporezivanju dohotka od kamate na štednju.

Prema novom sporazumu, države članice Europske unije i Monako automatski će razmjenjivati informacije o financijskim računima koje na njihovom teritoriju imaju građani države koja predstavlja drugu stranu u sporazumu, i to počevši od 2018. godine za informacije prikupljene od 1. siječnja 2017. Cilj je uhvatiti se u koštac sa situacijama u kojima porezni obveznici žele prikriti kapital koji predstavlja dohodak ili imovinu za koju nije plaćen porez.

U skladu s navedenim standardom OECD-a, dodatnim odredbama sporazuma želi se zajamčiti da se razmijenjene informacije ne odnose samo na dohodak kao što su kamate i dividende, već i na stanja na računu i prihode od prodaje financijske imovine.

U potpunosti pozdravljam i podržavam sporazum.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – L'UE e il Principato di Monaco hanno siglato un accordo, il 22 febbraio 2016, che renderà più difficili per i cittadini dell'UE evadere il fisco e occultare il denaro in conti bancari monegaschi. Le informazioni che dovranno essere scambiate non riguardano solamente i redditi, quali interessi e dividendi, ma anche i saldi di conto e i proventi delle vendite di attività finanziarie. Secondo tale accordo, l'UE e Monaco procederanno allo scambio automatico di informazioni sui conti bancari dei rispettivi residenti, a partire dal 2018 e per le informazioni raccolte dal 1° gennaio 2017. Le amministrazioni fiscali degli Stati membri e di Monaco saranno, così, in grado di identificare correttamente e inequivocabilmente i contribuenti interessati, applicare e far osservare la propria normativa fiscale in situazioni transfrontaliere, valutare la probabilità di un'evasione fiscale ed evitare ulteriori indagini superflue. Per tutte queste ragioni ho votato favorevolmente all'approvazione di tale accordo.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – UE i Monako będą automatycznie wymieniać się informacjami finansowymi dotyczącymi rezydentów drugiej strony zgodnie z uaktualnionymi wymogami określonymi w dyrektywie w sprawie współpracy administracyjnej (DAC2) i z globalnymi standardami OECD. UE i Monako będą wymieniać się informacjami od 2018 r., a od 1 stycznia 2017 r. rozpoczną gromadzenie informacji. Celem jest zaradzenie sytuacjom, w których podatnik usiłuje ukryć kapitał stanowiący dochód lub aktywa, od których nie są odprowadzane podatki. Podobne aktualizacje dotyczą umów ze Szwajcarią, Lichtensteinem, San Marino i Andorą. Komisja ECON sporządziła sprawozdanie w ramach procedury uproszczonej. Umowa jest zgodna z obowiązującym prawodawstwem UE i z globalnymi standardami OECD. Pozwoli to na uniknięcie w przyszłości stosowania podwójnych standardów. W rezultacie państwa członkowskie i Monako będą poprawnie identyfikować podatników, zarządzać przepisami podatkowymi w sytuacjach transgranicznych, oceniać prawdopodobieństwo uchylania się od opodatkowania oraz unikać niepotrzebnych postępowań. Wymieniane informacje będą dotyczyć nie tylko dochodu, takiego jak odsetki i dywidendy, ale także sald rachunków i wpływów ze sprzedaży aktywów finansowych. Niniejszym poparłem sprawozdanie.

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE), *pisemně*. – Tato dohoda s Monakem o výměně daňových informací má mou podporu, protože ji považuji za další krok na cestě k spravedlivému výběru daní. Zvlášť důležitý je fakt, že jde o dohodu se státem, který je tolik s EU propojen, jako právě Monacké knížectví.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte technique qui permet d'amender le protocole de l'accord entre l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco lié à l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Cet accord permet essentiellement que s'applique à l'extérieur des frontières de l'UE et ici à Monaco le même niveau de mesures relatives aux comptes financiers.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Par son vote en faveur de la signature de ce protocole avec la principauté monégasque, le Parlement européen apporte une nouvelle fois son soutien à la transparence fiscale et au respect des obligations fiscales au niveau international.

Dans la continuité de ceux signés avec le Liechtenstein, Saint-Marin ou encore Andorre, cet accord prévoit l'échange automatique entre Monaco et les États membres de l'Union des informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Ces informations seront collectées à compter du 1^{er} janvier 2017. L'acte vise avant tout à empêcher l'évasion fiscale des contribuables européens et la dissimulation de capitaux sous forme de revenus ou d'actifs sur lesquels l'impôt n'a pas été payé.

Dans le respect de la norme mondiale adoptée par l'OCDE en 2014, Monaco devra s'assurer que les informations échangées concernent non seulement les revenus tels que les intérêts et les dividendes, mais aussi les soldes de comptes et les produits issus de la vente d'actifs financiers. Pour rappel, selon la Commission, l'évasion et l'évitement fiscaux représenteraient jusqu'à 1000 milliards d'euros de perte par an dans l'Union européenne.

Robert Rochefort (ALDE), *par écrit*. – J'ai soutenu cette résolution, où notre Assemblée avalise un accord obtenu en février de cette année entre l'Union européenne et Monaco, sur la mise en place d'un échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes bancaires des résidents des deux parties signataires, échange qui débutera à compter de 2018 pour des informations recueillies depuis le 1^{er} janvier 2017. La signature formelle de l'accord est prévue cet été.

En outre, l'accord prévoit que Monaco appliquera des mesures renforcées, équivalentes à celles en place au sein de l'Union depuis mars 2014. Enfin, il demeure conforme aux normes de l'OCDE de 2014 sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers.

Cet accord constitue une nouvelle étape nécessaire afin de lutter contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales puisqu'il sera plus difficile pour une personne de dissimuler de l'argent sur lequel doit s'appliquer l'impôt. En effet, les administrations fiscales pourront identifier les contribuables impliqués, administrer et renforcer leurs lois fiscales dans les cas transfrontaliers ou encore évaluer la probabilité d'évasion fiscale en cause.

Cet accord est similaire aux accords conclus avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein ou encore Saint-Marin, auxquels j'avais également apporté mon soutien.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen a approuvé, par 549 voix pour, 16 contre et 23 abstentions, l'accord paraphé en février dernier entre l'Union européenne et Monaco sur l'échange automatique d'informations sur les comptes financiers. L'accord prévoit que Monaco et les États membres de l'Union échangent automatiquement, dès 2018, les informations relatives aux comptes financiers de leurs résidents, qui seront collectées à compter du 1^{er} janvier 2017. Dans le cadre du nouvel accord, les États membres recevront les noms, adresses, numéros d'identification fiscale et dates de naissance de leurs résidents ayant des comptes à Monaco, ainsi que certaines autres informations financières, y compris le solde de ces comptes.

La signature formelle de l'accord devrait avoir lieu avant les vacances d'été (à noter, des accords similaires avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Saint-Marin et Andorre ont déjà été approuvés par le Parlement européen).

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Monakas kartais yra priskiriamas „mokesčių rojų“ kategorijai ir, ne visuomet be pagrindo, yra kaltinamas pagalba slepiant mokesčius. Todėl esu įsitikinęs, jog šis protokolas dėl informacijos apie finansinių sąskaitų duomenų mainus bent kiek padės Monakui atsikratyti gėdingos „mokesčių rojaus“ etiketės, o Europos Sąjungai padės kovojant su mokesčių slėpimu.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – A União Europeia e o Principado do Mónaco negociaram um acordo sobre a troca automática de informações sobre contas financeiras, facto que representa um marco importante no âmbito dos esforços que têm sido levados a cabo na luta contra a fraude e a evasão fiscais. Este Acordo atualizou ainda o anterior acordo de 2004, que garantiu que o Mónaco adotasse medidas equivalentes às estipuladas na diretiva da UE sobre a tributação dos rendimentos da poupança.

Com este acordo, os Estados-Membros da UE e o Mónaco passarão a trocar automaticamente informações sobre contas financeiras detidas nos seus territórios por residentes do outro.

O objetivo primordial deste acordo é detetar situações em que um contribuinte procura esconder rendimentos ou bens de capital sobre os quais não foram pagos impostos. Assim, as administrações fiscais dos Estados-Membros e Mónaco passarão a ser capazes de identificar com acuidade as situações em causa, administrar e aplicar suas leis fiscais em situações transfronteiriças e ainda avaliar a eventual probabilidade de evasão fiscal.

Por concordar com a posição defendida pelo relator no acolhimento deste acordo enquanto medida viável e importante para assegurar um bom funcionamento, transparente e mais eficaz, das nossas administrações fiscais, votei a favor.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui porte sur le protocole à l'accord entre l'Union européenne et Monaco prévoyant l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers. Cet accord vient compléter ceux qui ont été conclus avec la Suisse, l'Andorre, le Liechtenstein et Saint-Marin, prévoyant des mesures équivalentes.

L'importance de l'échange automatique d'informations a été reconnue sur le plan international en tant que moyen de lutter contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales transfrontières. Dans ce contexte, l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) a été chargée par le G20 d'élaborer une norme mondiale unique pour l'échange automatique de renseignements relatifs aux comptes financiers.

C'est à travers une coopération bilatérale efficace que nous parviendrons à lutter contre l'évasion fiscale et à y mettre fin. Ce type d'accord répond non seulement à un besoin économique mais aussi à une attente des citoyens de l'Union.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho dato il mio voto a favore della relazione inerente all'accordo tra Unione europea e Principato di Monaco sullo scambio automatico di informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali. L'accordo in questione estende al Principato di Monaco misure europee in materia di tassazione dei redditi da risparmio sotto forma di pagamenti di interessi, contenute nella direttiva 2003/48/CE. Tale direttiva riveste un ruolo importante in materia finanziaria. In effetti, la regolamentazione a livello comunitario permette di colmare le lacune nel coordinamento tra gli Stati membri in materia di scambio di informazioni, rispondendo quindi al principio di sussidiarietà. Tuttavia, affinché le misure siano efficaci, è necessario che altri Stati in Europa, come appunto il Principato di Monaco, partecipino all'effettivo scambio di informazioni a richiesta sui pagamenti di interessi. Senza un reale coordinamento in materia finanziaria non solo tra gli Stati membri ma anche con gli altri paesi europei, l'UE continuerà a soffrire della fuga di capitali verso Stati terzi, con gravi conseguenze per la sua economia.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, mediante el cual la UE y Mónaco acuerdan intercambiar información sobre las cuentas financieras en los respectivos territorios, con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de la autoridad fiscal para identificar a los contribuyentes, aplicar la ley fiscal en situaciones transfronterizas, e identificar posibles casos de evasión fiscal.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über den Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über den Abschluss – im Namen der Europäischen Union – des Änderungsprotokolls zu dem Abkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und dem Fürstentum Monaco über Regelungen, die denen der Richtlinie 2003/48/EG des Rates gleichwertig sind“ gestimmt. Die EU passt hiermit die Beziehungen zu Monaco der aktuellen politischen Situation an.

Dabei geht es momentan um Datenschutz und auch Steuergesetze. Vor allem die Neuerungen gegen Steuervermeidung und Steuerbetrug werden in diesem Vertrag auch auf Monaco ausgeweitet.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un avance indispensable en el intercambio de información fiscal con el Principado de Mónaco. Si bien el intercambio de información ha demostrado no ser suficiente para que los estados miembros emprendan acción contra los principales evasores y elusores fiscales del continente es un paso importante para que los estados puedan identificar dichos capitales y sus propietarios. Es por esto que las disposiciones recogidas en este acuerdo suponen una mejora objetiva del funcionamiento de los intercambios de información con Mónaco. Pese a que este tipo de medidas no persigue la prohibición del uso de paraísos fiscales por parte de capitales europeos es un importante avance para poder llevar a cabo medidas más radicales para hacer pagar impuestos a los capitales donde la riqueza es generada. Es por esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – L'Unione Europea e il Principato di Monaco hanno firmato, il 22 febbraio 2016, un accordo sullo scambio automatico di informazioni in materia fiscale, inteso a migliorare la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale a livello internazionale. Ho deciso di dare il mio sostegno alla conclusione dell'accordo poiché esso rappresenta un importante passo avanti negli sforzi in atto per combattere la frode e l'evasione fiscale. A partire dal 2018, l'UE e il Principato di Monaco procederanno ad uno scambio automatico di informazioni sui conti finanziari dei rispettivi residenti, con l'obiettivo di far fronte alle situazioni in cui un contribuente cerchi di occultare capitale costituito da redditi o attività oggetto di frode fiscale.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Som rada, že EÚ dohodla dohodu s Monakom o automatickej výmene informácií o finančných účtoch. Dohodu som podporila, pretože som presvedčená, že ukrývanie hotovosti na monackých kontách s cieľom vyhnúť sa platbe daní by nemalo dostávať v Európe priestor. Schválením tejto dohody sa zavedie od roku 2018 automatická výmena informácií medzi EÚ a Monackým kniežactvom o bankových účtoch. Výmene budú podliehať údaje o jednotlivých kontách zaznamenané od januára 2017. Cieľom tejto dohody je bojovať proti daňovým únikom, čo by sa malo dosiahnuť uplatňovaním prísnejších opatrení zo strany Monackého kniežactva. Odteraz bude aj Monako podliehať rovnakým pravidlám o výmene údajov, na akých sa dohodli členské štáty EÚ v roku 2014, ktoré sú v súlade s

globalnimi štandardami OECD. Informácie, ktoré si budú daňové orgány členských štátov EÚ a Monaka vymieňať, sa netýkajú len príjmov občanov, napríklad vo forme úrokov a dividend, ale aj zostatkov na účtoch a výnosov z predaja finančných aktív. Aj tieto opatrenia by mali prispieť k tomu, aby občania s vysokými zárobkami platili dane v krajinách, v ktorých svoj zisk vytvárajú.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *pisno*. – Evropska unija se je z Monakom dogovorila o sporazumu o avtomatični izmenjavi podatkov o finančnih računih, da bi izboljšala mednarodno sodelovanje na davčnem področju in skladnost s predpisi.

Sporazum predstavlja pomemben korak v okviru prizadevanj za boj proti davčnim goljufijam in davčni utaji. Sporazum nadgrajuje predhodni sporazum iz leta 2004, s katerim je bilo doseženo, da Monako izvaja ukrepe, enakovredne tistim iz direktive EU o obdavčevanju dohodka od prihrankov.

Zaradi novega sporazuma bodo davčni organi v državah članicah in Monaku lahko pravilno in nedvoumno identificirali omenjene davkoplačevalce, upravljali in uveljavljali nacionalno davčno zakonodajo v čezmejnih primerih, ocenili verjetnost, ali gre za davčno utajo ter tudi preprečili nepotrebne nadaljnje preiskave.

Zaradi omenjenih razlogov, menim da je predlog sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi, v imenu Evropske unije, Protokola o spremembi k Sporazumu med Evropsko skupnostjo in Kneževino Monako o ukrepih dober ter sem na glasovanju poročilo o predlogu sklepa tudi podprl.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *pisomne*. – Skrývanie majetku a neplatenie daní je potrebné riešiť a to aj spôsobom dohody, ktorá dáva EÚ prístup k informáciám v iných krajinách. Vďaka tejto dohode bude jednoduchšie identifikovať daňovníkov a predísť daňovým únikom.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Europska unija i Monako vodili su pregovore oko sporazuma kojim se predviđa automatska razmjena informacija o financijskim računima, s ciljem poboljšanja međunarodne porezne suradnje i usklađenosti. Sporazum je važan korak u suzbijanju utaje poreza i poreznih prevara te se njime nadograđuje sporazum iz 2004. godine kojim je Monako počeo primjenjivati mjere jednake onima propisanim EU direktivom o porezu na ušteđevinu.

Prema novome sporazumu, države članice i Monako će automatski razmjenjivati informacije o financijskim računima, a glavni cilj je da se adekvatno odgovori na situacije u kojima porezni obveznici pokušavaju izbjeći plaćanje poreza.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da bi Monako trebao primjenjivati mjere jednake zakonodavnom okviru Europske unije, a koje su u skladu s procedurama automatske razmjene informacija o financijskim računima.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Europska unija i Monako dogovorile su Sporazum o automatskoj razmjeni informacija o financijskim računima s ciljem poboljšanja međunarodne porezne suradnje i usklađenosti. Sporazum predstavlja važan korak u procesu suzbijanja porezne prijevare i utaje poreza. Prema Sporazumu države članice Unije će s Monakom automatski razmjenjivati informacije o financijskim računima na njihovom teritoriju počevši od 2018. za informacije prikupljene od 1. siječnja 2017. Kao rezultat ovog Sporazuma porezne uprave država članica i Monaka moći će točno i nedvosmisleno utvrditi koji su obveznici u pitanju, provoditi svoje porezne zakone u prekograničnim situacijama te izbjegavati nepotrebne daljnje istrage.

Podržavam donošenje ovog Sporazuma jer smatram da će se na ovaj način riješiti situacije u kojima porezni obveznik nastoji sakriti kapital koji predstavlja prihode ili imovinu za koju nisu platili porez.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu sklepa Sveta o predlogu sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi, v imenu Evropske unije, Protokola o spremembi k Sporazumu med Evropsko skupnostjo in Kneževino Monako o ukrepih, enakovrednih tistim iz Direktive Sveta.

S sporazumom se bo okrepilo sodelovanje med Evropsko unijo in Monakom na področju izmenjave podatkov o finančnih računih ter na davčnem področju. Verjamem, da bomo s sporazumom okrepili boj proti davčnim goljufijam in davčnim utajam, do katerih moramo imeti ničelno toleranco. Gre pa za nadgradnjo sporazuma iz leta 2004.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), γραπτώς. – Η συμφωνία αυτή συνιστά σημαντικό βήμα στις συνεχιζόμενες προσπάθειες για πάταξη της φοροαπάτης και της φοροδιαφυγής.

Το Πριγκιπάτο του Μονακό αποτελεί γνωστό φορολογικό παράδεισο και κατά συνέπεια η ανταλλαγή φορολογικών πληροφοριών εξυπηρετεί τη διεθνή φορολογική συνεργασία και τη συμμόρφωση με τις σχετικές διατάξεις.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Szavazatommal támogattam a jelentés elfogadását, amely jóváhagyta az EU és Monaco közötti megállapodáshoz csatolt jegyzőkönyvet a pénzügyi elszámolási információk automatikus cseréjéről. Az EU és Monaco között 2004-ben megkötött egyezmény értelmében Monaco a megtakarításokból származó kamatjövedelem adóztatásával kapcsolatos EU-s szabályokkal egyenértékű intézkedéseket vezetett be. Az új megállapodás célja az, hogy a hercegség a 2014 decemberében átdolgozott uniós jogi keretet követő megerősített, az OECD ajánlásoknak is megfelelő szabályokat használja.

Ezzel magasabb szintre került az EU és Monaco közötti együttműködés az adócsalások, illetve az adóelkerülések megelőzése és elfojtása terén, amely mindenképp üdvözlendő, hiszen ennek köszönhetően könnyebben felderíthetővé válnak azon esetek, ahol az adóalanyok olyan vagyoni értéket vagy bevételt próbálnak eltüntetni a hatóságok elől, mely után nem fizettek adót.

Claudia Tapardel (S&D), în scris. – În contextul luptei inițiate de Uniunea Europeană împotriva evaziunii fiscale din statele membre, instituțiile europene au întreprins măsuri de adoptare a unor acorduri de schimb automat de informații cu o serie de țări terțe, în scopul îmbunătățirii cooperării în domeniul fiscal și respectării normelor fiscale la nivel internațional. Aceste acorduri sunt menite să combată fraudele și evaziunea fiscală privind impozitarea veniturilor din economii, inclusiv prin intermediul așa-numitelor „paradisuri fiscale”.

Principatul Monaco este unul dintre micile state europene considerat drept un „paradis fiscal”, unde unii cetățeni europeni obișnuiesc să își ascundă veniturile.

În acest context, încă din 2004, UE a încheiat cu Monaco un acord de aplicare a unor măsuri echivalente de impozitare. Noul acord, semnat de Comisia Europeană în februarie 2016, și care va intra în vigoare din 2018, va facilita schimbul automat de informații cu privire la conturile financiare deținute de rezidenții celor două părți pe teritoriul fiecăreia. Acest acord va îmbunătăți procedurile de cooperare administrativă între cele două părți, în conformitate cu standardul global al OCDE din 2014.

Consider că este vorba despre o măsură salutară și susțin adoptarea acestui raport în forma sa actuală.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – L'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont négocié un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, visant à accroître la coopération fiscale et le respect des obligations fiscales au niveau international. Le texte de cet accord a été paraphé par un représentant de la Commission européenne et par un représentant du gouvernement de la Principauté de Monaco le 22 février 2016, et la signature officielle est prévue avant les vacances d'été, dès que le Conseil aura donné son accord.

Cet accord marque une étape importante dans les efforts actuels visant à lutter contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales et renforce l'accord de 2004 qui garantissait que Monaco applique des mesures équivalentes à celles prévues dans la directive de l'Union en matière de fiscalité des revenus de l'épargne.

Le nouvel accord prévoit que les États membres de l'Union européenne et Monaco échangeront automatiquement des informations relatives aux comptes financiers de leurs résidents respectifs, à compter de 2018 pour les informations recueillies depuis le 1^{er} janvier 2017. L'objectif est de faire face aux cas de figure dans lesquels un contribuable cherche à dissimuler des capitaux qui correspondent à un revenu ou à des actifs sur lesquels l'impôt n'a pas été payé.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), in writing. – Cross-border tax fraud and tax evasion are harmful for our economy, as well as for our financial credibility and long-term sustainability. This is why I voted in favour of amending the Protocol to the Agreement concluded between the EU and Monaco, which aims at improving international tax cooperation and compliance through the automatic exchange of financial account information. This agreement will increase tax transparency in Europe by ensuring that Monaco applies the same measures on the taxation of savings income as those currently applied in the EU. It will also incorporate a new set of provisions to reflect the global standard for automatic exchange of financial account information developed by the OECD in 2014.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan.* – Podržala sam Sporazum između Europske unije i Kneževine Monako kojim se predviđa automatska razmjena informacija o financijskim računima. Automatska razmjena informacija kao sredstva za borbu protiv prekogranične porezne prijevare i prekogranične porezne utaje osiguravanjem potpune porezne transparentnosti i sustavne suradnje među poreznim upravama diljem svijeta veoma je značajna.

Skupina G20 povjerila je Organizaciji za gospodarsku suradnju i razvoj (OECD) zadaću da razvije jedinstveni globalni standard za automatsku razmjenu informacija o financijskim računima te je Vijeće OECD-a objavilo taj globalni standard u srpnju 2014. Obje ugovorne stranke se obvezuju provoditi i poštovati posebne mjere zaštite podataka, a informacije se otkrivaju isključivo osobama ili tijelima nadležnima za procjenu, naplatu i ubiranje poreza, izvršavanje ili kazneni progon u pogledu poreza, rješavanje žalbi u vezi poreza te jurisdikcije ili nadzora nad time.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno.* – Po sprejetju direktive o varčevanju in z namenom ohranitve enakih konkurenčnih pogojev za gospodarske subjekte, je Evropska unija podpisala sporazum s Kneževino Monako o ukrepih enakovrednim tistim, ki so določeni v direktivi.

17. junija 2011 je Komisija predstavila priporočila za mandat za začetek pogajanj s Kneževino Monako z namenom nadgradnje sporazumov Evropske unije s temi državami v skladu z mednarodnim razvojem in za zagotovitev, da te države še naprej uporabljajo ukrepe enakovredne tistim v Evropski uniji.

Na podlagi tega predloga je bil Svet pozvan, da v imenu Evropske unije odobri protokol o spremembi k sporazumu med Evropsko skupnostjo in Kneževino Monako o ukrepih, enakovrednim tistim iz direktive o obdavčevanju dohodka izhajajočega iz prihrankov v obliki obrestnih plačil.

Poročilo soglaša k sklenitvi protokola o spremembi sporazuma, zato sem ga podprla.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito.* – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, mediante el cual la UE y Mónaco acuerdan intercambiar información sobre las cuentas financieras en los respectivos territorios, con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de la autoridad fiscal para identificar a los contribuyentes, aplicar la ley fiscal en situaciones transfronterizas, e identificar posibles casos de evasión fiscal.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit.* – Le 22 février 2016, l'Union européenne et la Principauté de Monaco ont signé un accord sur l'échange automatique d'informations relatives aux comptes financiers, dans le cadre de la série d'accord entre l'UE et les États voisins visant à accroître la coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscales.

Pour mémoire, ces accords étaient une des conditions posées par le Luxembourg et l'Autriche pour mettre fin à leur secret bancaire il y a deux ans. Il fallait en effet éviter de laisser subsister des paradis fiscaux aux portes de l'UE, où pouvaient se réfugier les fraudeurs.

L'échange automatique d'informations portera toujours sur les revenus des comptes mais aussi sur leur solde et sur les produits de cession d'actifs.

Nous avons soutenus les précédents accords avec la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, Andorre et Saint Marin. Celui avec Monaco est à l'évidence symbolique, et il convient de le soutenir également.

J'ai voté POUR.

Mihai Țurcanu (PPE), *în scris.* – Importanța schimbului automat de informații a fost recunoscută pe plan internațional ca mijloc de a lupta împotriva fraudei și evaziunii fiscale transfrontaliere. În acest context, Organizația pentru Cooperare și Dezvoltare Economică a stabilit o normă mondială unică privind schimbul automat de informații relative la conturile financiare, în vigoare din iulie 2014.

Prin acest protocol se propune ca norma mondială stabilită de OCDE să se aplice între statele membre ale UE și Monaco. Astfel, prin noua înțelegere, statele membre și Monaco vor schimba în mod automat informații referitoare la conturile financiare existente pe teritoriile lor, începând cu anul 2018. Este vorba despre informațiile care au fost colectate începând cu 1 ianuarie 2017. Scopul este de a evita situațiile în care un plătitor de impozite caută să își ascundă capitalul reprezentând venituri sau bunuri pentru care nu au fost plătite impozite.

De asemenea, scopul înțelegerii este de a se asigura că Monaco aplică măsuri întărite care sunt echivalente cu cadrul legal al Uniunii Europene și că respectă procedurile privind schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare.

Prin urmare, am votat în favoarea Protocolului la Acordul între Uniunea Europeană și Monaco.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Obecna umowa jest aktualizacją umowy zawartej między Unią Europejską a Monako w roku 2004. Pozwoli ona m.in. polepszyć międzynarodową współpracę podatkową. Dodatkowo umożliwi skuteczniejszą walkę z oszustami podatkowymi oraz osobami, które unikają płacenia podatków. W związku z tym zagłosowałem za przyjęciem umowy.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió és Monaco tárgyalást folytatott a pénzügyi számlainformációk automatikus cseréjéről szóló megállapodásról, amelynek célja a nemzetközi adóügyi együttműködés és a szabályok betartásának javítása. E megállapodás szövegét az Európai Bizottság egyik képviselője és Monaco kormányának képviselője 2016. február 22-én parafálta, a hivatalos aláírásra a nyári szünetet megelőzően kerülne sor, amint a Tanács engedélyezi azt. Voksommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, mediante el cual la UE y Mónaco acuerdan intercambiar información sobre las cuentas financieras en los respectivos territorios, con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de la autoridad fiscal para identificar a los contribuyentes, aplicar la ley fiscal en situaciones transfronterizas, e identificar posibles casos de evasión fiscal.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Šis susitarimas yra svarbus žingsnis šiuo metu vykstančioje kovoje su mokesčiniu sukčiavimu ir mokesčių slėpimu, juo patobulinamas 2004 m. susitarimas, kuriuo buvo užtikrinama, kad Monakas taikytų priemones, lygiavertes ES Taupymo pajamų apmokestinimo direktyvos priemonėms.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the European Community and the Principality of Monaco providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC. The European Union and Monaco have negotiated an agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information, aimed at improving international tax cooperation and compliance. I voted in favour because I find that this agreement represents an important step in ongoing efforts to clamp down on tax fraud and tax evasion and upgrades the 2004 agreement that ensured that Monaco applied measures equivalent to those in an EU directive on the taxation of savings income. Under the new agreement, the EU Member States and Monaco will automatically exchange information on the financial accounts held on their territories by each other's residents. The aim is to address situations where a taxpayer seeks to hide capital representing income or assets for which taxes have not been paid.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mediante este protocolo la UE y el principado de Mónaco intercambiarán de manera automática información sobre las cuentas bancarias de sus residentes, incluyendo no solo ingresos, sino también los saldos en cuentas y los ingresos derivados de la venta de activos financieros. Hablamos de una buena noticia en la lucha contra el fraude fiscal, por lo que creo conveniente votar a favor de dicho protocolo.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un avance indispensable en el intercambio de información fiscal con el Principado de Mónaco. Si bien el intercambio de información ha demostrado no ser suficiente para que los estados miembros emprendan acción contra los principales evasores y elusores fiscales del continente es un paso importante para que los estados puedan identificar dichos capitales y sus propietarios. Es por esto que las disposiciones recogidas en este acuerdo suponen una mejora objetiva del funcionamiento de los intercambios de información con Mónaco. Pese a que este tipo de medidas no persigue la prohibición del uso de paraísos fiscales por parte de capitales europeos es un importante avance para poder llevar a cabo medidas más radicales para hacer pagar impuestos a los capitales donde la riqueza es generada. Es por esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – De Europese Unie en Monaco hebben onderhandeld over een overeenkomst inzake de automatische uitwisseling van gegevens over financiële rekeningen, bedoeld om de internationale belastingssamenwerking en -naleving te verbeteren. De overeenkomst is een belangrijke stap in de voortdurende inspanningen om belastingfraude en belastingontduiking aan te pakken. Daarom heb ik vóór deze overeenkomst gestemd.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der Bericht behandelt das Abkommen zwischen der EU und dem Fürstentum Monaco. Ziel ist eine Zusammenarbeit hinsichtlich des Informationsaustausches über Finanzkonten, mit dem die internationale Zusammenarbeit in Steuerangelegenheiten und die Steuerehrlichkeit bei internationalen Sachverhalten verbessert werden sollen. Ein sinnvoller Schritt, der meine Unterstützung erhält.

Jarosław Wałęsa (PPE), *na piśmie*. – Unia Europejska i Monako zawarły umowę, która dotyczy automatycznej wymiany informacji finansowych. Umowa ta została zawarta w celu poprawy współpracy podatkowej i przestrzegania międzynarodowych przepisów. Dzięki tej umowie będzie możliwe efektywniejsze zapobieganie oszustwom podatkowym, co więcej, wzrośnie efektywność egzekwowania prawa w kwestii uchylania się od opodatkowania. Na mocy tej umowy, która zostanie podpisana formalnie w 2016 roku, państwa członkowskie, jak i Monako, będą automatycznie dokonywały wymiany informacji finansowych dotyczących rezydentów poszczególnych stron na ich terytoriach. Uważam, że cel podpisania tej umowy jest bardzo ważny dla Unii Europejskiej oraz dla Monako, ponieważ dzięki temu porozumieniu administracje podatkowe państw członkowskich i Monako będą mogły jednoznacznie identyfikować podatników, co więcej, będą mogły egzekwować przepisy podatkowe oraz ocenić prawdopodobieństwo uchylenia się podatnika od opodatkowania. Uważam za słuszne jak najszybsze sfinalizowanie umowy, gdyż przyspieszy to wprowadzenie ustalonych w treści porozumienia instrumentów, które pomogą zwalczać działanie nieuczciwych podmiotów.

Iuliu Winkler (PPE), *în scris*. – Am votat Protocolul de modificare a Acordului dintre UE și Monaco referitor la schimbul automat de informații privind conturile financiare.

UE și Principatul Monaco au încheiat un acord referitor la schimbul automat de informații cu privire la conturile financiare, cu scopul de a îmbunătăți cooperarea în domeniul fiscal și respectarea normelor fiscale la nivel internațional. Ca urmare a noului acord, autoritățile fiscale din statele membre și Monaco vor fi în măsură să identifice în mod corect și fără echivoc contribuabilii în cauză; să administreze și să asigure punerea în aplicare a legislației lor fiscale în situații transfrontaliere; să evalueze probabilitatea comiterii de evaziune fiscală; să evite investigații suplimentare inutile.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφώς*. – Έδωσα τη θετική μου ψήφο στην έκθεση του συναδέλφου Schwab, που αφορά την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών για χρηματοπιστωτικούς λογαριασμούς και αναμένεται να εγκριθεί από το Συμβούλιο το επόμενο διάστημα. Η παρούσα πρωτοβουλία ενισχύει τους μηχανισμούς καταπολέμησης της φοροδιαφυγής και θα τεθεί σε ισχύ από την έναρξη του επόμενου έτους.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), *por escrito*. – Este acuerdo representa un paso más en la lucha contra el fraude y la evasión fiscal en la Unión Europea. Será más complicado encontrar, de ahora en adelante, casos en los que ciudadanos europeos oculten en bancos del Principado presuntos fondos destinados inicialmente a impuestos.

El gran avance que considero se ha logrado con esta resolución ha sido la de ampliar la información intercambiada entre Mónaco y la Unión Europea, pues los datos que se traspasen a partir de 2018 incluirán los balances de las cuentas bancarias, así como los ingresos y traspasos. Una mayor cooperación, como la que se busca con este tipo de medidas, reforzará la eficacia de las leyes impuestas tanto por los estados miembros como por la Unión, generará más confianza entre los contribuyentes que justamente pagan sus impuestos, y blindarán a las autoridades de futuras estrategias que tengan el fin de evadir sus responsabilidades.

Para finalizar, lograr un acuerdo tan positivo es una muestra de competencia institucional clara, y es prueba de una reacción constructiva ante algunos escándalos fiscales que han salido en la prensa recientemente.

Marco Zanni (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – L'Unione europea e il Principato di Monaco hanno firmato un accordo sullo scambio automatico delle informazioni finanziarie a fini fiscali inteso a migliorare la cooperazione e il rispetto degli obblighi in ambito fiscale a livello internazionale. Sulla base di tale accordo, l'UE e il Principato di Monaco procederanno a uno scambio automatico di informazioni sui conti finanziari dei rispettivi residenti, in maniera tale da incrementare gli sforzi per combattere la frode, l'elusione e l'evasione fiscale a partire dal 1° gennaio 2017. L'accordo (l'ultimo di un pacchetto di cinque accordi, che riguardano Svizzera, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra e Monaco) è migliorativo

rispetto allo status quo ma è ancora insoddisfacente. Penso che si sarebbe potuto e dovuto cercare un accordo più completo e approfondito. Sono ancora presenti, infatti, diversi vuoti normativi facilmente aggirabili e delle lacune non trascurabili nell'ambito della trasparenza. In generale, tutti gli accordi siglati sono ancora lontani dal risolvere in concreto la maggior parte delle criticità esistenti con tutti questi paesi. Per questo motivo ho preferito astenermi durante il voto in Aula.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), *písemně*. – Rozhodl jsem se tuto zprávu podpořit, neboť prohlubuje mezinárodní spolupráci v oblasti daní a zavazuje k dodržování příslušných předpisů. Jsem přesvědčen, že tato dohoda je důležitým krokem v rámci probíhajících snah o potírání daňových podvodů a vyhýbání se daňovým povinnostem. Cílem dohody je zajistit, aby Monako uplatňovalo přísnější opatření, která by byla rovnocenná právnímu rámci EU. V tomto opatření oceňuji zejména možnost správně a jednoznačně stanovovat totožnost příslušných daňových poplatníků a posuzovat pravděpodobnost toho, že došlo k vyhýbání se daňovým povinnostem.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), *por escrito*. – Votei favoravelmente o relatório Schwab por concordar com o acordo UE-Mónaco, que representa um passo importante nos esforços em curso para lutar contra a fraude e a evasão fiscais e atualiza o acordo de 2004 que garante que o Mónaco adote medidas equivalentes às da UE sobre a tributação dos rendimentos da poupança aplicada.

Com o novo acordo, os Estados-Membros da UE e o Mónaco poderão trocar automaticamente informações sobre as contas financeiras existentes nos seus territórios por residentes dos outros territórios, começando em 2018 para obter informações recolhidas a partir de 1 de janeiro de 2017.

O acordo tem por objetivo assegurar que o Mónaco aplica medidas reforçadas, equivalentes às do quadro jurídico da União Europeia e que estejam em conformidade com os procedimentos para a troca automática de informações de contas financeiras, de acordo com as normas previstas pela OECD.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za predlog sklepa Sveta o sklenitvi, v imenu Evropske unije, Protokola o spremembi k Sporazumu med Evropsko skupnostjo in Kneževino Monako.

Podpiram namen sporazuma, ki je zagotoviti, da bo Monako izvajal okrepljene ukrepe za boj proti davčnim goljufijam in davčni utaji ter spoštoval postopke za avtomatično izmenjavo podatkov o finančnih računih, kar spodbujajo tudi svetovni standardi OECD iz leta 2014.

9.6. Inanspruchnahme des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (Antrag Belgiens – EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery) (A8-0207/2016 - Victor Negrescu)

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Lars Adaktusson (PPE), *skriftlig*. – I dag röstade vi om ekonomiska bidrag från den s.k. globaliseringsfonden till personer som blivit arbetslösa efter det att europeiska företag lagts ned. Jag röstar konsekvent nej till dessa arbetslöshetsbidrag av två anledningar: För det första ska arbetsmarknadspolitik och ekonomiskt stöd till arbetslösa beslutas om, och finansieras, på nationell nivå – inte på EU-nivå. För det andra bygger grundidén till fonden på att globalisering är någonting negativt – vilket inte stämmer. Globalisering och fri handel leder till tillväxt och fred.

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione offre forme di sostegno a coloro che, a causa di mutamenti strutturali del commercio globale, abbiano perso il proprio lavoro. La richiesta è stata, in tal caso, formulata per la regione belga di Hainaut, dove, a seguito di una procedura di licenziamento collettiva, circa 488 lavoratori di un'impresa locale sono risultati in esubero. Considerando le finalità del Fondo e il fatto che tale area presenti uno dei tassi di disoccupazione più alti del paese, ho espresso voto favorevole ritenendo doveroso sostenere giovani e famiglie in un simile momento di crisi.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del informe ya que permite la movilización de un importe de 1 824 041 euros a raíz 488 trabajadores despedidos de la empresa Hainaut Machinery, así como 300 jóvenes de la región de Hainaut que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación (ninis) y tienen menos de 25 años. Esta movilización de fondos tiene como objetivo mitigar las desastrosas consecuencias sociales de la crisis económica del sistema capitalista.

Si bien estos fondos no son capaces de solucionar las problemáticas de estos trabajadores en Bélgica, al menos dan la posibilidad de paliar una pequeña parte del drama humano. Es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte sur la mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation.

L'objectif de ce rapport est de mobiliser la somme de 1,824 million d'euros dans le but de réintégrer sur le marché du travail 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme («NEET»).

Même si ce type de désastre n'est que la conséquence des politiques commerciales libre-échangistes de l'UE, je me positionne en défenseur de ces travailleurs et soutiens donc l'octroi de cette aide.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report which was concerned with an application to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

Sinn Féin have called for reform of this European fund which is designed to support workers who lose their jobs as a consequence of globalisation. However, my Sinn Féin colleague Eoin Ó Broin requested documents to be released under the Freedom of Information Act which showed that millions of euro in such supports, provided through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, had already been returned to the European Commission.

Sinn Féin has called on the Minister for Education Jan O'Sullivan and Minister of State for Skills Damien English to ensure €4.15 million in funding for 424 redundant Lufthansa Technik workers in Rathcoole, Dublin, to be spent by next September's deadline as, as it stands, it appears that 63% of this fund will remain unspent.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Προσαρμογής στην Παγκοσμιοποίηση δημιουργήθηκε για να παρέχει πρόσθετη στήριξη στους εργαζομένους που υφίστανται τις συνέπειες της παγκοσμιοποίησης. Είναι θετικό το γεγονός ότι η Ένωση έχει θεσπίσει νομοθετικά και δημοσιονομικά μέσα για να παρέχει πρόσθετη στήριξη στους εργαζομένους και κατάρτιση ώστε να διευκολύνει την επανένταξή τους στην αγορά εργασίας. Ως εκ τούτου, υπερψηφίζω την έκθεση η οποία εγκρίνει την αίτηση EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery, για την κινητοποίηση πόρων από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Προσαρμογής στην Παγκοσμιοποίηση.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Der Europäische Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung, kurz EGF, wurde eingerichtet, um Arbeitnehmer, die unter den Folgen weitreichender Strukturveränderungen im Welthandelsgefüge zu leiden haben, zusätzlich zu unterstützen.

Durch rückläufige öffentliche und private Infrastrukturinvestitionen in der EU und den deutlichen Anstieg der Stahlpreise in Europa ist der Handel gravierend eingebrochen. Zudem hat die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der europäischen Baumaschinenbetriebe abgenommen.

Infolgedessen wurden in der belgischen Region Hennegau 488 Arbeitnehmer dieses Wirtschaftszweiges entlassen. Des Weiteren sind dadurch 300 junge Menschen unter 25 Jahren betroffen.

Um die Betroffenen bei der Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt zu unterstützen, wäre die Inanspruchnahme des EGF außerordentlich hilfreich. Aus diesem Grund unterstütze ich den Antrag Belgiens voll und ganz.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose de mobiliser le Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme («NEET»).

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais aussi la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande de machines.

J'ai voté favorablement à ce texte afin de soutenir les travailleurs licenciés qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes décidés par l'UE (libre-échange à tout crin, austérité...), même s'il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport, qui réclame une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'aider financièrement à la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi que de soutenir 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme.

Si l'on en croit les autorités belges, la mondialisation serait la raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais il faut aussi prendre en compte la diminution de l'investissement public et privé.

S'il faut soutenir les travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes libre-échangistes décidés par l'UE, il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), par écrit. – J'ai évidemment soutenu cette intervention de 1 824 041 euros du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation, qui a permis non seulement d'aider à la réinsertion professionnelle des travailleurs licenciés chez Caterpillar et Doosan, mais qui permettra également de soutenir 300 jeunes NEET du Hainaut dans leur formation et leur accès à l'emploi.

Brando Benifei (S&D), per iscritto. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione è uno strumento pensato per fornire un sostegno supplementare ai lavoratori che risentono delle conseguenze dei grandi cambiamenti strutturali del commercio mondiale. Lo scoppio della crisi economica internazionale ha portato ad un calo degli investimenti pubblici e privati nelle infrastrutture all'interno dell'UE e ad un aumento considerevole dei prezzi dell'acciaio in Europa. Questi eventi hanno provocato gravi perturbazioni del commercio e una perdita di competitività degli impianti europei per la produzione di macchinari da costruzione. Tra gli impianti colpiti si trovano quelli della Hainaut Machinery, della regione belga di Hainaut. Ho votato a favore della relazione Negrescu perché condivido la necessità di mobilitare il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione per fornire assistenza ai 488 lavoratori collocati in esubero e ai 300 giovani NEET della regione di Hainaut. Grazie al FEG si potrà fornire loro un pacchetto coordinato di strumenti che comprendono indennità di formazione e di mobilità nonché contributi per l'avvio di imprese e programmi di formazione, riqualificazione e formazione professionale.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Votamos a favor en este informe, puesto que promueve unos fondos destinados a compensar y establecer medidas indemnizatorias en casos de relocalización o cierres de empresas por los cambios estructurales de los mercados a causa de la globalización. Servirán para atender la situación de los trabajadores despedidos, y ayudas a jóvenes sin estudios ni empleo, en la ya castigada por el desempleo, región de Hainaut (Bélgica), en el sector de la fabricación de maquinaria y equipamientos industriales, que vienen de un proceso anterior de despidos. Se trata de medidas que, de no existir dejarían en peor lugar a los trabajadores afectados. Este tipo de medidas tienen efecto sólo a corto plazo, pero no solucionan el problema a largo plazo, puesto que la cuestión del empleo y las relocalizaciones debieran tener otro enfoque de actuación. Por un lado, Europa necesita un plan de inversión, de un corte sumamente diferente al de Juncker, y otra política de empleo, para actuar en materia laboral. En segundo lugar, esa alternativa debiera consistir en invertir en actividades de futuro, especialmente en un cambio de modelo productivo.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), por escrito. – He apoyado este informe para movilizar recursos del fondo europeo de adaptación a la globalización porque los despidos producidos en la fábrica de maquinaria para obras públicas Hainaut Machinery en Gosselies cumplen los requisitos que se exigen para comceder este tipo de ayudas. Los despidos tienen su origen en la disminución de las inversiones públicas y privadas en obras de infraestructuras y la crisis del acero que han generado una pérdida de competitividad de las plantas europeas de construcción de este tipo de maquinaria. Igualmente se cumplen las garantías que deben aportar los estados miembros en cuanto a la aplicación equitativa de las medidas de apoyo e igualmente son acordes con los objetivos del fondo el tipo de programas activos de empleo organizados para reintegrar a los despedidos en el mundo laboral.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme («NEET»).

Les explications données par le Belgique et l'entreprise à ce licenciement sont multiples: production d'engins de chantier en chute libre, hausse du prix de l'acier, hausse des coûts unitaires (d'où la justification de délocalisations...).

J'ai voté pour ce rapport afin de soutenir les salariés, mais je considère encore que l'UE joue au pompier pyromane avec ce rapport en soutenant maintenant ce qu'elle a contribué à réaliser par le refus du protectionnisme et son ultralibéralisme.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Ho inteso sostenere la relazione Negrescu che chiede la mobilitazione del FEG per un valore di € 1.824.041 a favore di 488 lavoratori in esubero del settore della fabbricazione di macchinari e apparecchiature della Regione di Hainaut (BELGIO). Il Fondo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione è uno strumento fondamentale per il sostegno ai cittadini in questo periodo di crisi, ma credo che l'UE dovrebbe impegnarsi ancora di più per migliorarne l'efficienza.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de la movilización del Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización por la que se destinan 1 824 041 euros para reintegrar en el mercado laboral a 488 trabajadores despedidos por tres empresas de maquinaria en la región de Hainaut, en Bélgica, y prestar apoyo a 300 jóvenes que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación. Con estos fondos, se desarrollarán para los trabajadores despedidos amparados por la presente solicitud medidas de apoyo, orientación e integración; ayuda a la búsqueda de empleo; formación integrada; apoyo a la creación de empresas; apoyo a proyectos colectivos, búsqueda de empleo y asignaciones para formación.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Parlamentas pritaria Komisijos priimtam pasiūlymui dėl sprendimo dėl Europos prisitaikymo prie globalizacijos padarinių fondo (EGF) lėšų mobilizavimo siekiant Belgijai padėti remti darbuotojų, atleistų iš 3 įmonių grįžimą į darbo rinką.

Belgijos reikmėms iš EGF iš viso ketinama skirti 1 824 041 EUR. Paraiška susijusi su 488 atleistais darbuotojais ir ne daugiau nei 300 tikslinių nedarbingųjų, nesimokančių ir mokymuose nedalyvaujančių jaunuolių.

Prie individualių poreikių pritaikytas paslaugas, teiktinas atleistiems darbuotojams, sudaro šešių rūšių priemonės: parama, konsultacijos ir įtrauktis, ii) darbo paieškos palengvinimas, iii) integruotas mokymas, iv) parama įmonėms steigti, v) parama kolektyviniams projektams ir vi) darbo paieškos ir mokymo išmokos. Prie individualių poreikių pritaikytos paslaugos, teikiamos NEET jaunimui, apima: i) įtraukimą ir konsultavimą nukreipiant mokytis arba pasiūlant specialius įvadininius kursus, ii) mokymą, iii) prie individualių poreikių pritaikytą kvalifikacijos kėlimą ir iv) darbo paieškos, mokymo ir judumo išmokas.

Kaip nurodo Komisija, aprašyti siūlomi veiksmai yra aktyvios darbo rinkos priemonės, priskiriamos prie tinkamų finansuoti veiksmų. Šie veiksmai nepakeičia pasyvių socialinės apsaugos priemonių.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Globalizációs Alkalmazkodási Alap (EGAA) célja, hogy támogatást nyújtson a globalizáció hatására a világkereskedelemben bekövetkezett fő strukturális változások miatt, vagy a globális pénzügyi és gazdasági válság elhúzódása, illetve egy újabb globális pénzügyi és gazdasági válság következtében elbocsátott munkavállalóknak és tevékenységüket megszüntető önálló vállalkozóknak a munkaerőpiacon történő újbóli beilleszkedéshez. Belgium „EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery” referenciaszámon az EGAA igénybevételeire irányuló kérelmet nyújtott be az EGAA-ból igénybe vehető pénzügyi hozzájárulás iránt. A kérelem a Bizottság vizsgálatára szerint megfelel a vonatkozó rendeletben foglalt követelményeknek, ezért szavazatommal támogattam a javaslat elfogadását.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation afin d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 entreprises ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme.

Il faut soutenir ces travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas être tributaires des actes décidés par l'UE (austérité, libre échange), sans pour autant décharger les gouvernements de leur responsabilité.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), in writing. — I voted in favour of this report which was concerned with an application to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

Sinn Féin have called for reform of this European fund which is designed to support workers who lose their jobs as a consequence of globalisation. However, my Sinn Féin colleague Eoin O Broin requested documents to be released under the Freedom of Information Act which showed that millions of euro in such supports, provided through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, had already been returned to the European Commission.

Sinn Féin has called on the Minister for Education Jan O'Sullivan and Minister of State for Skills Damien English to ensure €4.15 million in funding for 424 redundant Lufthansa Technik workers in Rathcoole, Dublin, to be spent by next September's deadline as, as it stands, it appears that 63% of this fund will remain unspent.

Renata Briano (S&D), per iscritto. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG) è utile per fornire sostegno ai lavoratori collocati in esubero e ai lavoratori autonomi la cui attività sia cessata in conseguenza di trasformazioni rilevanti della struttura del commercio mondiale dovute alla globalizzazione, o a causa del persistere della crisi finanziaria ed economica globale oppure a causa di una nuova crisi economiche e finanziarie a carattere sovra-regionale. Il Fondo deve essere utilizzato per assisterli nel reinserimento nel mercato del lavoro, aggiornando la loro formazione e dandogli un sostegno economico nel contempo. È pertanto opportuno procedere alla mobilitazione del FEG per erogare un contributo finanziario ai lavoratori della regione belga di Hainaut che hanno subito gravi dissesti a causa di questi fenomeni.

Steeve Briois (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport vise à mobiliser 1,824 million d'euros issus du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation en faveur des 488 travailleurs licenciés par trois sociétés spécialisées dans la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut en Belgique. Cette somme doit contribuer à réintégrer sur le marché du travail ces salariés, ainsi qu'à soutenir 300 jeunes demandeurs d'emploi non qualifiés.

La Belgique, comme l'ensemble des États occidentaux, subit la concurrence internationale déloyale, exacerbée par le dumping social et environnemental que pratiquent les pays émergents. Dans ces conditions, il convient de mettre un terme au libre-échange généralisé ainsi qu'aux politiques d'austérité que la Commission impose aux États membres; ces dernières ont fortement pesé à la baisse sur le niveau des investissements publics en Europe.

Je me suis donc prononcé en faveur de la mobilisation de ce Fonds, qui n'apporte néanmoins aucune solution durable pour enrayer les conséquences désastreuses de la mondialisation sauvage.

Daniel Buda (PPE), în scris. – Fondul european de ajustare la globalizare are un rol esențial în sprijinirea lucrătorilor afectați de schimbările structurale intervenite în practicile comerciale mondiale. În situația dată, Fondul european de ajustare a fost solicitat de Belgia pentru a favoriza reintegrarea pe piața forței de muncă a lucrătorilor concediați din trei întreprinderi.

Aspectele care au declanșat aceste disponibilizări sunt atât scăderea investițiilor publice și private în infrastructură în cadrul UE, cât și creșterea semnificativă a prețurilor oțelului în Europa, care au avut un impact negativ asupra schimburilor comerciale, generând pierderea competitivității pentru fabricile europene de utilaje de construcție.

Prin mobilizarea acestui fond, lucrătorii vor beneficia de diferite măsuri active pe piața forței de muncă cum ar fi: serviciile de consiliere profesională, facilitarea căutării unui loc de muncă, formarea integrată, alocații pentru căutarea unui loc de muncă și pentru formare.

M-am exprimat în favoarea acestei solicitări deoarece consider necesară sprijinirea lucrătorilor care au fost disponibilizați din cauze externe, prin diverse forme care facilitează reintegrarea pe piața muncii.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – À l'heure de la mondialisation, les travailleurs sont les premières victimes des mutations structurelles du commerce international. Ils doivent donc être protégés et soutenus face aux licenciements causés par une concurrence mondiale exacerbée.

Récemment, la diminution de l'investissement dans les infrastructures et l'augmentation du prix de l'acier en Europe ont entraîné une perte de compétitivité pour les usines européennes de machines de construction.

La Belgique a formulé une demande de mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation. Cette demande a été validée par la Commission européenne. 488 employés licenciés de l'entreprise Hainaut Machinery pourront ainsi bénéficier d'une aide financière qui facilitera leur réinsertion sur le marché du travail. L'aide communautaire bénéficiera également à 300 jeunes sans emploi ni formation.

J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione sulla proposta relativa alla mobilitazione del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG) istituito per fornire sostegno supplementare ai lavoratori che risentono delle conseguenze di rilevanti cambiamenti della struttura del commercio mondiale. La domanda in questione è stata presentata dal Belgio in relazione a 488 esuberi presso Caterpillar Belgium S.A della regione Hainaut, azienda operante nel settore della fabbricazione di macchinari e apparecchiature.

Noto che la regione Hainaut sta affrontando una difficile situazione del mercato del lavoro, con un tasso di disoccupazione del 14,5 % (il 5,9 % in più rispetto alla media nazionale), la perdita di 1 236 posti di lavoro nel 2013 e di 1 878 posti nel 2014 nel settore manifatturiero, un calo delle offerte di lavoro del 13 % dal 2012 e un'elevata percentuale di lavoratori sottoqualificati, in quanto oltre la metà delle persone in cerca di lavoro non ha un'istruzione secondaria superiore, nonché alti livelli di disoccupazione di lunga durata.

Mi rammarico che le aziende italiane non possano usufruire maggiormente di questo Fondo per la mancanza di sostegno da parte delle istituzioni locali e nazionali.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, which was an approval of an application by Belgium to mobilise the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF). The report approved aid of €1.8 million for 488 redundant workers from Caterpillar Belgium SA. The EGF funds are used to provide re-training and personalised job search supports to workers made redundant as a result of globalisation and major changes in global trade patterns. In recent years changes to the rules of the EGF has meant that workers made redundant as a result of the financial crisis can also be covered by the EGF programmes. Caterpillar Group in the EU was largely dependent on public/private partnerships. Since these have been considerably reduced since the financial crash, large scale liquidations ensued.

Naturally I support the proposal to provide assistance to workers made redundant as a result of the crisis to find new employment.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I gave my consent to mobilise the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for the three manufacturing enterprises in the Hainaut region of Belgium in order to aid the workers who lost their jobs because of the major structural changes in world trade patterns. The decrease in investment and the rise in steel prices have hit the European the manufacturing of construction machinery hard, leading to redundant workers who are at risk of long-term unemployment and social exclusion. I am confident that the activation of the fund can effectively help these individuals find new jobs through professional training and guidance.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della mobilitazione del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione a favore dei lavoratori collocati in esubero presso 3 imprese operanti nella regione di Hainaut in Belgio. Questa regione rappresenta infatti una delle aree con il maggior tasso di disoccupazione del Belgio e il contributo è volto a favorire il reinserimento di ben 488 lavoratori e sostenere fino a 300 giovani che non lavorano e che non partecipano ad alcun ciclo di formazione.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση καθώς πράγματι οι απολύσεις προκλήθηκαν από τη μείωση των δημόσιων και ιδιωτικών επενδύσεων σε υποδομές στην ΕΕ και τη σημαντική αύξηση των τιμών του χάλυβα στην Ευρώπη, οι οποίες προκάλεσαν σοβαρές διαταραχές στο εμπόριο και απώλεια της ανταγωνιστικότητας των ευρωπαϊκών μονάδων κατασκευής μηχανημάτων έργων.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε σχετικά με την έκθεση για την πρόταση απόφασης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με την κινητοποίηση του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Προσαρμογής στην Παγκοσμιοποίηση. Είναι δεδομένο πως το ταμείο αυτό έχει δημιουργηθεί ακριβώς για την υποστήριξη εργαζόμενων μικρομεσαίων εταιριών που αντιμετωπίζουν προβλήματα επιβίωσης εξ αιτίας οικονομικών αναταράξεων λόγω της προσαρμογής σε ένα παγκόσμιο περιβάλλον. Καθώς θεωρώ θετική την προσπάθεια υποστήριξης τέτοιου είδους εταιριών προς όφελος των εργαζομένων, ψηφίσα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Numerosi lavoratori e ragazzi che risiedono in Belgio sono attualmente collocati in esubero presso tre imprese e per tanto non hanno né un lavoro né partecipano ad alcun ciclo di istruzione o formazione. A mio parere, la richiesta dello Stato belga è da prendere in considerazione. Ritengo che sia giusto mobilitare parte dei fondi dell'Unione per far sì che coloro che attualmente si trovano in esubero abbiano un sostegno nella ricerca di un impiego e una formazione accademica e professionale adeguata. È d'altro canto necessario che questo fondo non venga utilizzato per meri fini di assistenza sociale, perché in tal caso ci sarebbero ben altre realtà che ne avrebbero bisogno, ma finché il suo utilizzo è circostanziato e motivato mi sta anche bene che venga utilizzato con moderazione.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this vote on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which has been created in order to provide additional assistance to workers suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. – Apoio o Relatório Negrescu que vem permitir a utilização de 1 824 041 euros do Fundo de Ajustamento à Globalização na reintegração no mercado de trabalho de 488 trabalhadores despedidos da empresa Hainaut Machinery e 300 jovens visados que não trabalham, não estudam, nem seguem qualquer formação.

Os despedimentos foram provocados pelo declínio dos investimentos públicos e privados em infraestruturas da UE e pelo aumento considerável dos preços do aço na Europa, o que provocou graves perturbações no comércio e na perda de competitividade das fábricas europeias de maquinaria para a construção.

Através da utilização deste Fundo, criado para prestar um apoio complementar aos trabalhadores por mudanças estruturais importantes no comércio mundial, vai ser possível apoiar estes trabalhadores através de medidas que vão desde a orientação/interpretação e a facilitação da procura de emprego ao apoio à criação de empresas ou à requalificação profissional personalizada.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del informe ya que permite la movilización de un importe de 1 824 041 euros a raíz 488 trabajadores despedidos de la empresa Hainaut Machinery, así como 300 jóvenes de la región de Hainaut que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación (ninis) y tienen menos de 25 años. Esta movilización de fondos tiene como objetivo mitigar las desastrosas consecuencias sociales de la crisis económica del sistema capitalista.

Si bien estos fondos no son capaces de solucionar las problemáticas de estos trabajadores en Bélgica, al menos dan la posibilidad de paliar una pequeña parte del drama humano. Es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG) mira a fornire sostegno ai lavoratori collocati in esubero e ai lavoratori autonomi la cui attività sia cessata in conseguenza di trasformazioni rilevanti della struttura del commercio mondiale dovute alla globalizzazione, a causa di una crisi economica e finanziaria globale oppure a causa e ad assisterli nel reinserimento nel mercato del lavoro. La risoluzione del Parlamento europeo, che ho votato in favore, autorizza la domanda che il Belgio ha presentato a fine 2015 circa la richiesta di un contributo finanziario del FEG per 488 lavoratori collocati in esubero e di 300 giovani di età inferiore ai 25 anni che non lavorano e non partecipano ad alcun ciclo di istruzione o formazione (NEET) della regione di Hainaut. La risoluzi-

zione prende atto della ricevibilità della domanda del Belgio, in quanto gli esuberi hanno un grave impatto sull'occupazione e sull'economia locale, regionale e nazionale, e autorizza la mobilitazione del FEG per un contributo finanziario pari a 1 824 041 EUR.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Criza economică și financiară, recesiunea și măsurile de austeritate impuse în anumite state membre în vederea redresării economice au avut adesea un impact puternic asupra bunăstării cetățenilor. Alături de scăderea salariilor, disponibilizările masive și creșterea drastică a șomajului, în special în rândul tinerilor, au provocat reducerea veniturilor casnice și, implicit, a puterii de cumpărare a cetățenilor.

Începând cu 2012, în urma perturbărilor majore produse de creșterea prețurilor materiilor prime și a delocalizării diverselor industrii spre țările asiatice, provincia Hainaut (Belgia) a înregistrat o creștere rapidă a ratei șomajului.

Întrucât consider că o perspectivă globală necesită, în primul rând, o acțiune locală, am votat în favoarea acestui raport privind mobilizarea Fondului european de ajustare și globalizare, în cadrul căruia 488 de lucrători disponibilizați, precum și 300 de tineri cu vârsta sub 25 de ani din regiunea Hainaut, care nu sunt încadrați profesional, vor beneficia de sprijin pentru obținerea unui loc de muncă, cursuri de formare, recalificare și formare vocațională, contribuție pentru înființarea de întreprinderi și alocații sociale sau de mobilitate.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – EFG pomaga pracownikom znaleźć nową pracę i zdobyć nowe umiejętności, gdy stracili pracę na skutek zmian w strukturze światowego handlu, np. w przypadku zamknięcia dużej firmy, przeniesienia fabryki poza UE czy światowego kryzysu finansowo-gospodarczego. Jest to szósty wniosek analizowany w ramach budżetu na 2016 r. oraz czternasty wniosek odnoszący się do sektora produkcji maszyn i urządzeń i dotyczy uruchomienia z EFG łącznej kwoty 1,8 mln EUR na rzecz Belgii. Dotyczy 488 zwolnionych pracowników i maksymalnie 300 objętych pomocą młodych osób niekształących się, niepracujących ani nieszkolących się (młodzież NEET). Osobiście, w pełni popieram działania realizowane w ramach strategii na rzecz nowych miejsc pracy. Uważam, iż Europejski Fundusz Dostosowania do Globalizacji jest właściwym narzędziem wdrażania tych strategii. Ze względu na wyżej wskazane stanowisko, zagłosowałem za.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – As a general rule, the EGF can be used only where over 500 workers are made redundant by a single company, or if a large number of workers are laid off in a particular sector. I voted in favour of this report as the eligibility for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment fund is met and as I believe in helping redundant workers integrate back in the labour market.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – L'entreprise Hainaut Machinery Belgique a fait une demande de mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (FEM). Cette entreprise est spécialisée dans la fabrication de machines et d'équipements automobiles dans la région du Hainaut. L'entreprise Hainaut Machinery demande une mobilisation de 1 824 041 €, pour 488 travailleurs licenciés.

Selon la Commission européenne, l'impact de ces licenciements sur l'économie locale et régionale et sur l'emploi est significatif. L'ensemble du secteur de la fabrication a réduit sa production en Wallonie, avec 1 236 suppressions d'emplois en 2013 et 1 878 en 2014.

Considérant que l'Union européenne doit favoriser la transition des secteurs en perte de vitesse vers un modèle économique compétitif et la reconversion des travailleurs, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. — La proposition de la Commission européenne relative à la mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (FEM) vise à permettre à la Belgique de recevoir des contributions financières du FEM afin de soutenir la réinsertion sur le marché de l'emploi des travailleurs licenciés. La Belgique ayant respecté les conditions d'octroi des contributions financières du FEM et les licenciements étant dus à la diminution de l'investissement public et privé dans les infrastructures au sein de l'Union et l'augmentation significative du prix de l'acier en Europe, j'ai donc voté en faveur de ce texte.

Tamás Deutsch (PPE), *írásban*. – A Bizottság 2016. május 4-én határozatra irányuló javaslatot fogadott el az Európai Globalizációs Alkalmazkodási Alap (EGAA) Belgium javára történő igénybevételére, hogy támogassa Hainaut régióban működő két vállalatnál elbocsátott munkavállalók munkaerőpiacra történő újbóli beilleszkedését. Ez a 2016. évi költségvetés keretében vizsgálendő hatodik kérelem és az EGAA-ból összesen 1 824 041 euró igénybevételére irányul Belgium javára. A kérelem 488 elbocsátott munkavállalóra és megközelítőleg 300 nem foglalkoztatott, oktatásban és képzésben nem részesülő fiatalra (NEET-fiatalok) vonatkozik. A kérelmet 2015. december 17-én nyújtották be a Bizottságnak, és azt 2015. december 31-ig további információkkal egészítették ki. A Bizottság az EGAA-rendelet vonatkozó rendelkezései alapján megállapította, hogy a kérelem esetében teljesülnek az EGAA-ból nyújtott pénzügyi hozzájárulás feltételei.

Az elbocsátott munkavállalóknak nyújtandó, személyre szabott szolgáltatások a következő hat intézkedést foglalják magukban: segítségnyújtás/tanácsadás/integráció; a munkakeresés elősegítése; integrált képzés; vállalkozás létrehozásához nyújtott támogatás; a kollektív projektek támogatása; állskeresési és képzési támogatás. A Bizottság szerint a fent ismertetett intézkedések az EGAA-rendelet 7. cikke szerinti támogatható tevékenységek közé tartozó aktív munkaerőpiaci intézkedéseknek minősülnek. Ezek a tevékenységek nem helyettesítik a passzív szociális védelmi intézkedéseket. A fentiek alapján szavazatommal támogattam a jelentés elfogadását.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,82 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par trois compagnies, dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines, dans le Hainaut, en Belgique. Il propose aussi un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme (dits «NEET»).

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise dans ce secteur, mais également la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande dans le secteur des machines.

S'il convient de soutenir les travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes décidés par l'UE (libre-échange généralisé, austérité...), il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité. J'ai tout de même voté en faveur de cette mesure.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – За пореден път гласувам против, защото смятам, че Европейският фонд за приспособяване към глобализацията не е правилният инструмент за въвеждането на такива политики, нито пък вярвам, че е ефикасен инструмент, който предлага възвръщаемост на инвестицията от гледна точка на реинтегриране на съкратените работници обратно на пазара на труда. Но искам да подчертая, че както аз, така и моята група на Европейските консерватори и реформисти подкрепяме мерки, които създават растеж и работни места. Този фонд обаче не е правилната мярка. В този случай се предлага да се отпуснат 1,8 милиона евро за съкращаването на 488 работника в Белгия.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – O Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização foi criado para prestar um apoio complementar aos trabalhadores atingidos pelos efeitos de mudanças estruturais importantes nos padrões do comércio mundial e não pode exceder o montante máximo anual de 150 milhões de euros.

A Bélgica apresentou uma candidatura na sequência de despedimentos no setor da fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos e decidiu prestar também serviços personalizados cofinanciados pelo FEG a 300 jovens que não trabalham, não estudam nem seguem qualquer formação.

Concordo, por isso, que deva ser mobilizada uma contribuição financeira no montante de 1 824 041 euros para satisfazer o pedido apresentado pela Bélgica.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote pour: soutenir les travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes décidés par l'UE.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Sucodem-se as candidaturas submetidas sob os critérios de intervenção devido ao elevado número de trabalhadores despedidos. Este é mais um desses casos, embora o pedido não preencha os critérios de elegibilidade definidos no Regulamento do Fundo, enquadrando-se, portanto, num pedido ao abrigo de circunstâncias excecionais, podendo ter um sério impacto sobre o emprego e a economia local regional ou nacional.

O pedido refere-se a 488 trabalhadores despedidos em 3 empresas - SA Carwall, Caterpillar Bélgica SA, Doosan SA - da área da fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos, surgindo na sequência de pedidos anteriores já referentes às mesmas empresas.

A conversa é sempre a mesma: em consequência da queda de procura dos produtos na Europa, fecham uma unidade de produção na Europa (Frameries, neste caso) e abastecem o mercado europeu com fábricas situadas alhures (na Coreia do Sul, neste caso).

Cada nova aprovação deste Fundo é um vivo libelo acusatório contra o capitalismo, contra a UE e as suas políticas neoliberais.

A região de Hainaut enfrenta uma situação difícil de mercado de trabalho, com uma taxa de desemprego de 14,5 % (5,9 % superior à média nacional), pelo que se impõe um apoio aos trabalhadores afetados.

Mas, mais do que paliativos, exige-se uma mudança de políticas, que torne estes paliativos desnecessários.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour because it reiterates its call on the Commission to assure public access to all the documents related to EGF cases.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Európsky fond na prispôsobenie sa globalizácii slúži na pomoc konkrétnym spoločnostiam v členských štátoch Európskej únie pri boji proti následkom finančnej a hospodárskej krízy a pri premiestňovaní zamestnancov zo zanikajúcich spoločností a ich umiestňovaní na trhu práce. Pri tejto konkrétnej žiadosti ide o uvoľnenie celkovej sumy vo výške 1 824 041 EUR v prospech Belgicka. Táto suma sa týka 488 prepustených pracovníkov, z ktorých viac ako 300 predstavujú mladí ľudia, ktorí nie sú zamestnaní.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Voto a favore della relazione che cerca di aiutare cittadini europei in difficoltà.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφπτώς*. – Τα χρήματα του Ταμείου Προσαρμογής πρέπει να δίνονται κατά βάση στους απολυμένους και όχι σε προγράμματα επανένταξης ή μετεκπαίδευσης. Δεν χρειαζόμαστε εξειδικευμένους ανέργους.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of a report giving the green light for the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF) in Belgium, mainly Hainaut.

The application relates to 488 redundancies of the enterprise Hainaut Machinery in Belgium operating in the economic sector, classified under NACE Rev. 2 division 28 (Manufacture of machinery and equipment) during the reference period 25 December 2014 to 25 September 2015.

The EGAF funding of EUR 1,824,041 shall contribute to the costs of a coordinated package of eligible personalised services, providing assistance for 488 targeted beneficiaries following redundancies in three enterprises operating in the Hainaut region in the construction machinery sector, as well, as for 300 targeted young persons not in employment, education or training (NEETs) under the age of 25, with the aim of providing assistance for integrating the affected persons into the labour market. The redundancies were caused by major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho sostenuto la proposta di risoluzione del Parlamento europeo relativa alla decisione del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa alla mobilitazione di un contributo del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione di 1 824 041 EUR richiesto dal Belgio in relazione agli esuberi della società Hainaut Machinery, perché ritengo che queste misure rappresentino un esempio lampante del valore aggiunto che l'UE apporta ai singoli Stati membri.

La regione belga di Hainaut, infatti, vive una situazione di grave crisi, con un tasso di disoccupazione superiore di quasi 6 punti alla media nazionale, quasi 4 000 posti di lavoro persi nel settore manifatturiero negli ultimi anni e una preoccupante percentuale di lavoratori sotto qualificati e disoccupati di lungo periodo.

Il finanziamento tramite il FEAG di servizi personalizzati d'assistenza nella ricerca d'impiego, di sostegno e inserimento nel mercato del lavoro, sostegno alle start up e alle imprese collettive di nuova costituzione e azioni per la riqualificazione professionale permetterà dunque di mettere in campo azioni individuali e collettive a tutela dei lavoratori in esubero, con particolare attenzione ai lavoratori con più di 55 anni, che rappresentano il 36 % dei beneficiari degli interventi. Un intervento atteso e che dà benefici diretti ai territori, mostrano il valore aggiunto dell'UE.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe mich bei der Abstimmung zur Inanspruchnahme des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (Antrag Belgiens – EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery) enthalten. Nach meiner Auffassung ist der EGF in seiner aktuellen Form nicht wirklich geeignet, um Regionen und Menschen in solch sozialen Umbrüchen zu helfen.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Der Europäische Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung wurde eingeführt, um zusätzliche Unterstützung für Arbeiter zu gewährleisten, die unter den veränderten strukturellen Umständen des Welthandels leiden. In diesem Zusammenhang unterstütze ich den Antrag Belgiens.

Sylvie Goddyn (ENF), *par écrit*. – La mondialisation est une raison essentielle des crises sectorielles à répétition. Le Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation permet justement de réparer les erreurs commises par nos institutions, suite à l'ouverture des frontières avec des pays qui nous imposent une concurrence déloyale.

J'ai voté pour ce rapport qui fait suite à la demande de la Belgique. Le Fonds sera mobilisé pour permettre à 488 travailleurs de retrouver un emploi. Près de 36 % des travailleurs visés sont âgés de 55 à 64 ans et ont un risque d'exclusion sociale élevé, d'autant qu'ils ont des besoins spécifiques. De plus, il viendra en aide à 300 jeunes sans emploi, formation ou diplôme.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor en este informe, puesto que promueve unos fondos destinados a compensar y establecer medidas indemnizatorias en casos de relocalización o cierres de empresas por los cambios estructurales de los mercados a causa de la globalización. Servirán para atender la situación de los trabajadores despedidos, y ayudas a jóvenes sin estudios ni empleo, en la ya castigada por el desempleo, región de Hainaut (Bélgica), en el sector de la fabricación de maquinaria y equipamientos industriales, que vienen de un proceso anterior de despidos. Se trata de medidas que, de no existir dejarían en peor lugar a los trabajadores afectados. Este tipo de medidas tienen efecto sólo a corto plazo, pero no solucionan el problema a largo plazo, puesto que la cuestión del empleo y las relocalizaciones debieran tener otro enfoque de actuación. Por un lado, Europa necesita un plan de inversión, de un corte sumamente diferente al de Juncker, y otra política de empleo, para actuar en materia laboral. En segundo lugar, esa alternativa debiera consistir en invertir en actividades de futuro, especialmente en un cambio de modelo productivo.

Beata Gosiewska (ECR), *na piśmie*. – W sprawie wniosku dotyczącego decyzji Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w sprawie uruchomienia Europejskiego Funduszu Dostosowania do Globalizacji (EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery). Popieram wniosek w sprawie Europejskiego Funduszu Dostosowania do Globalizacji (EGF) utworzonego w celu udzielenia dodatkowego wsparcia pracownikom dotkniętym konsekwencjami istotnych zmian w strukturze światowego handlu.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund has been created in order to provide additional assistance to workers suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns. On 4 May 2016 the Commission adopted a proposal for a decision on the mobilisation of the EGF in favour of Belgium to support the reintegration in the labour market of workers made redundant in three enterprises operating under the NACE Revision 2 Division 28 (Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.) in the NUTS level 2 region of Hainaut (BE32) in Belgium.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτως*. – Υπερψηφίσαμε την εκροή των κονδυλίων από το Ταμείο Παγκοσμιοποίησης της ΕΕ, ώστε να δοθούν στους 488 απολυθέντες εργαζόμενους και 300 νέους εκτός εκπαίδευσης από το Βέλγιο με στόχο τη στήριξη και μετεκπαίδευση τους.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported this application to mobilise €1,824,041 of the EGF for 488 workers in Belgium made redundant in three enterprises under Hainaut Machinery that specialised in production of machines in the construction sector (Carwall SA; Caterpillar Belgium SA; Doosan SA) in the economic sector classified under the NCE Revision 2 division 28 (Manufacture of machinery and equipment).

Hainaut Machinery is a Belgian Machine construction company that due to structural changes in world trade patterns has undergone serious disruptions in union trade, resulting in a negative impact on the profitability in the three EU enterprises that specialised in production of machines in the construction sector.

Hainaut is facing a difficult labour market situation with an unemployment rate of 14.5% (5.9% higher than the national average), 1 236 job losses in 2013 and 1 878 in 2014 in the manufacturing sector. There has been a drop in job offers of 13% since 2012 and high proportion of underqualified labour, as over half of the job seekers lack upper secondary qualifications, as well as high levels of long-term unemployment, which stands at 39.0% of overall unemployment in Hainaut Region.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this proposal, as I had no objections to the proposed outcome.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Fondul european de ajustare la globalizare (FEG) a fost creat pentru a furniza un real sprijin lucrătorilor disponibilizați care au avut de suferit ca urmare a crizei financiare mondiale. Acest fond nu poate depăși plafonul maxim de 150 de milioane EUR pe an.

Cererea depusă de întreprinderea Hainaut Machinery privind accesarea sumei de 1 824 041 EUR pentru Belgia din FEG privind reintegrarea pe piața forței de muncă a lucrătorilor concediați din cadrul a trei întreprinderi a fost adoptată de către Comisia Europeană.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport care oferă măsuri concrete și eficiente de sprijin, orientare și integrare pe piața forței de muncă, formare profesională și cursuri în acest sens, alocații pentru căutarea unui loc de muncă și pentru mobilitatea forței de muncă.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o prijedlogu odluke Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o mobilizaciji Europskog fonda za prilagodbu globalizaciji (zahtjev koji je podnijela Belgija – EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery) jer smatram da bi financijska pomoć Unije radnicima koji su proglašeni viškom trebala biti dinamična i dostupna što je brže i učinkovitije moguće.

Ovo se Izvješće slaže se s Komisijom da su intervencijski kriteriji iz članka 4. stavka 2. Uredbe o EGF-u ispunjeni i da Belgija stoga u skladu s tom Uredbom ima pravo na financijski doprinos u iznosu od 1 824 041 eura.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme («NEET»).

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais aussi la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande de machines.

S'il faut soutenir les travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes décidés par l'UE (libre-échange sans limite, austérité...), il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité. Cette raison m'a poussé à voter en faveur du texte.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem pro uvolnění prostředků ve prospěch belgické firmy Hainaut Machinery. Evropský fond pro přizpůsobení se globalizaci poskytuje pomoc pracovníkům, kteří byli propuštěni v důsledku velkých strukturálních změn v celosvětovém obchodu souvisejících s globalizací. Dotace z fondu mají poskytovat pracovníkům profesní poradenství, školení, rekvalifikace a odborné přípravy stejně jako příspěvky na mobilitu. Vzhledem k tomu, že belgické orgány doložily potřebné informace a tento případ splňuje podmínky pro udělení dotací, hlasoval jsem ve prospěch dané zprávy.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui propose de mobiliser, à la demande de la Belgique, le Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation à hauteur de 1 824 041 euros afin d'aider les salariés licenciés dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines et équipements dans la province de Hainaut. Ce montant doit aider à financer des mesures d'accompagnement, d'orientation, d'insertion ou encore de formation pour les travailleurs licenciés.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. – It is of paramount importance to identify the spots that cause inefficiencies and worsening of the standards of labour for the workers who experience the pressures from the structural changes in the patterns of trade. The European Globalisation Adjustment fund must necessarily play its role in dealing with these problems and assist workers in their transition to other optimal labour and income allocations due to the necessary structural adjustments.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Dieser Antrag betrifft die Inanspruchnahme des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung wegen Entlassungen bei Carwall S.A., Caterpillar Belgium S.A. und Doosan S.A. von 488 Arbeitnehmern und weiteren 300 jungen Menschen unter 25 Jahren aus der Region Hennegau, die weder eine andere Arbeit haben noch eine schulische oder berufliche Ausbildung absolvierten (NEET-Jugendliche). Ich stimme daher dem vorliegenden Bericht zu.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk (ALDE), *in writing*. – As you know, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) aims to provide support for workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation or as a result of a continuation of the global financial and economic crisis. In this regard, the main aim of the fund is to help people who lost their jobs to reintegrate into the labour market. I supported the resolution because we should mobilise the fund to support Belgium's submitted application EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery for a financial contribution from the EGF, following redundancies in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 28 (Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.) in the region of Hainaut (BE32). In this case, 488 redundant workers, as well as 300 young people from the Hainaut Region are not in employment, education or training and the EGF is expected to support them and give them new opportunities to reintegrate into the labour market. Another reason why we should support the mobilisation of the fund is that Belgian authorities have implemented all necessary measures to activate and receive the EGF fund.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. – La mobilitazione del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione è stata istituita per garantire sostegno ai lavoratori che soffrono delle conseguenze derivanti dai continui cambiamenti del commercio mondiale. Sono moltissimi i lavoratori in esubero nel periodo di riferimento 2014-2015. Nel caso di specie, i fondi vanno all'azienda belga Hainaut Machinery e serviranno per aiutare i lavoratori in esubero o licenziati a essere riqualificati e trovare una nuova occupazione. Per tali motivi sostengo la relazione.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport car il vise notamment à accorder 1,824 million d'euros pour la réinsertion dans le marché du travail de 488 travailleurs licenciés dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut (Belgique).

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour la mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation suite à la demande concernant Hainaut Machinery. Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme.

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais aussi la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande de machines.

S'il faut soutenir les travailleurs licenciés, qui ne doivent pas subir les conséquences des actes décidés par l'UE (libre-échange à tout crin, austérité...), il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le Fonds d'ajustement à la mobilisation est une aide européenne destinée aux travailleurs licenciés, victimes des effets de la mondialisation, pour leur permettre de réintégrer le marché de l'emploi. C'est actuellement le cas de 488 salariés de 3 compagnies du secteur de fabrication des machines dans le Hainaut. Le rapporteur propose de leur faire bénéficier, ainsi qu'à 300 jeunes sans emploi ni diplômes, d'une aide de 1,824 million d'euros.

Je soutiens cette proposition, car j'estime que les citoyens européens n'ont pas à pâtir des conséquences des politiques désastreuses de l'UE (accords de libre-échange, austérité...). En revanche il est nécessaire que les gouvernements prennent leurs responsabilités et ne se dédouanent pas avec cette aide.

Je vote POUR son application.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del informe ya que permite la movilización de un importe de 1 824 041 euros a raíz 488 trabajadores despedidos de la empresa Hainaut Machinery, así como 300 jóvenes de la región de Hainaut que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación (ninis) y tienen menos de 25 años. Esta movilización de fondos tiene como objetivo mitigar las desastrosas consecuencias sociales de la crisis económica del sistema capitalista.

Si bien estos fondos no son capaces de solucionar las problemáticas de estos trabajadores en Bélgica, al menos dan la posibilidad de paliar una pequeña parte del drama humano. Es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – Como ya hemos hecho en otras ocasiones, apoyo esta propuesta para destinar parte del Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización, a apoyar la reincorporación al mercado laboral de los trabajadores belgas despedidos en tres empresas que operan en la división 28 de la NACE Revisión 2, para la fabricación de maquinaria y equipo, en la región de Hainaut, en Bélgica.

Las autoridades belgas indican que los hechos que dieron lugar a los despidos son la disminución de las inversiones públicas y privadas en infraestructuras y un aumento considerable del precio del acero en Europa, que han causado graves perturbaciones en el comercio y una pérdida de competitividad.

Ya que la Comisión ha garantizado que las medidas descritas constituyen medidas activas del mercado laboral susceptibles de recibir subvenciones contempladas en el artículo 7 del Reglamento FEAG, apoyo este informe para que parte de dichos fondos se destinen a tal fin.

Por las razones anteriormente descritas, voto favorablemente para la aprobación del mismo.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I support the mobilisation of funds to assist those facing long-term unemployment.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem proti. Jsem proti tomu, aby se z peněz daňových poplatníků a konkurenčních firem dotovaly firmy, kterým se na trhu nedaří. Nejlepší, co pro podniky můžeme udělat, je uvolnit byrokracii, snížit daně a zlepšit podnikatelské prostředí.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Šī Eiropas Globalizācijas pielāgošanas fonda finansiālo līdzekļu piešķiršanas gadījumā runa iet par kopējo summu 1,824,041 euro apmērā, kurus plānots izmantot 488 beļģu strādnieku reintegrācijai nacionālajā darba tirgū, kā arī vēl 300 jauniešu apmācībai un attiecīgai integrācijai nacionālajā darba tirgū.

Hainaut Machinery ir smagās rūpniecības uzņēmums no Beļģijas Valonijas reģiona, kas kādreiz bijis viens no rūpnieciski attīstītākajiem Eiropas reģioniem. Nožēlojami, bet tās ekonomika zaudēja vēl pustūkstoti darbvietu. Cerams, ka finansiāla atbalsta sniegšana palīdzēs šiem cilvēkiem pārvarēt esošās grūtības un pēc iespējas ātrāk atgriezties darba tirgū.

Ņemot vērā augstāk rakstīto un jautājuma lielo svarīgumu kā tādu, nobalsoju pozitīvi.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), *písomne*. – Mobilizáciu vyčleňujeme celkovú sumu 1 824 041 EUR z EGF v prospech Belgicka, kde v oblasti výroby strojov a zariadení došlo v dôsledku zníženia investícií do infraštruktúry v EÚ a zvýšenia cien ocele k hromadnému prepúšťaniu v závode Gosselies. Pomoc je určená 488 prepusteným pracovníkom a až 300 mladým ľuďom, ktorí nie sú zamestnaní, nie sú v procese vzdelávania alebo odbornej prípravy. Žiadosť spĺňa podmienky EFG, preto ju podporujem.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), *γραφώς*. – Υπερψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόταση απόφασης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με την κινητοποίηση του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Προσαρμογής στην Παγκοσμιοποίηση, διότι είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Nous émettons les mêmes réserves coutumières vis-à-vis du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (ci-après «FEM»), qui ne doit pas servir à dédouaner les gouvernements et l'Union européenne de leurs responsabilités en matière d'économie et d'emploi.

Pour autant, nous ne saurions nous opposer à cette aide financière d'un montant de 1,824 million d'euros à destination des 488 travailleurs licenciés du secteur de la machinerie dans le Hainaut et de 300 jeunes sans emploi ni formation.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho espresso voto favorevole in merito alla relazione concernente la mobilitazione del fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione , EGF /2015/012 BE/ - per un importo totale di 1 824 041 Euro a favore di 488 lavoratori collocati in esubero dalla impresa Carwall S.A , Caterpillar Belgium S.A e Doosan S. A., imprese operanti nel Belgio.

Tali stanziamenti riguardano in particolare misure destinate al sostegno di progetti collettivi e creazione di imprese .

E'di primaria importanza applicare misure a favore dei lavoratori in esubero in materia di: collocamento, formazione e salvaguardia dei posti di lavoro.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi apoyo a la propuesta para movilizar el Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización a favor de Bélgica para apoyar la reincorporación al mercado laboral de los trabajadores despedidos en tres empresas, que tuvieron que despedir personal ante la disminución de las inversiones públicas y privadas en infraestructuras y el aumento considerable del precio del acero en Europa, que han causado graves perturbaciones en el comercio y una pérdida de competitividad de las plantas europeas de maquinaria de construcción.

Los beneficiarios serían 488 trabajadores despedidos y un máximo de 300 jóvenes que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Belgien stellte am 17. Dezember 2015 den Antrag EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery auf einen Finanzbeitrag aus dem EGF infolge von Entlassungen. Es wurden ca. 300 junge Menschen unter 25 Jahren und 488 Arbeitnehmer entlassen, welche als NEET-Jugendliche (Not in Education, Employment or Training) gelten. Der Bericht teilt die Auffassung der Kommission, dass die Interventionskriterien gemäß Artikel 4 Absatz 2 der EGF-Verordnung erfüllt sind und Belgien daher Anspruch auf einen Finanzbeitrag in Höhe von 1 824 041 EUR gemäß dieser Verordnung hat. Dieser Betrag entspricht 60% der sich auf 3 040 069 EUR belaufenden Gesamtkosten.

Mit diesem Finanzbeitrag wird folgendes unterstützt: die Erleichterung der Arbeitssuche, integrierte Ausbildung, Unterstützung bei der Unternehmensgründung, Unterstützung für kollektive Projekte, Beihilfen für die Arbeitssuche und Aus- und Weiterbildungsbeihilfen. Daher unterstütze ich diesen Bericht.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Il est proposé que le Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation vienne en aide aux licenciements qu'ont subis 488 travailleurs et à 300 jeunes sans diplôme.

En principe, je désapprouve l'existence de ce Fonds, car il rend les entreprises irresponsables de leurs délocalisations. Je n'ignore pas ce phénomène qui pose question quant à l'utilité de ce Fonds. Il empêche par ailleurs que les États se préoccupent de la concurrence déloyale que permet le libre-échange. Cependant, il est juste de venir en aide à ces travailleurs afin de permettre leur réinsertion.

En conséquence, j'ai voté pour.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A UE é um espaço de solidariedade e nela se enquadra o Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização. Estes apoios são fundamentais para o auxílio aos desempregados e às vítimas das deslocalizações que se verificam num contexto globalizado. É cada vez maior o número de empresas que se deslocalizam, aproveitando os reduzidos preços do fator trabalho que são praticados em vários países, nomeadamente a China e a Índia, com efeitos nocivos para os países que respeitam os direitos dos trabalhadores.

O FEG destina-se a ajudar os trabalhadores vítimas da deslocalização de empresas e é fundamental para facilitar o acesso a um novo emprego. O FEG já foi, no passado, utilizado por outros países da UE, cabendo agora dar esse auxílio à Bélgica que apresentou a candidatura EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery a uma contribuição financeira do FEG, na sequência de despedimentos no setor económico classificado na divisão 28 (Fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos, n. e.) da NACE Rev. 2, na região de nível 2 da NUTS do Hainaut (BE32), e que as estimativas apontam para 488 trabalhadores despedidos, bem como 300 jovens, da província do Hainaut, que não trabalham, não estudam nem seguem qualquer formação (NEET).

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) is one of the tools at the Union's disposal to provide additional assistance to workers negatively impacted upon by major structural changes in world trade patterns. The Commission approved this specific application as it met the conditions for mobilising EGF to support the local economy.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de la proposition de la Commission visant à octroyer 1 824 041 euros au titre du Fonds européen à la mondialisation (FEM), sur un montant global de 3 000 000 euros, pour aider 488 travailleurs licenciés chez Carwall SA, Caterpillar Belgium SA et Doosan SA en province du Hainaut et pour aider 300 autres jeunes chômeurs de moins de 25 ans de cette province qui ne travaillent pas, ne suivent pas d'études ou de formation (NEET).

Le Hainaut, déjà confronté à une situation du marché du travail difficile avec un taux d'emploi inférieur à la moyenne nationale, souffre particulièrement du déclin des investissements publics et privés dans les infrastructures dans l'Union européenne et de l'augmentation significative des prix de l'acier en Europe, qui conduit inéluctablement à des délocalisations.

Il fallait aider ces 788 jeunes chômeurs et travailleurs à s'insérer ou se réinsérer sur le marché du travail en leur fournissant des services actifs d'orientation professionnelle, d'aide à la recherche d'emploi, de formation professionnelle ou de reconversion, d'aide à la création d'entreprise et de contribution à des projets collectifs.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. – Európsky fond na prispôsobenie sa globalizácii bol vytvorený na poskytovanie dodatočnej podpory pracovníkom postihnutým dôsledkami veľkých štrukturálnych zmien vo svetovom obchode. Tento fond nesmie prekročiť maximálnu ročnú sumu 150 miliónov EUR. Príslušné sumy sú zahrnuté do všeobecného rozpočtu Únie ako rezerva. Európska komisia prijala návrh rozhodnutia o mobilizácii fondu v prospech Belgicka na podporu opätovného začlenenia pracovníkov prepustených v troch podnikoch v Belgicku na trh práce. Celkovo ide o sumu 1 824 041 EUR v prospech Belgicka a týka sa 488 prepustených pracovníkov a až 300 mladých ľudí, ktorí nie sú zamestnaní, ani nie sú v procese vzdelávania alebo odbornej prípravy. Komisia vyhodnotila, že predmetná belgická žiadosť spĺňa podmienky na udelenie finančného príspevku. Personalizované služby, ktoré sa majú poskytovať prepusteným pracovníkom, predstavujú šesť typov opatrení. Ide najmä o integráciu, podporu pri hľadaní zamestnania, integrované vzdelávanie, podporu zakladania podnikov, podporu spoločných projektov a príspevky na hľadanie zamestnania. Medzi personalizované služby poskytované mladým ľuďom patrí mobilizácia a usmernenie buď na účely ďalšieho vzdelávania, alebo odbornej prípravy, odborná príprava, individuálne zvyšovanie kvalifikácie a príspevky na hľadanie zamestnania, odbornú prípravu a mobilitu. Hlasujem za daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the report because it is essential to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns or of the global financial and economic crisis and to assist their reintegration into the labour market.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Európai Globalizációs Alkalmazkodási Alap célja, hogy kiegészítő támogatást nyújtson a világkereskedelemben bekövetkezett főbb strukturális változások következményei által sújtott munkavállalóknak. Belgium kérelmet nyújtott be az Alap igénybevételeire: a Hainaut régióbeli Carwall SA, Caterpillar Belgium SA és Doosan SA vállalatoknál elbocsátott 488 munkavállaló, valamint a hainaut-i régióban élő 300 munkanélküli, képzésben vagy oktatásban nem részesülő, 25 év alatti fiatal részére kíván személyre szabott szolgáltatásokat biztosítani.

A 488 elbocsátott számára tervezett intézkedések: segítségnyújtás/tanácsadás/integráció; az álláskeresés elősegítése; integrált képzés; vállalkozás létrehozásához nyújtott támogatás; kollektív projektek támogatása, és álláskeresési és képzési juttatások, míg a 300 fiatal részére továbbtanulási/továbbképzési, illetve bevezetési célú mobilizációt és útmutatást az érdeklődési körök feltárására; célzott képzéseket, személyre szabott továbbképzést, álláskeresési, képzési és mobilizációs juttatásokat kívánnak nyújtani. Az intézkedések költsége 3 040 069 euró. A Bizottság javaslatot tett a Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak az intézkedésekhez az EGAA-rendelet értelmében nyújtható 60%-os, 1 824 041 eurós pénzügyi hozzájárulás odaítélésére.

A Költségvetési Bizottság jelentésében azt javasolja, hogy a Parlament értsen egyet a Bizottsággal abban, hogy az EGAA-rendelet által meghatározott beavatkozási kritériumok teljesülnek, és ezért Belgium jogosult az említett támogatásra. Az előterjesztést megszavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme.

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais aussi la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande de machines. Il y a lieu de soutenir cette action, même s'il ne s'agit que d'une modeste compensation de la part de l'UE en faveur des travailleurs qu'elle plonge dans la précarité par ses politiques ultralibérales.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – A Bélgica candidatou-se a uma contribuição do FEG, na sequência de despedimentos das empresas Carwall SA, Caterpillar Belgium SA e Doosan SA, e as estimativas apontam para que 488 trabalhadores despedidos, bem como 300 jovens da província do Hainaut que não trabalham, não estudam nem seguem qualquer formação (NEET), menores de 25 anos, participem nas medidas.

A candidatura cumpre o artigo 4.º, n.º 2, do Regulamento FEG, que permite uma derrogação quanto ao número de trabalhadores despedidos, pelo que a Bélgica tem direito a uma contribuição financeira no montante de 1 824 041 EUR ao abrigo do referido regulamento, o que representa 60 % do custo total de 3 040 069 EUR.

Subscrevo a importância de melhorar a empregabilidade de todos os trabalhadores despedidos por meio de formações adaptadas e do reconhecimento das qualificações e competências adquiridas ao longo da carreira profissional, assim como é vital que a formação proposta seja adaptada não só às necessidades dos trabalhadores despedidos, mas também ao ambiente real das empresas.

Defendo que as medidas destinadas à reintegração dos trabalhadores despedidos no mercado de trabalho, evitando as consequências de um impacto significativo na economia de Hainaut, devem ser aprovadas.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je vote pour cette aide aux travailleurs victimes de la mondialisation.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour la mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation en faveur de trois entreprises belges spécialisées dans la production de pièces et l'assemblage de machines utilisées dans le secteur de la construction afin de financer l'accompagnement, l'orientation, l'insertion, la formation, l'aide à la création d'entreprises et l'allocation de recherche d'emploi de 488 personnes licenciées.

Le Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation intervient pour soutenir les salariés licenciés en raison de modifications majeures de la structure du commerce mondial résultant de la mondialisation, en raison de la persistance de la crise financière et économique mondiale, ou en raison d'une nouvelle crise financière et économique mondiale.

Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Con il ramificarsi del processo di globalizzazione degli scambi commerciali nei settori produttivi europei, in concomitanza con fenomeni socio-economici rilevanti come persistenti crisi economiche e finanziarie, non possiamo che esprimerci a favore di una proposta volta a riequilibrare le forze commerciali e a fornire sostegno ai lavoratori collocati in esubero o la cui attività autonoma sia cessata. Esso include principalmente l'utilizzo di un fondo d'importo annuo pari a 150 milioni di EUR assieme, coniugato a strumenti legislativi e di bilancio. In questo modo, l'Unione europea è in grado di assistere tutti quei lavoratori che, a causa di cambi strutturali nel commercio mondiale, si ritrovano a doversi reinserire nel mercato lavorativo. In tale contesto può essere preso ad esempio l'intervento compiuto sul settore industriale del Belgio, che ha visto diminuire costantemente la propria competitività della produzione di macchinari da costruzione, delocalizzando in Asia gli impianti di produzione. Complementari alle azioni finanziate dai Fondi strutturali, la Commissione ha perciò provveduto non solo a stanziare 1,8 milioni di EUR a favore di circa 500 lavoratori, ma ha promosso l'intervento statale di progetti volti a facilitare la ricerca di un impiego, fornire una formazione integrata e sostenere la creazione di nuove imprese.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió belüli gazdasági problémák, mint az infrastrukturális beruházások visszaesése és az acélárak emelkedése, súlyosan érintették az építőipari gépeket gyártó vállalatok versenyképességét. Az Európai Globalizációs Alkalmazkodási Alapot (EGAA) többek között az ilyen strukturális változások következményei által érintett munkaadók megsegítésére és támogatására szolgál. Ennek fényében támogattam a belgiumi Hainaut-Namur Glass cég kérelmét, és remélem, hogy az elbocsátott dolgozóknak nyújtandó támogatások igazi segítségnek jelentenek majd a munkaerőpiacon történő gyors elhelyezkedésükben.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The European Commission has proposed to provide Belgium with €1.8 million from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) to help 488 workers made redundant by several manufacturers of construction machinery in the province of Hainaut (Wallonia, Belgium). The aim of the funding is to help these former workers to find new jobs. 300 young people not in employment, education or training (NEETs) will also be included in the actions planned. The proposal now goes to the European Parliament and the EU's Council of Ministers for approval. As rapporteur I have voted for this report that would help the workers and the NEETs find new jobs by providing them with active career guidance, job-search support, vocational training and retraining, promotion of entrepreneurship and contributions to collective projects. Job-search and training allowances will also be made available.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report which was concerned with an application to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

Sinn Féin have called for reform of this European fund which is designed to support workers who lose their jobs as a consequence of globalisation. However, my Sinn Féin colleague Eoin Ó Broin requested documents to be released under the Freedom of Information Act which showed that millions of euro in such supports, provided through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, had already been returned to the European Commission.

Sinn Féin has called on the Minister for Education Jan O'Sullivan and Minister of State for Skills Damien English to ensure €4.15 million in funding for 424 redundant Lufthansa Technik workers in Rathcoole, Dublin, to be spent by next September's deadline as, as it stands, it appears that 63% of this fund will remain unspent.

Андрей Новаков (PPE), *в писмена форма*. – Европейският фонд за приспособяване към глобализацията (ЕФПГ) има за цел да осигурява подкрепа за съкратени работници и самостоятелно заети лица, чиято дейност е прекратена в резултат на големи структурни промени в моделите на световната търговия вследствие на глобализацията, в резултат на продължаване на световната финансова и икономическа криза или в резултат на нова световна финансова и икономическа криза, както и да подпомага тяхната реинтеграция на пазара на труда. Докладът отбелязва, че вследствие на обявеното от Caterpillar Belgium S.A. на 23 февруари 2013 г. начало на процедура за колективни съкращения в производствения му обект, разположен в Госли, повечето от неговите 1399 работници са били обект на заявление EGF/2014/011 BE/Caterpillar, и подчертава, че регион Ено е изправен пред трудна ситуация на пазара на труда с равнище на безработицата от 14,5% (5,9% по-високо от средната стойност за страната), закрити 1236 работни места през 2013 г. и 1878 през 2014 г., както и високо равнище на дълготрайната безработица. Според доклада ЕФПГ не трябва да замества мерките, които са задължение на предприятията по силата на националното законодателство.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Firma Hainaut Machinery in Belgien steht vor einer Entlassung von 480 Mitarbeitern. Diese Mitarbeiter befinden sich in einem sozioökonomisch angespannten Gebiet, das diese Unterstützung braucht. Dementsprechend habe ich für diesen Bericht gestimmt.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariu pateiktam pasiūlymui skirti finansinę paramą pagal pateiktą Belgijos paraišką.

Visų pirma, ši parama yra būtina siekiant sušvelninti esamus neigiamus padarinius. Be to, bus galima tinkami įgyvendinti priemonės, kurios padės darbuotojams integruotis į darbo rinką, didinant įsidarbinimo galimybes, suteiks galimybę pasinaudoti kvalifikacijos kėlimo kursais ar kitomis priemonėmis, atitinkančiomis jų poreikius, beje, numatytos atskiros priemonės, taikytinos tik jaunimui.

Tačiau labai svarbu užtikrinti, kad įgyvendinant visas numatytas priemones būtų laikomasi vienodo požiūrio ir nediskriminavimo principo, taip pat būtų išvengta bet kokio dvigubo finansavimo.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerato che l'Unione europea ha predisposto strumenti legislativi e di bilancio volti a sostenere i lavoratori europei che risentono della crisi economica globale o delle trasformazioni della struttura del commercio mondiale al fine di assisterli nel loro percorso di reinserimento lavorativo; considerato che il Belgio nel 2015 ha presentato domanda per beneficiare di un contributo finanziario a titolo del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione; considerato, inoltre, che, come constatato dalla Commissione, la domanda, pur non rispettando i criteri di ammissibilità previsti dal regolamento FEG, è stata presentata conformemente ai criteri indicati nell'articolo 4, paragrafo 2; considerato, infine, che, a causa della critica situazione economica e occupazionale della regione interessata, il coinvolgimento dei NEET nell'accesso al fondo anche dopo il 2017 non può non essere valutato positivamente e che le garanzie fornite dal Belgio risultano soddisfacenti, ho ritenuto opportuno votare a favore.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Zbog smanjenja proizvodnje u cijelom jednom proizvodnom sektoru u Belgiji, proizvodnji strojeva i uređaja, a koja je rezultirala otpuštanjem čak 488 radnika u regiji Hainaut koji su proglašeni viškom, a budući da EU ima instrumente, ali i obveze pomoći radnicima pogođenima velikim strukturalnim promjenama, podržala sam odluku o mobilizaciji Europskog fonda za prilagodbu globalizaciji na temelju zahtjeva kojega je podnijela Belgija. Drago mi je da će se, uz pomoć kolektivno otpuštenim radnicima, finansijska pomoć dobivena iz Fonda uložiti i u mjere za stvaranje novih mogućnosti i radnih mjesta za nezaposlene mlade kojih u ovoj regiji ima iznimno mnogo.

Belgijska regija Hainaut suočava se s teškom situacijom na tržištu rada, uz stopu zaposlenosti od 52,7 %. Tu situaciju još više otežava činjenica da se proizvodnja smanjuje u cijelom proizvodnom sektoru u Valoniji, zbog čega je u 2013. i 2014. godini izgubljeno 3114 radnih mjesta, a regionalni zavod za zapošljavanje izvještava da se od 2012. ponuda slobodnih radnih mjesta znatno smanjila. S druge strane, tržište rada regije Hainaut karakterizira visok udio nedovoljno kvalificirane radne snage (nešto više od polovine tražitelja posla nema završenu srednju školu), stoga je važno ulagati u mjere za usmjeravanje i osposobljavanje te unaprijeđenje vještina prilagođenih potrebama.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – EU je uspostavila zakonodavne i proračunske instrumente kako bi pružila dodatnu potporu radnicima koji su pogođeni posljedicama velikih strukturalnih promjena u svjetskim trgovinskim tokovima i svjetske finansijske i gospodarske krize te kako bi im se pomoglo pri ponovnom uključivanju na tržište rada. Belgija je podnijela zahtjev za finansijski doprinos iz Europskog fonda za prilagodbu globalizaciji (EGF-a) nakon otpuštanja radnika u ekonomskom sektoru proizvodnje strojeva i uređaja, te s obzirom da se predviđa da će mjerama biti obuhvaćeno 488 radnika koji su proglašeni viškom, kao i 300 mladih iz regije Hainaut koji nisu zaposleni, ne školuju se i ne osposobljavaju te su mlađi od 25 godina.

Iako zahtjev ne ispunjava kriterije prihvatljivosti iz članka 4., stavka 1. Uredbe o EGF-u, podnesen na temelju intervencijskih kriterija navedenih u članku 4. stavku 2. kojima se u dopušta odstupanje od kriterija prihvatljivosti u skladu s brojem radnika koji su proglašeni viškom, slažem se s Komisijom da su intervencijski kriteriji iz članka 4. stavka 2. Uredbe o EGF-u ispunjeni i da Belgija stoga u skladu s tom Uredbom ima pravo na finansijski doprinos u iznosu od 1 824 041 eura, što iznosi 60% ukupnog troška od 3 040 069 eura.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione è stato istituito per fornire un sostegno supplementare ai lavoratori che risentono delle conseguenze dei grandi cambiamenti strutturali del commercio mondiale. La domanda in esame si riferisce alla mobilitazione del FEG per un importo totale di 1 824 041 EUR a favore del Belgio. Essa riguarda 488 lavoratori collocati in esubero e fino a 300 giovani che non lavorano e che non partecipano ad alcun ciclo di istruzione o formazione (NEET). Secondo le autorità belghe, gli eventi che hanno causato gli esuberi sono stati il calo degli investimenti pubblici e privati nelle infrastrutture nell'UE e l'aumento considerevole dei prezzi dell'acciaio in Europa, che hanno provocato gravi perturbazioni del commercio e la perdita di competitività degli impianti europei per la produzione di macchinari da costruzione. Mi auguro che la mobilitazione del FEG possa rivelarsi uno strumento decisivo per il sostegno a questi lavoratori e un valido aiuto per le comunità colpite dalla crisi del settore di produzione di macchine edili.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – EFG pomaga pracownikom znaleźć nową pracę i zdobyć nowe umiejętności, gdy stracili pracę na skutek zmian w strukturze światowego handlu, np. w przypadku zamknięcia dużej firmy, przeniesienia fabryki poza UE czy światowego kryzysu finansowo-gospodarczego. Jest to szósty wniosek analizowany w ramach budżetu na 2016 r. oraz czternasty wniosek odnoszący się do sektora produkcji maszyn i urządzeń i dotyczy uruchomienia z EFG łącznej kwoty 1,8 mln EUR na rzecz Belgii. Dotyczy 488 zwolnionych pracowników i maksymalnie 300 objętych pomocą młodych osób niekształących się, niepracujących ani nieszkolących się (młodzież NEET). Wniosek ten jest następstwem wniosku EGF/2014/011 BE/Caterpillar dotyczącego zwolnień w zakładzie w Gosselies. Działania realizujące strategię na rzecz wzrostu i nowych miejsc pracy są godne poparcia. Niniejszym poparłem sprawozdanie.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (FEM), créé en 2006, vient en aide aux personnes ayant perdu leur emploi à la suite de changements structurels survenus dans le commerce international, à l'image de délocalisations ou de fermetures d'entreprises. Ici, ce sont 488 anciens salariés de l'entreprise belge Hainaut Machinery qui bénéficieront d'une aide totale de 1,8 million d'euros pour financer des mesures telles que l'accompagnement, l'orientation, l'aide à la création d'entreprises ou bien les allocations de recherche d'emploi.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Bonne nouvelle dans un climat social difficile: le Parlement européen a accordé à la Belgique une aide de 1 824 041 euros pour soutenir la réinsertion sur le marché du travail de 488 travailleurs licenciés par plusieurs fabricants de machines de construction de la province de Hainaut en Wallonie.

À terme, environ 300 autres jeunes chômeurs devraient également bénéficier de l'aide, provenant du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (FEM).

Cette aide est la participation européenne, à hauteur de 60 %, visant à accompagner les anciens salariés des manufactures Carwall, Caterpillar Belgium et Doosan dans leur recherche d'emploi et plus largement dans leur réorientation professionnelle.

Comme beaucoup de licenciements économiques, sont concernées des personnes travaillant dans un secteur qui subit de plein fouet la concurrence mondiale. Dans ce cas précis, le déclin des investissements publics et privés dans les infrastructures et l'augmentation significative des prix de l'acier en Europe ont provoqué de graves perturbations dans le commerce, sapant la compétitivité des usines européennes de machines de construction.

Cette aide financière est donc la bienvenue pour les familles de ces travailleurs. L'enjeu majeur pour la Commission Juncker est maintenant d'instaurer une politique industrielle européenne à même d'optimiser le savoir-faire européen dans les secteurs de pointe.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai bien sûr voté en faveur de cette mobilisation du Fond européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation. Pour rappel, la Belgique avait déposé une demande en vue d'obtenir une contribution financière de ce Fonds européen à la suite des licenciements intervenus dans le secteur économique relevant de la fabrication de machines et équipements, en province de Hainaut. Des licenciements étaient intervenus chez Carwall, Caterpillar Belgium et Doosan suite aux perturbations survenues ces dernières années dans le commerce des machines de construction sur le marché européen et mondial (la demande des produits chez ces trois entreprises avait baissé en conséquence).

Il est à préciser qu'outre les 488 travailleurs licenciés, 300 jeunes de moins de 25 ans de cette même région qui ne travaillent pas devraient être concernés par les mesures et bénéficier de services personnalisés cofinancés par le Fonds, notamment: une mobilisation et orientation en vue d'entamer de nouvelles études ou formations spécifiques, une mise à niveau personnalisée des compétences, etc.

Toutefois, le règlement relatif au Fonds prévoit actuellement que cet accès ne peut être accordé que jusqu'au 31 décembre 2017. J'en profite donc pour demander la révision du règlement dans le cadre de la révision du cadre financier pluriannuel afin que ces personnes puissent continuer à bénéficier de cet accès après 2017.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), raštu. – „Hainaut Machinery“ paraiška pasinaudoti Europos globalizacijos fondo parama – liūdna globalizacijos ir aštrėjančios globalios konkurencinės kovos išdava. Tačiau tam, kad užsidarant stambioms įmonėms žmonės neatsidurtų tiesiog gatvėje, ir buvo įsteigtas Prisitaikymo prie globalizacijos padarinių fondas. Mūsų svarstomas atvejis ganėtinai liūdnas – 1 399 darbuotojai buvo atleisti 2014 metais. Dabar paramos prašoma dar didesniais skaičiais. Ir visa tai vyksta regione, kuriame darbo rinkos padėtis ir taip yra sunki, nedarbo lygis siekia 14,5 proc., arba 5,9 proc. daugiau už nacionalinį vidurkį. Nuo 2012 m. Hainaut (Heno) regione darbo pasiūlymų sumažėjo 13 proc. o pačiai rinkai būdingas didelis nekvalifikuotų darbuotojų skaičius: beveik pusė darbo ieškančių asmenų neturi vidurinio išsilavinimo.

Todėl šį pasiūlymą palaikau vienareikšmiškai ir kartu raginu valstybes nares imtis priemonių, padedančių išvengti tokių stambių darbuotojų atleidimų.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), por escrito. – O presente relatório diz respeito a uma proposta de decisão do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa à mobilização do Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização (FEaG), no montante de € 1 824 041 a favor da Bélgica, a fim de apoiar a reintegração no mercado de trabalho de 488 trabalhadores despedidos por três empresas que operam no sector económico da fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos, sector este que sofreu em virtude do declínio verificado nos investimentos públicos e privados em infraestruturas na UE e que foi bastante afetado pelo aumento considerável dos preços do aço na Europa.

Da análise efetuada, foi possível concluir que a candidatura reúne os pressupostos de atribuição do fundo previsto no Regulamento FEaG, pelo que votei favoravelmente a atribuição desta contribuição financeira, que será canalizada para apoio, orientação e integração dos trabalhadores despedidos, procurando facilitar a procura de emprego, o apoio à criação de empresas, projetos coletivos e ainda subsídios à formação.

Os 300 jovens que não trabalham, não estudam nem seguem qualquer formação serão também contemplados com medidas de mobilização e orientação para iniciar ações complementares de educação e formação, no âmbito das ações elegíveis previstas pelo artigo 7º do Regulamento FEG.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), per iscritto. – Il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione è uno strumento di cui l'Unione europea dispone per fornire un sostegno supplementare e aiutare il reinserimento nel mercato del lavoro di quei lavoratori che risentono delle conseguenze del processo di globalizzazione a livello economico o della crisi economica e finanziaria globale. In questo specifico caso la richiesta di mobilitazione del Fondo è stata avanzata dal Belgio, al fine di riallocare circa 500 lavoratori nel settore manifatturiero. In un'Europa costantemente criticata per le politiche di austerità imposte ai suoi Stati membri, il Fondo di adeguamento rappresenta una nota positiva, per questo motivo ho dato il mio voto a favore della relazione. Si tratta di un'occasione per riflettere sulle sfide poste dalla globalizzazione alle quali l'UE non può più aspettare di rispondere. Soluzioni parziali non fanno che tamponare il problema, ma è necessario riflettere su soluzioni lungimiranti, che sappiano rilanciare la crescita e l'occupazione a lungo termine, ed efficaci, ovvero all'altezza delle sfide rappresentate dal commercio globale.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Votamos a favor en este informe, puesto que promueve unos fondos destinados a compensar y establecer medidas indemnizatorias en casos de relocalización o cierres de empresas por los cambios estructurales de los mercados a causa de la globalización. Servirán para atender la situación de los trabajadores despedidos, y ayudas a jóvenes sin estudios ni empleo, en la ya castigada por el desempleo, región de Hainaut (Bélgica), en el sector de la fabricación de maquinaria y equipamientos industriales, que vienen de un proceso anterior de despidos. Se trata de medidas que, de no existir dejarían en peor lugar a los trabajadores afectados. Este tipo de medidas tienen efecto sólo a corto plazo, pero no solucionan el problema a largo plazo, puesto que la cuestión del empleo y las relocalizaciones debieran tener otro enfoque de actuación. Por un lado, Europa necesita un plan de inversión, de un corte sumamente diferente al de Juncker, y otra política de empleo, para actuar en materia laboral. En segundo lugar, esa alternativa debiera consistir en invertir en actividades de futuro, especialmente en un cambio de modelo productivo.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea raportului Negrescu privind mobilizarea Fondului european de ajustare la globalizare.

Mă bucur că, în urma acestei decizii, 488 de muncitori disponibilizați, dar și 300 de tineri cu vârsta sub 25 de ani din regiunea Hainaut, care nu sunt încadrați profesional, vor beneficia de sprijin pentru obținerea unui loc de muncă, cursuri de formare, recalificare și formare vocațională, contribuție pentru înființarea de întreprinderi și alocații sociale sau de mobilitate.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über den Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Inanspruchnahme des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (Antrag Belgiens – EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery)“ gestimmt, da wir unseren Bürgern in Zeiten schneller wirtschaftlicher Veränderungen auch helfen sollten.

Das jetzt beschlossene Paket stellt Geld für Beratung, Weiterbildung und Hilfe bei Unternehmensgründungen für circa 800 Menschen dar, 300 davon sind jüngere Menschen, denen entweder die Ausbildung fehlt oder die noch nie einen Job hatten. Ein ähnliches Paket wurde auch schon für deutsche Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten beschlossen.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del informe ya que permite la movilización de un importe de 1 824 041 euros a raíz 488 trabajadores y trabajadoras despedidas de la empresa Hainaut Machinery, así como 300 jóvenes de la región de Hainaut que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación (ninis) y tienen menos de 25 años. Esta movilización de fondos tiene como objetivo mitigar las desastrosas consecuencias sociales de la crisis económica del sistema capitalista.

Si bien estos fondos no son capaces de solucionar las problemáticas de estos trabajadores y trabajadoras en Bélgica, al menos dan la posibilidad de paliar una pequeña parte del drama humano. Es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *písomne*. – Plne podporujem opatrenia, ktoré zavádzajú politiky na vytváranie rastu a pracovných miest. Napriek tomu som hlasoval proti tomuto uzneseniu. Nemyslím si totiž, že Európsky fond na prispôsobenie sa globalizácii je správnym nástrojom na zavedenie takýchto politík a ani si nemyslím že je to efektívny nástroj, ktorý by ponúkal patričnú hodnotu (formou reintegrácie nadbytočných pracovníkov späť na trh práce) za vynaložené peniaze.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Európsky fond na prispôsobenie sa globalizácii bol vytvorený na poskytovanie podpory pracovníkom postihnutým dôsledkami veľkých štrukturálnych zmien v štruktúre svetového obchodu s cieľom poskytovať podporu pracovníkom, ktorí boli prepustení v dôsledku globalizácie alebo finančnej a hospodárskej krízy. Na základe žiadosti Belgicka sme schválili sumu 1 824 000 EUR pre 488 prepustených pracovníkov v troch podnikoch pôsobiacich pri výrobe strojov a zariadení. V rámci tohto projektu sa podporí aj 300 mladých ľudí mladších ako 25 rokov. Pre prepustených pracovníkov a mladých ľudí budú poskytnuté personalizované služby, medzi ktoré patria: mobilizácia a usmerňovanie buď na účely ďalšieho vzdelávania a odbornej prípravy, alebo s cieľom absolvovať úvodné školenia, pomocou ktorých sa identifikujú záujmy, špecifické vzdelávacie kurzy, individuálne zvyšovanie kvalifikácie, príspevky na hľadanie zamestnania a odbornú prípravu a mobilitu.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Európska únia sa snaží podporovať nezamestnaných ľudí, ktorí boli náhle prepustení. EÚ pre nich vytvorila personalizované služby, ktorí poskytujú nezamestnaným podporu, usmernenie a integráciu.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Tvrtka Caterpillar Belgium SA je uslijed znatnog porasta cijena čelika u Europi otpustila 1399 radnika u regiji Hainaut gdje trenutna stopa nezaposlenosti iznosi visokih 14,5 % (5,9 % više od nacionalnog prosjeka). Izvješće napominje kako će se iz spomenutog fonda financirati integrirano osposobljavanje radnika, potpora za pokretanje poduzeća i skupne projekte kao i troškove naknada za traženje posla i osposobljavanje.

Uzimajući u obzir to da se Unija obvezuje radnicima, koji su proglašenim viškom zbog posljedica ekonomske krize, finansijsku pomoć pružiti u što kraćem roku, vrlo je važno da se ovaj prijedlog usvoji što prije. Podržavam izvješće Odbora za proračune s obzirom na to da će pokretanjem fonda za prilagodbu globalizaciji regija Hainaut (BE32) moći pružiti dodatnu potporu radnicima te nezaposlenim mladima koji su pogođeni padom konkurentnosti europskih proizvođača.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan.* – Europski fond za prilagodbu globalizaciji (EFG) stvoren je kako bi se osigurala dodatna pomoć radnicima koji su izravno pogođeni posljedicama velikih strukturnih promjena u svjetskoj trgovini uzoraka. Dana 4. svibnja 2016., Komisija je usvojila prijedlog za odluku o mobilizaciji EGF-a u korist Belgije za potporu reintegraciji na tržište rada radnika koji su postali višak u 3 poduzeća koja posluju pod NACE Revizija 2 Divizija 28 (Proizvodnja strojeva i opreme) u razini NUTS 2 regije Hainaut (BE32) u Belgiji. Belgijske vlasti navode da su događaji koji su doveli do otpuštanja, pad javne i privatne investicije u infrastrukturu u EU-u i značajan porast cijena čelika u Europi, uzrokuju ozbiljne poremećaje u trgovini.

Podržavam prijedlog ove Rezolucije jer smatram da je njen cilj pružiti potporu radnicima koji su postali višak i samozaposlene osobe, čija je aktivnost prestala kao posljedica velikih strukturnih promjena u svjetskoj trgovini uzoraka uslijed globalizacije, kao rezultat nastavka globalne financijske i gospodarske krize, te kako bi im pomogli u njihovoj reintegraciji na tržištu rada.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno.* – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu sklepa Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o uporabi sredstev Evropskega sklada za prilagoditev globalizaciji – vloga iz Belgije Hainaut Machinery.

Evropski sklad za prilagoditev globalizaciji se izvaja kot izraz solidarnosti Evropske unije, ki predstavlja enega od temeljev na katerih je bila skupnost zgrajena.

Z današnjo potrditvijo na plenarnem zasедanju bomo z 1.824.041 evrov pomagali 488 presežnim delavcem iz treh podjetij v sektorju proizvodnje drugih strojev in opreme v belgijski regiji Hainaut ter 300 mladim, ki niso zaposleni, se ne izobražujejo ali usposablajo in so mlajši od 25 let.

Zelo pomembna je skladnost usposabljanj s potrebami v regiji in sosednjih regijah in pozornost potrebam starejših delavcev. Za starejše delavce je večje tveganje, da postanejo dolgoročno brezposelni in socialno izključeni, zato imajo posebne potrebe, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri podpori.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραπτώς.* – Τα χρήματα του Ταμείου Προσαρμογής πρέπει να δίνονται κατά βάση στους απολυμένους και όχι σε προγράμματα επανένταξης ή μετεκπαίδευσης. Δεν χρειαζόμαστε εξειδικευμένους ανέργους.

Hannu Takkula (ALDE), *kirjallinen.* – Äänestin globalisaatiovarojen käyttöönoton puolesta, koska kovien rakennemuutosten edessä olevia alueita on autettava ja Belgian hakemus oli asiallisesti täytetty. Myös Suomessa näille varoille on tarvetta esimerkiksi Oulun ja Salon kaupunkien kohdalla.

Claudia Tapardel (S&D), *in writing.* – The EU has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns or of the global financial and economic crisis and to assist their reintegration into the labour market. I welcome the green light for the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF) in Belgium, which will cover the 488 redundancies of the enterprise Hainaut Machinery operating in the economic sector during the reference period 25 December 2014 to 25 September 2015.

The EGAF funding of EUR 1 824 041 shall contribute to the costs of a coordinated package of eligible personalised services, providing assistance for 488 targeted beneficiaries following redundancies in three enterprises operating in the Hainaut region in the construction machinery sector, as well, as for 300 targeted young persons not in employment, education or training (NEETs) under the age of 25, with the aim of providing assistance for integrating the affected persons into the labour market. The redundancies were caused by major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation. This is the sixth mobilisation of the EGAF in 2016.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit.* – Le Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (FEM) a été créé pour fournir un appui complémentaire aux travailleurs subissant les conséquences de modifications majeures de la structure du commerce international.

En vertu des dispositions de l'article 12 du règlement (UE, Euratom) n° 1311/2013 fixant le cadre financier pluriannuel pour la période 2014-2020 et de l'article 15 du règlement (UE) n° 1309/2013, la dotation annuelle du FEM ne peut excéder 150 000 000 EUR (aux prix de 2011). Les montants nécessaires sont inscrits au budget général de l'Union européenne à titre de provision.

En ce qui concerne la procédure, conformément au point 13 de l'accord interinstitutionnel du 2 décembre 2013 entre le Parlement européen, le Conseil et la Commission sur la discipline budgétaire, la coopération en matière budgétaire et la bonne gestion financière, la Commission, pour activer le FEM lorsque la demande a fait l'objet d'une évaluation favorable, présente à l'autorité budgétaire une proposition de mobilisation du FEM et, simultanément, la demande de virement correspondante. En cas de désaccord, une procédure de trilogue est engagée.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of mobilising the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to support the reintegration in the labour market of workers in Belgium who lost their jobs at Hainaut Machinery, a company producing construction equipment. In recent years, trade in the sector of machinery and equipment manufacture has suffered significantly because of the declining public and private investments in infrastructure, the increasing cost of steel, and the delocalisation of production to other countries. Furthermore, the situation of Hainaut Machinery also has a negative effect on the suppliers as well as on the local and regional economy of the region Hainaut, which has been facing an unemployment rate of 14.5%. The fund will thus provide the former employees with much needed advice, guidance and training to improve their future employability, will offer training allowances and facilitate their job-search.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Europski fond za prilagodbu globalizaciji pruža podršku osobama koje su izgubile posao kao rezultat znatnih strukturalnih promjena u tokovima svjetske trgovine zbog globalizacije, zatvaranja velikih poduzeća ili preseljenja proizvodnje izvan Europske unije, ili kao rezultat globalne ekonomske i financijske krize. Belgija je u skladu s ovim programom podnijela zahtjev EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery za financijski doprinos iz Europskog fonda za prilagodbu globalizaciji, nakon otpuštanja u ekonomskom sektoru.

Kao zastupnica u Europskom parlamentu podržavam sve mjere za otvaranje novih radnih mjesta i rast, no smatram da Europski fond za prilagodbu globalizaciji nije učinkovit alat za reintegraciju viška radnika i u načelu ne podržavam njegov rad te sam glasovala protiv ovog Izvješća.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Evropski sklad za prilagoditev globalizaciji je bil ustanovljen za zagotovitev dodatne pomoči delavcem, ki so jih prizadele posledice velikih strukturnih sprememb v svetovnih trgovinskih tokovih.

Predlog o uporabi sredstev Evropskega sklada za prilagoditev globalizaciji sem podprla.

V primeru Belgije gre namreč za 488 delavcev, ki so bili odpuščeni v referenčnem obdobju od 25. decembra 2014 do 25. septembra 2015, in za 300 brezposelnih mladih.

V zadnjih letih je znotraj Unije trgovina na področju gradbenih strojev doživela resne motnje zaradi upada javnih in zasebnih naložb v infrastrukturo. To je povzročilo dramatično izgubo tržnega deleža za evropske proizvajalce skupaj z znatnim povečanjem cen jekla v Evropi.

Delavci stari med 55 in 64 let predstavljajo 35,9 % vseh ciljnih upravičencev Evropskega sklada za prilagoditev globalizaciji, saj so podvrženi večjemu tveganju za dolgotrajno brezposelnost in socialno izključenost.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor en este informe, puesto que promueve unos fondos destinados a compensar y establecer medidas indemnizatorias en casos de relocalización o cierres de empresas por los cambios estructurales de los mercados a causa de la globalización. Servirán para atender la situación de los trabajadores despedidos, y ayudas a jóvenes sin estudios ni empleo, en la ya castigada por el desempleo, región de Hainaut (Bélgica), en el sector de la fabricación de maquinaria y equipamientos industriales, que vienen de un proceso anterior de despidos. Se trata de medidas que, de no existir dejarían en peor lugar a los trabajadores afectados. Este tipo de medidas tienen efecto sólo a corto plazo, pero no solucionan el problema a largo plazo, puesto que la cuestión del empleo y las relocalizaciones debieran tener otro enfoque de actuación. Por un lado, Europa necesita un plan de inversión, de un corte sumamente diferente al de Juncker, y otra política de empleo, para actuar en materia laboral. En segundo lugar, esa alternativa debiera consistir en invertir en actividades de futuro, especialmente en un cambio de modelo productivo.

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – For several reasons that may change in every country, companies strategies affect their workers' jobs and lives. That is why I support this resolution, to help in an effective and fast way those who are suffering from the consequences of structural changes in world trade patterns or of the global financial and economic crisis and to assist their reintegration into the labour market.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport propose une mobilisation du Fonds d'ajustement à la mondialisation en vue d'accorder une aide de 1,824 million d'euros pour la réintégration sur le marché de 488 travailleurs licenciés par 3 compagnies dans le secteur de la fabrication de machines dans le Hainaut, ainsi qu'un soutien à 300 jeunes sans emploi, ni formation ou diplôme («NEET»).

La Belgique avance la mondialisation comme raison essentielle de la crise de ce secteur, mais aussi la diminution de l'investissement public et privé qui a comprimé la demande de machines.

S'il faut soutenir les travailleurs licenciés qui subissent les conséquences des décisions prises par l'UE, il ne faut pas que ces aides dédouanent les gouvernements de leur responsabilité.

J'ai voté POUR ce texte.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Europejski Fundusz Dostosowania do Globalizacji (EFG) powstał po to, aby pomagać pracownikom, którzy ucierpieli wskutek przemian wynikających ze zmian w międzynarodowym handlu. Narzędzia, które są przewidziane w ramach pomocy zwolnionym pracownikom, to m.in. szkolenia, doradztwo zawodowe czy wsparcie na tworzenie przedsiębiorstw. Postanowiłem zagłosować za przyjęciem wniosku.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Az alap célja, hogy a világkereskedelem fő strukturális változásainak következményei által sújtott, vagy a globális pénzügyi és gazdasági válság következtében elbocsátott munkavállalóknak, és támogassa újbóli munkaerő-piaci beilleszkedésüket. A belga kérelem kapcsán támogatóan szavaztam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor en este informe, puesto que promueve unos fondos destinados a compensar y establecer medidas indemnizatorias en casos de relocalización o cierres de empresas por los cambios estructurales de los mercados a causa de la globalización. Servirán para atender la situación de los trabajadores despedidos, y ayudas a jóvenes sin estudios ni empleo, en la ya castigada por el desempleo, región de Hainaut (Bélgica), en el sector de la fabricación de maquinaria y equipamientos industriales, que vienen de un proceso anterior de despidos. Se trata de medidas que, de no existir dejarían en peor lugar a los trabajadores afectados. Este tipo de medidas tienen efecto sólo a corto plazo, pero no solucionan el problema a largo plazo, puesto que la cuestión del empleo y las relocalizaciones debieran tener otro enfoque de actuación. Por un lado, Europa necesita un plan de inversión, de un corte sumamente diferente al de Juncker, y otra política de empleo, para actuar en materia laboral. En segundo lugar, esa alternativa debiera consistir en invertir en actividades de futuro, especialmente en un cambio de modelo productivo.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Visų pirma palankiai vertinu Belgijos valdžios institucijų poziciją ir bendradarbiavimą su socialiniais partneriais remiant bendrus projektus, skirtus darbuotojams, svarstantiems galimybę kartu kaip grupei įsteigti vadinamąją socialinę įmonę, nes ši priemonė gali turėti itin didelę pridėtinę vertę; palankiai vertinu tai, kad tikimasi, jog be 488 atleistų darbuotojų taip pat 300 jaunesnių nei 25 metų amžiaus nedirbančių ir nesimokančių jaunuolių (NEET), gyvenančių tame pačiame regione, dalyvaus taikant priemones ir gaus iš EGF bendrai finansuojamas prie individualių poreikių pritaikytas paslaugas, kurios apima: įtraukimą ir konsultavimą nukreipiant mokytis arba pasiūlant įvadinius kursus interesams nustatyti; specialius mokymo kursus; prie individualių poreikių pritaikytą kvalifikacijos kėlimą; darbo paieškos, mokymo ir judumo išmokas.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (application from Belgium - EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery). The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund has been created in order to provide additional assistance to workers suffering from the consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns. The report highlights the need to improve employability of all workers by adapted training and expects that the training offered in the coordinated package will meet both needs of the workers and the business environment in the region and in the neighbouring regions. In addition, the report calls on Member States to prepare, together with the social partners, strategies to anticipate the projected labour market changes and to protect Union jobs and skills, especially when negotiating trade agreements in order to ensure fair competition rules and common measures against economic, social and environmental dumping. The report equally highlights the need of improving employability of all workers by adapted training and expects that the training offered in the coordinated package will meet both needs of the

workers and the business environment in the region and in the neighbouring regions.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Hablamos de un fondo que se dedica a tramitar transferencias de fondos para atender indemnizaciones por despidos máximos por el cese de diferentes actividades empresariales de los Estados miembros. En este caso estamos hablando de una transferencia que viene a reintegrar a 488 trabajadores del sector manufacturero en la región belga de Hainaut y para el apoyo de 300 jóvenes desempleados a través de la educación y la formación. Es por tanto oportuno votar a favor de dicho informe.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del informe ya que permite la movilización de un importe de 1 824 euros a raíz 488 trabajadores despedidos de la empresa Hainaut Machinery, así como 300 jóvenes de la región de Hainaut que no trabajan ni siguen estudios ni formación (ninis) y tienen menos de 25 años. Esta movilización de fondos tiene como objetivo mitigar las desastrosas consecuencias sociales de la crisis económica del sistema capitalista.

Si bien estos fondos no son capaces de solucionar las problemáticas de estos trabajadores en Bélgica, al menos dan la posibilidad de paliar una pequeña parte del drama humano. Es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor del presente informe.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Het Europees Fonds voor aanpassing aan de globalisering (EFG) is opgericht om extra steun te verlenen aan werknemers die lijden onder de gevolgen van grote structurele veranderingen omwille van de globalisering. Op 4 mei 2016 heeft de Commissie een voorstel goedgekeurd voor een besluit betreffende de beschikbaarstelling van middelen uit het EFG aan België om de terugkeer naar de arbeidsmarkt te steunen van werknemers die gedwongen zijn ontslagen bij drie ondernemingen in Henegouwen. Ik stond achter deze Belgische vraag.

Paavo Väyrynen (ALDE), *kirjallinen*. – Mietintö Euroopan globalisaatiorahaston varojen käyttöön otosta noudattaa linjaa, jota olen ylläpitänyt. Mielestäni Euroopan globalisaatiorahasto tulisi lakkauttaa ja yhdistää Euroopan sosiaalirahastoon. Kuitenkin, kun tämä ohjelma on vielä käytössä ja sillä on tuettu muun muassa Oulun ja Salon seutuja niitä kohdanneissa äkillisissä rakennemuutoksissa, tuen myös tätä mietintöä. Belgian Hainaut'n työllisyystilanne on alueella toimineen yrityksen, Belgian Caterpillarin joukkovähentämisen nettelyn takia kestävä ja siksi EU:n tukitoimet ovat perusteltuja.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die belgische Firma Hainaut Machinery sieht sich gezwungen, 480 Mitarbeiter zu entlassen, welchen bei der Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt geholfen werden soll. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Betrag in Höhe von 1,8 Mio. EUR. Die belgischen Behörden führen an, dass die Entlassungen durch die rückläufigen öffentlichen und privaten Infrastrukturinvestitionen in der EU und den deutlichen Anstieg der Stahlpreise in Europa ausgelöst wurden. Ich bin der Meinung, dass es richtig ist, diesen Menschen, welche einer verfehlten Wirtschaftspolitik zum Opfer fielen, eine Perspektive zu bieten.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφτως*. – Το συγκεκριμένο αίτημα είναι το έκτο εντός του 2016 και αφορά τον κλάδο της κατασκευής μηχανημάτων και ειδών εξοπλισμού. Σύμφωνα με τη σχετική έκθεση, από την υπόθεση αυτή έχουν πληγεί περίπου 800 άτομα στην Βαλλωνία του Βελγίου. Το συνολικό ποσό ανέρχεται στα 1 824 041 ευρώ από το ΕΤΠ για το Βέλγιο. Υποστήριξη την έκθεση.

Marco Zanni (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Abbiamo votato oggi la richiesta di mobilitazione del FEG a favore del Belgio per facilitare il reinserimento professionale di lavoratori collocati in esubero da 3 imprese operanti nel settore della fabbricazione di macchinari e apparecchiature, concentrate nella regione di Hainaut. Da sottolineare che questa richiesta è da considerarsi complementare ad una prima domanda presentata dal Belgio nel 2014, poiché la causa all'origine è da ritrovarsi nell'annuncio effettuato dalla Caterpillar Belgium S.A., il 23 febbraio 2013, in merito all'avvio di una procedura di licenziamento collettivo nel suo impianto di produzione situato a Gosselies. La maggior parte dei quasi 1 400 lavoratori collocati in esubero dall'azienda sono stati considerati dal FEG nel 2014, mentre oggi si chiede un contributo di 1 824 041 EUR (su un costo totale di circa 3 milioni), per aiutare il reinserimento di 488 lavoratori collocati in esubero e per sostenere fino a 300 giovani che non lavorano e che non partecipano ad alcun ciclo di istruzione o formazione. Sono favorevole come regola generale alla mobilitazione di questo fondo, pur essendo consapevole che non si tratti probabilmente dello strumento che meglio possa aiutare i lavoratori colpiti da crisi aziendali, ma in mancanza di valide alternative ritengo che debba essere comunque sostenuto.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o predlogu sklepa Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o uporabi sredstev Evropskega sklada za prilagoditev globalizaciji – vloga iz Belgije Hainaut Machinery.

Namen Evropskega sklada za prilagoditev globalizaciji (ESPG) je zagotavljati podporo delavcem, ki so postali presežni zaradi velikih strukturnih sprememb v svetovnih trgovinskih tokovih, ki so posledica globalizacije in svetovne finančne in gospodarske krize ter pomagati pri njihovi ponovni vključitvi na trg dela.

9.7. Mehrjähriger Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun (A8-0367/2015 - Gabriel Mato)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señor Presidente, hoy es un gran día para los pescadores de atún rojo y, en especial, para los de Canarias. El Parlamento Europeo ha dicho, por aplastante mayoría, que el reparto de cuotas para pescar atún rojo tiene que ser más justo y que los Estados miembros tienen que tener en cuenta a los barcos tradicionales que hacen una pesca artesanal y más sostenible. Y ese es nuestro caso. El plan de recuperación es evidente que ha funcionado. Hay, por tanto, posibilidad de aumentar las cuotas notablemente, y ese aumento debe ir dirigido fundamentalmente a estas flotas.

No puede volver a repetirse que una flota artesanal, como la canaria, con una cuota miserable, vea cómo se cierra esta pesquería en 24 horas, por haber consumido dicha cuota. Agradezco al Parlamento el apoyo mayoritario a mi propuesta, y mi voto es un sí rotundo a una pesca sostenible y a un reparto de cuotas de atún rojo mucho más justo.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE). – Señor Presidente, quiero apoyar este Reglamento, que convierte en legislación europea las recomendaciones de la CICA y apostar por una metodología que, de acuerdo con las estimaciones científicas, va consiguiendo recuperar los stocks de atún rojo en el mar. Esa especie es crucial, especialmente para el delicado ecosistema mediterráneo, y una de las más valoradas del mundo. Por ello, recuperación y mantenimiento de la actividad pesquera deben ir de la mano.

En ese sentido, destaco mi especial apoyo a tres cuestiones fundamentales. La primera, mi total acuerdo con ofrecer un especial reconocimiento a las artes tradicionales con que se pesca esta especie: o el palangre, o la pesca de cebo vivo o la almadraza. Hablamos de artes que tienen un bajo impacto en los ecosistemas marinos, un alto grado de selectividad de las capturas y, además, una apreciable capacidad para poder crear empleo. La segunda, apostar por una distribución más equitativa de las cuotas de pesca entre las distintas flotas, con especial consideración hacia la pesca artesanal y de pequeña escala. Y, finalmente, consolidar las competencias que tiene este Parlamento en la transposición de las recomendaciones de las organizaciones regionales de pesca, que son competencia de esta Cámara y del Consejo y no deben solventarse mediante actos delegados de la Comisión.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL). – Señor Presidente, quiero utilizar esta oportunidad para explicar por qué me he abstenido en este informe. Es porque en el paso de este Reglamento del Parlamento al Consejo hemos perdido algo: la defensa explícita de cuotas adicionales y específicas para el atún de almadraza. No basta con una referencia a las almadrazas, como se hace en este documento. Hay que defenderlas y apoyarlas, porque el atún de almadraza representa pesca con derechos, pesca ligada a un territorio y a una economía de proximidad. Representa pesca medioambientalmente sostenible, aunque se le haya olvidado al Gobierno del PP en su injusto reparto de cuotas.

No quiero extenderme, porque todo esto es algo que esta Cámara ya conoce y que deberá defender con más firmeza frente a los Gobiernos del Consejo en el futuro. Nosotros no abandonamos nuestro compromiso. Hemos presentado en la Comisión de Pesca dos proyectos piloto con los que buscamos proteger y defender la producción del atún de almadraza mediante cuotas específicas y una etiqueta especial para este producto, iniciativa que —confío— recibirá el voto favorable.

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore di questa relazione perché è un bene che il piano dell'ICCAT sia stato un vero successo e che oggi i nostri mari, il Mar Mediterraneo in particolare, abbondino di tonno rosso.

Però io voglio sottolineare che sono stati i pescatori a fare grandi sforzi per rispettare i limiti imposti e oggi devono essere proprio i pescatori a tornare a pescare. Invece purtroppo non è così. L'aumento delle quote in seguito al ripopolamento del tonno rosso non ha per nulla coinvolto la piccola pesca. Sono sempre e solo i grandi armatori a beneficiare e così, dunque, a poter sfruttare un mare che è tornato sì ad essere ricco e che quindi potrebbe tornare ad essere il perno economico di migliaia di piccoli pescatori e delle piccole aziende familiari che vivono in mare.

La politica europea della pesca deve schierarsi, allora, scegliere una giusta direzione, e io suggerisco quella del sostegno alla pesca artigianale e tradizionale, scelgo la piccola pesca, gli operatori che per secoli hanno contato sul mare e che oggi sono schiacciati da regole e da interessi economici che hanno poco a che fare con la sostenibilità ambientale.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – La Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonnidati nell'Atlantico (ICCAT) ha la facoltà di adottare raccomandazioni, dal carattere vincolante, per la conservazione e la gestione della pesca. Tra le specie ittiche protette dall'ICCAT, il tonno rosso assume senza dubbio un'importanza centrale, considerando le numerose decisioni adottate fin dal 2006 per limitarne, ad esempio, le catture ad una percentuale massima concessa. Pertanto, ho espresso voto favorevole poiché ritengo che simili strategie andranno non solo a favore dell'ambiente e della biodiversità, ma potranno tra l'altro garantire uno sviluppo economico sostenibile.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento derogará el Reglamento (CE) n.º 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CCAA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadraba, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque ha supuesto un grave paso atrás en favor de la pesca industrial del atún y un reparto justo de las cuotas pesqueras. Este informe supone el resultado de los trilogos con Comisión y Consejo sobre el plan de recuperación del atún rojo. La posición inicial del parlamento, que apoyamos, contenía disposiciones en favor de artes tradicionales, sostenibles y de pequeña escala, en específico sobre la almadraba. La propuesta del Parlamento habría permitido una mejora de la situación de las almadrabas con un incremento de las cuotas para las mismas que suponen un incremento de la explotación sostenible de atún. Sin embargo todas estas referencias han quedado borradas en el proceso de los trilogos relegando la almadraba a una mera referencia sin poder vinculante alguno. Es por esto por lo que no he podido votar a favor del presente informe.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce projet qui, malgré quelques problèmes (demande de la part de la Commission de procéder à des actes délégués, seuls quelques thoniers profitent des stocks reconstitués), permet de respecter la procédure de codécision établie entre la Commission européenne et le Parlement. Ce texte permet en outre de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'atlantique (ICCAT), comme la Commission le souhaitait.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this report, which was concerned with technical measures concerning caging operations in the Mediterranean.

The report which was a multi annual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean put in place by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) in 2006 to address the alarming depletion in stock levels. However, it should be noted that the provisions contained within the recovery plan do not apply to Ireland

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Η παρούσα έκθεση αφορά την πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου αποκατάστασης του ερυθρού τόνου στον Ανατολικό Ατλαντικό και στη Μεσόγειο και για την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 302/2009. Η θέσπιση ποσοστώσεων και κανόνων στην αλιεία για την προστασία των αποθεμάτων του ερυθρού τόνου είναι ένα ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό ζήτημα. Εγώ υπερψήφισα την παραπάνω πρόταση κανονισμού, καθώς, προκειμένου να υπάρχει μία ενιαία και αποτελεσματική νομοθεσία σε όλη την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, θα πρέπει τα μέτρα που περιλαμβάνονται στο σχέδιο αποκατάστασης και ψηφίστηκαν το 2012 και 2014 να ενσωματωθούν σε κανονισμό της Ένωσης και να εφαρμοστούν από όλα τα κράτη μέλη.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les stocks de thon ont été reconstitués. Le débat porte sur une simple transposition de la convention de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thons de l'Atlantique.

La Commission européenne voulant agir très vite, elle demande de pouvoir faire des actes délégués. Mais le rapporteur a défendu la procédure de codécision, afin de défendre les prérogatives du Parlement européen.

Quelques thoniers seulement profitent des stocks; la pêche artisanale est en grande partie exclue, alors même que tout le monde prétend la défendre. Toutefois, la Commission européenne ainsi que les députés soulignent la protection qui doit être accordée à des modes de pêche traditionnels du thon rouge, tels que la madrague. Ces modes de pêche sont très sélectifs et donc respectueux de l'environnement. La Commission précise qu'elle va faire bénéficier ces modes de pêche traditionnels d'un régime spécifique avantageux.

La Commission souhaitait aller au-delà des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique. Les députés s'y sont opposés par amendement.

Ainsi, dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT.

J'ai donc voté favorablement à ce rapport.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le débat porte sur une simple transposition de la convention ICCAT (Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique).

De plus, ce rapport défend la procédure de codécision et les prérogatives du Parlement européen alors que la Commission demande de faire des actes délégués sous prétexte de pouvoir agir plus vite.

Enfin, contre la Commission qui souhaitait aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT, ce rapport vise au contraire à un meilleur respect des directives actuelles; j'ai donc voté en sa faveur.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – Dans le contexte de la nouvelle politique commune de la pêche, j'ai approuvé la transposition dans le droit de l'Union des mesures du plan pluriannuel de reconstitution pour le thon rouge de l'Atlantique Est et de la Méditerranée qui ont été adoptées par la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA) entre 2012 et 2014.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Nel 2006 l'ICCAT, la Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonnidell'Atlantico, ha adottato un piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso, composto da una serie di misure che devono essere seguite sino al 2022. L'Unione europea, che è parte di questa organizzazione regionale per la gestione della pesca, è chiamata ad adottare una serie di strumenti normativi per recepire le decisioni vincolanti stabilite in quella sede, in particolare relativamente al periodo 2012-2014. La relazione Mato, che ho sostenuto con il mio voto, presenta alcune modifiche alla proposta dalla Commissione che ha come obiettivo quello di recepire le raccomandazioni dell'ICCAT. Il testo approvato sottolinea in particolare il ruolo chiave che hanno le tonnare artigianali nella conservazione degli stock ittici. Il piano di ricostituzione dovrebbe favorire proprio un maggiore impiego di questi mezzi tradizionali che garantiscono non solo una selettività superiore ma hanno anche un impatto molto ridotto sugli ecosistemi marini.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado ABSTENCIÓN porque si bien el informe subraya el papel de las artes de pesca artesanales, como las tradicionales almadrabas, consideramos que a la hora de aplicar el plan de recuperación, la UE debe enfatizar aún más en el uso de trampas tradicionales que contribuyen a la restauración de las poblaciones de atún y tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

También creemos necesario denunciar que en la práctica la distribución de las cuotas en los Estados Miembros no aplica el art. 17 de la PPC por el que se insta al reparto atendiendo criterios «transparentes y objetivos, incluyendo aquellos de carácter medioambiental, social y económico».

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport concerne le plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge. Or, il existe plusieurs problèmes dans ce texte. Quelques thoniers seulement profitent des stocks; la pêche artisanale est en grande partie exclue, alors même que tout le monde prétend la défendre.

Néanmoins, il est nécessaire de protéger les modes de pêche traditionnels du thon rouge, tels que la madrague, parce qu'ils sont respectueux de l'environnement. La Commission veut justement faire bénéficier ces modes de pêche traditionnels d'un régime spécifique avantageux. Enfin, les députés se sont opposés au fait d'aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT, ce qui semble aller dans le bon sens. J'ai donc voté pour.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Pur essendo condivisibile l'obiettivo di questa proposta di includere in un regolamento tutte le misure del piano di ricostituzione del tonno rosso adottate tra il 2012 e il 2014, così da assicurare una più uniforme attuazione nell'intera UE, devo rilevare che alcune delle disposizioni applicate hanno causato un eccessivo aumento della burocrazia con effetti negativi sulle attività delle flotte. Per questo motivo ho deciso di astenermi e non supportare pienamente questo testo.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadraza, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Vilija Blinkėvičiūtė (S&D), raštu. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo siekiama užtikrinti vienodą ir veiksmingą visų 2012-2014 m. priimtų išteklių atkūrimo plano priemonių taikymą visoje Europos Sąjungoje.

Į pasiūlymą įtrauktos techninės priemonės susijusios su gyvų paprastųjų tunų perkėlimo ir perkėlimo į varžas operacijomis (įskaitant priemones, susijusias su stereoskopinių kamerų naudojimu paprastųjų tunų kiekiams ir paleistų žuvų kiekiams apytikriai įvertinti), sužvejotų žuvų kiekio ataskaitų teikimo reikalavimais ir ICCAT regioninės stebėtojų programos įgyvendinimu.

Nauju pagrindiniu BŽP reglamentu nustatytas įpareigojimas iškrauti visą laimikį, kuris taip pat taikomas paprastiesiems tunams. Tačiau įpareigojimas iškrauti laimikį taikomas nedarant poveikio Sąjungos tarptautiniams įsipareigojimams. Komisijai suteikiami įgaliojimai priimti deleguotuosius aktus, siekiant įgyvendinti tokius tarptautinius įsipareigojimus Sąjungos teisėje, įskaitant visų pirma nuostatas, kuriomis leidžiama nukrypti nuo įpareigojimo iškrauti laimikį. Taigi, paprastuosius tunus bus leidžiama išmesti į jūrą tam tikrais Komisijos nustatytais atvejais.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), par écrit. – Ce projet de règlement sur la reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et la Méditerranée présentait trois problèmes.

Le premier problème résulte de la Commission européenne qui, voulant agir au plus vite, demande de pouvoir faire des actes délégués. Il y a également le problème qui est dû à l'exclusion en grande partie de la pêche artisanale, seulement une minorité de thoniers profitant des stocks. Le dernier problème soulevé concerne encore la Commission qui souhaitait aller au-delà des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (ICCAT).

Ce projet amendé met fin à ces problèmes en permettant de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche, tels que la madrague, et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT.

C'est pour ces différentes solutions apportées que j'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), in writing. — I abstained on this report, which was concerned with technical measures concerning caging operations in the Mediterranean.

The report which was a multi annual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean put in place by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) in 2006 to address the alarming depletion in stock levels. However, it should be noted that the provisions contained within the recovery plan do not apply to Ireland.

Renata Briano (S&D), per iscritto. – Come sappiamo l'Unione europea, insieme agli Stati membri, è parte contraente dell'ICCAT e nel 2014, durante l'assemblea annuale dell'ICCAT, abbiamo accolto con favore la notizia sui dati positivi sullo stato di buona salute del tonno rosso e un aumento del 20 % delle quote assegnate agli Stati contraenti. Le quote del tonno rosso sono stabilite in sede ICAT, ma i criteri di distribuzione vengono decisi discrezionalmente dai singoli paesi membri. Purtroppo, in moltissimi casi di queste quote beneficiano soltanto pochi armatori, mentre i pescatori artigianali sono sostanzialmente esclusi. Senza dimenticare che, se accidentalmente viene pescato un tonno rosso, il piccolo pescatore rischia di essere gravemente penalizzato. Con l'accordo raggiunto con il Consiglio facciamo un chiaro appello alla protezione della pesca artigianale e tradizionale nella distribuzione delle quote di tonno rosso.

Daniel Buda (PPE), în scris. – Se impune exploatarea responsabilă a resurselor acvatice, ținându-se cont de condițiile economice, de mediu și sociale durabile. Prezenta propunere are rolul de a transpune în dreptul Uniunii măsurile prevăzute în planul multianual de refacere a stocurilor de ton roșu din Oceanul Atlantic de Est și din Marea Mediterană, astfel încât cele mai recente măsuri să fie aplicate în mod uniform și imediat pe întreg teritoriul Uniunii.

În vederea refacerii stocurilor de ton roșu sunt necesare o serie de noi prevederi, care să includă reducerea progresivă a capturii totale, anumite restricții la pescuit în funcție de zone și perioade, o nouă dimensiune minimă pentru tonul roșu, precum și măsuri referitoare la capacitatea de creștere și de pescuit.

Așadar, această inițiativă are rolul de a reconstitui stocurile de ton roșu, stabilind o serie de prevederi privind reducerea capturii totale admisibile și a capacității de pescuit, precum și consolidarea măsurilor de control.

Consider necesar ca exploatarea resurselor acvatice, și nu numai, să se bazeze întotdeauna pe principii precum dezvoltarea durabilă, sustenabilă și să aibă în vedere protejarea resurselor naturale, motiv pentru care m-am exprimat în favoarea acestei inițiative.

Soledad Cabezón Ruiz (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICAA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadraba, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport visant à transposer dans le droit de l'Union des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA) en ce qui concerne le thon rouge. En 2006, la CICTA a adopté un plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge qui prendra fin en 2022. Les totaux admissibles des captures (TAC) de thon rouge ont été réduits progressivement à partir de 2006, pour atteindre leur niveau le plus bas en 2012. La biomasse de thon rouge ayant ensuite montré une évolution positive considérable, la CICTA a décidé d'augmenter le TAC de 20 % pour les années 2015 à 2017. Les mesures prises il y a quelques années ont donc porté leurs fruits. L'amélioration significative des stocks de thon rouge en est la conséquence directe. Je m'en réjouis et invite la Commission à continuer à travailler en étroite collaboration avec la CICTA pour assurer une exploitation durable du thon rouge.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione in questione che mira a includere in un unico regolamento tutte le misure del piano di ricostituzione dei tonnidi adottate dalla Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonnidi dell'Atlantico (ICCAT) tra il 2012 e il 2014, al fine di assicurare la loro uniforme ed efficace attuazione nell'intera UE. L'applicazione uniforme dovrebbe garantire condizioni paritarie per tutti gli operatori nel settore della pesca del tonno, compresi, in particolare, gli operatori di paesi terzi.

Sottolineo che tutti gli sforzi profusi dai pescatori dell'UE e le restrizioni a essi applicate sarebbero vani, qualora venissero applicate norme differenti alle flotte straniere. Gli operatori dell'UE non dovrebbero essere penalizzati dall'imposizione di misure più rigide rispetto a quelle convenute, perché la Commissione europea non è riuscita a imporre tali misure nell'ambito dei negoziati dell'ICCAT.

Bisogna infine sollevare la questione dell'assenza del Parlamento europeo in questi negoziati internazionali. Insisto sul fatto che il recepimento delle raccomandazioni delle Organizzazioni regionali di gestione della pesca (ORGP), come ad esempio l'ICCAT, deve restare una competenza congiunta del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio nell'ambito della procedura ordinaria.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this report, which was a multi annual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean put in place by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) in 2006 to address the alarming depletion in stock levels. This proposal aims at implementing into Union law recovery measures adopted by the ICCAT at its annual meetings between 2012 and 2014 with a view to ensuring uniform application of the recovery plan throughout the EU. These are mainly technical measures concerning caging operations in the Mediterranean.

These measures do not concern Ireland.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report in support for a detailed and integrated multiannual recovery plan that aims to rebuild the stocks for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Under scrupulous fishing restrictions, our fishermen have made considerable efforts in reducing catches in order for the market to return to a healthy level. The efforts have paid back and the rapporteur proposes to incorporate all related recovery plans into a Regulation in order to ensure that there is uniformity in EU legislation. Moreover, I agree that the Regulation should also apply to foreign fleets, otherwise their efforts will be less effective and discriminatory against our fishermen. I therefore encourage holding international negotiations for the purpose of protecting the European environment, our market and citizens.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso, trattandosi di una misura volta ad implementare le recenti raccomandazioni della Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonnidi dell'Atlantico nel quadro normativo europeo.

Caterina Chinnici (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Le pratiche di pesca sleali e illegali sono una minaccia agli ecosistemi marini, che hanno messo a rischio la sopravvivenza delle specie alieutiche in particolare il tonno rosso.

La Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonnidi dell'Atlantico (ICCAT) ha espresso raccomandazioni e misure che, per diventare operative all'interno dell'UE, devono essere recepite nel diritto dell'UE affinché sia assicurata una attuazione uniforme ed efficace nell'intera Unione europea. Da qui la necessità del regolamento che abbiamo votato in plenaria che include tutte le misure del piano di ricostituzione ICATT adottate tra il 2012 e il 2014. Diverse le misure tecniche previste: dalle operazioni di trasferimento e ingabbiamiento di tonni rossi vivi, all'impiego di fotocamere stereoscopiche per la stima dei quantitativi di tonno rosso.

Le misure messe in atto negli anni precedenti stanno dando i primi risultati e si sta assistendo ad una progressiva ricostruzione degli stock ittici. Da quest'anno, infatti, le flotte europee hanno beneficiato di aumento del 20% della quota rispetto all'anno precedente, vale a dire 9 372 tonnellate di catture ammissibili per l'UE nel 2015. Vanno supportati tutti gli strumenti legislativi per tutelare le risorse alieutiche per permettere il ripopolamento dei nostri mari. Per questi motivi ho votato a favore.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση και συμφωνούμε με τη θέση του εισηγητή, κ. Gabriel Mato, ότι στόχος της μεταφοράς των συστάσεων της ICCAT είναι η ομοιόμορφη εφαρμογή τους σε ολόκληρη την ΕΕ και όχι η επανέναρξη της συζήτησης για θέματα που έχουν ήδη αποφασιστεί, συχνά μετά από μακρές διαπραγματεύσεις, όπου κάθε λέξη και σημείο στίξης έχει σημασία.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε σήμερα ως προς την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου αποκατάστασης του τόνου στον Ανατολικό Ατλαντικό και στη Μεσόγειο. Το σχέδιο αυτό αφορά την υποστήριξη ενός είδους που απειλείται από την υπεραλίευση αλλά και από περιβαλλοντικούς κινδύνους και οφείλουμε να το στηρίξουμε. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Sono d'accordo con questa proposta poiché rappresenta semplicemente l'evoluzione di un regolamento già attuato nel 2006. Il regolamento prevedeva una diminuzione della pesca del tonno rosso, il quale si pensava potesse essere in pericolo a causa dell'eccessiva cattura. Alla luce di ciò, noto con piacere che la quantità di tonno pescato è diminuito notevolmente dal 2006 ad oggi, più che dimezzato. Tuttavia, una riduzione così drastica implica meno posti di lavoro, meno disponibilità di cibo per molti paesi che invece ne avrebbero realmente bisogno. Pertanto, poiché la quantità di tonni rossi ha avuto un'evoluzione molto positiva negli ultimi anni, sono d'accordo ad aumentare moderatamente la loro cattura cosicché vi sia un buon equilibrio tra la sicurezza della specie animale e la possibilità del commercio di quest'ultimo da parte dei piccoli imprenditori.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this vote on the report on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna.

Birgit Collin-Langen (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den Bericht gestimmt, denn in meinen Augen müssen wir langfristige Pläne erarbeiten, um den Roten Thun vor der Ausrottung zu schützen. Die Nachhaltigkeit in der Fischerei ist eine wichtige Frage, für die wir starke Antworten brauchen. Hier gilt es gemeinsame europäische Lösungen zu finden.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque ha supuesto un grave paso atrás en favor de la pesca industrial del atún y un reparto justo de las cuotas pesqueras. Este informe supone el resultado de los trilogos con Comisión y Consejo sobre el plan de recuperación del atún rojo. La posición inicial del parlamento, que apoyamos, contenía disposiciones en favor de artes tradicionales, sostenibles y de pequeña escala, en específico sobre la almadraza. La propuesta del Parlamento habría permitido una mejora de la situación de las almadrazas con un incremento de las cuotas para las mismas que suponen un incremento de la explotación sostenible de atún. Sin embargo todas estas referencias han quedado borradas en el proceso de los trilogos relegando la almadraza a una mera referencia sin poder vinculante alguno. Es por esto por lo que no he podido votar a favor del presente informe.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Si tratta di una relazione positiva per garantire la ricostruzione e la preservazione degli stock di tonno rosso. I pescatori del Mediterraneo, soprattutto quelli piccoli, hanno sofferto in questi anni a causa delle restrizioni imposte e a causa del disequilibrio nella messa a disposizione delle quote, che sono andate a vantaggio delle grandi compagnie e dei grandi armatori, mettendo tante piccole realtà in difficoltà e spesso costringendole alla dismissione. Questa politica va sovvertita: tante piccole aziende, che operano in regimi di pesca tradizionali, molto spesso largamente sostenibili, non solo non devono essere penalizzate, ma devono essere valorizzate e sostenute. È vero che i criteri di distribuzione vengono decisi dai paesi membri, ma la Commissione e le istituzioni possono fare molto, soprattutto introducendo criteri e meccanismi di difesa e di salvaguardia di quote di tonno rosso in favore della piccola pesca artigianale. Credo che lo dobbiamo alle tante famiglie e ai tanti piccoli pescatori che, giorno dopo giorno, contribuiscono alla salvaguardia dei nostri mari.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Uniunea Europeană, în calitate sa de parte contractantă la Comisia Internațională pentru Conservarea Tonului din Oceanul Atlantic (ICCAT) - organizația regională de gestionare a pescuitului (ORGP) - are ca responsabilitate gestionarea stocurilor de ton roșu și a altor specii asemănătoare din Oceanul Atlantic de Est și din Marea Mediterană.

Propunerea elaborată de Comisia Europeană conține o serie de măsuri tehnice referitoare la eforturile de pescuit industrial și neindustrial, subliniind impactul redus asupra ecosistemelor marine al tehnicilor de capturare artizanală și importanța acestora în vederea refacerii stocurilor de ton și susținerii economice a IMM-urilor.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, dorind, pe de-o parte, să atrag atenția asupra importanței utilizării criteriilor transparente, obiective, sociale și de mediu în abordarea subiectului pescuitului în apele europene și, pe de altă parte, să afirm importanța menținerii procedurii de codecizie în cadrul transunerii recomandărilor ORGP.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Wniosek ma na celu przetransponowanie do unijnego prawa środków zawartych w wieloletnim planie odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym, przyjętym przez Międzynarodową Komisję ds. Ochrony Tuńczyka Atlantycznego (ICCAT) na dorocznych posiedzeniach w 2012 r. i 2014 r. Wieloletni plan odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego został ustanowiony w 2006 r. i wszedł w życie w 2007 r. Aby zapewnić jednolite i skuteczne stosowanie w całej UE wszystkich środków zawartych w planie odbudowy zasobów przyjętym w latach 2012-2014, obecny wniosek włączy je do rozporządzenia dotyczącego wieloletniego planu odbudowy tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym. Wniosek obejmuje środki techniczne, takie jak przepisy regulujące wykorzystanie kamer stereoskopowych w celu oszacowania liczby okazów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego i liczby wypuszczonych okazów, przepisy dotyczące operacji transferu żywego tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego i jego umieszczania w sadzach, a także wymogi dotyczące realizacji programu obserwatorów regionalnych ICCAT oraz raportów połowowych. Popieram tę rezolucję. Zagłosowałem na tak.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – I endorsed this report of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multi-annual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean as the amendments proposed are in line with the recovery plan adopted by ICCAT. Since the recovery plan has been adopted, bluefin tuna biomass has shown a positive trend. The regional organisation decided to increase the TAC by 20% for the following 3 years, based on solid scientific data stating that stocks are at healthy levels.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport porte sur la proposition de règlement visant à transposer dans le droit de l'Union les mesures du plan pluriannuel de reconstitution pour le thon rouge de l'Atlantique Est et de la Méditerranée adopté par la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA). Le rapporteur considère que la Commission transpose correctement les recommandations pertinentes de la CICTA, mais tient à rappeler que l'objectif de la transposition des recommandations est d'avoir une application uniforme dans l'ensemble de l'Union. Considérant que ce plan pluriannuel établira un modèle économiquement viable de la pêche de thon rouge tout en assurant la durabilité et la gestion raisonnable des activités de pêche, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai apporté mon soutien au rapport sur le plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et la Méditerranée. Les actes adoptés par la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA) sont contraignants et il est important que ceux-ci soient transposés dans le droit de l'Union afin de rétablir les stocks de thon rouge. Les conditions de pêche strictes prévues par ce plan doivent être respectées.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dans la mesure où quelques thoniers profitent des stocks de thon rouge, la pêche artisanale se retrouve en grande partie exclue. Toutefois, la Commission européenne et les députés de la commission de la pêche ont souligné la protection qui doit être accordée à des modes de pêche traditionnels du thon rouge, tels que la madrague. Ces modes de pêche sont très sélectifs et donc respectueux de l'environnement. La Commission précise qu'elle souhaite les faire bénéficier d'un régime spécifique avantageux. Le texte amendé permet en outre de respecter la procédure de codécision et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (ICCAT). Aussi, j'ai voté pour ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Червената риба тон е деликатес, който ние, жителите на тази планета, бяхме довели почти до изчезване. Радвам се, че с действията, които предприемаме, всички жители на планетата Земя сме поправили донякъде тази наша грешка. За съжаление, това подобряване на картината не се дължи предимно на нашите дейност, а на другите държави по света. Това, че политиката ни за риболовство е, ако не катастрофа, то поне е провал и може би това е една от причините Исландия да не иска да бъде част от Общността. Надявам се и ние да започнем да помагаме на останалия свят за спасяването на червения тон.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – Com vista a assegurar uma aplicação uniforme e efetiva em toda a União Europeia de todas as medidas do plano de recuperação adotadas entre 2012 e 2014, a presente proposta visa integrá-las num regulamento. A proposta contém medidas técnicas, como as relativas às operações de transferência e de enjaulamento de atum-rabilho vivo, incluindo também medidas sobre a utilização de câmaras estereoscópicas para estimar as quantidades de atum-rabilho e de libertações, as exigências em matéria de declaração das capturas e a execução do programa de observação regional da ICCAT.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote pour: dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este relatório centra-se na proposta legislativa publicada pela Comissão, tendo em vista atualizar a anterior diretiva sobre a conservação do atum-rabilho nas regiões do Atlântico Leste e Mediterrâneo, que vigorava desde 2009.

O presente plano multianual surge no âmbito da nova Política Comum das Pescas (PCP). A figura dos planos plurianuais tem potencialidades, padecendo, todavia, de algumas das limitações e constrangimentos inerentes à própria PCP.

Há aspetos positivos, que destacamos:

— a definição de quotas tem em conta as orientações da Comissão Internacional de Conservação do Atum Atlântico - ICCAT;

— o Regulamento torna-se mais abrangente, existindo diversas alterações que valorizam as técnicas tradicionais de pesca e a pesca costeira, consideradas como técnicas sustentáveis, nomeadamente através da utilização de critérios objetivos para a atribuição das quotas a nível nacional;

— a valorização do papel dos observadores do ICCAT.

A tendência de crescimento dos stocks de atum-rabilho levou o ICCAT a aumentar a quota em 20 %.

Defendemos uma gestão de recursos haliêuticos assente no conhecimento científico, pelo que as medidas adotadas no âmbito deste plano se afiguram adequadas.

Votámos favoravelmente.

Voltamos a sublinhar a necessidade de aumento da quota portuguesa de atum-rabilho, uma justa aspiração dos pescadores açorianos.

Santiago Fisas Ayxelà (PPE), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero apropiada la transposición de las recomendaciones del ICCAT con respecto al atún rojo por parte de la Comisión. Además, es importante destacar la importancia de las técnicas tradicionales y artesanales a la hora de conservar el atún rojo, ya que se trata de técnicas muy selectivas, que contribuyen a la recuperación de la especie.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho espresso il mio voto favorevole alla proposta di regolamento in quanto ritengo fondamentale la salvaguardia e la ricostituzione del tonno rosso nell'Atlantico Orientale e nel Mediterraneo.

Per far questo è necessario che tutte le misure adottate dalla Commissione internazionale per la conversazione dei tonnidi dell'Atlantico (ICCAT), di cui l'UE è parte contraente, vengano applicate in modo uniforme ed efficace in tutta l'UE attraverso un apposito regolamento.

In particolare manifesto apprezzamento per la presenza di importanti misure tecniche, quali l'impiego di fotocamere stereoscopiche per la stima dei quantitativi di tonno rosso e dei quantitativi rilasciati in mare, e gli obblighi concernenti la dichiarazione delle catture.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted against as I do not believe the common fisheries policy is Ireland's interests.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in quanto genera eccessivi obblighi e burocrazia che si sarebbero potuti evitare.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφώς*. – Καταψηφίζω το πολυετές σχέδιο αποκατάστασης του τόνου, καθώς η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – When dealing with this fishing sustainability, we must safeguard long-term productivity, promote local employment opportunities, encourage the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and a responsible exploitation of fisheries resources. Unfortunately, the current Bluefin tuna fishing quota system penalises small-scale fishermen, and needs to be reviewed. Owners of large vessels are too dominant and might harm fishing sustainability.

I therefore support transposal into Union law of the measures of the multiannual Bluefin Tuna recovery plan in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) at its annual meetings between 2012 and 2014. I believe that the technical measures included in the multiannual recovery plan will lead to positive developments for environment, nature and local employment.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Pozitív szavazatommal támogattam a kékúszójútonhal-állományra vonatkozó helyreállítási terv jelentését. Az Európai Unió az Atlanti Tonhal Védelmére Létrehozott Nemzetközi Bizottság (ICCAT) szerződő fele, amely az Atlanti-óceánban és az azzal határos tengerekben élő tonhalfélék és tonhalszerű fajok kezeléséért felelős regionális halászati gazdálkodási szervezete (RFMO). Az ICCAT-ajánlások átültetésének célja, hogy azokat egységesen alkalmazzák az EU egészében. Az egységes alkalmazásnak arra kell irányulnia, hogy a tonhalhalászatot folytató valamennyi gazdasági szereplő – közülük is elsősorban a nem uniós halászok – számára egyenlő versenyfeltételeket lehessen biztosítani. Ellenkező esetben, azaz ha más szabályok vonatkoznak a külföldi flottákra, hiábavalók lesznek az uniós halászok erőfeszítései és a rájuk alkalmazott korlátozások.

Nem szabad az uniós szereplőket azzal büntetni, hogy az elfogadottaknál szigorúbb intézkedéseket alkalmazunk velük szemben amiatt, hogy a Bizottság az ICCAT-tárgyalások során nem volt képes ezeket az intézkedéseket keresztülvinni. Fontos, hogy az Európai Parlament ne veszítse el hatáskörét a kérdésben. Az EP részvételének hiánya a nemzetközi tárgyalások során azt jelentené, hogy semmiféle beleszólása nem lenne az ICCAT-ban és a későbbiekben további nemzetközi fórumokon folyó tárgyalásokba. A regionális halászati gazdálkodási szervezetek ajánlásainak átültetése a rendes jogalkotási eljárás keretében az Európai Parlament és a Tanács közös hatáskörében kell, hogy maradjon.

Iratxe García Pérez (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe para incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014. En este sentido, se garantiza una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de dichas medidas en toda la UE.

Este nuevo Reglamento derogará el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, el cual ya fue modificado en 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICAA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta y que fue negociada con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, querría subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional es menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Si bien se pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible tal y como es la almadraba.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il rispetto della varietà della fauna ittica e la tutela della sostenibilità dei nostri mari sono priorità indiscusse nelle politiche europee in materia di pesca, ambiente e mare. Si tratta di obiettivi ancora più sensibili quando riguardano specie a rischio e di particolare rilevanza per il patrimonio faunistico, gastronomico e culturale del bacino Mediterraneo, il cuore della civiltà europea. Ho votato pertanto convintamente a favore della posizione del Parlamento sul presente regolamento, con cui diamo un sostegno alla proposta di razionalizzare e uniformare tutte le misure del piano di ricostituzione adottate tra il 2012 e il 2014 al fine di assicurare la loro uniforme ed efficace attuazione nell'intera UE.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den mehrjährigen Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun gestimmt. Die biologische Vielfalt unserer Meere ist mir ein ehrliches Anliegen. Sie ist Grundlage einer guten Zukunft für die nachfolgenden Generationen. Und dafür kämpfe ich als Europaabgeordneter der Familien-Partei.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Um den mehrjährigen Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun im Ostatlantik und im Mittelmeer zu gewährleisten, ist unter anderem eine schrittweise Verringerung der zulässigen Gesamtfangmengen sowie die Stärkung der gemeinsamen internationalen Inspektionsregelung der ICCAT vorgesehen. Uns ist es bei den Verhandlungen mit dem Rat gelungen, eine bevorzugte Behandlung handwerklicher und traditioneller Fischer durchzusetzen. Dies war eine wichtige Grundlage zur Unterstützung des Wiederauffüllungsplans.

Sylvie Goddyn (ENF), *par écrit*. – Grâce aux efforts consentis par les pêcheurs, les stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et en Méditerranée ont été reconstitués. Le rapport présenté en tient compte et propose simplement de transposer la convention CICTA, c'est-à-dire la convention de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique.

La Commission européenne, pour agir vite, a bien sûr tenté d'introduire des actes d'exécution et des actes délégués dans la proposition de règlement, afin d'accroître son pouvoir au détriment du Parlement européen. Mais les députés ont voté des amendements supprimant ces dispositions, afin de défendre les prérogatives du Parlement.

Il faut souligner également qu'une protection accrue est accordée par le nouveau règlement aux pêcheurs artisanaux, qui utilisent des modes de pêche traditionnels tels que la madrague. Ces modes de pêche sont très sélectifs et donc respectueux de l'environnement.

En conclusion, le projet amendé permet de préserver le contrôle du Parlement, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de la CICTA, c'est-à-dire de ne pas imposer aux pêcheurs des contraintes inutiles. J'ai donc voté en faveur de cette proposition.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Hemos votado abstención porque si bien el informe subraya el papel de las artes de pesca artesanales, como las tradicionales almadrabas, consideramos que a la hora de aplicar el plan de recuperación, la UE debe enfatizar aún más en el uso de trampas tradicionales que contribuyen a la restauración de las poblaciones de atún y tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

También creemos necesario denunciar que en la práctica la distribución de las cuotas en los Estados Miembros no aplica el art. 17 de la PPC por el que se insta al reparto atendiendo criterios «transparentes y objetivos, incluyendo aquellos de carácter medioambiental, social y económico».

Beata Gosiewska (ECR), na piśmie. – Wniosek dotyczący rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w sprawie wieloletniego planu odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym uchylającego rozporządzenie (WE) nr 302/2009. Zdecydowanie popieram plan odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym. Stosowanie w całej Unii Europejskiej wszystkich środków zawartych w planie odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego jest niezbędne do jednolitych i skutecznych działań w tym zakresie. Obecny wniosek ma za zadanie przetransponowanie do unijnego prawa środków technicznych zawartych w wieloletnim planie odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), in writing. – I voted in favour of the report. The agreement was reached in principle on a proposal aimed at implementing measures of the recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), por escrito. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICA en 2012 y 2013.

Quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadraza, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

No obstante, considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Καταψηφίσαμε την έκθεση, αφού προκρίνει περαιτέρω αύξηση των συνολικών ετήσιων αλιευμάτων τόνου και ως εκ τούτου αύξηση των ποσοστώςσεων, η οποία μειώνει το είδος (το οποίο είναι στην κόκκινη λίστα των απειλούμενων ειδών και έχει υποστεί σημαντική μείωση των αριθμών του κατά το πρόσφατο παρελθόν).

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported the Report. This plan was set up to rebuild Bluefin tuna stock and came after the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas also adopted a multiannual recovery plan. I was happy that the report acknowledged that the Commission's proposal went further than the ICCAT and even what EU legislation allows for. The aim of the transposition of the ICCAT Recommendations is to have uniform application throughout the EU; it is not to reopen the discussion about what has already been decided. Uniform application should aim at ensuring a level playing field for all operators, including non-EU operators. Otherwise, all the restrictions applied to EU fishermen will have no result, if different rules apply to foreign fleets. Finally, I was pleased that the rapporteur addressed the issue of delegated acts by the Commission. Considering the European Parliament are not negotiating the ICCAT agreement, the co-decision procedure is the only possible way we can influence the transposition of the agreement into Union law. If, in the future, delegated acts were used then it would mean that the Parliament has no say at all in ICCAT negotiations.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this proposal, as I had no objections to the recovery plan.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Comisia Internațională pentru Conservarea Tonului din Oceanul Atlantic (ICCAT) este autoritatea care adoptă decizii încă din 2006 privind conservarea și gestionarea activităților de pescuit, cea mai importantă specie reglementată fiind tonul roșu.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport pentru implementarea eficientă a planului de refacere a stocului de ton roșu cu impact semnificativ în ecosistemul maritim.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za izvješće o prijedlogu uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o višegodišnjem planu oporavka plavoperajne tune u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe (EZ) br. 302/2009 (COM(2015)0180–C8-0118/2015— 2015/0096(COD)), s obzirom da se ovom Uredbom želi osigurati jedinstvena i učinkovita primjena u Europskoj uniji svih mjera iz plana oporavka koji je usvojen između 2012. i 2014. godine, a koji je uz prijašnje mjere od 2008. godine doprinio izvanrednim rezultatima u pogledu očuvanja broja plavoperajne tune, te je moguće postepeno povećavati ukupni mogući ulov, a da se ne naruše postignuti rezultati. Ovim prijedlogom uključene su i tehničke mjere i postupci koji se primjenjuju kod procjene, praćenja i izvješćivanja o ulovu.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le débat porte sur une simple transposition de la convention ICCAT (Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique). Dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT. C'est tout naturellement que je me suis porté en faveur du texte.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Svým hlasem jsem podpořil zprávu, která se zabývá víceletým plánem pro obnovení populace tuňáka obecného. Plán představuje několik nutných kroků k naplnění daného cíle. Je potřeba snižovat hladiny přípustného odlovu. Také je třeba zavést přísnější pravidla pro odlov v určitých oblastech a v určitá období. Neméně důležitým krokem je pak posílení mezinárodní kontroly. Pro úspěšnou obnovu tuňáka je důležité dohodnutá pravidla uplatňovat jednotně a zajistit rovné podmínky pro všechny rybáře, včetně těch zahraničních. Bez shodných pravidel i pro rybáře ze zemí mimo EU nemůžeme dosáhnout žádoucího výsledku.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – La proposition de règlement vise à transposer dans le droit de l'Union les mesures du plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge de l'Atlantique Est et de la Méditerranée. Ce plan a été adopté par la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique dont est membre l'UE.

Le texte prévoit que soit accordé un traitement favorable aux pêcheurs artisanaux et traditionnels lors de l'attribution des quotas de pêche pour le thon rouge.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Obwohl im vorliegenden Bericht einige gute Ideen vorhanden sind, ist der Plan für die europäische Fischereiindustrie in seiner Gesamtheit kritisch zu betrachten. Daher enthalte ich mich zu diesem Bericht.

Béla Kovács (NI), írásban. - Az óceáni halállomány megőrzésének egyik sikertörténete, hogy nemzetközi korlátozó intézkedések révén az elmúlt évtizedben olyannyira felszaporodott a kékúszójú tonhal állománya, hogy most már évente 20%-al emelhető a kifogható mennyiség. A javaslat célja támogatandó, mert az illetékes ICCAT-bizottságnak a különböző rendeleteit hivatott egybe foglalni, biztosítva ezzel, hogy azok valamennyi tagállam számára kötelező erővel bírjanak. Az előadó jogosan bírálja a Bizottságot, mert egyes intézkedései nehezebb helyzetbe hozzák az EU-s flottákat, továbbá a feltétlenül szükségesnél nagyobb mértékben kíván felhatalmazáson alapuló rendeletekkel operálni.

Андрей Ковачев (PPE), в писмена форма. – Гласувах в подкрепа на предложението за регламент на Европейския парламент и на Съвета относно многогодишен план за възстановяване на червения тон в източната част на Атлантическия океан и в Средиземно море, тъй като научно обоснованите резултати от наложените през 2006 г. ограничения на общия допустим улов са повече от обещаващи. Положителното развитие на състоянието на запасите от биомаса на червения тон дава основание да се увеличи общият допустим улов, като въпреки това той остава на нива много под същия преди влизането в сила на Плана на възстановяване.

С цел осигуряването на ефективно и еднакво прилагане в рамките на целия Европейски съюз на мерките от Плана за възстановяване, с настоящото предложение те се включват в регламент. По този начин се гарантират равнопоставени условия за всички оператори, осъществяващи риболов на риба тон, включително тези, които оперират извън ЕС, тъй като в противен случай усилията и ограниченията, прилагани спрямо рибарите от Общността, няма да дадат резултат, ако по отношение на външните риболовни флотове се прилагат различни правила.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), per iscritto. — La proposta presa in analisi mira ad introdurre all'interno di un unico regolamento, tutte le misure che sono state adottate fino al 2014 al fine di assicurare la loro attuazione nell'intera Unione europea. Essa prevede il Piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso, nell'Atlantico orientale e nel Mediterraneo (BFT). Le misure previste dal piano adottato nel 2006 dall'ICCAT (Commissione internazionale per la conservazione dei tonni dell'Atlantico), che si concluderà nel 2022, avevano, di fatto, richiesto sacrifici necessari ma onerosi. Considerato il processo di progressiva ricostituzione dello stock di tonno rosso nell'Atlantico orientale e nel Mediterraneo, si è poi proceduto all'innalzamento sostenibile delle catture, con un aumento annuale del 20 %, il che significa, per l'Italia, che la quantità di pescato è passata da 2 302,8 a 2 752 tonnellate. Preservare l'ecosistema e aumentare la riserva, senza d'altra parte perdere di vista i livelli occupazionali, è stato l'obiettivo che ci siamo prefissati e che oggi possiamo dire di avere centrato. Grazie alle politiche ambientali dell'UE e agli sforzi dei pescatori per limitare le catture di tonno rosso, oggi siamo nelle condizioni di innalzare i livelli di pesca.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport car il vise à protéger les stocks de thon rouge, que des mesures précédentes ont permis de reconstituer.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté pour le plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge. Ces stocks ont été reconstitués. Le débat porte sur une simple transposition de la convention de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique. Quelques thoniers seulement profitent des stocks; la pêche artisanale est en grande partie exclue, alors même que tout le monde prétend la défendre. Toutefois, la Commission européenne comme les députés de la commission de la pêche soulignent la protection qui doit être accordée à des modes de pêche traditionnels du thon rouge, tels que la madrague. Ces modes de pêche sont très sélectifs et donc respectueux de l'environnement. La Commission précise qu'elle va faire bénéficier ces modes de pêche traditionnels d'un régime spécifique avantageux. Dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), par écrit. – Je me suis prononcé pour ce rapport. Il tend à appliquer la convention ICCAT (Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique) qui recommande une meilleure protection des thons et des modes de pêche traditionnels. Le texte dans son ensemble s'inscrit dans le plan pluriannuel européen de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et la Méditerranée. Or, dans ce cadre, la Commission tente de s'arroger davantage de prérogatives et de dépasser les recommandations de l'ICCAT, ce à quoi s'oppose le texte soumis au vote.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadra, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

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No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadra, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – Siguiendo la misma línea de argumentación del Ponente considero que el objetivo de la transposición de las recomendaciones de la CICA es la aplicación uniforme en toda la UE. Esta aplicación uniforme debe tener como finalidad garantizar la igualdad de condiciones para todos los operadores que participan en la pesca de atún, incluidos los operadores de terceros países. De lo contrario, si se aplican normas diferentes a las flotas extranjeras, todos los esfuerzos realizados y todas las restricciones aplicadas a los pescadores de la UE habrán sido en vano.

Esta transposición es además especialmente importante debido al papel de las artes de pesca artesanales en la conservación de las poblaciones. Considero que la Unión Europea debe prestar especial atención a las mismas, ya que tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

Por las razones anteriormente descritas, voto favorablemente para la aprobación de este informe.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I support this report that acknowledges the role of traditional gears and techniques in the conservation and rebuilding tuna fish stock.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. Pravidelně se u těchto zpráv zdržuji, jelikož Česká republika nemá moře.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), rakstiski. – Šī gada janvārī Parlamentā par apskatīto jautājumu jau notika debates, tomēr pēc attiecīgā balsojuma normatīvās rezolūcijas projekts tika atgriezts profila komitejai.

Parlamenta un Padomes regulas priekšlikuma galvenais mērķis ir sekmēt efektīvāku vispārējo zvejniecības politiku attiecībā uz zilās tunzivs krājumiem Atlantijas okeānā un Vidusjūrā. Tas būtu, starp citām metodēm, realizējams, sniedzot atbalstu “tradicionāliem” zvejniekiem, kas pielieto dažāda veida amatierzvejas rīkus, piemēram, “almadraba” lamatas, kuru visai svarīgs pluss ir to zemā ietekme uz skartām ekosistēmām.

Ekonomiskajā un patērīnā ziņā zilā tunzivs ir principiāli svarīga suga, tāpēc jau vismaz šo iemeslu dēļ tā vispārēji jāaizsargā. Zilā tunzivs ir klasificēta kā apdraudēta suga, tāpēc tiek regulāri realizēti vairāki pasākumi, lai veicinātu esošā bioloģiskā līdzsvara saglabāšanu un krājumu attiecīgo stabilizāciju un palielināšanu. Līdz ar to zināmas izmaiņas gaida arī atpūtas un sporta zveju.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. –

Týmto uznesením EP schválil začlenenie opatrení prijatých Medzinárodnou komisiou pre zachovanie atlantických tuniakov na chov a výlov tuniaka modroplutvého do nariadenia. Cieľom je zabezpečiť v celej Európskej únii jednotné a účinné uplatňovanie všetkých opatrení, preto som návrh podporil. Vzhľadom na účinnosť uplatňovaných opatrení nastal v uplynulých rokoch pozitívny trend v obnove populácie tohto druhu rýb, preto sa na roky 2015-2017 povolili vyššie kvóty výlovu.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), γραπτώς. – Ψηφίζω υπέρ της έκθεσης σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου αποκατάστασης του τόνου στον Ανατολικό Ατλαντικό και στη Μεσόγειο και για την κατάργηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 302/2009), διότι είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Il s'agit d'une simple transposition de la convention ICCAT (Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique), qui prend acte de la reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge. À l'inverse de la décision originelle de la Commission européenne, la procédure de codécision permet de prendre pleinement en compte l'avis du Parlement européen. Outre ces deux motifs de satisfaction, nous saluons l'intention annoncée de la Commission européenne d'instaurer un régime spécifique avantageux pour la pêche traditionnelle, laquelle est la grande perdante de la gestion des stocks de thons.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), per iscritto. – Ho votato a favore della relazione sulla proposta di regolamento del Parlamento e del Consiglio concernente un piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso nell'Atlantico orientale e nel Mediterraneo e recante abrogazione del regolamento (CE) n. 302/2009. La proposta mira a recepire nel diritto comunitario le misure del piano pluriennale di ricostruzione del tonno rosso nell'Atlantico e nel Mediterraneo adottato dell'ICCAT. Con questo piano si riesce a ricostruire lo stock del tonno rosso grazie a una selettività di catture per biodiversità e una diminuzione del totale ammissibile di catture.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Ο τόνος προστατεύεται σήμερα από πολλές διεθνείς συνθήκες αλλά και από τη Διεθνή Επιτροπή για τη διατήρηση των θυννοειδών του Ατλαντικού (ICCAT). Η επιτροπή αυτή, στην οποία η ΕΕ αποτελεί συμβαλλόμενο μέρος, έχει ως βασική αρμοδιότητα την έκδοση αποφάσεων για την ενίσχυση και διατήρηση των αλιευτικών πόρων του Ατλαντικού, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του τόνου. Το χρονοδιάγραμμα λήψης μέτρων προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση είναι μέχρι το 2022 με στόχους όπως η ανασύσταση των αποθεμάτων μέσω της σταδιακής μείωσης της επιτρεπόμενης αλιείας συμπεριλαμβανομένου του τόνου.

Η ICCAT έχει ήδη καταφέρει τη μείωση των συνολικών επιτρεπόμενων αλιευμάτων, με αποτέλεσμα να παρατηρούμε αύξηση στα αποθέματα τόνου. Στο αποτέλεσμα αυτό έχουν συμβάλει και οι ίδιοι οι αλιείς, οι οποίοι συμμορφώνονται με τις αποφάσεις της Επιτροπής.

Θα ήθελα λοιπόν να υπερψηφίσω το συγκεκριμένο ψήφισμα, αφού έχει ως στόχο την ενσωμάτωση τεχνικών μέτρων σε ένα ευρωπαϊκό κανονισμό, έτσι ώστε να επιτευχθεί ομοιόμορφη και αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή των αποφάσεων της Επιτροπής σε όλη την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Nachhaltige Fischerei leistet einen sehr positiven Beitrag zum Wiederaufbau der Thunfischbestände. Jedoch kann ich diesem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung nicht voll zustimmen. Daher enthalte ich mich meiner Stimme.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Il s'agit simplement d'une transposition de la convention de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (ICCAT). Le problème qui se pose est que quelques thoniers seulement profitent des stocks; la pêche artisanale est en grande partie exclue, alors même que tout le monde prétend la défendre. Les amendements votés permettent de faire respecter la procédure de codécision afin de limiter la Commission qui voulait aller au-delà des recommandations mesurées de l'ICCAT. Ce texte en faveur de la pêche artisanale me semble équilibré.

En conséquence j'ai voté pour.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A presente proposta destina-se a transpor para o Direito da União as medidas do plano plurianual de recuperação do atum-rabilho (BFT) no Atlântico Este e no Mediterrâneo adotado pela Comissão Internacional para a Conservação dos Tunídeos do Atlântico (ICCAT)¹ nas suas sessões anuais entre 2012 e 2014.

A presente iniciativa legislativa visa assegurar a aplicação uniforme e eficaz das medidas mais recentes do plano plurianual de recuperação do BFT da ICCAT em toda a União Europeia. As medidas de conservação e de gestão pertinentes estabelecidas pelas recomendações da ICCAT não são diretamente aplicáveis aos navios individuais nem aos nacionais da União.

É, pois, necessário transpor para o Direito da União as medidas da ICCAT relativas ao BFT adotadas em 2012, 2013 e 2014.

Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this report as it strikes a positive balance between the realities of environmental and ecosystem conservation and the needs of the EU fishing industry and SMEs.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Je salue l'approbation par le Parlement européen du règlement relatif à un plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et la Méditerranée. Cette étape permettra la transposition en droit européen des mesures prises au niveau de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique — la CICTA — afin de reconstituer les stocks de thon rouge. Alors qu'il y a quelques années ces stocks avaient chuté de manière si dramatique que la survie de l'espèce s'en trouvait compromise, il était devenu urgent d'adopter les mesures nécessaires pour inverser la tendance. Je me réjouis que ces nouvelles mesures viennent s'ajouter aux efforts déjà consentis par les acteurs concernés pour parvenir à assurer une pêche au thon rouge qui soit durable et garantir ainsi la pérennisation de nos possibilités de pêche.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. — Medzinárodná komisia pre zachovanie atlantických tuniakov je regionálnou organizáciou pre riadenie rybárstva zodpovedná za hospodárenie s tuniakmi a im príbuznými druhmi v Atlantickom oceáne a Európska únia je členom tejto organizácie. Komisia prijala v roku 2006 viacročný plán obnovy tuniaka modroplutvého, ktorého platnosť sa skončí v roku 2022. V záujme obnovy populácie sa v pláne stanovilo postupné znižovanie celkového povoleného výlovu v rokoch 2007 až 2011, obmedzenia rybolovu v určitých oblastiach a obdobiach, nová minimálna veľkosť, opatrenia týkajúce sa športových a rekreačných rybolovných činností, ako aj opatrenia týkajúce sa chovnej a rybolovnej kapacity. Biomasa tuniaka modroplutvého vykazuje od roku 2008 výrazne pozitívny trend. Regionálna organizácia rozhodla v roku 2014 o zvýšení celkového povoleného výlovu na nasledujúce tri roky o 20 %, keďže existujú spoľahlivé vedecké údaje, ktoré dokazujú, že populácie dosiahli zdravú úroveň. Cieľom transpozície odporúčaní medzinárodnej komisie je zabezpečiť jednotné uplatňovanie v celej Európskej únii. To by sa malo hlavne zamerať na zabezpečenie rovnakých podmienok pre všetkých prevádzkovateľov zapojených do lovu tuniaka vrátane prevádzkovateľov z krajín mimo EÚ. Vynaložené úsilie a obmedzenia uplatňované na rybárov EÚ inak nebudú mať žiaden úžitok, ak sa budú na zahraničné flotily uplatňovať odlišné pravidlá. Hlasujem za daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the report because I am in agreement with the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean repealing Regulation.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió az Atlanti Tonhal Védelmére Létrehozott Nemzetközi Bizottság (ICCAT) szerződő fele. Az ICCAT 2006-ban többéves, 2022-es lejáratú tervet fogadott el a kékúszójú tonhal állományának helyreállítása érdekében. A Bizottság javaslatot tett a Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak a 302/2009/EK rendelet hatályon kívül helyezésére és a helyreállítási terv 2012 és 2014 között elfogadott intézkedéseinek egy rendeletben történő összefoglalására. A Halászati Bizottság jelentésében azt javasolja, hogy a tervezetet a Parlament első olvasatban 40 módosító javaslattal hagyja jóvá. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique. Il peut donc être soutenu.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – A Comissão Internacional para a Conservação dos Tunídeos do Atlântico (ICCAT), da organização regional de gestão das pescas (ORGP), responsável pela gestão do atum e espécies afins no oceano Atlântico e mares adjacentes, da qual a UE é Parte Contratante, tem autoridade para adotar decisões («recomendações») para a conservação e gestão das pescas na sua zona de competência. Estes atos são vinculativos e devem ser transpostos para o direito da União.

O atum-rabilho é a espécie mais importante regulada pela ICCAT. Os pescadores envidaram esforços para ajustarem as respetivas capturas ao total admissível de capturas, passando das 33 000 toneladas antes do plano de recuperação, para o valor mínimo em 2012 (12 900 toneladas).

As unidades populacionais têm evoluído positivamente e o TAC tem vindo a aumentar, sendo que este, em 2015, é de 15 821 toneladas, cabendo à UE 9 372,9 toneladas.

Subscrevo a posição do relator, especialmente, em três pontos: o primeiro relativo à importância da transposição exata das recomendações da ICCAT e à sua não extrapolação; segundo, para lamentar a ausência do PE das negociações internacionais; e, por último, defendo ser fundamental atender às especificidades das diferentes artes de pesca do atum, nomeadamente as armações artesanais e tradicionais.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision et de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche. Je vote pour.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui vise à intégrer dans un règlement l'ensemble des mesures des plans de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge, afin de garantir une application uniforme et efficace. Ce rapport prévoit des mesures techniques, comme l'utilisation de caméras stéréoscopiques afin d'examiner les quantités de thon, mais également des exigences, notamment sur la mise en œuvre du programme régional d'observateurs de la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique.

Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Considerata la necessità di proteggere il tonno rosso da uno sfruttamento eccessivo nell'Atlantico e tenuto conto dell'importanza di cooperare nel mantenimento del consumo di tale specie a livelli massimamente sostenibili, accolgo con favore la proposta di integrare nel diritto dell'Unione tutte le modifiche del piano di ricostituzione adottate dall'ICCAT nel 2012, 2013 e 2014 che non sono ancora state recepite.

Nel 2006, infatti, l'ICCAT ha adottato un piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso, la cui conclusione è prevista per il 2022. Per ricostituire lo stock, il piano prevede una progressiva riduzione del totale ammissibile di catture (TAC), la restrizioni dell'attività di pesca in zone e periodi determinati, una nuova taglia minima, misure applicabili alle attività di pesca sportiva e ricreativa, misure concernenti la capacità di pesca e di allevamento e un rafforzamento del programma di ispezione internazionale congiunta dell'ICCAT. Dal 2008, la biomassa di tonno rosso ha registrato una tendenza nettamente positiva. Alla luce di tali miglioramenti, ritengo importante sostenere la decisione dell'ICCAT di anticipare al 2016 il TAC previsto per il 2017, che sarebbe comunque ampiamente inferiore al TAC vigente prima dell'entrata in vigore del piano di ricostituzione.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – A 2012 és 2014 között elfogadott helyreállítási terv kedvező alakulása öröme ad okot, mivel az egyik fontos célja, az Atlanti-óceán keleti részén és a Földközi-tengerben élő kékúszójú tonhalállomány növekedése megvalósult. Megszavaztam a javaslatot, amely egy rendeletben kívánja összefogni a különböző intézkedéseket, hogy ezeket a kedvező tendenciákat továbbra is fenn tudjuk tartani. A kialakult egészséges tonhalállomány megengedi, hogy valamennyi tonhalhalászattal foglalkozó gazdasági szereplő folytatni tudja a tevékenységét.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The proposal aims at transposing into Union law measures of the multiannual Bluefin Tuna (BFT) recovery plan in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) at its annual meetings between 2012 and 2014. I have voted for this report that contains technical measures such as those on transfer and caging operations of live BFT, including also measures on the use of stereoscopic cameras to estimate the quantities of BFT and releases, catch reporting requirements, and the Implementation of the ICCAT Regional Observer Programme.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am susținut prin votul meu de astăzi acest raport deoarece consider că este extrem de important ca aceste planuri multianuale pentru diferitele stocuri de pește să fie adoptate în cel mai scurt timp.

Negocierea și adoptarea acestui plan multianual pentru stocurile de ton roșu din Oceanul Atlantic de Est și din Marea Mediterană fac parte din procesul de stabilire a acestor planuri multianuale pentru stocurile de pește din mările UE, ca parte a PCP. Planurile multianuale sunt instrumentul de bază a PCP, fără de care nu vom reuși să îndeplinim obiectivele privind pescuitul sustenabil și protejarea stocurilor de pește stabilite prin PCP. În acest sens, deblocarea acestei situații, concretizată astăzi prin adoptarea acestui plan multianual, ne oferă speranța că vom putea atinge obiectivele stabilite.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I abstained on this report, which was concerned with technical measures concerning caging operations in the Mediterranean.

The report which was a multi annual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean put in place by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) in 2006 to address the alarming depletion in stock levels. However, it should be noted that the provisions contained within the recovery plan do not apply to Ireland.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Grundsätzlich bin ich der Meinung, dass die Europäische Union traditionellen Tonnaren besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken sollte, um zum Wiederaufbau der Thunbestände einen Teil beizutragen. Jedoch enthält der Bericht einige Punkte, denen ich nicht zustimmen kann, aus diesem Grund habe ich bei diesen Bericht meiner Stimme enthalten.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ritengo che la proposta del collega Mato sia da votare positivamente. Il ruolo dell'Unione europea nella ICCAT denota l'attenzione particolare che l'Unione riserva alla ricostituzione dello stock di tonno rosso. I risultati conseguiti finora vanno ben oltre le aspettative e gli obiettivi inizialmente fissati. Pertanto, condivido la proposta del collega di includere in un regolamento tutte le misure adottate tra il 2012 e il 2014 in quanto ciò consentirebbe un'attuazione uniforme ed efficace delle stesse in tutti gli Stati membri dell'UE. Allo stesso modo, ritengo opportuno sottolineare che la proposta della Commissione di recepire le modifiche future del piano di ricostituzione mediante atti delegati rischia di marginalizzare ulteriormente il ruolo del Parlamento europeo in una tematica così importante a livello internazionale. Pertanto, sento di dover votare a favore della proposta in esame, così come formulata dal collega.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. — All species are important in an ecosystem. The Bluefin tuna, which has been endangered for several years, has suffered a catastrophic decline in stocks in the Northern Pacific Ocean, of more than 96%. In order to preserve it the future we have to be cautious. Changes have to be made so that we ensure the continuity of the Bluefin tuna fish population. Therefore, I vote in favour of the recovery plan for Bluefin tune in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. — Međunarodna komisija za očuvanje atlantskih tuna donijela je mjere višegodišnjeg plana oporavka plavoperajne tune (BFT) u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru koji se primjenjuje od 2007. do 2022. godine. Ovaj Plan uključuje mjere upravljanja, tehničke mjere, mjere o sportskom i rekreacijskom ribolovu, koje u sebi sadrže opća pravila primjene kojima se nastoji postići biomasu koja odgovara najvećem održivom prinosu do 2022. godine. Ovakve zajedničke ribarstvene politike nužan su preduvjet očuvanja dobrog stanja ribljeg fonda te kako bi se na što učinkovitiji način osiguralo iskorištavanje morskih resursa.

Dva segmenta ovog izvješća posebno pozdravljam. Prvo, zagovaranje uloge tradicionalnih alata i tehnike očuvanju ribljeg fonda jer vjerujem da u provedbi plana oporavka plavoperajne tune EU treba posebno uzeti u obzir te alate i tehnike zbog njihove selektivnosti. Drugo, pozdravljam uključivanje u ovaj plan ulovnih plovila koja plove pod zastavom Republike Hrvatske čime se postojeći broj utvrđen 2008. godine proširuje i uzima u obzir pristupanje RH EU-u i njezinim naporima za očuvanje plavoperajne tune.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. — Svaka država članica poduzima potrebne mjere kako bi osigurala da ribolovni napor njezinih ulovnih plovila i zamki tunara bude razmjerni ribolovnim mogućnostima za plavoperajnu tunu koje su na raspolaganju toj državi članici u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru.

Najveći broj i odgovarajuća bruto tonaža ribarskih plovila koja plove pod zastavom države članice koja se bave ribolovom plavoperajne tune u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru ne smije biti veći od broja i ukupne odgovarajuće bruto tonaže ribarskih plovila koja plove pod zastavom te države članice i koja su plovila, zadržavala na plovilu, prekrćavala, prevozila ili iskrcavala plavoperajnu tunu u razdoblju od 1. siječnja 2007. do 1. srpnja 2008. To ograničenje primjenjuje se prema vrsti ribolovnog alata za ulovna plovila.

Država članica koja je država zastave ukida odobrenje za ribolov plavoperajne tune i od plovila može zahtijevati da se odmah uputi u luku koju ona odredi ako smatra da je plovilo izlovalo kvotu koja mu je dodijeljena.

Smatram da je, uz priložene amandmane, prijedlog uredbe Vijeća i Europskog parlamenta o višegodišnjem planu oporavka plavoperajne tune u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe (EZ) br. 302/2009 prijeko potreban ukoliko želimo vidjeti napredak po pitanju oporavka plavoperajne tune u navedenim područjima.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Alla luce dell'evoluzione positiva dello stato degli stock di tonno rosso negli ultimi anni, la Commissione internazionale per la conservazione del tonno (ICCAT) ha deciso di aumentare i limiti massimi di catture ammissibili del 20 % per i tre anni successivi (dal 2015 al 2017), in quanto i dati scientifici hanno attestato che gli stock si trovano a livelli ottimali di abbondanza. A metà dicembre 2015, il Consiglio dei Ministri dell'UE competente per la pesca e l'agricoltura ha definitivamente deliberato l'aumento del 20 % e ha proceduto alla ripartizione del contingente comunitario tra gli Stati membri interessati. Inoltre, le raccomandazioni dell'ICCAT tengono conto delle specificità dei diversi attrezzi per la pesca del tonno. In questo contesto, è importante il ruolo delle tonnare artigianali, come ad esempio quelle tradizionali, ai fini della conservazione degli stock. Ritengo che, nell'attuazione del piano di ricostituzione, l'Unione europea dovrebbe rivolgere un'attenzione particolare a dette tonnare tradizionali, che contribuiscono alla ricostituzione degli stock di tonno grazie alla loro notevole selettività. Inoltre, tali attrezzi hanno un impatto molto ridotto sugli ecosistemi marini in virtù del loro basso livello di consumo energetico e di catture accidentali. Per tutto ciò, ho votato a favore della relazione.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Wniosek ma na celu przetransponowanie do unijnego prawa środków zawartych w wieloletnim planie odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym, przyjętym przez Międzynarodową Komisję ds. Ochrony Tuńczyka Atlantyckiego (ICCAT) na dorocznych posiedzeniach w 2012 r. i 2014 r. Wieloletni plan odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego został ustanowiony w 2006 r. i wszedł w życie w 2007 r. ICCAT jest regionalną organizacją ds. zarządzania rybołówstwem odpowiedzialną za zarządzanie zasobami tuńczyka i gatunków tuńczykopodobnych w Oceanie Atlantyckim i morzach przyległych, której Unia jest Umawiającą się Stroną.

Aby zapewnić jednolite i skuteczne stosowanie w całej UE wszystkich środków zawartych w planie odbudowy zasobów przyjętym w latach 2012-2014, obecny wniosek włączy je do rozporządzenia dotyczącego wieloletniego planu odbudowy tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym. Wniosek obejmuje środki techniczne, takie jak przepisy regulujące wykorzystanie kamer stereoskopowych w celu oszacowania liczby okazów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego i liczby wypuszczonych okazów, przepisy dotyczące operacji transferu żywego tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego i jego umieszczania w sadzach, a także wymogi dotyczące realizacji programu obserwatorów regionalnych ICCAT oraz raportów połowowych. Niniejszym poparłem sprawozdanie.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – L'Union européenne est partie à la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA), organisation qui a adopté en 2006 un plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge jusqu'en 2022. J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte qui permet d'intégrer dans un règlement l'ensemble des mesures adoptées dans le cadre du plan de reconstitution des stocks.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Avec le vote ce midi du rapport Mato, le Parlement s'engage pour la conservation des thons rouges et contre la surpêche.

Aujourd'hui, deux des trois espèces de thons rouges répertoriées dans le monde sont considérées comme menacées par la surpêche, c'est dire l'urgence de la situation. Ce rapport associe l'Union à la Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique (CICTA) et à son plan pluriannuel de reconstitution des stocks de thon rouge pour la période 2007-2022.

Ce plan prévoit notamment une réduction progressive du total admissible des captures (TAC) de thons rouges, de nouveaux critères de pêche ainsi que des mesures pour encadrer la pêche sportive et récréative tout en renforçant le programme d'inspection internationale adopté par la CICTA.

Le rapport en lui-même prévoit la transposition en droit européen des mesures du plan de reconstitution adoptées entre 2012 et 2014: opérations de transfert et de mise en cage, mesures visant à estimer les quantités de thon et le nombre des remises à la mer.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, cuyo objeto es incorporar al Derecho de la Unión las medidas del plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo, adoptadas por la Comisión Internacional para la Conservación del Atún Atlántico en sus reuniones anuales celebradas entre 2012 y 2014, garantizando una aplicación uniforme y efectiva de las mismas en toda la Unión Europea.

Este nuevo Reglamento derogará el Reglamento (CE) n° 302/2009 del Consejo, que ya fue modificado en el 2014 para incorporar las medidas en relación con las temporadas de pesca adoptadas por la CICAA en 2012 y 2013.

Considero conveniente apoyar esta iniciativa de revisión de una regulación que estaba obsoleta, con la que se solventa algunos aspectos técnicos deficientes, y que fue tramitado con gran consenso en la Comisión de Pesca.

No obstante, quiero subrayar que el texto resultante de la negociación interinstitucional, es mucho menos ambicioso que el salió del propio Parlamento. Ya que, aunque pone de relevancia la importancia de la pesca artesanal, se han eliminado las referencias específicas a un arte de pesca tradicional y sostenible como es la almadraba, que a mí entender, merece una mención específica en esta regulación.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen a approuvé le texte de compromis entre institutions de l'UE sur le programme pluriannuel de rétablissement des stocks de thon rouge dans l'Atlantique Est et la Méditerranée.

En adoptant ce document, le Parlement a approuvé le texte du règlement qui transpose dans le droit de l'UE différentes mesures prises par la CICTA (Commission internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l'Atlantique) en 2012, 2013 et 2014.

L'objectif du règlement est d'obtenir une biomasse de thon rouge correspondant au rendement maximal durable d'ici à 2022, avec une probabilité d'au moins 60 % d'atteindre cet objectif. Le programme pluriannuel de rétablissement des stocks de thon rouge a débuté en 2007 et doit se poursuivre jusqu'en 2022.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Tunai yra itin svarbi sudedamoji žuvies pasiūlos dalis. Deja, daugelis žvejojančių šalių turi pakankamus pajėgumus, kad nereguliuojant žvejybos sunaikintų didžiąją tunų atsargų dalį pasaulyje. Tuo tikslu šiandien priimame daugiametį tunų išteklių atkūrimo planą.

Vertindamas dokumentą, galiu įvardinti tris jo trūkumus. Pirmas – planas yra ganėtinai neatsakingas. Jame labai nedaug dėmesio skiriama žuvų išteklių atkūrimui, kurio esminė sąlyga – žvejoti gerokai mažiau nei suauga žuvų. Antras plano trūkumas – jis yra socialiai neatsakingas: skurdesnės ES valstybės narės yra traktuojamos taip pat, kaip ir turtingesnės, neatsižvelgiant į tai, kad net ne žvejybos plėtra, o jos atgaivinimas po neatsakingų veiksmų mažinant ES žvejybos pajėgumus galėtų tapti vienu iš regioninio augimo tolygios regioninės plėtros varikliu. Ir trečiasis trūkumas – plane nepakankamai dėmesio skiriama darbui su ES nepriklausančiomis šalimis, ypač tomis, kurios yra žinomos dėl savo nesugebėjimo laikytis tarptautinių susitarimų.

Nepaisant to, geriau ne visai geras planas, nei jokie. Todėl balsuoju „už“, kartu ragindamas Komisiją ateityje atsižvelgti į išsakytas pastabas.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – A União Europeia é Parte Contratante da Comissão Internacional para a Conservação dos Tunídeos do Atlântico (ICCAT) que é a Organização Regional de Gestão das Pescas (ORGP) responsável pela gestão do atum e espécies afins no oceano Atlântico e mares adjacentes.

O atum-rabilho é a espécie mais importante regulada pela ICCAT, que em 2006 adotou um plano plurianual de recuperação desta espécie até 2022. No seguimento deste plano, verifica-se que a biomassa do atum-rabilho tem vindo a crescer nos últimos anos.

Este plano prevê uma redução gradual do nível do total admissível de capturas (TAC), restrições da pesca em determinadas zonas e determinados períodos, um novo tamanho mínimo para as capturas, medidas relacionadas com as atividades de pesca desportiva e recreativa, bem como com as capacidades de pesca e de cultura e o reforço do programa de inspeção internacional conjunta da ICCAT.

No seguimento da avaliação efetuada às medidas que este plano de recuperação adotou entre 2012 e 2014, a presente proposta decide integrá-las num Regulamento, com vista a assegurar uma aplicação mais eficaz e mais simples – visto que é uniforme – destas medidas nas águas de toda a União Europeia.

Pelas razões expostas, votei a favor deste relatório.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – In linea con il gruppo PPE ho dato il mio voto a favore alla relazione sulla proposta di adottare un piano pluriennale di ricostituzione del tonno rosso. Il ricorso frequente a pratiche di pesca intensive ha fortemente compromesso il numero di tonni rossi nell'Atlantico orientale e nel Mediterraneo. Per far fronte a questo problema l'ICCAT, organizzazione regionale di gestione della pesca, ha elaborato un piano pluriennale volto alla ricostituzione del tonno rosso nelle aree menzionate. Inutile dire che senza un intervento a livello comunitario il problema sarà pressoché irrisolvibile. Inoltre, tengo a segnalare che l'intervento incisivo dell'Onorevole Mato, gruppo PPE, ha permesso di aprire i negoziati con il Consiglio sul testo in esame e di approvare un emendamento a favore della pesca artigianale di piccola scala, un settore sempre più in affanno anche nell'economia italiana, e che il Parlamento europeo tenta di tutelare.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención porque si bien el informe subraya el papel de las artes de pesca artesanales, como las tradicionales almadrabas, consideramos que a la hora de aplicar el plan de recuperación, la UE debe enfatizar aún más en el uso de trampas tradicionales que contribuyen a la restauración de las poblaciones de atún y tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

También creemos necesario denunciar que en la práctica la distribución de las cuotas en los Estados Miembros no aplica el art. 17 de la PPC por el que se insta al reparto atendiendo criterios «transparentes y objetivos, incluyendo aquellos de carácter medioambiental, social y económico».

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *in writing*. – Stocks of Bluefin tuna are particularly vulnerable to over-exploitation and therefore need careful management. I have been a rapporteur on this issue in the past and I am aware of the tensions and difficulties which can arise when setting quotas. However, if strict rules are not applied to ensure that catches are below maximum sustainable yields then the future of the fishing industry itself is put at risk. Management of fisheries and enforcement of these regulations at sea remain big challenges with important social, economic and environmental consequences.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Mehrfährigen Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun im Ostatlantik und im Mittelmeer“ gestimmt.

Schon 2006 wurde der erste Plan dieser Art beschlossen, und zwar von der ICCAT (die Internationale Kommission für die Erhaltung der Thunfischbestände im Atlantik). Der Plan, dem das Parlament nun zugestimmt hat, soll die Bestände des Roten Thuns überwachen und die Gesamtfangmengen einschränken, damit sich die Bestände erholen können.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque ha supuesto un grave paso atrás en favor de la pesca industrial del atún y un reparto justo de las cuotas pesqueras. Este informe supone el resultado de los trilogos con Comisión y Consejo sobre el plan de recuperación del atún rojo. La posición inicial del parlamento, que apoyamos, contenía disposiciones en favor de artes tradicionales, sostenibles y de pequeña escala. Sin embargo todas estas referencias han quedado borradas en el proceso de los trilogos. Es por esto por lo que no he podido votar a favor del presente informe.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Il nuovo piano di ricostituzione del tonno rosso mira a recepire nel diritto dell'Unione Europea alcune misure adottate dall'ICCAT per una migliore gestione di questa importante specie presente nell'Atlantico orientale e nel Mediterraneo. Il nuovo regolamento, che ho appoggiato, riconosce la necessità di prestare maggiore attenzione alle attrezzature artigianali, come ad esempio le tonnare, che hanno un basso impatto sugli ecosistemi marini, un alto livello di selettività e contribuiscono alla creazione di posti di lavoro.

La proposta comprende misure tecniche, riguardanti, ad esempio, le operazioni di trasferimento e ingabbiamento di tonni rossi vivi, le misure che prevedono l'utilizzo di fotocamere stereoscopiche, le disposizioni concernenti la dichiarazione delle catture e l'attuazione del programma di osservazione regionale dell'ICCAT.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *písomne*. – Európska únia je zmluvnou stranou Medzinárodnej komisie pre zachovanie atlantických tuniakov (ICCAT). Komisia ICCAT má právomoc prijímať rozhodnutia („odporúčania“) v záujme ochrany a riadenia rybolovných zdrojov vo svojej oblasti pôsobnosti (vrátane stanovenia celkových povolených výlovov za určité obdobie). Tieto akty sú záväzné. Musia byť prevzaté do práva Únie. Počas uplynulých rokov bola zaznamenaná výrazná obnova populácie tuniaka modroplutvého, čo by mohlo znamenať, že celkový povolený výlov sa navýši viac ako bolo pôvodne naplánované. Hlasoval som za.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – EÚ je zmluvnou stranou Medzinárodnej komisie pre zachovanie atlantických tuniakov (ICCAT), regionálnej organizácie pre riadenie rybárstva (RFMO) zodpovednej za hospodárenie s tuniakmi a im príbuznými druhmi v atlantickom oceáne a príľahlých moriach. Tuniak modroplutvý je najdôležitejší druh, ktorý reguluje komisia ICCAT. Rybári vynaložili značné úsilie o prispôbenie svojich úlovkov zníženému celkovému povolenému výlovu, ktorý vyplýval z rozhodnutí prijatých v roku 2006, a to tým, že dodržiavali prísne rybolovné podmienky stanovené v pláne. Vzhľadom na pozitívny vývoj stavu populácií komisia ICCAT rozhodla o miernom zvýšení celkových pridelených kvót na 13 400 ton v roku 2013. Celkový povolený výlov v roku 2014 nebol zmenený. Regionálna organizácia rozhodla o navýšení povoleného rybolovu na nasledujúce tri roky (2015-2017) o 20 %, keďže existujú spoľahlivé vedecké údaje o tom, že populácie tuniaka modroplutvého. Cieľom schváleného návrhu je, aby v celej EÚ sa uplatňovali rovnaké podmienky pre všetkých prevádzkovateľov zapojených do lovu tuniaka. Rovnaké pravidlá by sa mali uplatňovať pre všetkých prevádzkovateľov aj mimo EÚ.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), pisno. – Evropska unija je pogodbenica Mednarodne komisije za ohranitev tunov v Atlantiku (ICCAT) in Regionalne organizacije za upravljanje ribištva (RFMO), pristojne za upravljanje tuna in njemu podobnih vrst v Atlantskem oceanu in sosednjih morjih.

Čeprav predlog Komisije na splošno ustrezno prenaša zadevna priporočila ICCAT, v nekaterih primerih presega sklepe ICCAT in celo področno zakonodajo EU. Modroplavuti tun je ekonomsko gledano izredno pomemben za Evropsko unijo, še posebej za mediteranske države članice. Čeprav je ulov precej majhen, je modroplavuti tun zelo cenjena riba na japonskem trgu, kjer so posledično tudi cene astronomske.

Poročilo zadeva spremenjeno obliko ICCAT načrta, opisuje izboljšanje nadzora reje, omejitve ter vrste ribiške opreme. Predlog uredbe vključuje tehnične ukrepe, kot so ukrepi v zvezi z dejavnostmi prenosa in reje živega modroplavutega tuna v mrežasti kletki, vključno z ukrepi v zvezi z uporabo stereoskopskih kamer za oceno količine modroplavutega tuna in izpustov, zahteve za poročanje o ulovu in izvajanje regionalnega opazovalnega programa ICCAT.

Poročilo poudarja, da bi morala Evropska unija pri izvajanju načrta za obnovo staleža posebno pozornost nameniti tradicionalnim pastem, ki prispevajo k obnovi staleža tuna, saj so izjemno selektivne.

Menim, da je poročilo dobro, zaradi česar sem ga tudi podprl.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), napisan. – Izvješče priporoča konkretnije mjere u svezi iskrcavanja, prenošenja, stavljanja u kaveze, korištenje stereoskopskih kamera radi učinkovitije analize količine plavoperajne tune, zahtjevi prilikom izvješća o ulovu, kao i provedba programa regionalnog nadzora Međunarodne komisije za očuvanje atlantske tune (ICCAT). Uzimajući u obzir da biomasa plavoperajne tune pokazuju pozitivne znakove oporavka od 2008, ICCAT je 2014. odlučila dignuti kvotu za dvadeset posto od 2015.-2017.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da je neophodno unaprijediti zaštitu jedne od najvažnijih vrsti riba za ribare Unije. Podržavam mišljenje odbora da Europska unija mora nastojati osigurati jednakost za sve operatore koji se bave ribolovom plavoperajne tune, i one koji nisu članovi EU-a. U suprotnom, svi naponi i ograničenja neće polučiti željene rezultate. Iznimno je bitno napomenuti kako izvješće stavlja naglasak na potrebu zaštite tradicionalnih običaja ribolova, s obrazloženjem da je njihov utjecaj na ekološki sustav zanemariv. U zaštiti principa otvorenog tržišta i jednakih mogućnosti potrebno je usvojiti obuhvatniju regulaciju plavoperajne tune.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), napisan. – Europska unija je ugovorna stranka Međunarodne komisije za zaštitu atlantskih tuna (ICCAT), Organizacije za regionalno ribarsko gospodarstvo (RFMO) odgovorne za gospodarenje tunom i tuni sličnim vrstama u Atlantiku i susjednim morima. Prijedlog sadrži tehničke mjere kao što su one za operacije prijenosa žive tune u kavezima, uključujući mjere korištenja stereoskopskih kamera kako bi se procijenila količina tune i o tome informirala javnost. ICCAT ima ovlast donijeti odluke (Preporuke) za očuvanje i upravljanje ribarstvom u okviru svoje nadležnosti. Takve odluke su obvezujuće i moraju biti inkorporirane u pravo Unije.

Podržavam stajalište Parlamenta koji usvaja Izvješće jer smatram da je Parlament dovoljno kompetentan da procijeni da li je neko izvješće dovoljno jasno i kvalitetno sročeno.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), pisno. – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o vzpostavitvi večletnega načrta za obnovo staleža modroplavutega tuna v vzhodnem Atlantiku in Sredozemskem morju ter razveljavitvi Uredbe.

Poročilo vsebuje tehnične ukrepe, s katerimi bomo zagotovili enotno in učinkovito izvajanje vseh ukrepov načrta za obnovo staleža, ki so bili sprejeti med letoma 2012 in 2014.

Predlog, denimo, vsebuje ukrep v zvezi z dejavnostmi prenosa in reje živega modroplavutega tuna v mrežasti kletki. Leta 2006 je namreč Mednarodna komisija za ohranitev tunov v Atlantiku sprejela večletni načrt za obnovo staleža modroplavutega tuna, ki velja do leta 2022.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), γραπτός. – Η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam az Atlanti-óceán keleti részén és a Földközi-tengerben élő kékúszójútonhal-állományra vonatkozó helyreállítási tervről szóló jelentést. Döntésem során figyelembe vettem azt a tényt, hogy az Atlanti Tonhal Védelmére Létrehozott Nemzetközi Bizottság (ICCAT) szerint a kékúszójú tonhal biomasszája 2008 óta rendkívül kedvező tendenciákat követ, és szilárd tudományos adatok igazolják, hogy a kékúszójú tonhal állománya egészséges szintű bőséget ért el. A regionális szervezet adatait alapul véve, támogatható az a döntés, hogy a 2017-re tervezett – és a helyreállítási terv elindítását megelőzően érvényes teljes kifogható mennyiségnél még így is jóval alacsonyabb – (23 155 tonnás) teljes kifogható mennyiséget előrehozzák 2016-ra.

Szintén helyeslem, hogy az ICCAT-ajánlások figyelembe veszik a tonhalhalászati eszközök különböző típusainak sajátosságait, és hogy ehhez kapcsolódóan a jelentés felhívja a figyelmet a kisüzemi, hagyományos csapdákhoz az állomány megőrzésében betöltött szerepére. A helyreállítási terv végrehajtása során az EU-nak valóban különös figyelmet kell szentelnie a hagyományos csapdákra, mivel ezen eszközök alacsony energiaszükségletük és a kevés járulékos fogás miatt igen alacsony hatást fejtenek ki a tengeri ökoszisztémákra. Üdvözlöm továbbá, hogy a jelentéstevő kiemeli az EP részvételének hiányát a nemzetközi tárgyalások során. Támogatom, hogy a regionális halászati gazdálkodási szervezetek ajánlásainak átültetése a rendes jogalkotási eljárás keretében az Európai Parlament és a Tanács közös hatáskörében maradjon.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), *în scris*. – Pescuitul este una dintre activitățile economice importante ale Uniunii Europene, generatoare de locuri de muncă, de venituri și de resurse alimentare semnificative pentru statele membre. Una dintre componentele acestei activități este pescuitul de ton în regiunea Oceanului Atlantic, care asigură cantități apreciabile statelor membre implicate. În același timp, însă, UE este parte semnatară a Comisiei Internaționale pentru Conservarea Tonului din Oceanul Atlantic (ICCAT), organizație regională de gestionare a pescuitului și care reglementează nivelul maxim al capturilor pentru a nu afecta biodiversitatea faunei marine din arealul respectiv. În urma studiilor științifice realizate în ultimii ani, s-a ajuns la concluzia că stocurile de ton roșu au înregistrat o regenerare spectaculoasă, ceea ce permite creșterea cotelor stabilite pentru UE. În aceste condiții, Comisia a propus o abordare uniformă și eficace a reglementărilor ICCAT la nivelul întregii Uniuni, incluzând măsuri tehnice de transfer și declarare a capturilor de ton roșu, utilizarea camerelor stereoscopice, obligația de debarcare în cazul depășirii cotelor. Este vorba despre o propunere constructivă, însă rolul Parlamentului European ar putea fi mai important în acest domeniu care îi privește direct pe cetățenii europeni. Din aceste motive, susțin adoptarea actualului raport.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai suivi le groupe dans ce vote sur la préservation du thon rouge. Même si, dans l'ensemble, la proposition de la Commission transpose correctement les recommandations pertinentes de la CICTA, dans certains cas, elle va au-delà de ce qui a été décidé par la CICTA, mais aussi de ce que prévoit la législation de l'Union. C'est le cas, par exemple, lorsque le quota individuel pour le thon rouge est considéré comme épuisé: les recommandations de la CICTA ainsi que le règlement de l'Union instituant un régime de contrôle prévoient que l'État membre du pavillon peut demander – et non «ordonner», comme le propose la Commission – au navire de faire route immédiatement vers un port qu'il a désigné.

À cet égard, rappelons que l'objectif de la transposition des recommandations de la CICTA est d'avoir une application uniforme dans l'ensemble de l'Union; il ne s'agit pas de rouvrir le débat sur ce qui a déjà été décidé, souvent après de longues négociations, où chaque mot et chaque virgule comptent.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – Bluefin tuna is one of the top predators in the Mediterranean Sea, a crucial species for its ecosystem, and has a very high economic value, both in the European and Japanese market. In the late 90s however, the Mediterranean stock dramatically decreased to levels compromising the future of the species and the viability of the fishing sector. The multi-annual Bluefin Tuna recovery plan in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean established in 2006 by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was very efficient in contributing to the recovery of the stock. This is why I voted in favour of transposing this plan into EU law, as I hope that it will contribute to ensuring the exploitation of living aquatic resources under sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions. I particularly agree with the decision to ensure equitable distribution between the various fleets and support small scale and artisanal fisheries, which usually practice sustainable fishing practices and ensure the livelihood of many local communities.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan.* – Glasovala sam za Izvješće o prijedlogu uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o višegodišnjem planu oporavka plavoperajne tune u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe (EZ) br.302/2009. Cilj ovog prijedloga je prenijeti u pravo Unije mjere višegodišnjeg plana oporavka plavoperajne tune u istočnom Atlantiku i Sredozemnom moru koji je donijela Međunarodna komisija za očuvanje atlantskih tuna na godišnjim zasjedanjima od 2012. do 2014. godine.

Ovom Uredbom se utvrđuju opća pravila plana oporavka tune te se istovremeno vodi računa i o posebnostima različitih alata, a posebna pažnja posvećuje se tradicionalnim i održivim ribolovnim alatima i ribolovnim alatima koji se upotrebljavaju u malom priobalnom ribolovu, kao što su zamke tunare. Ova zakonodavna inicijativa će riješiti pitanja osiguravanja jedinstvene i djelotvorne primjene najnovijih mjera višegodišnjeg ICCAT-ova plana oporavka plavoperajne tune diljem Europske unije.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno.* – Podpiram sedanjí predlog uredbe, ki želi prenesti v ukrepe prava Unije načrt za obnovo staleža modroplavutega tuna v vzhodnem Atlantiku in Sredozemskem morju.

V letu 2006 je Mednarodna komisija za ohranitev atlantskega tuna sprejela večletni načrt za obnovo staleža modroplavutega tuna, ki se konča leta 2022. Za obnovo staleža načrt določa postopno zmanjšanje skupne ravni dovoljenega ulova od leta 2007 do leta 2011, omejitev ribolova na nekaterih območjih in v časovnih obdobjih, nove minimalne velikosti, ukrepe v zvezi s športnimi in rekreacijskimi ribolovnimi aktivnostmi ter ribolovne zmogljivosti.

Predlog vsebuje tudi tehnične ukrepe o uporabi stereoskopskih kamer, da bi ocenili količine modroplavutega tuna. Pomembna je vloga obrtnih in tradicionalnih orodij ter tehnik pri ohranjanju staležev.

Pri izvajanju načrta za oživitev gospodarstva bi morala Evropska unija posebno pozornost nameniti tem orodjem in tehnikam, ki so prispevali k obnovi staležev modroplavutega tuna.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito.* –

Hemos votado ABSTENCIÓN porque si bien el informe subraya el papel de las artes de pesca artesanales, como las tradicionales almadrabas, consideramos que a la hora de aplicar el plan de recuperación, la UE debe enfatizar aún más en el uso de trampas tradicionales que contribuyen a la restauración de las poblaciones de atún y tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

También creemos necesario denunciar que en la práctica la distribución de las cuotas en los Estados Miembros no aplica el art. 17 de la PPC por el que se insta al reparto atendiendo criterios «transparentes y objetivos, incluyendo aquellos de carácter medioambiental, social y económico».

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing.* – I support this resolution.

The fishing industry in Europe is very important for many coastal areas. The fishermen are the first who want, and should care about, sustainable fishing.

The recovery plan should take into account the specificities of the different types of gears. When implementing the recovery plan, the EU and Member States should pay particular attention to non-industrial fishing activities and to the most artisanal and sustainable gear types, such as traditional traps ('almadrabas', 'tonnare'), which contribute very positively to the rebuilding of tuna stocks, due to their high level of selectivity and low environmental impact in marine ecosystems, and which are valuable in scientific terms.

Myłène Troszczyński (ENF), *par écrit.* – Les stocks de thon rouge ont été reconstitués. Le débat porte aujourd'hui sur une simple transposition de la convention ICCAT.

Problèmes:

— La Commission européenne, voulant agir très vite, demande de pouvoir faire des actes délégués

— Seulement quelques thoniers profitent des stocks; la pêche artisanale est en grande partie exclue, alors même que tout le monde prétend la défendre. Toutefois, la Commission européenne comme les députés de la commission de la pêche soulignent la protection qui doit être accordée à des modes de pêche traditionnels du thon rouge, tels que la madrague. Ces modes de pêche sont très sélectifs et donc respectueux de l'environnement. La Commission précise qu'elle va faire bénéficier ces modes de pêche traditionnels d'un régime spécifique avantageux.

— La Commission souhaitait aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT. Les députés de la commission de la pêche s'y sont opposés par amendement.

Dans l'ensemble, le projet amendé permet de respecter la procédure de codécision, de défendre les modes artisanaux de pêche (madrague) et de ne pas aller au-delà des recommandations de l'ICCAT.

J'ai donc voté POUR.

Mihai Țurcanu (PPE), *în scris*. – Propunerea de regulament vizează să transpună în dreptul european măsurile planului multianual de refacere a stocurilor de ton roșu din Atlanticul de Est și din Mediterana, adoptat în 2006 de către Comisia Internațională pentru Conservarea Tonului din Oceanul Atlantic (ICCAT), organizație la care Uniunea Europeană este parte contractantă.

Pentru a reface stocurile, planurile de reconstituire prevăd o reducere progresivă a nivelului totalului admisibil al capturilor, o limitare a pescuitului în anumite zone și în cursul anumitor perioade, precum și măsuri privind pescuitul sportiv și pescuitul recreativ. Propunerea conține măsuri tehnice privind operațiunile de transfer și de păstrare a tonului roșu viu, precum și măsuri de utilizare a camerelor stereoscopice pentru a putea estima cantitățile de ton roșu.

Scopul aplicării acestor recomandări ale ICCAT este de a avea o acțiune uniformă la nivelul Uniunii Europene, în vederea refacerii stocurilor de ton roșu. Raportul prevede, în acest sens, utilizarea unor instrumente și tehnici artisanale privind conservarea stocurilor, prin punerea în aplicare a planului de refacere.

În consecință, am votat în favoarea planului multianual de refacere a stocurilor de ton roșu.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Międzynarodowa Komisja ds. Ochrony Tuńczyka Atlantyckiego (ICCAT) przyjęła na posiedzeniach w 2012 i 2014 roku wieloletni plan odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego we wschodnim Atlantyku i w Morzu Śródziemnym. Rezolucja ma na celu jednolite stosowanie planu w całej Unii Europejskiej. Należy podjąć wszelkie możliwe działania w celu odbudowy zasobów tuńczyka błękitnopłetwego, w związku z czym poparłem rezolucję.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Európai Unió az Atlanti Tonhal Védelmére Létrehozott Nemzetközi Bizottság (ICCAT) szerződő fele, amely az Atlanti-óceánban és az azzal határos tengerekben élő tonhalfélék és tonhalszerű fajok kezeléséért felelős regionális halászati gazdálkodási szervezet (RFMO). Az ICCAT-nak illetékességi területén joga van állományvédelmi és gazdálkodási határozatokat hozni („ajánlásokat” megfogalmazni); e jogi aktusokat kötelező betartani és be kell emelni az Unió jogába. A mostani dokumentummal kapcsolatban igennel szavaztam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención porque si bien el informe subraya el papel de las artes de pesca artesanales, como las tradicionales almadrabas, consideramos que a la hora de aplicar el plan de recuperación, la UE debe enfatizar aún más en el uso de trampas tradicionales que contribuyen a la restauración de las poblaciones de atún y tienen muy poco impacto en los ecosistemas marinos gracias al bajo nivel de consumo de energía y de capturas accidentales.

También creemos necesario denunciar que en la práctica la distribución de las cuotas en los Estados Miembros no aplica el art. 17 de la PPC por el que se insta al reparto atendiendo criterios «transparentes y objetivos, incluyendo aquellos de carácter medioambiental, social y económico».

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), raštu. — Įgyvendindamas šį planą valstybės narės turėtų skirti ypatingą dėmesį nepramoninės žvejybos veiklai ir nepramoninės tausios žvejybos įrankių tipams, tokiems kaip tradicinės gaudyklės (isp. almadraba, tonnare), kurie labai teigiamai prisideda prie tunų išteklių atkūrimo, nes jų selektyvumas labai didelis ir poveikis aplinkai jūrų ekosistemose mažas, jie taip pat turi mokslinę vertę.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), in writing. – I voted in favour of report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean repealing Regulation (EC) No 302/2009. The European Union is Contracting Party to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) responsible for the management of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjoining seas. Bluefin tuna is the most important species regulated by ICCAT. The proposal contains technical measures such as those on transfer and caging operations of live bluefin tuna, including also measures on the use of stereoscopic cameras to estimate the quantities of bluefin tuna and releases, catch reporting requirements, and the implementation of the ICCAT Regional Observer Programme.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), por escrito. – Mediante este informe se confirma el acuerdo político alcanzado por las instituciones europeas responsables de este asunto. Hablamos de un informe que incorpora a las normas de la UE el plan de recuperación plurianual del atún rojo del Atlántico oriental y el Mediterráneo y mediante el cual el Parlamento Europeo lanza un claro mensaje en defensa de estas pesquerías, estableciendo además que la pesca artesanal y sostenible tenga un trato específico a la hora de decidir las cuotas de captura de atún rojo. Por todo ello creo conveniente votar a su favor.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – No he podido votar a favor del presente informe porque ha supuesto un grave paso atrás en favor de la pesca industrial del atún y un reparto justo de las cuotas pesqueras. Este informe supone el resultado de los trilogos con Comisión y Consejo sobre el plan de recuperación del atún rojo. La posición inicial del Parlamento, que apoyamos, contenía disposiciones en favor de artes tradicionales, sostenibles y de pequeña escala, en específico sobre la almadraba. La propuesta del Parlamento habría permitido una mejora de la situación de las almadrabas con un incremento de las cuotas para las mismas que suponen un incremento de la explotación sostenible de atún. Sin embargo todas estas referencias han quedado borradas en el proceso de los trilogos relegando la almadraba a una mera referencia sin poder vinculante alguno. Es por esto por lo que no he podido votar a favor del presente informe.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), schriftelijk. – Het Europees Parlement verzoekt de Europese Commissie om in haar herstelplan voor blauwvintonijn rekening te houden met de niet-industriële visserijactiviteiten en de meest ambachtelijke en duurzame types vistuig, zoals traditionele tonijnvallen. Zij dragen specifiek bij tot het herstel van de tonijnbestanden, aangezien zij uiterst selectief zijn en in mariene ecosystemen een geringe milieu-impact hebben. Het Europees Parlement verzoekt ook aan de Commissie om bij de toekomstige internationale onderhandelingen te worden betrokken. Ik heb daarmee ingestemd.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), schriftlich. – Dies ist ein Bericht über den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über einen mehrjährigen Wiederauffüllungsplan für Roten Thun im Ostatlantik und im Mittelmeer. Der Vorschlag enthält technische Maßnahmen in Bezug auf Vorgänge des Umsetzens und des Einsetzens von lebendem Thun in Netzkäfige. Da wir vom Inhalt dieser Thematik nicht direkt betroffen sind, möchten wir uns nicht in die Anliegen der tatsächlich aktiv betroffenen Mitgliedstaaten einmischen.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), γραπτώς. – Υπερψήφισα την έκθεση του συναδέλφου Matos, αρμοδιότητας της επιτροπής Αλιείας, για την αποκατάσταση του τόνου στις θαλάσσιες περιοχές του Ανατολικού Ατλαντικού και της Μεσογείου.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), por escrito. – Votei a favor do relatório Gato por concordar com o equilíbrio alcançado no plano plurianual de recuperação do atum-rabilho no Atlântico Este e no Mediterrâneo.

Destaco as alterações propostas pelo grupo socialista europeu no sentido de conferir especial atenção à preservação e à prosperidade dos profissionais da pesca de pequena escala, artesanal e tradicional, que utilizam armadilhas e outros métodos de pesca seletivos, e ao incentivo de tais métodos para que não sejam penalizados pelos critérios de atribuição das quotas nacionais.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o vzpostavitvi večletnega načrta za obnovo staleža modroplavutega tuna v vzhodnem Atlantiku in Sredozemskem morju ter razveljavitvi Uredbe.

Predlog uredbe določa splošna pravila za uporabo načrta za obnovo staleža ob upoštevanju specifičnih značilnosti različnih vrst ribolovnega orodja in namenja posebno pozornost tradicionalnemu, bolj trajnostnemu in obrtniškem orodju.

9.8. Mehrjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – A partire dal 2008, l'Unione europea ha dato il via ad un piano di gestione degli stock di merluzzo, volto ad uno sviluppo sostenibile dell'attività di pesca. Lo scorso marzo, però, il Consiglio ha siglato il nuovo patto pluriennale di pesca per il Mar Baltico, non solo aggiornando la disciplina per la gestione di alcune specie ittiche, ma soprattutto introducendo concetti nuovi di sostenibilità. All'approccio ecosistemico, che valorizza l'interazione biologica fra le specie, s'accompagna la previsione di un massimo rendimento sostenibile, in base al quale s'impone un quantitativo massimo di pesca consentita. Ho espresso pertanto voto favorevole, ritenendo che tutelare la biodiversità dei nostri mari e dell'ambiente rientri, senza dubbio, tra le priorità europee.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El «Plan plurianual para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico y para las pesquerías que explotan estas poblaciones» es el primero de los planes plurianuales presentados tras la reforma de la PPC de 2013. Estos planes pretenden ser las herramientas para la gestión y recuperación de las pesquerías comunitarias.

A pesar de la necesidad de contar con planes para gestionar la pesca en nuestros mares y océanos, no he podido votar a favor de éste ya que la propuesta original ha sido rebajada tras las negociaciones a tres bandas entre con el Consejo y la Comisión. Concretamente me preocupan la verdadera aplicación de un enfoque basado en el ecosistema o la corrección de la sobrepesca. Por todo ello me he abstenido.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – À cause de la surpêche, les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger. J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte qui insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραφώς*. – Ψήφισα υπέρ της έκθεσης σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου για τα αποθέματα γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας της Βαλτικής, διότι το εν λόγω σχέδιο προβλέπει ισόρροπη και βιώσιμη εκμετάλλευση αυτών των αποθεμάτων καθώς και τη σταθερότητα των αλιευτικών δυνατοτήτων στην περιοχή.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – À cause de la surpêche, les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger.

Des avis scientifiques ont établi que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable.

La Commission ne voulait pas attendre de nouvelles études du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer avant de mettre en œuvre le plan pluriannuel.

Le projet prévoit que beaucoup de mesures techniques soient déléguées à la Commission.

Le projet, tel qu'amendé, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil. J'ai donc voté en faveur de ce texte.

Zoltán Balczó (NI), írásban. – Egy, a Bizottságnak korábban visszaküldött jelentés teljes terjedelmében módosított változata a szavazás tárgya. A tőkehal, a hering és a spratt állományok a Balti-tengeri ökoszisztéma egymásra utalt alrendszerei. Már a Bizottság eredeti javaslata is kezelni igyekszik a fajok egymásra utaltságát. A módosító javaslat tudományos háttérű hivatkozásaival és indoklásaival tovább mélyíti egy komplex megközelítésű jogszabályalkotás létrejöttét. A javaslat úgy próbálja biztosítani a kérdéses halfajok fenntarthatóságát, hogy közben figyelembe veszi a part menti kihalászat megélhetését is.

A Bizottság új komplex szemléletű gondolkodását – amit a jelentéstevő és a módosító tovább csiszolnak – egyebek mellett az fémjelzi, hogy olyan gazdálkodási terv létrehozásának kereteit adja meg, amely nem csupán egy-egy faj állományváltozására van tekintettel, hanem valamennyi egymásra utalt faj szaporodásának, életkörülményeinek és halászatának körülményeit kölcsönhatásaiban veszi figyelembe. Mindezek alapján az indítvány elfogadását támogattam.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), par écrit. – À cause de la surpêche, les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger. Des avis scientifiques ont établi que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable.

Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission Pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient effectivement consultés. Il est également prévu que lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

J'ai donc voté en faveur de ce projet, respectueux de notre faune marine et des prérogatives du Parlement, seul organe élu de l'Union.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), par écrit. – Tout comme je l'ai approuvé pour le thon rouge, j'approuve ce plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat, qui prend en compte les éléments de l'écosystème de la mer Baltique, les conditions environnementales et l'impact socioéconomique.

Brando Benifei (S&D), per iscritto. – Il Mar Baltico costituisce un ecosistema estremamente sensibile, un bacino idrico virtualmente chiuso nel quale rivestono estrema importanza i rapporti reciproci, esistenti tra le varie specie marine. La relazione Wałęsa, che oggi ho sostenuto in Parlamento, migliora la proposta della Commissione, sottolineando allo stesso tempo l'importanza del piano pluriennale presentato. La gestione multispecie degli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto rappresenta infatti un passo avanti fondamentale nella gestione delle risorse ittiche e costituisca un modello per futuri piani di questo tipo. Occorre rafforzare l'approccio regionalizzato previsto dalla riforma della politica comune della pesca, consentendo al contempo una reazione tempestiva rispetto a quei cambiamenti repentini che riguardano lo stato degli stock delle specie considerate. Garantire una flessibilità al piano è cruciale e per questo bisogna prevederne una revisione del piano tra tre anni.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Hemos votado abstención dado que entendemos como un avance la aplicación de una gestión multispecífica, mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado.

Entendemos que es preciso que los planes de gestión garanticen una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas pesquerías, basadas en los dictámenes científicos, así como también es fundamental, que todas estas regulaciones respondan a las especificidades de los territorios y sus gentes, que desgraciadamente no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la UE, por lo que seguimos sin compartir los criterios de aplicación de la PPC en los territorios.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai souhaité voter en faveur du rapport de la commission pêche concernant le plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks.

Les députés de la commission pêche ont en effet eu le mérite d'amender la proposition initiale afin que soient notamment prises en compte les études les plus récentes du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer, lesquelles ont démontré que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif de rendement maximal durable.

Par ailleurs, la commission pêche a veillé à ce qu'il y ait plus de transparence au niveau des actes délégués, et que la Commission transmette les documents pertinents au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – L'obiettivo della proposta è stabilire un quadro per la gestione «multispecie» degli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto, nel Mar Baltico nelle zone in cui l'attività di pesca è principalmente finalizzata a queste tre specie. Pur essendo condivisibile l'approccio «multispecie» di questo piano, non posso sostenere pienamente questo testo, poiché non fornisce sufficienti informazioni sull'impatto che avrà per le economie delle zone interessate, mi sono quindi espressa con un'astensione.

Malin Björk (GUE/NGL), *skriftlig*. – Jag har röstat emot betänkandet.

Ursprungsförslaget från kommissionen var en bra plan för att göra Östersjöfisket mer hållbart. Dessvärre urvattnades betänkandet, exempelvis är det tillåtet att fiska över de rekommenderade hållbarhetsnivåerna (Maximum Sustainable Yield) och det kan vi aldrig ställa oss bakom. Det här betänkandet hotar både den biologiska mångfalden och fiskerisektorn eftersom fiskpopulationerna minskar av överfiske. Att tillåta fiske över de rekommenderade nivåerna innebär också en försvagning av ramverket för den europeiska fiskeripolitiken (Common Fisheries Policy). Därför har jag röstat emot betänkandet.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Este plan plurianual tiene por objeto establecer un marco de gestión multi-específico para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico, donde suponen más del 94 % de las capturas en los últimos años.

El 15 de marzo de 2016, representantes de la Comisión, Consejo y Parlamento alcanzaron un acuerdo para este plan plurianual, que se espera entre en vigor antes de finales de agosto de 2016. Este es el primero de varios planes requeridos en el artículo 9 del Reglamento de la PPC.

El plan acordado contiene una serie de requisitos coherentes las nuevas exigencias de la política pesquera común e introduce el concepto de «rangos» para el cálculo de la mortalidad por pesca.

Consideró esta reglamentación de suma importancia, tomando en consideración las interacciones entre las especies afectadas.

Por todo ello, he votado a favor de este informe.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo siekiama sukurti mišrios sudėties Baltijos jūros menkių, silkių ir šprotų valdymo planą, nes šiame regione daugiausiai vykdoma šių trijų rūšių žvejyba. Pastaraisiais metais iš Baltijos jūroje sugautų žuvų 94 % sudarė menkės, silkės ir šprotai. Baltijos jūra yra iš esmės uždari vandenys, kuriuose šios trys rūšys yra plačiai paplitusios ir nuolat tarpusavyje sąveikauja. Todėl svarbu sukurti taisyklės, kuriomis būtų atsižvelgiama į šių rūšių tarpusavio sąveiką, menkių įtaką silkių ir šprotų ištekliais, bei pastarųjų įtaką menkių ištekliais.

Atsižvelgiant į didelį biologinės sąveikos ir aplinkos sąlygų poveikį ištekliais Baltijos jūroje, pageidautina, kad šių išteklių eksploatavimo mastas ir modeliai būtų pritaikomi atsižvelgiant į patikslintus mokslinius duomenis apie tokią sąveiką ir aplinkos sąlygų pokyčius.

Be to, toks metodas atitiktų ekosisteminio žvejybos valdymo principą. Siekiant tokio pritaikomojo valdymo, pirmasis žingsnis būtų Komisijos pasiūlymas visus susijusius išteklius įtraukti į vieną bendrą valdymo planą.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte (contrairement à la Commission qui ne voulait pas les attendre) et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté pour.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il merluzzo bianco, l'aringa e lo spratto sono oggetto di importanti attività di pesca nel Mar Baltico. Il parere scientifico del Consiglio internazionale per l'esplorazione del mare (CIEM) indica che per alcuni di questi stock gli attuali tassi di sfruttamento non sono compatibili con il conseguimento del rendimento massimo sostenibile, previsto dalla PCP. Se per gli stock di merluzzo bianco del Mar Baltico è in vigore un piano di gestione dal 2007, gli stock di aringa e di spratto non sono ancora soggetti a un piano di gestione. Questo piano è il primo ad essere approvato dall'entrata in vigore della PCP e rappresenta un esempio da seguire.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Planul multianual pentru stocurile de cod, hering și șprot din Marea Baltică și pentru activitățile de pescuit care exploatează stocurile respective are rolul de a stabili un cadru pentru gestionarea multispeciilor din stocurile menționate anterior.

Având în vedere că heringul, codul și șprotul din Marea Baltică reprezintă mai mult de 94% din capturile din ultimii ani, este necesară o reglementare prin care să se permită recunoașterea interacțiunilor dintre speciile vizate.

Chiar dacă a existat un plan de gestionare a stocurilor de cod din Marea Baltică, acesta nu este îndeajuns de adaptat la noile condiții, cu atât mai mult cu cât stocurile de hering și șprot nu sunt incluse în niciun plan de gestionare. Astfel, e necesară o abordare care prevede gestionarea pentru mai multe specii, ținându-se cont de exploatarea durabilă și responsabilă și, totodată, de asigurarea stabilității posibilităților de pescuit.

Având în vedere importanța codului, a heringului și a șprotului pentru ecosistemul din Marea Baltică, precum și influența puternică a interacțiunilor biologice și a efectelor de mediu asupra stocurilor din Marea Baltică, consider că se impune existența planului multianual în vederea unei gestionări corecte a acestor stocuri, motiv pentru care m-am exprimat în favoarea acestui raport.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – Les plans de gestion pluriannuels sont les principaux instruments de gestion des pêcheries prévus par la politique commune de la pêche. Ils permettent de programmer sur le long terme un ensemble de mesures, y compris en ce qui concerne les possibilités de pêche. Ce plan de gestion est le premier élaboré selon les règles de la nouvelle politique commune de la pêche (réformée en 2013), qui impose notamment de gérer les stocks halieutiques au rendement maximal durable (RMD). Ce dossier a été très difficile. Le Parlement et le Conseil ont en effet négocié en trilogue durant 10 mois avant de trouver un accord. L'accord trouvé est équilibré. Il permet surtout de débloquent les plans de gestion pour les autres bassins maritimes, qui étaient conditionnés à un accord sur ce premier plan de nouvelle génération. J'ai donc voté en faveur de ce rapport.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione in questione per esprimere la mia soddisfazione per il fatto che gli Stati membri e il Parlamento europeo hanno raggiunto un valido accordo sul nuovo piano pluriennale per il Baltico. Esiste già, dal 2008, un piano di gestione degli stock di merluzzo bianco del Mar Baltico. Tuttavia, è ampiamente considerato inadeguato rispetto all'attuale situazione degli stock di merluzzo bianco e delle attività di pesca che da esso dipendono.

Considerata la forte influenza che le interazioni biologiche e gli effetti ambientali hanno sugli stock del Mar Baltico, penso sia auspicabile poter adeguare i modelli e i tassi di sfruttamento di tali stock alla luce dei progressi realizzati nella comprensione scientifica delle interazioni e delle variazioni delle condizioni ambientali. Ciò garantirebbe al piano la tanto necessaria flessibilità.

Sottolineo inoltre l'importanza di garantire che il nuovo piano si avvalga del contributo di coloro che conoscono meglio la regione in quanto saranno in grado di adattare le misure a livello regionale alle specificità delle attività di pesca in questione.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report that proposes a multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea. The stock of the three species dominates local fishery and the geographic feature of Baltic Sea to be a rather closed environment makes the three species interact frequently. This tailored plan is expected to be more effective in securing sustainable exploitation because it incorporates all related species in a single set of rules. I support the call for greater supervision and an update of the current legislation.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Il nuovo piano pluriennale per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico contempla concetti nuovi come l'approccio ecosistemico e l'interazione biologica fra le specie pescabili. Si tratta di una novità importante, in quanto per la prima volta si tiene conto nel calcolo delle quote catturabili che ad una cattura di predatori corrisponderà un aumento delle loro prede naturali. Nel complesso il Piano è di gran lunga migliore rispetto alle misure preesistenti e pertanto ho espresso il mio voto favorevole.

Δευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφικώς*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση θεωρώντας ότι η γενική γραμμή σκέψης της πρότασης της Επιτροπής, ότι δηλαδή υπάρχει ανάγκη για σχέδιο διαχείρισης για πολλά είδη στη Βαλτική Θάλασσα, είναι σωστή.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφικώς*. – Η σημερινή ψηφοφορία για την έκθεση σχετικά με τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου για τα αποθέματα γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας της Βαλτικής Θάλασσας και για τις αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες εκμετάλλευσης των εν λόγω αποθεμάτων εντάσσεται στην προσπάθεια προστασίας και υποστήριξης συγκεκριμένων ειδών που απειλούνται από την ανθρώπινη δραστηριότητα. Θεωρώ πως είναι χρέος μας η αναζήτηση λύσεων σε ανάλογα προβλήματα και το σχέδιο αυτό μπορεί να βοηθήσει στην αντιμετώπισή τους. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Il Mar Baltico rappresenta una zona con un'elevatissima quantità di pesca, in particolare del merluzzo bianco, dell'aringa e dello spratto. Ritengo che sia importante che venga creato un piano di controllo poiché le interazioni biologiche e gli effetti ambientali hanno una forte influenza sulla pesca. Sono d'accordo con questa proposta che si prefigge l'obiettivo di stabilire un quadro per la gestione multispecie degli stock delle tre specie sopra citate. A mio parere, questo strumento può portare molteplici vantaggi sia per riconoscere le interazioni tra le specie disciplinate sia per comprendere l'influenza del merluzzo bianco sugli stock di aringa e di spratto e viceversa. Avere migliori informazioni riguardanti questi temi migliorerà sicuramente lo sfruttamento equilibrato e sostenibile di questi stock, garantirà la stabilità delle possibilità di pesca e di conseguenza porterà molteplici benefici ai pescatori. Per questi motivi ho deciso di votare a favore.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this report on the multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks.

Birgit Collin-Langen (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den Bericht gestimmt, denn ich unterstütze eine ausgewogene und nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung unserer Meere. Wir haben eine Verantwortung für die nachkommenden Generationen und müssen dieser Verantwortung auch gerecht werden.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El «Plan plurianual para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico y para las pesquerías que explotan estas poblaciones» es el primero de los planes plurianuales presentados tras la reforma de la PPC de 2013. Estos planes pretenden ser las herramientas para la gestión y recuperación de las pesquerías comunitarias.

A pesar de la necesidad de contar con planes para gestionar la pesca en nuestros mares y océanos, no he podido votar a favor de éste ya que la propuesta original ha sido rebajada tras las negociaciones a tres bandas entre con el Consejo y la Comisión. Concretamente me preocupan la verdadera aplicación de un enfoque basado en el ecosistema o la corrección de la sobrepesca. Por todo ello me he abstenido.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il testo è il risultato di un lungo lavoro e rappresenta un compromesso che non è stato facile trovare. Si tratta del primo piano pluriennale che tiene conto delle interazioni tra le specie, per garantire uno sfruttamento equilibrato e sostenibile della pesca e migliori condizioni economiche ai pescatori nel lungo periodo. Grazie al Parlamento sono state assicurate misure di salvaguardia forti per mantenere gli stock a livelli sostenibili e per garantire un rapido ritorno a livelli accettabili in caso di impoverimento. Il piano di gestione deve entrare immediatamente in vigore, visto che gli stock si stanno riducendo, con conseguenze negative anche per i pescatori. Un modello per la gestione sostenibile della pesca, in termini ecologici, economici e sociali, nel lungo termine è l'unico approccio capace di scongiurare crisi cicliche che, oltre ai gravi danni ambientali, produce ripercussioni sul settore, mettendo a rischio il lavoro e la sicurezza di migliaia di famiglie.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – În calitatea sa de parte contractantă a Convenției Organizației Națiunilor Unite din 10 decembrie 1982 asupra dreptului mării, Uniunea Europeană promovează o abordare precaută și ecosistemică în privința reglementării activităților de pescuit și acvacultură. Prin urmare, pentru a asigura sustenabilitatea socio-economică și ecologică a politicilor vizate de planul multianual, este necesară o colaborare permanentă, eficientă și transparentă între colegiitori și Comisia Europeană. Astfel, în scopul de a reduce la minim efectele negative ale activităților de pescuit asupra ecosistemului marin trebuie, printre altele, introduse măsuri tehnice de sprijin, îmbunătățită selectivitatea uneltelor și practicilor, stabilite niveluri de referință pentru conservare și elaborat un plan global de pescuit.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, dorind să exprim importanța colaborării instituționale, a consultării cu experți și organisme specializate în vederea creării unor politici durabile în materie de pescuit.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Główne założenie wniosku Komisji, że potrzebny jest wielogatunkowy plan zarządzania dla Morza Bałtyckiego, jest słuszne. Podejście przewidujące zarządzanie wielogatunkowe jest skuteczniejsze niż zarządzanie poszczególnymi gatunkami. Plan ten powinien zapewnić zrównoważoną, trwałą eksploatację tych zasobów i stabilność uprawnień do połowów, a tym samym stabilność źródła utrzymania rybaków. Jednocześnie zarządzanie to opiera się na najbardziej aktualnym doradztwie naukowym dotyczącym stanu zasobów objętych planem, interakcji między gatunkami i innych aspektów związanych z ekosystemem i połowami. Należy też pamiętać, że plan jest pierwszą tego typu propozycją w bardzo wrażliwym ekosystemie Morza Bałtyckiego. W istocie może być on postrzegany jako „produkcja w toku” z uwagi na to, że naukowcy pracują nad bardziej zaawansowanymi podejściami wielogatunkowymi, których ujęcie w planie może okazać się niezbędne na późniejszym etapie. Dlatego istotne jest, by pierwszy przegląd został przeprowadzony stosunkowo wcześniej, tym bardziej że wielogatunkowy plan zarządzania jest konceptem nowym i rozwijającym się. Uważam, że pierwszy przegląd planu powinien odbyć się po trzech latach od jego wejścia w życie, a jeśli plan przyniesie pozytywne skutki, powinien on być ponownie poddany przeglądowi po pięciu latach. Zapewni to także pożądaną elastyczność w realizacji planu. Mając na uwadze wyżej omawiane zjawiska oraz ich konsekwencje dla ekosystemu Morza Bałtyckiego, zagłosowałem za przyjęciem wniosku.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the first multiannual management plan under the reformed Common Fisheries Policy, which consists of a set of rules for managing European fishing fleets and for conserving fish stocks. Designed to manage a common resource, it gives all European fishing fleets equal access to EU waters and fishing grounds and allows fishermen to be able to compete. This plan aims to ensure a sustainable exploitation of the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea taking into account the most up to date scientific information. It is important that these multiannual plans are in line with the Common Fisheries Policy objectives.

Michel Dantin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport porte sur les plans pluriannuels qui constituent des instruments essentiels de la gestion durable et de la reconstitution des stocks halieutiques. Ces stratégies à long terme visent à améliorer non seulement la conservation des stocks, mais également la visibilité à long terme pour les pêcheurs. En octobre 2014, la Commission a proposé un plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. L'une des grandes réformes du nouveau plan de gestion multi-espèces est l'échelonnement des quotas de captures autorisées afin d'assurer la durabilité des pêches. Considérant que ce plan pluriannuel établira un modèle économiquement viable de la pêche tout en assurant la durabilité et la gestion raisonnable des activités de pêche dans la mer Baltique, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté en faveur du rapport sur le plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. Les stocks concernés étant interdépendants, un plan de gestion pluri-espèces en mer Baltique est nécessaire. Le plan pluriannuel comprend des mesures de sauvegarde permettant de réduire les possibilités de pêche lorsque des avis scientifiques indiquent qu'un stock est menacé. Cela permet de réduire les incidences négatives des activités de pêche sur l'écosystème.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont menacés par la surpêche, l'exploitation actuelle des stocks étant incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable. La Commission n'a pas souhaité attendre de nouvelles études du CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) avant de mettre en œuvre ce plan pluriannuel. Le projet prévoit que beaucoup de mesures techniques soient déléguées à la Commission. Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte tout comme l'avis des conseils consultatifs concernés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil. Eu égard à ces conditions, j'ai voté pour ce texte qui va dans le

sens de la préservation des ressources halieutiques.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Изумен съм как досега сме правили планове за запасите от треска, херинга и цаца поотделно. Както ни е ясно от учебниците още в първите класове в училище, в природата всичко е свързано и не знам как са успявали да се справят с изпълнението си на плана, след като тези три риби са в непрекъснато взаимодействие, а и хабитатът, който населяват, е същият. Надявам се сега, когато се обединят усилията и се разглеждат и трите вида риби, а и както става ясно от доклада и за всички останали, ще постигнем паритет между природата и човека и ще можем както да запазим препитанието на рибарите, така и да позволим на природата да действа по своите закони.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), *γραφώς*. – Η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – O bacalhau, o arenque e a espadilha representam mais de 94% das capturas no mar Báltico nos últimos anos.

O mar Báltico é uma massa de água quase fechada, em que estas três espécies são omnipresentes e interagem de forma contínua. Por isso, é de extrema importância assegurar uma regulamentação que permita reconhecer as interações entre as espécies abrangidas, nomeadamente a influência do bacalhau nas unidades populacionais de arenque e de espadilha e o inverso.

Tendo em conta a forte influência que as interações biológicas e os efeitos ambientais exercem sobre as unidades populacionais de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico, é aconselhável poder adaptar as taxas e os padrões de exploração destas unidades populacionais à luz da evolução dos conhecimentos científicos sobre as referidas interações e sobre a evolução das condições ambientais.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote pour: le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – O plano plurianual, um dos instrumentos em que assenta a Política Comum das Pescas (PCP) – reforma de 2012 — apresenta como objetivo primordial a manutenção dos *stocks* acima dos níveis que permitirão um rendimento máximo sustentável.

As alterações propostas nesse sentido apresentam alguns pontos positivos, como a diminuição dos períodos entre avaliações, o que poderá permitir níveis de captura adequados do ponto de vista ecológico, facilitando uma abordagem socioeconómica da pesca nesta região e uma abordagem igualmente mais adequada à proteção das espécies capturadas de forma acessória.

O relatório limita os poderes da Comissão para realizar atos acessórios sem consulta do Parlamento e do Conselho.

Defendemos a prática de consulta e participação não apenas dos conselhos consultivos regionais, mas também dos Estados-Membros.

Há uma tendência para flexibilizar os limites e os períodos temporais para atingir os níveis necessários à sustentabilidade dos *stocks*, nomeadamente aumentando os intervalos de taxas-alvo de mortalidade, e o nível mínimo de biomassa reprodutora, ou fazendo com que os limites propostos para 2015 sejam cumpridos apenas em 2020.

A figura dos planos plurianuais tem potencialidades, padecendo, todavia, de algumas das limitações e dos constrangimentos inerentes à própria PCP.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho espresso il mio voto favorevole alla proposta della Commissione. Un approccio di gestione multispecie è sicuramente più vantaggioso ed efficace di una gestione di una singola specie.

Questa visione ha il merito di puntare ad una gestione equilibrata e sostenibile degli stock, e garantendo un livello di pesca che assicuri un reddito stabile ai pescatori.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted against as I do not believe the common fisheries policy is Ireland's interests.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in oggetto in quanto l'Unione europea dovrebbe lasciare maggiore autonomia in materia di pesca agli Stati membri.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτιώς*. – Υπερψηφίζω το πολυετές σχέδιο για τα αποθέματα γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας της Βαλτικής Θάλασσας και για τις αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες εκμετάλλευσης των εν λόγω αποθεμάτων. Η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Multiannual plans are fundamental to reduce fishing mortality to rate which can maximise long-term sustainable yield. The current management regimes do not allow sufficient predictability concerning the proper conservation of the stocks, or concerning fishing opportunities for the fisherman.

I therefore support changes in order to cover, in a single management plan, the three main fished species distributed in eight stocks in the Baltic Sea, namely two for cod, five for herring and one for sprat, with the aim to achieve and maintain Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for these stocks.

Moreover, I support the proposal to set a target range of fishing mortality in line with the MSY principle as from 2015, and a minimum level of the spawning stock biomass which fishing management measures should strive to conserve.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Pozitív szavazatommal támogattam a felsorolt halállományok halászatára vonatkozó többéves terv jelentését. A javaslat célja az, hogy több fajra vonatkozó gazdálkodási keretet hozzon létre a tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományai tekintetében. A tőkehal, a hering és a spratt az elmúlt évek balti-tengeri fogásainak több mint 94%-át tették ki. A Balti-tenger tulajdonképpen zárt víztestnek tekinthető, s mindhárom faj megtalálható benne. Ezért alapvető fontosságú egy olyan rendelet elfogadása, amely elismeri az érintett fajok közötti kölcsönhatásokat, többek között a tőkehalnak a hering és a spratt állományaira gyakorolt hatását.

A közös halászati politika regionalizált megközelítését alapul véve meg kell határozni az érintett állományokra vonatkozó maximális fenntartható hozam megvalósításához szükséges további intézkedéseket. A szabályoknak azonban szorosabban kell kapcsolódniuk a meghatározott regionalizáció elvéhez, és lehetővé kell tenniük a megfelelő időben történő reagálást abban az esetben, ha hirtelen változás áll be az érintett állományok helyzetében. A többéves tervek esetében meg kell hallani az adott régió hangját és annak alapján kell cselekedni, az Európai Parlament bevonásával a megfelelő szakaszban.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione del Parlamento europeo sulla proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un piano pluriennale per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico e per le attività di pesca che sfruttano questi stock, modifica il regolamento (CE) n. 2187/2005 del Consiglio e abroga il regolamento (CE) n. 1098/2007 del Consiglio perché si tratta del primo vero piano applicativo della riforma della politica comune della pesca e può servire da modello per le future negoziazioni. Le difficoltà dell'approccio legato alla politica comune della pesca nascono dalla necessità di trovare un compromesso tra le due opposte esigenze della sostenibilità degli stock ittici, da un lato, e di una necessaria flessibilità per gli operatori del settore e gli Stati membri nell'applicare le regole relative alla conservazione delle specie ittiche, dall'altro. Il compromesso raggiunto tra Parlamento e Consiglio in sede di trilogia rappresenta un buon accordo, che permetterà alle parti in causa di valutare gli effetti e le conseguenze pratiche delle misure e la loro trasferibilità ad altre specie. In particolare, sono favorevole all'inserimento nel Piano delle previsioni relative alla regionalizzazione e alla sostenibilità economica, sociale e ambientale delle attività di pesca.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Fischerei ist und bleibt ein wichtiger Wirtschaftszweig für meine Heimatregion Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und andere Regionen entlang der Baltischen See. Biologische Vielfalt ist Grundlage dieses zumeist mittelständisch geprägten Sektors. Deshalb ist der Erhalt dieser Vielfalt auch im ökonomischen und regionalen Interesse. Für mich war deshalb klar, dass ich für den „Mehrfjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen“ stimme.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Der Mehrjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee ist ein wesentliches Instrument für die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung und die Wiederauffüllung von Fischbeständen. Mit solchen langfristigen Ansätzen soll die Erhaltung der Bestände verbessert werden. Gleichzeitig muss dadurch aber auch die Wirtschaftlichkeit des Betriebs für die Fischer garantiert werden.

Sylvie Goddyn (ENF), *par écrit*. – À cause de la surpêche, les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger. Des avis scientifiques ont ainsi établi que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable, c'est-à-dire avec l'objectif d'une pêche responsable qui permet la meilleure reconstitution des ressources possible.

Il est donc nécessaire d'agir, mais sans confondre vitesse avec précipitation. Pour accélérer la procédure, la Commission européenne ne voulait pas attendre de nouvelles études du CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) avant de mettre en œuvre le plan pluriannuel. Heureusement, le projet de règlement, tel qu'amendé par les députés européens, insiste pour que les études scientifiques soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs locaux soient consultés.

Il est toutefois regrettable que le projet délègue beaucoup de pouvoirs à la Commission européenne, au détriment des prérogatives du Parlement européen.

J'ai cependant voté pour ce texte car les pêcheurs ont besoin de plans pluriannuels qui leur donnent une visibilité à long terme.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención dado que entendemos como un avance la aplicación de una gestión multispecífica, mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado.

Entendemos que es preciso que los planes de gestión garanticen una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas pesquerías, basadas en los dictámenes científicos, así como también es fundamental, que todas estas regulaciones respondan a las especificidades de los territorios y sus gentes, que desgraciadamente no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la UE, por lo que seguimos sin compartir los criterios de aplicación de la PPC en los territorios.

Beata Gosiewska (ECR), *na piśmie*. – W sprawie wniosku dotyczącego rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady ustanawiającego wieloletni plan w odniesieniu do stad dorsza, śledzia i szprota w Morzu Bałtyckim oraz połowów eksploatujących te zasoby, zmieniającego rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 2187/2005 i uchylającego rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1098/2007.

Popieram stworzenie ram wielogatunkowego zarządzania stadami dorsza, śledzia i szprota w Morzu Bałtyckim, w którym poławiane są głównie te trzy gatunki. Wieloletni plan dotyczący stad dorsza, śledzia i szprota w Morzu Bałtyckim oraz połowów eksploatujących te zasoby został opublikowany przez Komisję Europejską już 2014 roku. Zarządzanie wielogatunkowe dla Morza Bałtyckiego wydaje się być skuteczniejszym planem aniżeli zarządzanie każdym z tych gatunków ryb oddzielnie. Proponowany plan zapewni zrównoważoną, trwałą eksploatację zasobów dorsza, śledzia i szprota w Morzu Bałtyckim, co bezpośrednio przełoży się na stabilność źródła utrzymania dla rybaków.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. Multiannual plans for fisheries management are an essential tool to ensure the sustainable exploitation of fish stocks and marine ecosystems. European Parliament supported a proposal for multiannual plan for stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and for the fisheries exploiting them. This Baltic multiannual and multispecies plan is the first proposed plan to build on the principles of the 2013 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the above resolution. The ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management which is put forward in this resolution is essential to the maintenance of European marine wildlife systems. The resolution sets the fishing mortality target so that it takes into account the most recent scientific advice and should continue to do so, on a progressive, incremental basis, until 2020 at the latest. Moreover, the resolution provides for the temporary cessation of fishing activities in the region to allow for the replenishment of fish stock levels. I believe that maintaining fish stocks above levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield is essential to the economic and environmental development of the EU and its regions.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this resolution, as it is a pre-emptive measure and a tool for ensuring the sustainable management of our fish stocks.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport care prezintă o importanță ridicată în a asigura o legislație care să permită identificarea interacțiunilor dintre speciile vizate, a influenței speciei codului asupra stocurilor de hering și șprot și invers și pentru exploatarea activităților de pescuit.

Comisia ar trebui să includă toate stocurile de pește din Marea Baltică într-un singur plan de gestionare. Acest plan ar studia mult mai amănunțit problema resurselor speciilor de pește din zona Mării Baltice în vederea abordării ecosistemice a gestionării pescuitului.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o prijedlogu uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o utvrđivanju višegodišnjeg plana za stokove bakalara, haringe i papaline u Baltičkom moru i ribarstvo koje iskorištava te stokove, o izmjeni Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 2187/2005 i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1098/2007 (COM(2014)0614 – C8-0174/2014 – 2014/0285(COD)), s obzirom da se radi se o višegodišnjem planu upravljanja koji uzima u obzir više vrsti koje su u međusobnoj povezanosti i interakciji. Važan je i stoga što te tri vrste – bakalar, haringe i papaline u Baltičkom moru čine preko 94% ulova proteklih godina te postoje rizici prekomjernog ulova te posljedice za ekosustav zbog zatvorenosti Baltika.

Takav plan može poslužiti za razvoj drugih planova upravljanja i iskorištavanja ribljeg fonda u drugim morima, kod riba koje su u međusobnoj interakciji. Ovakav pristup upravljanja koji uključuje istovremeno više ribljih vrsti je mnogo učinkovitiji od upravljanja samo pojedinim vrsta, te bi trebao osigurati uravnoteženo, održivo korištenje količine ribljih vrsti, stabilnost mogućnosti ribolova kao i priloge za ribare.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte met en exergue les conséquences de la surpêche mettant en danger les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique. Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil. Dans cette mesure, j'ai voté pour le texte.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Tato zpráva přichází s dlouho očekávaným plánem pro rybolovnou politiku, který se už nesoustředí na jeden druh, ale bere v potaz vývoj různých druhů ryb a jejich vzájemnou interakci. Plán by měl napomoci vyváženému a udržitelnému lovu těchto druhů a také stabilitě příležitostí a tedy i živobytí rybářů. Důležitou součástí návrhu je garance využívání aktuálních vědeckých poznatků týkajících se jak zásob daných druhů, interakcí mezi nimi, tak ostatních aspektů udržitelného rybolovu. Domnívám se, že tento plán pro Baltické moře je velkým krokem správným směrem k reformování společné rybářské politiky a udržitelnému rybolovu, a rád jsem proto hlasoval ve prospěch návrhu.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique, qui permet d'assurer une gestion durable et la reconstitution des stocks halieutiques. Le texte vise à améliorer non seulement la conservation des stocks de poissons, mais également à donner de la visibilité à long terme aux pêcheurs.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Obwohl im vorliegenden Bericht einige gute Ideen vorhanden sind, ist der Plan für die europäische Fischereiindustrie in seiner Gesamtheit kritisch zu betrachten. Daher enthalte ich mich zu diesem Bericht.

Béla Kovács (NI), *írásban*. – Az egészséges táplálkozás nélkülözhetetlen kellékei a tengeri halak. Mind frissen, mind konzerv formájában az uniós országok nagy részében, így hazámban is elérhetők a Balti-tengerből kifogott halfélék. A térségi ökoszisztéma stabilitása feltétlenül támogatandó, komplex jogalkotással vélhetően sikerül megoldani a tőkehal, a hering és a sprottni állományok fenntartható halászátát. Fontos gazdasági-társadalmi szempont egyúttal a part menti hagyományos kishalászati tevékenység megőrzése is.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Gli effetti ambientali e le interazioni biologiche producono un effetto sugli stock marittimi e per questo motivo risulta necessario attuare delle norme per la salvaguardia di determinate specie. Di fatti, nel 2014 la Commissione ha pubblicato un piano pluriennale per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico e per le attività di pesca che sfruttano questi stock. Questa proposta, accordata dopo mesi di negoziati, vuole oggi regolare un quadro per la gestione multi specie degli stock sopracitati, nei mari in cui vengono più sfruttati, e vede un transito verso una nuova gestione di tipo adattiva. Finalmente è stato raggiunto un accordo sul primo piano pluriennale nell'ambito della nuova PCP e, per tali ragioni, voto a favore della proposta della Commissione per una pesca sostenibile degli stock nel Mar Baltico.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté pour le plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. À cause de la surpêche, les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger. Des avis scientifiques ont établi que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable. Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. — L'objectif principal du texte est de définir et de mettre en œuvre le plan pluriannuel proposé par la Commission pour lutter contre la surpêche en mer Baltique. Effectivement de nombreux avis scientifiques mettent en garde les autorités contre l'épuisement des stocks. Le CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) est notamment en train d'élaborer de nouvelles études pour leur préservation. Le texte impose à la Commission de prendre en compte ces recherches avant d'élaborer son plan annuel définitif. Néanmoins, il lui délègue de nombreuses mesures techniques. Malgré cela l'ensemble du texte étant positif, j'ai logiquement voté POUR.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. — El «Plan plurianual para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico y para las pesquerías que explotan estas poblaciones» es el primero de los planes plurianuales presentados tras la reforma de la PPC de 2013. Estos planes pretenden ser las herramientas para la gestión y recuperación de las pesquerías comunitarias.

A pesar de la necesidad de contar con planes para gestionar la pesca en nuestros mares y océanos, no he podido votar a favor de éste ya que la propuesta original ha sido rebajada tras las negociaciones a tres bandas entre con el Consejo y la Comisión. Concretamente me preocupan la verdadera aplicación de un enfoque basado en el ecosistema o la corrección de la sobrepesca. Por todo ello me he abstenido.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. — El principio general en el que se basa la propuesta de la Comisión, es la necesidad de un plan de gestión multiespecífico en el mar Báltico. La gestión multiespecífica es mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado. Este plan debe garantizar una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas poblaciones así como la estabilidad de las posibilidades de pesca y, de esta manera, de los medios de vida de los pescadores.

Considero que es importante subrayar, que cuando se elaboren planes plurianuales, la voz de la región debe ser escuchada y puesta en práctica, con la participación en el momento oportuno del Parlamento Europeo.

Del mismo modo hay que tener presente que el plan constituye una propuesta pionera en un ecosistema muy sensible del mar Báltico, por lo tanto la primera revisión tenga lugar relativamente pronto, debido, precisamente, a que el plan de gestión multiespecífico es un concepto nuevo y en desarrollo.

Por lo anteriormente descrito doy mi voto positivo para la aprobación de este informe.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. — I support this report that seeks to ensure the sustainability and conservation of future fish stocks in the Baltic sea.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. — Zdržel jsem se. Pravidelně se u těchto zpráv zdržuji, jelikož Česká republika nemá moře.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), rakstiski. – Šī plāna primārais mērķis ir izveidot pamatu mencas, reņģes un brētliņas krājumu pārvaldībai Baltijas jūrā, kur zvejo galvenokārt tieši šo trīs sugu zivis (ap 94 % no visas ikgadējas nozvejas). Pašlaik aktīvs 2008. gadā pieņemts plāns vairs neatbilst realitātei mencas nozvejas ziņā, kamēr brētliņas un reņģes tajā vispār nav skartas.

Ņemot vērā Baltijas jūras bioloģisko un ģeogrāfisko specifiku, ir nepieciešams ieviest praksē jauno modeli šo sugu krājumu izmantošanai, ko šis jaunais plāns lielā mērā arī piedāvā. Krājumu atjaunošana un uzturēšana, kā arī to saglabāšana un mīļiedarbības ņemšana vērā ir jaunās regulas galvenās sastāvdaļas.

Vērts atzīmēt, ka līdz ar Regulas stāšanos spēkā vienu no primāriem uzmanības atspērieniem jāsniedz ne tikai zivīm, bet tiem cilvēkiem, kas ir nodarbināti zivsaimniecības nozarē, — īpaši Baltijas valstīs, kur šīs jomas smagi cietušas līdz ar kontrsankciju ieviešanu no Krievijas Federācijas puses.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Podstatou návrhu Komisie je viacdruhové plánované riadenie chovu a obnovy rýb v Baltickom mori. Cieľom je zabezpečiť vyvážený vzťah medzi chovom a obnovou rýb a zabezpečením práce a živobytia pre rybárov. Tento návrh má pozitívne účinky na ekosystémy a zároveň na udržanie pracovných príležitostí.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), γραπτώς. – Ψηφίζω υπέρ της έκθεσης σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τη θέσπιση πολυετούς σχεδίου για τα αποθέματα γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας της Βαλτικής Θάλασσας και για τις αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες εκμετάλλευσης των εν λόγω αποθεμάτων, για την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2187/2005 του Συμβουλίου και την κατάργηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1098/2007 του Συμβουλίου, για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 22/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté pour ce rapport.

Nous approuvons ce projet qui a été amplement amendé par la commission de la pêche du Parlement européen. En l'occurrence, il s'agissait d'insister sur la prise en compte des études du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer sur les stocks de cabillauds, de harengs et de sprats de la mer Baltique, lesquels sont durement éprouvés par la surpêche. En outre, le projet prend en compte une autre exigence de la commission parlementaire: celle de la transmission au Parlement de documents relatifs aux décisions prises par la Commission dans le cadre de la gestion déléguée. En effet, par l'intermédiaire de ce mode de gestion, la Commission européenne s'arrogeait d'importants pouvoirs décisionnels, notamment en matière de mesures techniques.

La satisfaction de ces revendications correspond à nos attentes.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), per iscritto. – Sono favorevole al piano pluriennale per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto del Mar Baltico. L'obiettivo della proposta è stabilire un piano multispecie degli stock che è assai più efficace della gestione di una singola specie. Questo piano consente uno sfruttamento equilibrato e sostenibile di questi stock e assicura la stabilità della possibilità di pesca e dei mezzi di sussistenza dei pescatori, nello stesso tempo garantisce che la gestione si basi sui pareri scientifici più aggiornati riguardanti lo stato degli stock in oggetto, le interazioni tra le specie e altri aspetti relativi all'ecosistema e alle attività di pesca.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Τα αποθέματα γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας στη Βαλτική Θάλασσα διατρέχουν σοβαρό κίνδυνο μείωσης από τις αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες. Έτσι η Επιτροπή έχει ήδη προτείνει τη θέσπιση ενός πλαισίου που να ρυθμίζει το εύρος των αλιευτικών δυνατοτήτων εξασφαλίζοντας παράλληλα σταθερότητα στα αποθέματα των τριών αυτών ειδών αλιευμάτων.

Τα τρία αυτά είδη αποτελούν σημαντικά στοιχεία του οικοσυστήματος της Βαλτικής Θάλασσας, γι' αυτό και θεωρώ ότι είναι μείζονος σημασίας η προστασία και ο έλεγχος των αποθεμάτων τους. Έτσι υπερψηφίζω το παρόν ψήφισμα, που έχει ως στόχο τη βιώσιμη εκμετάλλευση των ειδών αυτών ως μέρος της γενικότερης προσπάθειας για προστασία του θαλάσσιου οικοσυστήματος.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – In diesem Bericht geht es um den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Festlegung eines Mehrjahresplans für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee. Nachhaltige ökologische Wirtschaft ist von immenser Bedeutung für unsere Zukunft. Jedoch ist dieser Bericht an manchen Stellen unschlüssig formuliert. Daher enthalte ich mich meiner Stimme.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Du fait d'une pêche intensive, ces espèces de poissons se trouvent en péril. Le projet proposait à la base que la Commission puisse disposer de beaucoup de mesures techniques. Celle-ci prévoyait d'appliquer le plan pluriannuel sans attendre le compte-rendu du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer. Les amendements m'ont semblé aller dans le bon sens, en ce qu'ils remettaient l'expertise de ce conseil au centre du débat. Cela me paraît être une mesure prudentielle. J'apprécie par ailleurs que la Commission soit finalement tenue de mettre au courant le Parlement lorsqu'elle s'apprêtera à faire des actes délégués.

En conséquence j'ai voté pour.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – O objetivo da presente proposta é estabelecer um plano de gestão para as unidades populacionais de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico.

O plano deverá assegurar a exploração sustentável dessas unidades populacionais, bem como a estabilidade das possibilidades de pesca, garantindo simultaneamente que a gestão assenta nas informações científicas mais recentes sobre as interações no interior e entre as unidades populacionais, bem como noutros elementos do ecossistema e do ambiente.

A iniciativa tem como objetivo específico assegurar que as unidades populacionais de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico sejam exploradas de forma sustentável, de acordo com os princípios do rendimento máximo sustentável e de uma abordagem ecossistémica da gestão das pescas. Para o efeito, as unidades populacionais em causa devem ser capturadas a níveis suscetíveis de gerar o rendimento máximo sustentável. Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this resolution because of its utilisation of a multispecies management plan to ensure sustainable fishing and support for both conservation of several Baltic fish species and for the economic livelihood of those in the fishing industry.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Je salue l'approbation par le Parlement européen du règlement relatif à un plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. L'inclusion dans les plans pluriannuels de concepts de gestion responsable des ressources tels que l'approche basée sur l'écosystème, le rendement maximal durable ou encore le principe de précaution traduit parfaitement la conception européenne des activités de pêche et je m'en réjouis. Seule cette approche pourra inverser la tendance qui a mené à la surpêche et donc à une exploitation non durable de nos ressources halieutiques, laquelle met gravement en péril toute pérennisation des activités de pêche quelle que soit la région du monde concernée.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. – Európska komisia uverejnila v roku 2014 viacročný plán pre populácie tresky, sleďa a šproty v Baltskom mori a rybolov využívajúci tieto populácie. Cieľom návrhu je vytvoriť rámec pre viacdruhové riadenie populácií tresky, sleďa a šproty v Baltskom mori, kde sa rybolov v prvom rade zameriava na tieto tri druhy. Prístup založený na viacdruhovom riadení je oveľa účinnejší ako riadenie jednotlivých druhov. V pláne by sa malo zabezpečiť vyvážené a udržateľné využívanie týchto populácií a stabilita rybolovných možností – a tým aj živobytie rybárov. Zároveň by mal zaručiť, aby sa riadenie zakladalo na najaktuálnejších vedeckých odporúčaniach týkajúcich sa stavu populácií, interakcie medzi jednotlivými druhmi a iných aspektov v súvislosti s ekosystémami a rybolovnými oblasťami. Vzhľadom na uvedené súhlasím s daným návrhom.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the report on the multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, which aims to establish a framework for the multispecies management of the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea, where fishing primarily targets these three species. Cod, herring and sprat account for over 94 % of Baltic catches in the recent years. The Baltic Sea is a virtually closed body of water in which these three species are omnipresent and interact continuously. Therefore it is of utmost importance to deliver regulation making it possible to recognize interactions between the species covered, inter alia the cod's influence on herring and sprat stocks and the other way round. The plan should provide for a balanced, sustainable exploitation of those stocks and the stability of fishing opportunities – and thereby of the livelihoods of fishers. At the same time it should guarantee that the management would be based on the most up-to-date scientific advice regarding the status of stocks covered, interactions between species and other aspects related to ecosystem and fisheries.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), írásban. – A tőkehal balti-tengeri állományaira vonatkozó gazdálkodási terv 2008 óta van érvényben, ez azonban még nem vonatkozik a hering és a spratt állományaira. Minthogy azonban a közönséges tőkehal sprattal és heringgel is táplálkozik, a tőkehalállomány mérete befolyásolja a hering- és sprattállományok méretét és fordítva. A Bizottság 2014 októberében a közönséges tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományaira és a halászatukra vonatkozó többéves tervet tett közzé azzal a céllal, hogy a három állományra nézve egységes gazdálkodási keretet hozzon létre. Azt javasolja a Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak, hogy helyezze hatályon kívül az 1098/2007/EK rendeletet, módosítsa a 2187/2005/EK rendeletet, és foglalja rendeletbe a közönséges tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományaira és a halászatukra vonatkozó többéves tervet.

A Halászati Bizottság jelentésében azt javasolja, hogy a Parlament a Bizottság javaslatát első olvasatban csaknem 50 módosító indítvánnyal fogadja el. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), par écrit. – Le rapport s'attaque au problème de la surpêche qui fait que les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont en danger. La Commission souhaite agir vite, sans attendre les derniers avis du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer. Toutefois, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, le rapport insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer soient prises en compte. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil. En conséquence, il est possible de voter en faveur du rapport.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), por escrito. – A presente proposta visa estabelecer um quadro para a gestão de múltiplas espécies das unidades populacionais de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico, onde a pesca incide principalmente nestas três espécies. O bacalhau, o arenque e a espadilha representam mais de 94% das capturas no mar Báltico nos últimos anos.

Subscrevo a posição do relator, no que concerne ao plano de gestão de múltiplas espécies para o mar Báltico, como sendo a opção correta. A abordagem da gestão de múltiplas espécies é muito mais eficaz do que a gestão de espécies individuais. O plano deve prever uma exploração equilibrada e sustentável dessas unidades populacionais e a estabilidade das possibilidades de pesca e, consequentemente, dos meios de subsistência dos pescadores.

Comungo ainda da posição do relator quanto à posição relativa à proteção das unidades populacionais de bacalhau durante a desova e quanto à defesa da pequena pesca artesanal.

Atendendo ao carácter inovador e pioneiro do plano de gestão de múltiplas espécies, defendo a sua análise e, consequente, revisão após o terceiro ano de vigência, de modo a garantir a flexibilidade desejada ao plano.

Sophie Montel (ENF), par écrit. – Ce projet tel qu'amendé est satisfaisant et permettra de préserver les cabillauds, les harengs et les sprats. Je vote pour.

Nadine Morano (PPE), par écrit. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport relatif au plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique et les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. Ce plan, qui est le premier élaboré selon les règles de la nouvelle politique de la pêche, impose de gérer les stocks halieutiques au rendement maximal durable qui s'apprécie, selon ce texte, en fonction d'une fourchette de valeurs.

József Nagy (PPE), írásban. – Nagyon fontosnak tartom a javaslat irányát, amely a Balti-tenger esetében egy hosszú távú gazdasági tervet prognosztizál. A több fajra is vonatkozó kiegyensúlyozott szabályozás figyelembe vesz számos felmerülő problémát. Meg kell mutatni, hogy a környezet megóvása érdekében felelősségteljes és fenntartható célokra van szükség. Szavazatommal ezért támogattam a javaslatot, amely egy rendkívül érzékeny ökoszisztéma estében iránymutató stabilitást eredményezhet. Így közelebb kerülünk ahhoz, hogy a halászati lehetőségek továbbra is biztosítottak legyenek a halászati tevékenységekből élők számára.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The CFP is a set of rules for managing European fishing fleets and for conserving fish stocks. This is the first multiannual management plan under the reformed CFP. I have voted for this report that aims to ensure the sustainable exploitation of the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea, while ensuring that management is based on the most up to date scientific information on interactions within and between the stocks and with other aspects of the ecosystem and environment.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport deoarece consider că este extrem de important ca aceste planuri multianuale pentru diferitele stocuri de pește să intre în vigoare în cel mai scurt timp.

Negocierea și adoptarea acestui plan multianual pentru stocurile de cod, hering și șprot din Marea Baltică au fost un proces foarte lung și anevoios, din cauza disputelor dintre Parlamentul European și Consiliu cu privire la atribuțiile deținute în acest caz. Adoptarea planurilor multianuale privind aceste stocuri de pește sunt instrumentul de bază folosit pentru îndeplinirea obiectivelor privind pescuitul sustenabil și protejarea stocurilor de pește stabilite prin PCP. În acest sens, deblocarea acestei situații prin adoptarea acestui plan va ajuta la adoptarea, într-un timp rezonabil, a viitoarelor planuri multianuale pentru celelalte mări ale UE, inclusiv pentru Marea Neagră.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der Mehrjahresplan für Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee ist der erste neue Plan unter den neuen gemeinsamen Fischereibeständen. Dieser Plan soll klare Ziele und Vorausssehbarkeit für Fischer bringen. Die gemeinsame Fischereipolitik verfolgt das gemeinsame Ziel der langfristigen Wirtschaftlichkeit. Fischerei und Aquakultur muss umweltverträglich und sozial tragbar sein. Nur so profitieren europäische Bürger, mit gesünderen Nahrungsmitteln und besserer Lebensqualität. Der Bericht enthält zwar sehr gute Ansätze, jedoch sind einige Punkte enthalten, bei denen ich nicht zustimmen kann, und ich habe mich daher meiner Stimme enthalten.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariu šiam daugiamečiam Baltijos jūros menkių, šprotų ir silkių valdymo planui.

Visų pirma, šis planas užtikrins, kad žvejyba Baltijos jūroje būtų tvari ir lengviau nuspėjama, taip pat būtų subalansuotas išteklių naudojimas ir žvejybos galimybių stabilumas. Be to, tai yra pirmasis planas, kuris iš tiesų apima skirtingus žuvų išteklius, užtikrinant, kad jų valdymas būtų pagrįstas naujausia moksline informacija. Numatyti papildomi tausios žvejybos saugikliai padės tinkamai reaguoti į besikeičiančią išteklių padėtį.

Pažymėtina, kad šiam ilgalaikiam plane numatytos priemonės padės išsaugoti smulkiosios žuvininkystės sektorių ir užtikrins patikimas pajamas iš žvejybos. Žvejams taisyklės taps aiškesnės ir paprastesnės. Bus nustatomas aiškus, nuspėjamas ir į ilgą laiką taupymą orientuotas žuvų išteklių valdymas.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerato il Piano pluriennale della Commissione europea per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico; considerato che le tre specie rappresentano il 94% delle catture nel Mar Baltico negli ultimi anni e che, pur esistendo un piano di gestione degli stock di merluzzo, questo non è adeguato alla situazione attuale; considerato che, con riferimento alle altre due specie, si registra un'assenza normativa e regolamentare e che tale carenza va necessariamente corretta, anche alla luce della tutela dell'ecosistema; considerato, quindi, che l'elaborazione di un piano unico, tale da includere anche altre specie di pesci e basato su studi scientifici aggiornati, rappresenterebbe un modo adeguato per colmare la lacuna normativa e assicurare una maggiore tutela degli stock, ho ritenuto opportuno votare a favore della proposta in oggetto.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. — The mortality rates of cod, herring and sprat are essential to the preservation of the marine ecosystem. The proposed agreement suggests that the fishing activities will be conducted in a sustainable way so that a balance is achieved. Thinking for tomorrow we have to act today if we are to sustain stability in our ecosystems. Hence, I vote in favour of the trilogue agreement as I believe that it is our duty to preserve the animal species populations.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Dosadašnjim uredbama za upravljanje stokovima u Baltičkom moru bio je obuhvaćen samo stok bakalara, a i za njega je procijenjeno da nije proporcionalan s trenutnom situacijom stokova bakalara i ribolova koji o njemu ovisi, što može narušiti stabilnost ekosustava u Baltičkom moru. Budući da su haringe i papaline također prisutne u Baltičkom moru i u konstantnoj su interakciji s bakalarom te su time neodvojivi dio ekosustava Baltičkog mora, smatram da je važno donijeti uredbu koja će prepoznati međusobni utjecaj tih vrsta i sukladno tome regulirati upravljanje njihovim stokovima te sam iz tog razloga glasovala za usvajanje Višegodišnjeg plana za stokove bakalara, haringe i papaline u Baltičkom moru.

Potrebno je na pravilan način brinuti o održavanju ravnoteže ekosustava te smatram dobrim potezom da se svi stokovi relevantnih ribljih vrsta uključe u jedinstveni plan upravljanja kojim se može osigurati učinkovitija i uravnoteženija eksploatacija tih stokova te stabilnost tradicionalnog ribolova budući da sadašnje stope iskorištavanja stokova bakalara, haringe i papaline nisu u skladu s postizanjem najvećeg održivog prinosa. Prema modelu ovog višegodišnjeg plana mogli bi se pripremiti slični planovi za ribarstvo u drugim zemljopisnim područjima, uz konstantnu upućenost na najnovija znanstvena istraživanja.

Tonino Picula (S&D), napisan. – Konvencijom Ujedinjenih naroda od 10. prosinca 1982. o pravu mora, čija je Unija ugovorna stranka, predviđene su obveze očuvanja, uključujući održavanje ili obnovu populacija ulovljenih vrsta na razinama koje mogu proizvesti najviši održivi prinos, kako je određeno odgovarajućim ekološkim i gospodarskim čimbenicima.

Plan upravljanja za veliki broj vrsta uspostavljen ovom Uredbom zahtijeva da se više uzmu u obzir različite ekološke uloge i funkcije vrsta obuhvaćenih planom; budući da su razne vrste u velikoj mjeri u interakciji, ulovi ne mogu biti maksimalno održivi za sve vrste istodobno i potrebno je donijeti odluke o tome kojoj će se vrsti dati prednost.

Iskorištavanje stokova bakalara i pelagičnih vrsta ne smije ugroziti održivost stokova uzetih kao prilov u tom ribolovu, tj. stokova lista zlatopjega, iverka, oblića i lista glatkog u Baltiku. Stoga bi plan isto tako trebao težiti osiguranju očuvanja tih stokova prilova iznad razine biomase koje odgovaraju pristupu predostrožnosti i pristupu temeljenom na ekosustavu u vezi s upravljanjem ribarstvom koji može proizvesti najveći održivi prinos.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), písemně. – Podpořil jsem přijetí tohoto prvního víceletého plánu v rámci reformované společné politiky pro rybolov. Právě proto, že se jedná o první víceletý plán, který bude logicky vzorem pro další podobné plány u dalších moří, je nastavení podmínek mimořádně důležité. Také proto bylo tak složité dosáhnout dohod a ústupků mezi Parlamentem a Radou. Cílem plánu je zajistit udržitelný lov tresek, sledů a šprotů v Baltském moři. V loňském roce Parlament rozhodl o odložení hlasování na toto téma, zejména z důvodu nemožnosti dosáhnout kompromisu ohledně míry úmrtnosti ryb. Parlament prosazoval daleko striktnější opatření. I když se mu podařilo v rámci dialogů prosadit jen částečná omezení flexibility navrhované členskými státy, vítám, že se zároveň podařilo prosadit silnější pojistná opatření, co se týká udržitelného výlovu. Sociální demokraté v tomto ohledu udělali vynikající práci v rámci Výboru pro rybolov. Vítám, že pozici výboru dnes potvrdilo i plenární zasedání.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), per iscritto. – Ritengo che, un piano di gestione, che riguardi diverse specie, nel Mar Baltico è più efficace di una gestione di una singola specie, perché consente uno sfruttamento equilibrato e sostenibile di stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico e garantisce la stabilità delle possibilità di pesca e, di conseguenza, dei mezzi di sussistenza dei pescatori. Inoltre, vi sono valide argomentazioni a favore del mantenimento di alcune norme già vigenti, che proteggono gli stock di merluzzo bianco durante il periodo di riproduzione e tutelano la pesca artigianale su piccola scala. Per questo motivo ho votato a favore del piano pluriennale in questione e auspico che, una siffatta soluzione consenta un approccio più flessibile nella determinazione annuale delle possibilità di pesca.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), na piśmie. – Główne założenie wniosku Komisji, że potrzebny jest wielogatunkowy plan zarządzania dla Morza Bałtyckiego, jest słuszne. Podejście przewidujące zarządzanie wielogatunkowe jest skuteczniejsze niż zarządzanie poszczególnymi gatunkami. Plan ten powinien zapewnić zrównoważoną, trwałą eksploatację tych zasobów i stabilność uprawnień do połowów, a tym samym stabilność źródła utrzymania rybaków. Jednocześnie zarządzanie to opiera się na najbardziej aktualnym doradztwie naukowym dotyczącym stanu zasobów objętych planem, interakcji między gatunkami i innych aspektów związanych z ekosystemem i połowami. Plan ten jest pierwszą tego typu propozycją w bardzo wrażliwym ekosystemie Morza Bałtyckiego. W istocie może być on postrzegany jako „produkcja w toku” z uwagi na to, że naukowcy pracują nad bardziej zaawansowanymi podejściami wielogatunkowymi, których ujęcie w planie może okazać się niezbędne na późniejszym etapie. Dlatego istotne jest, by pierwszy przegląd został przeprowadzony stosunkowo wcześniej, tym bardziej że wielogatunkowy plan zarządzania jest konceptem nowym i rozwijającym się. Pierwszy przegląd planu powinien odbyć się po trzech latach od jego wejścia w życie, a jeśli plan przyniesie pozytywne skutki, powinien on być ponownie poddany przeglądowi po pięciu latach. Zapewni to także tak pożądaną elastyczność w realizacji planu. Niniejszym poparłem sprawozdanie.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce plan de gestion pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique concernant les pêcheries exploitant ces stocks. Ce plan de gestion est le premier élaboré selon des nouvelles règles découlant de la politique commune de la pêche, réformée en 2013, qui impose notamment de gérer les stocks halieutiques au rendement maximal durable (RMD).

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen soutient la pratique d'une pêche raisonnée dans la mer Baltique et la protection des stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat.

Ces trois espèces sont essentielles à l'écosystème de la mer Baltique du fait de leurs fortes interactions biologiques. En effet, la taille du stock de cabillaud peut avoir une incidence sur la taille des stocks de hareng et de sprat et inversement. Malheureusement, ils font l'objet d'une surexploitation.

Il est donc essentiel de mettre en place un plan de gestion pour les stocks de hareng et de sprat comme il en existe déjà depuis 2007 pour le cabillaud.

Le rapport Walesa voté ce midi par le Parlement s'inscrit donc dans cette logique et fait un pas supplémentaire en intégrant tous les stocks concernés dans un plan de gestion unique. Ce dernier permettra de garantir une exploitation durable des stocks conformément aux principes de rendement maximal durable et de l'approche écosystémique de la gestion des pêcheries.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – Este plan plurianual tiene por objeto establecer un marco de gestión multiespecífico para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico, donde suponen más del 94 % de las capturas en los últimos años.

El 15 de marzo de 2016, representantes de la Comisión, Consejo y Parlamento alcanzaron un acuerdo para este plan plurianual, que se espera entre en vigor antes de finales de agosto de 2016. Este es el primero de varios planes requeridos en el artículo 9 del Reglamento de la PPC.

El plan acordado contiene una serie de requisitos coherentes las nuevas exigencias de la política pesquera común e introduce el concepto de «rangos» para el cálculo de la mortalidad por pesca.

Consideró esta reglamentación de suma importancia, tomando en consideración las interacciones entre las especies afectadas.

Por todo ello, he votado a favor de este informe.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement européen a adopté ce texte de compromis négocié avec le Conseil établissant un plan pluriannuel pour les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique. Ce rapport a été adopté à une large majorité.

Le plan de reconstitution du cabillaud en Baltique est le premier plan pluriannuel intégrant les dispositions sur la nouvelle politique commune de la pêche (PCP). Le texte du règlement stipule que le plan devrait avoir pour objectif de contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs de la PCP, en particulier d'atteindre et de maintenir un RMD (rendement maximal durable) pour les stocks concernés (cabillaud, hareng, sprat). L'atteinte du RMD devra se faire dès que possible, et d'ici 2020 au plus tard. Le règlement s'applique également aux prises accessoires de plie, de flet, de turbot et de barbue. En outre, et je m'en réjouis, les restrictions géographiques applicables à la pêche sont maintenues en Baltique pour protéger les reproducteurs et les juvéniles. Enfin, le plan met en œuvre l'approche écosystémique de la gestion des pêches afin de faire en sorte que les incidences négatives des activités de pêche sur l'écosystème marin «soient réduites au minimum».

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Žvejyba iš esmės vidinėje Europos Sąjungos jūroje – Baltijos jūroje – yra labai jautrus klausimas. Jautrus jis yra ne vien mums, Baltijos jūros šalių atstovams, tačiau ir visai Baltijos ekosistemai. Aplink jūrą įsikūrusios šalys turi pakankamus pajėgumus, kad nereguliuojant žvejybos sunaikintų visas žuvų atsargas šioje jūroje. Tuo tikslu šiandien priimame daugiametį Baltijos jūros menkių, silklių ir šprotų išteklį valdymo ir žvejybos planą.

Vertindamas dokumentą galiu įvardinti tris jo trūkumus. Pirmas – planas yra ganėtinai neatsakingas. Jame labai nedaug dėmesio skiriama žuvų išteklį atkūrimui, kurio esminė sąlyga – žvejoti mažiau žuvų nei jų suauga. Antras plano trūkumas – jis yra socialiai neatsakingas: skurdesnės ES valstybės narės yra traktuojamos taip pat, kaip ir turtingesnės, neatsižvelgiant į tai, kad net ne žvejybos plėtra, o jos atgaivinimas po neatsakingų veiksmų mažinant ES žvejybos pajėgumus, galėtų tapti vienu iš regioninio augimo tolygios regioninės plėtros varikliu. Ir trečiasis trūkumas – plane nepakankamai dėmesio skiriama darbui su ES nepriklausančiomis Baltijos jūros regiono šalimis, kurios yra žinomos dėl savo nesugebėjimo laikytis tarptautinių susitarimų.

Nepaisant to, geriau ne visai geras planas, nei jokio. Todėl balsuoju „už“, kartu ragindamas Komisiją ateityje atsižvelgti į išsakytas pastabas.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – Dadas as características da massa de água deste mar, estas três espécies são omnipresentes e interagem de forma contínua, pelo que é de extrema importância assegurar uma regulamentação que reconheça as interações existentes entre elas.

O bacalhau, o arenque e a espadilha são componentes importantes do ecossistema báltico e, atendendo à forte influência que as interações biológicas e os efeitos ambientais exercem sobre as unidades populacionais destas espécies, é aconselhável poder adaptar os padrões de exploração destas unidades populacionais à luz da evolução dos mais recentes conhecimentos científicos sobre as referidas interações e sobre a evolução das condições ambientais.

O presente relatório reflete a concordância com a proposta da Comissão no que respeita à integração de uma exploração equilibrada e sustentável destas espécies, com a qual concordo, e, por isso, votei favoravelmente.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho dato il mio voto a favore alla relazione presentata dall'onorevole Walesa (PPE) sulla proposta di regolamento che istituisce un piano pluriennale per la gestione degli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa e spratto nel Mar Baltico e per le attività di pesca che sfruttano tali stock. Il testo presentato in plenaria è il frutto di una serie di negoziati tra Parlamento, Consiglio e Commissione (trilogo), i quali hanno permesso di raggiungere un compromesso su un punto controverso, ovvero il massimo livello accettabile di mortalità causata dalle attività di pesca. Il piano di stock per il Mar Baltico costituisce il primo del suo genere ad essere adottato nell'ambito della nuova politica comune della pesca; esso assicura che le attività ittiche condotte nell'area interessata siano nel rispetto dell'ambiente ed economicamente sostenibili. Per questi motivi il piano sarà utilizzato come modello da applicare in altre aree, prime fra tutte il Mare del Nord e l'Atlantico. Sono del parere che si tratti di ottime ragioni per sostenere il testo presentato in plenaria.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención dado que entendemos como un avance la aplicación de una gestión multispecífica, mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado.

Entendemos que es preciso que los planes de gestión garanticen una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas pesquerías, basadas en los dictámenes científicos, así como también es fundamental, que todas estas regulaciones respondan a las especificidades de los territorios y sus gentes, que desgraciadamente no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la UE, por lo que seguimos sin compartir los criterios de aplicación de la PPC en los territorios.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Consider că este nevoie de un plan de gestionare pentru mai multe specii în Marea Baltică și salut propunerea Comisiei de revizuire a regulamentului în acest sens.

Abordarea care prevede gestionarea multispecii este mult mai eficientă decât gestionarea unei singure specii, iar planul ar trebui să prevadă exploatarea durabilă și echilibrată a acestor stocuri și garantarea stabilității posibilităților de pescuit și, bineînțeles, sursele de venituri ale pescarilor.

De asemenea, planurile multianuale ar trebui să garanteze că gestionarea stocurilor de cod și hering este bazată pe recomandările științifice cele mai recente privind situația stocurilor vizate, interacțiunile dintre specii și alte aspecte legate de ecosistem și activitățile de pescuit.

Totodată, susțin poziția Comisiei potrivit căreia regulamentul trebuie să includă norme legate de capturile accidentale de pește plat. Peștii plați, cum ar fi cambula de Baltica, cambula, calcanul și calcanul-neted, pot constitui cantități semnificative de capturi accidentale în timpul pescuitului de cod și nu expun codul, heringul și șprotul la niciun risc major.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Mehrjahresplan für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen“ gestimmt. Dieser mehrjährige Bewirtschaftungsplan zielt vor allem auf eine nachhaltige Befischung. Er setzt unter anderem Höchstfangmengen ein und sieht verschiedene technische Maßnahmen vor, welche die Bestände sichern und besser kontrollieren sollen.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El «Plan plurianual para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico y para las pesquerías que explotan estas poblaciones» es el primero de los planes plurianuales presentados tras la reforma de la PPC de 2013. Estos planes pretenden ser las herramientas para la gestión y recuperación de las pesquerías comunitarias.

A pesar de la necesidad de contar con planes para gestionar la pesca en nuestros mares y océanos, no he podido votar a favor de éste ya que la propuesta original ha sido rebajada tras las negociaciones a tres bandas entre con el Consejo y la Comisión. Concretamente me preocupan la verdadera aplicación de un enfoque basado en el ecosistema o la corrección de la sobrepesca. Por todo ello me he abstenido.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho espresso il mio voto favorevole in merito all'istituzione del piano pluriennale per gli stock di merluzzo bianco, aringa, e spratto nel Mar Baltico. L'obiettivo del regolamento è quello di consentire uno sfruttamento equilibrato e sostenibile di queste specie ittiche che insieme rappresentano il 94% del totale delle catture. Il piano di gestione multispecie istituito dal presente regolamento richiede che si tenga maggiormente conto delle funzioni e dei ruoli ecologici diversi delle specie contemplate dal piano. Dal momento che si tratta del primo piano di questo tipo adottato nell'ambito della nuova PCP, mi auguro che esso possa fungere da modello o da banco di prova per i futuri piani pluriennali riguardanti la gestione delle attività di pesca in altri mari europei.

Branislav Škripek (ECR), *písomne*. – Populácie tresky, sleďa a šproty predstavujú v posledných rokoch viac ako 94 % úlovkov v Baltskom mori. Všeobecné zameranie návrhu Komisie na potrebu viacdruhového plánu riadenia v Baltskom mori je správne. Prístup založený na viacdruhovom riadení je oveľa účinnejší ako riadenie jednotlivých druhov. V pláne by sa malo zabezpečiť vyvážené a udržateľné využívanie týchto populácií a stabilita rybolovných možností – a tým aj živobytie rybárov. Hlasoval som za.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Súhlasila som s návrhom nariadenia, ktorým Komisia plánuje regulovať populácie tresky, sleďa a šproty v Baltskom mori, keďže práve tieto tri druhy rýb predstavujú viac ako 90 % úlovkov v tejto oblasti. Baltské more je v podstate uzavretý vodný útvar, v ktorom sú tieto tri druhy všadeprítomné a neustále na seba vzájomne pôsobia. Preto je mimoriadne dôležité umožniť také riadenie ich populácie, ktoré bude brať do úvahy ich vzájomné interakcie. Populácie tresky ovplyvňuje veľkosť populácií sleďa a šproty, keďže treska je predátorom šproty a sleďa. Vzhľadom na to, že treska, sleď a šprota sú významné zložky baltského ekosystému, je žiaduce prispôsobiť miery a techniky ich využívania novým vedeckým poznatkom o interakciách a zmenách environmentálnych podmienok. Návrh nariadenia sa venuje práve týmto biologickým interakciám a environmentálnym účinkom populácie rýb v Baltskom mori. Prvým krokom k flexibilnému riadeniu populácií týchto troch druhov je návrh na zaradenie všetkých príslušných populácií do jednotného plánu riadenia. Umožní sa tým pružnejší prístup k zdrojom počas každoročného stanovenia rybolovných možností a zlepšia sa reakcie na meniace sa situácie.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *písno*. – Evropska komisija je oktobra 2014 objavila večletni načrt za staleže trske, sleďa in papaline v Baltskem morju ter ribištvo, ki izkorišča te staleže.

Namen predloga je vzpostaviti okvir za upravljanje staleže trske, sleďa in papaline v Baltskem morju, kjer je ribištvo predvsem usmerjeno v te tri vrste. V zadnjih letih so trska, sleď in papalina znašale več kot 94 % ulova v Baltskem morju.

Baltsko morje je skoraj zaprto vodno telo, v katerem so te tri vrste povsod navzoče in stalno sovplivajo med sabo. Zato je nadvse pomembno, da ima Evropska unija to področje dobro urejeno, tako da bo omogočeno sovplivanje med vrstami, ki jih načrt zajema, med drugim vpliv trske na staleže sleďa in papaline in obratno.

Poročilo je bilo v primerjavi z osnutki precej oslABLJENO. Tako na primer omogoča ribolov v večjih količinah, kot je to bilo omejeno v Skupni ribiški politiki, kar je nedopustno.

Čeprav poročilo izrecno omenja dober okolijski status Okvirne direktive o morski strategiji ter tudi omogoča omejevanje ribiške opreme z namenom ohranitve netrgovskih vrst rib, kar podpiram, menim da je poročilo precej slabo.

Zaradi tega sem glasoval proti sprejetju le-tega.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Od 2008. godine na snazi je odredba o kontroli izlova bakalara u Baltičkom moru, međutim procjena je Odbora za ribarstvo da postojeća odredba ne uzima u obzir trenutno ribolovno stanje Baltičkog mora te da je potrebna izmjena iste. Postojeće odredbe također ne pokrivaju stanje haringa i papalina Baltičkog mora.

Uzimajući u obzir ribolov te stalne ekološke promjene ribljeg staništa, Odbor smatra kako je potreban sveobuhvatan plan upravljanja bakalaram, haringom, i papalinom Baltika. Predlaže se da upravljanje bude obavljeno pomoću najsuvremenijih znanstvenih metoda, uzimajući u obzir posljedice na ostale vrste riba i ekologije Baltičkog podmorja. Ukoliko upravljanje ili ribolov pokaže znatne posljedice na takozvane „flat fish“, Odbor predlaže da se i one stave pod nadzor plana Komisije. Prva revizija plana trebala bi se održati tri godine nakon stupanja na snagu, a ukoliko plan nosi pozitivne učinke, druga revizija bi slijedila pet godina nakon uspostave. S obzirom da trenutne odredbe pokrivaju samo jednu vrstu Baltičke ribe, da je Baltičko more osjetljivo stanište i od velike ekonomske važnosti članicama te pokriva mogućnost proširenja na druge riblje vrste, podržavam ovo izvješće.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Višegodišnji plan za zalihe bakalara, haringe i papaline u Baltičkom moru te o ribarstvu i iskorištavanju tih stokova riba objavila je Europska komisija u listopadu 2014. Cilj projekta je uspostaviti okvir za upravljanje zalihama bakalara, haringi i papalina u Baltičkom moru, gdje je ribolov prvenstveno koncentriran na ove tri vrste. Plan upravljanja za Baltičko more na snazi je od 2008. godine, ali se procjenjuje da nisu u razmjeru s trenutnom situacijom stokova bakalara. Zalihe haringe i papaline još nisu obuhvaćene planom upravljanja. Bakalar, haringa i papaline važne su komponente baltičkog ekosustava. Procjenjuje se da bakalar, haringa i papalina u posljednjih nekoliko godina zauzimaju više od 94 % baltičkog ulova. Važno je imati na umu da je plan samo uvodni prijedlog u vrlo osjetljivom ekosustavu Baltičkog mora. Prvi pregled plana trebao bi se održati tri godine nakon njegovog stupanja na snagu, a ako će imati pozitivne efekte, ponovno će se revidirati nakon 5 godina. To će, također, osigurati prijeko potrebnu fleksibilnost plana.

Podržavam stajalište Parlamenta koji usvaja Izvješće jer smatram da je Parlament dovoljno kompetentan da procijeni da li je neko izvješće dovoljno jasno i kvalitetno sročeno.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o vzpostavitvi večletnega načrta za staleže trske, sleda in papaline v Baltskem morju ter ribištvo, ki izkorišča te staleže, o spremembi Uredbe št. 2187/2005 in razveljavitvi Uredbe št. 1098/2007.

Podpiram večletni načrt Komisije iz leta 2014, ki je objavila večletni načrt za staleže trske sleda in papaline v Baltskem morju ter ribištvo, ki izkorišča te staleže.

S tem je vzpostavila okvir za upravljanje več vrst za staleže trske, sleda in papaline v Baltskem morju, kjer je ribištvo predvsem usmerjeno v te tri vrste. Baltsko morje je skoraj zaprto vodno telo, v katerem so te tri vrste povsod navzoče in stalno sovplivajo med sabo.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραφτως*. – Η προστασία των αλιευτικών αποθεμάτων καθώς και η θέσπιση νομοθετικών μέτρων εκμετάλλευσης και διατήρησης της βιωσιμότητας των αλιευτικών στόλων οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις ιδιαιτερότητες των εκάστοτε θαλάσσιων περιοχών και των ενδιαφερόμενων κρατών.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a közönséges tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományaira és a halászatukra vonatkozó többéves terv létrehozásáról szóló jelentést, mivel jónak tartom a jelentéstevő által is elismert bizottsági javaslatot, amely szerint több fajra vonatkozó gazdálkodási tervre van szükség a Balti-tenger esetében. Ez a megközelítés hatékonyabb az egyetlen fajra irányuló gazdálkodásnál és nagyobb biztonságot ad a halállományok kiegyensúlyozott és fenntartható kiaknázását, a halászati lehetőségek stabilitását, így a halászatok megélhetését tekintve is.

Szintén egyetértek azzal a szemlélettel, hogy az érintett állományokra vonatkozó maximális fenntartható hozam megvalósításához szükséges intézkedéseket a regionalizáció elvének megfelelően kell meghozni. Ezzel biztosítható lenne, hogy az állományok helyzetében történő hirtelen változásra megfelelő időben lehessen reagálni. Támogatom továbbá a tőkehalállomány ívás ideje alatti védelmére, a kisüzemi halászat megővésére, valamint az új gazdálkodási terv korai felülvizsgálatra vonatkozó indítványokat.

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE), *na písmie*. – Wieloletni plan Unii Europejskiej w odniesieniu do stad dorsza, śledzia i szprota jest pierwszym planem w ramach nowej unijnej polityki rybołówstwa, który bierze pod uwagę interakcje między gatunkami. Do tej pory, aby chronić ławice przed nadmiernym połowianiem, Unia zarządzała pojedynczymi gatunkami, co mogło doprowadzić do ich wyginięcia. Takie podejście bowiem nie brało pod uwagę, że dorsze polują na śledzie i szproty, a te drugie żywią się ikrą dorsza. W praktyce oznacza to, że wielkość ławic dorszy wpływa na wielkość ławic śledzi i szprotów, i odwrotnie.

Podstawową zasadą nowego planu zarządzania biorącego pod uwagę zależności międzygatunkowe jest ustanowienie przedziałów, zgodnie z którymi Rada może ustalić limity połowowe i kwoty połowów. Zarządzanie ma się opierać na najbardziej aktualnych danych dostarczanych przez naukowców w sprawie stanu zasobów rybnych, interakcji pomiędzy gatunkami, a także wszelkich innych aspektów związanych z ekosystemem i rybołówstwem.

Nowe prawo ma zapewnić zbilansowaną i zrównoważoną eksploatację zasobów oraz zagwarantować stabilne możliwości połowów oraz utrzymanie dla rybaków. Dzięki temu sytuacja m.in. polskich rybaków może znacznie się poprawić. Ponadto plan zapewni, że działalność połowowa na Bałtyku będzie prowadzona w sposób zrównoważony, rozsądny, a przede wszystkim opłacalny gospodarczo, bez zbyteńnego nadwyrężania środowiska naturalnego.

Z tych powodów zdecydowałem się zgłasować za jego przyjęciem.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), *în scris*. – Pescuitul din zona Mării Baltice asigură un aport important pentru desfășurarea acestei activități la nivelul întregii Uniunii Europene. În cadrul acestei mase de apă aproape închise, nu mai puțin de 94% din capturi privesc codul, heringul și șprotul, doar accidental pești plați și alte specii. În acest context, Comisia a considerat, încă din 2008, că este nevoie de o gestiune integrată a capturilor celor trei specii principale pentru a nu afecta dezvoltarea durabilă a ecosistemului marin respectiv.

Studiile științifice din ultimii ani au demonstrat că stocurile de pește în rândul celor trei specii sunt interdependente, codul fiind prădător pentru celelalte două. În aceste condiții, Comisia a propus un regulament comun de gestionare a stocurilor respective din Marea Baltică, care include stocurile maxime permise pentru fiecare dintre cele trei specii, dar și pentru peștii plați, cum ar fi calcanul.

De asemenea, documentul include o abordare multianuală, încurajează micile întreprinderi de pescuit artizanal și prevede revizuirii periodice la fiecare cinci ani pentru mai multă flexibilitate.

Consider că este vorba despre un document important pentru ecosistemul marin din Marea Baltică, conform noii politici comune în domeniul pescuitului, astfel că susțin adoptarea sa.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – Je rejoins l'idée générale contenue dans la proposition de la Commission, selon laquelle un plan de gestion pluriespèces en mer Baltique est nécessaire. L'approche de gestion pluriespèces est beaucoup plus efficace que celle basée sur une seule espèce. Le plan devrait permettre une exploitation équilibrée et durable de ces stocks ainsi que des possibilités de pêche – et donc des ressources pour les pêcheurs – stables. Parallèlement, il devrait garantir une gestion fondée sur les avis scientifiques les plus récents en ce qui concerne l'état des stocks concernés, les interactions entre les espèces et d'autres aspects liés à l'écosystème et aux pêcheries.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – Cod, herring and sprat represent 94% of catches in the Baltic Sea and are important components of the very sensitive Baltic ecosystem. This is why I voted in favour of establishing a multiannual plan, whose aim is to establish a framework for the multispecies management of these stocks and the fisheries exploiting them, in order to reverse the effects of their overfishing in the EU. Based on sound scientific advice and an innovative long-term perspective, it strives to become a pioneer tool in fisheries management policies. The plan will thus provide for a balanced, sustainable exploitation of cod, herring and sprat stocks promote the stability of fishing opportunities and thereby guarantee the livelihoods of fishers. Beyond the content of this plan, I also welcome the increased participation of the European Parliament in European fisheries policies.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan.* – Podržala sam Izvješće o prijedlogu uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o utvrđivanju višegodišnjeg plana za stokove bakalara, haringe i papaline u Baltičkom moru i ribarstvo koje iskorištava te stokove, o izmjeni Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 2187/2005 i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 1098/2007. Cilj ove Uredbe Europskog parlamenta je utvrditi plan ribarstva za veliki broj vrsta uzimajući u obzir dinamiku između stokova bakalara, haringe i papaline te prilov vrsta u ribarstvu na te stokove, tj. lista zlatopjega, iverka, oblića i lista glatkog u Baltiku.

Iako je plan upravljanja zaliha bakalara za Baltičko more na snazi od 2008. godine, procjenjuje se da nije u razmjeru s trenutnom situacijom zaliha bakalara te da papaline i haringe nisu obuhvaćene planom. Stoga postoji potreba za novim pristupom koji će obuhvatiti više vrsta te osigurati uravnoteženo, održivo korištenje tih zaliha i stabilnost ribolovnih mogućnosti.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno.* – Predlog uredbe o vzpostavitvi večletnega načrta za staleže trske, sleda in papaline v Baltskem morju ter ribištvo, ki izkorišča te staleže, sem podprla.

Večletni načrti so osnovno orodje za trajnostno upravljanje ali obnovitev staležev rib. Takšni dolgoročni pristopi niso namenjeni le izboljšanju ohranjanja staležev ampak tudi povečanju predvidljivosti za ribiče na dolgi rok. Večletni načrt upravljanja je instrument za zagotovitev trajnostnega izkoriščanja staležev rib in morskih ekosistemov. Namen večletnih načrtov je ohranjanje velikosti staležev znotraj varnih bioloških meja. Ti določajo največje dovoljene ulove in vrsto tehničnih ukrepov ob upoštevanju značilnosti vsakega staleža in vplivov gospodarskih ukrepov na zadevna ribištva.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito.* – Hemos votado abstención dado que entendemos como un avance la aplicación de una gestión multiespecífica, mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado.

Entendemos que es preciso que los planes de gestión garanticen una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas pesquerías, basadas en los dictámenes científicos, así como también es fundamental, que todas estas regulaciones respondan a las especificidades de los territorios y sus gentes, que desgraciadamente no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la UE, por lo que seguimos sin compartir los criterios de aplicación de la PPC en los territorios.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit.* – Les stocks de cabillaud, de hareng et de sprat de la mer Baltique sont aujourd'hui en danger en raison de la surpêche.

— Des avis scientifiques ont établi que l'exploitation actuelle des stocks était incompatible avec l'objectif du rendement maximal durable.

— La Commission ne voulait pas attendre de nouvelles études du CIEM (Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer) avant de mettre en œuvre le plan pluriannuel.

— Le projet prévoit que de nombreuses mesures techniques soient déléguées à la Commission.

Le projet, tel qu'amendé par les députés de la commission de la pêche, insiste pour que les études les plus récentes du CIEM soient prises en compte et que les conseils consultatifs concernés soient consultés. Il est également prévu que, lorsqu'elle prépare des actes délégués, la Commission veille à ce que les documents pertinents soient transmis au Parlement européen et au Conseil.

J'ai donc voté POUR ce texte.

Mihai Țurcanu (PPE), *în scris.* – În octombrie 2014, Comisia a propus un plan multianual pentru stocurile de cod, hering și șprot din Marea Baltică și activitățile de pescuit care exploatează stocurile respective. Acest plan este primul care a fost propus, pe baza principiilor reformei politicii comune de pescuit din 2013.

Un plan de gestiune multianual trebuie să garanteze exploatarea durabilă a stocurilor de pește și a ecosistemelor marine. Conform principiului stabilit la articolul 2 din Regulamentul de bază privind politica de pescuit comună, exploatarea trebuie să permită restabilirea și menținerea populațiilor speciilor la niveluri superioare celor care permit obținerea unui randament maximal durabil.

Planurile multianuale de gestiune a acestor stocuri – care sunt interdependente – vizează menținerea mărimii stocurilor în limite sigure din punct de vedere biologic. Aceste planuri prevăd un maxim de capturi și o serie de măsuri tehnice, ținând cont de caracteristicile fiecărui stoc, precum și de incidența economică a măsurilor asupra activităților de pescuit care exploatează aceste stocuri.

Prin urmare, am votat în favoarea planului multianual privind stocurile de cod, hering și șprot.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Dorsz, śledź i szprot to główne gatunki, które są poławiane na Morzu Bałtyckim i stanowią blisko 94 % wszystkich połowów. Z tego powodu niezwykle istotne jest stworzenie nowego programu zarządzania połowami, który będzie adekwatny do współczesnych problemów. Dotychczasowy plan, pochodzący z 2008, nie jest dostosowany do obecnej sytuacji, ponadto nie obejmował śledzi i dorszy. Należy stworzyć nowy i całościowy plan zarządzania zasobami rybnymi Morza Bałtyckiego, który będzie obejmował wszystkie gatunki. Niniejsza rezolucja jest odpowiedzią na współczesne wyzwania, dlatego poparłem ją w głosowaniu.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A közönséges tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományaira és a halászatukra vonatkozó többéves tervet az Európai Bizottság 2014. októberben tette közzé. A javaslat célja az, hogy több fajra vonatkozó gazdálkodási keretet hozzon létre a tőkehal, a hering és a spratt balti-tengeri állományai tekintetében. A tőkehal, a hering és a spratt az elmúlt évek balti-tengeri fogásainak több mint 94%-át tették ki. A most napirenden lévő dokumentumot támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención dado que entendemos como un avance la aplicación de una gestión multiespecífica, mucho más eficaz que la gestión de especies por separado.

Entendemos que es preciso que los planes de gestión garanticen una explotación equilibrada y sostenible de las citadas pesquerías, basadas en los dictámenes científicos, así como también es fundamental, que todas estas regulaciones respondan a las especificidades de los territorios y sus gentes, que desgraciadamente no siempre son recogidas por las políticas de la UE, por lo que seguimos sin compartir los criterios de aplicación de la PPC en los territorios.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Šio plano tikslas turėtų būti atkurti, pasiekti ir išlaikyti atitinkamų rūšių populiacijas, viršijančias lygius, kuriems esant galima užtikrinti atitinkamų išteklį tausios žvejybos laimikį, kuo labiau sumažinant poveikį kitoms rūšims.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007. The aim of the plan is to establish a framework for the multispecies management of the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea, where fishing primarily targets these three species. Cod, herring and sprat account for over 94 % of Baltic catches in the recent years. The Baltic Sea is a virtually closed body of water in which these three species are omnipresent and interact continuously. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to deliver regulation making it possible to recognize interactions between the species covered, inter alia the cod's influence on herring and sprat stocks and the other way round. I voted in favour because I believe that the plan provides for a balanced, sustainable exploitation of those stocks and the stability of fishing opportunities – and thereby of the livelihoods of fishers.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Los planes plurianuales son un elemento esencial para la gestión sostenible y la reconstitución de las poblaciones. Hablamos del primer plan plurianual propuesto sobre la base de los principios de la reforma de la política pesquera común de 2013 y que reemplaza al plan existente de 2008, que solo trataba al bacalao y no trataba al arenque y al espadín del mar Báltico. Estamos ante un documento que ha sido objeto de largas negociaciones para poder dar lugar a un texto consensuado y equilibrado, por lo que considero necesario votar a su favor.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El «Plan plurianual para las poblaciones de bacalao, arenque y espadín del mar Báltico y para las pesquerías que explotan estas poblaciones» es el primero de los planes plurianuales presentados tras la reforma de la PPC de 2013. Estos planes pretenden ser las herramientas para la gestión y recuperación de las pesquerías comunitarias.

A pesar de la necesidad de contar con planes para gestionar la pesca en nuestros mares y océanos, no he podido votar a favor de éste ya que la propuesta original ha sido rebajada tras las negociaciones a tres bandas entre con el Consejo y la Comisión. Concretamente me preocupan la verdadera aplicación de un enfoque basado en el ecosistema o la corrección de la sobrepesca. Por todo ello me he abstenido.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – In oktober 2014 heeft de Europese Commissie een meerjarenplan gepubliceerd voor de kabeljauw-, haring- en sprotbestanden in de Oostzee. Het voorstel heeft tot doel een kader vast te stellen voor meersoortenbeheer van de bestanden van kabeljauw, haring en sprot in de Oostzee, waar de visserij vooral op deze drie soorten is gericht. Kabeljauw, haring en sprot vormden de afgelopen jaren meer dan 94 % van de vangst in de Oostzee. Ik heb hier terecht vóór gestemd.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Dieser Bericht behandelt den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Festlegung eines Mehrjahresplans für die Bestände von Dorsch, Hering und Sprotte in der Ostsee und für die Fischereien, die diese Bestände befischen. Nachhaltige ökologische Fischereien sind für die Meere von immenser Bedeutung.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφτως*. – Η παρούσα πρωτοβουλία αφορά την αλιευτική δραστηριότητα στη θαλάσσια περιοχή της Βαλτικής, και συγκεκριμένα την αλιεία γάδου, ρέγγας και παπαλίνας. Το σχέδιο που έχει κατατεθεί είναι πρωτοποριακό για τη συγκεκριμένη περιοχή και η πρώτη αναθεώρηση θα πραγματοποιηθεί με την πάροδο τριετίας.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), *por escrito*. – Votei a favor do relatório Wałęsa sobre o plano plurianual para as unidades populacionais de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico, por considerar que representa um passo crucial para a implementação da reforma da política comum das pescas.

Este plano constitui o primeiro plano de gestão plurianual da UE no âmbito da reforma da política comum das pescas e servirá como modelo para outros planos de bacias marítimas.

O objetivo consiste em estabelecer um plano de pesca multiespécies que tenha por finalidade reconstituir, atingir e manter as populações das espécies de bacalhau, arenque e espadilha do mar Báltico acima dos níveis que possam gerar o rendimento máximo sustentável, para além de minimizar, tanto quanto possível, o impacto noutras espécies, tais como as aves marinhas, e no meio marinho em geral.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o vzpostavitvi večletnega načrta za staleže trske, sleda in papaline v Baltskem morju ter ribištvo, ki izkorišča te staleže, o spremembi Uredbe št. 2187/2005 in razveljavitvi Uredbe št. 1098/2007.

Predlog uredbe prispeva k uresničevanju ciljev skupne trajnostne ribiške politike iz člena 2 Uredbe (EU) št. 1380/2013, zlasti z uporabo previdnostnega pristopa pri upravljanju ribištva.

Njegov namen je zagotoviti, da se pri izkoriščanju živih morskih bioloških virov, populacije lovljenih vrst obnavljajo in ohranjajo nad ravnmi, ki omogočajo največji trajnostni donos.

9.9. Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrechts (A8-0209/2016 - Jean-Marie Cavada)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore di questa relazione perché, si sa, la realtà corre molto più veloce delle norme e gli ordinamenti devono adeguarsi in fretta di fronte alle sfide e, soprattutto, ai nuovi equilibri della società.

Schengen, l'Erasmus, la mobilità fra Stati hanno aiutato la nascita e la diffusione di sempre più numerose coppie europee – possiamo definirle così – famiglie che abitano in uno Stato membro, hanno case in un altro Stato, ereditano patrimoni in un altro Stato ancora. È una società che ha avuto, fortunatamente, il coraggio di abbattere i confini e che quindi oggi ha bisogno di nuove norme.

L'Unione europea deve sostenere queste famiglie europee, soprattutto facilitando il dialogo tra Stati membri e decidendo chiaramente le competenze in tema di regimi patrimoniali, questo per dare certezza alle coppie, per fare chiarezza su quale sia il giudice competente.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Considerando il carattere globalizzato ed internazionale che ha assunto la società moderna, il diritto di famiglia deve necessariamente adeguarsi alle nuove esigenze dei cittadini. A tal fine, dopo l'approvazione della procedura di cooperazione rafforzata, la Commissione ha formulato una nuova proposta in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Si mira, in sintesi, a disciplinare e chiarire, in caso di decisioni transfrontaliere, quale sia il giudice competente, quale norma risulti applicabile ed, infine, come debba avvenire il riconoscimento e l'esecuzione della sentenza.

La certezza del diritto, soprattutto nella gestione delle problematiche familiari, è un diritto fondamentale dei cittadini. Per queste ragioni, ho espresso voto favorevole.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Face au constat qu'il existe un flou juridique en matière de droits de propriété des couples internationaux, la Commission a travaillé à une proposition de règlement européen visant à uniformiser les règles juridiques concernant les régimes matrimoniaux.

J'ai voté contre cette proposition de règlement, car l'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Celui-ci reste en effet une compétence exclusive des États membres qui peuvent, s'ils le souhaitent, conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc ici d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – As these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement a adopté sa position sur ces règlements au cours du dernier mandat. Le Conseil a pris beaucoup de temps pour prendre position. Nous nous félicitons de la coopération renforcée et nous espérons que d'autres États membres décideront de rejoindre ce processus. Ce règlement va rendre la vie des couples internationaux européens beaucoup plus facile et leur garantir une meilleure sécurité juridique.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραφώς*. – Η παρούσα έκθεση αφορά την πρόταση κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με τη δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των καταχωρημένων συζύγων. Υπερψήφισα την πρόταση κανονισμού επειδή είναι ξεκάθαρα προς το συμφέρον της Ένωσης και των ζευγαριών που αντιμετωπίζουν πολλές καθυστερήσεις, καθώς θα καταστεί δυνατό σε πολλές περιπτώσεις να αποφευχθεί η σύγχυση και η νομική αβεβαιότητα.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Mit einer zunehmenden Mobilität in einem Raum ohne Binnengrenzen sind internationale Paare keine Seltenheit mehr. Internationale Paare werden definiert als solche, die sich aus Bürgern von 2 EU-Mitgliedstaaten zusammenschließen und anschließend in einem Land bleiben, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit beide nicht besitzen.

Diese internationalen Paare sind oftmals sowohl im Alltag als auch bei Teilung des gemeinsamen Vermögens infolge einer Trennung oder des Todes einer Person mit Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert. Die neue Verordnung zielt darauf ab, den ehelichen Paaren dies zu erleichtern, indem sie das für sie zuständige Gericht und das auf ihre Vermögensrechte anzuwendende Recht bestimmt.

Auch weil die neue Verordnung vielen Personen zugutekommen wird, die in Grenzregionen wohnen, habe ich ihr zugestimmt.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), par écrit. – En 2010, la Commission a identifié l'incertitude quant aux droits de propriété des couples internationaux comme étant un des principaux obstacles que les citoyens de l'UE rencontrent dans leur vie quotidienne. Après le blocage des négociations, tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres.

Le règlement consacre le principe de l'unité du droit applicable, la même loi pour l'ensemble des biens détenus par le couple, où qu'ils se trouvent. Le règlement permet également le choix du droit applicable à la condition qu'il entretienne une certaine proximité avec la situation des époux.

L'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

J'ai donc voté contre le projet de résolution.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport porte sur un règlement déterminant la juridiction compétente et la loi applicable à des demandes en matière de régimes matrimoniaux. Outre le fait qu'il existe déjà à ce sujet la Convention du 14 mars 1978 sous l'égide de la Convention de la Haye, rien n'autorise l'UE à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille.

Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille, qui appelait un vote défavorable.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), par écrit. – Il s'agit ici de recourir à la coopération renforcée entre les États membres qui y sont favorables en matière de régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux. La proposition vise à établir un corps complet de règles de droit international privé applicables à la matière des régimes matrimoniaux.

J'ai approuvé ce point.

Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea (ALDE), por escrito. – Cuando hablamos de la importancia de la Unión y de cómo las decisiones que adoptamos en las instituciones europeas afectan directamente a la vida de los ciudadanos, nos referimos a medidas como las que contiene la propuesta de la Comisión que se aprueba en esta Resolución.

En Europa existen unas 16 millones de parejas «transfronterizas» que se beneficiarán de los futuros Reglamentos en materia de derechos de propiedad. No cabe duda que estos reglamentos suponen un avance que facilitará la vida de muchas parejas internacionales. Sin embargo, debido a la cooperación reforzada, habrá dos Europas para estas parejas: una donde se reconozcan sus derechos de propiedad y otra no.

He votado a favor de esta resolución, ya que suponen un avance. Pero no es suficiente. Mi compromiso es seguir trabajando por una Europa sin barreras para las parejas y familias, incluidas todas las formas de familia que existen en nuestra sociedad, y por tanto sin discriminaciones para los ciudadanos LGTBI.

Debemos garantizar la libre circulación dentro de la UE. Para conseguirlo sin discriminaciones, también es indispensable que cualquier matrimonio o unión registrada de parejas del mismo sexo se reconozca en otro Estado miembro.

Brando Benifei (S&D), per iscritto. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Cavada sulla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi. Dopo lo stallo delle trattative, l'avvio di una cooperazione rafforzata ha portato ad una proposta molto più in linea con le indicazioni espresse dal Parlamento nel 2013. Il testo presenta infatti importanti innovazioni, stabilendo in maniera chiara quale giudice è competente a pronunciarsi sulle domande in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Un grande passo avanti è poi riscontrabile nel principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile che prevede che il diritto dei regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi si applichi alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'unione, ovunque si trovino. In termini generali questo nuovo regolamento rappresenta una risposta efficace per superare i casi di confusione e le difficoltà giuridiche, per questo motivo ho deciso di sostenerlo con il mio voto.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai choisi de m'opposer à ce rapport ainsi qu'à la proposition de règlement du Conseil relative à la compétence, à la loi applicable, à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux.

Je considère cette intrusion dans le droit de la famille national inacceptable. Par ailleurs, s'il faut bien évidemment considérer la situation des couples internationaux et notamment ce qui est relatif à leurs droits de propriété, je rappelle qu'il existe déjà une Convention internationale en la matière, celle du 14 mars 1978, que tous les États membres sont libres de ratifier.

Le règlement en question n'ajoute rien au cadre déjà existant, puisqu'il exclut de son domaine les questions concernant la capacité des époux, l'existence, la validité ou la reconnaissance d'un mariage, ainsi que les obligations alimentaires et la succession du conjoint décédé.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Pur essendo una relazione ben strutturata e condivisibile, permangono dei passaggi che potrebbero aprire a criticità e strumentalizzazioni future che mi impediscono di sostenere totalmente questo testo. Mi sono quindi espressa con un voto di astensione.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – La libertad de movimiento dentro de la Unión ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de los matrimonios internacionales o de matrimonios que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo. Sin embargo, estas parejas se enfrentan, a menudo, a problemas relacionados con la propiedad, ya sea dentro del matrimonio o bien a la hora de repartir los bienes en caso de divorcio. Este Reglamento, elaborado mediante el procedimiento de cooperación reforzada y aplicable a dieciocho Estados miembros (Suecia, Bélgica, Grecia, Croacia, Eslovenia, España, Francia, Portugal, Italia, Malta, Luxemburgo, Alemania, República Checa, Países Bajos, Austria, Bulgaria, Finlandia y Chipre) que así lo han solicitado, pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y el ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados miembros.

Este Reglamento mejorará el estatuto jurídico de las parejas internacionales o que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo, al establecer un marco legal claro para determinar la jurisdicción, la ley aplicable y el reconocimiento y la aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad dentro del matrimonio, por lo que he votado a favor del mismo.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes šis pasiūlymas yra dėl Tarybos reglamento dėl sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo srityje taikytinos jurisdikcijos, teisės ir teismo sprendimų pripažinimo ir vykdymo.

Šis reglamentas bus labai naudinga priemonė Europos Sąjungoje gyvenančioms tarptautinėms poroms. Jame reglamentuojama sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo srityje taikytina jurisdikcija, teisė ir teismo sprendimų pripažinimas bei vykdymas.

Vis dėlto į reglamento taikymo sritį nepatenka klausimai, susiję su sutuoktinių veiksniumu, santuokos buvimu, galiojimu ar pripažinimu, išlaikymo prievolėmis ir mirusio sutuoktinio turto paveldėjimu. Taigi valstybių narių nepriklausomumas šeimos teisės srityje išsaugotas. Be to, reglamentas neturi poveikio valstybių narių materialinei teisei, susijusiai su sutuoktinių turto teisiniu režimu.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte est sans aucun doute un préalable à l'uniformisation des règles juridiques concernant les régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux, que ces derniers soient mariés ou liés par un partenariat enregistré. Il est à craindre une immixtion future dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — As these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La proposta di regolamento, presentata nel quadro di una cooperazione rafforzata capace di coinvolgere la larga maggioranza degli Stati membri, che intende chiarire e meglio disciplinare, all'interno dei Paesi in questione, le competenze, la legge applicabile, nonché le modalità di riconoscimento e di esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali tra coniugi, rappresenta un importante passo in avanti in grado di agevolare l'accesso ai diritti e di semplificare la vita a un gran numero di cittadini europei.

La nuova proposta di regolamentazione permetterebbe un maggiore margine di flessibilità (ad esempio nell'ambito della scelta della legge applicabile o ancora nella facilitazione della circolazione degli atti ufficiali) che andrebbe incontro alle esigenze, in particolare, di quelle coppie composte da cittadini provenienti da diversi Stati membri, chiarificando al tempo stesso alcune situazioni giuridiche attualmente poco chiare e fornendo in tal modo una maggiore certezza giuridica.

Si tratta in effetti di un ulteriore progresso verso una sempre più effettiva circolazione degli atti e delle decisioni tra Stati membri capace di rafforzare la creazione di uno spazio giuridico omogeneo, armonizzato e funzionale in grado di rispondere alla sfida della crescita della mobilità, nonché capace di promuovere lo sviluppo di un'effettiva cittadinanza europea.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Prezenta inițiativă se referă la jurisdicția și legea aplicabilă, precum și la recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor în materie de regimuri matrimoniale, stabilindu-se care este instanța competentă să se pronunțe cu privire la cererile în materie de regimuri matrimoniale.

Această propunere vine pe fondul mobilității crescute a persoanelor, care generează o creștere a numărului de cupluri formate din cetățeni ai unor state membre diferite, care locuiesc într-un stat membru diferit de statul lor membru de origine. În urma diverselor studii, s-au constatat o serie de dificultăți pe care le întâmpină aceste cupluri transnaționale, dificultăți produse de anumite incompatibilități între normele aplicabile care reglementează efectele patrimoniale ale căsătoriei, atât cele de drept material, cât și de drept internațional privat.

Cu toate acestea, abordarea cu privire la propunerea în cauză nu este una comună la nivelul tuturor statelor membre, iar motivul este acela că prevederile sunt insuficiente pentru a crea un cadru omogen, care să aibă în vedere toate situațiile ce pot apărea în acest sector, motiv pentru care am ales să mă abțin în privința votului final pe acest raport.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *în scris*. – Regimul matrimonial este acel sistem de reguli juridice care guvernează drepturile și obligațiile patrimoniale ale soților, atât în raporturile dintre aceștia, cât și în raporturile lor cu terțe persoane.

În prezentul regulament se stabilește clar instanța competentă care să se pronunțe cu privire la cererile în materie de regimuri matrimoniale. Dacă un stat membru nu aprobă căsătoria respectivă, se acordă instanțelor din statul respectiv posibilitatea de a transmite cauza instanțelor unui alt stat al Uniunii, care să recunoască căsătoria în cauză.

Susțin acest raport privind competența, legea aplicabilă, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești în materia regimurilor matrimoniale, deoarece consider că regulamentul răspunde cerințelor Parlamentului European privind atât circulația și forța executorie a actelor autentice, cât și tranzacțiile judiciare.

Acordul este în mod evident în folosul Uniunii și reprezintă totodată un pas important pentru cuplurile internaționale din UE, oferindu-le acestora noi mijloace de transmisiune a informațiilor juridice de bază.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Dopo attenta lettura e discussione in aula ho dato il mio voto positivo alla relazione sulla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Oggi che la Cassazione italiana, nel confermare l'adozione della coppia di donne omosessuali, ha affermato che questa «non determina in astratto un conflitto di interessi tra genitore biologico e minore adottando, ma richiede che l'eventuale conflitto sia accertato in concreto dal giudice», ha posto principi di diritto vivente che in quanto applicabili al diritto interno, pongono interrogativi, progressivamente sempre più importanti, in seno anche al diritto delle coppie internazionali dell'Unione europea.

Di conseguenza, mi associo alle parole del relatore ed ho dato il mio voto positivo.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This file follows on from another file voted on at the last plenary on property regimes of international couples. It seeks to define the rules applicable for jurisdiction, applicable law and the enforcement of decisions for international matrimonial property regimes. The last vote was consent of the Parliament for 17 Member States to proceed through the enhanced cooperation system, i.e. not through the normal EU legislative process. The Parliament now has to give its consent to the framework content of proposals by the European Commission, after which, negotiations between these countries will begin outside of the normal EU legislative process.

The resolution basically asks the Council to notify Parliament if negotiations depart from the framework presented today.

As these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but merely set out clear rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes. I was happy to vote in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report that proposes a detailed regulation touching on judicial and legal affairs on matrimonial property regimes for international couples. This regulation clarifies uncertainties and eliminates gaps among different national family law without depriving Member States of sovereignty. I am especially satisfied that the regulation sets a clear measure on determining which court has the jurisdiction tackling the lawsuits. I would like to call for a rapid implementation of this well-prepared regulation to provide a useful tool for many international couples in Europe.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Voto a favore della relazione sulla proposta di regolamento, in quanto si fornisce una maggiore chiarezza e si dettano regole specifiche per l'individuazione del Giudice competente e legge applicabile nei casi di decisioni transfrontaliere in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Caterina Chinnici (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Nonostante i progressi fatti dal processo di integrazione europea, milioni di cittadini legati da matrimonio o da unione registrata internazionale incontrano problemi pratici nella gestione dei propri beni. In effetti, spesso risulta difficile per tali coppie sapere qual è l'autorità giurisdizionale competente e qual è il regime patrimoniale applicabile alla situazione dei loro beni, in particolar modo in caso di separazione o successione.

Nell'ambito del diritto di famiglia, gli atti legislativi sono adottati dal Consiglio all'unanimità. Tuttavia, nel caso specifico, nell'impossibilità di arrivare ad una approvazione unanime delle proposte, 18 Stati membri hanno richiesto una procedura di cooperazione rafforzata.

Mi sono associata al voto dell'Aula che ha dato il suo accordo al Consiglio per autorizzare una cooperazione rafforzata in materia di regimi patrimoniali delle coppie internazionali, così da fornire agli Stati aderenti alla normativa europea un quadro giuridico chiaro e completo relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e alla esecuzioni delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali che faciliterà per molte coppie internazionali la soluzione delle problematiche in tale ambito.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση, καθώς πιστεύουμε πως η υπό εξέταση πρόταση κανονισμού για τις περιουσιακές σχέσεις συζύγων είναι σαφώς προς το συμφέρον της Ένωσης και των διεθνών ζευγαριών που υπάγονται σε αυτήν.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Η έκθεση σχετικά με τη δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των συζύγων αφορά ζητήματα που χιλιάδες πολίτες της Ευρώπης αντιμετωπίζουν καθημερινά. Θεωρώ πως οι αλλαγές που προτείνονται είναι αναγκαίες, ώστε να διευκολύνουμε την καθημερινότητα των πολιτών αυτών, και γι' αυτό τον λόγο ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Le coppie internazionali, attualmente, hanno ancora troppe poche sicurezze in materia dei loro regimi patrimoniali. Troppe volte i coniugi trovano blocchi legislativi poco chiari che protraggono esageratamente i tempi di attesa e ciò può comportare diversi problemi alle coppie. Ritengo necessario che sia garantita una maggiore protezione dei diritti di coloro che si trovano in questa situazione e questa proposta si prefigge proprio lo scopo di porre fine ai molti casi di confusione e difficoltà giuridiche. Per queste motivazioni ho deciso di votare a favore di questa proposta.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this vote, which covers jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes.

Its scope does not cover such matters as the legal capacity of the spouses, the existence, validity or recognition of a marriage, maintenance obligations or succession to the estate of a deceased spouse in order to preserve the Member States' autonomy in family law, nor does the regulation affect the Member States' substantive law on matrimonial property systems.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. –

Em 2011, a Comissão apresentou uma proposta relativa à competência, à lei aplicável, ao reconhecimento e à execução de decisões em matéria de regimes matrimoniais. Esta medida integra um conjunto de instrumentos que visa tornar mais fácil a vida de casais transnacionais, cada vez mais frequentes no seio da União Europeia.

No entanto, não foi possível alcançar um consenso no Conselho, exclusivamente competente nestas matérias e vinculado pela unanimidade. Assim, um conjunto de 18 Estados-Membros, em que se incluiu Portugal, pretenderam avançar com as medidas, socorrendo-se para tal do mecanismo da cooperação reforçada. É esta cooperação reforçada que hoje se aprova, cujo texto acolhe significativas propostas do Parlamento Europeu, feitas durante o primeiro processo negocial entre todos os Estados-Membros

No âmbito da cooperação reforçada, ao Parlamento Europeu cumpre avaliar, entre outros critérios, o respeito pelas competências nacionais, o que se verifica neste caso. São integralmente respeitadas as competências dos Estados-Membros no âmbito do Direito da Família, nomeadamente no que respeita ao reconhecimento do casamento.

Apoio, por isso, este relatório.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo approva la proposta della Commissione in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi. In particolare, si definisce la competenza giurisdizionale e il tribunale di competenza, la legge applicabile e come risolvere vuoti legislativi, il riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi. Con il mio voto in favore della risoluzione intendo supportare queste misure che limitano situazioni di confusione e incertezza giuridica. Una maggiore chiarezza delle norme in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi è senza dubbio nell'interesse dei cittadini europei e delle coppie internazionali.

Andi Cristea (S&D), în scris. – Dispariția frontierelor interne europene a antrenat creșterea mobilității, atât în scopuri turistice, cât și profesionale, având un impact semnificativ asupra numărului de cupluri formate din cetățeni de naționalități diferite. Însă aceste cupluri transnaționale se confruntă cu o serie de dificultăți de ordin practic și juridic, în special în materia regimurilor matrimoniale și al efectelor patrimoniale în cazul încetării vieții de cuplu.

Consider că securitatea juridică a cetățenilor europeni poate fi garantată prin adoptarea unor norme comune în cadrul regimurilor materiale, ce conțin prevederi concrete în materie de competență, lege aplicabilă, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești privind regimurile patrimoniale ale cuplurilor internaționale.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, dorind să reiterez necesitatea concordanței normelor de stabilire a competenței instanțelor judecătorești și a instrumentării procedurilor conexe în vederea asigurării securității juridice și a previzibilității pentru cetățeni.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Celem rozporządzenia jest ustanowienie jasnych ram prawnych w UE dla ustalenia jurysdykcji, prawa właściwego, uznawania i wykonywania orzeczeń w sprawach małżeńskich i sprawach majątkowych. Z ich zakresu wyłączone są kwestie związane ze zdolnością prawną małżonków, istnieniem, ważnością lub uznaniem małżeństwa, obowiązkami alimentacyjnymi i dziedziczeniem majątku po zmarłym małżonku. Główną kontrowersję w przypadku tego pakietu stanowi fakt, że decyzja upoważniająca do podjęcia wzmocnionej współpracy zobowiązuje państwa członkowskie do jednoczesnego związania się dwoma instrumentami - jednym dotyczącym związków partnerskich, drugim dotyczącym małżeństw. Nadal szereg państw członkowskich nie zna instytucji związku partnerskiego (Włochy, Bułgaria, Rumunia, Słowacja, Polska, Litwa, Łotwa), a dla objęcia ich skutkami rozporządzenia dotyczącego małżeńskich ustrojów majątkowych muszą one przystąpić do obu rozporządzeń wykonujących wzmocnioną współpracę i zgodzić się na uznawanie skutków instytucji związków partnerskich, której nie uznają na gruncie swojego prawa wewnętrznego i która może być uznawana za sprzeczną z ich porządkiem publicznym (np. z zasadą ochrony małżeństwa i rodziny). Ze względu na wskazane kontrowersje zgłosiowałem przeciwko.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – With the free movement of people, we can see an increase in the number of couples that move from one member state to another. These couples are thus obliged to deal with cross-border issues. The aim of this regulation is to have a clear legal framework in matters of matrimonial property regimes. I voted in favour of this report as it takes into account the Member States' autonomy in family law matters, however it will provide clear instructions to international couples and will help them choose the law that is applicable to them. It will make it possible to put an end to many cases of confusion and legal uncertainty.

Michel Dantin (PPE), par écrit. – Ce rapport porte sur la décision d'établir une coopération renforcée des régimes matrimoniaux entre les États membres volontaires, à savoir 23 États membres.

La proposition de règlement de la Commission vise à simplifier les procédures administratives en matière de régimes matrimoniaux entre les États membres et permettra aux couples internationaux de bénéficier d'une sécurité juridique.

Considérant que l'harmonisation des règles en matière de régime matrimonial est nécessaire pour éviter aux couples internationaux européens une incertitude juridique déconcertante, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), par écrit. — Avec la liberté de circulation et d'établissement inhérente à l'espace européen, le nombre de couples de ressortissants d'États membres différents a augmenté. Il est important que la législation européenne s'adapte à cette tendance, avec toutes les conséquences juridiques que cela implique. Afin de permettre aux nombreux ressortissants européens d'avoir un cadre juridique clair quant à leur régime matrimonial, j'ai donc voté en faveur de ce texte.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), par écrit. – En 2010, la Commission a identifié l'incertitude quant aux droits de propriété des couples internationaux comme étant un des principaux obstacles que les citoyens de l'UE rencontrent dans leur vie quotidienne. Elle a donc travaillé à une proposition de règlement européen visant à uniformiser les règles juridiques concernant les régimes matrimoniaux.

Après le blocage des négociations, tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres. Pour rappel, il existe déjà la Convention du 14 mars 1978 sous l'égide de la Conférence de La Haye qui n'engage certes que la France, les Pays-Bas et le Luxembourg, mais qui reste ouverte à toutes autres ratifications.

L'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont en revanche libres de conclure des conventions internationales. Ce texte constitue une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille. Aussi, j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Реших да гласувам „въздържал се“ по това досие. Това е предложение по отношение на партньорствата, но въпреки това, то е част от по-голям законодателен пакет, който включва също така и предложение по отношение на концепцията за партньорство. Това понятие не е известно в много страни. Задължителното прилагане на пакета като цяло означава, че на държавите членки Италия, Румъния, България, Словакия, Полша, Литва и Латвия ще бъдат наложени правила, които са не съществуващи в основата на националните им законодателства. Семейното и наследственото право е компетентност на държавите членки и приемането на този пакет ще подкопае националния суверенитет на редица държави – членки на ЕС. По мое мнение, това не е оправдано.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), *γραφτως*. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοδότηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE), *por escrito*. – La Unión constituye un espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia dentro del respeto de los derechos fundamentales y de los distintos sistemas y tradiciones jurídicos de los Estados miembros. En este sentido, esta propuesta persigue el principio de la unidad de legislación en el ámbito de la Unión, por el cual la ley aplicable al régimen matrimonial se aplique a todas las propiedades en virtud de dicho régimen, donde quiera que se encuentre. De esta forma se pretende materializar la cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia judicial y los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – Este regulamento será um instrumento muito útil para os casais internacionais na União Europeia.

Cobre, em matéria de regimes matrimoniais, a competência e a lei aplicáveis, bem como o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões. No entanto, exclui do seu domínio, nomeadamente, as questões relativas à capacidade dos cônjuges, à existência, à validade ou ao reconhecimento de um casamento, às obrigações alimentares e à sucessão do cônjuge falecido. A autonomia dos Estados-Membros em matéria de Direito da Família fica, pois, salvaguardada.

Considero que esta proposta de regulamento é claramente do interesse da União e dos respetivos casais internacionais. Permitirá acabar com muitos casos de confusão e de dificuldade jurídicas.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote contre: il s'agit d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – O relatório aprova a proposta da Comissão Europeia em matéria de jurisdição, legislação aplicável e reconhecimento e execução de decisões em matéria de regimes de propriedade no matrimónio.

O regulamento será um instrumento útil para casais internacionais na UE. Hoje, fruto de uma grande mobilidade de pessoas entre Estados-Membros da UE, os casais enfrentam várias dificuldades burocráticas quando é necessário tratar de questões relativas à propriedade ou divisão da mesma, quando se divorciam ou quando um dos membros do casal falece. Existem problemas quando a propriedade é adquirida em diferentes Estados-Membros, por exemplo.

Este regulamento abrange a competência, a lei aplicável, o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões em matéria de regimes matrimoniais. No entanto, o seu âmbito não abrange questões como a capacidade jurídica dos cônjuges, a existência, a validade ou o reconhecimento de um casamento, as obrigações alimentares ou a sucessão de bens de um cônjuge falecido. O regulamento não afeta também os direitos de segurança social ou direitos a pensão no caso de divórcio. A autonomia dos Estados-Membros em matéria de Direito de Família é preservada. Nem o regulamento afeta o Direito material dos Estados-Membros em sistemas matrimoniais.

Apoiámos a abertura do processo de cooperação entre Estados sobre esta matéria e votámos favoravelmente este relatório.

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, ya que considero que el marco de derecho privado que establece resultará de mucha utilidad para los Estados miembros y entre ellos España, para asegurar el cumplimiento del principio de no discriminación. Considero además adecuada la unificación de normativa que se logra con este informe.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Predložený návrh zahŕňa mnohé zmeny, ktoré navrhol Európsky parlament po predložení pôvodného návrhu Európskej komisie ešte z roku 2011. Európska únia myslí aj na majetkové režimy medzinárodných párov, ktoré žijú vo všetkých jej členských štátoch. V predmetnom nariadení je jasne a presne stanovené, ktorý súd má právomoc rozhodovať o žiadostiach vo veci majetkových režimov manželov. Ak je žiadosť týkajúca sa majetkových režimov manželov spojená s dedičstvom po smrti jedného z manželov alebo so žiadosťou o rozvod, rozluku alebo anulovanie manželstva, je to súd, ktorý má právomoc konať v otázkach špecifických pre tieto oblasti, ktorý má tiež právomoc rozhodnúť o majetkovom režime. Pre ostatné prípady sa v nariadení uvádza zoznam kritérií, ktoré sa uplatňujú pri rozhodovaní o právomoci, pričom príslušné páry majú v niektorých prípadoch možnosť vybrať si iný súd. Predmetným návrhom sa Európska únia snaží o zreteľnú úpravu majetkových režimov medzinárodných párov a priniesť riešenia pre mnohé zložité právne prípady v budúcnosti.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in oggetto.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοθέτηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαι αντίθετος στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – The purpose of the regulation is to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes.

Due to the free movement of people in the EU there has been a significant increase in the numbers of international couples or couples that need to deal with cross-border issues. These couples are currently facing legal problems in dealing with property, both inside their marriage, and when dividing property in case of divorce. Matters already covered by existing EU regulations, such as maintenance obligations, especially between spouses, and matters arising from the law of succession, are excluded from the scope of the regulation.

The regulation aims at providing clear instructions that will help international couples choose the law that is applicable to them, the jurisdiction of the courts and also in terms of the recognition and enforcement of decisions adopted in other Member States. The regulation does not affect the existence or validity of marriage under national law or the recognition in one Member State of a marriage concluded in another Member State.

I supported the report in the vote in plenary.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Elfogadtam a Jogi Bizottság jelentését a házassági vagyoni jogi rendszerekkel kapcsolatban. A jelentés megfelelő módon terjed ki a joghatóságra, az alkalmazandó jogra, valamint a határozatok elismerésére és végrehajtására. Hatálya azonban nem kompetens a házastársak jogképességére, a házasság fennállására, érvényességére és elismerésére, a tartási kötelezettségekre és az elhunyt házastárs utáni öröklésre. A tagállamok autonómiája a családjog terén tehát biztosítva van. A rendelet nagyon hasznos eszköz lehet az Európai Unióban élő nemzetközi párok számára.

Az előadóval egyetértésben a házassági vagyoni jogi rendszerekről szóló rendeletre irányuló javaslat egyértelműen az Unió és az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok érdekeit szolgálja. Lehetővé teszi, hogy véget vessenek sok zavaros esetnek és jogi nehézségnek. A jelenlegi, e témában a második javaslat magában foglalja a Parlament által korábban javasolt módosítások jelentős részét.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione legislativa del PE sulla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi che si trovano in situazioni a carattere transnazionale perché ritengo sia fondamentale portare a termine il percorso iniziato durante la scorsa legislatura e rimasto bloccato in Consiglio a causa della reticenza di alcuni Stati membri.

La libertà di movimento e di circolazione delle persone, e quindi delle coppie, comporta infatti la necessità di un quadro normativo chiaro e vincolante a livello europeo in materia di giurisdizione, legge applicabile e riconoscimento delle decisioni, così come avviene in materia di divorzio, filiazione e obbligazioni alimentari. Purtroppo però, la reticenza di alcuni Stati impedisce ancora oggi una regolamentazione generale e un riconoscimento europeo dei matrimoni contratti in un altro Stato membro.

La scelta della cooperazione rafforzata, che condivido pienamente, si è resa necessaria per fare avanzare questa importante legislazione nell'interesse dei cittadini europei e particolarmente delle coppie che sempre più spesso sono composte da coniugi di diversa nazionalità. Auspico, quindi, che il Consiglio agisca celermente e si metta fine ai numerosi casi di confusione e di difficoltà giuridiche.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe heute gegen den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrecht“ gestimmt – und das, obwohl er als Teil eines Konsultationsverfahrens lediglich den Vorschlag KOM 2016/0106 begrüßt. Er läuft allerdings irr in Punkt II der juristischen Begründung, wenn er behauptet, die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten bleibe im Bereich des Familienrechts gewahrt. Dem ist definitiv nicht so. Ich sehe im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen vehementen Eingriff in die Subsidiarität der Mitgliedstaaten, den ich in der Form verurteile.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Der Bericht behandelt die Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Fragen des ehelichen Güterstands. Das materielle Recht der Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich des ehelichen Güterstands wird jedoch nicht beeinflusst. Die Gewährleistung der Souveränität für die Mitgliedstaaten war ausschlaggebend für meine positive Abstimmung.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Maria Grapini (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat acest raport deoarece regulamentul va fi un instrument foarte util pentru cuplurile internaționale din UE. Autonomia statelor membre în materie de dreptul familiei este astfel protejată având în vedere faptul că regulamentul exclude din sfera sa de aplicare în special chestiunile referitoare la capacitatea partenerilor, la existența, valabilitatea sau recunoașterea parteneriatului, la obligațiile de întreținere și la succesiunea unui partener decedat. Regulamentul nu aduce atingere nici fondului dreptului statelor membre în privința parteneriatelor înregistrate sau a efectelor lor patrimoniale.

Efectele patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate propuse în regulament sunt în mod clar în interesul Uniunii și al cuplurilor internaționale, contribuind la eliminarea a numeroase cazuri de confuzii și dificultăți de ordin juridic.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. The proposal aims to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union, both harmonising and streamlining the determination of jurisdiction and the law applicable to matrimonial property and registered property regimes for cross-border cases and facilitating the movement of decisions and instruments among the Member States according to a single scheme.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Υπερψηφίσαμε την έκθεση, η οποία βοηθά διεθνή ζευγάρια εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης σχετικά με τη δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των συζύγων.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – As a result of the EU's free movement of persons and the absence of internal borders there have been an increase in the number of couples formed by nationals of different Member States who live in a Member State other than their own or acquire property in more than one Member State. This Regulation facilitates this by establishing a comprehensive set of rules of international private law applicable to matrimonial property regimes. It therefore aims to enable citizens to have their various related procedures handled by the courts of the same Member State.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this proposal, as I had no objections to it.

Hans-Olaf Henkel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe die Empfehlung meiner Fraktionskollegen befolgt und mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrecht“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport cu efecte directe și pozitive asupra cuplurilor internaționale și asupra Uniunii Europene privind regimurile matrimoniale. Prin aplicarea acestui regulament privind competența, legea aplicabilă, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești în materia regimurilor matrimoniale, confuziile și dificultățile de ordin juridic se vor elimina.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Prijedlog uredbe Vijeća o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu te priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na režime bračne stečevine jer smatram da je ovaj prijedlog uredbe o režimima bračne stečevine nedvojbeno u interesu Unije i njezinih međunarodnih parova. Njome će se otkloniti brojne pravne dvojbe i nesigurnosti.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – En 2010, la Commission a identifié l'incertitude quant aux droits de propriété des couples internationaux comme étant un des principaux obstacles que les citoyens de l'UE rencontrent dans leur vie quotidienne. Elle a donc travaillé à une proposition de règlement européen visant à uniformiser les règles juridiques concernant les régimes matrimoniaux.

Après le blocage des négociations, tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres.

L'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc d'une ingérence injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille et je m'y suis évidemment opposé.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), písemně. – Hlasoval jsem ve prospěch návrhu týkajícího se majetkových poměrů mezinárodních párů, který se týká zhruba 16 milionů takových párů v EU. Tato zpráva se zabývá případem mezinárodních manželství či registrovaného partnerství a majetkového vypořádání v případě rozvodu, rozluky či úmrtí. Nový právní rámec přináší pro páry z 18 států EU možnost zvolit si, která jurisdikce se bude jejich případem zabývat, aby se zabránilo souběžně probíhajícím řízením ve dvou státech a případným protichůdným soudním rozhodnutím. Mezinárodní páry tak získají právní jistotu, harmonizaci pravidel a lepší přístup ke spravedlivému řízení. Stejná práva budou zajištěna jak manželským pářům, tak registrovaným partnerům/partnerkám.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), par écrit. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette proposition de règlement qui vise à établir un corps complet de règles de droit international privé applicables aux régimes matrimoniaux. Il est en effet urgent de régler les difficultés pratiques et juridiques que rencontrent les couples transnationaux de l'Union tant dans la gestion quotidienne de leurs biens, qu'au moment de leur partage en cas de séparation ou de décès.

Eva Kaili (S&D), in writing. – It is a matter that needs to be addressed and the report is addressing it in an appropriate way setting up the next future steps. This proposal for a regulation on matrimonial property regimes is clearly in the interest of the EU and of its international couples. It will make it possible to put an end to many cases of confusion and legal uncertainty. The current proposal, the second on this topic, has incorporated a large proportion of the amendments proposed earlier by Parliament. Your rapporteur therefore proposes that Parliament issue a favourable opinion on this proposal, without any substantive amendments at this stage.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), schriftlich. – Ich stimme dem vorliegenden Bericht zu. Die Verordnung wird die Fragen des ehelichen Güterstandes hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeit, des anzuwendenden Rechts sowie der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen lösen. Vom Anwendungsbereich ausgeschlossen sind Fragen nach der Rechts-, Geschäfts-, und Handlungsfähigkeit des Ehegatten, dem Bestehen, der Gültigkeit und der Anerkennung der Partnerschaft, Unterhaltspflichten und Rechtsnachfolgen. Die Lösung dieser Fragen nach dem Güterstand liegt eindeutig im Interesse der beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten.

Bernd Kölmel (ECR), schriftlich. – Ich habe mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrecht“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Андрей Ковачев (PPE), в писмена форма. – Подкрепих доклада относно предложението за регламент на Съвета относно компетентността, приложимото право, признаването и изпълнението на решения по въпроси, свързани с имуществения режим между съпрузи. Свободното движение допринася, освен за свободна и улеснена размяна на стоки и услуги, и за създаване на предпоставки за възникване на международни партньорства.

Нуждата от приемането на доклада засяга 16 млн. европейски двойки, които съжителстват в трансгранична ситуация или водят трансграничен спор. Изчислено е, че годишно разноските по паралелни правни производства възлизат на 1,1 млрд. евро – сума, която несъмнено ще бъде намалена с влизането в сила на новия регламент.

Определянето на компетентен съд по въпроси като съществуването, действителността или признаването на брак, задълженията за издръжка и наследяване на починал(а) съпруг(а), както и трансграничното наследяване е важен напредък, който ще окаже пряко положително действие в много домакинства. Те ще се ползват с по-добър достъп до правосъдие и хармонизирани правила, които ще са пригодени за всеки конкретен случай и държава.

Новите правила ще се прилагат в 18 държави от ЕС, които се съгласиха да се присъединят към тази инициатива за „засилено сътрудничество“, сред които е и България.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Voto a favore della proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi. Tale regolamento non interferisce con le leggi degli Stati membri sulle unioni registrate, ma stabilisce a quale corte spetti la competenza nell'ambito delle unioni registrate. Questo sarà uno strumento utile per le coppie internazionali, in quanto darà la possibilità alla coppia di scegliere a quale legge, e di quale Stato, fare riferimento. Il regolamento, stabilisce, infine, gli strumenti necessari per dare accesso alle coppie internazionali alle dovute informazioni legali. La nostra società sta diventando sempre più multiculturale, con unioni matrimoniali extraterritoriali, ed è per questo motivo che dobbiamo tutelarne i diritti nel miglior modo possibile.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre ce rapport, car j'estime que l'Union européenne n'a pas à s'immiscer dans le droit de la famille, lequel relève des États.

En outre, il existe déjà sur la question une Convention de la Haye de 1978, qui fait l'affaire. Mieux aurait valu encourager les États à la ratifier.

Constance Le Grip (PPE), *par écrit*. — L'Union européenne, en créant un espace sans frontières intérieures et en facilitant la mobilité en son sein, a contribué à un accroissement important du nombre de couple transnationaux. Ces couples rencontrent aujourd'hui des difficultés pratiques et juridiques, du fait des différences de procédures et d'un manque de coordination entre les juridictions des États membres. C'est pourquoi j'ai voté en faveur du rapport Cavada concernant une coopération renforcée entre 18 États membres en matière de régimes matrimoniaux (ainsi que de son double en matière des effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés), au sujet de laquelle le Parlement avait été saisi pour avis.

Par ce vote, je souhaite soutenir un texte qui vise à simplifier la vie des citoyens et des couples transnationaux en soutenant la création d'un cadre juridique clair permettant de déterminer la compétence et la loi applicable dans ces situations.

Enfin, je souligne que ce texte s'applique uniquement dans des situations à caractère transnational. Dans le respect du principe de subsidiarité, il n'aura aucune incidence sur la reconnaissance dans un État membre de la validité d'un mariage ou partenariat enregistré conclu dans un autre État membre, ni sur le droit de la famille national.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre le rapport sur la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux. L'Union européenne n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. — Le rapport se focalise sur la création d'une juridiction précise pour les couples matrimoniaux internationaux. Selon la Commission, l'incertitude quant aux droits de propriété de ces couples est un obstacle majeur à leur vie quotidienne. C'est pourquoi, depuis 2010, elle tend à uniformiser les règles juridiques dans ce domaine.

Le texte propose de nouvelles réglementations, qui disposent que les couples doivent suivre la loi locale sur les biens détenus. Il n'aborde pas certains aspects comme la validité et la reconnaissance du mariage, la succession du conjoint décédé... 17 États membres y adhèrent, sous forme de coopération renforcée. Or, le droit de la famille est un droit souverain inaliénable à chaque État. La Commission n'a donc aucun pouvoir pour légiférer dans ce domaine. De plus, il demeure possible pour les pays de résoudre ces aspects juridiques en passant des accords internationaux, sans obligation de passer par l'UE.

Je vote fermement contre ce texte.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este reglamento porque su objetivo es establecer un marco legal claro en la UE para determinar la jurisdicción, ley aplicable y reconocimiento y aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad dentro del matrimonio.

La libertad de movimiento dentro de la UE ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de las parejas internacionales o de parejas que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo. El reglamento pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados Miembros.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – La presente propuesta de Reglamento pretende facilitar la gestión de los aspectos económicos de las parejas internacionales dentro de la Unión Europea, introduciendo mejoras a la propuesta inicial de la Comisión de 2011 y a la de 2013.

El Reglamento intenta preservar la autonomía de los Estados Miembros en materia de Derecho de Familia excluyendo de su ámbito algunas materias. También establece qué órgano es competente para pronunciarse sobre las solicitudes y declara que en caso de que un Estado miembro no reconozca el matrimonio en cuestión, los órganos jurisdiccionales de dicho Estado podrán confiar el asunto a los de otro Estado miembro que sí lo reconozca.

Considero que esta propuesta de Reglamento actúa claramente en interés de la Unión y de sus parejas internacionales, ya que gracias a él se pondrá fin a numerosos casos de confusión y dificultades jurídicas, y se hará más fácil la vida de los ciudadanos. Por lo tanto, estoy de acuerdo con que el Parlamento emita un dictamen favorable sobre la propuesta.

Bernd Lucke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrechts“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert. Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen, da sie sich in manchen Fällen über nationale Wertvorstellungen hinwegsetzen würde.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report that provides greater clarity to which courts have jurisdiction to rule on proceedings on matrimonial property regimes.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. Jsem pro, pokud se chtějí státy mezi sebou dobrovolně dohodnout na uznávání rozhodnutí ve věcech majetkových poměrů manželství. Podle mě jde o klasický příklad pro využití mezivládní spolupráce bez nutnosti zapojení Evropského parlamentu a EU.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), rakstiski. – Pagājušā gada beigās Padomes sanāksmes rezultātā neizdevās panākt visu dalībvalstu vēlmi izveidot maksimāli integrētu sadarbību apskatīto jautājumu jomā, līdz ar ko 17 dalībvalstis izvēlējās attīstīt ciešāku savstarpējo kooperāciju.

Topošās regulas tvērumā tiks reglamentētas laulāto mantiskās attiecības, jurisdikcija, piemērojamās tiesības un nolēmumu atzīšana un izpilde. Tajā pašā laikā no tās būs izslēgti tādi jautājumi kā laulāto rīcības spēja, laulības esamība, juridiskie spēki un atzīšana, uzturlīdzekļu nodrošināšanas pienākumi un mirušā laulātā mantojuma lietas, lai garantētu dalībvalstu autonomiju šajās jomās.

Kaut gan dažādi jautājumi Regulā nav ietverti, tās pieņemšana un turpmākā stāšanās spēkā izveidos visai produktīvas sadarbības formātu, kuram varētu pakāpeniski pievienoties arī citas dalībvalstis. Ņemot vērā skarto jautājumu svarīgumu, tas būtu visai vēlams un apsveicams.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Návrh nariadenia rieši právomoci súdov rozhodovať v majetkových veciach medzinárodných manželských párov. Upravuje rozhodné právo, uznávanie a vykonávanie rozhodnutí. Táto úprava sa dotkne tých členských štátov, ktoré sa v súlade s príslušným vymedzením nariadenia Rady, ktorým sa vykonáva posilnená spolupráca v oblasti rozhodného práva pre rozvod a rozluku, zúčastňujú na posilnenej spolupráci v oblasti rozhodného práva (Belgicko, Bulharsko, Nemecko, Španielsko, Francúzsko, Taliansko, Lotyšsko, Luxembursko, Maďarsko, Malta, Rakúsko, Portugalsko, Rumunsko, Slovinsko, Litva a Grécko). Keďže návrh nariadenia odstraňuje právnu roztrieštenosť a posilňuje právnu istotu medzinárodných manželských párov v dotknutých krajinách, návrh som podporil.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), γραπτώς. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με τη δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των συζύγων, για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 22/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport et donc contre le projet de résolution.

La Commission souhaite modifier le droit de propriété des couples internationaux et uniformiser les normes juridiques matrimoniales. En droit de la famille, la règle est celle de l'unanimité, il n'y a donc pour l'instant que des accords ou coopérations renforcées.

En l'espèce, le texte détermine des règles de procédure, comme la juridiction compétente ou la loi applicable et des grands principes comme l'unité du droit applicable. Or, l'Union européenne n'est pas destinée à régir le droit de la famille.

Nous nous opposons à ce qu'elle évince les États membres, qui ont vocation à conclure des conventions internationales dans ce domaine.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), per iscritto. – Favorevole alla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Dopo aver approvato la procedura di cooperazione rafforzata per la regolamentazione delle coppie internazionali si rendeva necessario regolamentare alcuni importanti aspetti procedurali, quali, la competenza, il riconoscimento e l'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali tra coniugi.

Il suddetto regolamento costituisce un valido strumento per tutte le unioni internazionali, in tal modo si è tutelata l'autonomia in materia di diritto di famiglia.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), por escrito. – Mi apoyo a la propuesta sobre la regulación de los regímenes económicos matrimoniales. El nuevo Reglamento va a resultar muy beneficioso para parejas internacionales, ya que gracias a él se pondrá fin a numerosos casos de confusión y dificultades jurídicas.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Ο κανονισμός που αφορά τα διεθνή ζευγάρια σχετίζεται με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο, την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση των αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών στοιχείων των καταχωρισμένων ζευγαριών. Έτσι παρόλο που τα θέματα οικογενειακού δικαίου ρυθμίζονται πρωταρχικά σε εθνικό επίπεδο, τα προαναφερθέντα ζητήματα ρυθμίζονται από τον συγκεκριμένο κανονισμό.

Αναφορικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, ο κανονισμός ρυθμίζει το δικαστήριο που είναι αρμόδιο να επιληφθεί των διαφορών αναφορικά με τα περιουσιακά στοιχεία των συζύγων. Σε σχέση με το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο, ο παρών κανονισμός φέρνει ενότητα, αφού το αρμόδιο δικαστήριο θα έχει δικαιοδοσία στο σύνολο των περιουσιακών στοιχείων ανεξάρτητα από την τοποθεσία που βρίσκεται το ακίνητο και έτσι δεν θα υπάρχει πλέον διαχωρισμός του εφαρμοστέου δικαίου για κάθε στοιχείο ξεχωριστά. Τέλος, σχετικά με την αναγνώριση, εκτελεστότητα και εκτέλεση των αποφάσεων, μια απόφαση είναι εκτελεστή μόνο μετά την κήρυξη της εκτελεστότητάς της από το συγκεκριμένο κράτος μέλος, το οποίο όμως υποχρεούται να το κάνει εκτός εάν συντρέχει σοβαρός λόγος δημοσίας τάξεως.

Θα ήθελα να υπερψηφίσω το συγκεκριμένο ψήφισμα, θεωρώντας ότι είναι ένας τρόπος να διευκολυνθούν τα διεθνή ζευγάρια μέσα από την απλούστευση αλλά και ενοποίηση της νομοθεσίας που τα αφορά.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der Berichterstatter billigt mit der vorliegenden legislativen EntschlieÙung den Vorschlag der Kommission. Die Verordnung wird die Fragen des ehelichen Güterstandes hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeit, des anzuwendenden Rechts sowie der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen lösen. Daher habe ich diesen Bericht positiv bewertet.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le problème que se donne à résoudre le texte est celui de l'incertitude du droit de propriété des couples internationaux. D'après le rapport sur la citoyenneté de l'Union 2010, c'est l'un des principaux obstacles que rencontrent les citoyens de l'UE.

Le règlement permet également le choix du droit applicable à la condition qu'il entretienne une certaine proximité avec la situation des époux. Le règlement exclut toutefois de son domaine les questions concernant la capacité des époux, l'existence, la validité ou la reconnaissance d'un mariage, les obligations alimentaires et la succession du conjoint décédé.

Plus que tout, je considère que l'UE n'a pas à légiférer sur le droit de la famille; les États membres sont libres de s'accorder sur des conventions, à leur convenance.

En conséquence, j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A presente proposta destina-se a criar na União Europeia um quadro normativo claro relativo à determinação do tribunal competente e da lei aplicável aos regimes matrimoniais e a facilitar a circulação das decisões e dos atos neste domínio entre os diferentes Estados-Membros.

O objetivo da presente proposta é estabelecer um conjunto completo de normas de Direito Internacional Privado aplicáveis aos regimes matrimoniais. Abrange, portanto, a competência, a lei aplicável, o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões proferidas em matéria de regimes matrimoniais. As normas previstas aplicam-se exclusivamente às situações com carácter transnacional. O requisito da incidência transfronteiriça formulado no artigo 81.º, n.º 3, encontra-se, assim, preenchido.

A presente proposta diz respeito apenas aos efeitos patrimoniais do casamento e não define o instituto do casamento nem impõe o reconhecimento de um casamento noutro Estado-Membro.

Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I am in favour of this report, as it clearly defines which courts have jurisdiction to rule on matrimonial property regimes, and furthers cooperation, uniform efficiency, and clarity of law between member states. International couples will benefit from having clearly defined applicable laws and jurisdiction pertaining to matters of property regimes.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. — J'ai soutenu ce règlement en matière de régimes matrimoniaux qui instaure une coopération renforcée, car il était temps d'avoir un cadre juridique clair visant des situations transnationales au sein de l'Union européenne, couvrant la détermination de la juridiction compétente, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions rendues dans ce domaine.

Dans un monde globalisé, la mobilité des personnes au sein d'un espace sans frontières intérieures ne cesse de s'accroître, entraînant une augmentation significative des unions entre ressortissants d'États membres différents et, le plus souvent, l'acquisition de biens situés sur le territoire de plusieurs pays de l'Union. Cette législation est – comme le dit très justement le rapporteur – dans l'intérêt des couples transnationaux.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. — Tento návrh nariadenia Rady o právomoci, rozhodnom práve a uznávaní a výkone rozhodnutí vo veciach majetkových režimov manželov je druhým návrhom v tejto oblasti. Keďže každá dohoda týkajúca sa oblasti rodinného práva musí byť jednomyselná, daný návrh je vo forme posilnenej spolupráce. Slovenská republika nie je jedným zo štátov, ktoré uznávajú túto posilnenú spoluprácu. Definičné znaky manželstva sa v jednotlivých členských štátoch značne líšia. Týmto nariadením by mohlo dôjsť k širokej interpretácii pojmu manželstvo, ku ktorej by slovenské súdy mali prihliadať, a to považujem za vmiešavanie sa do vnútorných záležitostí štátu. Otázky vzťahujúce sa k oblasti rodinného práva by mali zostať výlučne v právomoci Slovenskej republiky a mal by sa na ne vzťahovať slovenský právny poriadok. Vzhľadom na uvedené nepodporujem daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this regulation aimed at establishing a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. This will help international couples choose the law that is applicable to them, the jurisdiction of the courts and also in terms of the recognition and enforcement of decisions adopted in other Member States.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. — A házassági vagyoni rendszerekkel kapcsolatos ügyekben a joghatóságról, az alkalmazandó jogról, valamint a határozatok elismeréséről és végrehajtásáról szóló tanácsi határozatot – a minden, családjog terén létrejövő megállapodáshoz szükséges konszenzus hiányában – nem sikerült elfogadni. Minthogy azonban 23 tagállam elvileg egyetértett a javaslattal, a Tanács a megerősített együttműködést engedélyező határozatot fogadott el, amellyel 2016. június 7-i ülésén a Parlament is egyetértett. A Bizottság most az ezt szabályozó rendelet elfogadására tett javaslatot a Tanácsnak, amelynek ehhez konzultálnia kell a Parlamenttel.

A Jogi Bizottság jelentésében megállapítja, hogy a házassági vagyoni rendszerekről szóló rendeletre irányuló javaslat egyértelműen az Unió és az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok érdekeit szolgálja. Lehetővé fogja tenni, hogy véget vessenek sok zavaros esetnek és jogi nehézségnek. Magában foglalja a Parlament által korábban javasolt módosítások jelentős részét. Azt javasolja ezért, hogy a Parlament adjon kedvező véleményt a javaslatról. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. — Le règlement détermine la juridiction compétente et la loi applicable à des demandes en matière de régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux. L'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille. Vote défavorable.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. — O regulamento cobre, em matéria de regimes matrimoniais, a competência e a lei aplicáveis, bem como o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões. No entanto, ficam excluídas do seu domínio, as questões relativas à capacidade dos cônjuges, à existência, à validade ou ao reconhecimento de um casamento, às obrigações alimentares e à sucessão do cônjuge falecido. É importante destacar que a autonomia dos Estados-Membros, em matéria de Direito da Família, fica salvaguardada. O regulamento vem, ainda, determinar de forma clara qual o órgão jurisdicional competente para se pronunciar sobre os pedidos em matéria de regimes matrimoniais.

Defendo que a presente proposta é do interesse da União Europeia, uma vez que garante clareza, certeza e confiança jurídicas, principalmente para os denominados casais internacionais.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. — L'UE n'a pas vocation à légiférer en ce qui concerne le droit de la famille. Les États membres sont libres de conclure des conventions internationales pour aménager des règles de coopération avec d'autres États. Il s'agit d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille. Je vote donc contre.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport relatif à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux. Ce rapport, dont les préconisations s'appliquent aux situations transnationales, est essentiel afin de mettre en place un cadre juridique clair permettant d'éviter les conflits de lois et une meilleure diffusion des décisions et des actes relatifs à ces questions dans les États membres.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. — Due to the free movement of people in the EU there has been a significant increase in the numbers of families that need to deal with cross-border issues. These families are currently facing legal problems in dealing with property, both inside their marriage, and when dividing property in case of divorce. I have voted for this report that aims to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru acest raport, deoarece acesta urmărește simplificarea normelor juridice privind regimul matrimonial în statele membre ale Uniunii Europene, în ceea ce privește cuplurile internaționale. În acest sens, raportul votat astăzi introduce un nou regulament cu prevederi clare în ceea ce privește cesiunea drepturilor de proprietate în caz de divorț sau deces al unuia dintre partenerii din instituția matrimonială. De asemenea, regulamentul votat astăzi introduce un drept cu aplicabilitate universală, ceea ce asigură flexibilitate aplicării dreptului statului terț. Prin urmare, acest regulament pune capăt fracționării dreptului aplicabil regimului matrimonial al cuplului din UE, subiect de importanță majoră pentru foarte mulți dintre românii aflați în astfel de situații.

Prin această inițiativă, Consiliul și Parlamentul European contribuie la clarificarea jurisdicției dintre instanțele naționale și europene de a se pronunța în cazuri referitoare la dreptul de proprietate în cadrul regimurilor matrimoniale din UE.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem návrh nařízení vztahujícího se k majetkovým poměrům v manželství. Hlavním přínosem tohoto návrhu je vyjasnění postavení mezinárodních manželských párů. Vzhledem k tomu, že tento typ svazků se díky volnému pohybu osob stává stále častějším, je důležité, aby byl náležitě právně ošetřen ve všech otázkách včetně majetkových. Významným důvodem pro podporu tohoto návrhu je také jeho kompromisní podoba, která nezasahuje do autonomie členských států v otázce rodinného práva, a brání tak tomu, aby byl tento návrh členskými státy odmítnout, jak se již jednou stalo.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — As these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Diese Verordnung löst die Frage des ehelichen Güterstandes, bezugnehmend auf die Zuständigkeit des anzuwendenden Rechts, und der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen. Die Verordnung betrifft nicht Fragen nach Rechts-, Geschäfts-, und Handlungsfähigkeit des Ehegatten, dem Bestehen, der Gültigkeit und der Anerkennung der Partnerschaft, Unterhaltspflichtigen und Rechtsnachfolgern. Die Lösung dieser Fragen nach dem Güterstand liegt eindeutig im Interesse der beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Balsavau už ši pranešimą.

Atkreiptinas dėmesys, kad jurisdikcijos suvienodinimas, sprendžiant klausimus dėl sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo, suteiks galimybę tarptautinėms poroms spręsti turto klausimus jo neskaidant, o taikant bendrą teisę visam turtui, neatsižvelgiant į turto buvimą vietoje. Tai leis užtikrinti teisingą ginčų nagrinėjimą, kadangi yra aiškiai nustatyta, koks teismas turi jurisdikciją priimti sprendimus dėl prašymų dėl sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo. Be to, šiuo reglamentu patiems sutuoktiniams leidžiama pasirinkti taikytiną teisę, numatant tam tikrus apribojimus.

Δημήτρης Παπαδάκης (S&D), *γραφικώς*. – Η πρόταση κανονισμού αναφορικά με τη δικαιοδοσία, αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των συζύγων επανέρχεται από το Συμβούλιο ενώπιον του Κοινοβουλίου υπό τη μορφή της ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας, καθότι κάθε απόφαση που αφορά το οικογενειακό δικαίο θα πρέπει να είναι ομόφωνη.

Στήριξα την εν λόγω πρόταση, γιατί η ύπαρξη ενός κοινού νομοθετικού πλαισίου μεταξύ των κρατών μελών διευκολύνει και επιταχύνει την επίλυση των περιουσιακών διαφορών. Επίσης εξασφαλίζει την εφαρμογή ενός δικαιοδοτικού πλαισίου για την έκδοση μιας δικαστικής απόφασης η οποία θα τυγχάνει αναγνώρισης και εκτέλεσης στα κράτη μέλη.

Οι αποφάσεις ενός κράτους μέλους που άπτονται θεμάτων ιδιοκτησίας θα αναγνωρίζονται και θα εκτελούνται άμεσα σε άλλο κράτος μέλος.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Considerato l'iter finora seguito per la proposta di regolamento relativa alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra i coniugi; considerato che la proposta si estende alle decisioni riguardanti gli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate; considerato che il regolamento è uno strumento utile in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra i coniugi e non pregiudica le competenze degli Stati membri nel settore; considerato, infine, che la proposta contiene tutte le indicazioni fornite precedentemente dal Parlamento europeo ed è volto a tutelare le coppie internazionali, appoggio la proposta del collega e, pertanto, voto favorevolmente.

Eva Paunova (PPE), *in writing*. — The Union is to constitute an area of freedom and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. The increased mobility of persons leads to a marked increase in the number of couples made up of nationals of different Member States who may live in a Member State of which they do not have the nationality and often acquire property in more than one Union country. The divorce is a difficult time for anyone, who have to go through it, and European citizens should not be burdened even more by complicated administrative or legal procedures that cost time and money. Therefore, I support the report and vote in favour.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. — Iako bi uredba Vijeća o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu te priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na režime bračne stečevine u mnogome olakšala pravne postupke međunarodnim bračnim partnerima koji se nađu u situaciji rastave ili smrti jednoga od bračnih supružnika, nisam podržala prijedlog uredbe jer uredba nije dovoljno precizno pravno definirana, a pravna nejasnoća i praznina dovodi do neželjenih posljedica pridavanja jednakih prava bračnim i drugim životnim zajednicama te stavlja neopravdan pritisak na obiteljsko pravo država članica.

Ukoliko se želi donijeti objedinjeni europski zakonodavni akt, u njemu prije svega mora biti jasno definirano što se smatra brakom, odnosno da je brak zajednica jednog muškarca i jedne žene, što u ovom slučaju u uredbi nije precizirano. Budući da devet država članica Europske unije izjednačava istospolne zajednice s brakom, donošenjem ove uredbe na potpuno bi se neprimjeren način na razini cijelog EU-a izjednačili brak i druge životne zajednice. Time bi se također ugrozila nacionalna obiteljska politika država članica koje imaju precizno definiranu instituciju braka te jasno razlikuju, ili uopće zakonski ne uređuju, druge životne zajednice. Svaka država članica mora zadržati slobodu zakonske zaštite institucije braka, a razlika između bračne i drugih životnih zajednica mora biti vrlo precizno naznačena.

Pina Picierno (S&D), *per iscritto*. — Da oggi, la vita delle coppie internazionali in Europa sarà più semplice. Con l'approvazione di questo regolamento, infatti, si garantirà certezza giuridica in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi, in particolare per quanto riguarda la competenza, il riconoscimento e l'esecuzione delle decisioni.

Il Parlamento aveva adottato questi regolamenti già nel corso della passata legislatura. Finalmente anche il Consiglio ha assunto una sua posizione e molti Stati membri mostrano il giusto livello di collaborazione. Mi auguro che altri stati si uniscano presto alla procedura di cooperazione rafforzata.

L'autonomia degli Stati membri in materia di diritto di famiglia è completamente salvaguardata. Il regolamento, infatti, si occupa esclusivamente di fornire certezza per le questioni procedurali: diritto applicabile, giudice competente, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni. Un passo in avanti importante è l'affermazione del principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile, secondo il quale il diritto dei regimi patrimoniali si applica alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'unione, mettendo fine, dunque, alla suddivisione del regime dei beni della coppia.

Il regolamento, mettendo fine a molti casi di confusione e incertezza giuridica, è chiaramente nell'interesse delle coppie internazionali e del buon funzionamento dell'Unione europea. Per questo motivo, voto a favore.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. — Ovaj prijedlog uredbe Vijeća o nadležnosti, mjerodavnom pravu, priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na režime bračne stečevine drugi je po redu u tom pitanju. Nakon blokiranja pregovora između država članica, a s obzirom na to da u obiteljsko-pravnim pitanjima svaki sporazum mora biti jednoglasan, ovaj se prijedlog Parlamentu vraća u okviru pojačane suradnje.

Uredba će biti vrlo koristan instrument za međunarodne parove unutar Europske unije. U području režima bračne stečevine ona pokriva nadležnost i mjerodavno pravo kao i priznavanje i izvršenje odluka. Međutim, iz njezinog područja primjene isključena su, osobito, pitanja pravne sposobnosti bračnih drugova, postojanja, valjanosti ili priznavanja braka, obveza uzdržavanja i nasljeđivanje umrlog bračnog druga. Autonomija država članica u obiteljsko-pravnim pitanjima je stoga očuvana. Uredba ne utječe ni na materijalno pravo država članica o režimima bračne stečevine. Drugim riječima, udovoljeno je zahtjevima Parlamenta.

Zaključno, slažem se s izjaviteljem, gospodinom Jean-Marie Cavadom da je ovaj prijedlog uredbe o režimima bračne stečevine nedvojbeno u interesu Unije i njezinih međunarodnih parova. Njome će se otkloniti brojne pravne dvojbe i nesigurnosti.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), na pismie. – Celem propozycji jest ustanowienie jasnych ram prawnych w UE dla ustalenia jurysdykcji, prawa właściwego, uznawania i wykonywania orzeczeń w sprawach małżeńskich i sprawach majątkowych. Z ich zakresu wyłączone są kwestie związane ze zdolnością prawną małżonków, istnieniem, ważnością lub uznaniem małżeństwa, obowiązkami alimentacyjnymi i dziedziczeniem majątku po zmarłym małżonku. W ramach rozporządzenia wzajemne uznawanie dokumentów administracyjnych nie może być sprzeczne z zasadą pomocniczości – niniejsze rozporządzenie nie może narzucać państwom członkowskim harmonizacji ich krajowego prawa rodzinnego, w tym małżeńskich ustrojów majątkowych. Rozwiązanie to budzi zastrzeżenia w kontekście art. 4 ust. 2 TUE gwarantującego państwom członkowskim poszanowanie ich tożsamości narodowej, w tym szczególnym przypadku w zakresie określania instytucji prawa rodzinnego, których skutki państwa członkowskie chcą uznawać na gruncie swojego porządku prawnego. Niniejszym nie mogłem poprzeć sprawozdania.

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE), písemně. – Předložený návrh se týká 16 milionů párů s mezinárodním prvkem. Návrh podporuji, protože se nejedná o předávání pravomocí, ale o fakticky procesní a kolizní normy, které vyjasní postavení těchto manželských párů. Osobně se navíc domnívám, že by zde mohlo být přistoupeno i ke společné úpravě. Zde předložená posílená spolupráce jen některých členských států ovšem také přinese zlepšení právního stavu.

Franck Proust (PPE), par écrit. – J'ai voté en faveur de ces nouvelles dispositions qui s'appliqueront aux 18 États européens s'étant inscrits dans une procédure de coopération renforcée dans le domaine de la compétence, de la loi applicable, de la reconnaissance et de l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux, c'est-à-dire de deux nationalités différentes.

Bien que le mariage et le partenariat continuent à être définis par des lois nationales, ces nouvelles règles européennes permettront d'accroître la sécurité des couples internationaux.

Dominique Riquet (ALDE), par écrit. – La mobilité accrue des personnes au sein d'un espace européen sans frontières intérieures entraîne un accroissement important du nombre de couples de ressortissants d'États membres différents qui vivent dans un État membre autre que le leur ou qui acquièrent des biens situés sur le territoire de plusieurs États membres.

Si nous pouvons, en tant qu'Européens, nous en féliciter comme la manifestation d'un brassage accru des peuples européens, cela pose plusieurs questions juridiques et pratiques – en raison de la grande disparité entre les règles applicables aux effets patrimoniaux du mariage – auxquelles ce rapport entend répondre. Il vise notamment à établir un cadre légal clair, où les couples seront capables de choisir la juridiction et la loi applicable pour leurs possessions et leurs propriétés, évitant ainsi des conflits ultérieurs de juridictions.

À n'en pas douter, cette législation permettra une meilleure clarification, stabilité et prévisibilité du cadre légal pour les couples internationaux. En accord avec ces lignes politiques, j'ai voté en faveur de ce texte.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), por escrito. – La libertad de movimiento dentro de la UE ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de los matrimonios internacionales o de matrimonios que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo. Sin embargo, estas parejas se enfrentan, a menudo, a problemas relacionados con la propiedad, ya sea dentro del matrimonio o bien a la hora de repartir los bienes en caso de divorcio. Este reglamento, elaborado mediante el procedimiento de cooperación reforzada y aplicable a 18 Estados Miembros (Suecia, Bélgica, Grecia, Croacia, Eslovenia, España, Francia, Portugal, Italia, Malta, Luxemburgo, Alemania, República Checa Países Bajos, Austria, Bulgaria, Finlandia y Chipre) que así lo han solicitado, pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados Miembros.

Este reglamento mejorará el estatuto jurídico de las parejas internacionales o que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo, al establecer un marco legal claro para determinar la jurisdicción, ley aplicable y reconocimiento y aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad dentro del matrimonio, por lo que he votado a favor del mismo.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Je me réjouis de l'adoption de ce rapport qui mettra fin à des procédures parallèles coûtant près de 1,1 milliard d'euros par an dans différents États membres dont les tribunaux doivent régler des conflits de propriété. Elles s'appliqueront aux 18 pays qui ont souhaité rejoindre cette coopération renforcée (à savoir: la Belgique, la Bulgarie, Chypre, la République tchèque, l'Allemagne, la Grèce, l'Espagne, la France, la Croatie, l'Italie, le Luxembourg, Malte, les Pays-Bas, l'Autriche, le Portugal, la Slovénie, la Finlande et la Suède).

Les deux réglementations votées, l'une portant sur les régimes matrimoniaux et l'autre sur les effets patrimoniaux des couples enregistrés, fixeront quel tribunal aura juridiction et quelle loi sera applicable en cas de procédure concernant la propriété des couples internationaux. Elles simplifieront également la reconnaissance et le renforcement du jugement prononcé par un État membre portant sur la propriété dans un autre État membre.

Bronis Ropé (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Šeimos, ar kalbant platesniais terminais –poros, kurios yra kilusios ar gyvena skirtingose šalyse – vis labiau kasdienybėje tampantis vis labiau besiglobalizuojančios mūsų laikų kasdienybės reiškiny. Todėl yra būtina užtikrinti konkretų, aiškų ir skaidrų tokių porų civilinių santykių reguliavimą, turtinių interesų apsaugą, taip pat vaikų teisių apsaugos standartus. Sveikinu šią iniciatyvą, kolegas kviečiu balsuoti už, o Komisiją bei valstybes nares – toliau tęsti dialogą su suinteresuotomis pusėmis dėl šios srities reguliavimo tobulinimo.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – Esta proposta de regulamento do Conselho relativa à competência, à lei aplicável, ao reconhecimento e à execução de decisões em matéria de regimes matrimoniais esteve bloqueada por falta de unanimidade nas negociações entre os Estados-Membros, tendo sido remetida ao Parlamento, após um procedimento por cooperação reforçada.

Tratando-se de um processo legislativo especial, ao abrigo do artigo 81.º n.º 3, do TFUE, o Parlamento Europeu foi consultado para dar o seu parecer.

O regulamento versa sobre matérias relativas ao Direito da Família, com incidência transfronteiriça, estabelecendo um conjunto de medidas de significativa importância para os casais internacionais na União Europeia, no que se refere à competência, ao âmbito de aplicação, ao reconhecimento e à execução das decisões.

A autonomia dos Estados-Membros fica salvaguardada, tendo em conta o pedido do Parlamento para manutenção da competência em matéria de regimes matrimoniais, capacidade dos cônjuges, existência, validade ou reconhecimento de um casamento, bem como de obrigações alimentares e sucessão do cônjuge falecido.

Por ser um regulamento de interesse capital para a UE e para os casais internacionais, na medida em que elimina ambiguidades e facilita a simplificação e a interpretação do regime matrimonial transfronteiriço, e por terem sido atendidas todas as propostas apresentadas pelo Parlamento, votei favoravelmente.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Rates über die Zuständigkeit, das anzuwendende Recht und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Fragen des ehelichen Güterstands“ gestimmt, da es wichtig ist, diese Rechtlichkeit jetzt auch auf EU-level zu definieren und zu klären. Immer mehr Bürger haben Wohnsitze in mehr als einem EU-Mitgliedstaat, was zu Problemen bei der Rechtsprechung führen kann.

Die vorgeschlagene Verordnung soll endlich klären, welches Land und welches Gericht für die Fragen des ehelichen Güterstandes zuständig sind und welche Befugnisse sie dahingehend haben. Dabei werden viele Zuständigkeiten wie die rechtlichen Befugnisse eines Ehepartners oder die Regelungen nach dem Tod eines der Ehepartner immer noch den nationalen Gerichten und Behörden überlassen.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Rovnako tak, ako som podporila správu o majetkových dôsledkoch registrovaných partnerstiev, hlasovala som aj za túto správu, lebo majetkové vzťahy a výchovu detí považujem za dve najzákladnejšie otázky manželského vzťahu. Za mimoriadne dôležitú ju považujem aj preto, že fenomén medzinárodných párov EÚ je čoraz výraznejší a pri mobilite osôb v rámci priestoru bez hraníc dochádza k čoraz výraznejšiemu nárastu počtu manželských zväzkov medzi občanmi rôznych členských štátov. Aj napriek tomu, že v oblasti majetkových režimov takto uzatvorených manželstiev sa už urobili určité opatrenia, myslím si, že je nevyhnutné prijímať ďalšie úpravy právnych predpisov hmotného práva, ako aj medzinárodného práva súkromného, ktoré upravujú oblasť majetkových dôsledkov manželstiev. Vzhľadom na charakter a rozsah problémov občanov EÚ, s ktorými sa aj ja ako poslankyňa EP stretávam, je potrebné zo strany Únie vyvinúť väčší tlak na uplatnenie už existujúcich medzinárodných dohovorov vo veciach majetkových režimov manželov. Keďže rozdiely medzi členskými štátmi sú ešte stále obrovské, očakávam, že Komisia v spolupráci s členskými štátmi bude naďalej pracovať na vytvorení jednoznačného právneho rámca, ktorý bude zahŕňať určenie príslušného sudu a rozhodného práva vo veciach majetkových režimov manželov.

Michaela Šojdrová (PPE), *písemně*. – Legislativní usnesení o návrhu nařízení Rady o příslušnosti, rozhodném právu, uznávání a výkonu rozhodnutí v oblasti majetkových poměrů v manželství jsem podpořila.

Přestože se vzrůstající počet manželství s mezinárodním prvkem stal nezpochybnitelnou každodenní realitou Unie, mezinárodní manželské páry jsou při vypořádání svého majetku stále konfrontovány s praktickými problémy, například jakým právem se bude konkrétní majetková situace řídit nebo který soud bude pro vypořádání jejich majetku příslušný. Výsledkem je právní nejistota, průtahy ve věci a s tím spojené neúměrné náklady.

Posílená spolupráce vytvoří v zúčastněných členských státech jasný právní rámec pro vypořádání majetku tisíců mezinárodních manželství. Majetkové poměry mezinárodních manželství tak budou řešeny uceleným způsobem, v rámci jednoho rozhodného práva a jedním soudním orgánem. Zejména oceňuji flexibilní úpravu příslušnosti soudu pro vypořádání majetku a zásadu jednotnosti platného práva, kdy se rozhodné právo bude vztahovat na majetek jako celek. Zabrání se tak roztržičnosti úpravy, kdy by se na různé části majetku manželů vztahoval jiný právní řád.

Jsem rovněž potěšena, že ačkoli návrh nařízení přináší progresivní praktické prvky, zachovává autonomii členských států v oblasti rodinného práva. Nařízení tak žádným způsobem nezasáhne a nezmění českou hmotněprávní úpravu institutu manželství a jeho právních důsledků.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *pisno*. – Ta predlog uredbe Sveta o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema je že drugi na tem področju.

Poročilo pravi, da je predlog uredbe o premoženjskih razmerjih med zakoncema v očitnem interesu Unije in mednarodnih parov v njej. Uredba bo odpravila številne primere nejasnosti in pravne negotovosti.

Na področjih priznanja, izvršljivosti in izvrševanja odločb s področja premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema sedanje besedilo v veliki meri temelji na stališču Evropskega parlamenta iz leta 2013. Tako povzema zelo natančne določbe Uredbe št. 650/2012 o čezmejnem dedovanju.

Četudi je priznanje samodejno, je torej odločba izvršljiva šele po pridobitvi razglasitve o izvršljivosti v zadevni državi članici. Vendarle se razglasitev izvršljivosti lahko zavrne le v zelo natančno določenih primerih, na primer če je izvršitev v nasprotju z javnim redom.

Zaradi navedenega menim, da je poročilo o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema dobrodošlo, zaradi česar sem ga tudi podprl.

Joachim Starbatty (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe die Empfehlung meiner Fraktionskollegen befolgt und mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrecht“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *pisomne*. – Slovensko nie je členskou krajinou posilnenej spolupráce, a preto nie je možné sa na danú spoluprácu odvolávať.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Preporuka Odbora za pravna pitanja pojednostavljuje dosad nejasne i nedorečene jurisdikcije suda po pitanjima bračne stečevine za bračne parove koji dolaze iz različitih zemalja članica. Povodom ove preporuke, pravni subjekt dobiva pravo odabrati državu čiji je građanin, odnosno čiji je bračni partner građanin, te pitanja stečevine riješiti po zakonima odabrane zemlje. Preporuka nalaže da su eventualne sudske odluke vezano za stečevinu obvezujuće, osim u „vrlo specifičnim okolnostima“. Preporuka traži uspostavu efektivnog načina komuniciranja ovih prava svim bračnim parovima koji nisu državljani iste države.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Ovaj prijedlog za Uredbu Vijeća o nadležnosti, mjerodavnom pravu i priznanju i izvršenju odluka u pitanjima bračnih režima vlasništva je drugi na ovu temu. Prijedlog Uredbe 2016. razlikuje se od početnog prijedloga Komisije iz 2011. Naprotiv, ona sadrži mnoge izmjene predložene od strane Parlamenta u 2013. godini. Uredba ne pokriva pitanja kao što su pravna sposobnost supružnika, postojanje, valjanost ili priznavanje braka, obveza uzdržavanja. Autonomija država članica u pitanjima obiteljskog prava na taj način je sačuvana.

Podržavam prijedlog ove Uredbe jer smatram da će ona biti vrlo koristan instrument za prava međunarodnih parova u Uniji. Uredba će omogućiti da se stane na kraj brojnim dosadašnjim slučajevima pravne nesigurnosti u ovom području.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Sveta o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema.

Na področju premoženjskih razmerij uredba med zakoncema pokriva pristojnosti in pravo, ki se uporablja, pa tudi priznavanje in izvrševanje sodnih odločb, izključena pa so zlasti vprašanja pravne in poslovne sposobnosti zakoncev, obstoja, veljavnosti in priznanja zakonske zveze, prežिवninske obveznosti in dedovanje po pokojnem zakoncu. Države članice bodo tako še naprej imele avtonomijo držav članic na področju družinskega prava.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοθέτηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Szavazatommal támogattam a jelentés elfogadását, amely jóváhagyta a házassági vagyoni jogi rendszerekkel kapcsolatos ügyekben a joghatóságról, az alkalmazandó jogról, valamint a határozatok elismeréséről és végrehajtásáról szóló bizottsági javaslatot, mivel az egyértelműen az Unió és az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok érdekeit szolgálja. Egyetértek a javaslat célkitűzésével, amely csökkenteni kívánja az Unión belül élő nemzetközi házastársak gyakorlati és jogi nehézségeit vagyoniuk mindennapi kezelése, vagy akár különválásuk illetve az egyik fél halálából fakadó megosztása során. E nehézségeket gyakran az okozza, hogy a házasságok vagyoni jogi hatásait szabályozó rendelkezések a tagállami jogi rendelkezések és a nemzetközi magánjog terén egyaránt jelentősen eltérőek.

Bár az összes tagállam nem csatlakozott a kezdeményezéshez, 17 uniós tagállam azonban úgy döntött, hogy megerősített együttműködési eljárason keresztül nyújt nagyobb fokú kiszámíthatóságot és jogbiztonságot az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok számára, oly módon, hogy egyúttal megfeleljenek az arányosság elvének is.

Hannu Takkula (ALDE), kirjallinen. – Äänestin komission ehdotuksen puolesta ja valiokunnassa hyväksyttyä tarkistusta vastaan, sillä se on mielestäni tarpeeton. Komission ehdotuksessa osoitetaan jäsenvaltiot, jotka ovat mukana tiivistetyssä yhteistyössä ja painotetaan nimenomaisesti, että asetuksia sovelletaan ainoastaan kyseisiin jäsenvaltioihin.

Claudia Tapardel (S&D), in writing. – The overall aim of this regulation is clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. This is a necessary procedure in light of the fact that the free movement of people has led to a significant increase in the numbers of international couples. These couples have to deal with a number of cross-border issues, and are facing legal problems in dealing with property and when dividing it in case of divorce. Therefore, the present regulation will provide clear instructions which will help international couples by allowing them to choose the law that is applicable to them, the jurisdiction of the courts and also as regards the recognition and enforcement of decisions adopted in other Member States.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – La présente proposition de règlement du Conseil relatif à la compétence, à la loi applicable, à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux est la deuxième en la matière. Après le blocage des négociations entre États membres – tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille –, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée. Pour ce qui est des aspects procéduraux de la coopération renforcée, le lecteur est invité à consulter la recommandation spécifique sur le sujet.

Cette proposition a aussi un double, qui concerne la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés. Cette proposition de règlement sur les régimes matrimoniaux est clairement dans l'intérêt de l'Union et de ses couples internationaux. Le règlement proposé permettra de mettre fin à de nombreux cas de confusion et de difficulté juridique. La proposition actuelle, qui est la deuxième en la matière, a intégré une bonne partie des amendements proposés précédemment par le Parlement.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), in writing. – Due to the increased mobility, cooperation and exchange inside the EU, the EU now counts 16 million international couples, most commonly bound by the ties of marriage. This is why I voted in favour of a new legal framework that will clarify and simplify property rules in cases of divorce, legal separation or death for international married couples, by determining the jurisdiction and the law applicable to their property regimes. This is an indispensable measure to put an end to the practical and legal difficulties and costs these couples have to face, in line with the principle that every European citizen has the right to equal treatment in front of our national institutions.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Zbog sve veće mobilnosti osoba na području bez unutarnjih granica došlo je do znatnog povećanja broja parova koje čine državljani različitih država članica koji žive u državi članici koja nije njihova ili stječu imovinu u više država članica. Broj međunarodnih parova unutar Unije je velik te su uočene praktične i pravne poteškoće s kojima se oni suočavaju u svakodnevnom upravljanju svojom imovinom i pri podjeli imovine nakon rastave para ili smrti jednog od članova para, te se ovim prijedlogom želi uspostaviti jasni pravni okvir Europske unije za utvrđivanje nadležnosti i prava mjerodavnog za režime bračne stečevine te olakšati optjecaj odluka i isprava među državama članicama.

Budući da smatram da ovo područje treba ostati u nadležnosti država članica te da će stupanjem ove Uredbe doći do povrede načela supsidijarnosti, glasovala sam suzdržano.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Predlog uredbe, ki ureja pristojnost sodne oblasti, veljavno zakonodajo ter priznavanje in izvrševanje sodnih odločb v zadevah na področju premoženjskega razmerja med zakoncema sem podprla.

Z namenom ohranitve avtonomije držav članic na področju družinskega prava uredba ne zajema področij, kot so pravna sposobnost zakoncev, obstoj, veljavnost ali priznanje zakonske zveze, preživninske obveznosti ali dedovanje zapuščine umrlega zakonca.

Uredba prav tako ne vpliva ali posega v materialno pravo držav članic o zakonskih zvezah in sistemih lastnine. Predvideno je, da, če država članica ne priznava zakona, se sodiščem države članice podeli diskrecijska pravica, ki pristojnost v tej zadevi podeljuje sodiščem druge države članice, ki to zakonsko zvezo priznava.

Predlog upošteva tudi načelo enotnosti veljavne zakonodaje na področju premoženjskega razmerja med zakoncema, ki velja za vse nepremičnine v skladu s to ureditvijo ne glede na to, kje se nahajajo. Uredba omogoča izbiro prava, ki se uporablja za premoženjskopravne posledice med zakoncema, vendar je ta izbira omejena z zahtevo, da sta zakonca državljana države oz. imata v državi, katere pravo je bilo izbrano, vsaj običajno prebivališče.

Uredba prav tako določa sredstva za sporočanje potrebnih in osnovnih pravnih informacij, ki so namenjene mednarodnim parom.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'Union européenne n'ayant pas à légiférer dans le domaine du droit de la famille, ce texte viole le principe de subsidiarité et constitue une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille. Je suis résolument CONTRE.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Jurysdykcja i prawo właściwe w zakresie małżeństw międzynarodowych powinny zostać w gestii państw członkowskich UE. Należy pochwalić zmiany, które zaszły w porównaniu z bliźniaczym wnioskiem dotyczącym zarejestrowanych związków partnerskich z 2011. Niemniej nie są one wystarczające. Co więcej, rezolucja nie definiuje małżeństwa, a to oznacza, że może ono obejmować związki osób tej samej płci, przez co dla innych krajów członkowskich, m.in. Polski, nie jest ona do zaakceptowania. W związku z tym zagłosowałem przeciwko rezolucji.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A házassági vagyoni rendszerekkel kapcsolatos ügyekben a joghatóságról, az alkalmazandó jogról, valamint a határozatok elismeréséről és végrehajtásáról szóló tanácsi határozatra irányuló jelen javaslat ebben a tárgyban a második. A tagállamok közötti tárgyalások blokkolását követően – mivel a családjog terén minden megállapodást egyhangúlag kell elfogadni – ez a javaslat megerősített együttműködés formájában tér vissza a Parlamenthez. Szavazatommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), raštu. — Šis reglamentas bus labai naudinga priemone Europos Sąjungoje gyvenančioms tarptautinėms poroms. Jame reglamentuojama sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo srityje taikytina jurisdikcija, teisė ir teismo sprendimų pripažinimas bei vykdymas. Priėmus šį reglamentą nebeliks daugelio painių atvejų ir teisinių sunkumų.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), in writing. — I voted in favour of report on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. The regulation covers jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. I voted in favour because I believe that this regulation will be a very useful instrument for international couples in the EU.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), por escrito. — Mediante esta decisión el pleno aprueba un instrumento europeo para gestionar los regímenes económicos de matrimonios que van a servir para determinar qué tribunal tiene jurisdicción y qué legislación ha de aplicarse en cada caso. Hablamos por lo tanto de un paso muy importante para facilitar la gestión de dichos regímenes que afectan a unos 16 millones de parejas internacionales de la UE. Por todo ello creo necesario votar a su favor.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), por escrito. — Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), schriftlich. — Bei diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde um die Zuständigkeit, das anzuwendende Recht, die Anerkennung und die Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Ehegüterrechts. Er bezieht sich damit auf die Tatsache, dass immer häufiger Bürger aus verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten Bindungen miteinander eingehen und diese Paare sich in einem Mitgliedstaat niederlassen. Der vorgeschlagene Änderungsantrag bezieht sich hier sinnvollerweise auf eine Präzisierung der betroffenen Mitgliedstaaten, sodass es den Mitgliedsstaaten selbst frei steht, im Rahmen einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit diese Regelungen zu akzeptieren.

Lieve Wierinck (ALDE), in writing. — I voted in favour of this Council regulation. EU citizens are increasingly moving around the EU, working, living, marrying and buying property across EU Members states, other than their own. This makes things complicated if these couples separate, or when one of the two partners deceases, etc. This regulation provides clarification on which court has jurisdiction in such cases. To ensure consistency and enhance simplification, this regulation enables one regime to be applicable to property that is located outside the EU. Under certain conditions, it also allows for the law of third countries to apply. Citizens should be allowed to choose for themselves as to which regime will apply to their property. This will also facilitate things for citizens of third countries and for EU citizens that live outside the EU. The establishment by the regulation of means to communicate basic information to international couples will only enhance this. All of this makes life easier for people, during times that are usually the hardest to people. It puts an end to legal uncertainty for many of them and that is why I voted in favour.

Anna Záborská (PPE), písomne. — Nepochybujem o tom, že navrhovaná legislatíva uľahčí situáciu pri riešení majetkových záležitostí manželov, ktorí sú každý z iného členského štátu alebo ktorí uzavreli manželstvo v inom štáte, než je ten, v ktorom práve žijú. No treba si uvedomiť, že podmienky na uzavretie manželstva sa v členských štátoch EÚ líšia. Preto je dobré, že prijaté uznesenie sa týka zatiaľ len tých štátov, ktoré sa rozhodli pre posilnenú spoluprácu v tejto oblasti právnej harmonizácie. Slovensko medzi ne nepatrí, preto som sa v hlasovaní zdržala.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), γραπτώς. — Η παρούσα πρωτοβουλία αφορά τα διεθνή ζευγάρια στην ΕΕ και διευθετεί περιουσιακά ζητήματα με ορισμένες εξαιρέσεις οι οποίες αναφέρονται στο κείμενο. Η έκθεση υπερψηφίσθηκε με μεγάλη πλειοψηφία στην αρμόδια επιτροπή Νομικών Θεμάτων του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου. Ψήφισα θετικά.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), por escrito. — Estoy a favor de este paquete de propuestas referentes al derecho de familia, ya que creo que todas ellas son de gran utilidad en cuanto a que conforman un régimen de Derecho Internacional Privado reforzado, completando otros instrumentos de esta rama legislativa.

Las parejas y matrimonios internacionales son un fenómeno que por factores como la globalización y la crisis económica (que en muchos casos ha propiciado que los ciudadanos europeos hayan tenido que cambiar su lugar de residencia en busca de una vida laboral mejor) son cada vez más comunes.

Todo ello, sin duda, requiere de una revisión de la legislación, que permita a este perfil de parejas contar con respaldo y reconocimiento jurídico, de modo que quienes se encuentren en esta situación no perciban desventajas por esta unión de perfil internacional y cuenten con los mismos derechos y deberes que una pareja perteneciente al mismo estado.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), *písemně*. – Tuto zprávu podporuji, protože nařízení bude představovat velmi užitečný nástroj pro mezinárodní manželství v rámci Evropské unie, přičemž autonomie členských států v otázce rodinného práva zůstává zachována. Oceňuji, že požadavky Parlamentu byly tedy vyslyšeny. Jsem přesvědčen, že tento návrh nařízení o majetkových poměrech v manželství je rozhodně v zájmu Unie a jejích mezinárodních manželských párů a že se díky němu vyřeší řada nejasností a právních problémů.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), *písmo*. – Správu pána poslanca Cavada o majetkovom režime medzinárodných párov, v tomto prípade zosobášených, som nepodporila. Súhlasím síce s myšlienkou, že pravidlá na riešenie majetkových otázok po rozluke či rozvode medzinárodného manželského páru momentálne chýbajú a s celkovým nárastom mobility a tým aj počtu medzinárodných párov ide o veľmi dôležitú právnu oblasť, nesúhlasím však s princípom, akým boli návrhy nariadení predložené. Akceptáciou nariadenia týkajúceho sa manželstva totiž štáty musia automaticky prijať aj nariadenie týkajúce sa registrovaných partnerstiev. A hoci tento fenomén vo svete existuje a pravidlá na riešenie majetkových pomerov registrovaných párov sú potrebné, myslím si, že to vyvoláva množstvo právnych problémov v členských štátoch, ktorých právny poriadok inštitút registrovaného partnerstva nepozná, ako je tomu napríklad na Slovensku. Týmto právnym otázkam a najmä otázke súvisiacej s potenciálnym rozporom návrhu s princípom subsidiarity, keďže rodinné právo hmotné patrí do výlučnej právomoci členských štátov, nebola podľa môjho názoru v návrhu nariadenia venovaná dostatočná pozornosť. Práve preto som sa v záverečnom hlasovaní zdržala.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Sveta o pristoynosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema.

Menim, da bo uredba odpravila številne primere nejasnosti in pravne negotovosti za mednarodne pare znotraj Evropske unije. Na področju premoženjskih razmerij med zakoncema pokriva pristoynosti in pravo, ki se uporablja, pa tudi priznavanje in izvrševanje sodnih odločb.

Iz njenega področja uporabe so izključena zlasti vprašanja pravne in poslovne sposobnosti zakoncev, obstoja, veljavnosti in priznanja zakonske zveze, preživninske obveznosti in dedovanje po pokojnem zakoncu. Tako ohranja tudi avtonomijo držav članic na področju družinskega prava.

9.10. Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften (A8-0208/2016 - Jean-Marie Cavada)

Ustne vyjaśnienia dotyczące glosowania

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE). – Pane předsedající, já jsem podpořil obě tyto zprávy, obě tato nařízení. Nestihl jsem včera v rozpravě říci, že je velmi dobře, že ta nařízení prošla, ale je velkým mementem, že po debatě, která trvala více než pět let mezi Parlamentem a Radou, nakonec prošel plán, který v zásadě není až tak ambiciózní. Upravuje pouze některé kolizní normy a některé procesní předpisy a problémem je, že jej nepřijaly všechny státy Evropské unie, ale pouze osmnáct států.

Je to tedy velké varování, velké memento i do budoucna. Ve chvíli, kdy neupravujeme samotné hmotné právo, a nezasahujeme tak do pravomoci jednotlivých států, pak mě trochu mrzí, že u kolizních norem a procesních norem, které upravují například příslušnost soudu, nebo to, které bude rozhodné právo, že se nejsme schopni dohodnout všichni. Je to sice na jedné straně dobrý projekt, ale tím, že pouze osmnáct zemí jej přijalo, je ten projekt mimořádně oslabený, a vztahuje se tedy pouze na část Evropské unie. Takže musím nad tím vyjádřit i určité politování.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Le coppie internazionali, attualmente presenti in Europa, sono all'incirca 16 milioni. Una simile percentuale è sintomo dei profondi cambiamenti che hanno caratterizzato la società civile, rendendo una modifica del diritto di famiglia, una priorità assoluta.

Spesso, infatti, nella gestione dei loro beni, le coppie internazionali s'imbattono in conseguenze impreviste ed indesiderate, in virtù delle differenze esistenti tra i vari ordinamenti giuridici.

In mancanza di un accordo unanime in materia, 17 Stati membri hanno chiesto ed ottenuto una procedura di cooperazione rafforzata, volta a chiarire ed armonizzare la normativa circa gli effetti patrimoniali per le unioni registrate.

Ho espresso, pertanto, voto favorevole, poiché ritengo che rivedere la legislazione in materia, tentandone l'armonizzazione, potrà facilitare la vita dei cittadini e delle famiglie europee.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce texte relatif à la compétence, à la loi applicable, à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des décisions en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés.

En effet, même si ce règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel, il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner l'obstacle. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille sera donc entravée. Ce texte constitue une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This file is the same as the previous file. It follows on from another file voted on at the last plenary on property regimes of international couples.

The resolution asks the Council to notify Parliament if negotiations depart from the framework which has been presented.

Similar to the previous files, as these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – Le Parlement a adopté sa position sur ces règlements au cours du dernier mandat. Le Conseil a pris beaucoup de temps pour prendre position. Nous nous félicitons de la coopération renforcée et nous espérons que d'autres États membres décideront de rejoindre ce processus. Ce règlement va rendre la vie des couples internationaux européens beaucoup plus facile et leur garantir une meilleure sécurité juridique.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραφικώς*. – Η παρούσα έκθεση αφορά την πρόταση κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των καταχωρισμένων συντρόφων. Εγώ προσωπικά υπερψήφισα την παρούσα έκθεση στο πλευρό της Ομάδας των Σοσιαλιστών και Δημοκρατών του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, καθώς θα συνεισφέρει στη βελτίωση της ευρωπαϊκής νομοθεσίας στον τομέα αυτό και θα διευκολύνει τη ζωή πολλών ευρωπαίων πολιτών.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Mit einer zunehmenden Mobilität in einem Raum ohne Binnengrenzen sind internationale Paare keine Seltenheit mehr. Internationale Paare werden definiert als solche, die sich aus Bürgern von 2 EU-Mitgliedstaaten zusammenschließen und anschließend in einem Land bleiben, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit nicht beide besitzen.

Diese internationalen Paare sind oftmals sowohl im Alltag als auch bei Teilung des gemeinsamen Vermögens infolge einer Trennung oder des Todes einer Person mit Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert. Die neue Verordnung zielt darauf ab, Paaren einer eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft dies zu erleichtern, indem sie das für sie zuständige Gericht und das auf ihre Vermögensrechte anzuwendende Recht bestimmt.

Auch weil die neue Verordnung vielen Personen zugutekommen wird, die in Grenzregionen wohnen, habe ich ihr zugestimmt.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – En 2010, la Commission a annoncé une proposition de règlement permettant aux couples internationaux de savoir plus facilement quels tribunaux sont compétents en ce qui concerne leurs droits de propriété et quelle législation s'y applique. Après le blocage des négociations, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres.

Le règlement couvre, en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés, la compétence et la loi applicable. Le texte permet également le choix du droit applicable à condition qu'il soit celui de l'État dont est ressortissant un des partenaires, ou l'État dans lequel il a sa résidence habituelle. Les partenaires pourront, en outre, choisir la loi de l'État d'enregistrement du partenariat.

Même si le règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner l'obstacle. Ceci notamment par la possibilité généreusement aménagée de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, au final, pas sauvegardée. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

J'ai donc voté contre le rapport.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport visant à approuver un règlement qui a pour objet de permettre aux couples internationaux (mariés ou partenaires enregistrés) de savoir plus facilement quels tribunaux sont compétents en ce qui concerne leurs droits de propriété et quelle législation s'y applique.

Cependant, même si le règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (obligations alimentaires, succession...), il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages, notamment par la possibilité généreusement aménagée de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, finalement, pas sauvegardée. Il s'agit d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – Il s'agit ici de recourir à la coopération renforcée entre les États membres qui y sont favorables pour établir un corps complet de règles de droit international privé applicables aux effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés en ce qui concerne les couples transnationaux.

J'ai approuvé ce point.

Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea (ALDE), *por escrito*. – Cuando hablamos de la importancia de la Unión y de cómo las decisiones que adoptamos en las instituciones europeas afectan directamente a la vida de los ciudadanos, nos referimos a medidas como las que contiene la propuesta de la Comisión que se aprueba en esta Resolución.

En Europa existen unas 16 millones de parejas «transfronterizas» que se beneficiarán de los futuros Reglamentos en materia de derechos de propiedad. No cabe duda que estos reglamentos suponen un avance que facilitará la vida de muchas parejas internacionales. Sin embargo, debido a la cooperación reforzada, habrá dos Europas para estas parejas: una donde se reconozcan sus derechos de propiedad y otra no.

He votado a favor de esta resolución, ya que supone un avance. Pero no es suficiente. Mi compromiso es seguir trabajando por una Europa sin barreras para las parejas y familias, incluidas todas las formas de familia que existen en nuestra sociedad, y por tanto sin discriminaciones para los ciudadanos LGTBI.

Debemos garantizar la libre circulación dentro de la UE. Y para conseguirlo sin discriminaciones, también es indispensable que cualquier matrimonio o unión registrada de parejas del mismo sexo se reconozca en otro Estado miembro.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Cavada sulla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate.

Dopo lo stallo delle trattative, l'avvio di una cooperazione rafforzata ha portato ad una proposta molto più in linea con le indicazioni espresse dal Parlamento nel 2013. Un grande passo avanti è il principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile che prevede che il diritto dei regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi si applichi alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'unione, ovunque si trovino.

Il testo presenta importanti innovazioni anche in materia di riconoscimento, esecutività e esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, riprendendo le disposizioni molto precise del regolamento n. 650/2012. In termini generali questo nuovo regolamento rappresenta una risposta efficace per superare i casi di confusione e le difficoltà giuridiche, per questo motivo ho deciso di sostenerlo con il mio voto.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce projet de rapport relatif à la proposition de règlement du Conseil sur la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés.

Certes, chacun peut reconnaître les difficultés rencontrées par les couples dans l'enregistrement de leur partenariat, notamment du fait des grandes disparités dans les règles applicables aux effets patrimoniaux. Notons qu'en France, la question des partenariats enregistrés à l'étranger n'a jamais été tranchée, tandis que dans le reste de l'Europe, on retrouve une grande variété de systèmes en la matière.

Cependant, ce règlement porte en son sein le risque d'ouvrir une brèche et de permettre une sorte d'«exil patrimonial», permettant aux partenaires d'anticiper les blocages et de choisir la loi applicable. De ce fait, c'est une mise en danger de l'autonomie des États membres en ce qui concerne leur droit de la famille.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Pur essendo un voto meramente procedurale, ritengo che nella relazione esistano delle zone d'ombra che potrebbero aprire a future criticità, ho quindi deciso di esprimermi con un'astensione.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – La libertad de movimiento dentro de la Unión ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de las parejas de hecho internacionales o de parejas de hecho que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo. Sin embargo, estas parejas se enfrentan, a menudo, a problemas relacionados con la propiedad, ya sea mientras permanecen unidas o bien a la hora de repartir los bienes en caso de separación. Este Reglamento, elaborado mediante el procedimiento de cooperación reforzada y aplicable a dieciocho Estados miembros (Suecia, Bélgica, Grecia, Croacia, Eslovenia, España, Francia, Portugal, Italia, Malta, Luxemburgo, Alemania, República Checa, Países Bajos, Austria, Bulgaria, Finlandia y Chipre) que así lo han solicitado, pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y el ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados miembros.

Este Reglamento mejorará el estatuto jurídico de las parejas internacionales o que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo, al establecer un marco legal claro para determinar la jurisdicción, la ley aplicable y el reconocimiento y la aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad de las parejas de hecho, por lo que he votado a favor del mismo.

Vilija Blinkievičiūtė (S&D), raštu. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes šis pasiūlymas yra dėl Tarybos reglamento dėl registruotos partnerystės turtinių pasekmių srityje taikytinos jurisdikcijos, teisės ir teismo sprendimų pripažinimo ir vykdymo.

Šis reglamentas bus labai naudinga priemonė Europos Sąjungoje gyvenančioms tarptautinėms poroms. Jame reglamentuojama registruotos partnerystės turtinių pasekmių srityje taikytina jurisdikcija, teisė ir teismo sprendimų pripažinimas bei vykdymas.

Vis dėlto į reglamento taikymo sritį nepatenka klausimai, susiję su partnerių veiksniumu, partnerystės buvimu, galiojimu ar pripažinimu, išlaikymo prievolėmis ir mirusio partnerio turto paveldėjimu. Taigi valstybių narių nepriklausomumas šeimos teisės srityje išsaugotas. Be to, reglamentas neturi poveikio valstybių narių materialinei teisei, susijusiai su registruota partneryste ar jos turtinėmis pasekmėmis.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), par écrit. – Ce texte est sans aucun doute un préalable à l'uniformisation des règles juridiques concernant les régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux, que ces derniers soient mariés ou liés par un partenariat enregistré. Il est à craindre une immixtion future dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Par conséquent, j'ai voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), in writing. — This file is the same as the previous file. It follows on from another file voted on at the last plenary on property regimes of international couples.

The resolution asks the Council to notify Parliament if negotiations depart from the framework which has been presented.

Similar to the previous files, as these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs.

Renata Briano (S&D), per iscritto. – La proposta di regolamento, presentata nel quadro di una cooperazione rafforzata capace di coinvolgere la larga maggioranza degli Stati membri, che intende chiarire e meglio disciplinare, all'interno dei Paesi in questione, le competenze, la legge applicabile, nonché le modalità di riconoscimento e di esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, rappresenta un importante passo in avanti in grado di agevolare l'accesso ai diritti e di semplificare la vita a un gran numero di cittadini europei.

La nuova proposta di regolamentazione permetterebbe un maggiore margine di flessibilità (ad esempio nell'ambito della scelta della legge applicabile o ancora nella facilitazione della circolazione degli atti ufficiali) che andrebbe incontro alle esigenze, in particolare, di quelle coppie composte da cittadini provenienti da diversi Stati membri, chiarificando al tempo stesso alcune situazioni giuridiche attualmente poco chiare e fornendo in tal modo una maggiore certezza giuridica.

Si tratta in effetti di un ulteriore progresso verso una sempre più effettiva circolazione degli atti e delle decisioni tra Stati membri, capace di rafforzare la creazione di uno spazio giuridico omogeneo, armonizzato e funzionale in grado di rispondere alla sfida della crescita della mobilità, nonché capace di promuovere lo sviluppo di un'effettiva cittadinanza europea.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport vise à renforcer la coopération entre les États membres de l'Union afin de faciliter les démarches administratives des couples internationaux. Le texte couvre, en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés, la compétence et la loi applicable ainsi que la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions. Ce texte donne également la possibilité à ces couples de choisir le droit applicable à condition qu'il soit celui de l'État dont est ressortissant un des partenaires. En résumé, les partenaires pourront choisir la loi de l'État d'enregistrement du partenariat.

Bien que ce rapport exclue les questions touchant au droit matériel telles que la succession, il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner les obstacles juridiques. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, au final, pas sauvegardée.

C'est la raison pour laquelle j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Prezenta inițiativă se referă la jurisdicția și legea aplicabilă, precum și la recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor în materie de efecte patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate, stabilindu-se care este instanța competentă să se pronunțe cu privire la cererile în materie de efecte patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate.

Această propunere vine pe fondul mobilității crescute a persoanelor, care generează o creștere a numărului de cupluri formate din cetățeni ai unor state membre diferite care locuiesc într-un stat membru diferit de statul lor membru de origine.

În urma diverselor studii, s-au constatat o serie de dificultăți pe care le întâmpină aceste cupluri transnaționale, dificultăți produse de anumite incompatibilități între normele aplicabile care reglementează efectele patrimoniale ale căsătoriei, atât cele de drept material, cât și de drept internațional privat.

Cu toate acestea, abordarea cu privire la propunerea în cauză nu este una comună la nivelul tuturor statelor membre, iar motivul este acela că prevederile sunt insuficiente pentru a crea un cadru omogen care să aibă în vedere toate situațiile ce pot apărea în acest sector, motiv pentru care am ales să mă abțin în privința votului final pe acest raport.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *în scris*. – În societatea contemporană, deși căsătoria este cea mai comună formă a cuplurilor, ne întâlnim cu noi forme de uniune, printre care și parteneriatul înregistrat. Acesta presupune înregistrarea în mod oficial, în evidențele autorităților publice, a uniunii a două persoane aflate într-o relație stabilă.

Această propunere de regulament privind efectele patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate este de interes major pentru UE, deoarece clarifică o serie de confuzii în aplicarea legislației anterioare în materie de drept aplicabil cuplurilor internaționale. Trăim într-o lume mobilă, iar recunoașterea drepturilor partenerilor internaționali, indiferent unde s-ar afla, va pune capăt fracționării regimul juridic al bunurilor cuplului.

Realizarea majoră a acestei propuneri de raport a Consiliului, pe care o susțin, este unitatea dreptului aplicabil, conform căruia dreptul efectelor patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate se aplică tuturor bunurilor deținute în cadrul parteneriatului, oriunde s-ar afla. Regulamentul permite alegerea dreptului aplicabil efectelor patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate, însă această alegere este limitată de cerința de a fi cetățean al statului membru în cauză sau a-și avea reședința obișnuită în acesta. În plus, acest regulament respectă autonomia statelor membre în materie de dreptul familiei și nu aduce atingere nici fondului dreptului statelor membre în privința parteneriatelor înregistrate sau a efectelor lor patrimoniale.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Dopo attenta lettura e discussione in aula ho dato il mio voto positivo alla relazione sulla competenza, legge applicabile, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate sulle seguenti motivazioni:

— serve un confronto serrato su una regolamentazione, attenta ed inclusiva, che affermi in modo unitario e rispettoso delle scelte degli Stati membri, le delicate questioni riguardanti la capacità dei partner, l'esistenza, la validità o il riconoscimento di un'unione, le obbligazioni alimentari e la successione del partner premorto;

— il grande passo avanti è il principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile che prevede che il diritto dei regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi si applichi alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'unione, ovunque si trovino.

Mi associo quindi alla relazione ed alla necessità di una regolamentazione omogenea, di reale aiuto allo sviluppo dei temi della famiglia.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This file follows on from another file voted on at the last plenary on property regimes of international couples. It seeks to define the rules applicable for jurisdiction, applicable law and the enforcement of decisions for international registered partnerships concerning property regimes. The last vote was consent of the Parliament for 17 Member States to proceed through the enhanced cooperation system, i.e. not through the normal EU legislative process. The Parliament now has to give its consent to the framework content of proposals by the European Commission, after which, negotiations between these countries will begin outside of the normal EU legislative process.

The resolution basically asks the Council to notify Parliament if negotiations depart from the framework presented today.

As these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but merely set out clear rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes. I was happy to vote in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report that proposes a detailed regulation touching on judicial and legal affairs on the property consequences of registered partnerships. The regulation covers a wide range of areas and clarifies many uncertainties. The only areas which are not covered are those that remain solely within the competences of the Member States, such as the recognition of a partnership or maintenance obligations. This proposal mostly follows its parallel proposal on matrimonial property regimes and they share the same objective of creating a consistent system across the EU.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Esprimo il mio voto favorevole in quanto la misura garantisce una disciplina delle questioni transfrontaliere in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate e, pertanto, si tratta di una misura nell'interesse dei cittadini.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτως*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση, καθώς πιστεύουμε πως η υπό εξέταση πρόταση κανονισμού για τις περιουσιακές σχέσεις καταχωρισμένων συντρόφων είναι σαφώς προς το συμφέρον της Ένωσης και των διεθνών ζευγαριών που υπάγονται σε αυτήν.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτως*. – Ψηφίσαμε σήμερα ως προς την έκθεση σχετικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των καταχωρισμένων συντρόφων. Το ζήτημα αυτό επηρεάζει χιλιάδες ευρωπαίους πολίτες και η προώθηση ευέλκτων λύσεων όπως αυτή εξυπηρετεί τις ανάγκες τους. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – La varietà dei diritti di famiglia negli Stati membri fa sì che, in caso di coppie di due Stati diversi che decidano di legalizzare la propria unione con forme alternative al matrimonio, ci potrebbero essere dei seri problemi di riconoscibilità e di attuabilità transfrontaliera di tale unione. Laddove si parla, invece, delle quattro libertà fondamentali, è necessario che le conseguenze patrimoniali delle unioni sentimentali siano omogenee e salvaguardate. Per questo motivo ho votato a favore di questa relazione.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this vote, which covers jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. – Em 2011, a Comissão apresentou uma proposta relativa à competência, à lei aplicável, ao reconhecimento e à execução de decisões em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas, comumente designadas no nosso regime por «uniões de facto». Esta medida integra um conjunto de instrumentos que visa tornar mais fácil a vida de casais transnacionais, cada vez mais frequentes no seio da União Europeia.

No entanto, não foi possível alcançar um consenso no Conselho, exclusivamente competente nestas matérias e vinculado pela unanimidade. Assim, um conjunto de 18 Estados-Membros, em que se incluiu Portugal, pretenderam avançar com as medidas, socorrendo-se para tal do mecanismo da cooperação reforçada. É esta cooperação reforçada que hoje se aprova, cujo texto acolhe significativas propostas do Parlamento Europeu, feitas durante o primeiro processo negocial entre todos os Estados-Membros

No âmbito da cooperação reforçada, ao Parlamento Europeu cumpre avaliar, entre outros critérios, o respeito pelas competências nacionais, o que se verifica neste caso. São integralmente respeitadas as competências dos Estados-Membros no âmbito do Direito da Família, nomeadamente no que respeita ao reconhecimento de uniões de facto.

Apoio, por isso, este relatório.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La risoluzione del Parlamento europeo approva la proposta della Commissione relativa agli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate. In particolare, si definisce la competenza giurisdizionale e il tribunale di competenza, la legge applicabile e come risolvere vuoti legislativi, il riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate. Con il mio voto in favore della risoluzione intendo supportare queste misure che limitano situazioni di confusione e incertezza giuridica. Una maggiore chiarezza delle norme in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate è senza dubbio nell'interesse dei cittadini europei e delle coppie internazionali.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Posibilitatea de a călători liber în interiorul Uniunii și mobilitatea forței de muncă au dus la creșterea numărului de cupluri ai căror membri au naționalități diferite.

Alături de căsătorie, parteneriatele înregistrate oferă drepturi și îndatoriri cuplurilor ce decid să își oficializeze relația în fața autorităților statului de rezidență. Totuși, această formă de oficializare a relației nu este recunoscută în toate statele membre, iar între legislațiile statelor care permit parteneriatele înregistrate există diferențe majore.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport referitor la propunerea de regulament al Consiliului privind competența, legea aplicabilă, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești în materie de efecte patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate deoarece consider că acesta reprezintă un pas important în facilitarea procedurilor juridice și administrative cu care se confruntă o mare parte a cuplurilor internaționale.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Rozporządzenie to ma na celu ustanowienie jasnych ram prawnych w UE dla ustalenia decyzji dotyczących skutków majątkowych zarejestrowanego partnerstwa. Rozwiązanie to budzi zastrzeżenia w kontekście art. 4 ust. 2 TUE gwarantującego państwom członkowskim poszanowanie ich tożsamości narodowej, w tym szczególnym przypadku w zakresie określania instytucji prawa rodzinnego, których skutki państwa członkowskie chcą uznawać na gruncie swojego porządku prawnego. Projekt decyzji upoważniającej budzi także wątpliwości w kontekście jej zgodności z zasadą lojalnej współpracy Unii Europejskiej i państw członkowskich. W związku z powyższym zgłosowałem przeciwko.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – The aim of this regulation is to have a clear legal framework which is needed in matters of matrimonial property regimes which also promotes enhanced cooperation between member states and the European Union. I voted in favour of this report as it will make it possible to put an end to many cases of confusion and legal uncertainty.

Michel Dantin (PPE), par écrit. – Ce rapport porte sur l'établissement d'une coopération renforcée en matière d'effets patrimoniaux entre les États membres volontaires, à savoir 23 États membres.

La proposition de règlement de la Commission vise à simplifier les procédures administratives en matière de régimes patrimoniaux entre les États membres, et permettra aux couples internationaux de bénéficier d'une sécurité juridique.

Considérant que l'harmonisation des règles en matière de régime matrimonial est nécessaire pour éviter aux couples internationaux européens une incertitude juridique déconcertante, j'ai soutenu ce rapport.

Rachida Dati (PPE), par écrit. — Avec la liberté de circulation et d'établissement inhérente à l'espace européen, le nombre de partenariats enregistrés entre des ressortissants d'États membres différents a augmenté. J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte pour que la législation européenne puisse faciliter l'établissement de ces partenariats.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), par écrit. – En 2010, la Commission a annoncé une proposition de règlement permettant aux couples internationaux (mariés ou partenaires enregistrés) de savoir plus facilement quels tribunaux sont compétents en ce qui concerne leurs droits de propriété et quelle législation s'y applique.

Après le blocage des négociations, tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres.

Certes, le règlement affirme exclure de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...). Néanmoins, il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner l'obstacle. Ceci notamment par la possibilité de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc pas sauvegardée. Pour cette raison, j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), в писмена форма. – Реших гласувах „въздържал се“ по това досие. В следствие на последните обсъждания и гласувания по тази тема, има някои подобрения. Въпреки това, сега гласуваме правилата и същите въпроси, които съм повдигнал и преди и които все още са налице. Много държави членки не са запознати с институцията „партньорство“ (Италия, България, Румъния, Словакия, Полша, Литва, Латвия). Освен това, сега гласуваме реалните предложения. Макар и да не е толкова проблемно да бъдат гласувани предложенията за засилено сътрудничество по отношение на режимите на съпружеска собственост, по отношение на семейните двойки, това е съвсем различна тема, когато става дума за партньорства.

Докато някои страни са в подкрепа на предложението за засилено сътрудничество, те са задължени да транспонират двата инструмента и да въведат мерки за двете понятия в тяхната национална законодателна рамка. Това не само означава последваща несъвместимост с някои национални политики; това също е очевидно незачитане на суверенитета на някои държави членки, както и подкопава принципа на субсидиарност, като същевременно се насърчава засиленото сътрудничество в полза на гражданите. Докато аз като цяло съм в подкрепа на тази инициатива, не мога да подкрепя конфликта, който тя носи със себе си за някои държави членки и затова се въздържах.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοδότηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE), *por escrito*. – Diversos estudios han puesto de manifiesto el elevado número de parejas transnacionales existentes en la Unión y las dificultades prácticas y jurídicas a las que estas parejas se enfrentan, tanto en la administración cotidiana de su patrimonio como en su división cuando la pareja se separa o fallece uno de sus miembros. Estas dificultades son a menudo el resultado de la gran disparidad de normas aplicables, tanto de Derecho sustantivo como de Derecho internacional privado, que regulan los efectos patrimoniales del matrimonio.

El objetivo de la presente propuesta consiste en establecer un marco jurídico claro en la Unión Europea para la determinación de la competencia judicial y la ley aplicable a los regímenes económicos matrimoniales, y facilitar la circulación entre los Estados miembros de las resoluciones y otros actos en esta materia

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – Há cerca de 16 milhões de casais internacionais na UE. As ações judiciais paralelas em países diferentes, a complexidade dos processos e as despesas judiciais elevadas daí resultantes representam custos estimados em 1,1 mil milhões de euros anuais.

Considero importante clarificar qual o tribunal nacional competente para ajudar os casais internacionais - unidos pelo casamento ou por uma parceria registada - a gerir os respetivos bens ou proceder à sua partilha em caso de divórcio, separação ou morte (normas em matéria de competência) e qual a lei aplicável quando sejam potencialmente aplicáveis ao processo leis de diferentes países (normas relativas à lei aplicável).

As novas regras deverão também facilitar o reconhecimento e a execução num Estado-Membro de uma decisão judicial sobre aspetos patrimoniais proferida noutro Estado-Membro.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote contre: il s'agit d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Laura Ferrara (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Il Parlamento europeo più volte, con sue risoluzioni non legislative, ha chiesto alle altre istituzioni europee, ma anche agli Stati membri, di garantire parità di diritti per le coppie, sia eterosessuali sia omosessuali, che optano per le c.d. unioni civili.

Il pieno riconoscimento reciproco degli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, all'interno dell'Unione europea, rappresenta quindi un fondamentale passo in avanti in vista del riconoscimento della tanto reclamata parità di diritti ed è oltretutto indispensabile al fine di ridurre gli ostacoli discriminatori di natura giuridica e amministrativa per i cittadini che esercitano il loro diritto di libera circolazione.

La proposta di regolamento relativo agli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, a ben vedere, permetterà di porre fine a molti casi di confusione e difficoltà giuridiche con conseguente garanzia di maggiore certezza del diritto.

Si tratta, come già sottolineato, di un impegno concreto dell'Unione nella direzione dell'eguaglianza e della parità dei diritti.

Un impegno concreto che non possiamo fare a meno di condividere.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – O relatório aprova a proposta da Comissão Europeia em matéria de jurisdição, legislação aplicável e reconhecimento e execução de decisões em matéria de regimes de propriedade nas parcerias registadas.

O regulamento será um instrumento útil para casais/parcerias internacionais na UE. Hoje, fruto de uma grande mobilidade de pessoas entre Estados-Membros da UE, os casais enfrentam várias dificuldades burocráticas quando é necessário tratar de questões relativas à propriedade ou divisão da mesma, quando se divorciam ou quando um dos membros do casal falece. Existem problemas quando a propriedade é adquirida em diferentes Estados-Membros, por exemplo.

Este regulamento abrange a competência, a lei aplicável, o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões em matéria de regimes matrimoniais. No entanto, o seu âmbito não abrange questões como a capacidade jurídica dos cônjuges, a existência, a validade ou o reconhecimento de um casamento, as obrigações alimentares ou a sucessão de bens de um cônjuge falecido. O regulamento não afeta também os direitos de segurança social ou direitos a pensão no caso de divórcio. A autonomia dos Estados-Membros em matéria de Direito da Família é preservada. Nem o regulamento afeta o Direito material dos Estados-Membros em sistemas matrimoniais/parcerias registadas.

Apoiámos a abertura do processo de cooperação entre Estados sobre esta matéria e votámos favoravelmente este relatório.

Santiago Fisas Ayxelà (PPE), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe, ya que considero que el marco de derecho privado que establece resultará de mucha utilidad para los Estados miembros y entre ellos España, para asegurar el cumplimiento del principio de no discriminación. Considero además adecuada la unificación de normativa que se logra con este informe.

Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour because the proposal provides for the free circulation of decisions, authentic instruments and court settlements concerning matrimonial property regimes.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – V tomto konkrétnom prípade ide o veľmi podobný návrh ako pri úprave majetkových režimov medzinárodných párov a bude sa týkať iba tých členských krajín Európskej únie, ktoré majú vo svojej národnej legislatíve upravené registrované partnerstvá.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Mi astengo dalla relazione in oggetto.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφτώς*. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοθέτηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαι αντίθετος στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – I find it extremely important to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes.

Due to the free movement of people in the EU there has been a significant increase in the numbers of international couples or couples that need to deal with cross-border issues. These couples are currently facing legal problems in dealing with property, both inside their marriage, and when dividing property in case of divorce.

Parliament adopted its position on these Regulations during the last mandate, and it is very regretful the fact that the Council took such a long time to take a position. I welcome the enhanced cooperation and hope that other Member States will decide to join, as this regulation will make life of European international couples much easier and offer them legal certainty.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Megszavaztam a Jogi Bizottság jelentését a bejegyzett élettársi kapcsolatok vagyoni jogi vonatkozásai tekintetében alkalmazandó jogról. Ez a javaslat a házassági vagyoni jogi rendszereket érintő ügyek megegyező változata. A bejegyzett élettársi kapcsolatok vagyoni jogi hatásaival kapcsolatos ügyekben hatálya kiterjed a joghatóságra, az alkalmazandó jogra, valamint a határozatok elismerésére és végrehajtására. Nem terjed ki a hatálya azonban az élettársak jogképességére, az élettársi kapcsolat fennállására, érvényességére és elismerésére, a tartási kötelezettségekre és az elhunyt élettárs utáni öröklésre. A tagállamok autonómiája a családjog terén tehát biztosított. A rendelet nem érinti a tagállamok bejegyzett élettársi kapcsolatokra vagy azok vagyoni jogi hatásaira vonatkozó anyagi jogát.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione legislativa del Parlamento europeo sulla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate tra persone appartenenti a Stati membri diversi, perché ritengo che sia necessario andare avanti nel percorso di estensione e attribuzione dei diritti nell'UE. La parità di trattamento tra coppie sposati e unioni registrate è infatti un principio per me irrinunciabile. È quindi fondamentale che accanto al negoziato sul quadro normativo per i regimi matrimoniali, si proceda parallelamente al negoziato sul quadro normativo in materia di unioni registrate. Si tratta anche qui di un tema su cui il Parlamento ha una posizione chiara e decisa, purtroppo ostacolata dalla reticenza e dalla miopia di alcuni Stati membri. Sostengo, dunque, con forza la scelta della cooperazione rafforzata fra una maggioranza di Stati membri, perché ritengo che sia necessario andare avanti con questa importante legislazione.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe heute gegen den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ gestimmt – und das, obwohl er als Teil eines Konsultationsverfahrens lediglich den Vorschlag KOM 2016/0107 begrüßt. Er läuft allerdings irr in Punkt II der juristischen Begründung, wenn er behauptet, die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten bleibe im Bereich des Familienrechts gewahrt. Dem ist definitiv nicht so. Ich sehe im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen vehementen Eingriff in die Subsidiarität der Mitgliedstaaten, den ich in der Form verurteile.

Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D), *na piśmie*. – Parlament Europejski poparł w dniu dzisiejszym drugi w tej dziedzinie wniosek dotyczący jurysdykcji, prawa właściwego, uznawania i wykonywania orzeczeń sądowych w zakresie skutków majątkowych zarejestrowanych związków partnerskich. Uproszczenie procedur ułatwi wskazanie sądu właściwego do rozpatrywania spraw dotyczących majątkowych ustrojów par międzynarodowych, co położy kres kosztownym postępowaniom prowadzonym równolegle w różnych państwach członkowskich. Nowe przepisy będą obowiązywały w 18 państwach członkowskich, które zadeklarowały wolę podjęcia tzw. wzmocnionej współpracy, a do których niestety nie należy Polska. Według szacunków Komisji Europejskiej w 18 krajach UE objętych wyżej wymienioną współpracą żyje 16 milionów par międzynarodowych, a powyższe rozporządzenie będzie dla nich użytecznym instrumentem zapewniającym ochronę prawną oraz łatwiejszy dostęp do wymiaru sprawiedliwości.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Der Bericht behandelt die Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Fragen des Güterrechts von eingetragenen Partnerschaften. Die Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich Angelegenheiten zum Familienrecht bleibt jedoch bestehen, genauso wie das materielle Recht der Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich des Güterstands von eingetragenen Partnerschaften.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Maria Grapini (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat acest raport deoarece efectele patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate vizează cuplurile internaționale, dar și principiul unității în cadrul Uniunii, întrucât va reduce confuziile și piedicile de ordin juridic. Astfel, accesul cuplurilor internaționale la informațiile juridice de bază va fi facilitat, cu toate că obligațiile referitoare la existența, valabilitatea sau recunoașterea parteneriatelor și obligațiile referitoare la îndatoririle de întreținere sau succesiunea unui partener decedat vor rămâne responsabilitatea statelor membre. În acest context, regimul juridic al bunurilor cuplului va fi clarificat și bine delimitat. Astfel, persoanele vizate vor putea alege dreptul aplicabil efectelor patrimoniale în ceea ce privește parteneriatele înregistrate, dar vor fi limitați de cerința cetățeniei sau a reședinței într-un anumit stat membru.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. The proposed Regulation provides for the free movement of decisions, authentic instruments and court settlements concerning matrimonial property regimes introducing mutual recognition based on the mutual trust arising out of the integration of the Member States within the European Union.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Υπεριψηφίσαμε την έκθεση, αφού συμπληρώνει νομικά κενά που υπήρχαν σχετικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των καταχωρισμένων συντρόφων.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – Many international couples of separate Member States face practical and legal difficulties, both in the daily management of their property and in its division if the couple separate or one of its members dies. The European Union has set itself the objective of maintaining and developing an area of freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured. The aim of the proposal is to establish a clear, legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction and the law applicable to the property consequences of registered partnerships. It therefore deals with matters of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of a registered partnership. I believe that couples who are registered partners will be protected under EU law.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this proposal as I had no objections to the final proposal.

Hans-Olaf Henkel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe die Empfehlung meiner Fraktionskollegen befolgt und mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, a cărui propunere de regulament privind competența, legea aplicabilă, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești are un efect benefic și pozitiv asupra efectelor patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate și asupra Uniunii Europene.

Se dorește ca, prin acest vot, Parlamentul să exprime un aviz favorabil privind această propunere, fără modificări substanțiale în acest stadiu.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o prijedlogu uredbe Vijeća o nadležnosti, mjerodavnom pravu te priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava jer će se ovim prijedlogom pridonijeti uklanjanju brojnih dvojbi u tom području, što je svakako u interesu Europske unije te međunarodnih parova koji u njoj žive.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – En 2010, la Commission a annoncé une proposition de règlement permettant aux couples internationaux (mariés ou partenaires enregistrés) de savoir plus facilement quels tribunaux sont compétents en ce qui concerne leurs droits de propriété et quelle législation s'y applique.

Après le blocage des négociations, tout accord devant être unanime en matière de droit de la famille, cette proposition revient au Parlement sous la forme d'une coopération renforcée engageant seulement 17 États membres.

Même si le règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et contourner l'obstacle. Ceci notamment par la possibilité généreusement aménagée de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, au final, pas sauvegardée.

Il s'agit donc d'une ingérence injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille et je m'y suis évidemment opposé.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem ve prospěch návrhu týkajícího se majetkových poměrů mezinárodních párů, který se týká zhruba 16 milionů takových párů v EU. Tato zpráva se zabývá případem mezinárodních manželství i registrovaných partnerství a jejich majetkového vypořádání v případě rozvodu, rozluky či úmrtí. Nový právní rámec přináší pro páry z 18 států EU možnost zvolit si, která jurisdikce se bude jejich případem zabývat, aby se zabránilo souběžně probíhajícímu řízení ve dvou státech a případným protichůdným soudním rozhodnutím. Mezinárodní páry tak získají právní jistotu, harmonizaci pravidel a lepší přístup ke spravedlivému řízení. Stejná práva budou zajištěna jak manželským párům, tak registrovaným partnerům/partnerkám.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette proposition de règlement qui vise à établir un corps complet de règles de droit international privé applicables aux effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés. Il est en effet urgent de régler les difficultés pratiques et juridiques que rencontrent les couples transnationaux de l'Union tant dans la gestion quotidienne de leurs biens qu'au moment de leur partage en cas de séparation ou de décès.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted this proposal for a regulation on the property consequences of registered partnerships as it is clearly in the interest of the EU and of its international couples. It will make it possible to put an end to many cases of confusion and legal uncertainty. The current proposal, the second on this topic, has incorporated a large proportion of the amendments proposed by Parliament. Your rapporteur therefore proposes that Parliament issue a favourable opinion on this proposal, without any substantive amendments at this stage.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Ich stimme dem vorliegenden Bericht zu. Die Verordnung wird die Fragen des ehelichen Güterstandes hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeit, des anzuwendenden Rechts sowie der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen lösen. Vom Anwendungsbereich ausgeschlossen sind Fragen nach der Rechts-, Geschäfts-, und Handlungsfähigkeit des Ehegatten, dem Bestehen, der Gültigkeit und der Anerkennung der Partnerschaft, Unterhaltspflichten und Rechtsnachsfolgen. Die Lösung dieser Fragen nach dem Güterstand liegt eindeutig im Interesse der beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten.

Bernd Kölmel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Při hlasování o nařízení Rady o soudní příslušnosti, rozhodném právu, uznávání a výkonu rozhodnutí ve věcech majetkových poměrů v manželství a registrovaném partnerství jsem hlasovala pro návrh.

V rámci EU vzrůstá počet partnerských svazků s mezinárodním prvkem. Cílem nařízení je proto především zjednodušit režim společného majetku manželů a registrovaných partnerů, a to jak v každodenním životě, tak v případě rozvodu či smrti jednoho z partnerů. Nařízení zajišťuje větší míru právní jistoty v rámci těchto svazků, a to mimo jiné prostřednictvím snazšího určení společného soudu a vzájemného uznávání rozsudků v souvisejících věcech jednotlivými členskými státy. Veškeré majetkové poměry mezinárodních párů pocházejících z členských zemí EU tak budou bez ohledu na povahu majetku spravovány soudy jednoho členského státu, a to jak v rámci jejich každodenních poměrů, tak v případě rozvodu či úmrtí jednoho z partnerů.

Vzhledem k tomu, že v tomto ohledu neexistuje shoda mezi všemi členskými státy, bude nařízení uplatněno pouze mezi 17 členskými státy prostřednictvím tzv. užší spolupráce. Vzhledem k rostoucímu počtu manželství a registrovaných partnerství s mezinárodním prvkem je podle mého názoru důležité zjednodušit z toho vyplývající procesy, mezi nimi právě i majetkové poměry těchto osob.

Návrh nařízení jsem proto podpořila.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ribadendo quanto affermato nella dichiarazione precedente, accolgo la proposta di regolamento del Consiglio relativo alla competenza, alla legge applicabile, al riconoscimento e all'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia di regimi patrimoniali delle unioni registrate. Si tratta di un provvedimento importante, che tende a regolare gli effetti patrimoniali dei rapporti tra coppie, che necessitano di chiarezza, semplificazione e certezza del diritto.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre ce rapport, car j'estime que l'Union européenne n'a pas à s'immiscer dans le droit de la famille, lequel relève des États.

En outre, la reconnaissance des «partenariats enregistrés» au sein des couples, qu'elle favorise, est lourde de menaces pour la souveraineté et l'identité des États européens, car tous n'ont pas la même conception de ces «partenariats».

10 États sur 28 ont d'ailleurs catégoriquement refusé de l'appliquer.

Constance Le Grip (PPE), *par écrit*. — L'Union européenne, en créant un espace sans frontières intérieures et en facilitant la mobilité en son sein, a contribué à un accroissement important du nombre de couple transnationaux. Ces couples rencontrent aujourd'hui des difficultés pratiques et juridiques, du fait des différences de procédures et d'un manque de coordination entre les juridictions des États membres. C'est pourquoi j'ai voté en faveur du rapport Cavada concernant une coopération renforcée entre 18 États membres en matière des effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés (ainsi que de son double en matière de régimes matrimoniaux), au sujet de laquelle le Parlement avait été saisi pour avis.

Par ce vote, je souhaite soutenir un texte qui vise à simplifier la vie des citoyens et des couples transnationaux en soutenant la création d'un cadre juridique clair permettant de déterminer la compétence et la loi applicable dans ces situations.

Enfin, je souligne que ce texte s'applique uniquement dans des situations à caractère transnational. Dans le respect du principe de subsidiarité, il n'aura aucune incidence sur la reconnaissance dans un État membre de la validité d'un mariage ou partenariat enregistré conclu dans un autre État membre, ni sur le droit de la famille national.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté contre le rapport sur la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés.

Même si le règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et contourner l'obstacle. Ceci notamment par la possibilité généreusement aménagée de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, au final, pas sauvegardée.

Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. — À partir d'une initiative de la Commission en 2010, le rapport crée un cadre juridique précis pour les couples internationaux concernant leurs droits de propriété. Le fondement du texte leur octroie la possibilité de choisir le droit applicable de l'un des pays dont est issu l'un des partenaires, ou de l'un des pays dans lequel il a sa résidence habituelle.

Il est vrai que ce texte met en lumière l'absence de jurisprudence dans ce domaine. Cependant, le droit de la famille est un domaine inhérent à chaque État. Il relève de la responsabilité des États membres de fixer une législation précise, en développant par exemple des accords de coopération avec des pays tiers. À ce sujet, la Commission est hors de son champ de compétences.

Je m'oppose à ce texte en votant contre.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este reglamento porque el objetivo es establecer un marco legal claro en la UE para determinar la jurisdicción, ley aplicable y reconocimiento y aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad de las parejas de hecho.

La libertad de movimiento dentro de la UE ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de las parejas internacionales o de parejas que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo.

El reglamento pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados Miembros.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – Este Reglamento será un instrumento muy útil para las parejas internacionales dentro de la Unión Europea. En materia de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas, abarca la competencia y la ley aplicable, así como el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones.

El Reglamento establece de manera inequívoca qué órgano jurisdiccional es competente para pronunciarse sobre las solicitudes en materia de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas.

Con este reglamento ponemos fin al fraccionamiento del régimen jurídico de los bienes de la pareja. El Reglamento permite la elección de la ley aplicable a los efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas, pero esta elección se ve limitada por la exigencia de ser ciudadano o residente habitual del Estado en cuestión.

Voto para la aprobación de este Reglamento ya que redunda claramente en interés de la Unión y de sus parejas internacionales. Gracias a él se pondrá fin a numerosos casos de confusión y dificultades jurídicas.

Bernd Lucke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ der Stimme enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert. Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen, da sie sich in manchen Fällen über nationale Wertvorstellungen hinwegsetzen würde.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I support this report that establishes clearly the jurisdiction, law and recognition of decisions of courts in matters of property consequences of registered partnerships.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. Jsem pro, pokud se chtějí státy mezi sebou dobrovolně dohodnout na uznávání rozhodnutí ve věcech majetkových poměrů registrovaného partnerství. Podle mě jde o klasický příklad pro využití mezivládní spolupráce bez nutnosti zapojení Evropského parlamentu a EU.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), rakstiski. – Eiropas Savienībā dzīvo simtiem tūkstošu (ja ne miljonu) laulātu pāru, kuros vīrs un sieva nāk no dažādām valstīm, vai šis pāris dzīvo nevis savās dzimtajās valstīs, bet kādā trešā valstī. Kaut gan Savienībā šajā jomā pastāv dažāda veida pārrobežu garantijas, nolīgumi un citas vienošanās, joprojām nav visaptverošas likumdošanas sistēmas, kura varētu efektīvi papildināt dalībvalstu iekšējo likumdošanu. Līdz ar to reģistrētas partnerattiecības skarošā likumdošana ir primāri dalībvalstu neatkarīgi no tā, kur šis pāris dzīvo un no kurienes nākuši attiecīgi vīrs vai sieva.

Vērts atzīmēt, ka, kamēr 17 dalībvalstis pēc 2015. gada decembrī notikušās Padomes sanāksmes izvēlēties attīstīt ciešāku sadarbību šajos jautājumos, 23 dalībvalstis bija gatavas atbalstīt regulas priekšlikuma tekstu, kurš visai atbilst šodien apskatītajam. Tas dod cerību, ka līdz ar regulas pieņemšanu maksimāli plašs dalībvalstu sastāvs varētu pievienoties tās funkcionēšanai.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Právne predpisy niektorých členských krajín neumožňujú a neuznávajú registrované partnerstvá ako manželský zväzok (Slovensko, Taliansko, Bulharsko, Litva, Lotyšsko, Poľsko a Rumunsko). Preto aj ich vnútroštátne predpisy explicitne majetkové pomery registrovaných partnerstiev neriešia. V krajinách, kde je tento inštitút uznaný a akceptovaný, však predložený návrh nariadenia pomôže odstrániť existujúce prekážky v majetkových veciach a prispeje k posilneniu právnej istoty.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), γραπτώς. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόταση κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο και την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών σχέσεων των καταχωρισμένων συντρόφων, για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 22/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport et donc contre le projet de résolution.

Le contexte est le même que celui du texte précédent: la Commission souhaite modifier le droit des couples internationaux et uniformiser les normes juridiques mais cette fois-ci dans un domaine particulier, celui des partenariats enregistrés.

Le texte définit des règles de procédure, comme la juridiction compétente ou la loi applicable, des grands principes comme l'unité du droit applicable, ou encore la question de la reconnaissance et de l'exécution des décisions dans le cadre des partenariats enregistrés. Par ailleurs, il prévoit la possibilité pour les partenaires de choisir l'État d'enregistrement du partenariat.

Ce texte, s'il ne touche pas directement au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), permettra de contourner certains obstacles législatifs en choisissant notamment la loi applicable. Pour conclure, il favorise une immixtion injustifiée dans les règles nationales et prive les États membres de leur autonomie en matière de droit de la famille, ce à quoi nous nous opposons.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Ο κανονισμός που αφορά τα διεθνή ζευγάρια σχετίζεται με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο, την αναγνώριση και εκτέλεση των αποφάσεων στον τομέα των περιουσιακών στοιχείων των καταχωρισμένων ζευγαριών. Έτσι παρόλο που τα θέματα οικογενειακού δικαίου ρυθμίζονται πρωταρχικά σε εθνικό επίπεδο, τα προαναφερθέντα ζητήματα ρυθμίζονται από τον συγκεκριμένο κανονισμό.

Αναφορικά με τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, ο κανονισμός ρυθμίζει το δικαστήριο που είναι αρμόδιο να επιληφθεί των διαφορών αναφορικά με τα περιουσιακά στοιχεία των συζύγων. Σε σχέση με το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο, ο παρών κανονισμός φέρνει ενότητα, αφού το αρμόδιο δικαστήριο θα έχει δικαιοδοσία στο σύνολο των περιουσιακών στοιχείων ανεξάρτητα από την τοποθεσία που βρίσκεται το ακίνητο και έτσι δεν θα υπάρχει πλέον διαχωρισμός του εφαρμοστέου δικαίου για κάθε στοιχείο ξεχωριστά. Τέλος, σχετικά με την αναγνώριση, εκτελεστότητα και εκτέλεση των αποφάσεων, μια απόφαση είναι εκτελεστή μόνο μετά την κήρυξη της εκτελεστότητάς της από το συγκεκριμένο κράτος μέλος, το οποίο όμως υποχρεούται να το κάνει εκτός εάν συντρέχει σοβαρός λόγος δημοσίας τάξεως.

Θα ήθελα να υπερψηφίσω το συγκεκριμένο ψήφισμα, θεωρώντας ότι είναι ένας τρόπος να διευκολυνθούν τα διεθνή ζευγάρια μέσα από την απλούστευση αλλά και ενοποίηση της νομοθεσίας που τα αφορά.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Verordnung wird die Fragen des Güterstandes hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeit, des anzuwendenden Rechts sowie der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen lösen. Der Berichterstatter billigt mit der vorliegenden legislativen Entschließung den Vorschlag der Kommission. Hier soll Bürokratie abgebaut werden. Daher stimme ich diesem Bericht zu.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – En 2010, la Commission a fait une proposition pour que les couples internationaux sachent plus rapidement quels tribunaux sont habilités à traiter les droits de propriété et la législation qui s'y applique. Cela n'avait d'ailleurs pas fait l'unanimité puisqu'une coopération renforcée avait été mise en place pour 17 États.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'UE n'a pas de légitimité pour légiférer sur des affaires familiales. Cela constitue une intrusion dans les législations nationales concernant la famille. C'est une chose que je ne peux pas tolérer.

En conséquence, j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A presente proposta destina-se a criar na União Europeia um quadro normativo claro relativo à determinação do tribunal competente e da lei aplicável aos efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas e a facilitar a circulação das decisões e dos atos neste domínio entre os diferentes Estados-Membros.

O objetivo da presente proposta é estabelecer um conjunto completo de normas de Direito Internacional Privado aplicáveis aos efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas. Abrange, portanto, a competência, a lei aplicável, o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões proferidas em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas. As normas previstas aplicam-se exclusivamente às situações com carácter transnacional. O requisito da incidência transfronteiriça formulado no artigo 81.º, n.º 3, encontra-se, assim, preenchido.

A presente proposta diz respeito apenas aos efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas, não definindo o instituto da parceria registada nem impondo o reconhecimento de uma parceria registada noutro Estado-Membro.

Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I am in favour of this report, as it clearly defines which courts, laws, and rules of enforcement are applicable in property consequences, and furthers cooperation, uniform efficiency, and clarity of law between member states. International couples will benefit from having clearly defined applicable laws and jurisdiction pertaining to judicial matters of said property consequences.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Il était nécessaire d'aller de l'avant dans un monde globalisé en matière de clarification des régimes matrimoniaux pour les millions de couples/partenaires internationaux dans l'UE. Pour mettre fin au plus vite à cette incertitude sur le droit applicable en cas de gestion de patrimoine ou de partage en cas de divorce ou de décès, nous avons opté pour une coopération renforcée entre 18 États membres, dont la Belgique. Cette coopération permettra d'adapter la législation de l'Union dans un domaine qui touche à la vie même des citoyens.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. – Tento návrh nariadenia Rady o právomoci, rozhodnom práve a uznávaní a výkone rozhodnutí vo veciach majetkových dôsledkov registrovaných partnerstiev je druhým návrhom v tejto oblasti. Keďže každá dohoda týkajúca sa oblasti rodinného práva musí byť jednomyselná, daný návrh je vo forme posilnenej spolupráce. Slovenská republika nie je jedným zo štátov, ktoré uznávajú túto posilnenú spoluprácu, a rovnako neuznávajú registrované partnerstvá, pričom sa na ne nevzťahuje žiadna právna ochrana. Definičné znaky manželstva sa v jednotlivých členských štátoch značne líšia. Týmto nariadením by mohlo dôjsť k širokej interpretácii pojmu manželstvo, ku ktorej by slovenské súdy mali prihliadať, a to považujeme za vmiešavanie sa do vnútorných záležitostí štátu. Otázky vzťahujúce sa na oblasť rodinného práva by mali zostať výlučne v právomoci Slovenskej republiky a mal by sa na ne vzťahovať slovenský právny poriadok. Vzhľadom na uvedené nepodporujem daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this regulation which aims to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships. The regulation will help international couples to choose the law that is applicable to them, the jurisdiction of the courts and also in terms of the recognition and enforcement of decisions adopted in other Member States.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Ez a rendelettervezet az előző pontban tárgyalt rendelettervezet párja. Ilyen formában történő elfogadását ugyanazok a körülmények indokolják, ugyanúgy egyértelműen az Unió és az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok érdekeit szolgálja. A Jogi Bizottság ezért jelentésében azt javasolja, hogy a Parlament az előzőhöz hasonlóan erről a javaslatról is adjon kedvező véleményt. Ennek megfelelően szavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le règlement couvre, en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés (comme le Pacs en France), la compétence et la loi applicable, ainsi que la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions. Même si ce texte affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner l'obstacle. Ceci notamment par la possibilité généreusement ménagée de choisir la loi applicable. L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc, au final, pas sauvegardée. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille, appelant un vote défavorable.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – O regulamento cobre, em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas, a competência e a lei aplicáveis, bem como o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões. No entanto, exclui do seu domínio, nomeadamente, as questões relativas à capacidade dos parceiros, à existência, à validade ou ao reconhecimento de uma parceria, às obrigações alimentares e à sucessão do parceiro falecido. É importante destacar que a autonomia dos Estados-Membros, em matéria de Direito da Família, fica salvaguardada. O regulamento vem, ainda, determinar de forma clara qual o órgão jurisdicional competente para se pronunciar sobre os pedidos em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas.

Defendo que a presente proposta é do interesse da União Europeia, uma vez que garante clareza, certeza e confiança jurídicas, principalmente para os denominados casais internacionais.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est pas sauvegardée par ce texte. Il s'agit donc d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille, et je vote contre.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport relatif à la reconnaissance et à l'exécution des décisions en matière d'effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés. Ce rapport, dont les préconisations s'appliquent aux situations transnationales, est essentiel afin de mettre en place un cadre juridique clair permettant d'éviter les conflits de lois et une meilleure diffusion des décisions et des actes relatifs à ces questions dans les États membres.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – Due to the free movement of people in the EU there has been a significant increase in the numbers of families that need to deal with cross-border issues. These families are currently facing legal problems in dealing with property, both inside their marriage, and when dividing property in case of divorce. I have voted for this report that aims to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of registered partnerships property regimes.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport ce vizează o propunere de regulament al Consiliului privind competența, recunoașterea și executarea hotărârilor judecătorești în materie de efecte patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate. Avizul personal a fost unul favorabil, întrucât acest regulament va permite eliminarea a numeroase confuzii și dificultăți de ordin juridic în ceea ce privește reglementarea aspectelor juridice ale cuplurilor internaționale din Uniunea Europeană. În acest sens, raportul votat astăzi stabilește în mod clar care este instanța competentă să se pronunțe cu privire la cererile în materie de efecte patrimoniale ale parteneriatelor înregistrate.

Totodată, acest regulament va acorda o flexibilitate în reglementarea juridică a status quo-ului cuplurilor internaționale din UE, oferindu-le posibilitatea de a transmite cauza unei alte instanțe.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem návrh nařízení, které bude podle mého názoru v případě mezinárodních párů v Evropské unii velmi užitečným nástrojem. Ve věcech majetkových důsledků registrovaného partnerství se týká příslušnosti, rozhodného práva a uznávání a výkonu rozhodnutí. Z oblasti jeho působnosti jsou však vyjmuty zejména otázky právní způsobilosti partnerů, existence, platnosti a uznání partnerství, vyživovací povinnosti a dědictví majetku zemřelého partnera. Autonomie členských států v oblasti rodinného práva je tak zachována. Nařízení se netýká ani právní úpravy členských států v oblasti registrovaného partnerství nebo jeho právních důsledků. EP byl aktivním účastníkem jednání a podařilo se mu dosáhnout podstatného vylepšení obsahu nařízení.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — This file is the same as the previous file. It follows on from another file voted on at the last plenary on property regimes of international couples.

The Resolution asks the Council to notify Parliament if negotiations depart from the framework which has been presented.

Similar to the previous files, as these regulations will not affect national family law in the participating Member States, but simply set out opaque rules to determine what jurisdiction is applicable and ensure enforcement of decisions in the case of international matrimonial disputes, I voted in favour. I am disappointed that the Irish Government has chosen to opt out given the added value this could have for citizens and the saving of legal costs.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Diese Verordnung löst die Frage des ehelichen Güterstandes, bezugnehmend auf die Zuständigkeit des anzuwendenden Rechts, und der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen. Die Verordnung betrifft nicht Fragen nach Rechts-, Geschäfts-, und Handlungsfähigkeit des Ehegatten, dem Bestehen, der Gültigkeit und der Anerkennung der Partnerschaft, Unterhaltungspflichtigen und Rechtsnachfolgern. Die Lösung dieser Fragen nach dem Güterstand liegt eindeutig im Interesse der beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariu pateiktam pasiūlymui. Pasiūlyme teisingai perkeliama atitinkamos ICCAT rekomendacijos, kuriomis užtikrinamos vienodos veiklos sąlygos visiems tunų žvejybą vykdančioms subjektams. Siekiant užtikrinti veiksmingą priemonių įgyvendinimą, svarbu laipsniškai mažinti bendrą leidžiamą sužvejoti kiekį, apriboti žvejybą tam tikruose rajonuose ir tam tikrais laikotarpiais, nustatyti naują verslinį žuvų dydį, priemones, susijusias su sportinės ir mėgėjų žvejybos veikla, žuvų auginimui bei žvejybos pajėgumams taikomas priemones ir sugriežtinti ICCAT jungtinio tarptautinio tikrinimo sistemą.

Naujas teisinis reguliavimas pašalins esamas teisinės spragas, padės suvienodinti taikomą teisę regioninėje žuvininkystėje bei išdiferencijuoti reguliavimą, atsižvelgiant į įvairių tunų žvejybos įrankių ypatybes.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – In merito alla proposta del collega Cavada, ho ritenuto opportuno votare a favore considerata la portata del regolamento in esame. Pur riguardando gli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, la competenza e la legge applicabile oltre al riconoscimento e l'esecuzione delle decisioni, il presente regolamento tende a salvaguardare le competenze nazionali in materia di diritto di famiglia, assicurando nel contempo che il principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile sulla totalità dei beni nell'ambito del territorio dell'Unione venga rispettato. Nella convinzione che la proposta così come formulata sia da valutare positivamente, ho votato a favore.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Budući da je uz ovaj prijedlog o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu u stvarima koje se odnose na imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava donesen i sličan prijedlog koji se odnosi na režime bračne stečevine, a koji je gotovo u potpunosti preuzet, problematičan je takav pokušaj izjednačavanja braka i drugih životnih zajednica. Neizbježno je pitanje hoće li se nekim budućim aktom na sličan način pokušati izjednačiti brak i druge životne zajednice u pitanjima roditeljske skrbi, posvajanja djece i slično. Iako se u prijedlogu za imovinska pitanja registriranih partnerstava navodi da države članice Europske unije koje nemaju uređen institut registriranih partnerstava isti neće niti morati definirati, dolazi do poteškoća u razumijevanju kako će se pravo neke druge države članice, u kojoj je uređen institut registriranog partnerstva te koja je stoga mjerodavna za rješavanje povezanih imovinskih pitanja, primjenjivati u državi članici u kojoj taj institut nije poznat. Stoga se stječe dojam da se registrirano partnerstvo želi nametnuti svim državama.

Nisam podržala prijedlog o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu u stvarima koje se odnose na imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava jer smatram da nisu svi zakonski elementi dovoljno jasno i precizno definirani te se tim prijedlogom otvaraju vrata gotovo prisilnom usuglašavanju drugih spornih pitanja povezanih s registriranim partnerstvima.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Ovaj prijedlog uredbe Vijeća o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu te priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstva drugi je po redu o tom pitanju. Nakon blokiranja pregovora između država članica, a s obzirom na to da u obiteljskopравnim pitanjima svaki sporazum mora biti jednoglasan, ovaj se prijedlog Parlamentu vraća u okviru pojačane suradnje.

Uredba će biti vrlo koristan instrument za međunarodne parove unutar Europske unije. U području imovinskih posljedica registriranih partnerstva ona pokriva nadležnost i mjerodavno pravo kao i priznavanje i izvršenje odluka. Međutim, iz njezinog područja primjene isključena su osobito pitanja pravne sposobnosti partnera, postojanja, valjanosti ili priznavanja partnerstva, obveza uzdržavanja i nasljeđivanje umrlog partnera. Autonomija država članica u obiteljskopравnim pitanjima je stoga očuvana. Uredba ne utječe ni na materijalno pravo država članica o registriranim partnerstvima ili njihovim imovinskim posljedicama. Slijedom navedenog, udovoljeno je zahtjevima Parlamenta.

Zaključno, slažem se s izvjestiteljem, gospodinom Jean-Marie Cavadom, da je ovaj prijedlog uredbe o imovinskim posljedicama registriranih partnerstva nedvojbeno u interesu Unije i njezinih međunarodnih parova. Njome će se otkloniti brojne pravne dvojbe i nesigurnosti.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Il grande passo avanti di questo nuovo regolamento è rappresentato dal principio dell'unità del diritto applicabile che prevede che il diritto degli effetti patrimoniali di un'unione registrata si applichi alla totalità dei beni detenuti nell'ambito dell'unione, ovunque si trovino. Ciò mette dunque fine alla suddivisione del regime giuridico dei beni della coppia. Il regolamento consente la scelta del diritto applicabile agli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate, ma è limitato dal requisito di essere cittadino o residente abituale dello Stato in questione. La differenza rispetto al regolamento in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi, è che i partner registrati possono scegliere la legge dello Stato di registrazione. In mancanza di scelta, la legge applicabile è quella del luogo di registrazione. Ho votato a favore del nuovo regolamento perché va nell'interesse delle coppie internazionali mettendo fine a molti casi di confusione e difficoltà giuridiche.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Celem propozycji jest ustanowienie jasnych ram prawnych w UE dla ustalenia jurysdykcji, prawa właściwego, uznawania i wykonywania orzeczeń w sprawach decyzji dotyczących skutków majątkowych zarejestrowanego partnerstwa. Parlament Europejski podczas głosowania na sesji w Strasburgu w dniu 9 czerwca 2016 roku udzielił zgody w sprawie decyzji o wzmocnionej współpracy w zakresie reżimów majątkowych małżeństw oraz skutków majątkowych zarejestrowanego partnerstwa. Główną kontrowersję stanowi fakt, że decyzja upoważniająca do podjęcia wzmocnionej współpracy zobowiązuje państwa członkowskie do jednoczesnego związania się dwoma instrumentami - jednym dotyczącym związków partnerskich, drugim dotyczącym małżeństw. Szereg państw członkowskich nie zna instytucji związku partnerskiego, a objęcie ich skutkami rozporządzenia dotyczącego małżeńskich ustrojów majątkowych wymaga przystąpienia do obu rozporządzeń wykonujących wzmocnioną współpracę i zgody na uznawanie skutków instytucji związków partnerskich, której nie uznają na gruncie swojego prawa wewnętrznego i która może być uznawana za sprzeczną z ich porządkiem publicznym. Niniejszym nie mogłem poprzeć sprawozdania.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ces nouvelles dispositions qui s'appliqueront aux 18 États européens s'étant inscrits dans une procédure de coopération renforcée dans le domaine de la compétence, de la loi applicable, de la reconnaissance et de l'exécution des décisions en matière de régimes matrimoniaux des couples internationaux, c'est-à-dire de deux nationalités différentes.

Ces nouvelles règles européennes, qui permettront d'accroître la sécurité des couples internationaux, entraîneront aussi une simplification de la reconnaissance ainsi qu'un renforcement du jugement prononcé par un État membre portant sur la propriété dans un autre État membre.

Paulo Rangel (PPE), *por escrito*. – A presente proposta de regulamento do Conselho, relativo à competência, à lei aplicável, ao reconhecimento e à execução de decisões sobre efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas, cria um quadro normativo europeu simplificado, garantindo a observância do princípio da unidade do Direito, no âmbito do regime jurídico aplicável aos bens de casais compostos por cidadãos de diferentes Estados-Membros. De facto, estes casais têm vindo a adquirir uma representatividade crescente, no seio da União Europeia.

No seguimento das recomendações do Parlamento, ora pontualmente atendidas pela Comissão, e de forma a garantir a observância do princípio da subsidiariedade, a proposta afigura-se, a meu ver, equilibrada, não contendendo com as competências dos Estados-Membros, designadamente em matéria de parcerias registadas e dos respetivos efeitos patrimoniais.

E o que é mais, o documento consagra a chamada cláusula de ordem pública, cuja previsão se afigura, no meu entendimento, essencial, garantindo que, neste âmbito, a aplicação de uma disposição da lei de um Estado-Membro só pode ser afastada se essa aplicação for manifestamente incompatível com a ordem pública do foro (cf. artigo 31.º da proposta).

Pelo exposto, o meu voto é favorável.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Ce midi, le Parlement européen s'est prononcé en faveur de la mise en place d'un cadre juridique plus clair en matière de gestion et de partage des biens pour les 16 millions de couples internationaux dans l'Union ayant conclu un mariage ou un partenariat enregistré.

Cette proposition de coopération renforcée vise à établir des règles claires en cas de divorce ou de séparation de ces couples européens en mettant fin à l'engagement de procédures parallèles et parfois concurrentes dans plusieurs États membres. Une procédure qui s'apparente souvent à un parcours du combattant.

Concrètement, les améliorations consistent en la possibilité pour un couple de déterminer la juridiction ayant compétence à l'aider dans la gestion ou le partage de ces biens.

L'accord permettra également de déterminer le droit applicable lorsque les lois de plusieurs pays peuvent potentiellement s'appliquer à l'affaire en cause. Il facilitera surtout la reconnaissance et l'exécution, dans un État membre, d'une décision de justice en matière patrimoniale rendue dans un autre État membre.

Dominique Riquet (ALDE), *par écrit*. – La mobilité accrue des personnes au sein d'un espace européen sans frontières intérieures entraîne un accroissement important du nombre de couples de ressortissants d'États membres différents qui vivent dans un État membre autre que le leur ou qui acquièrent des biens situés sur le territoire de plusieurs États membres.

Si nous pouvons, en tant qu'Européens, nous en féliciter comme la manifestation d'un brassage accru des peuples européens, cela pose plusieurs questions juridiques et pratiques – en raison de la grande disparité entre les règles applicables aux effets patrimoniaux du mariage – auxquelles ce rapport entend répondre. Il vise notamment à établir un cadre légal clair, où les couples seront capables de choisir la juridiction et la loi applicable pour leurs possessions et leurs propriétés, évitant ainsi des conflits ultérieurs de juridictions.

À n'en pas douter, cette législation permettra une meilleure clarification, stabilité et prévisibilité du cadre légal pour les couples internationaux. En accord avec ces lignes politiques, j'ai voté en faveur de ce texte.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – La libertad de movimiento dentro de la UE ha traído consigo un significativo incremento de las parejas de hecho internacionales o de parejas de hecho que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo. Sin embargo, estas parejas se enfrentan, a menudo, a problemas relacionados con la propiedad, ya sea mientras permanecen unidas o bien a la hora de repartir los bienes en caso de separación. Este reglamento, elaborado mediante el procedimiento de cooperación reforzada y aplicable a 18 Estados Miembros (Suecia, Bélgica, Grecia, Croacia, Eslovenia, España, Francia, Portugal, Italia, Malta, Luxemburgo, Alemania, República Checa, Países Bajos, Austria, Bulgaria, Finlandia y Chipre) que así lo han solicitado, pretende proporcionar instrucciones claras que ayuden a las parejas internacionales a elegir la ley que les resulta aplicable, la jurisdicción de los tribunales y los términos del reconocimiento y ámbito de aplicación de decisiones adoptadas en otros Estados Miembros.

Este reglamento mejorará el estatuto jurídico de las parejas internacionales o que deben resolver cuestiones de carácter transfronterizo, al establecer un marco legal claro para determinar la jurisdicción, ley aplicable y reconocimiento y aplicación de decisiones en materia de regímenes de propiedad de las parejas de hecho, por lo que he votado a favor del mismo.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Je me réjouis de l'adoption de ce rapport qui mettra fin à des procédures parallèles coûtant près de 1,1 milliard d'euros par an dans différents États membres dont les tribunaux doivent régler des conflits de propriété. Elles s'appliqueront aux 18 pays qui ont souhaité rejoindre cette coopération renforcée (à savoir: la Belgique, la Bulgarie, Chypre, la République tchèque, l'Allemagne, la Grèce, l'Espagne, la France, la Croatie, l'Italie, le Luxembourg, Malte, les Pays-Bas, l'Autriche, le Portugal, la Slovénie, la Finlande et la Suède).

Les deux réglementations votées, l'une portant sur les régimes matrimoniaux et l'autre sur les effets patrimoniaux des couples enregistrés, fixeront quel tribunal aura juridiction et quelle loi sera applicable en cas de procédure concernant la propriété des couples internationaux. Elles simplifieront également la reconnaissance et le renforcement du jugement prononcé par un État membre portant sur la propriété dans un autre État membre.

Bronis Ropé (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Šeimos, ar kalbant platesniais terminais – poros, kurios yra kilusios ar gyvena skirtingose šalyse – vis labiau kasdienybėje tampantis vis labiau besiglobalizuojančios mūsų laikų kasdienybės reiškiny. Todėl yra būtina užtikrinti konkretų, aiškų ir skaidrų tokių porų civilinių santykių reguliavimą, turtinių interesų apsaugą, teismų sprendimų pripažinimą taip pat vaikų teisių apsaugos standartus. Sveikinu šią iniciatyvą, kolegą kviečiu balsuoti už, o Komisiją bei valstybes nares – toliau tęsti dialogą su suinteresuotomis pusėmis dėl šios srities reguliavimo tobulinimo.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – À semelhança da outra proposta apresentada em matéria de regimes matrimoniais, também aqui estamos perante um relatório em que o Parlamento é consultado no âmbito da proposta de regulamento do Conselho (igualmente em cooperação reforçada), relativo à competência, à lei aplicável, ao reconhecimento e à execução de decisões em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas.

Na prática, o que este regulamento, *in casu*, pretende fazer é clarificar as regras aplicáveis às parcerias registadas em situações transfronteiriças, abrangendo por isso casais que possuem bens noutro país da União Europeia (UE).

Constitui, por isso, um instrumento extremamente vantajoso para casais internacionais na UE, abrangendo a competência, a lei aplicável, o reconhecimento e a execução de decisões em matéria de efeitos patrimoniais das parcerias registadas.

De fora ficam as questões relacionadas com a capacidade dos parceiros, a existência, a validade ou o reconhecimento de uma parceria, bem como as obrigações alimentares e a sucessão do parceiro falecido, de molde a assegurar a autonomia dos Estados-Membros em matéria de Direito da Família.

Tendo em conta que esta proposta legislativa irá trazer mais certeza e segurança jurídicas, clarificando e simplificando um regime matrimonial e de parcerias anteriormente dúbio, considerei fundamental votar no sentido favorável à sua aprovação.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Rates über die Zuständigkeit, das anzuwendende Recht und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Fragen des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ gestimmt, da es durch die steigende Mobilität von EU Bürgern wichtig ist, derartige Zuständigkeiten und Gesetzgebungen direkt auf EU Ebene festzulegen.

Somit werden eingetragene Partnerschaften in allen teilnehmenden Mitgliedstaaten anerkannt – jedenfalls für die Rechtsfragen, die in diesem Bericht bestimmt werden. Dabei geht es um den Besitz beider Partner. Das Gesetz soll klären, welche Gerichte in welchem Land für diese rechtlichen Fragen zuständig sind, wobei dies abhängig davon ist, wo beide Partner wohnen, welche Staatsangehörigkeit sie haben und in welchem Land die Partnerschaft geschlossen wurde.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Aj keď voľný pohyb osôb medzi členskými štátmi patrí k základným cieľom EÚ, myslím si, že občania ešte stále čelia mnohým prekážkam, s ktorými sa stretávajú pri vykonávaní svojich práv. Keďže tento stav sa týka aj medzinárodných manželstiev a registrovaných partnerstiev, podporila som správu, lebo si myslím, že je potrebné hľadať možnosti postupného odstraňovania týchto problémov, s ktorými sa stretávajú najmä pri každodennej správe spoločného majetku, ale aj v čase zániku spôsobeného rozlukou partnerov alebo úmrtím jedného z nich. Požiadavku na zmenu v tejto oblasti považujem za mimoriadne dôležitú, pretože v poslednom období sa čoraz viac občanov sťahuje cez vnútroštátne hranice do iných krajín EÚ za účelom vytvárania manželstiev a registrovaných partnerstiev. Súhlasím s tým, aby sa v záujme doterajšej právnej neistoty a v mnohých prípadoch aj diskriminácie medzinárodných párov prijímali také legislatívne opatrenia, ktoré zabezpečia nielen jednotný a zjednodušený právny rámec, ale budú chrániť aj ich majetkový režim a majetkové dôsledky. Očakávam, že tieto zmeny pomôžu odstrániť ťažkopádne a nákladné formality súvisiace s cezhraničným uznávaním rôznych dokumentov, ktoré mnohokrát nie sú uznávané jednotlivými členskými štátmi (rodinný stav, životné udalosti).

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *pisno*. – Ta predlog uredbe Sveta o pristoynosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti, je drugi tovrstni predlog.

Po zastoji pogajanj med državami članicami se predlog vrača v Parlament v obliki okrepljenega sodelovanja. Za del o pravu, ki se uporablja, velja univerzalna uporaba, torej omogoča tudi uporabo prava tretjih držav. Pri tem je največji napredek načelo enotnosti veljavnega prava, v skladu s katerim pravo na področju premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti velja za vse premoženje v okviru partnerstva, ne glede na to, kje se nahaja.

S tem se odpravlja sistem razdelitve pravne ureditve premoženjskopравnega položaja parov. Uredba omogoča izbiro prava, ki se uporablja za premoženjskopравne posledice registrirane partnerske skupnosti, vendar je izbira omejena, saj je treba imeti v izbrani državi državljanstvo ali običajno prebivališče.

Razlika med tem predlogom uredbe in predlogom uredbe o premoženjskih razmerjih med zakoncema je ta, da bodo lahko registrirani partnerji izbrali zakon države, v kateri je partnerstvo registrirano. Poročilo poudarja, da je predlog uredbe o premoženjskopравnih posledicah registriranih partnerskih skupnosti v interesu mednarodnih parov, ki živijo v EU, saj bo odpravil številne primere nejasnosti in pravne negotovosti.

Zaradi navedenega sem glasoval za sprejetje poročila.

Joachim Starbatty (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe die Empfehlung meiner Fraktionskollegen befolgt und mich bei der Abstimmung über den Cavada-Bericht „Zuständigkeit, anzuwendendes Recht, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Bereich des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften“ enthalten.

In den EU-Mitgliedstaaten herrschen deutliche Unterschiede, wie eine auf Lebenszeit angelegte Partnerschaft zwischen zwei Personen gleichen Geschlechts von den Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Lesbische und schwule Lebenspartner können im Ausland deswegen auf Probleme stoßen. Bilaterale oder auch multilaterale Abkommen, die die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiieren, um nationale Regelungen anzunähern, halte ich deswegen für wünschenswert.

Eine einheitliche europäische Regulierung kann ich jedoch nicht unterstützen. Ganz im Gegenteil sehe ich im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission und des Rates einen Eingriff in die Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des Familienrechts.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Preporuka Odbora za pravna pitanja bi trebala pojednostavniti dosad nejasne i nedorečene jurisdikcije suda po pitanjima stečevine za životna partnerstva koji dolaze iz različite zemlje članice. Na temelju preporuke, pravni subjekt bi trebao dobiti pravo odabrati državu čiji je građanin, odnosno čiji je životni partner građanin, te pitanja stečevine riješiti po zakonima odabrane zemlje. Preporuka nalaže da su eventualne sudske odluke vezano za stečevinu obvezujuće, osim u „vrlo specifičnim okolnostima“. Preporuka traži uspostavu efektivnog načina komuniciranja ovih prava svim registriranim parovima koji nisu državljani iste države.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan*. – Ova uredba je vrlo koristan instrument za međunarodne parove u Europskoj uniji. Uredbom su pokrivena pitanja nadležnosti, primjene prava, priznanja i izvršenja odluka u pitanjima vlasništva registriranih partnerstva. Uredba jasno određuje koji sud ima nadležnost u proceduri vlasničkih sporova međunarodnih parova. Također, uredba uspostavlja načine za komuniciranje potrebnih osnovnih pravnih informacija međunarodnim parovima.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da je u skladu s interesima Europske unije i međunarodnih parova. Smatram da će se implementacijom ovog prijedloga otkloniti nejasnoće i stati na kraj mnogim slučajevima pravne nesigurnosti.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasovala sem za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Sveta o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju odločb na področju premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti.

Uredba med drugim tudi jasno določa katero sodišče je pristojno za odločanje o zahtevkih s področja premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti.

Poročilo sem podprla tudi zaradi tega, ker uredba pokriva pristojnosti in pravo, ki se uporablja, pa tudi priznavanje in izvrševanje sodnih odločb na področju premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti, vendar so iz njenega področja uporabe izključena zlasti vprašanja pravne in poslovne sposobnosti partnerjev.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραπτώς*. – Διά της εν λόγω έκθεσης επιχειρείται η θεσμοθέτηση ενός ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου αναφορικά με τις οικογενειακού δικαίου υποθέσεις των διεθνών ζευγαριών. Είμαστε αντίθετοι στην εμπλοκή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας στη διαρρύθμιση των οικογενειακών υποθέσεων, καθώς το κάθε κράτος μέλος καλύπτει επαρκώς με τη δική του νομοθεσία τα υπό κρίση ζητήματα. Αναφορικά δε με τις ιδιαιτερότητες που προκύπτουν στα διεθνή ζευγάρια, το ιδιωτικό διεθνές δίκαιο παρέχει την απαιτούμενη ασφάλεια ως προς την αποτελεσματική ρύθμιση των ως άνω σχέσεων.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a jelentés elfogadását, amely jóváhagyta a bejegyzett élet-társi kapcsolatokat vagyoni jogi hatásaival kapcsolatos ügyekben a joghatóságról, az alkalmazandó jogról, valamint a határ-ozatok elismeréséről és végrehajtásáról szóló bizottsági javaslatot. Véleményem szerint a javaslat elfogadása az Unió és az Unióban élő nemzetközi párok érdekeit szolgálja, csak úgy, mint a javaslat párja, amely a házasságban élők vagyoni-jogi rendszerét kívánja kiszámíthatóbbá tenni. Az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződés előírja, hogy az Unió – különösen a polgári ügyekben hozott bírósági és bíróságon kívüli határozatok kölcsönös elismerésének elvével – meg-könnyítse az igazságszolgáltatáshoz való hozzáférést.

Bár a Tanács arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy nem lehet egyhangúságot elérni a bejegyzett élettársi kapcsolat vagyoni vonatkozásairól szóló rendeletjavaslatok elfogadása tekintetében, 2016 februárjáig 17 tagállam mégis jelezte, hogy megerősített együttműködést kívánnak létrehozni egymás között e téren. Üdvözlöm ezt a döntést, hiszen a belső határok nélküli térségben a személyek növekvő mobilitása a különböző tagállami állampolgárságú személyek alkotta párok számának növekedéséhez vezet, akik számára szintén biztosítani kell a kiszámíthatóságot és jogbiztonságot.

Claudia Tapardel (S&D), *in writing*. – The overall aim of this regulation is to create a clear legal framework in the EU for determining the jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnership. This is a necessary procedure in light of the fact that the free movement of people has led to a significant increase in the numbers of international couples. These couples have to deal with a number of cross-border issues, and are facing legal problems in dealing with property and when dividing it following separation. Therefore, the present regulation will provide clear instructions which will help international couples by allowing them to choose the law that is applicable to them, the jurisdiction of the courts and also as regards the recognition and enforcement of decisions adopted in other Member States.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – Je me suis prononcé en faveur de la proposition de mon collègue, M. Cavada. Cette proposition de règlement sur les effets patrimoniaux des partenariats enregistrés est clairement dans l'intérêt de l'Union et de ses couples internationaux. Le règlement proposé permettra de mettre fin à de nombreux cas de confusion et de difficulté juridique. La proposition actuelle, qui est la deuxième en la matière, a intégré une bonne partie des amendements proposés par le Parlement

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – As a result of increased integration between European countries, the EU now counts 16 million international couples, namely 32 million citizens. While marriage remains the most common type of union, new forms of partnerships have emerged, including the registered partnership, by which two people in a stable relationship formally register their union with a public authority. These couples often encounter great difficulties when it comes to the property rights of their union, because of the significant difference regarding the rules governing registered partnerships between the different EU countries. This is why I voted in favour of the proposal that will enable international couples in the EU to benefit from legal security, a better access to justice and harmonised rules regarding property rights. Concretely, it will allow citizens in international couples to have the various procedures related to property rights, namely divorce, legal separation and death procedures, handled by the courts of the same EU country.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Prijedlog uredbe Vijeća o nadležnosti i mjerodavnom pravu te priznavanju i izvršenju odluka u stvarima koje se odnose na imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava drugi je po redu o tom pitanju i cilj mu je uspostaviti sveobuhvatni skup pravila međunarodnog privatnog prava mjerodavnog za imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava.

Kao i u slučaju režima bračne stečevine, imovinski odnosi između registriranih partnera te između partnera i trećih osoba proizlaze iz prethodnog postojanja registriranog partnerstva. Imovinske posljedice registriranih partnerstava nastaju registracijom partnerstva, kao što režim bračne stečevine nastaje brakom, i prestaju s raskidom partnerstva. Registracijom partnerstva pred javnim tijelom partneri uspostavljaju stabilan i pravno priznat odnos. No, nisam podržala ovo izvješće jer bi uspostava sveobuhvatnog skupa pravila Europske unije o ovom pitanju dovela do povrede načela supsidijarnosti.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Predlog uredbe, ki ureja pristojnost sodne oblasti, veljavno zakonodajo ter priznavanje in izvrševanje odločb v zadevah na področju premoženjskih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti, sem podprla.

Področje uredbe ne zajema zadev, kot so pravna sposobnost partnerjev, obstoj, veljavnost ali priznanje partnerstva, preživetinske obveznosti ali dedovaje zapuščine umrlega partnerja. Avtonomija držav članic na področju družinskega prava je zato ohranjena.

Uredba prav tako ne vpliva ali posega v materialno pravo držav članic o registriranih partnerstvih in sistemih lastnine. V uredbi je jasno določeno, katero sodišče je pristojno za odločanje v postopkih na področju premoženjskih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti.

Poleg tega je predvideno, da, če država članica ne priznava partnerstva, se sodiščem države članice podeli diskrecijska pravica, ki pristojnost v tej zadevi podeljuje sodiščem druge države članice, ki to partnersko zvezo priznavajo.

Predlog upošteva tudi načelo enotnosti veljavne zakonodaje, pri čemer zakon o premoženjskih posledicah registriranih partnerskih skupnosti velja za vse premoženje, ki je bilo ustvarjeno v času partnerstva ne glede na to, kje se nahaja.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le règlement affirme qu'il exclut de son domaine les questions touchant au droit matériel (capacité, obligations alimentaires, succession...), mais il permettra inévitablement aux partenaires d'anticiper d'éventuels blocages et de contourner l'obstacle, notamment par la possibilité de choisir la loi applicable.

L'autonomie des États membres en matière de droit de la famille n'est donc pas sauvegardée. Il s'agit d'une immixtion injustifiée dans les législations nationales concernant la famille.

J'ai donc voté contre.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A bejegyzett életjárási kapcsolatok vagyoni jogi vonatkozásait érintő ügyekben a joghatóságról, az alkalmazandó jogról, valamint a határozatok elismeréséről és végrehajtásáról szóló tanácsi határozatra irányuló jelen javaslat ebben a tárgyban a második. A tagállamok közötti tárgyalások blokkolását követően – mivel a családjog terén minden megállapodást egyhangúlag kell elfogadni – ez a javaslat megerősített együttműködés formájában tér vissza a Parlamenthez. Szavazatommal támogattam.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Proponemos votar a favor de este informe, ya que su propósito es la apertura de una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones en los regímenes de propiedad de las parejas internacionales, que abarca las cuestiones de los regímenes matrimoniales y la consecuencias patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. Se trata de medidas que van a facilitar las gestiones a las parejas internacionales.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Reglamentas sudaro galimybę pasirinkti teisę, taikytiną registruotos partnerystės turtinėms pasekmėms, tačiau šis pasirinkimas apribotas reikalavimu būti atitinkamos valstybės piliečiu arba nuolatinio gyventoju. Šis reglamentas skiriasi nuo reglamento dėl sutuoktinių turto teisinio režimo tuo, kad registruoti partneriai galės taip pat pasirinkti valstybės, kurioje registruota partnerystė, teisę.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships. The regulation covers jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of property consequences of registered partnership. I voted in favour because I believe that this regulation will be a very useful instrument for international couples in the EU.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mediante esta decisión el pleno aprueba un instrumento europeo para gestionar los regímenes económicos de parejas de hecho que van a servir para determinar qué tribunal tiene jurisdicción y qué legislación ha de aplicarse en cada caso. Hablamos por lo tanto de un paso muy importante para facilitar la gestión de dichos regímenes que afectan a unos 16 millones de parejas internacionales de la UE. Por todo ello creo necesario votar a su favor.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Este informe aprueba la propuesta de la Comisión para regular la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones relativas a los regímenes económicos de las parejas internacionales, tanto en materia de regímenes económicos matrimoniales como de efectos patrimoniales de las uniones registradas. He votado a favor del mismo puesto que de esta manera se facilitará el reconocimiento de los regímenes matrimoniales de las parejas transfronterizas.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Dit voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad betreffende het toepasselijke recht, de erkenning en de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen op het gebied van de vermogensrechtelijke gevolgen van geregistreerde partnerschappen is het tweede over dit onderwerp. Nadat de onderhandelingen tussen de lidstaten vast kwamen te zitten – voor afspraken op het gebied van familierecht is immers unanimiteit vereist –, wordt dit voorstel nu aan het Parlement voorgelegd in het kader van nauwere samenwerking. Wat de procedurele aspecten van nauwere samenwerking betreft, wordt verwezen naar de specifieke aanbeveling daarover. Dus ook hier mijn goedkeuring.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Bei diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde um die Zuständigkeit, das anzuwendende Recht und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Fragen des Güterstands eingetragener Partnerschaften. Er bezieht sich damit auf die Tatsache, dass immer häufiger Bürger aus verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten Bindungen miteinander eingehen und diese Paare sich in einem Mitgliedstaat niederlassen. Der vorgeschlagene Änderungsantrag bezieht sich hier sinnvollerweise auf eine Präzisierung der betroffenen Mitgliedsstaaten, sodass es den Mitgliedstaaten frei steht, im Rahmen einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit diese Regelungen zu akzeptieren.

Lieve Wierinck (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this proposal for a Council regulation because I believe that our system needs to evolve with modern times. As Europe's internal barriers disappeared and our citizens started exploring their continent more and more, an increasing amount of people started meeting their life partners abroad. Together with the Council regulation on matrimonial property regimes, it aims at the simplification and flexibility of legislation and procedures, for international couples, in the case of decease, divorce, etc. As with its complementary one, this regulation clarifies what the procedure, the scope, the jurisdiction, as well as the applicable law will be in such cases. At the same time, it enables, for example, the enforceability of authentic acts. This will also enhance legal certainty and predictability. Finally, I welcome the fact that many of the EP's previous recommendations in this matter have been taken into account.

Anna Záborská (PPE), *písomne*. – Dlhodobu nesúhlasím s tým, aby registrované partnerstvá požívali rovnakú ochranu a podporu zo strany štátu ako manželstvá tvorené jedným mužom a jednou ženou. Takéto manželstvá majú totiž potenciál priviesť na svet deti. Mimoriadny právny režim, ktorý štát priznáva manželstvu muža a ženy, nie je prejavom uznania lásky dvoch ľudí, ale praktickou odpoveďou na existenčné neistoty spojené s rodičovstvom. Registrovaní partneri rovnakého pohlavia nemôžu priviesť na svet potomstvo, a preto nepovažujem za spravodlivé ani správne, aby požívali rovnaké výhody ako manželia, ktorí sa môžu stať rodičmi. Z toho dôvodu som hlasovala proti predloženému návrhu uznesenia.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφίως*. – Ακολούθησα την πρόταση του αρμόδιου εισηγητή, όπως αυτή εγκρίθηκε από τους συναδέλφους της επιτροπής Νομικών Θεμάτων του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, ψηφίζοντας θετικά.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), *por escrito*. – Estoy a favor de este paquete de propuestas referentes al derecho de familia, ya que creo que todas ellas son de gran utilidad en cuanto a que conforman un régimen de Derecho Internacional Privado reforzado, completando otros instrumentos de esta rama legislativa.

Las parejas y matrimonios internacionales son un fenómeno que por factores como la globalización y la crisis económica (que en muchos casos ha propiciado que los ciudadanos europeos hayan tenido que cambiar su lugar de residencia en busca de una vida laboral mejor) son cada vez más comunes.

Todo ello, sin duda, requiere de una revisión de la legislación, que permita a este perfil de parejas contar con respaldo y reconocimiento jurídico, de modo que quienes se encuentren en esta situación no perciban desventajas por esta unión de perfil internacional y cuenten con los mismos derechos y deberes que una pareja perteneciente al mismo estado.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), písomne. – Rovnako ako prvú správu pána poslanca Cavada týkajúcu sa majetkového režimu manželských párov aj v jeho druhej správe o majetkovom režime medzinárodných registrovaných partnerstiev som sa v hlasovaní zdržala. Myslím si síce, že pravidlá na riešenie majetkových pomerov registrovaných partnerstiev sú potrebné, keďže registrované partnerstvá sú bežnou súčasťou právnych poriadkov mnohých členských štátov, na druhej strane ale sedem členských štátov, medzi nimi aj Slovenská republika, tento inštitút, či už v súvislosti s pármí rovnakého alebo opačného pohlavia, vôbec nepozná. Práve preto považujem za veľmi nešťastné, že právnym otázkam vyplývajúcim z tohto faktu, medziiným otázke súladu návrhu s princípom subsidiarity, keďže rodinné právo hmotné patrí do výlučnej právomoci členských štátov, sa nevenovala dostatočná pozornosť, hoci ide navyše aj o mimoriadne citlivú tému. Rovnako fakt, že obe nariadenia sú prepojené a akceptáciou jedného budú musieť členské štáty prijať aj druhé, považujem v daných súvislostiach za nie veľmi politicky korektné riešenie.

Milan Zver (PPE), pismo. – Glasoval som za poročilo o predlogu uredbe Sveta o prístupnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja, ter priznavanju in izvrševanju odločb na področju premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti.

Uredba med drugim jasno določa, katero sodišče je pristojno za odločanje o zahtevkih s področja premoženjskopравnih posledic registriranih partnerskih skupnosti zato menim, da bo odpravila številne primere nejasnosti in pravne negotovosti za mednarodne pare znotraj Evropske unije.

9.11. Massaker im Osten des Kongo (RC-B8-0801/2016, B8-0801/2016, B8-0802/2016, B8-0804/2016, B8-0805/2016, B8-0807/2016, B8-0808/2016, B8-0809/2016)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore di questa risoluzione perché è giusto che da Bruxelles parta il grido di allarme, seguito immediatamente da un'azione concreta dell'Europa per quello che sta succedendo in Congo.

Decine di migliaia di sfollati, migliaia di morti, atroci violenze su donne e bambini: è ormai da anni che nella parte orientale del Congo si consumano violenze sotto il benestare e sotto l'immobilismo dell'esercito regolare, impegnato a gestire e ad approfittare di altri affari ben più redditizi che fare la guerra ai gruppi armati che hanno costretto 35 000 famiglie a lasciare le loro abitazioni, le fortunate famiglie che sono riuscite a sopravvivere.

Che poi sul campo ci siano anche i caschi blu dell'ONU, impegnati in una missione, e che non siano stati in grado di fermare i massacri è davvero preoccupante. La situazione in Congo, oltre a creare ingiuste vittime tra i civili, rischia di gettare discredito sull'ONU e sulla comunità internazionale tutta. Ecco perché la politica europea deve essere più forte e coerente. Nessun *Migration Compact* sarà possibile senza prima la pacificazione dell'Africa.

Cécile Kashetu Kyenge (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, nessuna pietà per chi si macchia di questi crimini atroci. Il Parlamento europeo ha dato una grande prova di coraggio, chiedendo di far luce sui massacri che devastano interi territori nell'est del Congo. Una spirale di violenza che non si arresta tempestivamente deve essere arrestata soltanto con una voce molto più autorevole, con un intervento tempestivo. Se non si arresta, rischia di innescare i primi focolai di un genocidio e di destabilizzare tutta la regione dei Grandi Laghi. L'eccidio che si sta consumando da anni in questa regione, signor Presidente, è una caratteristica imprescindibile del popolo che abita in queste terre. Oggi non ci rassegniamo alla vergogna e da oggi questo Parlamento è con il popolo Beni, Lubero e Butembo.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), per iscritto. – Violazione dei diritti umani, crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono soltanto alcune delle violenze che, purtroppo, continuano a perpetrarsi in territorio congolese. La zona nord-orientale del paese, in particolare modo, continua ad essere teatro dell'azione di gruppi armati, in più occasioni denunciati per massacri, reclutamento di minori e violenze sessuali.

La risoluzione presentata invita la comunità internazionale ad avviare un'indagine approfondita, a predisporre sanzioni mirate ed efficaci, mettendo fine all'indifferenza che, fin ora, l'ha caratterizzata.

Poiché ritengo che, intervenire per contrastare le reiterate violazioni dei diritti umani, sia doveroso e prioritario, ho espresso voto favorevole.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha interétnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Me he abstenido en el voto final de la resolución conjunta debido principalmente a que en esta no se reconoce el genocidio, se pide el refuerzo de MOUNSCO y en particular a través de las patrullas y bases de operaciones móviles, incluso aunque algunos párrafos con los que estoy de acuerdo piden una evaluación, y no refleja información sobre las responsabilidades de las multinacionales en el apoyo financiero del conflicto y la explotación ilegal de los recursos naturales

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre les résolutions et abstention pour la résolution GUE qui est de très loin la plus étudiée et marque une véritable maîtrise du dossier. Les autres résolutions sont en effet marquées par une ignorance évidente de ce qu'il se passe au Congo. Il faut à l'évidence, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, se reporter à la fin de la Guerre Froide et à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette raison au détriment de la France (avec l'appui des diplomaties canadiennes, britanniques et israéliennes). C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui, en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – The initiative put forward by the European Parliament calling for peace in the Congo region was progressive, however, the Joint Motion for a Resolution was not critical enough on the interference of certain countries and companies in destabilising the country.

My Group, GUE/NGL tabled an alternative resolution which was much more critical and got to the root of the issues. However, as the majority of MEPs voted in favour of the Joint Resolution, I did not have an opportunity to endorse this alternative one and therefore, I was left with no choice but to abstain on this Resolution.

Eric Andrieu (S&D), *par écrit*. – Suite au conflit qui a provoqué la mort de six millions de personnes en 20 ans et tue plus de 800 individus chaque jour, nous demandons la mise en place d'une enquête internationale.

Les responsables européens doivent arrêter de se voiler la face sur les horreurs perpétrées ces deux dernières décennies en République démocratique du Congo par les milices armées. Ces dernières, en effet, ne cessent de déplacer les populations autochtones dans le seul but de prendre le contrôle des exploitations de ressources naturelles et minérales.

Nous invitons urgemment Federica Mogherini, la Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, à demander l'ouverture d'une enquête internationale sur les massacres, et ce, en collaboration avec les Nations unies et la Cour Pénale Internationale. Nous exigeons par ailleurs des membres de l'Union européenne faisant partie du Conseil de Sécurité de prendre toutes les mesures possibles dans le but d'arrêter ces crimes.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Η κατάσταση της ασφάλειας στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία του Κονγκό εξακολουθεί να επιδεινώνεται στο βορειοανατολικό τμήμα της χώρας, όπου δεκάδες ένοπλες ομάδες δρουν, αφήνοντας πίσω τους χιλιάδες νεκρούς. Σύμφωνα με πολλές αναφορές, σημειώνονται σφαγές, ανήλικα παιδιά πέφτουν θύματα αναγκαστικής στρατολόγησης και βίας, ενώ συχνά είναι και τα περιστατικά σεξουαλικής βίας. Λόγω αυτής της κατάστασης που επιδεινώνεται καθημερινά συντάχθηκε αυτή η κοινή πρόταση ψηφίσματος, την οποία και υπερψήφισα.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Im nordöstlichen Teil der Demokratischen Republik Kongo sind nach wie vor Dutzende bewaffnete Gruppen aktiv und die Sicherheitslage verschlechtert sich fortlaufend. Zahlreich wird über Massaker, Rekrutierung und Einsatz von Kindern durch bewaffnete Gruppen sowie über weitverbreitete sexuelle und geschlechterspezifische Gewalt berichtet. Jedoch zeigt sich die internationale Gemeinschaft demgegenüber meist gleichgültig.

Die erschreckenden Zustände in diesem Gebiet Kongos sind sehr bedauernswert und besorgniserregend. Zusammen mit dem Parlament wünsche ich mir eine Beendigung der Gewalt. Die Ungewissheit, ob die nächsten Wahlen nun auch zur rechtmäßigen Zeit abgehalten werden, ist beklagenswert. Zudem ist auch eine verbreitete Straffreiheit für Täter von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, sexuelle Gewalt gegen Mädchen und Frauen, oder für diejenigen, die für die Rekrutierung von Kindersoldaten verantwortlich sind, empörend.

Ich stimme der Forderung des Parlamentes uneingeschränkt zu, dass solche Verbrecher nach nationalem und internationalem Strafrecht bestraft werden müssen. Die EU muss für einen kontinuierlichen Dialog zwischen den Ländern der Region der Großen Seen sorgen und aktiv zu den Stabilisierungsbemühungen beitragen.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ces résolutions font suite à une aggravation des exactions commises en République démocratique du Congo.

À l'exception de celle de l'extrême gauche, les résolutions sont marquées par une ignorance manifeste de ce qui se passe au Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide et à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette région au détriment de la France, avec l'appui des diplomaties canadiennes, britanniques et israéliennes. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

J'ai donc voté contre toutes les résolutions et me suis abstenue pour la résolution de l'extrême gauche qui, si elle est difficile à suivre par ses recommandations sur la famille, reste la plus étudiée.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ces propositions de résolution, qui font suite à une aggravation des exactions commises dans l'ex-Zaïre, mais qui brillent par leur ignorance de la situation dans l'actuelle République démocratique du Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide ainsi qu'à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette région au détriment de la France avec l'appui d'autres diplomaties occidentales.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques, tactique dont nous pouvons aujourd'hui constater les conséquences désastreuses pour les populations locales.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – Les massacres commis par des violentes milices se succèdent dans l'Est du pays et plus particulièrement dans la province du Nord-Kivu. La situation humanitaire y est alarmante. La résolution commune, que j'ai soutenue, demande dès lors qu'une enquête approfondie, transparente et indépendante soit ouverte par la Communauté internationale et rappelle qu'il ne peut y avoir d'impunité pour les personnes responsables de violations graves des droits de l'homme, de crimes de guerre, de crimes contre l'humanité, d'actes de violence sexuelle contre les femmes et les jeunes filles ainsi que de l'enrôlement d'enfants soldats.

Brando Benifei (S&D), per iscritto. – La Repubblica democratica del Congo si trova da lungo tempo a dover affrontare una situazione di notevole gravità che coinvolge in particolare la parte nordorientale del paese. Violenze, massacri, scomparse e ripetute violazioni dei diritti umani più elementari costituiscono ormai una triste quotidianità. Si tratta di episodi che si collegano a scontri tra la politica regionale e quella nazionale, alla strumentalizzazione delle tensioni etniche e allo sfruttamento delle risorse.

La risoluzione approvata oggi dal Parlamento, e da me sostenuta, chiede con forza la cessazione delle ostilità nel paese africano e l'avvio di un'indagine approfondita, indipendente e trasparente sui massacri, che veda attivamente coinvolti anche il governo e le forze ONU presenti sul territorio. Il processo di pacificazione non può non avere, tra le prime tappe, lo svolgimento delle libere elezioni previste dalla Costituzione al termine del mandato presidenziale.

L'Unione europea ha il dovere di favorire il dialogo tra i paesi dell'Unione africana per impedire ulteriori destabilizzazioni nell'area dei Grandi Laghi e deve prevedere la possibilità di imporre sanzioni mirate, tra cui il divieto di viaggio e il congelamento dei beni, nei confronti dei responsabili dei massacri nel Congo orientale.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Hemos votado abstención en esta resolución pues pese a condenar los recientes dramáticos acontecimientos sucedidos en la República Democrática del Congo puede ser considerada parcial al no atender a las causas de fondo de la actual situación de inestabilidad, concretamente la desigualdad y el rol de las grandes transnacionales extractivas en el territorio.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), por escrito. – Apoyo el texto de esta resolución común porque la situación de la República Democrática del Congo requiere una acción intensa e inmediata de la comunidad internacional y en especial de la unión europea. Entre los aspectos fundamentales de este pronunciamiento muestro mi especial apoyo a la ejecución de una investigación por parte de la Corte penal Internacional sobre los crímenes de la región de Beni, la posibilidad de aplicar sanciones selectivas entre las que figuren la prohibición de viajar a la UE y la congelación de activos de todas las personas responsables de la represión y matanzas en la república democrática del Congo y el llamamiento a la responsabilidad de las empresas europeas que operan en la zona. Igualmente considero imprescindible la convocatoria electoral y el final del mandato del presidente Kabila.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre cette résolution commune qui concerne les massacres dans l'est du Congo.

Comme tout un chacun, je suis sensible à la situation sécuritaire des Congolais, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le drame des enfants soldats, enrôlés de force dans des groupes armés et envoyés au massacre. Il est également tragique qu'entre octobre 2014 et mai 2016 dans les territoires de Beni, Lubero et Butembo, plus de 1 160 personnes aient été sauvagement assassinées, avec également de nombreuses disparitions, des destructions des infrastructures scolaires et médicales et des violences sexuelles commises.

Cependant, cette résolution européenne, loin de résoudre les problèmes, se contente d'une posture d'ingérence fondée sur un sentimentalisme qui, s'il est compréhensible, est irresponsable en matière de politique étrangère.

Je salue à ce titre certains amendements déposés par la GUE qui souligne notamment qu'une des solutions réalistes passent par la nécessité pour le Congo de retrouver sa souveraineté en ce qui concerne ses ressources et sur la responsabilité des multinationales étrangères dans la spoliation de celles-ci.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), per iscritto. – Condanno fortemente i massacri che perdurano ormai da più di 20 anni nel Congo orientale, ritengo che l'UE dovrebbe agire con fermezza per sostenere queste popolazioni e riportare la giustizia e la democrazia in questo Paese.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución -iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista- porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha étnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šios rezoliucijos, nes ja reiškiamas didelis susirūpinimas smurto eskalavimu ir nerimą keliančia bei blogėjančia humanitarine padėtimi Kongo Demokratinėje Respublikoje (KDR), kurią visų pirma lėmė ginkluoti konfliktai rytinėse provincijose, nesiliaujantys jau daugiau nei 20 metų, apgailestaujama dėl prarastų gyvybių ir išreiškiama užuojauta KDR gyventojams.

Rezoliucija ragina, kad tarptautinė bendruomenė pradėtų išsamų, nepriklausomą ir skaidrų žudynių tyrimą, ir ragina užtikrinti, kad būtų vykdomas nuolatinis politinis Didžiųjų ežerų regiono šalių dialogas siekiant užkirsti kelią tolesniam destabilizavimui. Taip pat ragina ES siūsti stebėtoją siekiant įvertinti humanitarinę padėtį ir atkreipti tarptautinės bendruomenės dėmesį į žudynes, apsvarstyti galimybę taikyti tikslines sankcijas, įskaitant draudimą keliauti ir turto išaldymą asmenims, KDR vykdydžiusiems smurtinius susidorojimus, ragina ES ir jos valstybes nares toliau teikti paramą KDR gyventojams.

Primenama, kad neutralizavus visas ginkluotas grupuotes regione bus labai prisidėta prie taikos ir stabilumo ir kad ES turi darniai vykdyti įvairių sričių politiką bei derybose dėl susitarimų regione turi būti skatinama taika, stabilumas, vystymasis ir žmogaus teisės.

Simona Bonafè (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'escalation di violenza che sta interessando il Congo orientale, con il reclutamento forzato di bambini da parte di gruppi armati e il protrarsi di massacri in vaste zone del Paese, non può passare sotto silenzio. Si tratta di un'emergenza umanitaria che non può essere ignorata se non vogliamo un nuovo genocidio in una regione, come quella dei Grandi Laghi, da tempo al centro di tensioni etniche e territoriali, ma anche oggetto di contrasti legati allo sfruttamento delle molteplici risorse naturali, e in special modo minerarie, di cui l'area è estremamente ricca.

Alla luce di ciò, il Parlamento europeo si è pronunciato oggi per chiedere la fine delle ostilità e delle violenze ancora in atto, per invocare il ripristino di una situazione di legalità e invitare le parti in conflitto al dialogo e alla ricerca di una soluzione pacifica.

Nella risoluzione approvata oggi abbiamo inoltre affermato la necessità di assicurare alla giustizia i responsabili delle violazioni dei diritti umani perpetrate, per contrastare il clima di sostanziale inerzia e impunità che ha favorito l'attuazione di ulteriori crimini. È importante infatti che la comunità internazionale avvii al più presto un'indagine approfondita, in modo da fare chiarezza e accertare tutte le responsabilità in gioco.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre toutes les résolutions et me suis abstenue sur la résolution GUE qui, si elle est difficile à suivre entre autres par ses recommandations sur la famille, est de très loin la plus étudiée et marque une véritable maîtrise du dossier.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — The initiative put forward by the European Parliament calling for peace in the Congo region was progressive, however, the Joint Motion for a Resolution was not critical enough on the interference of certain countries and companies in destabilising the country.

My Group, GUE/NGL tabled an alternative resolution which was much more critical and got to the root of the issues. However, as the majority of MEPs voted in favour of the Joint Resolution, I did not have an opportunity to endorse this alternative one and therefore, I was left with no choice but to abstain on this resolution.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Nella Repubblica democratica del Congo c'è il rischio di un nuovo genocidio. Le popolazioni della provincia di Beni, nel Congo orientale, sono vittime di stragi e di gravi persecuzioni su cui vi è ancora una cappa di silenzio che noi Europei abbiamo il dovere, politico e morale, di sollevare. Chiediamo che l'Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza, Federica Mogherini, lanci a livello internazionale un'inchiesta su questi massacri coinvolgendo le Nazioni Unite e la Corte Penale Internazionale; che l'UE invii un rappresentante speciale nella zona di Kivu per redigere un rapporto urgente da presentare al Parlamento Europeo e le più alte istituzioni europee; alla Francia e al Regno Unito di attivarsi nel Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU perché si approvi una risoluzione vincolante per arrestare prima possibile questi massacri. Oltre duemila famiglie sono state uccise e di almeno altrettante si sono perse le tracce: la comunità internazionale, presente con la missione dell'ONU Monusco, non può assistere inerte. Se non interverremo la regione verrà destabilizzata con nuove vittime innocenti e nuove ondate di migranti che fuggiranno verso Paesi più benestanti e sicuri.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – La République démocratique du Congo est actuellement en proie à de graves troubles intérieurs, particulièrement dans le nord-est du pays où des groupes armés se rendent coupables de massacres, d'assassinats, de violences sexuelles et d'enlèvements. Cette situation est d'autant plus intolérable que le gouvernement peine à agir afin d'éradiquer ces organisations criminelles. Si nous condamnons fermement l'ensemble des exactions commises dans cette région, nous considérons que l'Union européenne n'a aucune légitimité et crédibilité pour s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures de ce pays. Nous tenons d'ailleurs à rappeler que la politique extérieure est une compétence exclusive des États membres. Les institutions internationales devraient, à ce titre, jouer un rôle plus conséquent afin de mettre un terme à ces pratiques barbares. C'est la raison pour laquelle j'ai voté contre ce texte.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Republica Democratică Congo se află într-o situație alarmantă. Criza militară și umană a cauzat moartea a aproximativ 5 milioane de oameni. Au fost atacați copii, au fost abuzate femeile, au fost ocupate o serie de teritorii din estul Congo de către grupuri armate.

Diferiți actori estimează faptul că peste 7 milioane de oameni necesită servicii de asistență și sprijin. Criza umanitară se intensifică din ce în ce, sute de mii de congolezi fiind obligați să părăsească țara. Vulnerabilitatea congolezilor a atins cote maxime pe fondul crizei militare, aceștia având nevoie de sprijin imediat.

Nu pot să nu salut eforturile depuse de autoritățile congoleze de a combate această criză, însă îmbunătățirile trebuie să fie mult mai vizibile. Trebuie să se ia măsuri imediate împotriva încălcării drepturilor și libertăților umane, este nevoie de soluții urgente și politici în vederea soluționării crizei din estul Republicii Congo pentru stabilirea siguranței și securității publice și consolidării păcii, motiv pentru care m-am exprimat în favoarea acestei rezoluții.

Soledad Cabezón Ruiz (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha étnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – L'escalade de la violence dans la région du nord-est du Congo doit cesser immédiatement. Ce pays fait face à une situation humanitaire très alarmante. La population locale est la cible de massacres insupportables. Sa sécurité doit être la priorité absolue du gouvernement congolais. Il est nécessaire qu'une enquête approfondie soit ouverte par la communauté internationale. Les responsables de ces massacres doivent être jugés et punis sans attendre. La stabilisation du pays est conditionnée par la tenue de nouvelles élections. Il faut que l'Union européenne et ses États membres répondent présents afin de promouvoir la paix, la stabilité et le respect des droits de l'homme. J'ai donc voté pour cette résolution.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della risoluzione sui Massacri nel Congo orientale Perché la situazione nel Paese è precipitata in modo preoccupante negli ultimi mesi, le cronache parlano di un territorio in cui è tornato a scorrere il sangue e questa grave situazione potrebbe avere conseguenze sull'intera regione. La popolazione è vittima di massacri, documentati nei rapporti degli organismi internazionali che operano nella zona, provocati da un'invasione di bande armate che stanno mettendo in atto un vero e proprio genocidio.

Missionari e religiosi, insieme a Rete Pace per il Congo, chiedono un'inchiesta internazionale su quanto sta accadendo nel Nord Kivu, la regione al confine col Ruanda. Ora più che mai è necessario l'intervento della comunità internazionale e dell'Unione europea per porre fine alle stragi. Occorre rispondere all'appello delle associazioni di volontari presenti nell'area che chiedono una inchiesta internazionale, seria e neutrale che ponga fine a questo dramma.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this report which is concerned with ongoing violence in eastern Congo and calls for action to help end it. Congo has known armed conflicts for a very long time, mostly due to it being a mineral rich country.

Although happy with the initiative by the European Parliament to call for peace, the Joint Motion for a Resolution was not critical enough on the interference of certain countries and companies in destabilising the country. My own European political group had tabled an alternative resolution which was much more critical, however as the majority of MEPs voted in favour of the Joint Resolution, I did not have an opportunity to endorse this alternative one.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of this resolution as it strongly reaffirms issues that as Europeans we take for granted, namely the fact that businesses' activities must comply fully with international human rights standards. The DRC is a state with high numbers of vulnerable people, particularly internally displaced ones. I believe that trade could be of benefit to the country by improving its standards of living, resulting in less chance of any massacres in the future.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho appoggiato con il mio voto la risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo volta a condannare con fermezza e a chiedere giustizia in relazione ai recenti massacri che hanno avuto luogo nel Congo orientale.

Δευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραφτως*. – Εκφράζουμε τη βαθιά μας ανησυχία για την τρέχουσα κατάσταση της ασφάλειας και των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων στο ανατολικό τμήμα της ΛΔΚ, η οποία παραμένει εξαιρετικά ασταθής, με συνεχείς επιθέσεις εναντίον του άμαχου πληθυσμού από τις διάφορες ένοπλες ομάδες.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραφτως*. – Το ψήφισμα σχετικά με τις σφαγές στο Ανατολικό Κονγκό αφορά ένα ζήτημα που μας απασχολεί όλους και καλούμαστε να το αντιμετωπίσουμε προς όφελος αθώων ανθρώπων. Η έκφραση της βαθιάς μας ανησυχίας σχετικά με τις αυξανόμενες εντάσεις και τις απάνθρωπες πρακτικές εις βάρος πολιτών στην περιοχή αυτή είναι το λιγότερο που μπορούμε να κάνουμε σε μια προσπάθεια αποκλιμάκωσης της έντασης και τερματισμού της βίας. Γι' αυτό και ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Sono profondamente preoccupato per la situazione, che va sempre peggiorando, che vige nella Repubblica democratica del Congo. Non vi è più sicurezza nel Paese, troppe persone vengono uccise, massacrate o costrette a far parte di gruppi armati senza avere alcuna scelta. Ritengo questa situazione sbagliata e immorale e sebbene vi siano forze armate che cercano di contenere questo fenomeno esse non bastano. Sebbene centinaia di migliaia di persone siano riuscite a scappare dal Paese, altre migliaia sono state brutalmente uccise. Reputo necessario che l'Unione europea e tutti i suoi Stati membri forniscano assistenza al Congo cosicché questa orribile situazione finisca più in fretta possibile.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this motion for resolution on massacres in Eastern Congo.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. – A República Democrática do Congo enfrenta atualmente uma situação humanitária e de segurança grave, que apresenta sinais de deterioração na parte oriental do país, onde dezenas de grupos armados executam massacres e atos de violência sexual generalizada e recrutamento de crianças, estimando-se que 7,5 milhões de pessoas necessitam de assistência.

Apoio a presente Resolução que condena estes atos e exorta ao termo da violência beligerante com vista a uma resolução pacífica e sustentável do conflito e que solicita ao Tribunal Penal Internacional que proceda à análise destes abusos, devendo os responsáveis pelos crimes de guerra, crimes contra a humanidade, recrutamento de crianças-soldado e de violência sexual contra menores e maiores de idade ser identificados e punidos de acordo com o Direito Penal Nacional e Internacional.

Condeno também os ataques perpetrados contra os funcionários de organizações humanitárias e os bloqueios ao acesso à ajuda humanitária.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Me he abstenido en el voto final de la resolución conjunta debido principalmente a que en esta no se reconoce el genocidio, se pide el refuerzo de MOUNSCO y en particular a través de las patrullas y bases de operaciones móviles, incluso aunque algunos párrafos con los que estoy de acuerdo piden una evaluación, y no refleja información sobre las responsabilidades de las multinacionales en el apoyo financiero del conflicto y la explotación ilegal de los recursos naturales

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. — La parte nordorientale del Congo è attualmente teatro di massacri, reclutamento dei minori nei gruppi armati, violenze sessuali e occupazioni arbitrarie di villaggi. Tale situazione ha gravemente minato il livello minimo di sicurezza dei cittadini, complice l'incapacità o la mancanza di volontà politica da parte delle autorità congolese di assicurare i responsabili alla giustizia, sotto il silenzio del governo nazionale e della comunità internazionale. A ciò si aggiunge una crisi umanitaria che conta 7,5 milioni di persone in necessità di assistenza, 1,5 milioni di persone sfollate a causa del conflitto in corso e 400.000 profughi.

Ho votato a favore di questa risoluzione, perché riporta l'attenzione internazionale sulla drammatica situazione del Congo orientale e avanza una serie di richieste che ritengo importanti al fine di riportare pace e giustizia nel Paese. Tra queste, la richiesta di riprendere rapidamente e attivamente la collaborazione tra la MONUSCO e le forze armate nazionali, in particolare per garantire una maggiore capacità operativa per la protezione dei civili; lo svolgimento di un'indagine trasparente sui massacri commessi in collaborazione con la comunità internazionale; infine, la piena attuazione dell'accordo quadro strategico per la regione dei Grandi Laghi, per la pace, la sicurezza e la cooperazione, di febbraio 2013.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – În ultimii 20 de ani, peste 6 milioane de persoane și-au pierdut viața în conflictul civil din estul Republicii Democratice Congo, iar situația continuă să se înrăutățească, în ciuda eforturilor depuse de organizațiile internaționale. Cauzele persistenței acestui climat de violență sunt diverse, printre acestea numărându-se lipsa instituțiilor statului care ar putea permite dialogul și creșterea cooperării interetnice, conflictul între grupările paramilitare și armată sau lupta grupurilor de crimă organizată în vederea obținerii controlului numeroaselor resurse naturale și a frontierelor pentru a facilita traficul ilicit.

Degradarea condițiilor de trai și lipsa unei evoluții în materie de respectare a drepturilor omului, alături de starea de insecuritate și incertitudine la care sunt supuși cetățenii acestui stat, indică necesitatea creșterii importanței acordate acestui conflict.

Condamn cu fermitate masacrele din estul Republicii Democratice Congo, recrutarea și folosirea minorilor în luptele armate, violențele fizice sau sexuale la care sunt supuși copiii, femeile și bărbații, atacurile asupra angajaților organizațiilor umanitare și reducerea la tăcere a mass-mediei.

Asistența Uniunii Europene trebuie să continue, în special în vederea dezvoltării instituțiilor statului și a promovării dialogului social incluziv, în contextul organizării următoarelor alegeri prezidențiale, care vor avea un rol major în stabilizarea situației politice.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Ocenia się, że akty przemocy we wschodnim Kongu pochłonęły życie 1116 osób w okresie od października 2014 r. do maja 2016 r., natomiast kolejnych 1470 osób zostało uprowadzonych, a 34 297 rodzin zostało przymusowo wysiedlonych lub rozłączonych. Owe masowe morderstwa we wschodnim Kongu są wynikiem skomplikowanych powiązań między sferą polityki, podziałami etnicznymi i konfliktami o wydobywanie zasobów naturalnych. W kraju utrzymuje się bardzo poważne napięcie polityczne, odkąd prezydent Kabila, będący u władzy od 2001 r. i zgodnie z konstytucją zobowiązany ustąpić przed końcem roku, oskarżany jest o opóźnianie wyborów prezydenckich, wypadających za listopad br., aby jak najdłużej utrzymać się u władzy. Projekt rezolucji EKR wzywa rząd DRK do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa wszystkim jego mieszkańcom oraz do wznowienia wspólnych działań w ramach misji FARDC i MONUSCO w celu zneutralizowania grup zbrojnych we wschodnim Kongu. Apeluje również o przeprowadzenie międzynarodowego dochodzenia, które może pomóc w identyfikacji sprawców i współsprawców oraz inicjatorów masakr. Rezolucja EKR ponawia ponadto apel do władz DRK, aby w sposób wyraźny zobowiązały się do przestrzegania przepisów konstytucji w celu terminowego przeprowadzenia wyborów pod koniec 2016 roku. W pełni zgadzam się z postanowieniami rezolucji, nawołującymi do przestrzegania praw człowieka oraz zasad demokratycznych w DRK, dlatego też zagłosowałam na tak.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – I am very concerned about the reports of widespread massacres, sexual violence and child-soldier recruitment by active armed groups in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. These armed groups have allegedly taken the lives of over 1,000 people throughout the territories of Beni, Lubero and Butembo, while a further 1,000 are said to be missing. Furthermore, reports have also suggested that a number of schools, health centres and homes were burnt down during the attacks. For this reason, I voted in favour of this resolution which reiterates the parliament's call to end the violence in Congo, for all parties to lay down their arms and work towards a peaceful solution and most imperatively, release all child-soldiers from their ranks.

Jean-Paul Denanot (S&D), par écrit. – Cette résolution et les exactions qu'elle dénonce résonnent encore dans notre hémicycle qui régulièrement attire l'attention sur le drame des enfants soldats et les violences de toutes sortes dont sont victimes les populations civiles au Congo. Je suis profondément préoccupé par cette situation qui ne cesse de se dégrader sur le plan humanitaire avec des villages entiers occupés par des groupes armés bloquant toute possibilité d'aide. Il est très difficile de réconcilier les peuples et les ethnies quand chacun déplore la violence de l'autre camp. Une enquête doit avoir lieu afin de sortir de l'impunité, de l'inaction et du silence, afin que la justice se fasse et que les coupables des massacres soient désignés et jugés. Ce sujet est aussi économique et commercial, les massacres ayant lieu sur fond d'exploitation des ressources et le trafic des armes. C'est pourquoi cette résolution appelle à traduire l'accord européen récemment obtenu concernant les contrôles obligatoires sur les minerais de sang en une législation ambitieuse, applicable rapidement.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre ce texte car il démontre une ignorance manifeste de la situation du Congo. Pour comprendre l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide et à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette région au détriment de la France, avec l'appui des diplomates canadiennes, britanniques et israéliennes. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'instrumentalisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui, en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Καταψηφίζουμε. Αν και κάθε λογικός άνθρωπος δεν μπορεί παρά να καταδικάσει τα γεγονότα στο Κονγκό, πάγια θέση μας είναι η μη ανάμειξη στα εσωτερικά τρίτων κρατών, την οποία και ακολουθούμε και τώρα.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), por escrito. – Entre outubro de 2014 e maio de 2016, nos territórios de Beni, Lubero e Butembo, mais de 1160 pessoas foram brutalmente mortas, mais de 1470 pessoas encontram-se desaparecidas, muitas habitações, centros de saúde e escolas foram incendiados e muitas mulheres, homens e crianças foram vítimas de violência sexual. Os intervenientes humanitários estimam que 7,5 milhões de pessoas necessitam atualmente de assistência e o conflito e as operações militares em curso conduziram igualmente à deslocação interna de 1,5 milhões de pessoas e forçaram mais de 400 mil a fugir do país.

Por isso, manifesto a minha profunda apreensão face à escalada de violência e à situação humanitária preocupante e cada vez mais grave na RDC, concordando com o apelo aos beligerantes para que ponham de imediato termo à violência, deponham as armas, libertem todas as crianças que se encontram nas suas fileiras e promovam o diálogo, com vista a uma resolução pacífica e sustentável do conflito.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Vote contre toutes les résolutions et abstention sur la résolution GUE.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Sendo preocupante e grave a situação que se vive na República Democrática do Congo (RDC), as intenções desta resolução não passam por assinalar essa preocupação.

Esta resolução insere-se num processo de ingerência e desestabilização da região, que visa restaurar o poder e o controlo das antigas potências coloniais europeias sobre as imensas riquezas naturais do país, explorando dessa forma os conflitos que aí existem, usando-os a seu favor.

A resolução oculta o papel desestabilizador de países europeus na RDC, por exemplo a Bélgica. Não se chama à responsabilidade, nem se atacam as multinacionais e o seu papel no financiamento de grupos armados. Não tem uma única palavra para condenar o papel militarista e intervencionista da NATO, nem o reforço da sua presença militar através do comando militar dos EUA – AFRICOM.

Debaixo das críticas à missão da ONU – MONUSCO, cujo papel e intervenção naturalmente devem ser controlados, está a vontade de meter outras forças e talvez a NATO no terreno. Visa-se ainda contribuir para a desestabilização da situação política do país, quando as eleições se aproximam.

Defendemos a não proliferação de armas, a não militarização da região, o apoio a uma solução política e pacífica dos conflitos, a soberania dos povos e o desmantelamento do AFRICOM.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della proposta di risoluzione sui massacri in Congo Orientale. I trattamenti inumani perpetrati in Congo sono il risultato di interrelazioni malsane tra la politica, le etnie e lo sfruttamento delle risorse. L'Europa in primis deve impegnarsi a far rispettare la previsione di elezioni presidenziali trasparenti e credibili entro il 2016, al fine di eliminare ulteriori tensioni politiche. L'Unione europea deve impegnarsi nello svolgimento di un'indagine internazionale che contribuisca a individuare i responsabili, i complici e gli istigatori di questi crimini contro l'umanità e delle violazioni dei diritti umani subiti dalle popolazioni di questo Paese.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Pretrvávajúce humanitárne a vojenské krízy v Kongu už spôsobili smrť približne päť miliónov ľudí. Európsky parlament je hlboko znepokojený súčasnou bezpečnostnou situáciou a situáciou v oblasti ľudských práv vo východnej časti Konga, ktorá ostáva naďalej veľmi nestabilná, s neustálymi útokmi voči civilnému obyvateľstvu zo strany rôznych ozbrojených skupín. Vláda v Kongu musí prebrať zodpovednosť za zaručenie bezpečnosti na svojom území a za zabezpečenie ochrany svojich občanov, v dôsledku čoho musia zodpovedné orgány prijať všetky potrebné rozhodnutia a opatrenia na ukončenie ozbrojeného konfliktu.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφώς*. – Καταψηφίζω στο σύνολο τις εκθέσεις. Αν και κάθε λογικός άνθρωπος δεν μπορεί παρά να καταδικάσει τα γεγονότα στο Κονγκό, πάντα θέση μου είναι η μη ανάμειξη στα εσωτερικά τρίτων κρατών, την οποία και ακολουθώ και τώρα.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – I am extremely concerned by the deteriorating security situation in the north-eastern part of the Democratic republic of Congo, by the numerous reports of massacres, recruitment and use of children by armed groups and widespread violence.

I strongly support the call on the DRC government and the the ONU Peacekeeping mission MONUSCO to conduct an investigation on the failures of the Congolese and MONUSCO forces to protect civilians in the region of Beni.

A thorough, independent and transparent investigation to be launched by the international community into the massacres is urgently needed, in order to find out who is behind these attacks beside the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

The neutralisation of all armed groups, safety for all citizens and stability in the territories of Beni, Lubero and Butembo has to be our priority. Perpetrators of human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity and sexual violence must be reported, identified, prosecuted and punished in accordance with national and international criminal law.

Iratxe García Pérez (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional y, en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). Más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha interétnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO, cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Il Parlamento europeo dia un messaggio forte di condanna ai massacri e ai crimini contro l'umanità che continuano ad imperversare nel Congo orientale e supporti con la stessa convinzione la proposta di risoluzione in cui si invoca un regolare, libero e trasparente svolgimento delle prossime elezioni presidenziali, affinché la stabilità e la ricostruzione dello Stato di diritto possano incidere su un percorso di ricomposizione democratica del Paese, riuscendo a contrastare le attività criminali dei gruppi armati.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Immer neu erreichen uns schreckliche Meldungen aus dem rohstoffreichen Osten des Kongo: Es sind Berichte von neuen, schrecklichen Massakern. In der Region Beni etwa, in Nord-Kivu, sind bei einem neuerlichen Blutbad vor wenigen Tagen 50 Zivilisten ums Leben gekommen. In den vergangenen 18 Monaten sind bis zu 1000 Menschen umgebracht worden. Verantwortlich gemacht wird dafür die ADF, eine islamistische Einheit aus Uganda mit Verbindungen zu al-Shabaab in Somalia. Europa muss helfen, diesen Gräueln ein Ende zu setzen. Deshalb habe ich für die Resolution gestimmt.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención en esta resolución pues pese a condenar los recientes dramáticos acontecimientos sucedidos en la República Democrática del Congo puede ser considerada parcial al no atender a las causas de fondo de la actual situación de inestabilidad, concretamente la desigualdad y el rol de las grandes transnacionales extractivas en el territorio.

Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

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Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour for the report. The report declares that President Kabila, who has been in power since 2001, is required to step down on 20 December 2016 as the mandate of the President of the DRC is limited under the Congolese Constitution to only two terms. By not yet having declared that he will do so, he is exacerbating political tensions in the country.

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

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Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφώς*. – Ως ομάδα τηρήσαμε θέση αποχής στο κοινό ψήφισμα, γιατί θεωρούμε ότι το ψήφισμα που κατέθεσε η δική μας ομάδα είναι πληρέστερο. Σε κάθε περίπτωση θεωρούμε ότι η κατάσταση στο ανατολικό Κονγκό είναι πολύ σοβαρή και χρήζει αντιμετώπισης από τη διεθνή κοινότητα.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I am deeply concerned the regarding the escalation of violence and the alarming and deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An independent and transparent investigation should be launched in order to assess the human rights violations and war crimes. The European Union should work closely with the African Union to ensure a permanent political dialogue in order to prevent any further destabilisation of the region. I welcome the any effort to implement and maintain peace in the region on the part of the Congolese Authorities.

György Hölvényi (PPE), *írásban*. – Tisztelt Képviselőtársaim! A Kelet-Kongóban kibontakozott évtizedes polgárháború jelenleg Afrika legsúlyosabb fegyveres konfliktusa. A szűnni nem akaró gyilkolás és erőszakhullám drámai hatással van a népesség többségét kitevő keresztény egyházak életére is. A térség egyik legerősebb milíciája, a Nemzetközi Muszlim Véderő nevű terrorcsoport különös kegyetlenséggel számolja fel a keresztény felekezeteket és templomaikat a kelet-kongói régióban. E helyen is meg kell ismételnünk a kongói keresztény felekezetek kétségbeesett segélykiáltását: a világ számos helyéhez hasonlóan Afrikában is népiirtást hajtanak végre az iszlám szélsőséges követői.

A Muszlim Véderő agressziója jól illeszkedik az Afrika számos pontján kibontakozott átfogó iszlamista előrenyomulásba. A nemzetközi dzsihádisták mozgalmai ideológiáját követő milíciák célja, hogy szerte a kontinensen az iszlám jog szerint működő kalifátusokat kiáltssanak ki a jelentős keresztény hagyományokkal rendelkező országokban. A legutóbbi, májusi kegyetlenkedések és kivégzések következtében családok ezrei kényszerültek távozásra Kelet-Kongóban, a vallási vezetők ugyanakkor a végsőig próbálnak kitartani a súlyosan traumatizált hívek mellett. A közösségek túlélését tovább nehezíti, hogy a folyamatos megfélemlítés hatására megszűntek a szertartások a katolikus, anglikán és egyéb keresztény felekezetek templomaiban.

A nemzetközi közösségnek, így Európának is erkölcsi kötelessége, hogy azonnali politikai nyomást gyakoroljon a béke érdekében Kongóban. Amíg pedig tart az üldöztetés, minden elérhető humanitárius és fejlesztési erőforrást mozgósítani kell egy újabb menekülthullám megelőzése érdekében.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Prijedlog rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o masakrima u istočnom Kongu, s obzirom da međunarodna zajednica i vlada DR Konga nisu dovoljno učinile na osudi i suzbijanju pogoršanog sigurnosnog stanja u sjeveroistočnom dijelu Demokratske Republike Konga, gdje oružane skupine nastavljaju sa svojim djelovanjem i zabilježeni su brojni masakri, novačenje djece u oružane skupine te seksualno i rodno uvjetovano nasilje. EU treba razmotriti mogućnost nametanja ciljanih sankcija onima koji su odgovorni za masacre u istočnom dijelu Konga i nasilnu represiju u DR Kongu. EU treba nastaviti pružati pomoć stanovništvu DR Konga kako bi poboljšali životne uvjete najugroženijih slojeva stanovništva, a posebno interno raseljenih osoba. Međunarodna zajednica treba hitno pokrenuti temeljitu, neovisnu i transparentnu istragu masakra.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les résolutions font suite à une aggravation des exactions commises au Congo. À l'exception de celle de la GUE, les résolutions sont marquées par une ignorance manifeste de ce qui se passe au Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide et à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette raison au détriment de la France avec l'appui des diplomaties canadiennes, britanniques et israéliennes. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques. J'ai voté contre les résolutions.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem společné usnesení reagující na znepokojující eskalaci násilí a zhoršující se humanitární situaci v Konžské demokratické republice způsobené zejména dlouholetými ozbrojenými konflikty ve východních provinciích. Parlament vyzývá všechny strany konfliktu k okamžitému ukončení násilí a nastolení dialogu směřujícího k mírovému řešení situace. Zároveň naléhá na důkladné, nezávislé a transparentní vyšetřování masakrů s plnou spoluprací KDR. Tato situace by nicméně neměla bránit uskutečnění plánovaných voleb právě proto, že úspěšné a včasné konání voleb bude mít zásadní význam na dlouhodobou stabilitu a rozvoj země.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette résolution qui dénonce les massacres récurrents qui ont lieu dans l'est du Congo où s'opposent les rebelles ougandais et l'armée congolaise.

Eva Kaili (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted for the motion as it addresses an issue of the utmost importance for the people of Congo. Should the Council and the Commission act upon what we ask them to do, we will witness a change benefiting the lives of the locals.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Společný návrh usnesení o masakrech ve východním Kongu jsem nemohla podpořit. Nevyjádřilo své znepokojení nad nárůstem akcí, které destabilizují situaci a představují společné vměšování se různých vlád a nadnárodních podniků do záležitostí několika zemí na africkém kontinentu. Neodsuzovalo skutečnost, že základní potřeby obyvatel Demokratické republiky Kongo jsou systematicky obětovány hospodářským a geopolitickým zájmům nadnárodních společností a cizích mocností. Nepožadovalo zahájení nezávislého šetření, jak podniky, a to zejména evropské, dodržují v odvětví přírodních zdrojů sociální a environmentální normy a jaké vazby mohou mít tyto podniky na financování ozbrojených skupin, a nežádalo rovněž, aby bylo zahájeno mezinárodní vyšetřování s cílem osvětlit údajné souvislosti mezi programy strukturálních změn, finančními dotacemi od mezinárodních finančních institucí a zločiny páchanými v této zemi. Vlády kritizujeme neustále, ale na korporace si často netroufáme, i když to jsou právě ti, kteří často v Africe škodí nejvíce. Kongo je velmi jasným příkladem.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk (ALDE), *in writing*. – The security situation in the Eastern Congo is a matter of great concern. Unfortunately, the armed conflicts in the eastern provinces of Beni, Butembo and Lubero have been continuing with numerous reports of massacres, recruitment and use of children by armed groups, widespread of sexual and gender violence. There also reports of destruction of many houses, health centres and schools as well as violent attacks against local and international staff of humanitarian actors working in the region. It is a disturbing fact that the escalation of violence has often occurred in front of the eyes of Congolese army and MONUSCO which are present in the region to maintain stability, fight the armed forces and protect civilians. Given the risk of further destabilisation in the Eastern Congo, the EU should actively work with the Congolese authorities and the UN mission in the country (MONUSCO) to protect the civilian population, to neutralise the armed groups, to identify those responsible for the violence and to bring them to justice. Last but not least, the EU should maintain its assistance to the people of the DRC in order to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable sections of the population.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre cette résolution car malgré quelques bons passages, notamment sur le rôle des multinationales, elle s'immisce dans les affaires intérieures du Congo.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre la résolution sur les massacres dans l'est du Congo. Celle-ci fait suite à une aggravation des exactions commises sur place, mais fait preuve d'une ignorance manifeste de ce qui se passe au Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette région au détriment de la France. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui, en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, accolgo la proposta di risoluzione da parte del Parlamento, per quanto riguarda i massacri nel Congo orientale. La proposta condanna gli atti di violenza che le comunità della regione hanno subito. Esprime solidarietà verso queste popolazioni, i quali diritti vengono violati da anni e causano una divisione della popolazione, e sottolinea l'urgenza di concentrarsi sulle circostanze di donne e bambini, che sono i gruppi più vulnerabili. Chiede inoltre che venga effettuata un'indagine internazionale al fine di trovare i responsabili, che vengano attuate tutte le misure necessarie per porre fine al genocidio, e che venga fatto risarcimento alle vittime dei massacri. Spiega, per di più, che solo mettendo in atto un regolamento sulla gestione delle risorse naturali, il conflitto potrà terminare, e chiede quindi una celere collaborazione con il Consiglio per la ratifica di tali norme. Per contribuire alla promozione di un mondo più unito ed equo voto a favore della proposta del Parlamento.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les textes soumis au vote par les différents partis politiques du Parlement portent sur la République démocratique du Congo (RDC). Le contexte y est particulièrement tendu, les massacres se multiplient et déchirent la population. Cette situation est la résultante de la politique américaine menée après la Guerre froide et soutenue par le Canada, l'Angleterre et Israël pour déstabiliser la RDC. Elle s'est appuyée sur l'Ouganda et le Rwanda comme éléments déstabilisateurs, en insistant sur les fractures ethniques déjà présentes dans le pays, ce qui produit les massacres actuels. Les propositions de résolution des partis politiques ignorent cette causalité historique essentielle, je vote donc CONTRE. Cependant le rapport de la GUE/NGL se distingue par la maîtrise du sujet, mais ses propositions sur la famille le ternissent ce qui m'a poussé à l'ABSTENTION sur ce dernier.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha interétnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Me he abstenido en el voto final de la resolución conjunta debido principalmente a que en esta no se reconoce el genocidio, se pide el refuerzo de MOUNSCO y en particular a través de las patrullas y bases de operaciones móviles, incluso aunque algunos párrafos con los que estoy de acuerdo piden una evaluación, y no refleja información sobre las responsabilidades de las multinacionales en el apoyo financiero del conflicto y la explotación ilegal de los recursos naturales

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Zdržel jsem se. Je mi líto, že v Kongu dochází k násilí, ale usnesení Evropského parlamentu situaci nijak nezmění. Nemyslím si, že je úkolem Evropského parlamentu, aby přijímal usnesení ke všem konfliktům na světě.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), rakstiski. – Kaut gan Otrais Kongo pilsoņkarš beidzās 2003. gadā, valsts austrumu daļā joprojām pastāv vairāki grupējumi, kuru savstarpējās un pret valdības spēkiem veiktās karadarbības nereti iekļauj arī blakus esošās valstis, īpaši Ugandu. Laikā no 2014. gada oktobra līdz 2016. gada maijam robežu rajonos tika nogalināti 1160 cilvēki, kamēr vēl 1470 ir bezvēsts pazuduši. Vairākas mājas, slimnīcas un skolas tika nodedzinātas. Ir izplatīta seksuālā vardarbība, īpaši pret sievietēm un bērniem, ka arī faktiskā verdzība. Vēl vairāk — ir informācija, ka nereti šajās zvērestībās piedalās ne tikai nemiernieku bruņotās grupas, bet arī valsts militārie spēki.

Kongo Demokrātiskās Republikas teritorijā apmēram 7,5 miljoniem cilvēku ir nepieciešama humānā palīdzība, vairāk kā 400 tūkstoši ir pametuši valsti. Tā kā konfliktu virkne reģionā pastāv jau kādus 20 gadus, vismaz viena paaudze pieauga tās apstākļos un zina tikai karu un vardarbību.

Pievienojos aicinājumam KDR valdībai un visām pārējām konfliktā iesaistītajām pusēm (īpaši reģionālām valdībām, KDR kaimiņiem un Āfrikas Savienības struktūrām), maksimāli cieši savstarpēji sadarbojoties, pielikt punktu notiekošajai vardarbībai. Paralēli visai apsveicu centienus minimizēt nelegālo grupējumu finansiālo atbalstu, izmantojot konfliktu minerālu tirdzniecību.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Odsudzuju vsetky útoky na humanitárnych pracovníkov a prekážky, ktoré bránia prístupu k humanitárnej pomoci. Obidve strany musia rešpektovať nezávislosť, neutralitu a nestrannosť humanitárnych pracovníkov. Podporujem návrh, aby Európska únia využila všetko diplomatické a obchodné úsilie na dosiahnutie a zabezpečenie vnútornej stability v Kongu, nastolenia a rozvoja demokracie a princípov právneho štátu a prostredníctvom politik rozvojovej spolupráce pomohla odstrániť korupciu a nelegálne obchodovanie s nerastným bohatstvom tejto krajiny.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζω την κοινή πρόταση ψηφίσματος σχετικά με τις σφαγές στο ανατολικό Κονγκό για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 22/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση είναι επαρκώς τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre toutes les résolutions.

L'ensemble de ces résolutions dénote d'une profonde méconnaissance de la situation géostratégique de la République démocratique du Congo. La déstabilisation de ce grand État africain est pour grande part le fait de l'influence américaine, via le Rwanda et l'Ouganda. Compte-tenu de cette maîtrise lacunaire du sujet, nous ne saurions soutenir ces textes.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), por escrito. – Desde este Parlamento condenamos con toda firmeza las masacres y crímenes contra la humanidad que siguen cometiéndose en la región oriental de la República Democrática del Congo.

Es necesario que de una vez se ponga fin a las actividades criminales de todos los grupos armados sin excepción en la región oriental del país y que en ese país se recupere la situación de control democrático, para lo que tiene que intervenir tanto el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo como las instituciones internacionales que deben garantizar la paz en esa región.

Además, los eurodiputados pedimos, con mi apoyo, que el Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional investigue también las atrocidades perpetradas en Kivu Norte desde octubre de 2014, y que procese a las personas de responsabilidad más manifiesta.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), par écrit. – Les propositions de résolution des différents groupes dénotent leur ignorance de la réalité, à l'exception de celle du groupe GUE. Pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique de la région des Grands Lacs, il faut se référer aux décisions américaines de réinvestir ces régions décolonisées. Cela s'est fait d'ailleurs au détriment de la France avec l'appui des puissances anglo-saxonnes canadiennes et britanniques. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre l'instabilité créée dans ces régions et la crise du Rwanda, puis son utilisation ainsi que celle de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la République démocratique du Congo.

En conséquence j'ai voté contre les propositions de résolutions et me suis abstenue sur celle de la GUE qui ne peut être suivie pour ses recommandations sur la famille

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A segurança na RDC continua a deteriorar-se na parte oriental do país, onde dezenas de grupos armados continuam ativos, sendo muitos os relatos que dão conta de massacres, recrutamento e utilização de crianças pelos grupos armados, violência sexual generalizada e violência de género.

Assim sendo, a comunidade internacional no seu conjunto tem que envidar esforços para encontrar uma solução pacífica para este grave conflito com graves consequências para as populações, nomeadamente para as mais desprotegidas - mulheres, idosos e crianças.

Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this motion for a resolution as a matter of human rights. The institutions of the European Union must recognise and formulate a proper response to the violence currently occurring in the Congo, and call for peace and the immediate end of all armed aggression in the area.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *par écrit*. — Comme l'a dit Koffi Annan en 2003, «La démocratie ne se résume pas à la tenue d'élections. Elle exige que chacun, y compris le gouvernement et le parti au pouvoir, respecte l'état de droit. Elle exige des institutions viables qui garantissent les droits fondamentaux de tous les citoyens, y compris des minorités. Elle exige la vigilance constante d'une société civile dynamique». Or, les restrictions croissantes des libertés d'expression et des libertés politiques limitent d'autant la capacité d'action de la société civile, des médias et de l'opposition. Toute restriction de l'espace démocratique et de la participation politique n'est pas tolérable. Le dialogue inter-congolais doit s'inscrire dans le cadre de la constitution. Il doit être conforme à la résolution 2277 des Nations unies, à savoir ouvert, rassembleur et démocratique; c'est le chemin que privilégie la Communauté internationale (Union africaine et Union européenne). Des pistes d'actions doivent être élaborées pour éviter que cette crise latente, dans un climat préélectoral tendu, ne conduise à des violences menaçant la stabilité du pays et de la sous-région et ne se transforme en crise sécuritaire.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. — V severovýchodnom regióne Konžskej demokratickej republiky už viac ako 20 rokov pretrváva konflikt medzi rôznymi konžskými a zahraničnými milíciami. Región poznačili v októbri 2015 masacre v okolí miest Beni, Butembo, Miriki a Lubero v provincii Severné Kivu, ktoré si vyžiadali mnohé obete a desiatky tisíc ľudí museli opustiť svoje domovy. Za najväčší problém považujem neexistenciu legislatívnych alebo súdnych inštitúcií, ktoré by dokázali efektívne fungovať a riešiť vzniknutú situáciu. Jedným z ďalších problémov je fakt, že prezident Kabila sa snaží udržať pri moci aj po ústavou stanovenom funkčnom období, čo by mohlo vyvolať násilie v oveľa väčšom rozsahu ako v Burundi, čo by destabilizovalo celý región Veľkých jazier. Domnievam sa, že slobodné, transparentné a spravodlivé voľby by mohli prispieť k ukončeniu pretrvávajúcej krízy vo východnom Kongu, umožniť dôslednejšiu kontrolu dohôd týkajúcich sa ťažby nerastných surovín a zneužívania príjmov pochádzajúcich z tejto činnosti a tým zlepšiť situáciu v oblasti ľudských práv v Kongu. Preto podporujem daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted in favour of the resolution on the massacres in eastern Congo, which highlights that the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to deteriorate in the north-eastern part of the country, where dozens of armed groups remain active, with numerous reports of massacres, of recruitment and use of children by armed groups, and of widespread sexual and gender-based violence. The resolution calls for all parties to the conflict to put an immediate end to the violence, lay down their arms, release all children from their ranks and promote dialogue towards a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the conflict. It also calls notably for quick and active resumption of collaboration between MONUSCO and the RDC armed forces (FARDC), on the basis of the military cooperation agreement signed on 28 January in Kinshasa, in order to re-establish and consolidate peace and security in both the eastern area and the country as a whole

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – A jelzett tárgyan az ECR, a PPE, az S&D, a GUE/NGL, az EFDD, a Verts/ALE és az ALDE képviselőcsoportok nyújtottak be állásfoglalásra irányuló indítványt. A GUE/NGL kiegészítővel a többi hat képviselőcsoport megegyezésre jutott és közös, kompromisszumos indítványt fogadtak el. Ezt szavaztam meg.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – Em 2013, o exército congolês controlou o grupo rebelde designado de M23, lançando a esperança de que o ambiente de insegurança que se vivia no leste do Congo evoluiria no sentido da pacificação. Não obstante, diversos grupos armados continuaram ativos, pelo que se mantém o ambiente de insegurança, de divisões étnicas e políticas e de conflitos no sector da extração de minérios.

Recentemente, grupos radicais têm cometido diversas violações dos direitos humanos, incluindo massacres de civis e o rapto de colaboradores de organizações de ajuda humanitária.

A UE presta ajuda humanitária à República Democrática do Congo e, neste quadro, deve usar a sua influência para promover o diálogo político permanente, quer com as demais instituições internacionais que acompanham esta situação, quer com os países desta região e as autoridades congoleesas, no sentido de pôr fim às situações de violação dos direitos, dos crimes contra a Humanidade, e de restabelecer a paz e a segurança na região.

Neste sentido, voto favoravelmente este relatório, na medida em que considero importante que a União Europeia tenha um papel ativo no respeito pelos direitos humanos e na pacificação e estabilização política desta região.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – La plupart des résolutions présentées ici sont marquées par une ignorance manifeste de ce qui se passe au Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette raison au détriment de la France avec l'appui des diplomates canadiennes, britanniques et israéliennes. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette résolution relative aux massacres dans l'est du Congo, qui appelle les parties au conflit à arrêter la violence et à dialoguer. Entre octobre 2014 et mai 2016, plus de 1160 personnes ont été assassinées et plus de 1470 ont disparu.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaság napjainkban súlyos problémákkal néz szembe, melyek legfőbb okozója az ország keleti felén fennálló humanitárius katasztrófa. Radikális fegyveres csoportok üldöznek és aláznak meg emberek ezreit, akik emiatt kénytelenek elhagyni az otthonaikat. Ahogy az állásfoglalásban is elhangzott, az emberi jogok tiszteletben tartása mindennél fontosabb. Nem maradhatunk némák. Az erőszaknak véget kell vetni, és úgy gondolom, hogy a térség stabilitásának megteremtése nagyban függ az állami hatalom tisztességes fellépésétől. A közelgő választások tétje, hogy megteremtse az alkotmányos jogállamiságot, felelősségre vonja az elkövetőket és megálljt parancsoljon a gyűlöletnek. Támogatom az Európai Uniót abban, hogy továbbra is segítse ezt a már amúgy is sokat szenvedett országot.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to deteriorate in the north-eastern part of the country, where dozens of armed groups remain active, with numerous reports of massacres, of recruitment and use of children by armed groups, and of widespread sexual and gender-based violence. I have voted for this motion for a resolution that calls for all parties to the conflict to put an immediate end to the violence, lay down their arms, release all children from their ranks and promote dialogue towards a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the conflict.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem návrh usnesení Parlamentu, které se vztahuje k masakrům ve východním Kongu. Vzhledem ke znepokojivému zhoršení situace v zemi je třeba, aby mezinárodní společenství přijalo příslušná opatření. Proto je správné, že Parlament podpořil ochranná opatření, která již v zemi probíhají, jako je mise OSN MONUSCO, a vyzval mezinárodní organizace a státy, aby se situací více zabývaly.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — The initiative put forward by the European Parliament calling for peace in the Congo region was progressive, however, the Joint Motion for a Resolution was not critical enough on the interference of certain countries and companies in destabilising the country.

My Group, GUE/NGL tabled an alternative resolution which was much more critical and got to the root of the issues. However, as the majority of MEPs voted in favour of the Joint Resolution, I did not have an opportunity to endorse this alternative one and therefore, I was left with no choice but to abstain on this resolution.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), raštu. – Balsavau už šią rezoliuciją.

Kadangi saugumo padėtis Kongo Demokratinės Respublikos šiaurės rytuose ir toliau blogėja, buvo būtina imtis atitinkamų priemonių. Labai svarbu, kad visos atitinkamos valdžios institucijos nedelsiant imtųsi veiksmų siekiant patraukti kaltininkus atsakomybėn. Reikia imtis neatidėliotinų veiksmų siekiant stabilizuoti padėtį bei užtikrinti žmogaus teises Rytinėje Kongo dalyje, bei tinkamai įgyvendinti teisėtumo bei nebaudžiamumo principus. Turi būti nedelsiant nutraukta visų be išimties ginkluotų grupuočių nusikalstama veikla.

Pažymėtina, kad esama padėtis neturėtų sutrukdyti įvykti rinkimams, kaip numatyta Konstitucijoje. Be to, labai svarbu, kad tarptautinė bendruomenė imtųsi veiksmų ir pradėtų išsamų, nepriklausomą ir skaidrų žudynių tyrimą.

Δημήτρης Παπαδάκης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Η κλιμάκωση της βίας στο ανατολικό Κονγκό έχει σοβαρές πολιτικές, οικονομικές, κοινωνικές, ανθρωπιστικές συνέπειες στο θέμα της ασφάλειας στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία του Κονγκό και σε ολόκληρη την περιοχή, η οποία είναι ήδη εύθραυστη και ασταθής. Η περιοχή εξακολουθεί να μαστίζεται από την παρουσία δεκάδων ενόπλων ομάδων που ανταγωνίζονται για αποδέματα χρυσού, κασσίτερου και τανταλίου.

Ο απολογισμός των πολέμων είναι εκατομμύρια νεκροί και εξαθλιωμένοι κυρίως από πείνα και ξέσπασμα ασθενειών. Η ανθρωπιστική κατάσταση στην περιοχή είναι τραγική. Εκατομμύρια εσωτερικοί εκτοπισθέντες, εκατομμύρια άτομα που χρειάζονται τροφή και επείγουσα βοήθεια. Οργή προκαλούν η μαζική αύξηση στην εξαναγκαστική στρατολόγηση παιδιών στις σφοδρές μάχες που μαίνονται στο ανατολικό Κονγκό και η ευρύτερα διαδεδομένη χρήση του βιασμού ως πολεμικού όπλου.

Υποστήριξα την πρόταση ψηφίσματος η οποία μεταξύ άλλων καλεί όλα τα εμπλεκόμενα μέρη να βάλουν ένα τέλος στη βία προωθώντας τον διάλογο για εξεύρεση μιας βιώσιμης, διαρθρωτικής και ειρηνικής πολιτικής λύσης στην κρίση. Είναι σημαντικό επίσης να γίνουν αμερόληπτες έρευνες για όλες τις παρελθούσες και παρούσες περιπτώσεις παραβιάσεων ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων καθώς και να διωχθούν δικαστικά και να τιμωρηθούν οι αυτορρογοί παραβιάσεων των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων, εγκλημάτων πολέμου, εγκλημάτων κατά της ανθρωπότητας, πράξεων σεξουαλικής βίας σε βάρος γυναικών και στρατολόγησης παιδιών.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), per iscritto. – Evidenziando come nella Repubblica democratica del Congo sono sempre più i gruppi armati operanti nella parte nordorientale del Paese, si nota che aumenta sempre più il numero di massacri, stupri e reclutamento di minori. In merito, gli operatori umanitari stimano che 7,5 milioni di persone necessitano attualmente di assistenza. Pertanto, non posso non approvare la richiesta avanzata nel documento in esame di neutralizzare tali gruppi e, allo stesso tempo, di operare una analisi approfondita sul tema. Auspicando più protezione per la popolazione civile, appoggio la visione del gruppo al quale appartengo. Voto a favore.

Eva Paunova (PPE), in writing. — Thousands of people have been massacred in Bunia, north-eastern Congo, as part of the long-running civil war in the country. This violence and the alarming and deteriorating humanitarian situation have to be stopped. I urge for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and I voted in favour of the resolution.

Marijana Petir (PPE), napisan. – Kongo je zemlja koja već desetljećima ne može prevladati sukobe koji ju pustoše, prvenstveno zbog njezinih prirodnih bogatstava (rudača, šuma, naftnih polja...). Budući da je bogat koltanom, crnim metalom koji se koristi u proizvodnji brojnih elektroničkih uređaja, ali i drugim prirodnim bogatstvima, ratovi su do danas uzrokovali smrt više od 5 milijuna ljudi.

Podržala sam rezoluciju o masakrima u Istočnom Kongu jer se u toj državi svakodnevno sramotno narušavaju osnovna ljudska prava i dužni smo na to reagirati. U prosjeku 60 ljudi izgubi svoj život u jednome mjesecu, neke ljude čak i žive spaljuju, više od 30 000 ljudi prisilno je raseljeno, mnoga sela su okupirana, a brojne žene i djeca silovana. Vrijednost ljudskoga života u Istočnom Kongu svedena je na najnižu razinu, a materijalna korist motiv je pobunjenicima da do krajnjih granica opustoše ovu zemlju.

Stoga smo se dužni angažirati i konkretno pomoći tim nesretnim ljudima, u čemu je usvajanje ove rezolucije samo prvi korak. Istočni Kongo izmučen je godinama ratovanja i teško će ponovno postati zemlja mira, ali sve svjetske institucije moraju se djelotvorno angažirati kako se počinjene strahote više ne bi ignorirale i kako bi patnja ljudi u Istočnom Kongu konačno prestala.

Pina Picierno (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Le notizie di massacri e violenze provenienti dal nord-est della Repubblica democratica del Congo sono sempre più allarmanti. Uccisioni e rapimenti di migliaia di persone, incendi di villaggi, centri sanitari e scuole, violenze sessuali ai danni di donne e bambini, reclutamenti forzati di minori continuano ad avvenire in un clima di impunità e di indifferenza generale da parte dei media, del governo nazionale e delle organizzazioni internazionali.

Mi unisco all'appello della risoluzione affinché tutte le parti coinvolte nel conflitto pongano immediatamente fine alle violenze, deponendo le armi e aprendo il dialogo per una soluzione pacifica e duratura del conflitto. Chiedo che il contingente delle Nazioni Unite, MONUSCO, si avvalga pienamente del suo mandato per proteggere la popolazione civile.

E, infine, esorto l'Unione europea ad adottare politiche coerenti nella regione, in particolare per quanto riguarda il commercio di armi e di materie prime, nell'ottica della promozione della pace, della stabilità, dello sviluppo e dei diritti umani.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Sigurnosna situacija u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo nastavlja se pogoršavati, naročito u sjeveroistočnom dijelu zemlje. Iz zemlje dolaze vijesti o masakrima, regrutaciji i uporabi djece od strane oružanih bandi i o rasprostranjenom seksualnom nasilju. Na područjima Benia, Lubera i Butemboa više od 1 160 osoba je divljački ubijeno između listopada 2014. godine i svibnja 2016. godine, više od 1 470 ljudi je nestalo, mnogo kuća, zdravstvenih centara i škola je spaljeno. Velik broj žena, djece i muškaraca su postali žrtve seksualnog nasilja. Trenutačni konflikt i vojne operacije natjerale su 1.5 milijuna ljudi na premještanje unutar zemlje, kao i 500 000 ljudi da se odsele iz zemlje. Žalosti me činjenica da su ovi navedeni strašni događaji popraćeni šutnjom od strane međunarodne zajednice i medija.

Izražavam svoju duboku brigu u svezi s eskalirajućim nasiljem u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo i alarmantnim humanitarnim stanje nastalim radi oružanog sukoba u istočnim provincijama koji se odvijaju već više od 20 godina. Smatram da ovakva situacija ne smije utjecati na održavanje demokratskih izbora u predviđenom ustavnom roku.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem jednoznačně tuto rezoluci, neboť jsem hluboce znepokojen situací v Demokratické republice Kongo. Za 20 let konfliktu došlo k tisícům změřených životů, denně dochází k sexuálnímu a dalšímu násilí na ženách i dětech. Dne 28. ledna byla v Kinshase podepsána dohoda o vojenské spolupráci mezi misí MONUSCO a ozbrojenými silami DRK (FARDC) s cílem obnovit a upevnit mír a bezpečnost ve východním regionu i v celé zemi, tato dohoda však není dodržována. Je nutné urychleně obnovit spolupráci s cílem neutralizovat všechny ozbrojené skupiny, které navíc často zneužívají děti pro boje ve svých řadách. Je nutné, aby se co nejdříve konaly volby, které jsou nezbytným předpokladem pro další fungování země. Jsem přesvědčen, že Evropská unie ještě nevyčerpala všechny možnosti, jak napomoci řešit konflikt, zejména posílenou spoluprací s Africkou unií, podporou občanské společnosti, obchodu se zbraněmi a surovinami, ale také v podpoře vlády DRK při uplatňování právních předpisů, které zakazují obchodování s nerosty a jejich zpracovávání v oblastech, v nichž probíhá nelegální těžba (tzv. konfliktní minerály). Zejména v posledním zmíněném musíme učinit mnohem více, především převést evropské ujednání o povinných kontrolách dodavatelů konfliktních minerálů do právních předpisů, které je třeba urychleně přijmout.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – La situazione nella Repubblica Democratica del Congo è preoccupante. Diversi gruppi armati reclutano e utilizzano bambini e numerose sono le segnalazioni di massacri nel Paese. Ci troviamo ad affrontare una escalation di violenza e una situazione umanitaria allarmante. Bisogna, pertanto, porre fine alle violenze e promuovere il dialogo per una soluzione pacifica, coinvolgendo la comunità internazionale nell'organizzare una riunione d'emergenza al fine di garantire trasparenza nelle elezioni, che saranno cruciali per la stabilità a lungo termine e lo sviluppo del paese. Per tutto ciò, ho votato a favore di questa proposta di risoluzione.

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE), *písemně*. – Podporuji snahu Evropského parlamentu upozornit na tragickou situaci ve východním Kongu. Tento konflikt, který bývá právem srovnáván se světovými válkami, si zaslouhuje nejenom pozornost, ale hlavně snahu ho ukončit a pomáhat obětem násilí v této části světa. EU musí vyvíjet reálný tlak zejména na vládu Demokratické republiky Kongo, aby se snažila krizi opravdu řešit.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – La situation dans l'est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) est extrêmement préoccupante car marquée par des violences continues entre groupes armés ainsi qu'une impunité trop répandue. Cette situation doit être combattue avec force pour que l'ordre et la paix permettent au pays de retrouver rapidement la voie de la stabilité.

Paulo Rangel (PPE), *por escrito*. – A situação de insegurança no leste da República Democrática do Congo é hoje - como é, de resto, desde há várias décadas - profundamente alarmante.

Em províncias orientais, os conflitos armados, que perduram há mais de 20 anos, têm vindo a escalar, sendo frequentes os relatos de massacres, recrutamento de crianças, discriminação em função do sexo e violência sexual generalizada. Considerado como o conflito mais sangrento desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a persistente crise humanitária e militar na República Democrática do Congo já causou a morte de cerca de 5 milhões de pessoas.

Com efeito, condeno todos os responsáveis pelos referidos conflitos e saliento a importância dos processos que visem a sua denúncia e punição segundo as normas do Direito Penal Nacional e Internacional. Noto, também, que os ataques contra os funcionários de organizações humanitárias, que primam pelos imperativos de independência, neutralidade e imparcialidade, são verdadeiramente lamentáveis.

Pelo que vem de ser exposto, apoio a presente resolução comum e saliento a importância de a União Europeia e de os seus Estados-Membros manterem a assistência à população da República Democrática do Congo.

Robert Rochefort (ALDE), *par écrit*. – J'ai soutenu cette résolution qui exige la fin des massacres dans l'est du Congo. La situation en République démocratique du Congo en matière de sécurité ne cesse de se détériorer dans le nord-est du pays en raison des conflits armés qui durent depuis plus de 20 ans. Les exactions commises par les groupes armés sont intolérables: massacres, enrôlement et utilisation d'enfants, et violences sexuelles. La situation humanitaire, déjà alarmante, se détériore également et l'augmentation des enlèvements, agressions et attaques à l'encontre des travailleurs humanitaires retarde l'acheminement de l'aide.

Face à cette situation, l'inaction et le silence du gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et des médias ainsi que l'indifférence de la communauté internationale sont inadmissibles.

Toutes les parties sont appelées à mettre fin au conflit et à la violence, à déposer les armes, à libérer tous les enfants et à promouvoir le dialogue. Les auteurs des violations des droits de l'homme doivent être traduits en justice et la communauté internationale devrait lancer une enquête approfondie, indépendante et transparente. Rappelons enfin la nécessité d'un bon déroulement des élections et de leur tenue dans les délais prévus.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de esta resolución —iniciativa impulsada por el Grupo Socialista— porque creo que la comunidad internacional, y en particular la Unión Europea, debe hacer mucho más ante un conflicto como el que continua afectando, desde hace décadas, al este de la República Democrática del Congo (RDC), y que más que por su supuesta condición de conflicto de «baja tensión», sufre sobre todo por la «baja atención» que recibe del resto del mundo.

En los últimos 20 años, este conflicto ha causado seis millones de muertos a manos de los múltiples grupos armados que ejercen una violencia brutal sobre la población civil. Centenares de mujeres y niñas son violadas a diario. Las masacres de civiles se han convertido en algo rutinario, en el marco de una lucha interétnica y de la disputa por el control de los abundantes recursos naturales de la región.

En esta resolución pedimos a la Alta Representante que impulse una investigación internacional de las últimas masacres en la zona de Beni, en colaboración con NNUU y el Tribunal Penal Internacional. También pedimos una evaluación del desempeño de la MONUSCO cuyo principal objetivo, la protección de la población civil, debe reforzarse.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Le texte de la résolution, adoptée par le Parlement européen, entend sensibiliser la communauté internationale et les médias restés silencieux, alors qu'entre octobre 2014 et mai 2016, plus de 1 160 personnes ont été sauvagement assassinées à Beni, Lubero et Butembo, plus de 1 470 personnes ont disparu, beaucoup de maisons, de dispensaires et d'écoles ont été brûlés et nombre de femmes, d'hommes et d'enfants ont été victimes de violences sexuelles. Nous avons appelé toutes les parties au conflit à cesser immédiatement la violence, à déposer les armes, à libérer tous les enfants qui servent dans leurs rangs. Nous avons également appelé à la reprise rapide et active de la collaboration entre la Monusco et les forces armées congolaises sur la base de l'accord de coopération militaire conclu le 28 janvier dernier. Le texte voté demande aux autorités congolaises de faire de la neutralisation de tous les groupes armés de la région une priorité, d'assurer la sécurité de tous les citoyens et de rétablir la stabilité.

On a, en outre, demandé qu'une enquête approfondie, indépendante et transparente sur ces massacres soit ouverte par la communauté internationale et que le groupe des envoyés et représentants internationaux pour la région des Grands Lacs sur les élections en RDC se réunisse d'urgence.

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Afrikos širdyje – Konge – nesiliaujantis smurtas neretai nublinksta arčiau Europos vykstančių karinių konfliktų kontekste. Nepaisant to, mes, europiečiai, turime padaryti viską, kad vienoje didžiausių Afrikos šalių įsivyrautų taika ir stabilumas. Tai prisidėtų ir prie stabilumo formavimosi visame žemyne. Negalime leisti, kad Konge ir toliau siautėtų islamo ar kitokie ekstremistai, būtų pažeidinėjamos žmogaus teisės, o karo užkulisuose vykstanti nelegali prekyba iškasenomis pildytų karinių nusikaltėlių kišenes.

Kartu mes turime sudaryti sąlygas patiems afrikiečiams tapti savo likimo šeimininkais. Turime skatinti bendras Afrikos Sąjungos šalių pastangas sureguliuoti konfliktus ir užtikrinti taiką.

Todėl balsuoju už šią rezoliuciją ir kviečiu kolegas ją palaikyti. Pasakyčiau dar daugiau – rezoliucijos projekte galėjo būti skiriama daugiau dėmesio paramai pačių afrikiečių – Kongo ir kaimyninių šalių – pastangoms susitvarkyti savo kieme.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – O clima de guerra civil por parte de grupos armados no leste do Congo continua a ser extremamente preocupante, com recrutamento e utilização de crianças para cenários de guerra e sistemática violência sexual junto de grupos populacionais vulneráveis.

É importante que o Parlamento Europeu demonstre o seu veemente repúdio por estas atrocidades e manifeste um profundo sentimento de solidariedade para com o povo congolês, dando um sinal claro que está a acompanhar esta catastrófica situação humanitária de perto e com elevada preocupação.

O Tribunal Penal Internacional deverá proceder a investigações para apuramento da existência de abusos e analisar a premência de realizar um inquérito sobre os crimes alegadamente perpetrados.

Por seu turno, a UE deve adotar uma política coerente em matéria de comércio de armas e de matérias-primas, garantindo também que as negociações de acordos nesta região são condizentes com os valores da paz, da estabilidade, do desenvolvimento e dos direitos humanos.

Deverá ainda averiguar a hipótese de aplicar sanções aos responsáveis por estes massacres no leste do Congo.

Por considerar que estamos perante gravíssimos atropelos aos mais elementares e essenciais Direitos Humanos e por subscrever o teor das medidas constantes desta proposta de resolução, votei-a favoravelmente.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette résolution sur les massacres qui ont lieu dans l'est du Congo. Ce texte appelle toutes les parties à mettre fin à la violence, à déposer les armes, à libérer tous les enfants de leurs rangs et à promouvoir le dialogue vers une solution pacifique.

La République démocratique du Congo connaît une escalade de la violence sans précédent et une situation humanitaire alarmante. Aujourd'hui, des dizaines de groupes armés restent actifs, recrutant et utilisant des enfants, avec de nombreux massacres rapportés.

Afin de garantir le retour de la stabilité au Congo, il est urgent de mettre fin à cette violence et d'organiser des élections démocratiques en décembre 2016.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho dato il mio voto a favore della proposta di risoluzione comune presentata dai gruppi PPE, S&D, ECR, ALDE, Verdi e EFDD relativa ai massacri nel Congo orientale. Il Parlamento europeo guarda con preoccupazione ai recenti avvenimenti che hanno scosso il Paese, divenuto teatro, soprattutto nella parte nordorientale, di massacri ai danni della popolazione civile perpetrati da fazioni appartenenti a etnie diverse. Di fronte alla crescente violenza, alla totale negazione dei diritti umani e ad una conseguente instabilità politica, le agenzie presenti sul territorio hanno lanciato l'allarme.

È bene ricordare che l'Unione europea rappresenta un attore rilevante nella regione, l'UE è infatti una dei principali prestatori di aiuti umanitari alla Repubblica democratica del Congo. I programmi di cooperazione finanziati dall'Europa nel Paese si concentrano soprattutto su infrastrutture e migliore governance, mentre attraverso le missioni di PSDC l'UE mira al rafforzamento del settore della sicurezza. In questo stato d'allarme, do il mio appoggio ad un intervento più incisivo nel Paese, volto a porre fine ai massacri attuali e a ristabilire un clima di pace e sicurezza.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención en esta resolución pues pese a condenar los recientes dramáticos acontecimientos sucedidos en la República Democrática del Congo puede ser considerada parcial al no atender a las causas de fondo de la actual situación de inestabilidad, concretamente la desigualdad y el rol de las grandes transnacionales extractivas en el territorio.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru rezoluția referitoare la situația îngrijorătoare din Congo.

În ultimul timp, a avut loc o escaladare a violenței, care a dus la deteriorarea situației umanitare în Republica Democratică Congo.

Criza umanitară este cauzată, în special, de conflictele armate din provinciile din estul țării, care durează de peste 20 ani.

Din păcate, prea multe vieți omenești sunt plătite tribut în acest conflict interminabil și azi, prin acest vot, doresc să-mi exprim solidaritatea față de poporul din RDC.

Solicit UE și statelor sale membre să își mențină măsurile de asistență destinate locuitorilor RDC, pentru a îmbunătăți condițiile de trai ale celor mai vulnerabile segmente ale populației, îndeosebi ale persoanelor strămutate în interiorul țării.

Totodată, doresc să condamnm orice atac împotriva personalului implicat în acțiunile umanitare, precum și împiedicarea accesului pentru salvarea de vieți omenești sau pentru distribuirea de ajutoare umanitare.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Me he abstenido en el voto final de la resolución conjunta debido principalmente a que en esta no se reconoce el genocidio, se pide el refuerzo de MOUNSCO y en particular a través de las patrullas y bases de operaciones móviles, incluso aunque algunos párrafos con los que estoy de acuerdo piden una evaluación, y no refleja información sobre las responsabilidades de las multinacionales en el apoyo financiero del conflicto y la explotación ilegal de los recursos naturales.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Aj keď sa v Kongu už oficiálne skončila vojna, dodnes tam operujú ozbrojené povstalecké skupiny, ktoré sa rovnako ako aj vládne jednotky dopúšťajú ohavných zločinov na civilnom obyvateľstve. Mrzí má, že vláda nedostatočne potláča povstalecké jednotky terorizujúce obyvateľstvo. Dlhodobá ma znepokojuje nedostatočná infraštruktúra Konga a napriek obrovským zásobám drahých kovov a minerálov aj zúfalá ekonomická situácia väčšiny obyvateľov. Rovnako má znepokojuje aj situácia v oblasti garantovania základných ľudských práv a slobôd, ktorá patrí medzi základné znaky demokracie každej krajiny. Žiaľ, napriek snahám medzinárodných organizácií pôsobiacich v oblasti ochrany ľudských práv môžeme v Kongu pozorovať znaky porušovania základných ľudských práv a slobôd, a to vo forme rasizmu, diskriminácie určitej rasy, náboženstva či pohlavia. O týchto porušovaniach svedčí aj fakt, že z Konga zo svojich domovov utieklo kvôli zabíjaniu, lúpežným prepadnutiam, brutálnemu sexuálnemu násiliu voči ženám a dievčatám približne 1,7 milióna ľudí a takmer 500 tisíc z týchto dôvodov utieklo do zahraničia. Odsudzujem všetky násilnosti, ktoré sa dejú v Kongu a verím, že príslušné orgány a inštitúcie urobia všetko preto, aby

sa zastavili zločiny páchané na úkor civilného obyvateľstva.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), písno. – Na območju okrog mesta Beni na východu Demokratickej republiky Kongo je bilo od leta 2014 več kot 600 civilistov brutalno umorjenih z mačetami, sekirami in noži, med drugim ženske, otroci in celo dojenčki.

Istočasno so oborožene skupine ne samo uporabljale spolno nasilje kot vojno orožje, ampak so tudi rekrutirale otroke vojake. Zaradi velike nezmožnosti, da bi pred sodišče privedli kršitelje človekovih pravic, je to povzročilo veliko nekaznovanosti in nove zločine.

Boji v vzhodnem Kongu izhajajo iz več virov, vključno z etničnim konfliktom, političnim nezadovoljstvom in regionalno geopolitiko. To nezanesljivo mešanico pa še dodatno poslabša pomanjkanje virov v obubožani regiji.

Zaradi vsega navedenega, smo se poslanci Evropskega parlamenta odločili sprejeti resolucijo, s katero smo obsodili stalne napade oboroženih skupin in izvajanje skrajnega nasilja nad prebivalci Demokratickej republiky Kongo v vzhodnih provincih, ter pozvali vse ustrezne organe, naj nemudoma ukrepajo in kršitelje privedejo pred sodišče.

Resolucija poziva tožilca Mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča, naj zbere informacije in preuči zlorabe, da bi ugotovil, ali je potrebna preiskava Mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča glede domnevnih zločinov na območju mesta Beni.

Zaradi vsega navedenega menim, da je resolucija dobrodošla ter sem jo podprl.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), písomne. – Po strašných udalostiach v Kongu, kde vyhasli nevinné ľudské životy a tisíce ľudí prišlo o svoj domov, musíme zaujať jednoznačný postoj a pomôcť pri riešení problémov nešťastím postihnutých ľudí vo východnom Kongu.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), napisan. – Neprestana humanitarna i vojna kriza u Kongu uzrokovala je smrt oko 5 milijuna ljudi, a sigurnosna situacija, kao i situacija ljudskih prava u istočnom dijelu države još uvijek se pogoršava. Oružane grupe su još uvijek aktivne, a izvješća o kršenju ljudskih prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, poput usmjerenih napada na civile i sistematsko iskorištavanje djece od strane oružanih grupa, ne prestaju dolaziti. Strane i domaće oružane grupe, uključujući FARDC (Oružane snage DR Konga), nastavljaju s napadima na civile, često na etičkoj osnovi. Nedopustivo je kršiti ljudska prava, činiti ratne zločine i zločine protiv čovječnosti.

Stoga je nužno da vlasti u Kongu i međunarodni partneri provedu temeljita, neovisna i transparentna istraživanja te da se neutralizacijom oružanih grupa u regiji pokuša stvoriti i zadržati mir i stabilnost. Isto tako smatram da bi Europska unija trebala napraviti detaljnu evaluaciju humanitarne situacije u Kongu, upozoriti međunarodnu zajednicu na masakre te pružati pomoć kako bi se spasili životi i poboljšali uvjeti života najranjivijih skupina u Kongu. Držim da je situacija u Kongu zabrinjavajuća te stoga podržavam ovo izvješće.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), napisan. – Humanitarna i vojna kriza u Kongu do sada je uzrokovala smrt preko 5 milijuna ljudi. Stalna su izvješća o kršenju ljudskih prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, osobito na istoku zemlje. Europski parlament izrazio je duboku zabrinutost za takva kršenja, pogotovo napadima na civile od strane naoružanih skupina. Parlament poziva na intervenciju međunarodnih organizacija, osobito Afričke i Europske unije kao i susjednih zemalja države Kongo, kako bi se osigurao politički dijalog svih dionika, spriječila daljnja destabilizacija, potaknuo napredak u provedbi mira, sigurnosti, okvira za suradnju. Poziva se Unija da pošalje promatrača koji će ocijeniti situaciju i upozoriti međunarodnu zajednicu o počinjenim masakrima.

Podržavam prijedlog ove Rezolucije jer smatram da se njome može postići određeni pomak po pitanju sigurnosti i zaštite ljudskih prava u državi Kongo te spriječiti ciljane napade na civile, sve raširenije seksualno nasilje i sustavno regrutiranje i korištenje djece od strane naoružanih skupina.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), písno. – Glasovala sem za skupni predlog resolucije o pokolih na východu Konga.

Podpiram poziv iz resolucije, da vse strani v konfliktu nemudoma končajo nasilje, odložijo orožje ter iz svojih vrst izpustijo vse otroke, hkrati pa začnejo spodbujati dialog za mirno in trajno rešitev konflikta.

V zadnjem času so se namreč varnostne razmere in razmere na področju človekovih pravic v Kongu še naprej slabšajo zaradi delovanja več deset oboroženih skupin.

Prednostna naloga vlade Demokratične republike Kongo bi morala biti razorožitev oboroženih skupin ter vzpostavitev trajne varnosti in miru za vse državljanke.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), γραπτώς. – Τα γεγονότα που λαμβάνουν χώρα στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία του Κονγκό είναι καταδικαστέα.

Η ΕΕ όμως δεν πρέπει να αναμειγνύεται στα εσωτερικά άλλων χωρών.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Szavazatommal támogattam a parlamenti határozat elfogadását, bízva abban, hogy ezáltal az Európai Parlament ráirányítja a figyelmet egy olyan széleskörű erőszakra és tömeges emberi jogsértésre, amely ellen a nemzetközi közösség immár közel két évtizede képtelen hatékonyan fellépni. Különösen aggasztónak és elfogadhatatlannak tartom, hogy az ország keleti határa mentén tevékenykedő, különböző összetételű, irreguláris fegyveres milíciák rendszeresen és célzottan nők és gyermekek elleni erőszakot követnek el, továbbá gyakran kiskorú gyermekeket toboroznak fegyveres harcra, gyilkosságok elkövetésére. Éppen ezért támogatom azt a határozatban is megfogalmazott követelést, hogy a nemzetközi közösség, akár az ENSZ BT szintjén is, az eddigénél sokkal határozottabban lépjen fel az erőszakos akciók leállítására, az azért felelősök megbüntetésére érdekében.

Egyetértek azzal, hogy az Európai Unió – Afrikával kapcsolatos közös külpolitikai céljainak és európai emberi jogi alapelveinknek megfelelően – álljon e törekvés élére, küldjön külön megfigyelőt a térségbe és kezdeményezzen konkrét nemzetközi szankciókat az elkövetőkkel szemben.

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE), na piśmie. – Utrzymujący się w Kongu kryzys humanitarny i wojskowy doprowadził już do śmierci około 5 mln osób, a stan bezpieczeństwa i sytuacja w zakresie praw człowieka wciąż ulega pogorszeniu, szczególnie we wschodniej części kraju. Niestety, pomimo licznych aktów okrucieństwa ze zarówno strony rebeliantów, jak i państwowych sił zbrojnych, prezydent Kabili pozostaje nieczuły na apele społeczności międzynarodowej. W efekcie tej sytuacji kraj jest na skraju upadku, a ponad 7 mln ludzi potrzebuje natychmiastowej pomocy humanitarnej.

Parlament Europejski w swojej rezolucji oprócz oceny obecnej sytuacji w Kongu zaapelował do stron konfliktu o natychmiastowe zaprzestanie stosowania przemocy, złożenie broni, zwolnienie dzieci ze służby w szeregach i propagowanie dialogu na rzecz pokojowego i trwałego rozwiązania konfliktu. Ponadto w dokumencie zwrócono uwagę na ciężący na rządzie Konga obowiązek zagwarantowania bezpieczeństwa na terytorium całego kraju oraz zapewnienia ochrony jego obywatelom.

W rezolucji Parlament wezwał także Unię i jej państwa członkowskie do dalszego zapewnienia pomocy ludności Konga w celu uchronienia przed śmiercią i poprawienia warunków życia szczególnie wrażliwych grup ludności.

Uważam, że rezolucja Parlamentu daje ważny i jednoznaczny przekaz, że sytuacja w Kongu musi się polepszyć, a władza zacząć brać odpowiedzialność za losy własnych obywateli, dlatego też zdecydowałem się zgłosować za przyjęciem rezolucji.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), în scris. – Uniunea Europeană acordă o importanță sporită relațiilor cu statele din Africa, în vederea sprijinirii consolidării democrației, a dezvoltării economice și a condițiilor sociale din această parte a lumii. În acest sens, a fost dezvoltată o relație foarte bună cu Republica Democratică Congo, țară afectată de conflictele militare și civile din ultimele decenii. În prezent, în partea de est a țării acționează o serie de grupuri rebele înarmate care se manifestă în mod violent prin masacrarea civililor și răpirea activiștilor umaniitari, promovând epurarea pe criterii etnice, traficul ilegal de diamante, secesiunea anumitor regiuni. UE s-a implicat în mod activ în asistența umanitară pentru populația din regiune și în susținerea forțelor armate ale țării prin intermediul Misiunii ONU pentru stabilizare în RDC (MONUSCO). Totuși, eforturile desfășurate până în prezent nu au dus la remedierea situației de la fața locului. În același timp, administrația guvernamentală a întreprins o serie de măsuri reprobabile împotriva liderilor opoziției politice, de natură să discrediteze sistemul democratic în rândul populațiilor locale. Rezoluțiile de față sprijină o implicare mai mare a instituțiilor UE, în cooperare cu autoritățile din R.D. Congo, pentru soluționarea problemelor interne și pentru consolidarea democrației și a statului de drept din această țară. Susțin adoptarea acestor documente necesare.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – La situation actuelle ne devrait pas empêcher la tenue d'élections conformes à la Constitution, ni le gouvernement de la RDC et la Monusco de mener une enquête sur l'incapacité des forces congolaises et de la Monusco à protéger les civils de la région de Beni. La communauté internationale doit ouvrir une enquête rigoureuse, indépendante et transparente sur les massacres.

Nous demandons que le groupe des envoyés et représentants internationaux pour la région des Grands Lacs de l'Afrique sur les élections en République démocratique du Congo se réunisse d'urgence pour prendre des mesures appropriées en ce sens, telles que la mobilisation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), in writing. – I voted in favour of the resolution stating that the massacres carried out in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) amid general indifference have to stop and those responsible for the atrocities brought to justice. Indeed, I am deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in the country in this pre-election period which has seen an escalation in the violence.

It is now high time that all parties to the conflict to put an end to the violence, lay down their arms, and release all children from their ranks. I also call for quick and active resumption of collaboration between MONUSCO and the RDC armed forces, on the basis of the military cooperation agreement signed on 28 January. In order to ensure the future and reconciliation in DRC I call with my colleagues from the European parliament for a thorough, independent and transparent investigation to be launched by the international community into the massacres, with the full collaboration of the DRC Government and MONUSCO.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), napisan. – Između listopada 2014. i svibnja 2016. godine zbog nasilja u Istočnom Kongu život je izgubilo 1116 ljudi. Situacija u istočnom Kongu po pitanju sigurnosti i ljudskih prava veoma je alarmantna, napadi na civilno stanovništvo su kontinuirani dok počinitelji kršenja ljudskih prava prolaze nekažnjeno. Veliko nezadovoljstvo stanovništva raste i zbog nepoduzimanja nikakvih mjera glede pitanja kažnjavanja počinitelja od strane predsjednika Kabila.

Smatram da odgovorni za povrede i kršenje ljudskih prava, otmice djece, za seksualno nasilje nad ženama i djecom moraju biti privedeni i odgovarati. Uz to, vlada Republike Kongo mora jamčiti zaštitu svojih građana kako bi se stalo na kraj sukobima. Isto tako se nadam da će se pojačati dijalog Europske unije s Republikom Kongo kako bi spasili živote i poboljšali uvjete života najranjivijim skupinama stanovništva.

Romana Tomc (PPE), pisno. – Predlog resolucije o pokolih na vzhodu Konga sem podprla.

Na območju okrog mesta Beni na vzhodu Demokratične republike Kongo je bilo od leta 2014 več kot 600 civilistov brutalno umorjenih z mačetami, sekirami in noži, med drugim ženske, otroci in celo dojenčki.

Ti pokoli so najhujše nasilje v državi v zadnjem desetletju, niti kongovske oblasti niti misija MONUSCO pa o tem niso izvedle uradne preiskave. V več kot desetletnem konfliktu v vzhodnem Kongu so civiliste sistematično napadale številne oborožene skupine. Le-te so uporabljale spolno nasilje kot vojno orožje in rekrutirale otroke vojake. Velika nezmožnost, da bi pred sodišče privedli kršitelje človekovih pravic, je povzročila veliko nekaznovanosti in nove zločine.

Boji v vzhodnem Kongu izhajajo iz več virov, vključno z etničnim konfliktom, političnim nezadovoljstvom in regionalno geopolitiko, to nezanesljivo mešanico pa še poslabša pomanjkanje virov v obubožani regiji.

Neuradno ali obrtno rudarjenje predstavlja skoraj petino gospodarske proizvodnje države in zaposluje milijon prebivalcev Konga, hkrati pa predstavlja vir dobička za upornike in skorumpirane vladne vojake, pa tudi za trgovce iz sosednjih držav, ki trgujejo neposredno ali prek lokalnih oboroženih zaveznikov.

Zagotavljanje miru ovirajo neuspešna prizadevanja Demokratične republike Kongo za demobilizacijo več tisoč uporniških borcev, bodisi z njihovo vključitvijo v nacionalno vojsko bodisi s pomočjo pri vključitvi v civilno življenje.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención en esta resolución pues pese a condenar los recientes dramáticos acontecimientos sucedidos en la República Democrática del Congo puede ser considerada parcial al no atender a las causas de fondo de la actual situación de inestabilidad, concretamente la desigualdad y el rol de las grandes transnacionales extractivas en el territorio

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – I fully support this resolution as I strongly condemn what is happening in Eastern Congo.

I call as a matter of urgency for a thorough, independent and transparent investigation to be launched by the international community into the massacres, with the full collaboration of the DRC Government and MONUSCO.

With this vote we ask for an emergency meeting of the Team of International Envoys and Representatives for the Great Lakes region of Africa on elections in the DRC with a view to taking appropriate action in this direction, such as mobilising the UN Security Council.

I insist that this situation should not prevent elections from taking place as constitutionally planned.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les résolutions proposées sont marquées par une ignorance manifeste de ce qui se passe au Congo. En effet, pour comprendre la situation de l'Afrique des Grands Lacs, il faut se reporter à la fin de la guerre froide et à la décision américaine de réinvestir cette région au détriment de la France avec l'appui des diplomates canadienne, britannique et israélienne.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut comprendre d'abord la crise rwandaise puis l'utilisation du Rwanda comme de l'Ouganda pour déstabiliser la RDC aujourd'hui en s'appuyant sur les fractures ethniques.

Je vote CONTRE toutes les résolutions, excepté celle de la GUE, qui paraît la mieux étudiée.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado abstención en esta resolución pues pese a condenar los recientes dramáticos acontecimientos sucedidos en la República Democrática del Congo puede ser considerada parcial al no atender a las causas de fondo de la actual situación de inestabilidad, concretamente la desigualdad y el rol de las grandes transnacionales extractivas en el territorio.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the resolutions on massacres in eastern Congo. The resolution recalls the commitment made by the DRC under the Cotonou Agreement to respecting democracy, the rule of law and human rights principles. The resolution condemns all attacks against humanitarian actors and impediments to humanitarian access and urges all parties to the conflict to respect the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors. The resolution equally calls the EU to intensify its dialogue with the DRC and to focus its development cooperation on building better governance and improving the weak military, police and judicial system in the country. The resolution considers that the relevant authorities and the international community must prioritise putting an end to the phenomenon of child soldiers. I voted in favour because I strongly believe that the massacres and crimes against humanity which are still going on in eastern Congo should be stopped promptly.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – Es necesario condenar las masacres y crímenes contra la humanidad que siguen cometiéndose en la región oriental de la República Democrática del Congo e intentar poner fin a las actividades criminales de todos los grupos armados sin excepción en la región oriental del país, así como reconstruir la autoridad del estado de derecho en los ámbitos de gobernanza y seguridad y proceder a una investigación transparente y exhaustiva sobre las masacres y crímenes producidas como bien señala la resolución. Por todo ello creo necesario votar a favor de esta resolución.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Me he abstenido en el voto final de la resolución conjunta debido principalmente a que en ésta no se reconoce el genocidio, se pide el refuerzo de MOUNSCO y en particular a través de las patrullas y bases de operaciones móviles. Incluso aunque algunos párrafos con los que estoy de acuerdo piden una evaluación, no refleja información sobre las responsabilidades de las multinacionales en el apoyo financiero del conflicto y la explotación ilegal de los recursos naturales.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – We spreken al zo veel jaar over de oorlog in Congo dat we bijna vergeten zijn hoe mooi het er is in tijden van vrede. Hele dorpen worden geëxecuteerd. Vrouwen worden beestachtig afgeslacht aan de poorten van de legerposten. Moeders gooien wanhopig hun kinderen over de hekken van de Monuscokampen voor ze neergemaaid worden. Sinds 1996 wordt seksueel geweld als oorlogstactiek ingezet. Elke minuut wordt er een vrouw verkracht in Congo. We kunnen bijna spreken van een seksuele genocide en dat terwijl de internationale gemeenschap al zestien jaar aanwezig is.

Kunnen de Congolezen nog op ons vertrouwen, op Monusco? 10 000 troepen passeren en laten geen vrede maar trauma's na. We moeten nadenken over het mandaat en over de impact. En we weten het allemaal: Congo is in trek. Het is hier al gezegd: de natuurlijke rijkdommen houden het gevecht brandend. President Kabila zaait twijfel over zijn ambities voor een derde ambtstermijn. Alleen vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen vormen een deel van de oplossing. We moeten een rol spelen. Vier punten: we moeten de vredesprocessen blijven ondersteunen, het mandaat en de impact van Monusco streng bekijken, de straffeloosheid bestraffen en de daders straffen, en vooral de democratie echt laten spelen. Geef Oost-Congo alstublieft weer een toekomst.

Jarosław Wałęsa (PPE), *na piśmie*. – Zgłosowałem za rezolucją w sprawie masakry we wschodniej części Konga, gdyż uważam, że należy podjąć konkretne działania zapobiegające trwaniu przemocy w tym rejonie świata. Tysiące osób było zmuszonych opuścić swoje domy, by ratować życie. Wiele osób zostało zabitych. Już od lat mają tam miejsce akty przemocy wobec kobiet i dzieci. Pomimo zapewnionej ochrony wojsk ONZ osoby tam mieszkające nie mogą w żadnym stopniu czuć się bezpiecznie. Taka sytuacja prowadzi do wzrostu ofiar wśród cywili. Uważam, że trzeba powstrzymać wciąż szerzące się ludobójstwo we wschodniej części Konga, stosując odpowiednie kroki, które powstrzymają funkcjonowanie działających tam zabójców.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), *γραφώς*. – Η κατάσταση στο βορειοανατολικό Κονγκό επιδεινώνεται συνεχώς. Μεταξύ Οκτωβρίου 2014 και Μαΐου 2016 σε περιοχές του Βόρειου Κίβου σφαγιάστηκαν περισσότεροι από 1.160 άνθρωποι, ενώ 1.470 εξαφανίστηκαν. Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία που ενσωματώθηκαν στο ψήφισμα, η συνεχιζόμενη σύγκρουση έχει εκτοπίσει 1,5 εκατομμύριο ανθρώπους από τις εστίες τους, ενώ 400.000 έχουν οδηγηθεί σε φυγή από την χώρα. Τέλος, υπάρχει σοβαρό πρόβλημα στην παροχή και στην πρόσβαση στην ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια, καθώς σημειώνονται αυξημένες επιθέσεις σε μέλη ανθρωπιστικών οργανώσεων, ενώ δεν είναι λίγα τα κρούσματα απαγωγών και επαγγελματιών του ανθρωπιστικού τομέα. Υπερπήφισα την πρωτοβουλία αυτή που μεταξύ άλλων καλεί τα αντιμαχόμενα μέρη να σεβαστούν την ανεξαρτησία, την ουδετερότητα και την αμεροληψία των ανθρωπιστικών φορέων.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), *písomne*. – Uznesenie o situácii vo východnom Kongu som podporila. Násilie, ktorému čelia jeho obyvatelia, je totiž nepredstaviteľné a neustále sa zhoršuje. Tisícky ľudí prišlo o život, bolo unesených či násilne vysídlených. Tieto masakre sú pritom výsledkom politických a etnických problémov v krajine, okupácie častí krajiny ozbrojenými skupinami, ktoré na svoje financovanie využívajú nerastné bohatstvo krajiny. Jedným z hlavných zdrojov napätia je aj prezident, ktorý sa, zdá sa, nemieni vzdať svojho mandátu a vypísať riadne prezidentské voľby. Práve preto si myslím, že je na mieste, aby Európsky parlament využil prostriedky, ktoré na to má, a naliehavo apeloval na vládu Konga, aby sa snažila zlepšiť bezpečnosť svojich obyvateľov a najmä aby sa postarala o riadne vyšetrovanie zločinov, ktoré boli na obyvateľoch páchané, aby tieto zločiny nezostali bez trestu. Dúfam preto, že aj výzvy Európskeho parlamentu pomôžu situáciu tejto oblasti Konga čoskoro stabilizovať a podporia dialóg v záujme mierového riešenia konfliktov.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za skupni predlog resolucije o pokolih na vzhodu Konga.

Varnostne razmere in razmere na področju človekovih pravic v vzhodnem delu Demokratične republike Kongo se še naprej slabšajo, saj je na tem območju še vedno dejavnih več deset oboroženih skupin, od tam pa prihajajo tudi številna poročila o pokolih, novačenju in uporabi otrok v oboroženih skupinah ter vsesplošnem spolnem nasilju in nasilju na podlagi spola.

Zato podpiram poziv naj vse strani v konfliktu, nemudoma končajo nasilje, odložijo orožje, iz svojih vrst izpustijo vse otroke in začnejo spodbujati dialog za mirno in trajno rešitev konflikta.

9.12. Folgemaßnahmen zum strategischen Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung (ET2020) (A8-0176/2016 - Zdzisław Krasnodębski)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore di questa relazione perché credo fermamente che la maggior parte dei problemi che sta vivendo oggi l'Europa e la gran parte delle difficoltà europee siano superabili attraverso l'istruzione e la cultura. Il radicalismo religioso, l'intolleranza, la violenza e il populismo sono tutte situazioni di disagio che possono essere sconfitte da una forte cultura europea maturata nelle scuole, nelle università, nei centri culturali e di aggregazione.

Non sono solo le scuole e gli insegnanti ad essere coinvolti. Oggi la formazione è anche «non formale». L'Unione europea ha creato il passaporto delle competenze per dare sempre maggiore valore alle attività di volontariato e all'associazionismo. Soprattutto per chi non può proseguire gli studi, ogni esperienza positiva vissuta nell'ottica dell'impegno e della crescita è occasione di formazione che, se riconosciuta, porta alla possibilità di trovare un'occupazione.

L'Unione europea deve sostenere in ogni modo la cultura, l'istruzione e la formazione per dare ai nostri ragazzi maggiori opportunità di crescere come cittadini europei e come professionisti in grado di competere alla pari.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), per iscritto. – La cooperazione comunitaria nel settore dell'istruzione e della formazione (ET2020) mira all'elaborazione di un quadro strategico volto a sostenere i cittadini europei nella realizzazione del proprio potenziale formativo e personale.

A tal scopo, sono stati individuati 4 obiettivi principali, che vanno dalle modifiche strutturali, alle politiche di coesione sociale fino alla digitalizzazione delle competenze.

La relazione stilata, però, non esamina in alcun modo le cause delle gravi problematiche ed inefficienze che caratterizzano il settore dell'istruzione. Le politiche di austerità non devono, in alcun modo, danneggiare l'istruzione e la formazione dei cittadini europei.

Per queste ragioni, ho espresso voto negativo.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – El marco estratégico es un plan plurianual relacionado con los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 que persigue aumentar la movilidad estudiantil, la equidad, cohesión y ciudadanía activa, así como un enfoque hacia la «creatividad e innovación, incluido el espíritu empresarial». Los resultados de los últimos años demuestran que la orientación mercantilista del sistema educativo, la estandarización de los programas educativos para aumentar la competitividad entre alumnos y centros, así como los recortes de los programas de austeridad aplicados en economías como la española, han derivado en un desequilibrio evidente entre los propios objetivos marcados por la Comisión y el Consejo, que ya de por sí no representan mi posición en favor de una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad.

Esta resolución aprobada, que valora un informe conjunto de la Comisión y el Consejo, trata de legitimar a través del Parlamento estas prácticas, añadiendo matices positivos menores (por ejemplo, pidiendo impulsar la formación multidisciplinar y adaptada de los y las docentes ante los nuevos desafíos sociales, o la revisión de los grupos de trabajo de evaluación).

Por ello, ya que el informe no aborda los problemas fundamentales que derivan en un incremento de las desigualdades sociales, he votado en contra.

Louis Aliot (ENF), par écrit. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce texte relatif au suivi du cadre stratégique pour la coopération européenne dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. En effet, si ce rapport tente de trouver un réel équilibre entre les objectifs en matière d'éducation et le respect de la compétence nationale des États membres, on trouve un volet migration (intégration scolaire des migrants, favoriser l'intégration dans nos sociétés, facilitation de leur inscription dans les universités) que nous ne pouvons soutenir.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), in writing. – This report was concerned with European cooperation in education and training. While there were some progressive provisions, particularly those which addressed the need to include refugees and migrants in the education system, the report contained instructions on harmonising national education and training systems, and that runs contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.

Sinn Féin is committed to ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is respected and strengthened at national level. In everyday language, subsidiarity means that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible, i.e. at the level of power that should take action. Erosion or breaches of the principle of subsidiarity can lead to unintended consequences – undermining, for example, citizens' faith in the European Union – and should, therefore, be avoided.

Whilst the report contained some progressive elements, these failed to mitigate the erosion of the principle of subsidiarity, and I therefore voted against it.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Ψήφισα υπέρ της έκδοσης σχετικά με τη συνέχεια στην υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης (ΕΚ 2020), διότι αναφέρεται σε εξαιρετικά σημαντικά ζητήματα όπως της μετανάστευσης για εκπαιδευτικούς λόγους καθώς και στην ποιότητα της εκπαίδευσης/κατάρτισης.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), schriftlich. – Der Strategische Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung, bekannt als ET2020, setzt mehrere gemeinsame bildungspolitische Ziele. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahme der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten und durch die Kommission wurden neue Forderungen erarbeitet, um die Bildung in Europa weiter zu stärken.

Der beschlossene Bericht zielt darauf an, dass Lehrkräfte weitreichender unterstützt werden. Durch die Flüchtlingskrise sind Klassen so divers wie noch nie zuvor, was auch die Lehrkräfte vor eine Herausforderung stellt. Eine kompetente Bildung kann der Integration nur zugutekommen. Zudem soll denjenigen, die eine Brücke zwischen Theorie und Praxis bauen, mittels Stipendien oder Darlehen geholfen werden, da sich immer mehr Arbeitgeber über die Praxisunerfahrenheit des Nachwuchses beschweren.

Meiner Meinung packt der Bericht die wichtigen Probleme und neuen Herausforderungen der EU-Bildungspolitik an, weshalb ich diesem auch zugestimmt habe.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport tente de trouver un équilibre entre les travaux de ce cadre stratégique qui ont pour but des recommandations en vue de réformes des systèmes d'éducation nationaux et le respect de la compétence nationale et de la diversité des cultures et besoins des États membres.

Cependant, la place faite à la question de l'intégration des migrants, faisant fi du chômage considérable en Europe tout comme de la fuite des cerveaux dans les pays d'origine des migrants m'ont empêchée de me prononcer favorablement à ce texte sur lequel je me suis abstenue.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport constitue l'avis du Parlement sur la mise en œuvre du cadre stratégique pour la coopération européenne dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation (ET2020). De prime abord, il semble plutôt équilibré, insistant sur l'importance de tenir compte de la diversité des conjonctures des États membres, ou encore soulignant l'importance du rôle de la famille dans l'éducation.

Cependant, je n'ai pu voter en faveur de ce rapport, car il faut déplorer que ces recommandations soient gâchées par une volonté toute idéologique de transformer l'ET2020 en programme d'accueil des migrants, aux dépens des intérêts et des droits les plus fondamentaux des populations européennes.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – J'ai soutenu ce rapport d'initiative qui souligne les problèmes importants qui existent en matière d'accessibilité et de discriminations socioéconomiques dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la formation.

Dans le contexte migratoire actuel, le rapport demande notamment des mesures pour intégrer les enfants de migrants, de réfugiés et de demandeurs d'asile dans les systèmes d'éducation et de formation. De même, il souligne l'importance de mesures facilitant l'inscription des étudiants migrants, réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile à l'université.

Cela est évidemment primordial pour favoriser leur intégration et leur participation à notre société.

Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea (ALDE), *por escrito*. –

He votado a favor de este informe pone de relieve la necesidad de aumentar la cooperación en materia educativa y de formación. Desde una visión europeísta, presenta diferentes medidas destinadas a aumentar la movilidad de estudiantes y profesores dentro de la UE, uno de los grandes logros de nuestra Unión que es necesario preservar y mejorar.

El informe contiene una orientación progresista en busca de integrar a los grupos más vulnerables y desfavorecidos de nuestra sociedad. Asimismo, tiene como fin combatir las diferentes discriminaciones que todavía hoy existen en nuestro continente y que afectan a los ciudadanos LGTBI, los discapacitados, las mujeres o los inmigrantes.

La integración de los migrantes y refugiados es otra de sus prioridades. La educación es una herramienta vital para garantizar la convivencia en nuestras sociedades así como para dotar de oportunidades a aquellos ciudadanos que han llegado a la Unión huyendo de la barbarie, la miseria y en busca de un futuro mejor.

En una época como la actual, una educación y una formación de calidad, universal, integradora y accesible es uno de los mayores activos con el que contamos para tener una Unión más justa y para erradicar las diferentes formas de intolerancia.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Le grandi sfide del nostro tempo sono strettamente connesse al tema dell'istruzione e della formazione. Tra il 2011 e il 2014, il tasso di disoccupazione medio nell'Unione europea a 28 è aumentato quasi del 13% tra i giovani tra i 25 e i 29 anni che avevano completato l'istruzione terziaria. Si tratta di un dato allarmante che evidenzia chiaramente uno dei problemi cruciali della realtà contemporanea. La relazione Krasnodębski, sul seguito del quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione, rappresenta un contributo importante per analizzare gli aspetti migliorabili dell'impegno dell'Unione in materia di istruzione e formazione. Il tema cruciale è quello di rafforzare la ricalibrazione di ET2020, puntando a coniugare l'occupabilità con la promozione della coesione sociale, l'uguaglianza, la non discriminazione e le competenze civiche. Tra le diverse misure da intraprendere, che passano da una corretta analisi dei risultati del processo di Bologna e una correzione delle pericolose tendenze verso politiche di tagli all'istruzione, c'è quella di prestare attenzione alla prossima Agenda europea delle competenze. Questo strumento dovrà affrontare non solo le sfide economiche e occupazionali ma anche i temi legati alla conoscenza della materie, ai risultati accademici e soprattutto al pensiero critico.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – En 2014 la Comisión hizo balance de la estrategia de educación y formación, ET 2020, en cooperación con los Estados miembro. A partir de las conclusiones del informe resultante, la Comisión estableció las prioridades para el periodo 2016-2020. Si bien dichas prioridades atienden a aspectos incuestionables como la educación inclusiva, la igualdad, la equidad, la no discriminación, las competencias cívicas, el bienestar, la cohesión social, el diálogo intercultural, la innovación y el apoyo a la docencia, no dejan de ser un envoltorio con el que prestigiar una concepción neoliberal de la educación y la formación. El informe Krasnodebski, en línea con la Comisión, no oculta la conversión de la educación y la formación en objeto de negocio, y las orienta a la empleabilidad en lugar de al desarrollo del conocimiento. Se ha de reconocer la inclusión en el informe de aspectos como la acogida en este ámbito de los migrantes, los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo, así como de la perspectiva de género. No obstante, estas inclusiones, necesarias, no deben pagar el peaje de la mercantilización de la educación; por ello hemos votado en contra.

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), *por escrito*. – Apoyo las aportaciones que este informe hace sobre el papel que la educación tiene en la integración de los cientos de miles de personas que llegan a nuestra unión huyendo de la violencia, la guerra y la miseria. Un trabajo que debe reforzar entre los que ya estamos aquí los valores de la unión, el mejor antídoto contra el populismo con que se trata este problema. Una tarea que debe centrarse también en superar las carencias que la educación europea ofrece a los que llegan. Una clave para insistir en el humanístico principio de Unidos en la Diversidad. Felicito igualmente el fortalecimiento de los mecanismos para compartir buenas prácticas, la insistencia en el apoyo a padres y familias como protagonistas básicos del proceso educativo y la implicación en esta cooperación estratégica de todos los agentes que pueden aportar y que demuestran con datos que hay políticas que dan resultados, aunque sus protagonistas sean incómodos para algunos de los estados miembros. Este Parlamento ha asistido, y acompañado en alguna ocasión, a críticas gratuitas, por ejemplo, al sistema educativo vasco por su apuesta por un bilingüismo efectivo que llegó a considerarse señal de apoyo al terrorismo. Esta misma semana la BBC lo ponía como ejemplo de integración, innovación y resultados.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai préféré m'abstenir sur ce rapport relatif au cadre stratégique pour la coopération européenne dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation (ET2020).

En effet, si je salue la recherche d'équilibre menée par le rapporteur, notamment en reconnaissant la diversité des États membres en matière d'éducation et de formation et en rappelant que ces domaines restent de leur compétence, je regrette que le rapport ait été dévoyé du fait des compromis que le rapporteur a dû mener avec les autres groupes politiques.

Ainsi, les bonnes propositions en matière d'apprentissage, de qualité de l'enseignement des savoirs fondamentaux ou de reconnaissance du rôle des enseignants et professeurs et de la famille, sont-elles mises en danger par la non remise en cause du processus de Bologne.

Enfin, je regrette les propositions concernant l'intégration des migrants par l'éducation, la vraie posture humanitaire consistant à ne pas priver les pays subissant l'émigration des ressources humaines et économiques, et à travailler avec eux pour la création de «couloirs éducatifs» permettant aux étudiants en provenance des zones de guerre de pouvoir continuer à étudier au plus près de chez eux.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Questa relazione di iniziativa doveva inizialmente occuparsi delle priorità nel settore dell'istruzione e della formazione, invece è stata stravolta e strumentalizzata per portare avanti in maniera faziosa i temi dell'accoglienza dei migranti ad ogni costo e della politica delle porte aperte senza distinzione fra migranti e rifugiati. Per tutti questi motivi ho votato contro questo testo.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – El marco estratégico para la cooperación europea en el ámbito de la educación y la formación ha sido revisado por el Consejo y el Parlamento Europeo con el fin de reforzar su eficacia, reordenar las áreas prioritarias de acción y aumentar su valor añadido.

Este informe, que he apoyado, remarca la necesidad de lograr los objetivos a largo plazo mientras se trabaja en temas específicos de relevancia para cada país, como un bajo nivel de participación en la formación de adultos, el abandono escolar, la inclusión social o la brecha de género, entre otras cuestiones.

Gracias al Grupo S&D, se ha incluido la necesidad de poner el foco en la inclusión social con el fin de alcanzar los objetivos de la ET 2020, mejorar la inclusión y la calidad de los sistemas de educación y formación con una perspectiva de aprendizaje permanente y pedir una mejor gobernabilidad y cooperación en esta materia. Igualmente, se hace hincapié en el refuerzo de las habilidades digitales, la educación infantil de alta calidad y una educación inclusiva para garantizar la igualdad de acceso y oportunidades para todos, especialmente para los grupos más vulnerables, al tiempo que se incluye un capítulo específico sobre la migración y la educación, en el que se pide la adecuada integración de los migrantes, refugiados y solicitantes de asilo en los sistemas de educación y formación.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Parlamentas pritaria Komisijos atliktam programos „ET 2020“ apžvalginiam vertinimui.

Apžvalginiam vertinime ekspertai pažymi, kad vienas iš masinio domėjimosi aukštuoju mokslu padarinių yra didėjanti nelygybė švietimo sistemų viduje. Sistemai plečiantis, bet kurioje šalyje padidėja skirtumas tarp geriausių ir prasčiausių švietimo įstaigų, o tai neigiamai paveikia švietimo kokybę, absolventų įsidarbinimo galimybes ir socialinę sanglaudą.

Palankiai vertinama tai, kad pagalba pedagogams įvardyta kaip viena iš naujų „ET 2020“ prioritetinių sričių, nes mokytojų rengimo ir nuolatinio profesinio tobulėjimo programų kokybė vis dar neatitinka didėjančio kompetencijų diapazono ir sudėtingumo. Bet ataskaitose keliamas susirūpinimas, kad akademikai laikosi neigiamo požiūrio į Bolonijos procesą ir darbdaviai skundžiasi absolventų įgūdžiais bei kritiškai vertina naują laipsnių struktūrą.

Vertinime pastebima, kad skiriasi valstybių narių pažanga integruojant iš migrantų kilusius moksleivius ir studentus. Taip pat pastebima, kad svarbu užkirsti kelią aukštos kvalifikacijos migrantų protų nutekėjimui ar protų švaistymui tiek jų pačių, tiek priimančiųjų šalių labui.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), in writing. — Education and training are important in helping people to acquire the knowledge and professional skills they need to become competitive and innovative employees. They can play an important role in nurturing open-minded, empathic, inquiring human beings and responsible citizens with a strong sense of identity, a deep knowledge of their culture and heritage. We should welcome the fact that the Paris Declaration was reflected in the joint report and that the recalibration of ET2020 has been done by putting on equal footing employability goals and the promotion of social cohesion, equality, non-discrimination and civic competences.

ET2020 cooperation, while respecting the competence of Member States, should complement national actions and support Member States in their efforts to develop education and training systems.

I welcome the ET2020 stocktaking exercise. The ET2020's four strategic objectives and current benchmarks remain valid as they were formulated in a comprehensive and forward-looking manner in the ET2020 Council conclusions of 2009, providing a solid basis for ET2020 activities up to 2020. Therefore, I supported this resolution with my vote.

Simona Bonafè (S&D), per iscritto. – Il quadro strategico «IF 2020» rappresenta un'importante cornice per la promozione della cooperazione in materia di istruzione e formazione, finalizzata a offrire risposte e soluzioni a sfide attuali comuni come il fabbisogno di qualifiche, la necessità di sostenere un apprendimento inclusivo, permanente e di qualità, favorire l'innovazione e lo sviluppo di competenze digitali.

La risoluzione votata oggi dal Parlamento europeo, che ho sostenuto, mira a conferire maggiore forza ed efficacia al quadro strategico, riordinandone le aree prioritarie di azione e aumentando il valore aggiunto delle iniziative ad esso legate.

Ho accolto inoltre favorevolmente il fatto che, come richiesto dal gruppo dei Socialisti e Democratici, il testo approvato in plenaria ponga maggiormente l'accento sulla necessità di favorire l'inclusione sociale nel processo di formazione, garantendo l'accessibilità all'istruzione e opportunità di mobilità in ogni fase dell'apprendimento, con particolare riguardo alle categorie economicamente e socialmente più svantaggiate.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), in writing. — This report was concerned with European cooperation in education and training. While there were some progressive provisions, particularly those which addressed the need to include refugees and migrants in the education system, the report contained instructions on harmonising national education and training systems, and that runs contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.

Sinn Féin is committed to ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is respected and strengthened at national level. In everyday language, subsidiarity means that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible, i.e. at the level of power that should take action. Erosion or breaches of the principle of subsidiarity can lead to unintended consequences – undermining, for example, citizens' faith in the European Union – and should, therefore, be avoided.

Whilst the report contained some progressive elements, these failed to mitigate the erosion of the principle of subsidiarity, and I therefore voted against it.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – I giovani europei si trovano ad affrontare sfide comuni che richiedono risposte comuni. La minaccia della radicalizzazione evoca l'urgenza di migliorare le prospettive educative trasversalmente a tutte le collettività. Gli Stati Europei devono collaborare per intensificare gli sforzi comuni per ridurre la dispersione scolastica, contrastare l'esclusione sociale e sostenere la diversificazione degli allievi nelle aule di tutta Europa. L'adeguamento dell'offerta formativa alle reali esigenze del mercato del lavoro e dei cittadini che vi operano unita alla maggior attenzione all'inclusione sociale sono la chiave per sottrarre i giovani ai reclutatori della criminalità organizzata e del terrorismo, al fine di costruire un futuro più solido e sicuro per centinaia di migliaia di giovani europei che – ad oggi – vengono troppo spesso trattati come cittadini secondari dalle istituzioni dedite alla formazione.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – «Éducation et formation 2020» (ET2020) constitue le cadre de la coopération dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. Cette plateforme d'échange de bonnes pratiques et d'apprentissage mutuel diffuse des informations et des éléments probants tout en fournissant des conseils et un appui aux réformes. L'objectif étant de réduire le taux de chômage chez les 18-25 ans en s'attaquant à la déscolarisation ainsi qu'en facilitant l'accès aux universités. Ce rapport dresse un constat plutôt objectif de l'état du cadre stratégique. En outre, il rappelle que la tendance actuelle d'assigner le système universitaire à des objectifs quantitatifs ne doit pas nuire à la qualité des enseignements. Le rapporteur souligne également qu'ET2020 ne tient pas suffisamment compte de la spécificité des problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les États membres en matière d'éducation. Bien que ce rapport aille dans le bon sens, je me suis abstenu sur ce texte qui défend la scolarisation gratuite pour l'ensemble des migrants clandestins. Pour finir, il est indispensable de rappeler que l'éducation est une compétence exclusive des États membres.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Educația și formarea profesională sunt foarte importante pentru că ajută oamenii să dobândească cunoștințe și competențe profesionale necesare pentru a putea deveni angajați competitivi și inovatori. De asemenea, joacă un rol important în formarea unor ființe umane cu un spirit deschis, cu empatie și curiozitate, dar și a unor cetățeni responsabili, cu un puternic sentiment al identității, cu o cunoaștere aprofundată a culturii și patrimoniului lor, care respectă și cunosc valorile europene comune.

Este bine de știut că recalibrarea ET2020 se realizează atât prin reflectarea Declarației de la Paris din 17 martie 2015 a ministrului învățământului, dar și prin acordarea unei foarte mari importanțe obiectivelor legate de capacitatea de inserție profesională, cât și promovării coeziunii sociale, a egalității, a nediscriminării, dar și a aptitudinilor civice.

Am votat în favoarea raportului referitor la măsurile întreprinse ca urmare a cadrului strategic pentru cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației și formării profesionale (ET2020), deoarece consider că este necesară o cooperare cât mai bună la nivel european în ceea ce privește educația.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *în scris*. – Principalul scop al strategiei de educație și formare profesională 2020 este de a sprijini statele membre în dezvoltarea sistemelor de educație și formare pentru a permite tuturor cetățenilor europeni să dobândească și să-și dezvolte abilități și competențe necesare pentru ocuparea unui loc de muncă și continuarea învățării pe tot parcursul vieții, acoperind toate nivelurile și contextele, respectiv formal, non-formal și informal.

Subliniez faptul că una dintre cele mai eficiente metode de combatere a inegalității și a sărăciei o reprezintă consolidarea educației; așadar, menționez că eficacitatea și aspectele operaționale ale ET2020 trebuie consolidate și solicit să se acorde o atenție sporită calității educației, începând de la grădiniță și apoi pe tot parcursul vieții, fapt ce le va permite tinerilor să se adapteze cu ușurință la mediul social și economic în schimbare.

Uniunea trebuie să răspundă cât mai repede provocărilor actuale, prin urmare avem nevoie, la nivel național și european, de măsuri urgente în cadrul ET2020 pentru solicitanții de azil adulți care au sosit de curând în Europa.

Educația este esențială pentru integrare, iar participarea la programele de formare și învățare pe tot parcursul vieții reprezintă o șansă pentru imigranții nou sosiți.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – Bien que les politiques sociales soient de la compétence des États membres, il est important d'en assurer la coordination au sein du marché unique. «Éducation et formation 2020» (ET2020) est le programme de coopération européenne pour l'éducation et la formation. Ce cadre stratégique permet d'atteindre plus facilement les objectifs européens en matière d'éducation. L'éducation et la formation sont deux éléments primordiaux en vue de préparer les jeunes au monde du travail. Cela permet de faire accéder un maximum de personnes à des qualifications nécessaires à l'insertion dans le monde du travail. Une approche collaborative permet également une meilleure gestion du programme Erasmus+. J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport, qui propose une série de mesures visant

l'amélioration du cadre stratégique ET2020.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione in questione perché ritengo necessario incrementare l'efficienza dei sistemi di istruzione e formazione ed i livelli generali di abilità e competenze, collegando al meglio il mondo del lavoro a quello dell'istruzione.

Un punto della relazione sul quale vorrei porre l'accento riguarda il sostegno a favore degli educatori, individuato come uno dei nuovi settori prioritari del Quadro strategico su istruzione e formazione 2020. La qualità della preparazione degli insegnanti e i programmi di sviluppo professionale permanente sono, purtroppo, ancora in ritardo rispetto all'aumento della molteplicità delle competenze necessarie all'insegnamento.

La cooperazione europea secondo la «IF 2020» assume la forma di scambi di informazioni e di esperienze sui problemi comuni ai sistemi di istruzione e formazione dei paesi europei. Tali scambi includono l'apprendimento tra pari, il monitoraggio periodico e la presentazione periodica di relazioni e gli strumenti di riferimento comuni.

Sarebbe opportuno alla luce dell'accelerazione ascrivibile alla mobilità intra-europea e alla persistente crisi dei rifugiati, prestare particolare attenzione alle esigenze delle varie tipologie di studente, appartenente a minoranze etniche o religiose, proveniente da famiglie a basso reddito o di immigrati.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I abstained on this report, which concerns European cooperation in education and training. Although there are some general good elements, addressing the need to include refugees and migrants in the education system, there are some issues with national sovereignty. In particular, the report contains instructions on national education and training systems, with the aim of harmonising those systems, which is contradictory to the principle of subsidiarity.

For this reason, I chose to abstain.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this stocktaking report that records the progress of the European education and training framework and puts forward very concrete recommendations to enhance the influence that the framework can exert on society.

Europe is under pressure to tackle youth unemployment and the refugee crisis. Strengthened coordination in policy-making and support for education programmes will definitely pay back in the future. I am especially content with the proposal to take account of gender gaps. I believe that the revised framework can provide high-quality education and training so it can effectively assist young people and new immigrants on the job market – which is in the interest of all EU Member States.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Non ho appoggiato la relazione sulla valutazione del quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione. Si rilevano infatti numerose carenze nel rapporto di iniziativa, che non menziona le cause principali dell'aggravamento delle problematiche dei settori dell'Istruzione e della Formazione nell'UE e non propone alcuna risoluzione ai problemi in materia di qualità, accessibilità e discriminazione socio economica nel campo dell'istruzione.

Caterina Chinnici (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'istruzione e la formazione sono i pilastri della crescita personale e dello sviluppo delle società. Nel contesto attuale, in cui la crisi economica ha determinato elevati tassi di disoccupazione, per sostenere la ripresa della crescita economica bisogna puntare immancabilmente sul sostegno all'istruzione e alla formazione anche per adeguare i profili professionali alle nuove esigenze del mercato.

La valutazione del quadro strategico «Istruzione e formazione» per il 2020 ha rilevato che l'abbandono prematuro dei percorsi scolastici e formativi rimane ancora molto alto all'interno dei paesi dell'UE ed è per questo che occorre rafforzare le prevenzioni.

Qualità ed efficacia della formazione dovranno rimanere gli obiettivi da raggiungere per il 2020, ma accanto a questo sono altresì necessarie misure urgenti a livello nazionale ed europeo nel campo dell'istruzione e della formazione per gli adulti richiedenti asilo che si trovano in Europa. L'istruzione rimane la chiave per l'integrazione: se i sistemi nazionali non saranno in grado di raccogliere tale sfida il rischio di esclusione sociale sarà alto nei prossimi anni.

Ho votato a favore del documento perché ritengo che se l'Europa intende davvero realizzare l'ambizione di diventare l'economia basata sulla conoscenza più competitiva e dinamica dovrà investire di più in questi ambiti.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση και τονίζουμε πως η εκπαίδευση και η κατάρτιση είναι σημαντικές, καθώς βοηθούν τους ανθρώπους να εξασφαλίσουν τις γνώσεις και τις επαγγελματικές δεξιότητες που χρειάζονται για να τους καταστήσουν ανταγωνιστικούς και καινοτόμους εργαζόμενους. Επιπλέον, θα μπορούσαν να διαδραματίσουν σημαντικό ρόλο στην καλλιέργεια ανοιχτόμυαλων και φιλομαθών ανθρώπων με ευαισθησία και ισχυρή αίσθηση ταυτότητας, καθώς και βαθιά γνώση του πολιτισμού και της κληρονομιάς τους, οι οποίοι αναγνωρίζουν και τιμούν τις κοινές ευρωπαϊκές αξίες.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Η έκθεση σχετικά με τη συνέχεια στην υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης αποτελεί μια ιδιαίτερη διαδικασία την οποία οφείλουμε να προσεγγίσουμε προσεκτικά, προς όφελος των μαθητών και φοιτητών της Ευρώπης. Παρότι η έκθεση αυτή περιέχει θετικά στοιχεία για την εναρμόνιση των διαδικασιών για ζητήματα εκπαίδευσης και κατάρτισης των πολιτών σε πανευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο, θεωρώ πως δεν καταφέρνει να αποφύγει διακρίσεις σε βάρος προσφύγων και μεταναστών στο σύνολο του πληθυσμού και γι' αυτό τον λόγο απείχα.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), per iscritto. – L'istruzione dei cittadini, in particolare quella dei bambini, è un tema di fondamentale importanza per me. Avere una comunità colta, istruita, rappresenta un punto di forza veramente importante per l'Europa. Non solo dal punto di vista delle capacità lavorative, che è di notevole importanza, ma anche dal punto di vista della società, poiché dare un'istruzione di buona qualità costituisce un valore importante nello sviluppo delle virtù etiche e civili e nel rafforzamento del rispetto dei principi democratici su cui si fonda l'Europa. Sono convinto che l'Unione debba dare molta importanza a questo tema e ritengo che ci sia bisogno di investire in questo settore più di quanto si stia attualmente facendo. Per queste ragioni, che ritengo di fondamentale importanza, ho deciso di votare a favore.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), in writing. – I supported this report. In a time of high youth unemployment, affecting even graduates, it is of foremost importance to evaluate the European ET2020 framework with a view to increasing its added value and optimising its effectiveness. The stocktaking exercise conducted by the Commission in 2014 concluded with a number of recommendations from the Commission and Council for addressing the problem of the complex landscape of ET2020 and its governance: definition of mandates for the new generation Working Group, involvement of independent experts, closer dialogue, and more regular consultation and coordination between the Commission, Member States and educational stakeholders.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), por escrito. – O balanço do quadro estratégico EF2020 foi realizado pela Comissão em cooperação com os Estados-Membros em 2014, tendo em 2015 a Comissão e o Conselho publicado um Relatório sobre o complexo panorama do Quadro.

Apoio o Relatório Krasnodebski e, em concreto, a nova geração de grupos de trabalho no âmbito do Quadro com uma maior representação das diferentes partes através da inclusão de um maior número de especialistas, jovens trabalhadores, representantes da sociedade civil, professores, etc.

Apoio, de igual modo, a criação de um órgão informal de coordenação que inclua vários funcionários de alto nível da Comissão, representantes da sociedade civil, dos parceiros sociais e da Comissão da Cultura e da Educação do PE, com o objetivo de assegurar uma melhor coordenação, coerência política e acompanhamento das recomendações formuladas pelos organismos EF2020.

De ressalvar a necessidade de ser consagrada mais atenção à qualidade da educação em todos os ciclos e a importância das competências gerais de base em matéria de ensino e aprendizagem, como as TIC, a matemática, o pensamento crítico, as línguas estrangeiras, a mobilidade, entre outras, que permitem a fácil adaptação dos jovens a um contexto social e económico em mutação.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – El marco estratégico es un plan plurianual relacionado con los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 que persigue aumentar la movilidad estudiantil, la equidad, cohesión y ciudadanía activa, así como un enfoque hacia la «creatividad e innovación, incluido el espíritu empresarial». Los resultados de los últimos años demuestran que la orientación mercantilista del sistema educativo, la estandarización de los programas educativos para aumentar la competitividad entre alumnos y centros, así como los recortes de los programas de austeridad aplicados en economías como la española, han derivado en un desequilibrio evidente entre los propios objetivos marcados por la Comisión y el Consejo, que ya de por sí no representan mi posición en favor de una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad.

Esta resolución aprobada, que valora un informe conjunto de la Comisión y el Consejo, trata de legitimar a través del Parlamento estas prácticas, añadiendo matices positivos menores (por ejemplo, pidiendo impulsar la formación multidisciplinar y adaptada de los y las docentes ante los nuevos desafíos sociales, o la revisión de los grupos de trabajo de evaluación).

Por ello, ya que el informe no aborda los problemas fundamentales que derivan en un incremento de las desigualdades sociales, he votado en contra.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'istruzione e la formazione sono un diritto umano fondamentale e un bene pubblico accessibile a tutti e contribuiscono certamente allo sviluppo economico e alla coesione sociale in Europa. Le conseguenze dirette di investimenti insufficienti in materia sono povertà, esclusione sociale, disuguaglianze a tutti i livelli.

Pertanto, sostengo questa risoluzione che riconosce la necessità di una strategia più coordinata ed efficace per risolvere gli annosi problemi di qualità, accesso e discriminazione socio-economica nell'istruzione e nella formazione. Lo strumento della cooperazione comunitaria nel settore dell'istruzione e della formazione (IF2020) già fornisce importanti linee guida per orientare gli sforzi e le capacità dell'UE e dei suoi Stati membri.

Tuttavia, viste la diversa situazione socioeconomica e le diverse tradizioni educative degli Stati membri, occorre evitare approcci prescrittivi uniformi a livello europeo e ogni Stato dovrebbe, invece, incoraggiare gli studenti a raggiungere e sfruttare i propri risultati accademici e le proprie specifiche competenze nel mercato del lavoro.

La risoluzione tiene conto di ambo i livelli: le specificità nazionali e l'esigenza di un approccio coordinato a livello europeo per rafforzare la convergenza sociale, promuovere la cittadinanza attiva attraverso l'educazione formale e informale e prevenire la radicalizzazione. Questo approccio deve includere anche rifugiati, migranti e richiedenti asilo.

Andi Cristea (S&D), *în scris*. – Prin cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației și formării profesionale, statele membre au posibilitatea de a promova o serie de politici educaționale ce favorizează distribuția echitabilă a cunoașterii în rândul populației, diminuând discrepanțele socioeconomice și crescând nivelul incluziunii sociale.

Consider că accesul la programe de educație și formare de calitate este un drept ce trebuie garantat tuturor cetățenilor europeni.

Fără a pierde din vedere importanța dobândirii competențelor practice în vederea inserției profesionale, este elementar ca sistemele de educație și formare profesională să permită obținerea de competențe transversale civice, sociale și interculturale, ce sunt benefice dezvoltării creativității și gândirii critice. De asemenea, prin promovarea valorilor și principiilor democratice și prin creșterea investițiilor în educație, cercetare și inovare, se poate crea un sistem cu adevărat incluziv, reducând semnificativ șansele emergenței curențelor extremiste și radicaliste.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, dorind să reiterez importanța accesului nediscriminatoriu la educație și formare, a transmiterii principiilor și valorilor sociale, civice și etice, a sprijinului personalului didactic și a creșterii investițiilor în acest domeniu. Astfel, doresc să încurajez cooperarea și schimbul de bune practici, inspirat din diferitele tradiții europene, în scopul întreprinderii unor acțiuni politice ambițioase, coordonate și eficace la nivel european.

Edward Czesak (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Komisja Europejska ogłosiła doprecyzowany zestaw priorytetów europejskiej współpracy w dziedzinie kształcenia i szkolenia. Kształcenie i szkolenie jest ważne, ponieważ pomaga ludziom nabywać wiedzę i kwalifikacje zawodowe, jakich potrzebują, by stać się konkurencyjnymi i innowacyjnymi pracownikami. Co więcej, kształcenie i szkolenie może odgrywać ważną rolę w wychowywaniu ludzi o szerokich horyzontach, wrażliwych i dociekliwych, a także odpowiedzialnych obywateli z silnym poczuciem tożsamości, gruntowną znajomością swojej kultury i dziedzictwa. Celem sprawozdania jest nasilenie współpracy grup roboczych i dyrekcji generalnych lub grup wysokiego szczebla, określenie mandatów dla nowej generacji grup roboczych z wyznaczeniem struktury ich prac i rezultatów, które należy osiągnąć. Ważne jest zaangażowanie w większym stopniu niezależnych ekspertów w dziedzinie edukacji. Ścisły dialog między Komisją, państwami członkowskimi a zainteresowanymi stronami z sektora edukacji jest konieczny do zapewnienia rzeczywistych działań. Dużo uwagi poświęcono potrzebom różnych kategorii osób uczących się, takich jak osoby z mniejszości etnicznych lub religijnych, ubogie dzieci lub dzieci ze środowisk migracyjnych. W sprawozdaniu wzywa się do jakościowych zmian w polityce mobilności, rozwiązania problemów, jakie pojawiają się w przyspieszonej mobilności wewnątrz europejskiej i które wynikają dla krajowych systemów kształcenia i szkolenia z obecnego kryzysu związanego z uchodźcami. Zgadzam się z postanowieniami omawianego sprawozdania. W związku z powyższym zagłosowałem za jego przyjęciem.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – Education and training are an important basis for integration and employability. Urgent measures are also required at national and European levels, within the ET2020 framework, in the field of education and training for adult asylum seekers who have recently arrived in Europe. It is important that Member States have a strategic framework in order to address the issues of diversity and segregation. We must ensure that highly skilled migrants are employed in the interest of the host country and the migrants themselves. For these reasons I voted in favour of the report.

Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), *în scris*. – Consider că strategiile de comunicare între școală și părinți și formarea caracterului și alte programe de dezvoltare personală, puse în aplicare în mediul de învățare, în cooperare cu familiile și cu alți parteneri sociali relevanți, pot contribui la o convergență socială ascendentă, la promovarea cetățeniei active și a valorilor europene. De asemenea, cred că un mediu familial încurajator este esențial pentru dobândirea corespunzătoare a competențelor de bază de către copii și evidențiază valoarea cursurilor pentru părinți, care se pot dovedi eficace în combaterea sărăciei educaționale.

Rachida Dati (PPE), *par écrit*. — J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport, sans valeur législative contraignante, qui appelle à optimiser l'efficacité du cadre européen pour l'éducation et la formation au sein de l'Union européenne. Face à un taux de chômage des jeunes toujours plus important dans de nombreux États membres, il est indispensable d'améliorer les outils qui ont fait leurs preuves, comme par exemple l'apprentissage. Face à la crise migratoire, certains paragraphes dans le rapport font mention d'une meilleure intégration des migrants, des réfugiés et des demandeurs d'asile dans les systèmes d'éducation et de formation européens. Je regrette le flou qui entoure ces différentes mentions, mais parce que je soutiens l'intégration des réfugiés politiques, j'ai tout de même voté pour les paragraphes en question. Parce que l'éducation permet l'intégration et une implication accrue dans notre société, notamment financière, elle doit être proposée aux personnes qui obtiennent le droit de s'installer dans nos pays.

Jean-Paul Denanot (S&D), *par écrit*. – Le texte de ce rapport dresse un inventaire très complet des mesures à promouvoir et mettre en place pour assurer l'efficacité et la justice des systèmes scolaires et de formation européens dans une société du savoir. De l'innovation au décroisement, du formel à l'informel, des petites classes à la prise en charge des réfugiés, de l'irrespect à la radicalisation, de l'employabilité à la formation d'un esprit critique, il éclaire tous les enjeux, les risques et les difficultés pour parvenir à instruire et émanciper dans un monde en profonde mutation et où les référentiels en terme de connaissances et de compétences sont bousculés par le numérique. Il ne néglige pas de rappeler aussi les méfaits des politiques d'austérité qui ont vu certains États baisser leur effort budgétaire dans l'enseignement scolaire et supérieur. C'est tout l'intérêt de ce rapport de montrer combien la Commission européenne est extrêmement performante sur le diagnostic et complètement contradictoire dans ses injonctions!

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport a le mérite d'établir un équilibre entre les travaux du cadre stratégique qui ont pour but des recommandations en vue de réformes des systèmes d'éducation nationaux et le respect de la compétence nationale et de la diversité des cultures et besoins des États membres. Il renferme malheureusement un volet politiquement correct relatif aux migrants, en demandant notamment à ce que soit facilitée leur inscription à l'université. Compte tenu du fait que celui-ci était intégré au rapport commun de la Commission et du Conseil, il était difficile de l'exclure. Pour cette raison, j'ai préféré m'abstenir.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – След обявяването на набор от приоритети на Европейската комисия в областта на образованието и обучението моят колега Краснодобски изработи доклад, който аз в голяма степен подкрепям. В него се подчертава, че има проблем с изтичането на квалифицирана работна ръка от повечето държави членки, в това число и България, дават се препоръки за по-тясно сътрудничество, с оглед на по-добро качество и ефективност на образованието и обучението на всички нива.

Аз обаче се въздържах при крайното гласуване, защото, за да постигне консенсус с другите групи, проф. Краснодобски е приел на няколко места да включи неприемливи за мен и моята политика предложения, насочени към имигрантите – като например препоръката за специални „коридори за образование“ за новопристигналите бежанци, които да им позволяват да се запишат в европейски университети, което за мен лично говори, че следващата стъпка ще бъде да се създадат квоти за такива, което ще им даде привилегии за сметка на граждани на ЕС, което не смятам за редно.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Καταφιζόμαστε. Με αυτό το απαράδεκτο κείμενο αποδεικνύεται ακόμα μια φορά πως η Ένωση αντί να ενδιαφερθεί για το πώς θα σταματήσει την συνεχή υποβάθμιση της εκπαίδευσης στην Ευρώπη, απασχολείται μόνο με τους λαθρομετανάστες και κοινωνικά απροσάρμοστους ιδεοληπτικούς που προσπαθούν να επιβάλλουν στους μαθητές τις απόψεις τους.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – O relatório conjunto publicado pela Comissão e pelo Conselho aborda o problema do complexo panorama do quadro estratégico «EF 2020», que nem sempre foi claramente compreendido por alguns participantes ou por uma parte da comunidade em geral. Alguns Estados-Membros devem continuar a melhorar a forma como interagem com as estruturas formais e informais, velando por que sejam enviadas as pessoas certas às reuniões certas e por que se reduza ao mínimo o recurso a substitutos.

São, por isso, necessárias medidas urgentes a nível nacional e europeu, no âmbito do quadro estratégico «EF 2020», no sector da educação e da formação dos requerentes de asilo adultos recém-chegados à Europa. Atendendo a que a educação é fundamental para a integração e a empregabilidade, a ausência de resposta a este desafio por parte dos sistemas nacionais poderá provocar um agravamento das disparidades sociais e da segregação cultural e, assim, intensificar a tendência já existente para a formação de sociedades paralelas.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – A cooperação e o intercâmbio de boas práticas entre Estados-Membros nas áreas da educação e da formação podem ser positivas. No entanto, importa examinar o conteúdo, plano de fundo do EF 2020 e as suas prioridades. O quadro estratégico da cooperação europeia na educação e formação (EF 2020) é parte da abordagem neoliberal da UE. Tanto as prioridades iniciais como as novas tentam harmonizar a educação e os sistemas de formação dos Estados-Membros com as políticas económicas e de emprego da UE.

O relatório contém aspetos positivos, de crítica à situação atual do ensino e formação. Mas não consegue diferenciar-se da abordagem dominante da UE. A mobilidade, a empregabilidade e o empreendedorismo são exemplos. No âmbito do EF 2020, a educação e a formação são colocados ao serviço das exigências do mercado. Visão redutora e errada, da qual discordamos.

Muito embora concordemos com alguns pontos do relatório, isoladamente considerados, eles acabam por ser contraditórios com a visão geral que lhe subjaz.

Os objetivos de reduzir a taxa de abandono escolar precoce e aumentar os jovens com um diploma de ensino superior não devem ser cumpridos em detrimento da qualidade na educação - refere o relatório. De acordo. Mas o que são as «qualificações e competências relevantes»? Relevantes para quem? O diabo (também) está nos detalhes.

Santiago Fisas Ayxelà (PPE), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero que es un gran paso adelante para alcanzar las metas propuestas para obtener mejores resultados de la formación y educación a nivel europeo, a través de la comparación de mejores prácticas y fomentando una mejor transición al mercado de trabajo, la utilización de nuevas formas pedagógicas, así como el avance en la transparencia y el reconocimiento de títulos.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – L'istruzione e la formazione sono strumenti essenziali per la formazione di cittadini responsabili, con un forte senso di identità, una profonda conoscenza della loro cultura e del loro patrimonio e che riconoscono e onorano i valori europei condivisi. Tuttavia nell'ultimo decennio, nonostante sia aumentato il numero di persone che hanno avuto accesso ad una istruzione formale, l'Europa registra ancora livelli senza precedenti di disoccupazione giovanile, che colpisce anche i laureati.

Ho espresso il mio voto favorevole alla strategia IF 2020, perché favorisce un salto di qualità nella cooperazione europea in materia di qualità dell'istruzione. Ciascun sistema nazionale di istruzione deve essere in grado di sostenere l'implementazione di opportunità per i nostri giovani, attraverso scambi di informazioni e di esperienze sui problemi comuni ai sistemi di istruzione e formazione dei paesi europei. Inoltre, l'apprendimento permanente e la mobilità devono diventare una realtà per i nostri Paesi, con sistemi di istruzione e formazione professionale più reattivi al cambiamento e al resto del mondo.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *pisomne*. – Uplynulá dekáda znamenala v celej Európskej únii výrazný nárast počtu vysokoškolsky vzdelaných ľudí. Súčasne s tým sa počet nezamestnaných zvyšoval najviac práve v prípade mladých vysokoškolákov. Masovosť vysokoškolského vzdelávania išla, bohužiaľ, v mnohých prípadoch na úkor jeho kvality. Jasným merítkom sú reakcie zamestnávateľov. Hovoria o nepostačujúcej úrovni vedomostí a zručností absolventov univerzít. Upozorňujú na významné rozdiely medzi ich potrebami a odbornou prípravou na vysokých školách. Nesúlad medzi vzdelávaním a požiadavkami praxe má negatívny vplyv na uplatniteľnosť a schopnosť mladých ľudí konkurovať na trhu práce. Vyhnúť sa musíme aj umelému vynucovaniu si vysokoškolského vzdelania. Existuje veľké množstvo profesií, pri ktorých je podmienka získania diplomu skutočne navyše. Stojí nás to pritom nemalé peniaze z verejných zdrojov. Úspechom v rámci európskej spolupráce medzi vysokými školami je výmenný program Erasmus. Ako problematická sa však niekedy ukazuje motivácia študentov ísť na zahraničný výmenný pobyt. Dôkazom je aj neúmerne vysoká obľúbenosť niektorých južných krajín.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Voto contrario alla relazione perchè non tratta il tema in maniera adeguata e parziale; è troppo politicizzata e strumentalizzata.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραφώς*. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με τη συνέχεια στην υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης, καθώς με αυτό το απαράδεκτο κείμενο αποδεικνύεται ακόμα μια φορά πως η Ένωση, αντί να ενδιαφερθεί για το πώς θα σταματήσει τη συνεχή υποβάθμιση της εκπαίδευσης στην Ευρώπη, απασχολείται μόνο με τους λαθρομετανάστες και κοινωνικά απροσάρμοστους ιδεοληπτικούς που προσπαθούν να επιβάλλουν στους μαθητές τις απόψεις τους.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – The ET2020 education and training strategic framework has been revisited by the Council and Parliament in order to strengthen its effectiveness, reorder the priority areas of action and increase its added value.

The ET2020 stocktaking exercise underlines the need to achieve the long-term goals while working on issues of country-specific relevance: low rates of adult learning, early school leaving, social inclusion, the gender gap, teacher training, etc.

As the S&D Group, we have included the need for maximum focus on social inclusion in order to reach the ET2020 targets and improve the inclusiveness and the quality of education and training systems in a lifelong learning perspective, and we are calling for better governance and cooperation in this area.

Digital skills, high-quality early childhood education and inclusive education, to ensure equal access and opportunities for all, including access to mobility opportunities especially for VET and more vulnerable groups are all important. A specific chapter is included on migration and education, calling for the proper integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in education and training systems.

I voted in favour of the report.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Pozitív szavazatommal támogattam a jelentést, mivel a hatályban lévő keretrendszer hozzáadott értékének növelése és hatékonyságának optimalizálása a cél. Az oktatás és a képzés fontos szerepet játszik azon tudás és szakmai készségek megszerzése terén, amelyek által az alkalmazottak versenyképessé és innovatívvá válhatnak. Az elmúlt évtized során ugrásszerűen növekedett a felsőfokú oktatásban részt vevők száma, azonban ezzel egy időben a fiatalok példa nélküli magas munkanélkülisége tapasztalható. 2011 és 2014 között az Unió 28 tagállamának átlagos munkanélküliségi aránya különösen azon fiatalok (25–29 éves korosztály) körében nőtt, akik felsőfokú végzettséggel rendelkeznek (+12,9%). Ezt a folyamatot meg kell szüntetni. az „Oktatás és képzés 2020” stratégia fontos eszköz lehet a tudásalapú gazdaság művelésének és a társadalmi beilleszkedés előmozdításának érdekében.

A célok megfelelő minimális küszöböt állapítanak meg a végzettségek tekintetében és az oktatás szintjének növelését érintik. Fontos aspektusa egy felelős oktatáspolitikának az iskola és a családok közötti kapcsolatok fejlesztése. A támogató otthoni háttérkörnyezet nemcsak az oktatási szegénység ellensúlyozását tudja elősegíteni, de a fiatalok körében terjedő erőszközös szűkösségek vonzerejének is gátat tud szabni. Ezen kívül fontos a szülők bevonása az oktatásról folyó jelenlegi vitákban. A szülői szervezeteket célszerű bevonni az „Oktatás és képzés 2020” munkájába, valamint az iskola és a család közötti együttműködéssel kapcsolatos bevált gyakorlatok alkalmazása.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Non è possibile costruire un percorso di crescita economica ed occupazionale senza promuovere un quadro strategico di cooperazione tra gli Stati membri su istruzione e formazione. Credo fermamente che la principale responsabilità che noi parlamentari assumiamo nel corso del nostro mandato sia la scelta delle priorità da supportare, affinché gli obiettivi che ci proponiamo qui in Europa riescano ad entrare nelle nostre case, cambiando la vita dei cittadini e dei nostri figli.

Trovo che investire su un'istruzione che sia innovativa e aperta ai contenuti e agli strumenti digitali, equa e accessibile, inclusiva, maggiormente orientata alle richieste del mondo del lavoro, non discriminante e improntata alla formazione permanente sia non solamente necessario ma urgente.

Imparare a rileggere la mobilità come un'occasione e non come una complicazione significherà per le nuove generazioni integrarsi con maggiore facilità, sentirsi cittadini del mondo e quindi moltiplicare le proprie possibilità allargandogli prospettive di cittadinanza attiva. Per questo ho espresso voto favorevole alla relazione del collega Zdzisław Krasnodębski.

Elena Gentile (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione sul seguito del quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione (IF 2020), perché ritengo che l'istruzione sia innanzitutto un bene pubblico e che i riferimenti a «istruzione e formazione», dovrebbero comprendere le forme formali e informali e non dovrebbero mirare unicamente a rispondere alle esigenze del mercato del lavoro, ma costituire un valore intrinseco, poiché contribuiscono allo sviluppo personale e alla crescita dei cittadini.

Come affermato nell'analisi annuale della crescita per il 2014, gli Stati membri in termini di spesa debbono trovare metodi per tutelare o promuovere investimenti a più lungo termine in materia di istruzione, ricerca, innovazione, pertanto è essenziale investire nell'ammodernamento dei sistemi di istruzione e formazione, ivi compreso l'apprendimento lungo l'arco della vita. Tuttavia, molti Stati membri, i cui i bilanci pubblici sono sottoposti a forte pressione dalle regole di bilancio, hanno attuato tagli consistenti alla spesa per l'istruzione e la formazione.

Nondimeno, è indubbio che i fondi a disposizione e i futuri investimenti nel settore della formazione e istruzione debbano essere resi più efficienti in quanto fattore che influisce sulla produttiva, competitività e crescita, come affermato nella recente relazione speciale della Corte dei conti europea.

Arne Gericke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über die Folgemaßnahmen zum strategischen Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung (ET2020)“ gestimmt. Allgemeine und berufliche Bildung sind – grenzübergreifend – ein wichtiger Baustein, um jungen Menschen die Chance zu geben, die Grundwerte und den Mehrwert Europas konstruktiv-kritisch zu erkennen. Das zu fördern, ist mir ein Anliegen.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – In der Entschließung geht es unter anderem um die Steuerung und Koordinierung des ET2020 auf allen Ebenen, die Durchsetzung hochwertiger Bildung und Ausbildung sowie um Migration und Bildung. Dies ist vor allem in Zeiten hoher Jugendarbeitslosigkeit sehr wichtig und macht eine Evaluation des europäischen Rahmens ET2020 umso notwendiger. Eine unserer Hauptprioritäten liegt bei der schulischen Erziehung junger Leute. Vor allem eine Verbesserung der Umstände für die Lehrer ist notwendig. Eine gewisse Führungsrolle wird allerdings auch von der Kommission erwartet. Diese soll Forschungen zu den Themen Radikalisierung, Gewalt und Mobbing in allen Mitgliedstaaten durchführen.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – En 2014 la Comisión hizo balance de la estrategia de educación y formación, ET 2020, en cooperación con los Estados miembro. A partir de las conclusiones del informe resultante, la Comisión estableció las prioridades para el periodo 2016-2020. Si bien dichas prioridades atienden a aspectos incuestionables como la educación inclusiva, la igualdad, la equidad, la no discriminación, las competencias cívicas, el bienestar, la cohesión social, el diálogo intercultural, la innovación y el apoyo a la docencia, no dejan de ser un envoltorio con el que prestigiar una concepción neoliberal de la educación y la formación. El informe Krasnodebski, en línea con la Comisión, no oculta la conversión de la educación y la formación en objeto de negocio, y las orienta a la empleabilidad en lugar de al desarrollo del conocimiento. Se ha de reconocer la inclusión en el informe de aspectos como la acogida en este ámbito de los migrantes, los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo, así como de la perspectiva de género. No obstante, estas inclusiones, necesarias, no deben pagar el peaje de la mercantilización de la educación; por ello hemos votado en contra.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. Education and training 2020 (ET2020) is the framework for cooperation in education and training. It covers exchanges of best practice, mutual learning, gathering and dissemination of information and evidence of what works, as well as the provision of advice and support for policy reforms between Member States. The report presented follow-up on Erasmus + at all levels, and on training and education for people of all ages.

Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), *γραφτώς*. – Η γενικότερη προσέγγιση του εισηγητή εδράζεται στην λογική ότι η εκπαίδευση πρέπει να οριοθετείται στα πλαίσια των αναγκών της αγοράς. Εντούτοις η έκθεση συμπεριλαμβάνει σειρά σημαντικότερων τροπολογιών, με τις οποίες συμφωνούμε (ανάγκη ένταξης των προσφύγων στο εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα, κριτική στη φυγή νέων επιστημόνων στο εξωτερικό, αναγνώριση των υψηλών ποσοστών νεανικής ανεργίας, κριτική στην αποκοπή κονδυλίων που προορίζονται για την εκπαίδευση σε πολλά κράτη μέλη και πάρα πολλές άλλες), ειδικότερα όσον αφορά τον ευρύτερο ρόλο που οι θετικές τροπολογίες που συμπεριλαμβάνονται στην έκθεση μπορούν δυνητικά να συνεισφέρουν (και συνεισφέρουν σε ένα βαθμό) στην πολιτική συνοχής και την όσο το δυνατό μεγαλύτερη μείωση των τοπικών κοινωνικο-οικονομικών ανισοτήτων.

Marian Harkin (ALDE), *in writing*. – I supported this report on Education and Training 2020 (ET2020) which aims to improve control and coordination of the existing framework (e.g. by extending working groups with various stakeholders, such as civil society representatives, teachers and youth workers), in order to enhance the quality of education and training, and to highlight the migration aspect.

I was happy that the report stressed the need to prioritise the integration of migrants and asylum seekers into the labour market, e.g. by quickly setting up a system of language courses and basic skills training. It is important that past mistakes on immigration are not replicated in the future, for that could lead to integration difficulties in Member States. Thankfully, this report points out the major role of education, training and sport in this process. Better cooperation between the EU and the national authorities is required in order to find the right approach to the full integration of migrants and asylum seekers into education and training systems and to ensure that existing qualifications are properly recognised.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this resolution, as I did not have any objections to the final report.

Hans-Olaf Henkel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Der Initiativbericht analysiert den strategischen Rahmen der „Allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung 2020“.

Jedes EU-Land ist selbst für seine Bildungs- und Ausbildungssysteme verantwortlich, da es sich hier um keine Kernkompetenz der EU handelt. Rolle der EU-Politik ist es, nationale Maßnahmen zu unterstützen und bei der Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen zu helfen. In diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde darum, den Rahmen „Allgemeine und berufliche Bildung 2020“ zu evaluieren und Empfehlungen auf der Ebene der Zusammenarbeit, Qualität und Effizienz abzugeben. Die Länder erhalten hier Rat und Unterstützung für politische Reformen. Die ALFA stimmt mit den Kerninhalten dieses Berichtes überein und unterstützt eine Vielzahl der im Bericht genannten Verbesserungsvorschläge. Erwähnt seien hier nur die Bereiche bessere Kommunikation, bessere Qualität der Bildung, Unterstützung und Weiterentwicklung der Lehrer, Anerkennung von Abschlüssen sowie Integration der aufenthaltsberechtigten Migranten in unseren Bildungssystemen. Aus diesen Gründen habe ich dem Bericht zugestimmt.

Sollte die Europäische Kommission in dieser Sache jedoch in Zukunft einen Gesetzesentwurf auf den Weg bringen, so werde ich deutlich kritischer abwägen, ob hierbei nicht versucht wird, den Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsame Vorschriften aufzuerlegen.

Филиз Хюсменова (ALDE), в писмена форма. – Уважаеми г-н Председател, подкрепям доклада относно проследяването на стратегическата рамка за европейско сътрудничество в областта на образованието и обучението, тъй като съм убедена, че е нужна повече и по-целенасочена подкрепа към усилията на държавите членки за развиване на системите им на обучение и образование, като се отчитат различията между тях и специфичните им потребности.

За съжаление т.нар. „образователна бедност“ и слабото включване на хората с нисък социално-икономически статус в системата на образованието продължава да е предизвикателство, пред което е изправена Европа. В същото време, висококачественото и всеобхватно образование и обучение, отговарящо на нуждите на трудовия пазар и развиването на „умения на 21 век“, са от ключово значение за социалното, културно и икономическо развитие на ЕС.

Ето защо считам, че заключенията от прегледа на стратегическата рамка „Образование и обучение 2020“ трябва да бъдат взети предвид и поуките от тях да се приложат незабавно, с цел оптимизиране на рамката и предприемане на по-амбициозни, координирани и ефективни действия на политиката в областта на образованието и обучението на европейско и на национално ниво.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), în scris. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport care prevede utilizarea corectă și eficientă a cadrului referitor la măsurile întreprinse ca urmare a climatului strategic pentru cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației și formării profesionale (ET2020).

Educația contribuie enorm la formarea adultului european, liber, creativ și cunoscător. La baza competențelor profesionale dobândite se află educația și formarea profesională. Aceasta trebuie încurajată atât prin programe eficiente, precum Erasmus+, cât și prin ceea ce contribuie la valoarea adăugată a potențialului uman, a viitorilor cetățeni europeni responsabili, cu un puternic sentiment al identității, cu o desăvârșită cunoaștere a culturii și patrimoniului lor.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), napisan. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o daljnjem postupanju u vezi sa strateškim okvirom za europsku suradnju u području obrazovanja i osposobljavanja (ET 2020.) jer smatram da je uključivo i visokokvalitetno obrazovanje i osposobljavanje od ključne važnosti za kulturni, gospodarski i društveni razvoj Europe. Ovo Izvješće pozdravlja pregled stanja programa ET 2020. te naglašava da je potrebno u obzir uzeti njegove zaključke i bez odgode ih provesti kako bi se povećala dodana vrijednost i optimizirala učinkovitost okvira, što će ojačati važnost za svaku pojedinu zemlju i uzajamno učenje. Obrazovanje bi trebalo doprinijeti osobnom razvoju, uzajamnom poštovanju i rastu mladih kako bi oni postali proaktivni, odgovorni i svjesni građani s građanskim, socijalnim i interkulturalnim međusektorskim kompetencijama te kvalificirani stručnjaci.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport vise à instiguer des réformes des systèmes d'éducation nationaux et à maintenir le respect de la compétence nationale et de la diversité des cultures.

On peut regretter le «volet politiquement correct» du rapport sur les migrants. Il suit ainsi leurs recommandations et prônant l'intégration scolaire des migrants, mais il l'assume dans une perspective de favoriser leur intégration dans nos sociétés. Il demande notamment à ce que soit facilitée leur inscription à l'université. Il se rattrape toutefois en pointant du doigt le risque de «fuite des cerveaux» découlant des programmes de mobilité. Ce rapport, s'il est globalement satisfaisant, dispose de quelques failles et c'est pour cela que je me suis abstenu.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Vzhledem k vysoké nezaměstnanosti mladých, ale i nové výzvě v důsledku migrace je třeba přehodnocovat evropskou spolupráci v oblasti vzdělávání a odborné přípravy. ET 2020 je fórum pro výměnu osvědčených postupů, vzájemné učení, shromažďování a šíření informací, kde spolupracují pracovní skupiny složené z odborníků jmenovaných členskými zeměmi. Daná zpráva si klade za cíl zlepšit kontrolu a koordinaci stávajícího rámce, aby se kvalita vzdělávání a odborné přípravy dále zvyšovala. Také chce více pozornosti věnovat právě integraci žadatelů o azyl na trh práce, např. prostřednictvím jazykových kurzů a školení základních dovedností, a pomoci zlepšit jejich kvalifikaci a následně šance uplatnění na trhu práce. Zprávu zohledňující nové trendy a výzvy jsem rád podpořil.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport sur le suivi du cadre stratégique européen ET2020 (éducation et formation). L'objectif du texte est d'accroître la valeur ajoutée et d'optimiser l'efficacité de ce cadre stratégique, alors même que le taux de chômage des jeunes, au plus haut dans l'Union, et qui touche également les jeunes diplômés, appelle une réponse forte de la part des institutions européennes.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der strategische Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung soll einer kulturellen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung Europas dienen. Bildung spielt zwar eine wichtige Rolle bei der Bekämpfung von Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung, doch eine Fokussierung auf Migranten, so stark wie der Berichterstatter diese in den Vordergrund stellt, dient kaum der Zielsetzung einer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der europäischen Bürger. Daher stimme ich diesem Bericht nicht zu.

Bernd Kölmel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Der Initiativbericht analysiert den strategischen Rahmen der „Allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung 2020“.

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Sollte die Europäische Kommission in dieser Sache jedoch in Zukunft einen Gesetzesentwurf auf den Weg bringen, so werde ich deutlich kritischer abwägen, ob hierbei nicht versucht wird, den Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsame Vorschriften aufzuerlegen.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Ačkoli při přijímání jednotlivých článků usnesení jsem s těmito vyslovila souhlas, při přijímání celkového znění rezoluce jsem se zdržela hlasování.

Návrh usnesení shrnuje cíle evropské spolupráce v oblasti unijního vzdělávání a odborné přípravy. Usnesení zdůrazňuje mimo jiné začleňování dětí přistěhovalců do společnosti právě prostřednictvím jejich plnohodnotného vzdělávání, funkčnost tzv. boloňského systému, nutnost lepšího finančního ohodnocení a celoživotního vzdělávání vyučujících na všech úrovních a přínosy a problémy programu Erasmus. Zmiňuje také stále trvající problémy nerovného přístupu ke kvalitnímu vzdělání v EU a nezaměstnanosti absolventů některých vysokých škol.

I když s mnoha v usnesení vyslovenými myšlenkami souhlasím, s některými hledisky celkového směřování dokumentu naopak souhlasit nemohu. Především se podle mého názoru usnesení podrobně zaměřuje na některé méně důležité otázky a naopak jen okrajově se dotýká těch zásadních. Ocenila bych proto menší důraz na spolupráci soukromých společností se vzdělávacími institucemi či úpravu boloňského systému a naopak větší důraz na rovný přístup ke kvalitnímu vzdělání bez sociální diskriminace stejně jako spravedlivé finanční ohodnocení učitelů.

V souladu s výše uvedeným jsem se proto při schvalování usnesení zdržela hlasování.

Agnieszka Kozłowska-Rajewicz (PPE), *na písmie*. – Sprawozdanie dotyczące europejskich ram współpracy w dziedzinie kształcenia i szkolenia (ET 2020) autorstwa Zdzisława Krasnodębskiego zasługuje na poparcie, gdyż dotyczy kluczowej działalności UE w zakresie polityki oświatowej, łącząc sektory rynku pracy i edukacji. Zwraca uwagę na główne wyzwania UE w tym zakresie: problem zubożenia edukacyjnego w środowiskach migranckich i o niskim statusie społeczno-ekonomicznym, niedostateczne powiązania między szkolnictwem wyższym a kształceniem i szkoleniem zawodowym oraz instytucjami badawczymi i sektorem gospodarki, a także ogromne zapotrzebowanie na umiejętności cyfrowe, konieczne do poruszania się w zdigitalizowanym świecie.

Żałuję, że ten ostatni aspekt - zapotrzebowania na nowe umiejętności - zajmuje w sprawozdaniu tak skromną pozycję, skoro w percepcji ekspertów i Komisji Europejskiej nowe umiejętności to temat zasługujący na odrębną agendę, uważaną za przełomową w kontekście przyszłości Unii Europejskiej. Sprawozdanie słusznie zaleca większe zaangażowanie uniwersytetów w cykl prac w ramach ET 2020; podkreśla znaczenie mobilności w obrębie UE i wysokiej jakości edukacji wczesnoszkolnej, która istotnie wpływa na dalsze etapy kształcenia i funkcjonowania zawodowego. Pozytywne są również obecne w sprawozdaniu wezwania do niedyskryminacji i ułatwień dla migrantów, uchodźców i studentów ubiegających się o azyl. Jednocześnie sprawozdanie wzywa do zajęcia się sprawą nierównych proporcji migracji w obrębie UE, co prowadzi do drenażu mózgów w państwach Europy Wschodniej oraz Południowej.

Giovanni La Via (PPE), *per iscritto*. — Nonostante sia aumentato il numero di persone che ottengono un'educazione terziaria, è purtroppo aumentata anche la percentuale di giovani disoccupati. L'UE ha quindi messo in atto il quadro IF2020, per promuovere l'istruzione e la formazione dei giovani, necessarie per acquisire le competenze professionali e diventare lavoratori competitivi. La Commissione ha presentato una valutazione di tale quadro, accogliendo una serie di raccomandazioni che puntano a ottimizzare l'efficacia dello stesso.

Si vuole, quindi, definire il ruolo degli organi informali di governance, includere esperti indipendenti, promuovere il dialogo e migliorare la comunicazione e la collaborazione fra la Commissione, gli Stati membri e le organizzazioni educative. In un periodo tanto delicato per i nostri giovani, risulta necessario analizzare al meglio le politiche necessarie per contribuire alla creazione di un futuro più prospero.

Per tali ragioni accolgo con favore l'esercizio di valutazione del quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia d'istruzione e formazione.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce rapport car s'il tente en théorie de respecter la diversité des cultures et des politiques d'éducation des États membres, il sert de cheval de Troie au modèle européen d'immigration.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenue sur le rapport sur le suivi du cadre stratégique pour la coopération européenne dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. Ce texte est plutôt équilibré. Il rappelle notamment que l'éducation et la formation ne doivent pas uniquement être axées sur les besoins du marché de l'emploi, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne doivent pas servir à aliéner les apprenants en les réduisant à une donnée économique. Il rappelle de plus que les États membres ne sont pas toujours confrontés aux mêmes défis en la matière et qu'il s'agit de tenir compte de leur diversité de conjoncture. Il souligne l'importance du rôle de la famille dans l'éducation. M. Krasnodębski s'inquiète par ailleurs de la tendance actuelle d'assigner aux universités des objectifs de rendement au détriment de la qualité de l'enseignement, ce qui pourrait notamment mettre en péril l'enseignement des humanités. Malheureusement, le rapport comporte un volet «politiquement correct» et naïf sur l'immigration.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'ET2020 doit remplir plusieurs objectifs fixés par le programme «Éducation et formation 2020». Ces critères fixent un certain nombre d'impératifs, comme atteindre à l'horizon 2020 une proportion inférieure à 15 % de jeunes de 15 ans ayant une maîtrise insuffisante des fondamentaux (lecture, mathématiques, sciences), ou avoir 95 % d'enfants à partir de quatre ans en enseignement préscolaire. Le rapporteur étudie ces points et apporte des remarques pleines de bon sens. Il rappelle que les objectifs quantitatifs ne doivent pas l'emporter sur les objectifs qualitatifs et insiste également sur la place primordiale de la famille dans l'éducation. Enfin, il appelle la Commission à faire preuve d'honnêteté quant aux potentielles conséquences négatives liées à la mobilité des étudiants. Malgré quelques propos idéologiquement corrects sur la migration, ce rapport est équilibré. J'y suis donc favorable et vote POUR.

Javi López (S&D), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque señala la necesidad de lograr los objetivos a largo plazo en el ámbito de la educación y la formación mientras se trabaja en temas específicos de relevancia para cada país como un bajo nivel en el aprendizaje de adultos, el abandono escolar, la inclusión social, la brecha de género, la formación de profesores, etc.

Pone el foco en la inclusión social con el fin de alcanzar los objetivos ET 2020, en mejorar la inclusión y la calidad de los sistemas de educación y formación con una perspectiva de aprendizaje permanente y pidiendo una mejor gobernabilidad y cooperación en esta materia. Un refuerzo de las habilidades digitales, la educación infantil de alta calidad y una educación inclusiva para garantizar la igualdad de acceso y oportunidades para todos y todas, especialmente para los grupos más vulnerables.

También se ha incluido un capítulo específico sobre la migración y la educación, pidiendo la adecuada integración de los migrantes, refugiados y solicitantes de asilo en los sistemas de educación y formación.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El marco estratégico es un plan plurianual relacionado con los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 que persigue aumentar la movilidad estudiantil, la equidad, cohesión y ciudadanía activa, así como un enfoque hacia la «creatividad e innovación, incluido el espíritu empresarial». Los resultados de los últimos años demuestran que la orientación mercantilista del sistema educativo, la estandarización de los programas educativos para aumentar la competitividad entre alumnos y centros, así como los recortes de los programas de austeridad aplicados en economías como la española, han derivado en un desequilibrio evidente entre los propios objetivos marcados por la Comisión y el Consejo, que ya de por sí no representan mi posición en favor de una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad.

Esta resolución aprobada, que valora un informe conjunto de la Comisión y el Consejo, trata de legitimar a través del Parlamento estas prácticas, añadiendo matices positivos menores (por ejemplo, pidiendo impulsar la formación multidisciplinar y adaptada de los y las docentes ante los nuevos desafíos sociales, o la revisión de los grupos de trabajo de evaluación).

Por ello, ya que el informe no aborda los problemas fundamentales que derivan en un incremento de las desigualdades sociales, he votado en contra.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – La educación y la formación son importantes para ayudar a las personas a adquirir los conocimientos y las aptitudes profesionales que les permitan convertirse en empleados competitivos e innovadores.

Se necesitan medidas urgentes a escala nacional y europea, también en el marco del ET 2020, en el ámbito de la educación y la formación. La educación es esencial para la integración y la empleabilidad, y el fracaso de los sistemas nacionales a la hora de afrontar este desafío puede incrementar las divisiones sociales y la segregación cultural. También es importante impedir el desperdicio del talento de los migrantes altamente cualificados, así como afianzar el vínculo entre las escuelas y las familias ya que son los padres los responsables de la educación de sus hijos.

Considero que una buena medida sería la elaboración por parte de la Comisión de una decisión para garantizar la cobertura horizontal de la cuestión de la migración en los mandatos de todos los grupos de trabajo y desarrollar actividades de aprendizaje recíproco a fin de determinar cuáles son las buenas prácticas para la integración efectiva de los migrantes. En este sentido he votado favorablemente el presente informe.

Bernd Lucke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Der Initiativbericht analysiert den strategischen Rahmen der „Allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung 2020“.

Jedes EU-Land ist selbst für seine Bildungs- und Ausbildungssysteme verantwortlich, da es sich hier um keine Kernkompetenz der EU handelt. Rolle der EU-Politik ist es, nationale Maßnahmen zu unterstützen und bei der Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen zu helfen. In diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde darum, den Rahmen „Allgemeine und berufliche Bildung 2020“ zu evaluieren und Empfehlungen auf der Ebene der Zusammenarbeit, Qualität und Effizienz abzugeben. Die Länder erhalten hier Rat und Unterstützung für politische Reformen. Die ALFA stimmt mit den Kerninhalten dieses Berichtes überein und unterstützt eine Vielzahl der im Bericht genannten Verbesserungsvorschläge. Erwähnt seien hier nur die Bereiche bessere Kommunikation, bessere Qualität der Bildung, Unterstützung und Weiterentwicklung der Lehrer, Anerkennung von Abschlüssen sowie Integration der aufenthaltsberechtigten Migranten in unseren Bildungssystemen.

Aus diesen Gründen habe ich dem Bericht zugestimmt – unbeschadet meiner unveränderten Auffassung, dass die EU keine Gesetzgebungskompetenz in Bildungsangelegenheiten hat.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, which outlines key priorities in helping to combat the high level of youth unemployment and promote inclusivity in education and our society.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem proti. Odmítám výzvu, že ministři školství musí spolupracovat s Evropskou komisí „na zajištění rovného přístupu k velmi kvalitnímu vzdělání, zejména je nutné se snažit do tohoto procesu vtáhnout nejvíce znevýhodněné osoby a osoby z různých prostředí, včetně čerstvě příchozích migrantů, a integrovat je do pozitivního výukového prostředí“. Školství je záležitostí národních států a EU do něj nemá mluvit.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Kā zināms, stratēģiskās sistēmas “Izglītības un mācības 2020” primārie mērķi, kas tika noteikti pirms 7 gadiem, ir padarīt mūžizglītību un mobilitāti par realitāti, uzlabot izglītības un apmācības kvalitāti un efektivitāti, veicināt taisnīgumu, sociālo kohēziju un pilsonisko aktivitāti, kā arī visos izglītības un apmācības līmeņos sekmēt novatorismu un jaunradi, tostarp uzņēmējdarbības garu. Sistēma iekļauj arī pirmskolas izglītības aktīvu propo-
nēšanu un vispārējās lasītprasmes līmeņa uzlabošanu.

Kaut gan pašā izglītībā tika panākts ievērojams progress, tieši starp jauniešu universitāšu absolventiem bezdarba līmenis pēdējos gados pieauga visstraujāk. Tāpēc viennozīmīgi piekrītu, ka izglītības sistēmām jāpievērš maksimāla uzmanība jauniešu sagatavošanai reālā darba tirgus apstākļiem, lai tie varētu aktīvāk tajā integrēties.

Tas pats attiecas arī uz skolotāja profesijas imidža un attiecīgo darba apstākļu uzlabošanu, jo daļā no dalībvalstīm šī profesija ir viena no vissliktāk apmaksātajām, kā arī ievērojama daļa darbinieku ir pat vecāki par pensijas vecumu. Saprotais, ka šie jautājumi primāri ir dalībvalstu kompetencē, tomēr ET 2020 un citas asociētas programmas arī varētu pienest pozitīvas izmaiņas.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), *písmne*. – Od kvality vzdelávania a odbornej prípravy súčasnej generácie detí a mladých ľudí je priamo závislá kvalita života budúcich generácií. Vzdelávanie mladých, ale aj dospelých je v čase globalizácie nevyhnutnosťou, ktorá môže ľuďom pomôcť uplatniť sa na trhu práce a skvalitniť svoj život. Pokladám za zásadné, aby príprava a vzdelávanie dokázali flexibilne reagovať na potreby praxe a aby materiálne, technické a finančné zabezpečenie dokázalo dostatočne pokryť potreby moderného vzdelávania. Európska únia vytvorila strategický rámec ET 2020 pre európsku spoluprácu vo vzdelávaní a odbornej príprave a vytvorila finančné nástroje na podporu kvalitného vzdelávania. Je teraz na členských štátoch, nakoľko efektívne a racionálne dokážu tieto zdroje využiť a prispieť tak aj k zvýšeniu svojej konkurencieschopnosti.

Νότης Μαρίας (ECR), *γραφώς*. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με τη συνέχεια στην υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης («ΕΚ 2020»), για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 22/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce texte.

Le cadre stratégique pour la coopération européenne dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation a pour objet d'échanger les bonnes pratiques en vue des réformes. En matière d'éducation pour 2020, des objectifs consistent par exemple, réduire à 15 % la proportion des jeunes de 15 ans ayant une maîtrise insuffisante de la lecture ou encore atteindre 82 % de taux d'emploi des diplômés de 20 à 34 ans.

Le projet de texte se positionne sur le rapport conjoint de la Commission et du Conseil concernant la mise en œuvre du cadre stratégique. Le rapport est équilibré et comporte de nombreux points positifs. Il précise par exemple que les apprenants ne doivent pas être réduits à une donnée économique, l'importance du rôle de la famille dans l'éducation ou encore qu'il faut tenir compte des conjonctures des États membres. Il rappelle l'importance de ne pas viser le quantitatif au détriment du qualitatif, notamment s'agissant de l'objectif visant à ce que 40 % des jeunes obtiennent un diplôme.

En revanche, le rapport prône l'intégration scolaire des migrants notamment par leur inscription à l'université. Il invite les États membres à envisager la «diversité» comme une richesse pour le système éducatif dans son ensemble, etc.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato favorevolmente la relazione relativa al quadro strategico per la cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione. L'esercizio di valutazione globale del quadro IF 2020, condotto dalla Commissione in collaborazione con gli Stati membri, affronta il problema del complesso panorama dell'IF 2020.

Obiettivo della relazione è di potenziare il ruolo degli organi informali di governance e di coinvolgere esperti indipendenti in materia di formazione, nell'attività dei gruppi di lavoro e di altri organi IF 2020, affinché siano definiti gli strumenti politici comuni a livello europeo e misure urgenti a livello nazionale ed europeo nel campo dell'istruzione e della formazione.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Mi voto a favor de informe debatido en esta Cámara sobre el seguimiento del marco estratégico para la cooperación europea en el ámbito de la educación y la formación (ET 2020).

Hasta ahora esta estrategia parece estar dando resultados, pero debemos trabajar con ahínco para reforzar las políticas de educación y formación y garantizar la calidad de la enseñanza que se proporciona, ya que la educación es un elemento clave para la integración y la empleabilidad.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), *γραφτώς*. – Η εκπαίδευση και κατάρτιση αποτελούν σημαντικά εργαλεία για την εύρεση δουλειάς, αφού σήμερα οι εργοδότες έχουν περισσότερες απαιτήσεις σε σχέση με τις γνώσεις και τις επαγγελματικές δεξιότητες των ατόμων που προσλαμβάνουν. Επομένως, στόχο της Ένωσης αποτελεί η προώθηση της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης για την καλλιέργεια καινοτόμων και ανοιχτόμυαλων εργαζομένων που θα συμβάλουν στην ευημερία και ανάπτυξη της Ευρώπης. Ευρύτερα θέματα προς αντιμετώπιση είναι σίγουρα η μείωση της ανεργίας και η καταπολέμηση των διακρίσεων.

Θα ήθελα με τη θετική μου ψήφο να συμβάλω στη μείωση των υψηλών ποσοστών ανεργίας, ειδικά αναφορικά με τους νέους οι οποίοι παρόλο που είναι απόφοιτοι πανεπιστημίου δεν απορροφούνται από τα επαγγελματικά πεδία. Αυτό είναι και ένα από τα σημαντικότερα έργα που οφείλει να επιτελέσει η Ένωση μέσα από τη στρατηγική «Ευρώπη 2020», η οποία ορίζει ένα κατώτατο επίπεδο εκπαίδευσης αλλά και τη διεύρυνση των επιπέδων ανώτερης εκπαίδευσης. Αυτό προϋποθέτει βεβαίως ότι θα υπάρξει και βελτίωση της ποιότητας σε όλα τα επίπεδα της εκπαίδευσης. Η βελτίωση της ποιότητας μπορεί να επιτευχθεί μέσα από την αξιοποίηση καταρτισμένων ακαδημαϊκών, αλλά και με προώθηση της ενδοευρωπαϊκής κινητικότητας των νέων σπουδαστών μέσα από προγράμματα όπως το Erasmus, βοηθώντας έτσι νέους επιστήμονες να αποκτήσουν εμπειρία από εκπαιδευτικά συστήματα άλλων κρατών μελών.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Der Bericht erkennt ganz richtig, dass eine humanistische Ausbildung im Berufsleben bessere Chancen bietet. Auch wird die zunehmende Radikalisierung in den Grundschulen angesprochen. Jedoch versucht dieser Bericht, Asylanten einen leichteren Zugang zu unserem Ausbildungssystem zu verschaffen. Auch sollen nichteuropäische Studienabschlüsse leichter anerkannt werden. Dies ist klar abzulehnen.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Les travaux pour ce cadre visent à donner des recommandations en vue de réformer les systèmes d'éducation nationaux. Je note que le rapport tente de trouver un équilibre entre les travaux de ce cadre stratégique et le respect de la compétence des États, de la diversité de leurs cultures et besoins. Toutefois, ces bonnes recommandations sont détournées par un modèle européen d'intégration des migrants qui se glisse en arrière-plan.

En conséquence j'ai voté l'abstention.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A educação e a formação não devem somente pretender adequar-se às necessidades do mercado de trabalho, mas também constituir um valor intrínseco em si mesmas, uma vez que a educação desempenha um papel tão importante no desenvolvimento da ética e do civismo como no respeito pelos princípios democráticos fundadores da Europa. A educação deve contribuir para o desenvolvimento pessoal, o respeito mútuo e o crescimento dos jovens, a fim de os tornar voluntariosos, responsáveis e cidadãos conscientes, dotados de competências cívicas, sociais e transversais no domínio cultural, para além de profissionais qualificados. A formação e o ensino inclusivos e de elevada qualidade são essenciais para o desenvolvimento cultural, económico e social.

Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I am in favour of this report, as it addresses the need for both national and EU-level policy concerning lack of access to education, poor quality of education, and socio-economic discrimination in education. The report provides concrete recommendations for improving the quality of education and the training of future educators across the EU.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. — Als gewezen leerkracht ligt de opvoeding en het onderwijs van jonge mensen mij bijzonder nauw aan het hart. Kwaliteitsvol onderwijs zorgt ervoor dat jongeren onderlegde vaklui worden, dat ze de noodzakelijke competenties en vaardigheden verwerven. Maar onderwijs is ook een waarde op zich. Het draagt bij tot de ontwikkeling van burgerlijke en morele waarden. Verantwoordelijke leerkrachten zijn sleutelfiguren in de ontwikkeling van jongeren tot bewuste en geëngageerde Europese burgers. De jeugdwerkloosheid in Europa ligt nog steeds veel te hoog. Daarom steun ik de aanbevelingen in dit verslag waarbij gepleit wordt voor doeltreffende investeringen in onderwijs en opleidingen.

Zo kan het opzetten van partnerschappen in de lidstaten tussen het onderwijs en de arbeidsmarkt een bron zijn van duurzame groei. Het verwerven van de nodige competenties, het bevorderen van de studentenmobiliteit en het inclusief onderwijs zijn prioritair in de strijd tegen jongerenwerkloosheid. De oproep aan de lidstaten om in de leerdoelen ook verhoogde aandacht te besteden aan de ontwikkeling van sociale vaardigheden, het promoten van actief burgerschap en van de Europese waarden verdient alle steun. Het aanleren van sociale en humane competenties is immers een essentieel en effectief pedagogisch middel om bij jonge mensen ontluikende vormen van radicalisering te voorkomen.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *pisomne*. — Medzi Európskou komisiou, členskými štátmi Únie a zainteresovanými stranami pôsobiacimi v oblasti vzdelávania treba nadviazať úzky dialóg, ktorý by sa mal viesť prostredníctvom pravidelných konzultácií a koordinačných stretnutí, aby sa skutočne prijali opatrenia nadväzujúce na odporúčania vypracované skupinami občianskej spoločnosti v oblasti vzdelávania. Považujem za nevyhnutné, aby sa nezávislí experti v oblasti vzdelávania vo väčšej miere zapájali do práce pracovných skupín a iných orgánov pre strategický rámec ET 2020. Problémy, ktorým Európa čelí, nemožno zmysluplne vyriešiť bez posilnenia väzieb medzi školami a rodinami a bez uznania toho, že za vzdelávanie svojich detí sú primárne zodpovední rodičia. Podporné domáce prostredie môže pomôcť nielen v boji proti nedostatočnému vzdelaniu, ale aj pri vyvažovaní lákadla násilného extrémizmu medzi mladými ľuďmi. Pre rodičov ako vychovávateľov je dôležité, aby boli pre deti príkladom, aby rozvíjali svoje morálne a občianske hodnoty, aby doma vytvárali atmosféru otvorenosti, aby u detí pestovali zodpovednosť a umožňovali im zmysluplne sa podieľať na rozhodnutiach, ktoré sa týkajú ich života. Považujem za nanajvýš dôležité, aby sa rovnako združenia rodičov zapojili do práce na strategickom rámci ET 2020. Súhlasím s predmetným návrhom.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I supported the follow-up report on the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training (ET2020) which puts its strongest focus on social inclusion in reaching the ET2020 targets – improving the inclusiveness and the quality of education and training systems in a lifelong learning perspective – and calls for better governance and cooperation in this area. I have always supported the development of digital skills, high-quality early childhood education and inclusive education as means of ensuring equal access and opportunities for all. Therefore, I voted in favour of the non-legislative resolution that promotes those objectives.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az „Oktatás és képzés 2020” keretrendszer összegző értékelését a Bizottság 2014-ben készítette el. A Kulturális és Oktatási Bizottság ezzel foglalkozó állásfoglalásra irányuló indítványa rámutat, hogy az oktatás és a képzés fontos szerepet játszik azon tudás és szakmai készségek megszerzése terén, amelyek az alkalmazottak versenyképessé és innovatívvá válásához szükségesek. Ezen túlmenően fontos szerepet játszhatnak a széles látókörű, empátikus, érdeklődő emberek és felelős állampolgárok nevelésében, akik erős identitástudattal rendelkeznek, jól ismerik kultúrájukat és hagyományait, valamint elismerik és tiszteletben tartják a közös európai értékeket.

A jelentés elégedetten nyugtázza, hogy a keretrendszer kiigazítása során egyenlő hangsúlyt fektettek a foglalkoztathatósági célkitűzésekre, valamint a társadalmi kohézióra, az egyenlőségre, a diszkrimináció tilalmára és a polgári kompetenciákra. A jelentés kiemeli, hogy bár az elmúlt évtized során ugrásszerűen növekedett a felsőfokú oktatásban részt vevők száma, ezzel egy időben azonban Európában a fiatalok – a felsőfokú végzettséggel rendelkezőket is beleértve – példa nélküli magas munkanélkülisége tapasztalható. Külön kitér az oktatás és képzés szerepére a migráció során Európába érkező tömegek integrációjában. A jelentést megszavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dans l'ensemble, il s'agit d'un bon rapport, qui tente de trouver un équilibre entre les travaux de ce cadre stratégique qui ont pour but des recommandations en vue de réformes des systèmes d'éducation nationaux et le respect de la compétence nationale et de la diversité des cultures et besoins des États membres. On peut regretter le volet «politiquement correct» sur les migrants, mais, compte tenu du fait que celui-ci était intégré au rapport commun de la Commission et du Conseil, il était difficile de l'exclure. Il faut également rester très prudents sur les objectifs purement quantitatifs de l'enseignement pour tous tels qu'ils sont présentés par le programme ET2020.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – A estratégia «Educação e Formação 2020», estabelece a cooperação entre a União e os seus Estados-Membros em matéria de formação e educação, na qual é adotada uma perspetiva de aprendizagem ao longo da vida por forma a garantir a coerência das várias medidas adotadas no sentido de promover a educação e a formação desde a infância até à idade adulta. Neste âmbito, a cooperação tem um carácter voluntário, pelo que as ações ao nível da União devem apoiar e complementar as ações nacionais.

A educação e a formação constituem pilares importantes para a formação enquanto cidadãos e para a aquisição de competências profissionais necessárias para integrar o mercado de trabalho.

A formação e a educação têm igualmente um papel fundamental para a concretização das políticas da União, designadamente a Estratégia Europa 2020, o Mercado Único Digital, a Agenda Europeia para a Segurança e o Plano de Investimento para a Europa.

Neste sentido, voto no sentido favorável, na medida em que considero crucial que os Estado-Membros procurem tirar o máximo proveito desta cooperação com vista à promoção da educação e da formação ao longo da vida enquanto motor decisivo para o desenvolvimento económico e social na União.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – Globalement, c'est un bon rapport, qui tente de trouver un équilibre entre les travaux de ce cadre stratégique qui ont pour but des recommandations en vue de réformes des systèmes d'éducation nationaux et le respect de la compétence nationale et de la diversité des cultures et besoins des États membres.

On peut cependant regretter le «volet politiquement correct» sur les migrants. Je m'abstiens sur ce texte.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenue sur ce rapport dont certaines dispositions constituaient clairement un appel d'air à l'immigration illégale. En effet, en demandant d'intégrer des migrants, qui n'ont même pas obtenu le statut de réfugié et sont donc des clandestins, aux différents programmes d'éducation et de formation, ce texte laisse penser que nous pouvons dignement accueillir des migrants en Europe, alors qu'en réalité nous ne sommes pas en mesure de leur fournir un logement, un emploi ni les moyens de s'assimiler correctement.

József Nagy (PPE), írásban. – Nagy örömmel üdvözlöm ezt a jelentést, hiszen az oktatás és képzés mindennapi életünk igencsak fontos részei. Nem meglepő, hogy éppen ezen a területen alakult ki az egyik legeredményesebb együttműködés a tagállamok között, amit a jelentés különböző ajánlásokkal kíván még hatékonyabbá tenni. Az Európai Unió komoly kihívásokkal találta magát szemben a bevándorlói válság következtében, melynek kezelésében elengedhetetlen szerepet játszik az integráció. Külön üdvözlöm ezért a jelentés menekültekkel foglalkozó részét, hiszen az integráció az oktatással kezdődik.

Szükségesnek érzem továbbá kihangsúlyozni, hogy az oktatás olyan eszköz, ami az Európai Unió jövőjét is biztosítja, ugyanis megfelelő programokkal képes előmozdítani az aktív polgári szerepvállalást, illetve segíti az EU alapvető értékeinek elsajátítását. Szlovákiában például állandó probléma a választásokon való alacsony részvétel, aminek egyik legfőbb okozója, hogy a lakosság jelentős része még mindig úgy tekint az Európai Parlamentre, mint a helyre a messzi Brüsszelben, ahonnan a kedvezőtlen döntések érkeznek.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), in writing. – Education and Training 2020 (ET2020) is the framework for cooperation in education and training. It is a forum for exchanges of best practice, mutual learning and the gathering and dissemination of information and evidence of what works, as well as advice and support for policy reforms.

I voted for this report, which will put in place at national and European levels, including within the ET2020 framework, education and training measures for adult asylum seekers who have recently arrived in Europe.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), in writing. – I support the conclusions presented in this report, reflecting the findings of the follow-up to the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training (ET2020). Ensuring the quality of education and training, understood as encompassing formal, non-formal and informal systems, is now more necessary than ever in a context of high youth unemployment and further challenges. The follow-up to ET2020 indicates that significant problems persist with regard to quality, accessibility and socio-economic discrimination in education and training. Better coordination, both at European and at national level, needs to be achieved. This should include measures such as the extension of the work cycle from three to five years, the establishment of a new generation of ET2020 working groups, a strengthening of the steering role of informal bodies within ET2020, and the creation of an informal coordination body.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), písemně. – Podpořil jsem návrh na pokračování strategického rámce evropské spolupráce v oblasti vzdělávání. Vzhledem k tomu, že vzdělání představuje klíčovou oblast pro vývoj společnosti, je aktivita Unie v této oblasti velmi důležitá. Právě absence vzdělání je totiž odpovědná za mnoho problémů, které trápí současnou společnost – zejména xenofobii a radikalismus. Velmi oceňuji, že návrh poctivě reflektuje problémy, které evropská vzdělávací soustava má, a přináší odpovědi, které mohou přispět k jejich řešení. Vítám například snahu zapojit do pracovních skupin odborníky z různých oblastí, což umožní přijít s návrhy, které mohou vést k širšímu pojetí vzdělávání.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), in writing. — This report was concerned with European cooperation in education and training. While there were some progressive provisions, particularly those which addressed the need to include refugees and migrants in the education system, the report contained instructions on harmonising national education and training systems, and that runs contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.

Sinn Féin is committed to ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is respected and strengthened at national level. In everyday language, subsidiarity means that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible, i.e. at the level of power that should take action. Erosion or breaches of the principle of subsidiarity can lead to unintended consequences – undermining, for example, citizens' faith in the European Union – and should, therefore, be avoided.

Whilst the report contained some progressive elements, these failed to mitigate the erosion of the principle of subsidiarity, and I therefore voted against it.

Андрей Новаков (PPE), в писмена форма. – Докладът отбелязва, че образованието следва да допринася за личностното развитие и израстването на младите хора, за да ги направи проактивни, отговорни и осведомени, с граждански, социални, межкултурни компетентности, както и квалифицирани специалисти. Образованието и обучението трябва да играят важна роля в борбата с бедността и социалното изключване. Докладът призовава за по-широко участие на всички съответни заинтересовани страни в работата на стратегическата рамка „Образование и обучение 2020“ и насърчава държавите членки да се възползват в пълна степен от потенциала, предоставен от цифровизацията, ИКТ и новите технологии. Изтъква се значението на преподаването и усвояването на общи основни умения като ИКТ, математика, критично мислене, чужди езици, мобилност и др., които биха помогнали на младите хора да се адаптират по-лесно към променящата се социална и икономическа среда. Гласувам в подкрепа на предложената резолюция.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe mich gegen diesen Bericht ausgesprochen, da er jede Menge Punkte enthält, die Schlupflöcher von Nichteuropäern in die europäischen Bildungssysteme bietet. Eine Abtretung nationaler Kompetenzen unserer Bildungssysteme an die EU ist nicht zu befürworten.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariau pateiktam pranešimui.

Švietimas ir mokymas svarbūs padedant žmonėms įgyti žinių ir profesinių įgūdžių, kurie jiems būtini norint tapti konkurencingais ir išradiniais darbuotojais. Manau, kad investicijos į ikimokyklinį ugdymą ir priežiūrą, tinkamai jas pritaikius prie kiekvienos tikslinės grupės jautrumo ir brandos lygio, duotų didesnę grąžą negu investicijos bet kurio kitu ugdymo etapu.

Be to, tinkamai įgyvendinus numatytas priemones, bus užkirstas kelias aukštos kvalifikacijos protų nutekėjimui. Ypatingas dėmesys turi būti skiriamas bendrai kvalifikacijų ir diplomų pripažinimo sistemai.

Švietimo sėkmė visais lygmenimis priklauso nuo gero mokytojų parengimo ir nuo jų nenutrūkstamo siekio tobulėti savo srityje, taigi ši strateginė programa taip pat leis pakankamai investuoti į mokytojų rengimą. Be to, labai svarbu, kad į „ET 2020“ darbą būtų įtrauktos tėvų asociacijos ir kad būtų skatinami mokyklų ir šeimų bendradarbiavimo gerosios praktikos mainai.

Κωνσταντίνος Παπαδάκης (NI), *γραφώς*. – Τους γνωστούς στόχους της ΕΕ για μια εκπαίδευση που θα εξυπηρετεί τη στρατηγική «Ευρώπη 2020», δηλαδή τα κέρδη των μονοπωλίων, επανέλαβε το ψήφισμα για την «υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης (ΕΚ2020)».

Το ψήφισμα προωθεί τη «διά βίου μάθηση» και τη διαρκή απόκτηση «κατάλληλων και υψηλής ποιότητας δεξιοτήτων και ικανοτήτων» «που ευνοούν την απασχολησιμότητα», κατακερματισμό δηλαδή των γνώσεων, προκειμένου οι εργαζόμενοι να προσαρμόζονται στις ανάγκες των επιχειρηματικών ομίλων για συγκεκριμένες δεξιότητες σε ένα συγκεκριμένο χρονικό διάστημα. Η συνθήκη της Μπολόνια, που ήταν η αρχή μιας σειράς αντιδραστικών αλλαγών στα πανεπιστήμια, εξυμνείται.

Αντίληψη που διαπερνά το ψήφισμα είναι ότι η εκπαίδευση είναι εμπόρευμα. Οι λαϊκές οικογένειες, οι νέοι εργαζόμενοι θα πρέπει να βάζουν το χέρι στην τσέπη και, εάν δεν έχουν, να καταφεύγουν σε υποτροφίες, αλλά και σε δάνεια όπως προτείνεται.

Γι' αυτούς τους λόγους, η Ευρωκοινοβουλευτική Ομάδα του ΚΚΕ καταψήφισε το εν λόγω ψήφισμα.

Σχετικά με την εκπαίδευση των προσφύγων -παρά το ότι η γενική κατεύθυνση του ψηφίσματος εντάσσεται στη λογική στήριξης της ανταγωνιστικότητας των επιχειρήσεων-, το ΚΚΕ ψήφισε εκείνες τις προτάσεις που δίνουν έστω και μια μικρή ανακούφιση στο άμεσο πρόβλημα της εκπαίδευσης των παιδιών των προσφύγων που είναι ακόμα στον αέρα.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Al fine di avere persone con competenze lavorative elevate, occorre sostenere lo sviluppo in materia di istruzione e formazione. Allo stesso modo, il riconoscimento dell'importanza della formazione degli educatori sottolinea il ruolo chiave che essi svolgono nel processo di apprendimento.

Sfortunatamente, in Europa si registra ancora un livello di disoccupazione molto elevato, soprattutto tra i giovani laureati. Si consideri poi la recente crisi dei rifugiati che ha fatto emergere nuove sfide, in quanto l'istruzione è da considerarsi la chiave di volta per far sì che i summenzionati soggetti possano integrarsi nella comunità di accoglienza.

Spetta alla politica dell'Unione europea e agli interventi dei singoli Stati affrontare le sfide in tema di istruzione e formazione. Rilevando che quanto esposto nel documento è pertinente a quanto si produce nella realtà, mi sento di votare positivamente.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Pravo na obrazovanje jedno je od važnih ljudskih prava koje razvija čovjeka i njegove sposobnosti u svim segmentima, obogaćuje ga, otvara i proširuje vidike, stvara temelj za prosperitetniji život i vrijednost je sama po sebi. Zato sam podržala Izvješće o daljnjem postupanju u vezi sa strateškim okvirom za europsku suradnju u području obrazovanja i osposobljavanja. Moramo uložiti dodatne napore kako bi svakom djetetu bio omogućen pristup obrazovanju, a ono se mora temeljiti ne samo na tehničkom prenošenju znanja, nego na prenošenju vrijednosti i stvaranju odgovornih građana koji će svojim znanjem pridonijeti boljitku svoje zemlje i Europske unije. Pri tome je važno da se poštuje neovisnost svake države članice i da obrazovni kurikulumi ostanu u nadležnosti nacionalnoga obrazovnog zakonodavstva, kako bi kroz njih mogli njegovati svoju povijest, kulturu i nacionalne vrijednosti.

Na obrazovanju se ne smije štedjeti jer ono nam osigurava bolju budućnost, stoga je potrebno uložiti najveće napore kako bi se osigurala dovoljna financijska sredstva za kvalitetni obrazovni sustav od najranije, predškolske dobi. Koliko je god moguće, treba poticati i blagodat mobilnosti i međunarodne suradnje tijekom obrazovanja, koje svim državama članicama omogućuje članstvo u Europskoj uniji, a koje stvara nova iskustva i međusobno nacionalno obogaćuje.

Pina Picierno (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'istruzione e la formazione sono fondamentali per fornire ai cittadini le conoscenze e le competenze professionali necessarie a diventare lavoratori competitivi e innovativi. Non solo, esse svolgono un ruolo importantissimo nel formare esseri umani aperti e cittadini responsabili. È positivo, quindi, che IF 2020 abbia incluso tra i suoi obiettivi la coesione sociale, l'uguaglianza, la non discriminazione e le competenze civiche, sullo stesso piano delle esigenze occupazionali.

Il recepimento, da parte di Commissione e Consiglio, delle raccomandazioni emerse nel corso della valutazione globale del quadro IF 2020, permetterà di aumentarne l'efficacia. Accanto alla definizione dei mandati della nuova generazione di gruppi di lavoro, infatti, è potenziato il ruolo degli organi informali di governance e sono istituiti circuiti di feedback per migliorare la comunicazione tra i diversi livelli.

Molto positiva è anche l'inclusione, tra le priorità del programma, del sostegno a favore degli educatori e la particolare attenzione alle esigenze degli studenti più svantaggiati, come quelli appartenenti a minoranze etniche o religiose, i bambini di famiglie a basso reddito o i figli d'immigrati. Una sfida rilevante per i sistemi nazionali sarà, infatti, anche quella di contribuire all'integrazione dei tanti profughi arrivati di recente.

Giudico positivamente il lavoro fatto su IF 2020 e perciò voto a favore.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Smatram da obrazovanje i osposobljavanje ne bi smjeli biti usmjereni samo na zadovoljavanje potreba tržišta rada, nego bi trebali biti vrijednost sami po sebi s obzirom na to da obrazovanje ima jednako važnu ulogu u razvoju etičkih i građanskih vrlina i humanističkih vrijednosti u širokom smislu, koje su utvrđene u Ugovorima, te u jačanju demokratskih načela na kojima se temelji Europa.

Obrazovanje treba doprinijeti osobnom razvoju, uzajamnom poštovanju i rastu mladih kako bi oni postali proaktivni, odgovorni i svjesni građani s građanskim, socijalnim i interkulturalnim međusektorskim kompetencijama te kvalificirani stručnjaci. Također, smatram da se obrazovanje treba smatrati temeljnim ljudskim pravom i javnim dobrom koje bi svima trebalo biti dostupno.

Pozdravljam pregled stanja programa ET 2020. te naglašavam da je potrebno u obzir uzeti njegove zaključke i bez odgode ih provesti kako bi se povećala dodana vrijednost i optimizirala učinkovitost okvira, što će ojačati važnost za svaku pojedinu zemlju i uzajamno učenje.

Sa druge strane, želim zbog toga što veliki problemi u pogledu kvalitete, dostupnosti i socioekonomske diskriminacije u području odgoja i obrazovanja još nisu riješeni te smatram da treba poduzeti ambicioznije, usklađenije i učinkovitije mjere politike na europskoj i nacionalnoj razini.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – L'istruzione e la formazione sono importanti nell'aiutare le persone ad acquisire le conoscenze e le competenze professionali di cui necessitano per diventare lavoratori competitivi e innovativi. Tali elementi potrebbero, inoltre, svolgere un ruolo importante nel formare cittadini europei curiosi e responsabili, con un forte senso di identità, una profonda conoscenza della loro cultura e del loro patrimonio comune in grado di riconoscere e salvaguardare i valori condivisi europei. Dovremmo rallegrarci del fatto che la dichiarazione di Parigi dei ministri dell'istruzione del 17 marzo 2015 abbia trovato riscontro nella relazione congiunta. Ho votato a favore perché ritengo che l'istruzione, insieme alla cultura, sia la chiave per promuovere l'integrazione e favorire l'occupazione.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Kształcenie i szkolenie jest ważne, ponieważ pomaga ludziom nabywać wiedzę i kwalifikacje zawodowe, jakich potrzebują, by stać się konkurencyjnymi i innowacyjnymi pracownikami. Co więcej, kształcenie i szkolenie może odgrywać ważną rolę w wychowywaniu ludzi o szerokich horyzontach, wrażliwych i dociekliwych, a także odpowiedzialnych obywateli z silnym poczuciem tożsamości, gruntowną znajomością własnej kultury i dziedzictwa. Celem sprawozdania jest nasilenie współpracy grup roboczych i dyrekcji generalnych lub grup wysokiego szczebla, określenie mandatów dla nowej generacji grup roboczych, wyznaczenie struktury ich prac i rezultatów, które należy osiągnąć. Ważne jest zaangażowanie w większym stopniu niezależnych ekspertów w dziedzinie edukacji. Ścisły dialog między Komisją, państwami członkowskimi a zainteresowanymi stronami z sektora edukacji jest konieczny do zapewnienia rzeczywistych działań następczych w związku ze sformułowanymi zaleceniami, skupienia się na poprawie jakości edukacji na wszystkich szczeblach z zamiarem wyznaczenia zagadnienia podmiotów kształcących

nauczycieli jako jednego z nowych priorytetowych obszarów ET 2020. Dużo uwagi poświęcono potrzebom różnych kategorii osób uczących się, takich jak osoby z mniejszości etnicznych lub religijnych, ubogie dzieci lub dzieci ze środowisk migracyjnych. Niniejszym poparłem sprawozdanie.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – Chaque pays de l'Union européenne est responsable de son système d'éducation et de formation. À l'échelle européenne, le cadre stratégique «Éducation et formation 2020» permet de définir les axes de coopération entre États pour soutenir des actions nationales et aider à relever des défis communs, tels que le vieillissement de nos sociétés, le déficit de main d'œuvre qualifiée dans certains secteurs et l'impact des développements technologiques. J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte, qui établit des recommandations visant à accroître l'efficacité technique de cette coopération européenne.

Paulo Rangel (PPE), *por escrito*. – A educação e a formação são fundamentais para possibilitar aos cidadãos a aquisição de competências profissionais e os conhecimentos necessários à integração num mercado de trabalho cada vez mais competitivo e inovador, fomentando um sentido de identidade e uma aculturação fundada no respeito pelos valores europeus comuns.

Num contexto em que as taxas de desemprego jovem permanecem em níveis preocupantes e em que os desafios demográficos originados, entre outros fatores, pela atual crise migratória, colocam em «xeque» os hodiernos sistemas de educação e formação na União Europeia, o balanço do quadro estratégico para a cooperação europeia no domínio da educação e da formação «EF 2020», realizado pela Comissão em cooperação com os Estados-Membros, apresenta, a meu ver, uma extraordinária relevância.

Neste domínio, o documento dá ênfase ao papel dos progenitores e à necessidade de desenvolvimento de uma parentalidade positiva, bem como ao papel dos educadores na integração de migrantes, assim como na resolução de problemas causados pela harmonização das práticas educativas europeias.

A educação é crucial para a integração e para a empregabilidade. Por conseguinte, necessitamos de medidas novas a nível nacional e europeu, que visem a melhoria dos sistemas de ensino e que considerem a importância da formação e educação dos requerentes de asilo adultos e dos seus filhos. Voto favoravelmente.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Renforcer la coopération au niveau européen dans le domaine de l'éducation, de la formation et de l'innovation est une des priorités du Parlement européen qui a voté ce midi en faveur du rapport Krasnodębski complétant le cadre stratégique «Éducation et formation 2020» (ET2020).

ET2020 vise à faciliter l'apprentissage et la mobilité des citoyens européens. Il cherche aussi à améliorer la qualité et l'efficacité des formations scolaires et à favoriser l'équité, la cohésion sociale et la citoyenneté active.

Ces mesures devraient permettre de faire face aux grands défis de ces prochaines années comme le vieillissement des populations, le manque de main d'œuvre qualifiée et la course à l'innovation dans un contexte de concurrence mondiale.

Les objectifs d'ET2020 en termes d'éducation sont multiples. On peut noter la volonté de passer à 95 % d'enfants intégrés dans l'enseignement préscolaire ainsi qu'une réduction significative de la proportion de jeunes ayant une maîtrise insuffisante de la lecture, des mathématiques et des sciences.

Sur le plan de la formation, on peut relever l'objectif affiché de viser au moins 40 % de personnes dans la tranche d'âge 30-34 ans diplômées de l'enseignement supérieur et plus généralement des 18-34 ans aux programmes d'études ou de formation à l'étranger.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – El marco estratégico para la cooperación europea en educación y formación ha sido revisado por el Consejo y el Parlamento Europeo con el fin de reforzar su eficacia, reordenar las áreas prioritarias de acción y aumentar su valor añadido.

Este informe, que he apoyado, remarca la necesidad de lograr los objetivos a largo plazo mientras se trabaja en temas específicos de relevancia para cada país como un bajo nivel en el aprendizaje de adultos, el abandono escolar, la inclusión social o la brecha de género, entre otros.

Gracias al S&D, se ha incluido la necesidad de poner el foco en la inclusión social con el fin de alcanzar los objetivos ET2020, mejorar la inclusión y la calidad de los sistemas de educación y formación con una perspectiva de aprendizaje permanente y pedir una mejor gobernabilidad y cooperación en esta materia. Igualmente, se hace hincapié en el refuerzo de las habilidades digitales, la educación infantil de alta calidad y una educación inclusiva para garantizar la igualdad de acceso y oportunidades para todos, especialmente para los grupos más vulnerables, al tiempo que se incluye un capítulo específico sobre la migración y la educación, pidiendo la adecuada integración de los migrantes, refugiados y solicitantes de asilo en los sistemas de educación y formación.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Alors que le taux de chômage des jeunes en Europe est au plus haut, il est capital d'évaluer le cadre européen ET2020 dans le but d'en accroître la valeur ajoutée et d'en optimiser l'efficacité. L'évaluation réalisée par la Commission en 2014 a débouché sur l'adoption, par celle-ci et par le Conseil, d'une série de recommandations destinées à apporter des solutions au problème de la complexité du contexte dans lequel s'inscrivent l'ET2020 et sa gouvernance: définition des mandats de la nouvelle génération de groupes de travail, mobilisation d'experts indépendants, dialogue plus étroit, consultation et coordination plus régulières entre la Commission, les États membres et les acteurs de l'enseignement. La résolution adoptée ce jour contient une série de priorités et de recommandations politiques, notamment sur la gouvernance et la coordination de l'ET2020 à tous les niveaux (par exemple, il conviendrait que la Commission ouvre les nouveaux groupes de travail aux représentants des différentes parties prenantes et que les fruits de leurs travaux soient davantage diffusés à tous les niveaux), mais également sur un enseignement de qualité (par exemple, la réalisation des objectifs de référence concernant l'enseignement et la formation ne doit pas se faire au détriment de la qualité, etc.)

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Švietimas ir mokymas neturėtų tapti vien tik priemone tenkinti darbo rinkos poreikius. Jis turėtų būti savaimė vertingas: švietimas ne mažiau svarbus formuojant moralines ir pilietines dorybes bei, plačiąja prasme, humanistines vertybes, įtvirtintas Sutartyse, taip pat stiprinant demokratinius principus, kuriais grindžiama Europos Sąjunga. Todėl pranešimas apie Bendradarbiavimo mokymo ir švietimo srityje padėtį – programą „ET 2020“ – yra svarbus visų pirma kaip įžvalga į tai, kokią ateities Europą mes norime matyti. Sveikinu pranešime deklaruojamas nuostatas, jog švietimas turi skatinti jaunuolių asmeninį tobulėjimą, tarpusavio pagarbą ir augimą, o ir pats švietimas turėtų būti laikomas visiems prieinama pagrindine žmogaus teise ir viešąja gėrybe. Kartu džiugu, jog pranešimas akcentuoja skirtingas valstybių narių patirtis šioje srityje, taip pat poreikį mokytis visą gyvenimą.

Pačią programą „ET 2020“ galima vertinti tik teigiamai. Nepaisant to, kad švietimo ir mokymo srityje vis dar neišspręstos didžiulės problemos, susijusios su kokybe, prieinamumu ir diskriminacija dėl socialinės ir ekonominės padėties, pranešime įvardijamos svarbiausios kryptys, kaip valstybės narės galėtų ir turėtų tobulinti tiek pačius švietimo ir mokymo procesus, tiek ir tarpusavio bendradarbiavimą.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – O balanço do quadro estratégico no domínio da educação e da formação 2020 foi realizado em 2014, tendo sido consideradas recomendações com vista a aumentar o valor acrescentado do quadro e otimizar a sua eficácia.

Embora ao longo da última década se tenha assistido a um aumento do número de pessoas que frequentam o ensino formal, a Europa regista infelizmente níveis de desemprego juvenil sem precedentes, afetando todos os níveis de formação, inclusivamente jovens licenciados.

Os esforços para cultivar a economia do conhecimento e promover a inclusão social refletiram-se no grande objetivo duplo da Estratégia Europa 2020: fixar um limiar mínimo para o nível de escolaridade e aumentar a adesão aos níveis de ensino superiores.

A educação e a formação são importantes para a aquisição de competências profissionais e de conhecimentos necessários para a formação de trabalhadores motivados e realizados.

Votei favoravelmente este relatório por reconhecer a importância que estas políticas desempenham na formação de uma cidadania ativa e responsável.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport, qui dresse un bilan et propose des recommandations sur la mise en œuvre du cadre stratégique d'éducation et de formation 2020 (ET2020). L'éducation et la formation inclusives et de qualité sont essentielles pour le développement culturel, économique et social de l'Europe. En ce sens, ce rapport demande à ce que soit menée, dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la formation, une action politique plus ambitieuse, coordonnée et efficace, à la fois au niveau européen et national.

Dans le but d'améliorer la qualité de l'éducation et de la formation, ce texte appelle à l'émergence de bonnes pratiques permettant d'évaluer les progrès qualitatifs, en plus des indices et critères de références utilisés dans le cadre de l'ET2020.

Il est crucial que les États membres investissent dans une éducation inclusive qui réponde aux enjeux sociétaux de façon à garantir le même accès et les mêmes opportunités à tous.

Dans ce sens, ce texte prend également en considération l'enjeu de la crise actuelle des réfugiés.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della relazione sulla razionalizzazione nell'ambito della cooperazione europea in materia di istruzione e formazione. Benché l'istruzione sia una competenza esclusiva degli Stati membri, l'Unione europea interviene sul fronte delle sfide comuni ai sistemi di formazione e di istruzione nazionali, ed è proprio per rispondere a queste sfide che è stata formulata la strategia IF 2020.

Concretamente IF 2020 consiste in un forum al quale partecipano attori di natura diversa, da funzionari della Commissione europea a rappresentanti della società civile, che si scambiano informazioni relative a buone pratiche, soluzioni vincenti, e consulenze. Nel 2014 la Commissione ha condotto una valutazione del quadro esistente, individuando i punti deboli e le soluzioni da apportare, e che fanno l'oggetto del testo votato in plenaria.

L'importanza di IF 2020 e più in generale dei programmi europei in materia di istruzione è fondamentale per il futuro dei nostri ragazzi: sempre più studenti partecipano a programmi di mobilità europea acquisendo conoscenze e competenze che danno un importante vantaggio sul mercato del lavoro, come numerose ricerche di settore hanno dimostrato.

Queste esperienze non si limitano ad arricchire il curriculum, ma permettono ai giovani di vivere appieno la cittadinanza europea, rappresentando un momento di crescita senza eguali.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – En 2014 la Comisión hizo balance de la estrategia de educación y formación, ET 2020, en cooperación con los Estados miembro. A partir de las conclusiones del informe resultante, la Comisión estableció las prioridades para el periodo 2016-2020. Si bien dichas prioridades atienden a aspectos incuestionables como la educación inclusiva, la igualdad, la equidad, la no discriminación, las competencias cívicas, el bienestar, la cohesión social, el diálogo intercultural, la innovación y el apoyo a la docencia, no dejan de ser un envoltorio con el que prestigiar una concepción neoliberal de la educación y la formación. El informe Krasnodebski, en línea con la Comisión, no oculta la conversión de la educación y la formación en objeto de negocio, y las orienta a la empleabilidad en lugar de al desarrollo del conocimiento. Se ha de reconocer la inclusión en el informe de aspectos como la acogida en este ámbito de los migrantes, los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo, así como de la perspectiva de género. No obstante, estas inclusiones, necesarias, no deben pagar el peaje de la mercantilización de la educación; por ello hemos votado en contra.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Bericht über die Folgemaßnahmen zum strategischen Rahmen für die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung (ET 2020)“ gestimmt, da die Anpassung des europäischen Rahmens ET 2020 (Education and Training 2020) an momentane Verhältnisse sehr wichtig ist.

ET 2020 ist das europäische Förderprogramm für Bildung und Ausbildung. Vor allem mit der noch immer anhaltenden hohen Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in vielen Ländern ist es wichtig, immer wieder unser Programm so anzupassen, dass es den größtmöglichen Nutzen für alle erbringt.

Olga Sehnalová (S&D), *písemně*. – Vzdělávání a odborná příprava jsou důležitým, ne však jediným předpokladem k uplatnění na trhu práce a pro sociální začlenění. Důležitá je proto podpora rovného přístupu k celoživotnímu vzdělávání pro všechny. Vítám proto hodnocení Strategického rámce pro vzdělávání a odbornou přípravu 2020 a souhlasím s tím, že by se měl reformovat tak, aby více odpovídal praxi a zohlednil doporučení z dosavadních zkušeností stran.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El marco estratégico es un plan plurianual relacionado con los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 que persigue aumentar la movilidad estudiantil, la equidad, cohesión y ciudadanía activa, así como un enfoque hacia la «creatividad e innovación, incluido el espíritu empresarial». Los resultados de los últimos años demuestran que la orientación mercantilista del sistema educativo, la estandarización de los programas educativos para aumentar la competitividad entre alumnos/as y centros, así como los recortes de los programas de austeridad aplicados en economías como la española, han derivado en un desequilibrio evidente entre los propios objetivos marcados por la Comisión y el Consejo, que ya de por sí no representan mi posición en favor de una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad.

Esta resolución aprobada, que valora un informe conjunto de la Comisión y el Consejo, trata de legitimar a través del Parlamento estas prácticas, añadiendo matices positivos menores (por ejemplo, pidiendo impulsar la formación multidisciplinar y adaptada de los y las docentes ante los nuevos desafíos sociales, o la revisión de los grupos de trabajo de evaluación).

Por ello, ya que el informe no aborda los problemas fundamentales que derivan en un incremento de las desigualdades sociales, he votado en contra.

Remo Sernagiotto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – La relazione sottolinea la necessità e l'importanza dell'interazione e cooperazione fra gli Stati membri in materia di istruzione e formazione.

Il programma ET2020 si occupa di supportare il sistema di istruzione e formazione di ogni singolo Stato membro e presenta quattro obiettivi: favorire la mobilità ai fini istruttivi, migliorare la qualità e l'efficacia delle istituzioni e della formazione, promuovere la coesione sociale e la cittadinanza attiva e incoraggiare la creatività e l'innovazione dello spirito imprenditoriale. Il programma di mobilità Erasmus rappresenta, per esempio, un grande risultato di ET2020: infatti solo nel 2013-2014 ha permesso a 272 000 studenti e a 57 500 operatori di trarre vantaggio dalle esperienze culturali e formative in diversi istituti europei. Augurandomi che la cooperazione europea in questo ambito continui, ho deciso di votare a favore di questa relazione.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Vzdelávanie a odborná príprava majú zásadný význam pri rozvíjaní etických a občianskych hodnôt a všeobecne chápaných hodnôt, ktoré sú zakotvené v zmluvách, ako aj pri upevňovaní demokratických zásad, na ktorých je Európa založená. Hoci došlo k zlepšeniu výsledkov súvisiacich s dosahovaním cieľov pre vysokoškolské vzdelávanie v rámci ET 2020, objavujú sa správy o obavách, pokiaľ ide o účinnosť investícií členských štátov do vzdelávania. Znepokojujú má súčasné riziká spojené s nástupom radikalizácie, násilia, šikanovania a problémov spojených so správaním, ktoré už začínajú na úrovni základných škôl. Ako bývalého pedagogického pracovníka má trápi, že v oblasti vzdelávania a odbornej prípravy sú stále obrovské problémy, najmä pokiaľ ide o kvalitu, prístupnosť a sociálno-ekonomickú diskrimináciu. Podporila som uznesenie, lebo verím, že aj vďaka navrhovaným opatreniam sa nám podarí odstrániť súčasnú nízku úroveň vedomostí a základných zručností. Očakávam, že v záujme dosiahnutia strategického rámca ET 2020 a systému vzdelávania členské štáty posilnia väzby medzi inštitúciami vysokoškolského vzdelávania a odborného vzdelávania a prípravy, výskumnými ústavmi a hospodárskym odvetvím.

Michaela Šojdrová (PPE), *písomně*. – Hlasovala jsem pro zprávu Evropského parlamentu o pokračování strategického rámce evropské spolupráce v oblasti vzdělávání a odborné přípravy (ET 2020).

Byla jsem stínovou zpravodajkou této zprávy za PPE a s její výslednou podobou souhlasím. Jsem ráda, že byla přijata tak velkou většinou. Při konečném hlasování se podařilo vypustit některé kontroverzní body namířené proti mobilitě a boloňskému procesu, které považuji za důležité a přínosné aspekty politiky EU v oblasti vzdělávání. Zpráva zcela respektuje skutečnost, že vzdělávání je primárně v rukou členských států. Z úrovně EU se ale očekává určitý rámec pro dovednosti, vzdělávání podporující začleňování a omezující radikalizaci a také doporučení pro sblížování vzdělávání a trhu práce s cílem snižovat nezaměstnanost mladých. Na druhé straně zpráva správně zdůrazňuje, že vzdělávání je hodnotou samo o sobě, a nikoli pouze naplňováním potřeb trhu práce. Do zprávy se mi v tomto kontextu podařilo prosadit důraz na etickou a osobnostní výchovu a také důraz na nezastupitelnou roli rodičů v procesu vzdělávání a v komunikaci se školami.

Je dobře, že zpráva pozitivně hodnotí kroky EU směřující k podpoře učitelů, včetně využití programu Erasmus+. Celkově zpráva akcentuje kvalitu vzdělávání před kvantitou a nezapomíná ani na nutnost integrace dětí uprchlíků a migrantů do vzdělávacího systému.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *pisno*. – V zadnjem desetletju se je močno povečalo število ljudi, ki vstopajo v formalno izobraževanje, hkrati pa Evropo pesti raven brezposelnosti med mladimi brez primere, ki prizadene tudi diplomante. Med letoma 2011 in 2014 se je v EU povprečna stopnja brezposelnosti najbolj povečala prav med mladimi.

Poročilo o nadaljnji obravnavi strateškega okvira za evropsko sodelovanje v izobraževanju in usposabljanju je razdeljeno na tri dele, strateški okvir, kvaliteto izobraževanja in usposabljanja ter migracije in izobraževanje.

Na ta način poročilo ne upošteva glavnih izzivov na področju izobraževanja in usposabljanja v Evropi, saj ne sledi celovitemu pristopu. Kar je še več, navkljub temu, da ima poročilo celotno poglavje namenjeno migracijam in izobraževanju, se sploh ne dotakne izzivov povezanih z begunci. Poleg tega v poročilu pogrešam močnejšo povezavo med izobraževanjem, podjetništvom ter raziskavami, ter tudi vključitev socialnih partnerjev in civilne družbe.

Četudi poročilo poudarja, da je izobraževanje dobro za osebno ter posledično tudi družbeno rast nad ekonomsko blaginjo, menim da so priporočila precej neuravnotežena ter spodbujajo tradicionalni pogled na družbo.

Na podlagi navedenega menim, da poročilo ne prispeva k nadaljnjemu razvoju agende 2020, zaradi česar sem glasoval proti sprejemu poročila.

Joachim Starbatty (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Der Initiativbericht analysiert den strategischen Rahmen der „Allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung 2020“.

Jedes EU-Land ist selbst für seine Bildungs- und Ausbildungssysteme verantwortlich, da es sich hier um keine Kernkompetenz der EU handelt. Rolle der EU-Politik ist es, nationale Maßnahmen zu unterstützen und bei der Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen zu helfen. In diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde darum, den Rahmen „Allgemeine und berufliche Bildung 2020“ zu evaluieren und Empfehlungen auf der Ebene der Zusammenarbeit, Qualität und Effizienz abzugeben. Die Länder erhalten hier Rat und Unterstützung für politische Reformen. Die ALFA stimmt mit den Kerninhalten dieses Berichtes überein und unterstützt eine Vielzahl der im Bericht genannten Verbesserungsvorschläge. Erwähnt seien hier nur die Bereiche bessere Kommunikation, bessere Qualität der Bildung, Unterstützung und Weiterentwicklung der Lehrer, Anerkennung von Abschlüssen sowie Integration der aufenthaltsberechtigten Migranten in unseren Bildungssystemen. Aus diesen Gründen habe ich dem Bericht zugestimmt.

Sollte die Europäische Kommission in dieser Sache jedoch in Zukunft einen Gesetzesentwurf auf den Weg bringen, so werde ich deutlich kritischer abwägen, ob hierbei nicht versucht wird, den Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsame Vorschriften aufzuerlegen.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písomne*. – Za problémami, ktorým Európa dennodenne čelí, stojí aj kvalita vzdelávania a chuť sa vzdelávať. Projekt ET 2020 by nám mal v budúcnosti priniesť lepšiu integráciu v rámci vzdelávania, ktoré je kľúčom k znižovaniu nezamestnanosti.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Uslijed vala migracije koja neprekidno dovodi nove obitelji u EU, stvorila se potreba za ponovnu evaluaciju obrazovnog sistema pod nazivom ET 2020. Izvješće Odbora za kulturu i obrazovanje aludira na segmente obrazovanja i osposobljavanja koje treba pomno analizirati kako bismo stvorili što učinkovitiju integraciju migranata. Budući da je institucija obitelji temeljni stup društva, vrlo je važno uključiti udruge roditelja u rad okvira ET 2020 i poticati razmjenu primjera dobre prakse u školama. S obzirom da je transparentnost temelj svake uspješne demokracije, Odbor smatra ključnim da rezultate novoga radnog ciklusa europskih i nacionalnih inicijativa u području osposobljavanja i obrazovanja podjele s javnošću.

Postizanje određenih mjerila u završenom stupnju obrazovanja stoga treba popratiti snažnim usredotočivanjem na poboljšanje kvalitete obrazovanja na svim razinama. Potrebne su mjere na nacionalnoj i europskoj razini, odnosno u okviru ET 2020., u području obrazovanja i osposobljavanja za odrasle tražitelje azila koji su stigli u Europu. U izvješću valja, među ostalim, izdvojiti podršku učiteljima u daljnjim naporima dokvalifikacija jer je nužno imati stručne učitelje koji su upoznati sa najnovijim promjenama obrazovanja. Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram kako je obrazovanje ključno za integraciju i zaposlenje, jer ukoliko se ne nađe formula za potrebne promjene, vjerojatno će se produbiti društvene razlike.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), *napisan.* – Obrazovanje se mora smatrati temeljnim ljudskim pravom i javnim dobrom koje bi svima trebalo biti dostupno. Obrazovanje treba doprinijeti osobnom razvoju, uzajamnom poštovanju i rastu mladih kako bi oni postali proaktivni, odgovorni i svjesni građani. Također, kvalitetno obrazovanje i osposobljavanje su izvor održivog rasta, ali doprinose i strategijama i inicijativama Europske unije kao što su Europa 2020., inicijativi za jedinstveno digitalno tržište, Europskom programu sigurnosti, itd. Treba istaknuti važnost digitalnih vještina koje su od ključne važnosti jer usvajanjem tih vještina mladi su spremni za 21. stoljeće. Sami učenici svih dobi i u svim oblicima obrazovanja se moraju poticati da aktivno sudjeluju u upravljanju svojim obrazovnim strukturama.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da obrazovanje i osposobljavanje ne bi smjeli biti usmjereni samo na zadovoljavanje potreba tržišta rada, nego bi trebali biti vrijednost sami po sebi s obzirom na to da obrazovanje ima važnu ulogu u razvoju građanskih vrlina i humanističkih vrijednosti, kao i u jačanju demokratskih načela na kojima se temelji Europska unija.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *pisno.* – Glasovala sem za poročilo o nadaljnji obravnavi strateškega okvira za evropsko sodelovanje v izobraževanju in usposabljanju.

Izobraževanje in usposabljanje bi moralo biti vrednota samo po sebi, ne pa da sta usmerjena le v to, da zadostita potrebam na trgu dela. Strinjam se s poročilom, ki pozdravlja pregled stanja ET 2020, hkrati pa poudarja, da je treba zaključke iz tega pregleda upoštevati in nemudoma izvajati, da bi povečali dodano vrednost okvira in optimizirali njegovo učinkovitost ter okrepili relevantnost za vsako državo in medsebojno učenje.

Prav tako soglašam, da še vedno niso rešene zelo velike težave na področju izobraževanja in usposabljanja, kar se tiče kakovosti, dostopnosti in socialno-ekonomske diskriminacije.

Νεοκλής Σουλκιώτης (GUE/NGL), *γραπτώς.* – Η εν λόγω έκθεση δυστυχώς κινείται στη λογική πως η εκπαίδευση πρέπει να εξυπηρετεί τις ανάγκες της αγοράς. Κινείται δηλαδή σε αντίθετη κατεύθυνση από τον μορφωτικό χαρακτήρα -τον δημοκρατικό και ανθρώπινο- που εμείς οραματιζόμαστε. Ως αποτέλεσμα, αντί να προωθούνται προτάσεις για βελτίωση της ποιότητας της εκπαίδευσης, προωθείται η εμπορευματοποίησή της με στόχο τη δημιουργία ενός ευέλικτου εργατικού δυναμικού, το οποίο θα έχει την κατάρτιση και θα μπορεί να μεταβάλλεται συνεχώς για να ανταποκρίνεται στις ανάγκες της αγοράς.

Για τους λόγους αυτούς καταψηφίσαμε την έκθεση.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), *γραπτώς.* – Η εκπαίδευση πέραν της παροχής γνώσεων στους νέους θα πρέπει να εστιάζεται στη μόρφωση και διαπαιδαγώγησή τους με σεβασμό στις ανθρώπινες αξίες, την ηθική, το ήθος και στις ιδιαιτερότητες των κατά περίπτωση εθνών. Η ισοπέδωση, η απόλυτη εξίσωση και η κακώς εννοούμενη πολυπολιτισμικότητα και διαφορετικότητα δεν οδηγούν στη διαπαιδαγώγηση των νέων.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), *írásban.* – Szavazatommal támogattam az oktatás és képzés terén folytatott európai együttműködés stratégiai keretrendszerének nyomon követéséről szóló jelentés elfogadását, mivel amellett, hogy rámutat a „Oktatás és képzés 2020” keretében folytatott munka eddigi eredményeire, helyesen kiemeli az oktatás és képzés területén rejlő további lehetőségeket és az előttünk álló kihívásokat. Egyetértek a jelentés megállapításával, miszerint az oktatásban és képzésben a minőség, a hozzáférhetőség és a társadalmi-gazdasági megkülönböztetés terén továbbra is hatalmas problémák vannak, ezért nagyra törő, összehangolt és hatékony szakpolitikai intézkedéseket kell kialakítani mind európai, mind nemzeti szinten egyaránt.

Osztom továbbá a jelentéstevő aggodalmát a növekvő radikalizálódással, erőszakkal, bántalmazással és magatartási problémákkal kapcsolatban, mely kockázatok már az alapfokú oktatás szintjén megjelennek. Ezért valóban hasznos lenne a Bizottságnak erre nézve uniós szinten kutatást végezni, megvizsgálva, hogy a tagállamok milyen választ adnak az efféle tendenciákra.

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE), *na piśmie.* – Europejska współpraca w dziedzinie kształcenia i szkolenia, która została przyjęta w 2008 roku, ma charakter dobrowolny. Strategia ta przyjmuje perspektywę uczenia się przez całe życie, aby zapewnić spójną edukację i szkolenie we wszystkich fazach życia, od wczesnego dzieciństwa do późnej starości. ET 2020 oprócz podkreślenia strategii uczenia się przez całe życie akcentuje promowanie równości, włączenia społecznego, innowacyjności, kreatywności i przedsiębiorczości Europejczyków.

Dane statystyczne wskazują, że 8 lat po zatwierdzeniu ET 2020 pewien postęp został osiągnięty, jednakże nie we wszystkich dziedzinach. Obecnie szczególnie problematyczna jest kwestia poziomu zatrudnienia osób zaraz po studiach.

Sprawozdanie Parlamentu Europejskiego we właściwy sposób akcentuje istniejące problemy z wdrażaniem strategii oraz wskazuje na konieczność podejmowania dalszych działań przez państwa członkowskie UE, aby poprawić współpracę w dziedzinie kształcenia i szkolenia. Dlatego też zdecydowałem się zagłosować za przyjęciem tego dokumentu.

Claudiu Ciprian Tănăsescu (S&D), *în scris*. – Incluziunea socială are un rol esențial în atingerea obiectivelor ET2020. Este necesară îmbunătățirea calității sistemelor de educație și a formării profesionale, astfel încât să existe oportunități pentru toți, mai ales pentru grupurile vulnerabile. Avem nevoie de implicarea tuturor actorilor în procesul de învățare/pregătire pe termen lung. Buna guvernare și strânsa cooperare între statele membre reprezintă elemente-cheie în atingerea acestor obiective.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), *în scris*. – Cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației și formării profesionale este voluntară, dar un cadru strategic stabilește obiectivele care trebuie atinse până în 2020. Acest cadru structurează comunicarea în domeniul educației între statele membre la nivelul Uniunii Europene.

În acest context, raportul pus în discuție prevede un program detaliat de lucru și obiective de referință aprobate în documentele succesive între anii 2001 și 2003.

Consider că educația și formarea profesională nu ar trebui să vizeze doar satisfacerea nevoilor de pe piața muncii, ci să constituie o valoare în sine, deoarece educația are un rol important în dezvoltarea virtuților civice și etice. Din acest motiv, susțin prin votul meu recomandările enunțate în raport.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), *par écrit*. – L'intensification de la mobilité intra-européenne et l'actuelle crise des réfugiés ont placé les systèmes d'éducation et de formation nationaux devant des défis majeurs. De nos jours, les classes sont plus hétérogènes que jamais et comportent des élèves ayant besoin d'une aide supplémentaire pour s'adapter aux nouveaux programmes, aux exigences académiques, aux méthodes d'enseignement et souvent aussi à de nouvelles langues et normes culturelles. Les enseignants ont besoin d'un soutien supplémentaire, au début de leur formation et pendant toute leur carrière, grâce à des cours de perfectionnement professionnel continu, afin qu'ils puissent enseigner avec efficacité à des enfants immigrés, pour faciliter leur intégration dans la société d'accueil tout en les encourageant à préserver et à entretenir leur héritage culturel. Il est urgent d'arrêter des mesures aux niveaux national et européen, également dans le cadre d'ET2020, dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation des adultes demandeurs d'asile récemment arrivés en Europe. L'éducation est la clé de l'intégration et de l'employabilité, et si les systèmes nationaux sont incapables de relever ce défi, cela risque de provoquer une aggravation des divisions sociales et de la ségrégation culturelle et, partant, de renforcer l'émergence, déjà latente, de sociétés parallèles.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – Faced with high youth unemployment and the new challenges of migration, it is essential to rethink our take on European cooperation in education and training. That is why I voted in favour of improving the Strategic Framework for European cooperation in Education and Training 2020 (ET2020), which is an umbrella for all EU-level policy exchanges on education and training between EU countries.

It is important that we enhance the quality of education and training by extending cooperation with more stakeholders from civil society, by ensuring coherent, transparent and inclusive education for a diverse group of learners, and by promoting a new agenda for adult learning. This is also an opportunity to reiterate the importance of creating access for migrants to language courses, basic skills training and higher education, in order to facilitate their integration into society and the labour market. Finally, better cooperation between EU Member States would certainly be very helpful in establishing new, innovative and interactive methods of teaching, training and learning.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – V času visoke brezposelnosti mladih, ki vpliva tudi na diplomante, je najpomembnejši korak ocenitev evropskega okvira ET2020 z namenom povečanja njegove dodane vrednosti in optimizacije njegove učinkovitosti.

Zato sem predlog resolucije za nadaljevanje strateškega okvira za evropsko sodelovanje na področju izobraževanja in usposabljanja podprla.

Resolucija namreč vsebuje niz političnih prednostnih nalog in pozitivnih priporočil.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – En 2014 la Comisión hizo balance de la estrategia de educación y formación, ET 2020, en cooperación con los Estados miembro. A partir de las conclusiones del informe resultante, la Comisión estableció las prioridades para el periodo 2016-2020. Si bien dichas prioridades atienden a aspectos incuestionables como la educación inclusiva, la igualdad, la equidad, la no discriminación, las competencias cívicas, el bienestar, la cohesión social, el diálogo intercultural, la innovación y el apoyo a la docencia, no dejan de ser un envoltorio con el que prestigiar una concepción neoliberal de la educación y la formación. El informe Krasnodebski, en línea con la Comisión, no oculta la conversión de la educación y la formación en objeto de negocio, y las orienta a la empleabilidad en lugar de al desarrollo del conocimiento. Se ha de reconocer la inclusión en el informe de aspectos como la acogida en este ámbito de los migrantes, los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo, así como de la perspectiva de género. No obstante, estas inclusiones, necesarias, no deben pagar el peaje de la mercantilización de la educación; por ello hemos votado en contra.

Ulrike Trebesius (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Der Initiativbericht analysiert den strategischen Rahmen der „Allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung 2020“.

Jedes EU-Land ist selbst für seine Bildungs- und Ausbildungssysteme verantwortlich, da es sich hier um keine Kernkompetenz der EU handelt. Rolle der EU-Politik ist es, nationale Maßnahmen zu unterstützen und bei der Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen zu helfen. In diesem Bericht geht es im Grunde darum, den Rahmen „Allgemeine und berufliche Bildung 2020“ zu evaluieren und Empfehlungen auf der Ebene der Zusammenarbeit, Qualität und Effizienz abzugeben. Die Länder erhalten hier Rat und Unterstützung für politische Reformen. Die ALFA stimmt mit den Kerninhalten dieses Berichtes überein und unterstützt eine Vielzahl der im Bericht genannten Verbesserungsvorschläge. Erwähnt seien hier nur die Bereiche bessere Kommunikation, bessere Qualität der Bildung, Unterstützung und Weiterentwicklung der Lehrer, Anerkennung von Abschlüssen sowie Integration der aufenthaltsberechtigten Migranten in unseren Bildungssystemen. Aus diesen Gründen habe ich dem Bericht zugestimmt.

Sollte die Europäische Kommission in dieser Sache jedoch in Zukunft einen Gesetzesentwurf auf den Weg bringen, so werde ich deutlich kritischer abwägen, ob hierbei nicht versucht wird, den Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsame Vorschriften aufzuerlegen.

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – Education should contribute not only to young people's acquisition of professional skills but also to their personal development and growth. I see only positive outcomes in this regard, as are explained in the resolution. That is why I support it, and I would urge that the ET2020 Strategic Framework be promptly implemented in order to optimise its effectiveness.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai préféré l'abstention sur ce rapport car s'il tente de trouver un équilibre entre les travaux des institutions européennes et le respect des compétences nationales en matière d'instruction, il reste malheureusement une promotion du modèle européen d'intégration des migrants.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Az „Oktatás és képzés 2020” keretrendszer összegző értékelését a Bizottság 2014-ben készítette el a tagállamokkal együttműködve. Az érdekelt felek számos ajánlást tettek a Bizottságnak és a Tanácsnak a keretrendszer hozzáadott értékének növelése és hatékonyságának optimalizálása érdekében. Megerősítették az informális irányító testületek szerepét, és visszajelzési hurkokat vezettek be a munkacsoportok, a főigazgatóságok vagy a magas szintű csoportok között. Egyes tagállamoknak még tökéletesíteniük kellene a formális és informális szervezetekkel való interakciójuk módját, azáltal, hogy a megfelelő embert küldik a megfelelő megbeszélésre, és a lehető legkisebb mértékben élnek a helyettesítéssel. Voksommal az S&D álláspontját követtem.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – En 2014 la Comisión hizo balance de la estrategia de educación y formación, ET 2020, en cooperación con los Estados miembro. A partir de las conclusiones del informe resultante, la Comisión estableció las prioridades para el periodo 2016-2020. Si bien dichas prioridades atienden a aspectos incuestionables como la educación inclusiva, la igualdad, la equidad, la no discriminación, las competencias cívicas, el bienestar, la cohesión social, el diálogo intercultural, la innovación y el apoyo a la docencia, no dejan de ser un envoltorio con el que prestigiar una concepción neoliberal de la educación y la formación. El informe Krasnodebski, en línea con la Comisión, no oculta la conversión de la educación y la formación en objeto de negocio, y las orienta a la empleabilidad

en lugar de al desarrollo del conocimiento. Se ha de reconocer la inclusión en el informe de aspectos como la acogida en este ámbito de los migrantes, los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo, así como de la perspectiva de género. No obstante, estas inclusiones, necesarias, no deben pagar el peaje de la mercantilización de la educación; por ello hemos votado en contra.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Teigiamai vertinu „ET 2020“ apžvalgą ir pabrėžiu, kad būtina atsižvelgti į jos išvadas ir nedelsiant jas įgyvendinti, siekiant padidinti pridėtinę programos vertę ir optimizuoti jos veiksmingumą, sustiprinant kiekvienai šaliai aktualius aspektus ir tarpusavio mokymąsi.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report on follow-up to the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training (ET2020). The stocktaking exercise on the ET2020 framework was conducted in 2014 by the Commission in cooperation with the Member States. The report urges that greater attention be devoted to the quality of education, starting in the kindergarten and throughout life. It calls for the development of good practices in assessing qualitative progress and investment in the use of quality data with stakeholders at local, regional and national level. The report emphasises the importance of providing high-quality early childhood education and of its timely modernisation. It calls on the Member States to channel investment into inclusive education that responds to societal challenges with regard to ensuring equal access and opportunities for all.

I voted in favour because I believe that education and training are important in helping people to acquire the knowledge and professional skills they need to become competitive and innovative employees.

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (PPE), *por escrito*. – En un tiempo de alto desempleo que también afecta a los licenciados, es muy importante evaluar el marco estratégico para la cooperación europea en el ámbito de la educación y la formación para incrementar su valor añadido y optimizar su efectividad. Este seguimiento concluye con una serie de recomendaciones que deben ser tenidas en cuenta para seguir avanzando en la cooperación en la educación y la formación. Por ello creo conveniente votar a su favor.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – El marco estratégico es un plan plurianual relacionado con los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 que persigue aumentar la movilidad estudiantil, la equidad, cohesión y ciudadanía activa, así como un enfoque hacia la «creatividad e innovación, incluido el espíritu empresarial». Los resultados de los últimos años demuestran que la orientación mercantilista del sistema educativo, la estandarización de los programas educativos para aumentar la competitividad entre alumnos y centros, así como los recortes de los programas de austeridad aplicados en economías como la española, han derivado en un desequilibrio evidente entre los propios objetivos marcados por la Comisión y el Consejo, que ya de por sí no representan mi posición en favor de una educación pública, gratuita y de calidad.

Esta resolución aprobada, que valora un informe conjunto de la Comisión y el Consejo, trata de legitimar a través del Parlamento estas prácticas, añadiendo matices positivos menores (por ejemplo, pidiendo impulsar la formación multidisciplinar y adaptada de los y las docentes ante los nuevos desafíos sociales, o la revisión de los grupos de trabajo de evaluación).

Por ello, ya que el informe no aborda los problemas fundamentales que derivan en un incremento de las desigualdades sociales, he votado en contra.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – Onderwijs en opleiding zijn belangrijk om mensen te helpen de kennis en de beroepsvaardigheden te verwerven die zij nodig hebben om concurrerende en innoverende werknemers te worden. Bovendien kunnen zij een belangrijke rol spelen bij de vorming van mensen met een open geest. Het feit moet worden verwelkomd dat de Verklaring van Parijs van de ministers van Onderwijs van 17 maart 2015 weerspiegeld is in het gezamenlijk verslag en dat ET 2020 is bijgesteld, doordat de doelstellingen inzake inzetbaarheid en de bevordering van sociale cohesie, gelijkheid, non-discriminatie en burgerlijke vaardigheden op gelijke hoogte zijn geplaatst. Het kon rekenen op mijn volledige steun.

Paavo Väyrynen (ALDE), kirjallinen. – Mietintö eurooppalaisen koulutusyhteistyön strategisten puitteiden (ET 2020) seurannasta on pääasialliselta sisällöltään kannatettava, ja on tärkeää pitää huolta siitä, että koulutusjärjestelmät huolehtivat ihmisten integroitumisesta osaksi yhteiskuntaa. Äänestin kuitenkin joissakin kohdin tyhjää, sillä katson, että koulutuspolitiikka kuuluu jäsenvaltioille eikä se ole osa EU:n päätösvaltaa.

Lieve Wierinck (ALDE), in writing. — I strongly endorse this EP resolution, because it represents our views on the Commission's evaluation of ET2020 very well. It is important to follow up on such frameworks and programmes in order to observe whether the predetermined objectives are being achieved – and, if not, what action is needed. This framework is important as the future of our workforce depends on education and training. These will be the tools that will help the EU in maintaining one of the most competitive and innovative workforces in the world. In this regard, the Erasmus programme plays a significant role, which the resolution recognises.

I welcome the resolution's call for quality assurance in education at all levels and its emphasis on the importance of the quality of educators, who need to be supported through continuing professional development programmes. The resolution also stresses the importance of exchange of good practices between Member States.

Anna Záborská (PPE), písomne. – Podporila som túto správu, pretože považujem za správne, aby sa pri politických stratégiách v oblasti vzdelávania zdôrazňovala zásadná zodpovednosť rodičov za vzdelávanie svojich detí. Žiaden vzdelávací program, ktorý ignoruje rodičovskú zodpovednosť, nemôže byť úspešný. Bola by som veľmi rada, aby odporúčanie na lepšiu spoluprácu škôl s rodičmi, ktoré obsahuje táto správa, bolo zohľadnené pri všetkých legislatívnych aj nelegislatívnych návrhoch zo strany Komisie aj tohto Parlamentu. Za podnetné považujem aj úvahy o význame kurzov pre rodičov zo znevýhodneného prostredia, ktoré by im mohli pomôcť lepšie zvládať rodičovskú zodpovednosť pri výbere najlepšieho vzdelávania pre ich deti.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), γραπτώς. – Υπερψήφισα την έκθεση ως μέλος της επιτροπής Πολιτισμού και Παιδείας, που αφορά την υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία σε διαφορετικούς τομείς της κοινωνίας υπό το πρίσμα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης.

Σωτήριος Ζαριανόπουλος (NI), γραπτώς. – Τους γνωστούς στόχους της ΕΕ για μια εκπαίδευση που θα εξυπηρετεί τη στρατηγική «Ευρώπη 2020», δηλαδή τα κέρδη των μονοπωλίων, επανέλαβε το ψήφισμα για την «υλοποίηση του στρατηγικού πλαισίου για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία στον τομέα της εκπαίδευσης και της κατάρτισης (ΕΚ2020)».

Το ψήφισμα προωθεί τη «διά βίου μάθηση» και τη διαρκή απόκτηση «κατάλληλων και υψηλής ποιότητας δεξιοτήτων και ικανοτήτων» «που ευνοούν την απασχολησιμότητα», κατακερματισμό δηλαδή των γνώσεων, προκειμένου οι εργαζόμενοι να προσαρμόζονται στις ανάγκες των επιχειρηματικών ομίλων για συγκεκριμένες δεξιότητες σε ένα συγκεκριμένο χρονικό διάστημα. Η συνθήκη της Μπολόνια, που ήταν η αρχή μιας σειράς αντιδραστικών αλλαγών στα πανεπιστήμια, εξυμνείται.

Αντίληψη που διαπερνά το ψήφισμα είναι ότι η εκπαίδευση είναι εμπόρευμα. Οι λαϊκές οικογένειες, οι νέοι εργαζόμενοι θα πρέπει να βάζουν το χέρι στην τσέπη και, εάν δεν έχουν, να καταφεύγουν σε υποτροφίες, αλλά και σε δάνεια όπως προτείνεται.

Γι' αυτούς τους λόγους, η Ευρωκοινοβουλευτική Ομάδα του ΚΚΕ καταψήφισε το εν λόγω ψήφισμα.

Σχετικά με την εκπαίδευση των προσφύγων -παρά το ότι η γενική κατεύθυνση του ψηφίσματος εντάσσεται στη λογική στήριξης της ανταγωνιστικότητας των επιχειρήσεων-, το ΚΚΕ ψήφισε εκείνες τις προτάσεις που δίνουν έστω και μια μικρή ανακούφιση στο άμεσο πρόβλημα της εκπαίδευσης των παιδιών των προσφύγων που είναι ακόμα στον αέρα.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), *písemně*. – Rozhodl jsem se podpořit tuto zprávu. Vzdělávání a odborná příprava jsou důležité v tom, že pomáhají lidem získat znalosti a odborné dovednosti, díky nimž se stávají konkurenceschopnými a inovativními zaměstnanci. Osobně oceňuji zejména to, že mezi prioritní oblasti rámce ET 2020 byla zařazena podpora pro učitele. Kvalita programů přípravy učitelů a jejich trvalého profesního rozvoje je s ohledem na rostoucí rozsah složitosti a kompetencí, které jsou v současnosti pro výuku vyžadovány, stále nedostatečná. Jsem zastáncem toho, že by se měla věnovat zvláštní pozornost potřebám různých typů žáků, například žáků pocházejících z národnostních nebo náboženských menšin nebo dětí z rodin s nízkými příjmy nebo z rodin migrantů, kteří jsou nyní znovu v centru pozornosti v důsledku zrychlené mobility v rámci Evropy a nynější uprchlické krize.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), *písemne*. – Správu o opatreniach v nadväznosti na strategický rámec pre európsku spoluprácu vo vzdelávaní a v odbornej príprave som podporila. Podľa môjho názoru bola táto správa veľmi dobre zostavená a hoci sa zaoberá témou vzdelávania, ktoré patrí do výlučných právomocí členských štátov, má vyslovene odporúčací charakter a nezasahuje tak do národnej suverenity. Okrem toho správa veľmi dobre identifikovala problémy, ktorým vzdelávanie a odborná príprava čelia a navrhovala opatrenia na ich skvalitnenie, na lepší prístup znevýhodnených skupín k vzdelávaniu, ale aj na veľmi dôležité posilnenie prípravy a postavenia učiteľov. Rovnako je dôležité, že správa navrhuje flexibilné opatrenia založené na situácii v jednotlivých krajinách a nesnaží sa prijať jeden systém pre všetkých, čo považujem za omnoho udržateľnejšie riešenie v porovnaní s často používaným tzv. „one size fits all“ prístupom.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o nadaljnji obravnavi strateškega okvira za evropsko sodelovanje v izobraževanju in usposabljanju.

Izobraževanje in usposabljanje se morata prilagajati potrebam na trgu dela, saj le na ta način lahko pomagamo povečati zaposlenost mladih in starejših ter okrepimo gospodarstvo.

Obenem morata izobraževanje in usposabljanje prispevati tudi k razvoju posameznikovih etičnih in državljanskih kompetenc ter humanističnih vrednot. Države članice morajo usmeriti naložbe v vključujoče izobraževanje, ki se odziva na družbene izzive in okrepi možnosti vseživljenjskega učenja.

9.13. Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ (A8-0196/2016 - Paloma López Bermejo)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore di questa risoluzione perché sono certa che le energie rinnovabili siano il futuro dell'Europa, non solo per il loro valore ambientale ma anche per dare impulso economico ai territori.

Ci sono regioni, come la mia, la Sicilia, nel Sud d'Italia e d'Europa, che potrebbero diventare degli *hub* sperimentali per lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili e potrebbero persino aspirare all'autosufficienza energetica e invece hanno livelli di inquinamento altissimo e si parla ancora di petrolio.

È chiaro che per lo sviluppo delle energie pulite in Europa serve una forte volontà politica. Prima di tutto serve assistere le regioni nella spesa dei fondi strutturali, perché nell'attuale politica di coesione la percentuale dei fondi per le energie rinnovabili è invece solo dell'1,4 %. E poi bisogna incanalare e indirizzare gli ingenti fondi destinati alle energie rinnovabili verso quelle regioni che sono ricche di risorse, ma sono più deboli nei fronti e sul fronte della progettazione.

L'energia rinnovabile è la chiave per la crescita, per creare città più pulite, un ambiente più sano e un'Europa migliore.

Biljana Borzan (S&D). – Gospodine predsjedniče, iznimno mi je drago što je Hrvatska među onim državama koje su blizu ispunjenja ciljeva koje je odredila Komisija. Ipak, želim naglasiti važnost informiranosti potrošača i njihovu ulogu kao proizvođača energije. Potrošač u svakom trenutku treba biti u mogućnosti očitati potrošnju kako bi je mogao i kontrolirati. Procjena je da bi prosječno kućanstvo samo na grijanju i hlađenju moglo uštedjeti 10-30%. Isto tako, promjene dobavljača su jako skupe, a u nekim državama mjesecima se čeka na zamjenu.

Posebno sam zadovoljna novom inicijativom da se energetske razrede pojednostave kako bi se potrošači lakše snalazili. Isto tako, Odbor za energiju usvojio je prijedlog S&D-a da se uređaji testiraju u prirodnim uvjetima, a ne u laboratorijima. Smatram to iznimno važnim i predlažem da se uvažavaju i studije koje govore o programiranom kvarenju. Međutim, dug je posao pred nama, i u pogledu obnovljivih izvora energije, ali i u pogledu energetske učinkovitosti. Vjerujem da osnaživanje potrošača treba biti u srcu energetske reforme.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin, bhí áthas orm tacaíocht a thabhairt don tuarascáil seo mar a rinne an chuid is mó de na Feisirí – 80% díobh, 444 i bhfabhar agus 103 i gcoinne. Taispeánann sé sin go bhfuil na Feisirí sa Pharlaimint dáiríre faoin sprioc atá romhainn anois tar éis COP 21 i bPáras – mar a rabhas féin páirteach ar son na Parlaiminte roimh an Nollaig.

Dar ndóigh, tá seans iontach againn fuinneamh in-athnuaite a chur ar fáil trasna na hEorpa go léir mar a dúirt Uachtarán an Choimisiúin Juncker ag tosach a thréimhse agus caithfidh ceannasaíocht a thabhairt faoi sin. Go háirithe tá seans againn níos mó a dhéanamh maidir le taighde, taighde atá á dhéanamh i mo cheantar féin in Ionad Taighde Beaufort i Rinn an Scidígh i gCorcaigh, maidir le taoide, maidir le tuilte agus maidir le gaoth ar an bhfarraige. Déanfaidh sé sin an-difríocht nuair a bheidh an teicneolaíocht sin againn.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Lars Adaktusson (PPE), skriftlig. – Idag röstade jag om initiativbetänkandet "Lägesrapport om förnybar energi". Betänkandet innehöll problematiska förslag på bindande mål om minst 30 procent förnybar energi samt nationella delmål. I betänkandet fanns också en problematisk punkt om bioenergi från skog och dess påstådda negativa påverkan på miljön. Jag anser att det är medlemsstaternas kompetens att råda över sin egen energimix, samt att man skall hålla fast vid redan beslutade procentmål, men valde ändå att stödja betänkandet i slutomröstningen i plenum då betänkandet i det stora hela bars upp av budskap om vikten av förnybara lösningar för energiförsörjningen.

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), per iscritto. – L'Unione europea si impegna nell'elaborazione di politiche e strategie rispettose dell'ambiente, ispirate ad un modello energetico sostenibile.

I cambiamenti climatici, le politiche sociali e di sicurezza ed, infine, il rinnovo dei sistemi produttivi, hanno evidenziato la necessità di porre le energie rinnovabili al centro delle priorità dell'UE.

La nuova strategia per il 2030 mira alla creazione di un modello decentralizzato, in grado d'implementare la transizione energetica ricavandone migliori risultati in termini d'indipendenza, efficienza e sostenibilità. Per queste ragioni, ho espresso voto favorevole.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D), por escrito. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un importante respaldo al desarrollo del sector de las energías renovables y una importante llamada a los estados miembros que no están cumpliendo con los objetivos de la Directiva. El informe se hace eco del avance del sector pero también de los problemas que encuentran en determinados estados miembros como el «impuesto al sol», la retroactividad de las medidas de apoyo, las dificultades en el acceso a la red, etc. además el informe hace referencia a la necesidad de generar empleo de calidad y de incluir a los sindicatos y la sociedad civil en el desarrollo de estas energías. Así mismo se hacen proposiciones específicas sobre la definición de prosumers, el apoyo al cambio modal de transporte, el desarrollo de tecnologías de refrigeración renovables, la inversión pública en el sector, etc. Esto convierte al texto en una importante referencia para el desarrollo de la próxima directiva, es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor.

Louis Aliot (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport sur les progrès accomplis dans les énergies renouvelables. Malgré quelques points intéressants, notamment sur les usagers en situation de précarité ou encore l'accent mis sur la formation, qui est un enjeu clef de ce secteur, nous regrettons le ton bien trop intégrationniste de ce rapport. Si nous sommes favorables aux énergies renouvelables, nous ne pouvons soutenir un texte qui est composé d'objectifs très contraignants et qui invite la Commission européenne à renforcer son rôle.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – This report was a positive and progressive one, which highlighted the need for a modal shift and for higher energy efficiency of renewables in order to improve the sustainability of transport. Furthermore, it criticises the promotion of biofuels for transport, which competes with the food production sector.

The report also analyses how Member States have done in achieving their renewable energy targets. There is currently an EU target of 20%, which is shared by Member States and broken down into national targets.

Ireland has fallen short of the heat energy target. While this is not acceptable, the report correctly expresses concern that some Member States may have to revise policies and instruments in order to achieve their targets.

For these reasons outlined above, I voted in favour.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραφώς*. – Ψήφισα υπέρ της έκθεσης σχετικά με την πρόοδο στον τομέα των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας, διότι αναφέρεται στην πρόοδο που έχει επιτευχθεί για τους στόχους της ΕΕ 2020 καθώς και στο πλαίσιο για τους στόχους του 2030.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Die Entwicklung von erneuerbaren Energien macht eine Neuausrichtung notwendig, durch die sie zum Grundpfeiler des energiewirtschaftlichen Modells der Union werden. Der Klimawandel muss bekämpft werden, und wir stehen in der Verantwortung, dies zu tun.

Die Abhängigkeit von Energieressourcen aus anderen Ländern muss verringert werden, wenn wir das Ziel erreichen wollen, eine Führungsrolle beim Aufbau strategischer Technologien für die Energiewende einzunehmen, ein erfolgreiches und realistisches Energieerzeugungsmodell zu strukturieren und so hochwertige Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen.

Dies berücksichtigt die Forderung des Parlamentes, der ich nur zustimmen kann.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dès qu'on parle d'environnement le Parlement européen entre dans des délires fédéralistes. C'est le cas ici, où l'on parle d'énergies renouvelables.

Toute la première partie n'est composée que d'objectifs contraignants, de propositions législatives et de contraintes pour les États.

Sans compter le charabia incompréhensible où on réinvente l'eau chaude, alors que nos États avaient patiemment construit un service public de l'électricité et du gaz abordable et cohérent.

Même si je suis favorable aux énergies renouvelables, la tonalité nettement intégrationniste du rapport ne permet pas de le voter en l'état. Je m'y suis donc opposée.

Zoltán Balczó (NI), írásban. – A megújuló energiák fejlesztése új megközelítést követel, mely az Európai Unió energiamodelljének fő pillérévé teszi azokat. A fenntartható energiatermelési modell felé történő elmozdulás társadalmi prioritás, melyet egyedül a piac nem tud megoldani. A szabályozás és a demokratikus részvétel is szükséges, ha el kívánjuk kerülni a szociális és környezeti negatív hatásokat. Az EU jogi eszköze a megújuló energiákról szóló 2009/28/EK számú irányelv, melynek elfogadásával az EU megkezdte a tagállamok energiaszerkezetének átalakítását. Ez kötelező célokat ír elő, egyértelmű szabályokat fogalmaz meg a felügyeletről és nyomonkövetésről.

A bioüzemanyagok közlekedésben történő előmozdítására irányuló kötelezettségvállalás egyértelműen az élelmiszer-gyártó ágazatnak ártott, ahelyett, hogy mélyreható vitát indított volna a logisztikai és városrendezési politikák összehangolásának hiányáról és arról, hogy ezek fenntarthatóságához átfogó tervezés szükséges. Sajnos számos esetben olyan előírást fogalmaz meg a jelentés, amely kötelező célértékek létrehozását, azok ellenőrzését, nem teljesülésük esetén szankcionálását tenné lehetővé a Bizottságnak. Ez egyértelműen a tagállamok energiamixébe történő beavatkozás. Számos esetben burkoltan, vagy nyíltan szót emel a jelentéstevő mellett, hogy a Bizottságnak meg kell adni a hatáskört, hogy a tagállamok adópolitikáján belül a megújuló energiatermelést elősegítő és a fosszilis energiatermelést nem támogató adójogszabályokat fogadjon el és EU-s szinten megvalósuljon ennek a területnek az adóharmonizációja. Mindezeket a szempontokat összevetve a szavazáskor tartózkodtam.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport, qui porte sur les progrès accomplis en matière d'énergies renouvelables, est certes intéressant mais son ton intégrationniste, à la limite du fédéralisme, met mal à l'aise en le faisant plus apparaître comme un prétexte que comme une fin en soi. Cela commence dès le point 2, où il est indiqué que le Parlement «invite la Commission à renforcer son rôle».

De même, toute sa première partie n'est composée que d'objectifs à la limite de l'irréalisable, de propositions législatives et de contraintes pour les États. Ainsi, les États membres sont invités à démanteler les services publics de l'électricité et du gaz abordables et cohérents qu'ils avaient mis en place. J'ai donc voté contre ce rapport destructeur bien loin de favoriser l'utilisation courante des énergies renouvelables.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), par écrit. – J'ai approuvé ce rapport qui, tout en saluant ses efforts en faveur des énergies renouvelables, encourage la Commission à garantir la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les énergies renouvelables et à proposer un cadre législatif ambitieux après 2020. Il insiste sur la nécessité de disposer d'un cadre réglementaire à long terme stable, comportant des objectifs nationaux en matière d'énergies renouvelables qui soient cohérents et efficaces pour atteindre les objectifs climatiques à long terme (2050) de l'Union.

Il souligne aussi l'importance, pour le secteur des énergies renouvelables, du partage des meilleures pratiques, des régimes de soutien et de l'accès au capital notamment pour les PME.

Brando Benifei (S&D), per iscritto. – L'Unione europea ha intrapreso da tempo la via della transizione energetica a favore delle energie rinnovabili. Si tratta di una visione, di medio e lungo periodo, dal grande valore strategico che mira non solo a favorire la realizzazione degli obiettivi internazionali, tra cui quelli stabiliti con la recente COP21, ma soprattutto ad assicurare al Vecchio Continente una vera indipendenza energetica fondata su un sistema sostenibile e proiettato verso il futuro. Il mio sostegno alla relazione López Bermejo nasce dalla convinzione che sia fondamentale assicurare il successo del percorso intrapreso, evitando che esso sia affidato solamente alle forze del mercato. Occorre semplificare le procedure amministrative, potenziare la normativa per creare un mercato dell'energia più integrato, favorire i meccanismi di condivisione delle buone politiche nazionali energetiche e investire in sistemi di stoccaggio dell'energia elettrica. Bisogna raggiungere gli obiettivi stabiliti per il 2020 e nel contempo stabilire un quadro regolamentare a lungo termine per il conseguimento degli obiettivi climatici dell'Unione per il 2050.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Votamos a favor del informe de Paloma López Bermejo porque establece buenas bases para la revisión de la Directiva relativa a las energías renovables. Subraya las posibilidades de creación de empleos, los beneficios para la economía, al igual que la centralidad del desarrollo de las renovables para luchar contra el cambio climático. Fija objetivos ambiciosos y pide que sean vinculantes. También promueve el autoconsumo y la democratización del sistema energético.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis opposée à ce rapport concernant les progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables.

C'est regrettable, d'autant que plusieurs bonnes propositions y figuraient: la prise en compte des usagers en situation de précarité énergétique, l'exclusion des investissements publics des objectifs de déficit, ou encore la suggestion de simplifier les règles administratives et fiscales pour les producteurs-consommateurs.

Malheureusement, ces bons vœux sont pervertis par la volonté fédéraliste portée par le rapporteur, laquelle se sent obligée de donner à la Commission le rôle de gendarme devant guider les États membres sur le chemin des énergies renouvelables par des objectifs et des législations contraignants.

Par ailleurs, le texte se veut donneur de leçon en la matière, remettant en cause notre service public de l'électricité et du gaz, lequel est pourtant performant et de qualité.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – La relazione oggetto di voto è poco equilibrata e condivisibile, ho quindi deciso di non supportarla col mio voto.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Parlamentas pritaria, kad atsinaujinančios energijos plėtojimui reikia taikyti naują požiūrį, pagal kurį ji taptų pagrindiniu Europos energetikos modelio ramsčiu. Jei norime plėtoti savo gamybos modelį ir kurti kokybiškas darbo vietas, taip pat skatinti plėtoti strategines technologijas, kuriomis būtų paremtas perėjimas prie naujos energetikos, privalome sumažinti priklausomybę nuo likusio pasaulio energijos išteklių.

Perėjimas prie tvarios energijos gamybos modelio yra socialinis prioritetinis klausimas, kurio negalima išspręsti vien tik rinkos priemonėmis. Reikia suprasti, kad demokratinis reglamentavimas ir dalyvavimas yra būtinas siekiant išvengti rimto išorinio socialinio ir aplinkos poveikio. Negalima leisti, kad energetinės oligopolijos lemtų Europos energetikos ateitį.

Sektoriaus reguliavimas ES lygmeniu turi išspręsti daugelį problemų, kurios trukdo jam vystytis, skatinti viešąsias investicijas, demokratinę kontrolę ir stabilią investavimo sistemą, kurios palengvintų kolektyvinį ir demokratinį energetikos valdymą, siekiant iki 2050 m. sukurti visiškai nepriklausomą, efektyvų ir švarų energetikos modelį.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), írásban. – Üdvözlöm, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világelsővé tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiainportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyban hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

Fontos, hogy a tagállamok energiamixének meghatározása továbbra is nemzeti hatáskörbe tartozik, minden tagállam maga fejlesztheti megújuló energiaforrásait, és alakíthatja energiamixét. Az állami támogatásokkal kapcsolatos intézkedések számos tagállamban segítettek elő az uniós célkitűzések elérését, ugyanakkor döntő politikai lökés szükséges, ha további, még komolyabb eredményeket akarunk elérni. Ahhoz, hogy 2050-re egy hatékony és egy megújuló energiaforrásokon alapuló energiamodell jöjjön létre, az európai szintű szabályozásnak számos, a fejlődés útjában álló problémát kell megoldania: elő kell mozdítani a beruházásokat és azok demokratikus felügyeletet, valamint stabil beruházási kereket kell teremteni.

Simona Bonafè (S&D), per iscritto. – Lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili è un fattore fondamentale per il raggiungimento dei nostri obiettivi in campo climatico ed energetico, rappresentando un elemento chiave lungo il nostro percorso verso la decarbonizzazione.

L'Unione europea è complessivamente sulla buona strada per conseguire gli obiettivi del 2020 in materia di rinnovabili, ma sono necessari ulteriori sforzi da parte degli Stati membri che hanno registrato un maggiore ritardo. Tali sforzi risultano tanto più doverosi alla luce della progressiva diminuzione dei costi legati a tali energie, che, di pari passo ai progressi tecnologici in materia di produzione e stoccaggio, ha reso le energie rinnovabili sempre più competitive e il ricorso ad esse sempre più conveniente.

È importante dunque che il sostegno a tali fonti di energia prosegua oltre il 2020, mantenendo l'efficace combinazione di obiettivi vincolanti e piani di azione nazionali che ci hanno permesso di ottenere risultati tangibili sinora, in un quadro regolamentare ambizioso ed efficace, capace di lanciare segnali adeguati e di lungo termine agli investitori. La Commissione, da parte sua, deve continuare a monitorare attivamente i progressi nel campo delle rinnovabili, promuovendo la trasparenza, la coerenza e l'assenza di ostacoli tecnici nello sviluppo di queste fondamentali energie.

Marie-Christine Boutonnet (ENF), par écrit. – Même si je suis favorable au développement des énergies renouvelables, la tonalité nettement intégrationniste du rapport ne me permet pas de le voter en l'état.

J'ai donc voté contre.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), in writing. — This report was a positive and progressive one, which highlighted the need for a modal shift and for higher energy efficiency of renewables in order to improve the sustainability of transport. Furthermore, it criticises the promotion of biofuels for transport, which competes with the food production sector.

The report also analyses how Member States have done in achieving their renewable energy targets. There is currently an EU target of 20%, which is shared by Member States and broken down into national targets.

Ireland has fallen short of the heat energy target. While this is not acceptable, the report correctly expresses concern that some Member States may have to revise policies and instruments in order to achieve their targets.

For these reasons outlined above, I voted in favour.

Renata Briano (S&D), per iscritto. – Le energie rinnovabili sono il futuro dello sviluppo di lungo termine della UE. Dobbiamo attuare politiche economiche che le trasformino nel pilastro fondamentale del modello energetico dell'Unione europea. Abbiamo un compito storico: combattere il cambiamento climatico e ridurre la dipendenza dalle risorse energetiche del resto del mondo per ristrutturare il nostro modello produttivo e generare posti di lavoro di qualità, oltre a salvaguardare il nostro territorio e il futuro dei nostri discendenti. La transizione verso un modello di produzione energetica sostenibile costituisce anche una priorità sociale che non può essere affidata solo al mercato: dobbiamo capire che la regolamentazione e la partecipazione democratica sono necessarie per evitare gravi crisi sociali ed ambientali. Dobbiamo impedire che siano gli oligopoli energetici a definire il futuro dell'energia per l'Europa ma che si riesca invece

a garantire un modello energetico europeo integrato, efficiente e pulito per il 2050.

Steeve Briois (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport vise à dresser un constat sur l'état des progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables. Si le rapporteur a le mérite de soulever quelques problématiques pertinentes comme la situation des producteurs-consommateurs pour lesquels les règles administratives et fiscales devraient être simplifiées, je me suis opposé à ce texte, qui renforcera les dispositions législatives contraignantes au détriment des États membres. S'il est essentiel pour les générations futures d'investir dans les énergies renouvelables, il n'en demeure pas moins que le renforcement des contraintes administratives et juridiques dans l'Union exacerbera la concurrence déloyale actuelle que subissent nos entreprises. C'est pourquoi j'ai voté contre ce rapport.

Daniel Buda (PPE), în scris. – Dezvoltarea energiei din surse regenerabile are nevoie de o nouă abordare, care să o transforme în principalul pilon al modelului energetic din UE. Este o responsabilitate fundamentală pentru combaterea schimbărilor climatice, este o datorie istorică care trebuie îndeplinită. Tranziția către un model de producție durabilă reprezintă o prioritate socială ce nu poate fi soluționată doar de piață, iar participarea democratică și reglementarea sunt elemente necesare pentru evitarea externalităților de mediu și sociale grave, ceea ce nu ne permite ca oligopolurile energetice să definească viitorul energetic al Europei.

UE dispune de un instrument juridic care ajută la atingerea acestui obiectiv prin Directiva privind energia din surse regenerabile. Prin adoptarea acestei Directive, Europa a inițiat un proces de transformare a mixului energetic din statele membre, instrument juridic ce a permis stabilirea unui cadru favorabil pentru dezvoltarea sectorului energiei din surse regenerabile și a contribuit la dezvoltarea unui sector diversificat și variat.

Am acordat un vot favorabil raportului privind progresele înregistrate în domeniul energiei din surse regenerabile pentru că este nevoie de această sursă de energie regenerabilă pentru toate statele membre UE, atât pentru crearea unor progrese în ceea ce privește energia bio, dar și pentru combaterea schimbărilor climatice din UE și nu numai.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), in writing. – The shift towards renewable energies is of the utmost importance for the European Union's energy model. We need to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels in order to combat climate change effectively. With this, we must ensure the creation of quality jobs and the development of necessary technologies in order to ensure a successful and smooth energy transition.

The adoption of the Renewables Directive has provided a legal instrument to create a varied and diversified sector, through binding targets and clear rules on supervision and monitoring. This has allowed many of the Member States to work more effectively to achieve the targets set for 2020.

Since reducing greenhouse gas emissions also depends on achieving the goals in renewable energy, it is important that the measures adopted improve support mechanisms for renewable energy sources to ensure that consumers benefit from the technological advances. Thus, I voted for the resolution on the renewable energy progress report to ensure that we will reach the targets set for 2020 and those of the COP 21 Paris agreement.

Soledad Cabezon Ruiz (S&D), por escrito. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Alain Cadec (PPE), *par écrit*. – Une des priorités de l'Union est de réussir la transition énergétique dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Dans cette perspective, le développement des énergies renouvelables est très important. Un autre enjeu demeure de réduire la dépendance énergétique de l'Union européenne vis-à-vis des pays tiers. Les États membres disposent déjà d'un cadre juridique pour atteindre les objectifs fixés à l'horizon 2020. La régulation du secteur des énergies renouvelables doit favoriser un cadre stable pour l'investissement et un contrôle démocratique efficace, propices à leur développement. Le rapport soulève des questions essentielles sur l'avenir énergétique de l'Europe. J'ai donc voté en faveur de ce rapport.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione in questione per far sì che l'obiettivo sulle energie rinnovabili dell'UE – il 20% del consumo totale entro il 2020 — sia raggiunto da tutti i Stati membri dell'UE.

La Commissione dovrebbe garantire la piena attuazione della direttiva 2020 in materia di energie rinnovabili e dovrebbe presentare un quadro normativo ambizioso per il periodo successivo al 2020. Sottolineo, a questo proposito, la necessità di un quadro regolamentare stabile a lungo termine, che includa obiettivi in materia di energie rinnovabili a livello nazionale e dell'UE, permettendo di conseguire gli obiettivi climatici dell'UE a lungo termine (2050).

Ricordo che la richiesta del Parlamento europeo in relazione alla definizione di obiettivi vincolanti pari ad una quota di almeno il 30% di energia da fonti rinnovabili nel consumo energetico deve essere attuata per mezzo di obiettivi nazionali al fine di garantire la necessaria sicurezza per gli investitori e la necessaria certezza del diritto.

Ritengo inoltre che, alla luce del recente accordo della COP 21, sia auspicabile un'ambizione considerevolmente superiore con obiettivi chiari al fine di assicurare una posizione di leadership all'UE a livello mondiale in materia di rinnovabili.

Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, which analyses how Member States have done in achieving their renewable energy targets. There is currently an EU target of 20%, which is shared by Member States and broken down into national targets. Some Member States have been quicker to implement their targets than others. For instance, Ireland is set to fall short of its heat energy target, but to reach others. The report expresses concern that some Member States may have to revise policies and instruments to achieve their targets.

Overall, the report is quite good, criticising the promotion of biofuels for transport, which competes with the food production sector. The report highlights the need for a modal shift and for higher energy efficiency of renewables in order to improve the sustainability of transport. And it rightly criticises the reliance on market mechanisms to get us all to use renewables.

For these reasons I voted in favour.

David Casa (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report in order to show my support for the EU's energy efficiency target through the development of renewable energy. I especially welcome combining the EU objective for renewable energy with national targets. We have the obligation to combat climate change and I am glad to see all Member States have made efforts in this fight. The EU is on the path to shift from traditional energy resources to renewable energy and, in order to be successful, we need a more consistent framework at EU level.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della relazione di iniziativa sui progressi in materia di energie rinnovabili. Il rapporto affronta una revisione critica del quadro derivante dalla Direttiva 2009/28/EC e fornisce spunti per utilizzare il modello energetico decentralizzato e democratizzato per implementare la transizione energetica e ricavarne i relativi risultati in termini di indipendenza, efficienza e sostenibilità.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), *γραπτώς*. – Στηρίζουμε την έκθεση και υπογραμμίζουμε για άλλη μια φορά πως η ανάπτυξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας απαιτεί έναν νέο προσανατολισμό που να τις καθιστά τον θεμελιώδη πυλώνα του ενεργειακού μοντέλου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Έχουμε την πρωταρχική ευθύνη για την καταπολέμηση της κλιματικής αλλαγής, καθώς βρισκόμαστε αντιμέτωποι με μια ιστορική δέσμευση. Οφείλουμε να μειώσουμε την εξάρτηση από ενεργειακούς πόρους του υπόλοιπου κόσμου, αν θέλουμε να υποστηρίξουμε το παραγωγικό μοντέλο μας και να δημιουργήσουμε ποιοτικές θέσεις εργασίας, με αιχμή του δόρατος την ανάπτυξη τεχνολογιών στρατηγικής σημασίας για την ενεργειακή μετάβαση.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), *γραπτώς*. – Ψηφίσαμε σήμερα την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόοδο στον τομέα των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Είναι νομίζω προφανές πως ανάλογες εκθέσεις προωθούν τις διαδικασίες επιλογής νέων πηγών ενέργειας, φιλικότερες προς το περιβάλλον, και πιθανώς προς την επανεκκίνηση της οικονομίας, μέσω της δημιουργίας προοπτικών επενδύσεων και θέσεων εργασίας. Ως εκ τούτου θεωρώ πως πρόκειται για θετική προσπάθεια και γι' αυτό τον λόγο ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Per quanto al momento le fonti fossili siano ancora economicamente insostituibili, lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili è strategico per il futuro di un Europa che non dispone di petrolio ma dispone di sole e vento. I progressi compiuti finora sono incoraggianti e i cittadini, se opportunamente incentivati, reagiscono positivamente mostrando apertura alle nuove tecnologie. Tuttavia, è importante che questi incentivi non costituiscano un peso eccessivo sulle tasche delle comunità e che siano sempre utilizzati in maniera trasparente di modo che le imprese sappiano quanto costa ciascuna tecnologia, anche in termini di imposte e soldi pubblici che potrebbero essere utilizzati anche per altri obiettivi.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this report, which examines Member States' policies for implementing renewable energy initiatives.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. – O desenvolvimento de fontes de energia renováveis exige uma nova abordagem que as transforme no pilar fundamental do modelo energético da União Europeia.

Temos a responsabilidade de lutar contra as alterações climáticas e reduzir a nossa dependência dos recursos energéticos provenientes do resto do mundo para assim podermos organizar o nosso modelo de produção, criar empregos de qualidade e estarmos na linha da frente no desenvolvimento de tecnologias para a transição energética.

A transição para um modelo de produção de energia sustentável é, pois, uma prioridade social que não pode ser confiada apenas ao mercado, temos de compreender que a regulação e a participação democrática são necessárias para evitar externalidades sociais e ambientais.

O desenvolvimento de energias renováveis contribuirá para garantir a segurança e a soberania energéticas, pôr termo à pobreza energética e fomentar o desenvolvimento económico e a liderança tecnológica da UE, combatendo as alterações climáticas.

A futura estratégia de I&D deve centra-se em facilitar o desenvolvimento de redes e cidades inteligentes. A eletrificação dos transportes, o carregamento inteligente de veículos e as tecnologias «veículo-rede» contribuirão para a melhoria da eficiência energética e para a absorção do potencial das fontes de energias renováveis.

Pelo exposto, apoiei o presente relatório.

Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (PPE), *skriftlig*. – I dag röstade vi för betänkandet om lägesrapporten om förnybar energi. Förnybar energi är en förutsättning för att nå miljö- och klimatmålen och för det krävs en energimarknad byggd på en öppen och fri konkurrens, marknadspriser och incitament att investera i ny teknologi och transmission.

I betänkandet som parlamentet antog finns förslag på ett bindande mål om minst 30 procent förnybar energi med nationella delmål. Vi anser dock att det är, och bör i fortsättningen även vara, medlemsstaternas exklusiva kompetens att råda över sin egen energimix.

I betänkandet finns också en punkt som pekar ut bioenergi från skogsbruk som potentiellt skadligt för miljön och klimatet. Sverige har lång och bred erfarenhet av att bruka skog på ett effektivt och miljövänligt vis, som tillvaratar skogens resurser med minsta möjliga klimat- och miljöpåverkan. Därför delar vi inte betänkandets problemformulering, utan ser tvärtom det hållbara skogsbruket som en del av arbetet med att minska utsläppen.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un importante respaldo al desarrollo del sector de las energías renovables y una importante llamada a los estados miembros que no están cumpliendo con los objetivos de la Directiva. El informe se hace eco del avance del sector pero también de los problemas que encuentran en determinados estados miembros como el «impuesto al sol», la retroactividad de las medidas de apoyo, las dificultades en el acceso a la red, etc. además el informe hace referencia a la necesidad de generar empleo de calidad y de incluir a los sindicatos y la sociedad civil en el desarrollo de estas energías. Así mismo se hacen proposiciones específicas sobre la definición de prosumers, el apoyo al cambio modal de transporte, el desarrollo de tecnologías de refrigeración renovables, la inversión pública en el sector, etc. Esto convierte al texto en una importante referencia para el desarrollo de la próxima directiva, es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), per iscritto. – L'obiettivo del 20% del consumo totale di energie rinnovabili entro il 2020, è implementato in maniera differente a seconda degli Stati Membri. Per questo sostengo la richiesta di una piena attuazione della legislazione per raggiungere gli obiettivi in maniera uniforme sull'intero continente. Allo stesso tempo, sostengo il rilancio degli obiettivi per il 2050, verso un modello energetico sovrano, efficiente e pulito. Dobbiamo essere ambiziosi. Abbiamo il dovere e la responsabilità di combattere il cambiamento climatico, riducendo la dipendenza da risorse che siamo costretti ad importare dal resto del mondo. Dobbiamo garantire sempre più una produzione sostenibile e autoctona delle energie, un elemento fondamentale per il rilancio della nostra economia, in funzione della creazione di posti di lavoro. La direttiva UE sulle rinnovabili è uno strumento giuridico che va sostenuto e attuato, con obiettivi vincolanti e norme chiare. Ma spesso non basta. Dobbiamo agire a un livello più basso, sensibilizzando e stimolando l'attivo contributo dei nostri cittadini e dei consumatori, attraverso campagne e incentivi che possano renderli veramente protagonisti di una stagione di rilancio della sostenibilità del nostro continente.

Andi Cristea (S&D), în scris. – Progresele tehnologice în materie de producție și stocare a energiei provenite din surse regenerabile, conștientizarea necesității de a reduce impactul asupra mediului înconjurător în vederea dezvoltării durabile, dar și nevoia de a crește autonomia statelor membre într-o perioadă în care energia este folosită în politicile de constrângere indică importanța generalizării utilizării acestor resurse. În acest context, consider că Uniunea Europeană și statele membre trebuie să fixeze obiective mai ambițioase în materie de climat și energie, depășind cota stabilită de Consiliul European la 27% din energie obținută din surse regenerabile în consumul de energie până în 2030.

Am votat în favoarea acestui raport, dorind să subliniez importanța diversificării surselor de energie în vederea constituirii unei veritabile uniuni energetice la nivel european. Monitorizarea responsabilă, eficientă și transparentă a punerii în aplicare a legislației europene existente, încurajarea investițiilor publice și a controlului democratic asupra sectorului energetic vor permite dispariția oligopolurilor energetice și vor asigura existența unui model energetic autonom, durabil și eficient.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – Przyjęta w 2009 r. dyrektywa w sprawie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych wymaga przedstawiania co dwa lata sprawozdania z postępów. Sprawozdanie z postępów, które jest obecnie przedmiotem debaty, stanowi śródkresowy przegląd tej dyrektywy i zawiera wstępną jej ocenę w ramach REFIT. W sprawozdaniu Komisji Europejskiej stwierdzono, że dwadzieścia pięć państw członkowskich jest na dobrej drodze do osiągnięcia wiążących celów w zakresie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych, a pięć już osiągnęło lub za chwilę osiągnie swoje cele. Sprawozdanie INI pozytywnie odnosi się do ścisłej koordynacji między państwami członkowskimi i regionami, co współgra z oceną Komisji, zgodnie z którą należy lepiej wykorzystywać mechanizmy współpracy, jeżeli cele w zakresie energii odnawialnej mają zostać osiągnięte. W sprawozdaniu INI stwierdzono wprawdzie, że określanie koszyka energetycznego państw członkowskich należy do kompetencji krajowych, jednak zawarto w nim również kilka odniesień do wiążących celów krajowych i opodatkowania, skrytykowano brak zaleceń dla poszczególnych krajów, opowiedziano się za większą rolą Komisji w monitorowaniu działań państw członkowskich poprzez zwiększenie możliwości nadzoru, a także zaproponowano podwyższenie celów UE w zakresie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych. Z wieloma punktami omawianego sprawozdania nie mogę się zgodzić, dlatego zgłoszowałem przeciwko przyjęciu sprawozdania.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), *in writing*. – The use of renewable energy in the Member States is an essential element in working towards a cleaner environment which is sustainable and which takes into account the health of our citizens. The progress made under the Europe 2020 strategy in meeting the 20% renewable energy target represents a step in the right direction. However, in order to have sustainable use of energy we must ensure more ambitious targets, leaving room for manoeuvre for small Member States like Malta, which may have certain specificities.

Rosa D'Amato (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – È urgente giungere all'abbandono della dipendenza da fonti fossili, per agevolare una diffusa autoproduzione e l' autosufficienza energetica.

L'impegno assunto dall'UE per l'abbattimento delle emissioni di CO₂, ma anche la necessaria drastica riduzione di inquinanti come metalli pesanti e diossine presenti nell'aria, nell'acqua e nel suolo, dovrebbe obbligare tutti gli Stati dell'UE a mettere tempestivamente in pratica misure efficaci. Ne va della nostra salute e del nostro ambiente, ma anche delle nostre risorse finanziarie, visti i costi sanitari e sociali di un ambiente devastato proprio dalla dipendenza dalle fonti fossili come il petrolio e i suoi derivati, il carbone, il gas.

Per una rapida transizione servono ricerca, innovazione e un utilizzo effettivo ed efficace di tutti i fondi europei disponibili per l'efficienza energetica e la produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili. E bisogna evitare il freno di riforme strutturali che si traducono, di fatto, in politiche di austerità o tagli insensati.

In sintesi, le città e le regioni europee devono realizzare un cambiamento di paradigma, ma affinché ciò avvenga bisogna che vi siano impegni precisi e vincolanti ad affidarsi a un mix energetico basato su fonti realmente rinnovabili. Per queste ragioni il mio voto al report è favorevole.

Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), *în scris*. – Consider că este important schimbul celor mai bune practici cu privire la politicile naționale în domeniul energiei din surse regenerabile pentru a promova adoptarea acestora în cadrul unui model european mai convergent, favorizând cooperarea sporită și coordonarea între statele membre.

Andor Deli (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Parlament üdvözlí, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világszerte tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiaimportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyban hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

Fontos, hogy a tagállamok energiamixének meghatározása továbbra is nemzeti hatáskörbe tartozik, minden tagállam maga fejlesztheti megújuló energiaforrásait, és alakíthatja energiamixét. Az állami támogatásokkal kapcsolatos intézkedések számos tagállamban segítettek elő az uniós célkitűzések elérését, ugyanakkor döntő politikai lökés szükséges, ha további, még komolyabb eredményeket akarunk elérni. Ahhoz, hogy 2050-re egy hatékony és egy megújuló energiaforrásokon alapuló energiamodell jöjjön létre, az európai szintű szabályozásnak számos, a fejlődés útjában álló problémát kell megoldania: elő kell mozdítani a beruházásokat és azok demokratikus felügyeletet, valamint stabil beruházási kereteket kell teremteni.

Jean-Paul Denanot (S&D), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport donne la température de l'état d'avancement en matière d'équipement et de production des énergies renouvelables qui se résume dans l'expression «le verre à moitié plein et à moitié vide». Par ailleurs, on peut regretter qu'il ne s'accompagne pas de recommandations pays par pays et reste à un niveau méta très général. Pour ma part, je suis très attentif à la question de l'investissement dans la recherche, notamment sur la question du stockage de l'électricité, qui est un instrument de gestion des énergies renouvelables. Cela passe par une implication des autorités locales, une simplification du cadre administratif et des procédures de financement et la mise en place d'équipements intelligents susceptibles de démontrer aux consommateurs finaux l'intérêt de basculer dans les énergies propres.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), *par écrit*. – Certes, ce rapport n'oublie pas de faire référence aux usagers en situation de précarité énergétique, à l'importance de la formation comme enjeu clef de ces politiques. Il souhaite en outre exclure les investissements publics des objectifs de déficits et associer les citoyens aux plans nationaux pour les énergies renouvelables. Enfin, il se penche sur la situation des producteurs-consommateurs, pour lesquels les règles administratives et fiscales devraient être simplifiées. Toutefois, il s'agit d'un texte fédéraliste qui «invite la Commission à renforcer son rôle» et qui renferme autant d'objectifs contraignants, de propositions législatives et de contraintes pour les États. Pour ces raisons, j'ai voté contre.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), *в писмена форма*. – Гласувах против доклада относно напредъка в областта на енергията от възобновяеми източници, тъй като в този доклад се настоява за по-малко участие на държавите членки и повече регулации чрез законодателството на ЕС. Смятам за недопустимо да се твърди, че преходът към модел на устойчиво производство на енергия е обществен приоритет, който не може да бъде поверен единствено на пазара, защото можем да дадем за пример Финландия, където именно пазарът принуждава производителите да насърчават иновации в областта на възобновяемите източници.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), *γραφτως*. – Καταψηφίζουμε. Αν και η έκθεση περιέχει πάρα πολλά καλά στοιχεία, δίνει στην Επιτροπή υπερεξουσίες, πράγμα που δεν μπορούμε να αποδεχούμε.

Norbert Erdős (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Parlament üdvözli, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világszerte tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiaimportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyban hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

Fontos, hogy a tagállamok energiamixének meghatározása továbbra is nemzeti hatáskörbe tartozik, minden tagállam maga fejlesztheti megújuló energiaforrásait, és alakíthatja energiamixét. Az állami támogatásokkal kapcsolatos intézkedések számos tagállamban segítettek elő az uniós célkitűzések elérését, ugyanakkor döntő politikai lökés szükséges, ha további, még komolyabb eredményeket akarunk elérni. Ahhoz, hogy 2050-re egy hatékony és egy megújuló energiaforrásokon alapuló energiamodell jöjjön létre, az európai szintű szabályozásnak számos, a fejlődés útjában álló problémát kell megoldania: elő kell mozdítani a beruházásokat és azok demokratikus felügyeletet, valamint stabil beruházási kereteket kell teremteni.

Eleonora Evi (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore del rapporto di iniziativa sui progressi in materia di energie rinnovabili perché, oltre a contenere una serie di importanti raccomandazioni per la nuova direttiva sulle rinnovabili per il 2030, fa riferimento ai «prosumer», un nuovo e rivoluzionario modello di produzione e consumo di energia che vede un pieno coinvolgimento del cittadino in modelli di cooperazione e di autoproduzione. Un importante passo verso la transizione energetica a cui fa riferimento il Movimento 5 Stelle, un modello energetico decentralizzato e democratico che garantisce indipendenza, efficienza e sostenibilità.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – A regulação do setor a nível europeu deve resolver os numerosos problemas que travam o seu desenvolvimento, favorecendo o investimento público, o controlo democrático e um quadro estável para o investimento, a fim de facilitar a gestão coletiva e democrática da energia e garantir um modelo energético plenamente soberano, eficiente e limpo para 2050.

A transição para um modelo de produção de energia sustentável é uma prioridade social que não pode ser confiada apenas ao mercado. Pelo contrário, temos de compreender que a regulação e a participação democrática são necessárias para evitar graves externalidades sociais e ambientais.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre, car la tonalité nettement intégrationniste du rapport ne permet pas de le voter en l'état.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – As intenções da relatora foram em parte frustradas por um contexto difícil, que decorre da composição e da relação de forças existente neste Parlamento. As alterações introduzidas à versão inicial do relatório não o melhoraram, pelo contrário. Apesar disso, o relatório conserva aspetos positivos que nos levam a apoiá-lo.

O relatório refere, e bem, que a transição para um modelo de produção de energia sustentável é uma prioridade social que não pode ser confiada apenas ao mercado. Pelo contrário, temos de compreender que a regulação e a participação democrática são necessárias para evitar graves externalidades sociais e ambientais. Devemos impedir que os oligopólios energéticos possam definir o futuro energético da Europa. Acrescentaríamos que uma condição dessa regulação democrática do sector é a propriedade e gestão públicas, democráticas, do mesmo.

Essa regulação do sector, na qual devem pesar decisivamente as opções soberanas de cada Estado-Membro, deve resolver os numerosos problemas que travam o desenvolvimento das energias renováveis. Deve ser favorecido o investimento público, o controlo democrático e um quadro estável para o investimento, a fim de facilitar a gestão coletiva e democrática da energia e garantir um modelo energético plenamente soberano, eficiente e limpo, segundo o relatório, até 2050.

O relatório defende um impulso político ambicioso para cumprir os objetivos fixados.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della presente relazione poiché ritengo che lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili esiga un approccio differente che le trasformi nel pilastro fondamentale del modello energetico dell'Unione europea. La nostra responsabilità fondamentale, in qualità di rappresentanti dei cittadini europei, è quella di combattere il cambiamento climatico, un dovere storico che si ha l'obbligo di non trascurare. Diviene di fondamentale importanza, inoltre, ridurre la dipendenza dalle risorse energetiche del resto del mondo se vogliamo strutturare il nostro modello produttivo e generare posti di lavoro di qualità, oltre a guidare lo sviluppo di tecnologie strategiche per transizione energetica.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *pisomne*. – Európska únia sa veľmi aktívne zapojila do boja proti zmene klímy. Neoddeliteľnou súčasťou záväzkov Európskej únie v predmetnej oblasti je aj rozvoj obnoviteľných zdrojov, ktorý si však bude v budúcnosti vyžadovať nový prístup a nevyhnutné investície, ktoré môžu prispieť k vytváraniu kvalitných pracovných miest pre občanov členských štátov Európskej únie. Ak máme splniť ambiciózne ciele do roku 2020, potrebujeme pridať v mnohých oblastiach a dať nový politický impulz vo viacerých členských štátoch.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Voto contrario alla relazione che è confusa e con una eccessiva liberalizzazione si rischia di indebolire la sovranità.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραπτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την πρόοδο στον τομέα των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Αν και η έκθεση περιέχει πάρα πολλά καλά στοιχεία, δίνει στην Επιτροπή υπερεξουσίες, πράγμα που δεν μπορώ να αποδεχθώ.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Continued investment in renewables requires ambitious leadership and commitment and a long-term, stable and reliable policy framework consistent with the climate commitments made by the EU in Paris. In order to achieve our goals, the Commission has to ensure full implementation of the 2020 Renewable Energy Directive and put forward an ambitious post-2020 legislative framework.

The fact that the European Council decided to abandon the binding national targets and set a relatively low target of 27% for 2030, binding purely at European level, is highly disappointing. I support an EU that is on track to meet its 2020 targets thanks to the use of binding national targets. I will not accept getting rid of these targets and I will not accept the European Council's low 2030 target.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Elfogadtam Bermejo képviselőtársam jelentését a megújuló energiáról. Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világszerte tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiaimportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyon hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

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Iratxe García Pérez (S&D), por escrito. – Apoyo la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo -más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo- favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030 a través de objetivos nacionales vinculantes. Objetivo no compartido por el Partido Popular Europeo (PPE) y el Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer ante esta cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

A pesar del voto en contra del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, lamento que se haya rechazado una enmienda que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas a favor de los consumidores vulnerables, es decir, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando a la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. resulta sorprendente, una vez más contra el sentir general de esta cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), per iscritto. – La lotta al cambiamento climatico è fatta di impegni concreti cui l'UE e gli Stati membri devono dare seguito anno dopo anno. È molto importante pertanto monitorare il progresso compiuto nel campo delle rinnovabili, che sono uno dei settori centrali per realizzare gli obiettivi prefissati a Parigi alla COP21. Alcuni paesi manifestano purtroppo ancora un ritardo netto in questo percorso. Condivido pertanto la richiesta della relazione che oggi votiamo di far salire l'impegno politico complessivo della Commissione, proprio per vigilare sull'azione degli Stati e soprattutto per introdurre strumenti concreti – ad esempio un meccanismo finanziario ad hoc – volti a ridurre i costi del capitale e i rischi relativi ai progetti di energia rinnovabile

Elena Gentile (S&D), per iscritto. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione del PE sui progressi compiuti nel campo delle energie rinnovabili perché ritengo che lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili necessiti un nuovo approccio che le trasformi nel pilastro fondamentale del modello energetico dell'Unione europea.

Confrontata al cambiamento climatico, l'UE deve ridurre la dipendenza dalle risorse energetiche del resto del mondo se davvero vuole strutturare il proprio modello produttivo e generare posti di lavoro di qualità, oltre a guidare lo sviluppo di tecnologie strategiche per la transizione verso un modello di produzione energetica sostenibile, che costituisce una priorità sociale. Tale transizione non può essere affidata unicamente al mercato, ma deve essere regolata dall'UE in modo che non si crei concorrenza sleale fra gli Stati membri dell'UE, che comporterebbe dei danni ai cittadini, sotto forma di esternalità sociali e ambientali.

Ritengo che l'attuale combinazione di obiettivi nazionali vincolanti, piani di azione nazionali per le energie rinnovabili e controllo biennale, abbia costituito il fattore trainante per lo sviluppo delle capacità di produrre energia rinnovabile negli Stati membri.

È necessario creare un quadro regolamentare che rispetti il principio di proporzionalità, che riconosca un ruolo fondamentale nella transizione energetica alle autorità locali, alle comunità, alle famiglie e ai singoli individui.

Arne Gericke (ECR), schriftlich. – Ich habe gegen den vorgelegten Fortschrittsbericht „Erneuerbare Energiequellen“ gestimmt – nicht, weil ich gegen erneuerbare Energien bin. Im Gegenteil. Ich bin für den weiteren, ambitionierten Ausbau regenerativer Energien – sie müssen Grundlage einer nachhaltigen Energieversorgung sein. Dabei aber hat die EU-Rahmengesetzgebung nicht immer konstruktiv mitgewirkt. Ich erinnere etwa an das „Ausbooten“ der europäischen Biosprit-Bewegung. Hier wurde Landwirten ohne Grund ein wichtiges neues Marktsegment genommen.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich unterstütze den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien. Er reduziert unter anderem unsere Abhängigkeit von fossilen Brennstoffen. Einzelstaatliche Zielvorgaben und eine Zielvorgabe von 30 % sind jedoch nicht zielführend. Hier müssen wir Überregulierung vermeiden. Im Grundsatzpapier der EVP-Fraktion haben wir uns stattdessen für eine Zielvorgabe von max. 27 % auf Ebene der EU (nicht der Mitgliedstaaten) ausgesprochen.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor del informe de Paloma López Bermejo porque establece buenas bases para la revisión de la Directiva relativa a las energías renovables. Subraya las posibilidades de creación de empleos, los beneficios para la economía, al igual que la centralidad del desarrollo de las renovables para luchar contra el cambio climático. Fija objetivos ambiciosos y pide que sean vinculantes. También promueve el autoconsumo y la democratización del sistema energético.

Maria Grapini (S&D), *în scris*. – Țara mea, România, este pe primul loc la procentul energiei verzi în total energie produsă, dar consumatorii au avut un cost ridicat și nu este normal să transferăm toată presiunea pe consumatorul final. Nu am susținut acest raport deoarece nu cuprinde prevederi clare privind modalitatea de protecție a consumatorilor la creșterea prețului energiei verzi, nu se prevede clar implicarea FEIS în cercetarea pentru tehnologii moderne pentru eficientizare și decarbonizare. De asemenea, nu sunt de acord cu faptul că nu s-a ținut cont de condițiile specifice din fiecare țară și nici de cerințele de subsidiaritate în stabilirea mixului energetic.

Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report. The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, thereby realising the 2015 Paris Agreement, depends on achieving EU climate and energy policy goals in the field of renewable energy. The report also highlights the fact that the current 2020 energy strategy and energy goals will be insufficient to reach the 2050 decarbonisation target, and it therefore calls on the Commission to present a more ambitious climate and energy package for 2030, increasing the EU target for renewable energy sources to at least 30%, to be implemented by means of individual national targets.

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

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Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Υπερψηφίσαμε την έκθεση για τον λόγο ότι προκρίνει τη δημιουργία μιας ολοκληρωμένης στρατηγικής για την ανάπτυξη και στήριξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας ως θεμελιώδους πυλώνας της ενεργειακής πολιτικής της ΕΕ. Κάνει επίσης αναφορά στην ενεργειακή φτώχεια καθώς και στην ενίσχυση/στήριξη μικρών παραγωγών των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report as I have no problems with the outcome.

Hans-Olaf Henkel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um eine Zwischenbilanz der Implementierung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aus dem Jahr 2009. Er enthält einige gute Elemente, z. B. den Aufruf, EU-weit enger zusammenzuarbeiten, und dass erneuerbare Energien kostenwirksam gefördert und wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen. Allerdings enthält der Bericht auch Elemente, die weit über den vorgesehenen Umfang hinausgehen. Zum Beispiel schlägt der Berichtersteller steuerliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Erneuerbaren Energien vor oder eine stärkere Überwachung und Kontrolle seitens der EU-Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird das vom Rat beschlossene erneuerbare-Energien-Ziel in dem Bericht von 27% auf 30% angehoben. ALFA ist der Ansicht, dass wir uns an den vom Rat beschlossenen Zielen orientieren sollten und dass Entscheidungen bezüglich der Implementierung von Beschlüssen den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen sein sollten. Deshalb habe ich den Bericht abgelehnt.

György Hölvényi (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Parlament üdvözli, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világszerte tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiaimportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyban hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

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Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport care încurajează dezvoltarea energiei regenerabile la nivel european, care, prin susținerea cadrului juridic la nivelul Uniunii Europene, ar încuraja investițiile publice, controlul democratic și ar facilita gestionarea colectivă și democratică a acestui sector. Se dorește asigurarea unui model strategic pe deplin suveran și eficient pentru 2050.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o provedbi Direktive o energetskej učinkovitosti jer ona stavlja naglasak na povećanje energetske učinkovitosti i štednju energije kao ključne faktore za zaštitu okoliša i klime, jačanje gospodarske konkurentnosti, otvaranje radnih mjesta, sigurnost opskrbe energijom te borbu protiv energetske siromaštva. Energetska učinkovitost iznimno je važna za smanjenje i naše ovisnosti o uvozu. Europska unija trenutno dobro napreduje u pogledu ispunjavanja svojih klimatskih i energetske ciljeve za 2020. koji su smanjenje emisija ugljičnog dioksida, povećanje udjela obnovljivih izvora energije i poboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti, te bi u tome trebala zadržati svoju vodeću ulogu u svijetu. Ovom Direktivom potaknuti su brojni pozitivni pomaci u državama članicama, ali loša provedba koči ostvarenje njenog punog potencijala.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le rapport est pertinent, car il n'oublie pas les usagers en situation de précarité énergétique et consacre presque un paragraphe à la formation. Il veut exclure les investissements publics des objectifs de déficits et envisage d'associer les citoyens aux plans nationaux pour les énergies renouvelables. Par ailleurs, le rapport revient, à plusieurs reprises, sur la situation des producteurs-consommateurs, pour lesquels les règles administratives et fiscales devraient être simplifiées. Toutefois, l'ingérence de la Commission au sein du rapport est accablante. Toute la première partie n'est composée que d'objectifs contraignants, de propositions législatives et de contraintes pour les États.

Bien que je reconnaisse l'intérêt des énergies renouvelables, la tonalité contraignante du rapport m'a poussé à voter contre le texte.

Ramón Jáuregui Atondo (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Benedek Jávor (Verts/ALE), *in writing*. – Parliament called for a higher ambition level and for a 2030 EU renewable energy target of 30%, in line with the Union's commitments (the Paris climate agreement, decarbonisation and achieving a 100% RES based economy by 2050). Importantly, this target should be delivered through national binding targets.

The EP also called for a consumer-centric approach, strengthened oversight by the Commission and assistance for local operators, as well as targeted measures for low-income consumers. These measures would bring stability for investors and ensure an adequate level of investments; and technological lock-in, incompatible with the EU's long-term goals, can be avoided. Therefore, I supported the report with my vote.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Ačkoliv má EU dobře nakročeno ke splnění cílů ohledně obnovitelné energie do roku 2020, ukazuje se, že mnoho členských států by mělo posílit své politiky a nástroje, aby zajistily splnění určených cílů. Zpráva se zaměřuje na významnost sdílení osvědčených postupů či nutnost vyhodnocování vlivu obnovitelných zdrojů na ceny, zejména pro domácnosti. Zdůrazňuje potřebu evropské legislativy ohledně pravidel trhu s energií, stabilní a efektivní režimy podpory obnovitelných zdrojů pro dlouhodobé investice, které jsou též přizpůsobené národním potřebám a okolnostem. Péče o životní prostředí je opravdu globální problém. Zprávu volající po efektivnější spolupráci a účinné koordinaci uvnitř členských států i mezi nimi jsem rád podpořil.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport, qui fait le point sur les progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables. Le rapport estime que, dans son ensemble, l'Union est en bonne voie pour atteindre les objectifs 2020 (20 % d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre, 20 % d'énergie de sources renouvelables et 20 % d'efficacité énergétique). Si les énergies renouvelables continuaient à se développer, le rapport souligne que l'Union pourrait économiser à terme jusqu'à 30 milliards d'euros par an.

Εύα Καϊλή (S&D), *γραφτως*. – Υπερψήφισα την έκθεση προόδου στον τομέα των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας, καθώς θεωρώ ότι η ανάπτυξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας απαιτεί έναν νέο προσανατολισμό που να τις καθιστά τον θεμελιώδη πυλώνα του ενεργειακού μοντέλου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Η μετάβαση σε ένα βιώσιμο πρότυπο παραγωγής ενέργειας αποτελεί κοινωνική προτεραιότητα που δεν μπορεί να αντιμετωπιστεί μόνο από την αγορά.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Förderung von Energie aus erneuerbaren Quellen ist zwar wichtig, doch dieser Bericht stellt Forderungen, die weit über das Maß der Kompetenzen der EU und technischen Möglichkeiten hinausgehen. Zu Ende gedacht würde die Umsetzung mancher Forderungen in diesem Bericht indirekte Subventionen von Erneuerbaren schaffen, und das für eigentlich schon marktreife Technologien. Erneuerbare Energien mit Energiearmut zu verknüpfen ist außerdem verfehlt: Sozialpolitik ist eine Angelegenheit der Mitgliedstaaten, während die Integration Erneuerbarer ein technisches Problem ist, das durch viele Umlagen und Subventionen zurzeit gelöst wird. Aus diesen Überlegungen und aufgrund meiner Unterstützung für die erneuerbaren Energien enthalte ich mich zu diesem Bericht.

Jaromír Kohlíček (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Obnovitelné zdroje jsou vděčným tématem filozofických diskusí. Radikální požadavky na 100% pokrytí energetických potřeb v nejbližších letech jsou technicky zdůvodněny filozofickými úvahami a skutečný technik zůstává v úžasu nad tím, jak je vše jednoduché. Jestliže budeme brát vážně snahu o zabezpečení na jedné straně přísné ochrany životního prostředí a na druhé straně zajištění 100 % energetických potřeb obnovitelnými zdroji, dostáváme se do obtížně řešitelných rozporů. Větrné parky mění zásadně ráz krajiny, ať jsou již umístěny kdekoliv. Několikahektarové fotovoltaiky výrazně ovlivňují místní proudění vzduchu, stejně jako velké projekty údolních vodních nádrží. Přitom denní a roční rozložení spotřeby elektrické energie nikterak nekoresponduje se slunečním svitem, větrnými ani srážkovými poměry. Zbývá nám tedy ještě biomasa a geotermální energie. Když porovnáme možnosti jednotlivých obnovitelných zdrojů, zjišťujeme, že na jedné straně existuje velké množství administrativních překážek (zejména při připojování malých fotovoltaik a instalaci malých vodních elektráren) a na druhé straně jsou zde oprávněné obavy provozovatelů velkých elektrizačních sítí o zajištění stability celého systému. Elektrická energie se totiž velmi obtížně skladuje. Těmito problémy se ovšem zpráva nezabývá. Protože kromě optimistických perspektiv je ve zprávě i řada pozitivních podnětů a předpokládám, že ty nejfantastičtější návrhy nebudou přijaty, podporuji přijetí dané zprávy.

Bernd Kölmel (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um eine Zwischenbilanz der Umsetzung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aus dem Jahr 2009. Er enthält einige gute Elemente, z. B. den Aufruf, EU-weit enger zusammenzuarbeiten, und dass erneuerbare Energien kostenwirksam gefördert und wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen. Allerdings enthält der Bericht auch Elemente, die weit über den vorgesehenen Umfang hinausgehen. Zum Beispiel schlägt der Berichtester steuerliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung von erneuerbaren Energien vor oder eine stärkere Überwachung und Kontrolle seitens der EU-Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird das vom Rat beschlossene erneuerbare-Energien-Ziel in dem Bericht von 27% auf 30% angehoben. ALFA ist der Ansicht, dass wir uns an den vom Rat beschlossenen Zielen orientieren sollten und dass Entscheidungen bezüglich der Umsetzung von Beschlüssen den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen sein sollten. Deshalb habe ich den Bericht abgelehnt.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Dne 23. 6. 2016 jsme na dodatečném plenárním zasedání Evropského parlamentu v Bruselu hlasovali o zprávě o pokroku v oblasti energie z obnovitelných zdrojů. Jednalo se o zprávu Výboru pro průmysl, výzkum a energetiku. Této problematice se však dlouhodobě věnuje také můj Výbor pro životní prostředí, veřejné zdraví a bezpečnost potravin. Proto jsem na předložený text měla od začátku velmi kritický názor. Na začátek musím říci, že jsem se při hlasování zdržela. I když dokument nakonec obsahoval několik dobrých věcí, jako je zmínění problematiky energetické chudoby nebo tlak na podporu nových generací biopaliv na úkor té staré a závadné, nemohla jsem jej s čistým svědomím podpořit. Dle mého názoru je zpráva nevyvážená, výrazným způsobem totiž např. adoruje využívání biomasy, u které již dnes všichni víme, že její masové používání v energetice je zcela neudržitelné, jak co se týče emisí, tak co se týče jejího negativního vlivu na potravinovou soběstačnost. Z celého textu pak vychází, že jediným správným zdrojem pro budoucnost energetiky jsou právě jen zdroje obnovitelné, což je neakceptovatelné. Zpráva opomíjí jakkoliv zmínit jadernou energetiku, s jejíž existencí již do budoucna vůbec nepočítá. Opomíjí i jakýkoliv možný průlom v tomto odvětví, např. co se týče studené fúze.

Ádám Kósa (PPE), írásban. – Az Európai Parlament üdvözli, hogy a Bizottság elkötelezett amellett, hogy világszerte tegye Európát a megújuló energia területén. Ez nem csak iparpolitikai szempontból szükségszerű, de hozzájárulhat bizonyos közép- és kelet-európai tagállamok egyetlen fosszilisüzemanyag-szállítótól való függésének csökkentéséhez, ezáltal lehetővé válhat a világ legnagyobb energiaimportőrének számító Európa energiafüggetlensége és energiabiztonsága. Ezen felül, felelősségünk, hogy tegyünk az éghajlatváltozás ellen, amihez nagyban hozzájárulhat a megújuló energiaforrások arányának növekedése. A nemzeti célokon alapuló energiaforrásokkal kapcsolatos politika hosszú távon garantálja az ipar és a befektetők számára az áramtermelési kapacitásba, valamint a szállítási és elosztási infrastruktúrába való befektetéshez szükséges biztonságot.

Fontos, hogy a tagállamok energiamixének meghatározása továbbra is nemzeti hatáskörbe tartozik, minden tagállam maga fejlesztheti megújuló energiaforrásait, és alakíthatja energiamixét. Az állami támogatásokkal kapcsolatos intézkedések számos tagállamban segítettek elő az uniós célkitűzések elérését, ugyanakkor döntő politikai lökés szükséges, ha további, még komolyabb eredményeket akarunk elérni. Ahhoz, hogy 2050-re egy hatékony és egy megújuló energiaforrásokon alapuló energiamodell jöjjön létre, az európai szintű szabályozásnak számos, a fejlődés útjában álló problémát kell megoldania: elő kell mozdítani a beruházásokat és azok demokratikus felügyeletet, valamint stabil beruházási kerekét kell teremteni.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk (ALDE), in writing. – I supported the report because the development of renewable energy is a key priority to the EU. This is so because renewable energy has the capacity, on one hand, to ensure the normal functioning of the EU energy market and, on the other hand, to secure EU energy supplies. Furthermore, the development of renewable energy will facilitate rational use of Europe's energy resources, technology development, smart infrastructure, economic growth and job creation. Most importantly, the development of renewable energy will significantly decrease energy cost for Europe's citizens and businesses.

In the light of this, the EU should continue its work to reach the 2020 targets for renewable energy. However, in order to achieve those targets the EU should promote tax cuts for renewable energy and, in particular, reform the Energy Taxation Directive to facilitate further the shift from fossil energy to renewable energy. Furthermore, the EU should promote regional cooperation and coordination including sharing best practices among Member States in order to develop the rational use of renewable energy sources.

Last but not least, the EU should work to promote collective and democratic management of renewable energy with a view to ensuring a fully sovereign, efficient and clean European energy model.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport, car, sous prétexte d'encourager les énergies renouvelables, il cherche à renforcer l'Union européenne et à punir les États récalcitrants. Il promeut, en outre, le concept fumeux de «démocratie énergétique». Des bons sentiments et des mots creux au service d'une volonté d'hégémonie !

Marine Le Pen (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre le rapport sur les progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables. Dès qu'on parle d'environnement, le Parlement européen entre dans des délires fédéralistes. Le rapport est pourtant intéressant sur quelques points. Il n'oublie notamment pas les usagers en situation de précarité énergétique. Il veut associer les citoyens aux plans nationaux pour les énergies renouvelables. Il revient à plusieurs reprises sur la situation des producteurs-consommateurs, pour lesquels les règles administratives et fiscales devraient être simplifiées. Cependant, toute la première partie n'est composée que d'objectifs contraignants, de propositions législatives et de contraintes pour les États. Sans compter le charabia incompréhensible où on réinvente l'eau chaude, alors que la plupart des États membres avaient construit un service public de l'électricité et du gaz abordable et cohérent.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre. Le texte fait quelques remarques intéressantes, comme l'importance de former sur les énergies renouvelables, d'aider les usagers en situation de précarité énergétique, mais aussi d'associer les citoyens aux plans nationaux des énergies renouvelables. Cependant ces remarques disparaissent sous la volonté intégrationniste du rapporteur. De surcroît, il tend à mettre en place des objectifs et des propositions législatives contraignantes pour les États. Il m'est impossible de souscrire à ce rapport fédéraliste. J'ai fermement voté contre.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un importante respaldo al desarrollo del sector de las energías renovables y una importante llamada a los estados miembros que no están cumpliendo con los objetivos de la Directiva. El informe se hace eco del avance del sector pero también de los problemas que encuentran en determinados estados miembros como el «impuesto al sol», la retroactividad de las medidas de apoyo, las dificultades en el acceso a la red, etc. además el informe hace referencia a la necesidad de generar empleo de calidad y de incluir a los sindicatos y la sociedad civil en el desarrollo de estas energías. Así mismo se hacen proposiciones específicas sobre la definición de prosumers, el apoyo al cambio modal de transporte, el desarrollo de tecnologías de refrigeración renovables, la inversión pública en el sector, etc. Esto convierte al texto en una importante referencia para el desarrollo de la próxima directiva, es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – Considero que es necesario un nuevo enfoque sobre las energías renovables que las convierta en el pilar fundamental del modelo energético de la Unión Europea. Nuestra obligación principal es la lucha contra el cambio climático y la reducción de la dependencia de los recursos energéticos del resto del mundo.

Para cumplir con esta obligación considero apropiada la aplicación de la Directiva sobre las fuentes de energía renovables, ya que actúa como el instrumento jurídico de la UE para la transición hacia un modelo de producción energética sostenible.

La regulación del sector a nivel europeo pretende solucionar los diversos problemas que están frenando el desarrollo del sector, favoreciendo la inversión pública, el control democrático y un marco estable para la inversión que faciliten la gestión colectiva y democrática de la energía para asegurar un modelo energético plenamente soberano, eficiente y limpio para 2050. Por estar de acuerdo con estos presupuestos voto a favor.

Bernd Lucke (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um eine Zwischenbilanz der Implementierung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aus dem Jahr 2009. Er enthält einige gute Elemente, z. B. den Aufruf, EU-weit enger zusammenzuarbeiten, und dass erneuerbare Energien kostenwirksam gefördert und wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen. Allerdings enthält der Bericht auch Elemente, die weit über den vorgesehenen Umfang hinausgehen. Zum Beispiel schlägt der Berichtersteller steuerliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung von erneuerbaren Energien vor oder eine stärkere Überwachung und Kontrolle seitens der EU-Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird das vom Rat beschlossene Erneuerbare-Energien-Ziel in dem Bericht von 27% auf 30% angehoben. ALFA ist der Ansicht, dass wir uns an den vom Rat beschlossenen Zielen orientieren sollten und dass Entscheidungen bezüglich der Implementierung von Beschlüssen den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen sein sollten. Deshalb habe ich den Bericht abgelehnt.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of promoting energy diversification, phasing out subsidies on mature renewable energy and encouraging competitiveness in our renewable energy sector.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem proti. Jsem proti tomu, aby Evropská komise zasahovala do energetických politik členských států. Nesouhlasím také s ekologickým aktivismem vedoucím ke zdražování energií a dotováním neefektivních zdrojů. Jsem proti „ambicióznějšímu klimaticko-energetickému balíčku do roku 2030“.

Monica Macovei (ECR), *în scris*. – Până în 2030, jumătate din energia noastră electrică va fi regenerabilă. Până în 2035, energia electrică nu va mai avea emisii de dioxid de carbon.

Sursele regenerabile produc alternative la combustibilii fosili și vizează reducerea emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră. Aceste surse contribuie la diversificarea ofertei de energie și la reducerea dependenței de piețele volatile și lipsite de fiabilitate ale combustibililor fosili, în special de petrol și gaze.

Dezvoltarea energiei din surse regenerabile (energia eoliană, energia solară, energia hidroelectrică, energia oceanelor, energia geotermală, biomasa și biocombustibilii) reprezintă o prioritate la nivel de UE.

Raportul prevede recomandări specifice fiecărui stat membru și poate că așa mai mult decât 5 țări vor atinge țintele propuse la nivelul Uniunii. De asemenea, vechiul cadru de promovare a energiei din surse regenerabile - de exemplu promovarea biocarburanților în transporturi - a avut un puternic impact negativ asupra producției de alimente.

Trebuie să avem o coordonare și o planificare globală a logisticii și a politicilor urbane pentru ca acestea să devină cu adevărat sustenabile.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – Kopš 2009. gadā pieņemtas Atjaunojamās enerģijas direktīvas (2009/28/EK) Savienības dalībvalstīs lielākoties pārdzīvoja atjaunojamo enerģijas avotu straujo attīstības periodu, kurš joprojām turpinās un kas viennozīmīgi jāatbalsta arī turpmāk.

Saprotams, ka atjaunojamai enerģētikai jābūt ne tikai vienkārši ekoloģiski labvēlīgai, bet arī ekonomiski izdevīgai. Ņemot to vērā, finansiāls atbalsts no ES budžeta šajā jomā ir principiāli svarīgs un visai apsveicams.

Nozares caurskatāmības sekmēšanai, zinātniskiem jauninājumiem un to integrēšanai praksē, pieredzes apmaiņai un, kas principiāli svarīgs, starptautiskai sadarbībai jābūt primāriem atspērieniem atjaunojamās enerģētikas politikā, ko attiecīgā direktīva lielā mērā ietver.

Nožēlojami, ka nesens Komisijas progresa ziņojums atjaunojamo energoresursu jomā neietvēra konkrētas rekomendācijas atsevišķām dalībvalstīm sakarā ar izvirzīto mērķu sasniegšanu līdz 2020. gadam. Nav īsti iespējams veicināt efektīvu politiku šajā nozarē bez konkrēto valstu situācijas sīkas izanalizēšanas un rekomendāciju sniegšanas.

Pievienojos aicinājumam īpašu uzmanību sniegt transporta sektoram, kurš ir viens no galvenajiem dabas piesārņotājiem. Atjaunojamo degvielu attīstībai un proponēšanai jāklūst par vēl vienu principiālo ES politikas un dalībvalstu pīlāru šajā jomā.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), *písmene*. – Udržiavanie rovnováhy medzi nutnosťou zabezpečiť energetickú nezávislosť a sebestačnosť Únie a zachovaním ekosystémov a ochranou životného prostredia patrí k najväčším výzvam so zásadným vplyvom na život všetkých obyvateľov. Preto podpora a hľadanie obnoviteľných zdrojov energie musia vždy zohľadňovať nutnosť ochrany životného prostredia a potrebu najmä predchádzajúceho vyhodnocovania možných vplyvov každého riešenia. Verejný záujem na bezpečnej a čistej energii musí byť prioritou.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), *γραφτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την έκθεση προόδου στον τομέα των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας, για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 23/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), *în scris*. – Am votat pentru raportul referitor la energia din surse regenerabile deoarece este necesar un cadru de reglementare stabil pe termen lung.

Tranziția la un sistem energetic sustenabil trebuie să includă eforturi în ceea ce privește eficiența energetică, energia din surse regenerabile, utilizarea optimă a resurselor energetice din Europa și infrastructura inteligentă.

Dezvoltarea energiei din surse regenerabile ar trebui să coincidă cu dezvoltarea unei piețe interne a energiei electrice funcționale, care să asigure condiții de concurență echitabile pentru toți participanții la piață. Energia din surse regenerabile trebuie să implice mai mult părțile interesate și consumatorii în sistemul energetic. Comisia trebuie să includă în viitoarele rapoarte intermediare privind energia din surse regenerabile o evaluare a impactului surselor regenerabile de energie asupra costurilor și prețurilor, în special a prețurilor pentru gospodării.

Producția de energie din surse regenerabile ar trebui corelată cu necesitatea de a asigura continuitatea producției convenționale de energie, ca premisă pentru durabilitate, securitatea aprovizionării și competitivitate. Stabilirea mixului energetic al statelor membre trebuie să rămână o competență națională, mixurile energetice fiind, în continuare, foarte diversificate. Și, nu în ultimul rând, stimulentele pentru dezvoltarea surselor de energie autohtone, cum ar fi hidroelectricitatea, ca sursă de energie regenerabilă, rămân prioritare.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté contre ce texte.

Ce rapport contient plusieurs points positifs: la prise en compte des usagers en situation de précarité énergétique, de la formation, de la situation des producteurs-consommateurs qui souffrent de normes administratives et fiscales trop contraignantes, mais aussi la volonté d'exclure les investissements publics des objectifs de déficits et d'associer les citoyens aux plans nationaux.

Pour autant, ce rapport adopte une vision intégrationniste, voire fédéraliste, du secteur énergétique à laquelle nous nous opposons fermement. Il fixe un certain nombre d'objectifs contraignants pour les États membres et vise à renforcer le rôle de la Commission.

Fulvio Martusciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Favorevole alla relazione sui progressi in materia di energie rinnovabili. Nonostante i passi avanti compiuti dagli Stati membri nella realizzazione degli obiettivi nazionali nel settore delle energie rinnovabili attestino i meriti della politica dell'Unione per le fonti rinnovabili, è necessario incoraggiare ulteriormente gli Stati membri che hanno riportato sviluppi più lenti a rafforzare i propri sforzi al fine di assicurare il conseguimento degli ambiziosi obiettivi energetici e climatici per il 2030 che permetta un afflusso sicuro di investimenti e finanziamenti nel settore delle energie rinnovabili.

Vi è dunque la necessità di garantire un quadro regolamentare stabile ambizioso e trasparente al fine di garantire un modello energetico pienamente sovrano, efficiente e pulito per il 2050.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – La UE va por buen camino para alcanzar los objetivos fijados para el año 2020 de reducir las emisiones de CO₂ en un 20%, de aumentar hasta el 20% la cuota de las fuentes de energía renovables en el consumo total de energía y de incrementar la eficiencia energética en otro 20%.

Pero debemos continuar el desarrollo de energías renovables y conseguir que esa cuota se siga elevando en la próxima década, llegando si es posible al objetivo del 30% en 2030, como recalca el informe que hemos aprobado, con mi apoyo, en esta Cámara.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), *γραφτώς*. – Η αξιοποίηση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας αποτελεί κύριο στόχο της Ένωσης με βασική κινητήρια αιτία την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος. Η ΕΕ συμβάλλει στην καταπολέμηση της κλιματικής αλλαγής και στην ανάπτυξη νέων τεχνολογιών με στόχο την ενεργειακή μετάβαση προς τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας.

Θεωρώ ότι η οδηγία που αφορά στις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας αποτελεί νομική δέσμευση για την Ένωση να δράσει προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση για μια κοινωνικά αποδεκτή και βιώσιμη παραγωγή ενέργειας, η οποία να είναι φιλική προς το περιβάλλον και προς την υγεία των ευρωπαίων πολιτών. Παράλληλα, η συγκεκριμένη οδηγία περιέχει και μηχανισμούς εποπτείας της εφαρμογής των κανόνων που περιλαμβάνονται, έτσι ώστε να επιτευχθεί στον μέγιστο δυνατό βαθμό η αξιοποίηση και ανάπτυξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας.

Υπερψηφίζω το συγκεκριμένο ψήφισμα, με την ελπίδα ότι θα καταφέρουμε να δημιουργήσουμε ένα αποτελεσματικό και αποδοτικό σύστημα στον τομέα αυτό, μέσα από ενίσχυση των επενδύσεων αλλά και τον σωστό έλεγχο της διαχείρισης της παραγωγής ενέργειας.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Förderung von „erneuerbarer Energie“ ist von immenser Bedeutung, jedoch ist dieser Bericht bei gewissen Punkten ungenau formuliert. Auch versucht die Europäische Union, Kompetenzen an sich zu ziehen. Daher enthalte ich mich meiner Stimme.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je m'aperçois, non sans circonspection, qu'au Parlement européen, énergie renouvelable, fédéralisme et intégration sont intimement liés. Si je suis favorable à la première, je dois avouer que cette association systématique ne laisse pas de contrarier le bon sens. De bonnes idées sont développées sur plusieurs points, dont l'association des citoyens aux plans nationaux pour les énergies renouvelables. Mais il est question de renforcer le rôle de la Commission et d'ajouter encore et encore des contraintes aux États membres.

En conséquence, j'ai voté contre.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A UE no seu conjunto está em vias de alcançar os objetivos de 2020 em matéria de energias renováveis, embora sejam necessárias medidas suplementares reforçadas em alguns Estados-Membros.

Temos, pois, que todos em conjunto continuar a contribuir para a consecução dos objetivos estipulados, para tornar o planeta mais sustentável para as gerações vindouras. Daí o meu voto favorável.

Roberta Metsola (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report, as it is the responsibility of the EU to combat climate change through the utilisation of, and support for, renewable energy. By introducing proper and efficient regulation of the renewable energy market, we are moving forward towards the proposed clean energy model for 2050.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. — De EU ligt op schema om haar 2020-doelstellingen te halen. Dat is het resultaat van een ambitieuze aanzet van de EU en haar lidstaten naar een koolstofarme economie gebaseerd op een efficiënter gebruik van energie en het aanboren van hernieuwbare energiebronnen. In het kader van de afspraken die ze heeft gemaakt op de klimaatop in Parijs is het een logische volgende stap dat ze, samen met de lidstaten, haar ambities verhoogt, meer investeert in energietechnologie en de richtlijn voor hernieuwbare energie aanscherpt.

De kosten voor hernieuwbare energie zijn de afgelopen jaren sterk gedaald. Dit schept kansen om een geïntegreerd, competitief en duurzaam Europees energiebeleid in de steigers te zetten. Een optimale benutting van hernieuwbare energiebronnen, verdere technologische innovaties en het uitrollen van slimme energienetwerken vormen de belangrijkste pijlers van een ambitieuze, concurrerende Europese energiemarkt. Burgers moeten daarom gestimuleerd worden actief deel te nemen aan die energiemarkt, door zelf energie op te wekken, deze energie te gebruiken, op te slaan en te verkopen. In sommige landen van de EU is biomassa uit hout de meest gebruikte hernieuwbare energievorm voor verwarming. Aangezien bossen cruciaal zijn voor ons ecosysteem, is een verantwoorde exploitatie en een duurzaam gebruik van onze bossen van belang.

Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE), *písomne*. — Rozvoj obnoviteľných zdrojov energie si vyžaduje nový prístup, aby sa stal základným pilierom energetického modelu Európskej únie. Naším spoločným úsilím a zodpovednosťou je bojovať proti klimatickým zmenám. Stáť na čele vývoja strategických technológií na zlepšenie energetického prechodu si vyžaduje posilnenie nášho výrobného modelu a vytváranie kvalitných pracovných miest. Zároveň musíme zabrániť tomu, aby energetické oligopolý boli tými, ktorí určujú budúcnosť energetiky pre Európu. Prijatím smernice o obnoviteľných zdrojoch energie začala Európa proces transformácie energetického mixu členských štátov. Tento právny nástroj so záväznými cieľmi a jasnými pravidlami dohľadu a kontroly vytvoril priaznivé prostredie pre rozvoj odvetvia obnoviteľných zdrojov energie a prispel k tomu, že sa z neho stalo rôznorodé a diverzifikované odvetvie. Opatrenia verejnej podpory síce umožnili značnú mieru úspechu v mnohých členských štátoch, potrebný je však politický impulz, ak máme splniť ciele stanovené na rok 2020 a neskôr. Regulácia odvetvia obnoviteľných zdrojov energie na európskej úrovni by mala vyriešiť veľa problémov, ktoré brzdia rozvoj tohto odvetvia, podporovať verejné investície, demokratickú kontrolu a stabilný rámec pre investície s cieľom uľahčiť kolektívne a demokratické hospodárenie s energiou v záujme zabezpečenia plne suverénneho, efektívneho a čistého energetického modelu do roku 2050. Hlasujem za daný návrh.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – This report looks at progress towards meeting the EU's 2020 20% renewable energy target, and also looks forward to the post-2020 framework. I agree with the main objective of the report and that we need to adopt a new approach towards renewable energy at European level.

Climate change is a fact and we have the responsibility to combat it, and to solve the social and environmental problems it creates, before it is too late. We need to reduce our dependence on energy resources, and shift towards a sustainable energy production model, if we wish to avoid serious social and environmental consequences. Therefore, I voted in favour of this report, although with reservations on certain passages which, in my opinion, do not fit with the main objective of the report and are not realistic.

Sorin Moisă (S&D), *in writing*. – The renewable energy progress report assesses the Member States' efforts in the promotion and use of renewable energy. In the run-up to the review of the Renewable Energy Directive and associated instruments, which will take place later this year, Parliament took the opportunity to show its support for this legal mechanism that has an enormous potential to drive substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Although we acknowledge the growth driven by the development of renewable energy in various sectors, some constructive criticisms are nonetheless in order, to make the framework sustainable to the fullest degree. I voted in favour of this motion for a resolution that seeks to orientate policy towards a cost-efficient and clean energy model for 2050.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Ipari, Kutatási és Energiaügyi Bizottság jelentése az Európai Bizottság megújuló energiáról közzétett 2015-ös eredményjelentéséről szóló állásfoglalásra tesz javaslatot. A jelentés egyetértőleg állapítja meg, hogy az Uniónak történelmi kötelessége küzdeni az éghajlatváltozás ellen, továbbá csökkentenie kell a külső energiaforrásoktól való függőségét. A megújuló energiákat mindehhez az Európai Unió energiamodelljének fő pillérévé kell tenni. A jelentés megállapítja, hogy a megújuló energiákról szóló 2009/28/EK irányelv elfogadásával, amely kötelező célokat ír elő, Európa megkezdte a tagállamok energiaszerkezetének átalakítását.

Míg azonban Ausztria, Bulgária, a Cseh Köztársaság, Dánia, Észtország, Finnország, Horvátország, Olaszország, Lettország, Litvánia, Románia és Svédország már idő előtt teljesítették, vagy hamarosan teljesíteni fogják 2020-as céljait, addig Belgiumot, az Egyesült Királyságot, Franciaországot, Hollandiát, Luxemburgot, Máltát és Spanyolországot a jelentés szükségesnek tartja fölszólítani, hogy hozzanak további intézkedéseket 2020-as célkitűzéseik elérésének biztosítása érdekében. Leszögezi, hogy döntő politikai lökés szükséges, ha az EU el akarja érni és túl akarja szárnyalni a 2020-ra megállapított célkitűzéseket. Kitér arra is, hogy a tőke költségek jelentős mértékben eltávolodtak egymástól a 28 tagú Unión belül, ami miatt választóvonal alakult ki észak/nyugat, illetve dél/kelet között, ezért uniós pénzügyi mechanizmus létrehozását látja szükségesnek a megújuló energiával kapcsolatos projektek kockázatból adódó magas tőke költségeinek csökkentésére. A tervezetet megszavaztam.

Bernard Monot (ENF), *par écrit*. – Même si on est favorable aux énergies renouvelables, la tonalité du rapport, qui est très ouvertement en faveur d'un renforcement des compétences de la Commission au détriment de celles des États, ne permet pas de le voter en l'état.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), *por escrito*. – A Diretiva 2009/28/UE estabelece como objetivo para a União Europeia atingir 20 % de consumo de energia proveniente de fontes renováveis até 2020. Neste quadro, é essencial garantir o reforço da vigilância por parte da Comissão, no sentido de garantir que os Estados-Membros não só cumprem os objetivos traçados na Diretiva, como adaptam medidas nesse sentido. Exemplo disso são as medidas de melhor acesso aos canais de financiamento ou mesmo a criação de um mecanismo financeiro ao nível da União Europeia que apoie a implementação dessas medidas, bem como melhorar os procedimentos administrativos para que tenham em consideração esquemas de custo-benefício.

A conjugação das políticas em matéria de energias renováveis e da eficiência energética são fundamentais enquanto fatores que podem contribuir para reduzir a dependência energética da União Europeia, uma vez que a UE importa mais de metade do seu consumo energético, o que representa 20% do total das importações.

Neste sentido, voto a favor do presente relatório, na medida em que considero importante que a União Europeia tenha uma estratégia a longo prazo para encorajar o investimento em energias renováveis.

Sophie Montel (ENF), *par écrit*. – Même si certaines orientations sont bonnes en terme d'énergies renouvelables, la tonalité nettement intégrationniste du rapport ne me permet pas de le voter en l'état. Je vote contre.

Nadine Morano (PPE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport dresse le bilan des progrès réalisés dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables. L'Union européenne, qui importe plus de 50 % de l'énergie qu'elle consomme pour 1 milliard d'euros par jour, est largement dépendante énergétiquement notamment pour le pétrole brut, le gaz naturel et le charbon. L'Union européenne doit promouvoir les énergies renouvelables par des incitations, notamment fiscales, afin de respecter l'objectif de 20 % d'énergie renouvelable qu'elle s'est fixé pour 2020. J'ai donc voté en faveur de ce texte, tout en m'opposant à ses dispositions qui visaient à promouvoir les énergies renouvelables par la contrainte.

Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Di fronte ad un innalzamento costante della temperatura globale a 1,5°C rispetto ai livelli preindustriali, dovuto allo spropositato utilizzo di risorse energetiche non rinnovabili e non sostenibili, accogliamo con fervore la proposta. Lo sviluppo di fonti rinnovabili attraverso la direttiva 2009/28/CE, ha permesso ridurre significativamente i costi di produzione e quindi di favorire una leadership tecnologica dell'UE che permetterà di creare, da qui al 2020, fino a 20 milioni di posti di lavoro nel settore della green economy. Perciò, di fondamentale importanza diviene non solo una maggior cooperazione e coordinamento tra gli Stati membri ma soprattutto la combinazione di piani d'azione nazionali vincolanti assieme ad obiettivi comuni, verificati tramite controlli biennali, al fine da rispettare gli impegni promessi con l'accordo di Parigi (COP 21). Ciò è possibile tramite potenti incentivi economici, quali l'implementazione di sgravi fiscali e la promozione di investimenti pubblici, al fine di facilitare una transizione verso un modello energetico pienamente autonomo, efficiente e pulito per il 2050. Per poter raggiungere tale scopo, inoltre, crediamo sia necessario sostenere le attività di ricerca e sviluppo e garantendo supporto ai Paesi membri ad adottare misure supplementari al fine di raggiungere questi obiettivi ambiziosi in tempo.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Az Európai Uniónak példát kell mutatnia a többi globális szereplő felé az éghajlatváltozás elleni harcban. Üdvözlöm azt a fajta megközelítést, amely a megújuló energiáknak nagyobb szerepet biztosít, hiszen a hosszú távú cél az Európai Unió területén kívüli energiaforrásoktól való függőség csökkentése. Egy fenntartható energia-termelési modell irányába kell elindulni, hiszen itt az egész társadalom biztonsága a tét. Nagyon bízom benne, hogy a jelentés támogatásával sikerül elérni a megújuló energiára vonatkozó 2020-as célkitűzéseket és az ehhez szükséges fellépés minden tagállamban megvalósul.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – The development of renewable energies calls for a new approach that entails making them the main pillar of the European Union's energy model. I voted for this report, which looks at progress towards meeting the EU's 2020 20% renewable energy target, and also looks forward to the post-2020 framework.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport deoarece consider că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să continue și să consolideze politica dezvoltării industriei energetice obținute din surse regenerabile, o politică care este aproape de a-și atinge obiectivele pentru anul 2020.

Datorită progreselor tehnologice din ultimii ani, progrese obținute în cadrul procesului de creare și stocare, costurile de producție a energiei din surse regenerabile au scăzut semnificativ. Acest lucru permite, acum, ca această energie să fie din ce în ce mai competitivă cu energia fosilă.

Salut propunerea cuprinsă în raport de a intensifica colaborarea dintre Comisia Europeană și statele membre în vederea îmbunătățirii performanțelor energetice din surse regenerabile, energie care consumă puține resurse naturale, având aceleași calități și, nu în ultimul rând, energie care diminuează poluarea și gazele cu efect de seră.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem zprávu o pokroku v oblasti energie z obnovitelných zdrojů, protože považuji politickou podporu transformace energetické sítě směřující k využívání obnovitelných zdrojů za naprosto klíčovou. Důvodem není pouze snaha o boj proti klimatickým změnám, avšak také otázka energetické bezpečnosti a podpora rozvoje nových odvětví ekonomiky. Oceňuji také kritický přístup zprávy k některým aspektům podpory obnovitelných zdrojů, jako byla například podpora biopaliv v dopravě.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), in writing. — This report was a positive and progressive one, which highlighted the need for a modal shift and for higher energy efficiency of renewables in order to improve the sustainability of transport. Furthermore, it criticises the promotion of biofuels for transport, which competes with the food production sector.

The report also analyses how Member States have done in achieving their renewable energy targets. There is currently an EU target of 20%, which is shared by Member States and broken down into national targets.

Ireland has fallen short of the heat energy target. While this is not acceptable, the report correctly expresses concern that some Member States may have to revise policies and instruments in order to achieve their targets.

For these reasons outlined above, I voted in favour.

Андрей Новаков (PPE), в писмена форма. — Докладът отбелязва, че ЕС като цяло напредва добре във връзка с постигането на набеязаните за 2020 г. цели за възобновяемите енергийни източници, но че са необходими допълнителни активни действия в някои държави членки. Амбициозните политики за енергията от възобновяеми източници, в съчетание с енергийната ефективност, са главна движеща сила за намаляване на зависимостта на ЕС от вноса и на общите му разходи за внос на енергия, както и за повишаване на енергийната сигурност спрямо външни доставчици. ЕС внася повече от половината енергия, която потребява, а разходите за този внос възлизат на повече от 1 млрд. евро на ден (над 50% от общия внос). В доклада се признава, че засиленото регионално сътрудничество в областта на възобновяемата енергия е от ключово значение за гарантиране на по-нататъшното развитие на възобновяемите източници на енергия. Подкрепям предложената резолюция.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), schriftlich. — Ich habe neutral gegenüber diesem Bericht gestimmt. Die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien ist eine der größten Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. Trotz allem beinhaltet der Bericht Aspekte, denen gegenüber ich kritisch eingestellt bin. Außerdem gibt es ein unter den Mitgliedstaaten ausgehandeltes Klimapakett, das zunächst umgesetzt werden sollte.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), raštu. — Pritariu šiai ataskaitai, kadangi atsinaujinančios energijos plėtojimui reikia taikyti naują požiūrį, pagal kurį ji taptų pagrindiniu Europos energetikos modelio ramsčiu. Be abejo, kova su klimato kaita yra vienas iš prioritetinių orientyrų kiekvienam iš mūsų – tai yra istorinė pareiga, kurią turime vykdyti.

Būtina sukurti palankią aplinką atsinaujinančiosios energijos sektoriaus plėtrai, kuri skatintų įvairiarūšio ir diversifikuoto sektoriaus augimą, viešąsias investicijas, demokratinę kontrolę ir stabilią investavimo sistemą, kurios palengvintų kolektyvinį ir demokratinį energetikos valdymą. Taip pat reikia tinkamai išnaudoti didžiulės darbo vietų kūrimo atsinaujinančiųjų išteklių energijos sektoriuje galimybes.

Manau, kad Komisija turėtų pateikti ambicingesnę 2030 m. klimato kaitos ir energetikos dokumentų rinkinį, kuriame atsinaujinančiosios energijos tikslas būtų padidintas bent iki 30 proc. Be to, valstybės narės turėtų efektyviau vykdyti energijos vartojimo efektyvumo didinimo politikos priemones ir teikti tikslines socialines garantijas, kurios būtų orientuotos į pažeidžiamoje padėtyje esančius vartotojus.

Δημήτρης Παπαδάκης (S&D), γραπτώς. — Στηρίζω σε ψηφοφορία στην Ολομέλεια την έκθεση προόδου αναφορικά με την ανανεώσιμη ενέργεια, επικροτώντας έτσι τον στόχο του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για περαιτέρω χρήση των πηγών αυτών, καθιστώντας τις ικανές στο να διαμορφώσουν το ενεργειακό μοντέλο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Η σκιαγράφηση ενός πιο αποδοτικού ενεργειακού μοντέλου, το οποίο να καθιστά πιο εύχρηστες τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας, δεν μπορεί να μη συνδέεται με τον στόχο της μείωσης των εκπομπών αερίων του θερμοκηπίου και με τη συνακόλουθη εφαρμογή της πρόσφατης συμφωνίας του Παρισιού 2015.

Υπάρχει το ορθό ρυθμιστικό πλαίσιο, φτάνει να περιλαμβάνει πιο δεσμευτική στοχοθεσία στη χρήση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας, για να μπορέσουμε να μιλήσουμε για αποτελεσματική πορεία προς τους μακροπρόθεσμους κλιματικούς στόχους της Ένωσης 2050.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Il contrasto al cambiamento climatico e la ricerca di metodi alternativi che riescano a ridurre la dipendenza dalle fonti di energia esterne dell'Unione europea trovano risposta nella direttiva sulle rinnovabili (2009/28/CE). Il processo di trasformazione del mix energetico degli Stati membri permette la creazione di un ambiente favorevole per lo sviluppo del settore delle energie rinnovabili. Tuttavia, rilevo le preoccupazioni esposte nella relazione e appoggio quanto detto in merito alla necessità di risolvere tali problemi. Affermo di votare positivamente.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Važan dio okolišne i energetske politike Europske unije odnosi se na dobivanje i korištenje energije iz obnovljivih izvora energije. Pozdravljam ovo izvješće koje pokazuje da je europska politika u području obnovljivih izvora energije do sada bila uspješna. Danas države Europske unije, uključujući i Hrvatsku, u velikoj mjeri ovise o uvozu energenata. Europa uvozi 53% energije te taj uvoz plaća više od jedne milijarde eura dnevno. Kako bismo smanjili tu ovisnost moramo se usmjeriti na one izvore energije koji su nam lokalno dostupni, a u te izvore svakako spadaju obnovljivi izvori energije.

Ovo izvješće daje i smjernice za novo zakonodavstvo EU-a koje bi trebalo nastaviti uspješno provoditi politiku EU-a i nakon 2020. godine. Upravo područje poljoprivrede i šumarstva može dobiti snažan poticaj ukoliko se do sada zane-mareni potencijali prepoznaju i iskoriste. Iskorištavanje punog potencijala poljoprivrednog i šumarskog sektora kroz ulaganja u proizvodnju naprednih biogoriva može doprinijeti otvaranju 146.000 stalnih te još 162.000 privremenih radnih mjesta u EU-u što bi bitno doprinijelo oživljavanju naših ruralnih područja i ostanku ljudi na selu.

Podržala sam ovo izvješće te se nadam da će Hrvatska identificirati svoje prednosti i učiniti potrebno kako bi nacionalna politika u sinergiji s politikama EU-a dala potrebe i željene rezultate.

Pina Picierno (S&D), *per iscritto*. – La transizione verso un modello di produzione energetica sostenibile è una priorità politica, economica, sociale e ambientale per l'Unione europea. La direttiva sulle rinnovabili si è dimostrata uno strumento efficace per avviare il processo di trasformazione del mix energetico dei suoi Stati membri, con obiettivi vincolanti e norme chiare di supervisione e controllo. Siamo vicini al raggiungimento degli obiettivi fissati per il 2020 e ora è necessario mandare un forte segnale politico per il proseguimento di questa strategia, stabilendo obiettivi significativamente più alti di quelli proposti dal Consiglio.

La relazione stabilisce che, entro il 2030, almeno il 30 % dell'energia dovrà provenire da fonti rinnovabili. Un obiettivo più ambizioso (fino al 45 %) sarebbe auspicabile, ma il Parlamento corregge comunque al rialzo la proposta deludente del 27 % fatta dal Consiglio. Al tempo stesso, la relazione ribadisce la necessità che questi obiettivi siano perseguiti da tutti gli Stati membri come stabilito dalla vecchia direttiva, e non solo al livello europeo come vorrebbe la nuova proposta del Consiglio. Per potersi aspettare risultati concreti, infatti, gli Stati membri andrebbero responsabilizzati con la previsione di target certi. La relazione promuove lo sviluppo delle rinnovabili come un pilastro fondamentale del modello energetico dell'Unione europea e perciò voto a favore.

Tonino Picula (S&D), *napisan*. – Budući da su ambiciozne politike u području obnovljive energije zajedno s energets-kom učinkovitošću važna pokretačka snaga za smanjenje ovisnosti EU-a o uvozu i njezina ukupnog vanjskog troška za energiju te za povećanje energetske sigurnosti u odnosu na vanjske dobavljače te budući da EU uvozi više od polovice ukupne energije koju troši, po cijeni od više od 1 milijarde eura svaki dan, što čini više od 20% ukupnog uvoza i budući da je ovisnost o uvozu posebno visoka kada je riječ o sirovoj nafti, prirodnom plinu i kamenom ugljiku, pozivam na veće korištenje obnovljive energije.

Premda sa zadovoljstvom primjećujem da je EU na dobrom putu da postigne svoj cilj za 2020., izražavam zabrinutost zbog velikog broja zemalja koje će, prema procjenama Komisije za razdoblje 2014. –2020. iz Izvješća o napretku u području obnovljive energije za 2015., možda morati ojačati svoje politike i instrumente kako bi postigle ciljeve do 2020. Pozivam države članice koje zaostaju u napretku da poduzmu dodatne mjere kako bi nadoknadile zaostatak.

Pozdravljam činjenicu da su neke države članice već postigle ili će ubrzo postići svoje ciljeve za 2020., puno prije roka, kao što je npr. Hrvatska.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), *písemně*. – Jsem rád, že Evropský parlament, i díky mému hlasu, dnes schválil tuto zprávu. Zpráva vyhodnocuje pokrok, který EU učinila v souvislosti s cílem dosáhnout do roku 2020 20% podílu obnovitelných zdrojů v energetickém mixu EU. Zpráva se zároveň zabývá výhledy do období po roce 2020. Podobně jako ve zprávě k energetické účinnosti nejsem spokojený s málo ambiciózními cíli, které Komise původně navrhla – Komise zrušila závazné cíle na národní úrovni a pouze stanovila celoevropský cíl 27 % do roku 2030, což je skutečně málo. Jsem proto velmi rád, že se podařilo prosadit jasný vzkaz Komisi v tom smyslu, že právě díky závazným národním cílům se daří dosahovat stávajících cílů pro rok 2020 a že zrušení národních cílů je velkou chybou. Sociální demokraté dále dlouhodobě zastávají názor, že by celoevropským cílem pro rok 2030 měl být alespoň 45% podíl obnovitelných zdrojů a i tento požadavek se podařilo do zprávy prosadit.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Una delle nostre responsabilità fondamentali è quella di combattere il cambiamento climatico e ridurre la dipendenza dalle risorse energetiche provenienti dal resto del mondo se vogliamo generare posti di lavoro di qualità, oltre a guidare lo sviluppo di tecnologie strategiche per la transizione energetica. L'UE si è dotata di uno strumento giuridico per raggiungere questi obiettivi con la direttiva sulle rinnovabili (2009/28/CE). Questo strumento giuridico, ha consentito la creazione di un ambiente favorevole per lo sviluppo del settore delle energie rinnovabili e ha contribuito alla crescita di un settore variegato e diversificato. Ritengo che, la prossima revisione della direttiva sulle energie rinnovabili, dovrebbe prevedere misure per promuovere e incoraggiare gli investimenti in questi settori. Un mercato più integrato è essenziale per lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili e la riduzione dei costi energetici. Per tutto ciò, ho votato a favore.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Sprawozdanie z postępów dyrektywy w sprawie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych przyjętej w 2009 r., które jest obecnie przedmiotem debaty, stanowi śródkresowy przegląd tej dyrektywy i zawiera wstępną jej ocenę w ramach REFIT. W sprawozdaniu Komisji Europejskiej stwierdzono, że dwadzieścia pięć państw członkowskich jest na dobrej drodze do osiągnięcia wiążących celów w zakresie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych, a pięć już osiągnęło lub za chwilę osiągnie swoje cele.

Sprawozdanie INI pozytywnie odnosi się do ściślejszej koordynacji między państwami członkowskimi i regionami, co współgra z oceną Komisji, zgodnie z którą należy lepiej wykorzystywać mechanizmy współpracy, jeżeli cele w zakresie energii odnawialnej mają zostać osiągnięte.

W sprawozdaniu INI stwierdzono wprawdzie, że określanie koszyka energetycznego państw członkowskich należy do kompetencji krajowych, jednak zawarto w nim również kilka odniesień do wiążących celów krajowych i opodatkowania, skrytykowano brak zaleceń dla poszczególnych krajów, opowiedziano się za większą rolą Komisji w monitorowaniu działań państw członkowskich przez zwiększenie możliwości nadzoru, a także zaproponowano podwyższenie celów UE w zakresie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych. Niniejszym nie mogłem poprzeć sprawozdania.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – Aujourd'hui, l'Union européenne importe plus de 50 % de l'énergie qu'elle consomme et est dépendante en ce qui concerne le pétrole, le gaz naturel ou encore le charbon. J'ai voté en faveur de ce texte, qui souligne l'importance des énergies renouvelables, secteur qui représente plus d'un million d'emplois en Europe, pour atteindre les objectifs que l'Union s'est fixés.

Paulo Rangel (PPE), *por escrito*. – Em matéria de energias renováveis, a União Europeia tem desenvolvido um trabalho exemplar. O presente relatório, verdadeira declaração de ciência quanto às relevantes externalidades sociais e ambientais decorrentes dos hodiernos modelos de produção de energia, alerta para a necessidade de regulação do setor, assegurando a sua competitividade e prevenindo, por exemplo, os oligopólios energéticos.

Dito isto, no meu entendimento, aliás perfilhado pelo grupo parlamentar de que sou parte integrante, o presente relatório andou bem ao consagrar as energias renováveis como uma das formas mais eficientes de reduzir a dependência dos combustíveis fósseis e de, concomitantemente, contribuir para a criação da chamada *low-carbon economy*.

Ainda neste âmbito, o relatório fomenta a competitividade e a melhor relação custo-benefício no mercado das energias renováveis, sem prejuízo da diversidade e da salvaguarda das competências dos Estados-Membros nesta matéria. E o que não é de somenos importância, o documento favorece um sistema energético sustentável, em que a dependência de subsídios passa a ser gradualmente suprida - e suprimida - num mercado interno autossuficiente e regulado pela Comissão, mormente quanto ao preço da energia.

Pelo que vem de ser exposto, o meu voto é favorável.

Frédérique Ries (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Il y a fort à parier que les énergies renouvelables soient la première source d'énergie d'ici à 2030 au niveau mondial. L'Union européenne, dont la Belgique, a donc tout intérêt à miser sur le secteur des énergies propres, ne serait-ce que pour diminuer sa dépendance énergétique. C'est grosso modo ce que souligne le rapport López Bermejo adopté ce midi, qui énumère plus précisément les progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables.

Certains États membres ont déjà atteint ou vont très prochainement atteindre leurs objectifs 2020, là où d'autres ont pris un peu de retard. Mais cela serait faire peu de cas des caractéristiques géographiques et topographiques qui diffèrent vraiment d'un territoire européen à l'autre. À l'évidence, les États membres ne sont pas tous égaux pour assurer leur transition énergétique. La Belgique, par exemple, ne dispose ni des massifs montagneux de l'Autriche ni des forêts de la Suède pour miser en priorité sur le développement de l'énergie hydraulique ou de la biomasse.

Or, comme le souligne la résolution du Parlement européen, tous les États membres doivent faire preuve d'une ambition commune, opter pour la décarbonisation de leurs industries et viser l'objectif de 30 % d'énergie renouvelable à l'horizon 2030.

Dominique Riquet (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Les énergies renouvelables sont une composante essentielle de la politique énergétique de l'Union, permettant tout à la fois de réduire les émissions polluantes et de renforcer l'indépendance énergétique de l'Union.

À cet égard, si on constate que la majorité des États membres sont en bonne voie pour atteindre les objectifs ambitieux fixés par l'Union dans ce domaine (20 % d'énergies renouvelables d'ici 2020), des inégalités de réalisation entre eux demeurent, parmi lesquels la France, qui accuse un certain retard dans la réalisation de ses objectifs climatiques et énergétiques.

Par ailleurs, nous, députés européens, avons rappelé la nécessité pour la Commission et les États membres de garantir un cadre réglementaire stable pour les différents acteurs en ce qui concerne les énergies renouvelables, d'assurer la cohérence entre les différentes politiques de l'Union et de renforcer les investissements dans le secteur.

En accord avec ces lignes politiques, j'ai voté en faveur de ce texte.

Robert Rochefort (ALDE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de cette résolution, qui dresse un bilan des actions accomplies dans l'Union en ce qui concerne les énergies renouvelables, et qui énumère les efforts à poursuivre afin d'atteindre les objectifs fixés pour 2020 et 2030. La transition énergétique et écologique est un impératif, comme l'a attesté encore il y a peu l'accord de la COP 21, et elle doit être encouragée tant elle présente des avantages notamment en termes d'amélioration de la santé publique, de création d'emplois et d'augmentation du confort de vie. C'est pourquoi il est essentiel que les États membres, dans leurs stratégies respectives, s'assurent qu'ils rempliront les objectifs visés et renforcent, pour ceux qui ne sont pas sûrs de les atteindre, leurs politiques, notamment dans des secteurs clés tels que l'électricité, le chauffage et le refroidissement ou encore dans les transports. Il n'est ainsi pas acceptable de voir une diminution des investissements en Europe dans les énergies renouvelables. Par ailleurs, il convient de permettre aux citoyens d'être partie intégrante de cette transition et de créer un cadre pertinent et équitable pour l'autoproduction et l'autoconsommation.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto la posición mayoritaria del Parlamento Europeo favorable a un 30% de renovables en 2030, por medio de objetivos nacionales vinculantes, más ambiciosa que la adoptada por el Consejo. Idea que no comparte el PPE, tal y como ha manifestado con su voto y por la actuación del Comisario Cañete, pendiente de comparecer por los escándalos que le salpican.

Siempre con la oposición del PPE, se ha aprobado nuestra enmienda a favor del empleo de calidad en las renovables. Sin embargo, debemos de lamentar que se rechazase la que defendía la adopción de garantías sociales específicas en favor de los consumidores vulnerables, esto es, aquellos en situación de pobreza energética.

El informe da respuesta al drama de las medidas retroactivas contra las ayudas a las renovables aprobadas por el actual gobierno de mi país, solicitando de la Comisión que evite este tipo de cambios y garantice la viabilidad económica de los activos existentes. Sorprende, una vez más contra el sentir general de la Cámara, la oposición del PPE a no penalizar con impuestos o tasas adicionales la autoproducción y el autoconsumo energético.

En líneas generales, con las salvedades hechas, el resultado es positivo y ha merecido mi voto a favor.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – Á la veille de la révision du cadre législatif européen, à l'automne, le Parlement européen a réaffirmé, jeudi 23 juin, ses ambitions élevées en matière d'énergies renouvelables à l'horizon 2030.

Le texte de la résolution adoptée met l'accent sur le rôle-clé de l'autoproduction et de l'autoconsommation, de la production décentralisée d'énergie renouvelable et de la gestion collective de l'énergie par l'intermédiaire des municipalités, autant de domaines dans lesquels la prochaine révision de la directive relative aux énergies renouvelables devra encourager les investissements.

J'ai également voté en faveur d'un amendement qui souligne l'énorme potentiel de création d'emplois du secteur des énergies renouvelables et qui invite les États membres à veiller à ce que les normes du travail ne soient pas affaiblies du fait de la transition énergétique, laquelle devrait aussi être fondée sur la création d'emplois de qualité.

Bronis Ropé (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Atsinaujinančiųjų išteklių energijos naudojimas – vienas svarbiausių ES pažangos, kuriant darnią ir prieš ateities kartas atsakingą ekonomiką, rodiklis. Skaitant Komisijos pateiktą ataskaitą džiugina valstybių narių, bent jau daugumos iš jų, pasiekimai pereinant nuo iškastinio kuro prie vietinio ar atsinaujinančio. Kartu, manyčiau, ataskaitoje Komisija galėjo pabrėžti ir atsinaujinančios energetikos svarbą regionų plėtrai. Juk perėjimas prie vietinių kuro rūšių taupo lėšas, kurios kitu atveju būtų išleidžiamos atvežtiniam kurui. Be to, atsinaujinanti energetika kuria darbo vietas, o daugeliu atvejų ir skatina inovacijas.

Kartu ypač noriu pabrėžti dvi svarbiausias žinias, kurias Europos Komisijai ir valstybėms narėms savo rezoliucija siunčia Europos Parlamentas. Pirma – mažinkite biurokratinės kliūtis atsinaujinančios energetikos plėtrai. Tai itin aktualu valstybėms narėms, kur dominuojančios stambios energetikos kompanijos nelabai žavisi galimybe į bendrą energetikos mišinį priimti žaliąją energiją. Antra žinia – daugelis valstybių narių jau pasiekė laikotarpiui iki 2020 m. nustatytus atsinaujinančios energetikos tikslus. Ir tai padaryti nebuvo sunku, daugeliu atvejų tai jau atsipirko. Vadinasi, metas pereiti prie ambicingesnių tikslų, prie reikalavimo gamintis bent pusę energijos iš atsinaujinančių šaltinių.

Fernando Ruas (PPE), *por escrito*. – O futuro do modelo energético da União Europeia assenta fundamentalmente no desenvolvimento de fontes de energia renováveis. Para alcançar este modelo desejado, é imperioso combatermos as alterações climáticas e minorar a nossa dependência energética externa (sobretudo de combustíveis fósseis), criando o nosso próprio modelo de produção, mais amigo do ambiente, gerando empregos de qualidade e fomentando a criação de uma nova era tecnológica (estratégica) neste domínio.

Esse modelo de produção energética deve constituir uma prioridade social, regulado e com ampla participação das empresas e dos cidadãos, que não fique dependente do mercado de oligopólios e não implique graves externalidades sociais e ambientais.

A Diretiva 2009/28/CE constitui o instrumento legislativo âncora no qual assenta todo o processo de transformação energética a desenvolver por parte dos Estados-Membros até 2020, pese embora seja necessário estabelecer metas mais ambiciosas à luz do que foi estabelecido recentemente no Acordo de Paris.

Subscrevo, por isso, as considerações tecidas pelo relator quanto à necessidade de desenvolver este modelo de produção de energia, regulá-lo a nível europeu e torná-lo um motor de crescimento económico, capaz de favorecer o investimento público, gerar riqueza, criar emprego e garantir um modelo energético eficiente e ambientalmente sustentável a longo prazo.

Tokia Saïfi (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport qui met en avant les importants progrès qui ont été accomplis sein de l'Union dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables tout en soulignant les nombreux efforts qu'il reste à faire.

Ce rapport met l'accent sur la nécessité de partager les meilleures pratiques en termes de politiques nationales concernant les énergies renouvelables et de promouvoir leur adoption dans le cadre d'un modèle européen plus convergent. Il insiste sur le besoin de garantir l'accès aux financements, notamment pour les PME, et de soutenir la recherche et le développement dans le domaine des énergies renouvelables. La transparence, la convergence des pratiques et l'augmentation des investissements permettront à notre politique environnementale de progresser et de gagner en efficacité.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della relazione sui progressi in materia di energia rinnovabile, materia alla quale è dedicata molta attenzione a livello europeo e sulla quale la Commissione dovrebbe presentare una nuova proposta entro la fine del 2016, dopo la comunicazione pubblicata nel giugno dello scorso anno. Il testo discusso in commissione ITRE, di cui sono membro, contiene numerosi punti di forza necessari al raggiungimento degli obiettivi fissati per il 2020 nell'ambito energetico. Tra questi si possono elencare il rapporto costo-efficacia e la competitività delle energie rinnovabili, la tutela delle competenze nazionali per il mix energetico e la promozione della diversificazione delle fonti di approvvigionamento energetico. Inutile dire che le rinnovabili rappresentano un futuro sempre più concreto nel panorama energetico, con un'Unione sempre più orientata in questa direzione. Tuttavia, il progetto di un'economia basata sulle rinnovabili al 100 % mi sembra francamente poco realistico, soprattutto nel breve termine. Per questo motivo sono del parere che il gas costituisca una risorsa da non sottovalutare per il fabbisogno energetico dell'UE.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor del informe de Paloma López Bermejo porque establece buenas bases para la revisión de la Directiva relativa a las energías renovables. Subraya las posibilidades de creación de empleos, los beneficios para la economía, al igual que la centralidad del desarrollo de las renovables para luchar contra el cambio climático. Fija objetivos ambiciosos y pide que sean vinculantes. También promueve el autoconsumo y la democratización del sistema energético

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *in writing*. – Renewable energy contributes to increased energy independence and reduced greenhouse gases. Some good progress has been made. However, the 2030 targets need to be ambitious enough to send a strong signal for investment in renewable energy projects which are sustainable both economically and environmentally. Sustainability criteria for biomass will be especially important in the coming years.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe für den „Fortschrittsbericht ‚Erneuerbare Energiequellen‘“ gestimmt.

Manche Mitgliedstaaten sind noch weit entfernt davon, die Zielvorgaben für erneuerbare Energie bis 2020 zu erreichen. Der Bericht analysiert und kritisiert eben dies und fordert die Mitgliedstaaten zur gemeinsamen Entwicklung bester Vorgehensweisen und damit die Verbesserung ihrer momentanen Strategien auf.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un importante respaldo al desarrollo del sector de las energías renovables y una importante llamada a los estados miembros que no están cumpliendo con los objetivos de la Directiva. El informe se hace eco del avance del sector pero también de los problemas que encuentran en determinados estados miembros como el «impuesto al sol», la retroactividad de las medidas de apoyo, las dificultades en el acceso a la red, etc. además el informe hace referencia a la necesidad de generar empleo de calidad y de incluir a los sindicatos y la sociedad civil en el desarrollo de estas energías. Así mismo se hacen proposiciones específicas sobre la definición de prosumers, el apoyo al cambio modal de transporte, el desarrollo de tecnologías de refrigeración renovables, la inversión pública en el sector, etc. Esto convierte al texto en una importante referencia para el desarrollo de la próxima directiva, es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor.

Czesław Adam Siekierski (PPE), *na piśmie*. – Rolnictwo jest sektorem szczególnym, nie tylko z uwagi na swoje strategiczne znaczenie w produkcji i dostarczaniu na rynek żywności, ale jest również niezwykle istotnym dostawcą surowców dla przemysłu oraz, w coraz większym stopniu, dla sektora energii. Kwestia ta nabiera szczególnego znaczenia w kontekście dążenia do zmniejszenia zależności energetycznej Unii, która 50% swojego zapotrzebowania na energię pokrywa z importu. Obecnie Unia jest największym importerem energii na świecie, a wydatki z tym związane to około 400 mld euro rocznie.

Poza tym w kontekście wyzwań klimatycznych rolnictwo i leśnictwo są sektorami posiadającymi, obok emisji dwutlenku węgla w procesach produkcyjnych, również ogromny naturalny potencjał wychwytywania CO₂ z powietrza, co zasługuje na uwagę przy dokonywaniu odpowiednich przeliczeń. Dlatego też warto sprzyjać badaniom i innowacjom w zakresie tworzenia instalacji wykorzystujących bioenergię i nie stwarzać nadmiernych obciążeń i utrudnień administracyjnych, które hamowałyby rozwój tego sektora, który ma również znaczny potencjał w zakresie tworzenia nowych miejsc pracy.

Duże znaczenie dla rozwoju obszarów wiejskich obecnie i w przyszłości może mieć możliwość sprzedaży nadwyżek wytworzonej energii do sieci elektroenergetycznej oraz zaprojektowanie systemu, który skupowałby w pierwszej kolejności energię z takich właśnie źródeł. Dla prawidłowego rozwoju sektora tak produkowanej energii potrzebny będzie prawdopodobnie również stabilny mechanizm dla pojedynczych producentów energii dający przewidywalność cen w dłuższym okresie.

Monika Smolková (S&D), písomne. – Sektor energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov zamestnáva v Európe viac ako 1 milión ľudí a dosahuje hodnotu vyše 13 miliárd EUR ročne. Teší má, že dnes sa 26 % energie EÚ vyrába z obnoviteľných zdrojov a približne 10 % celkovej elektrickej energie EÚ pochádza z variabilných obnoviteľných zdrojov elektrickej energie (napr. veternej a slnečnej energie) a čoraz viac ľudí akceptuje obnoviteľné zdroje ako prirodzený zdroj energie. Napriek tomu, že stanovené záväzné ciele do roku 2020 v oblasti energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov by mali dosiahnuť všetky európske krajiny, pre niektoré členské štáty, ktoré už teraz pomaly napredujú, sú potrebné ďalšie opatrenia. Aj keď bol dosiahnutý určitý pokrok v oblasti energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov (zníženie nákladov na energiu), rozmanitosťou rôznych politík na podporu obnoviteľných zdrojov energie vznikajú riziká ďalšieho prehlbovania rozdielov v konkurencieschopnosti medzi členskými štátmi EÚ. Podporila som uznesenie, pretože navrhované opatrenia vytvárajú ďalšie možnosti pre rozvoj obnoviteľných zdrojov energie, ktoré môžu pomôcť zabezpečiť energetickú bezpečnosť a zvrchovanosť, odstrániť energetickú chudobu a podporiť hospodársky rozvoj EÚ.

Michaela Šojdrová (PPE), písomně. – Usnesení o zprávě o pokroku v oblasti energie z obnovitelných zdrojů jsem nakonec podpořila. Nezávazné usnesení reaguje na vyhodnocovací zprávu Komise z loňského roku a přináší podněty pro Komisi k nadcházející revizi příslušné legislativy. Ve své zprávě Komise konstatuje, že cíl dosáhnout v roce 2020 alespoň 20% podíl spotřeby energie z obnovitelných zdrojů pravděpodobně bude splněn, což Evropský parlament vítá. Těší mě, že Česká republika je v usnesení oceněna jako země plnící svůj cíl se značným předstihem. Usnesení reaguje na některé problémy, které zavádění obnovitelných zdrojů přineslo, a žádá jejich účinné řešení. Například zdůrazňuje, že některé členské státy zanedbaly své přenosové sítě a tyto dnes nedokážou pojmout výkyvy energie z obnovitelných zdrojů – s důsledky nedostatků německé přenosové sítě se potýká i Česká republika. Za důležitou považuji i zmínku o dopadech podpory obnovitelné energie na zemědělství. Pěstování plodin za účelem výroby biopaliv nesmí jít proti výrobě potravin nebo jejich bezpečnosti.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), pisno. – Razvoj energije iz obnovljivih virov zahteva nov pristop, s katerim bo postala temeljni steber energetskega modela Evropske unije. Boj proti podnebnim spremembam je naša osnovna odgovornost in zgodovinska dolžnost, ki jo moramo izpolniti. Prav tako moramo zmanjšati odvisnost od energetskih virov iz drugih delov sveta, če želimo utrditi naš proizvodni model in ustvariti kakovostna delovna mesta ter imeti vodilno vlogo pri razvoju strateških tehnologij za energetski prehod.

Prehod k modelu trajnostne proizvodnje energije je socialna prednostna naloga, ki je ne moremo obravnavati le z vidika trga. Zaradi tega moramo razumeti, da sta regulacija in demokratična udeležba nujni za preprečevanje resnih socialnih in okoljskih zunanjih učinkov.

Preprečiti moramo, da bi prihodnost energije za Evropo določali energetski oligopoli. Pomembno je, da poskušamo doseči cilj, da bi gospodarstvo temeljilo 100 % na obnovljivi energiji.

Poročilo podpre pomen obvezujočih ciljev na nacionalni ravni ter potrebo po stabilnem političnem okvirju. Tako poročilo zahteva bolj ambiciozne cilje do leta 2030 ter izpostavljanje tistih držav, ki pri obnovljivih virih za zdaj nazadujejo.

Na pobudo Zelenih je poročilo tudi okrepljeno na področju prihodnjega upravljanja z energijo ter jasno opredeli zahteve glede poročanja držav na tem področju. Zaradi navedenega sem poročilo podprl.

Joachim Starbatty (ECR), schriftlich. – Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um eine Zwischenbilanz der Implementierung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aus dem Jahr 2009. Er enthält einige gute Elemente, z. B. den Aufruf, EU-weit enger zusammenzuarbeiten, und dass erneuerbare Energien kostenwirksam gefördert und wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen. Allerdings enthält der Bericht auch Elemente, die weit über den vorgesehenen Umfang hinausgehen. Zum Beispiel schlägt der Berichtersteller steuerliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung von erneuerbaren Energien vor oder eine stärkere Überwachung und Kontrolle seitens der EU-Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird das vom Rat beschlossene Erneuerbare-Energien-Ziel in dem Bericht von 27% auf 30% angehoben. ALFA ist der Ansicht, dass wir uns an den vom Rat beschlossenen Zielen orientieren sollten und dass Entscheidungen bezüglich der Implementierung von Beschlüssen den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen sein sollten. Deshalb habe ich den Bericht abgelehnt.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), písomne. – Ak chce EÚ posilniť svoj výrobný model, musí znížiť závislosť od zdrojov energie zo zvyšku sveta. Regulácia obnoviteľných zdrojov by mala zamedziť hroziace problémy a vyriešiť tie existujúce.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), napisan. – Razvoj obnovljive energije može uvelike doprinijeti energetske sigurnosti i suverenitetu, kao i iskorjenjivanju energetske siromaštva te poticanju ekonomskog razvoja Europske unije. Obnovljivi izvori energije značajni su za pružanje stabilne, cjenovno pristupačne i održive energije europskim građanima koji, između ostalog, mogu obnovljivim izvorima energije iskoristiti prednosti vlastite proizvodnje.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da je Europska unija na dobrom putu u pogledu ostvarenja ciljeva u području energije iz obnovljivih izvora za 2020., ali da svaka država članica mora individualno uložiti još više napora. Isto tako vjerujem da je potreban stabilan i dugoročan regulatorni okvir kako bi Europska unija ostvarila gospodarski rast, otvorila nova radna mjesta te zadržala vodeću ulogu u spomenutim područjima na globalnoj razini. Na posljetku, kako bi Europska unija smanjila svoju ovisnost o uvozu i ukupni vanjski trošak za energiju te povećala energetske sigurnost u odnosu na vanjske dobavljače, ključno je da ima ambicioznu politiku u području obnovljive energije te energetske učinkovitost.

Dubravka Šuica (PPE), napisan. – Da bi obnovljivi izvori energije postali glavni stup energetske modela Europske unije potreban je nov pristup njihovom razvoju. Danas naša glavna odgovornost mora biti borba protiv klimatskih promjena. Kako bi učvrstili svoj energetske model moramo otvoriti kvalitetna radna mjesta, usmjeriti razvoj strateških tehnologija i smanjiti ovisnost o energetskim izvorima iz ostatka svijeta. Prijelaz na model održive energetske proizvodnje je socijalni prioritet, stoga moramo shvatiti da su demokratsko sudjelovanje i regulacija nužni kako bi se izbjegli štetni učinci na okoliš i društvo. Regulacijom obnovljivih izvora energije na europskoj razini riješili bi se brojni problemi koji otežavaju njihov razvoj u cilju ostvarenja suverenog, djelotvornog i čistog modela energija do 2050. godine. Programi potpore trebali bi biti usmjereni na tehnologije koje imaju velik potencijal za smanjenje troškova obnovljive energije i povećanje tržišne prihvaćenosti obnovljive energije.

Podržavam ovo izvješće jer smatram da su smjernice u njemu kvalitete i naglašavaju potencijal koji razvoj energije iz obnovljivih izvora ima za Europu. Također, smatram da je iznimno važno utvrditi temeljno pravo na vlastitu proizvodnju i potrošnju vlastite energije.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), pisno. – Glasovala sam za poročilo o napredku na području energije iz obnovljivih virov.

Cilji Evropske unije do leta 2020 na području obnovljivih virov so dovolj ambiciozni, prav tako je Evropska unija kot celoti na dobri poti do uresničitve le teh, je pa še veliko rezerve v nekaterih državah članicah.

Zato je na Komisiji, da zagotovi, da se bo direktiva o uporabi energije iz obnovljivih virov 2020 v celoti izvajala, hkrati pa naj zagotovi trden zakonski okvir tudi po letu 2020 z zavezujočimi cilji glede obnovljivih virov energije, ki bodo usklajeni z najučinkovitejšim načinom uresničevanja dolgoročnih podnebnih ciljev Unije.

Νεοκλής Σουλκιώτης (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Υπερψηφίσαμε την έκθεση, καθώς κινείται προς την ορθή κατεύθυνση για τη δημιουργία μιας ολοκληρωμένης στρατηγικής για την ανάπτυξη και στήριξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Μεταξύ άλλων τονίζεται πως η ανάπτυξη των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας πρέπει να αναγνωριστεί ως θεμελιώδης πυλώνας της ενεργειακής μας πολιτικής. Επίσης επισημαίνεται πως για την καταπολέμηση της κλιματικής αλλαγής, για την αντιμετώπιση της ενεργειακής φτώχειας καθώς και για την ανάπτυξη ενός παραγωγικού ενεργειακού μοντέλου προς όφελος της κοινωνίας, είναι πολύ σημαντικό να τεθούν δεσμευτικοί και φιλόδοξοι στόχοι.

Εξίσου σημαντικές είναι οι αναφορές στην ανάγκη να ενισχύσουμε τις δημόσιες επενδύσεις για την προώθηση των απαραίτητων υποδομών, να προωθήσουμε μέτρα στήριξης των μικρών παραγωγών των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας καθώς και μέτρα για τη διασφάλιση της ώθησης των ανανεώσιμων πηγών με το μικρότερο δυνατό κόστος για τους καταναλωτές. Επισημάνει ορθά πως στη διαδικασία αυτή ο δημοκρατικός έλεγχος και η συλλογική διαχείριση είναι στοιχεία αναγκαία ώστε να επιτευχθεί η καλύτερη εξυπηρέτηση των αναγκών και των συμφερόντων της κοινωνίας και να διασφαλιστεί η ενέργεια ως κοινωνικό αγαθό, στο οποίο όλοι οι λαοί να έχουμε ισότιμη και φθηνή πρόσβαση.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), γραπτώς. – Το 1968 ερευνητές προειδοποιούσαν το Αμερικανικό Ινστιτούτο Πετρελαίου ότι οι εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα από τα ορυκτά καύσιμα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν σε παγκόσμιες περιβαλλοντικές αλλαγές. 48 χρόνια αργότερα και ενώ η επιστήμη και η τεχνολογία έχουν κάνει άλματα, ακόμη δεν εφαρμόζονται κατάλληλες τεχνολογίες για τη βέλτιστη αξιοποίηση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Αναρωτηθήκαμε γιατί;

Η συνειδητή απόκρυψη επιστημονικών ευρημάτων, η συγκάλυψη πληροφοριών και η εσκεμμένη παραπλάνηση της κοινής γνώμης επέβαλαν την κοντόφθαλμη πολιτική της προσωρινής κερδοφορίας των μεγάλων εταιρειών εις βάρος αντίστοιχων βιώσιμων επιλογών. Πετρελαϊκοί γίγαντες και εμπορικοί όμιλοι δαπανούν 115 εκατομμύρια δολάρια ετησίως μπλοκάροντας κλιματικές πολιτικές. Ταυτόχρονα ασκούν πιέσεις ώστε το φυσικό αέριο να αναδειχθεί ως η βασική τεχνολογία με την οποία η Ευρώπη θα μειώσει οικονομικά τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα.

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αντιμετωπίζει την κατάσταση θέτοντας χαμηλούς στόχους και ασκώντας μετριοπαθείς πολιτικές. Εγκληματούμε. Όχι μόνο εις βάρος του περιβάλλοντος, αλλά κυρίως εις βάρος των παιδιών μας. Η πολιτική δεν πρέπει να γίνεται υποχείριο των κέντρων οικονομικής εξουσίας και αισχρής κερδοφορίας. Πρέπει να στηριχθεί ουσιαστικά η ανάπτυξη και εφαρμογή των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας και να τιμωρηθούν οι υπαίτιοι κωλυσιεργίας.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Egyetértek a megújuló energiák ösztönzésével, és hogy azt az EU energiamodelljének fő pillérévé kell tenni azt. Abszolút igazat adok annak a megállapításnak, mely szerint alapvető felelősségünk küzdeni az éghajlatváltozás ellen, és olyan történelmi kötelességünk, melyet teljesítenünk kell. Csökkentenünk kell továbbá a világ más részeiből származó energiaforrásoktól való függőségünket, ha strukturálni kívánjuk termelési modellünket, minőségi munkahelyeket kívánunk teremteni és élen kívánunk járni azon stratégiai technológiák fejlesztésében, melyeken energetikai átmenetünk alapul. Alapvető gondnak tartom, hogy az Európai Tanács ilyen alacsony, 27%-os célt támogat a 2020 utáni időszakra (2030-ig). Az is aggályos, hogy a célszám csak EU-szinten kötelező, tehát lehetőséget ad egyes tagállamoknak, hogy elrejtőzzenek a jól teljesítő tagállamok árnyékában.

Éppen ezért támogattam a jelentést, amelyben ragaszkodunk a magasabb célszámhoz és annak tagállami szinten kötelező jellegéhez. Úgy vélem, hogy a kormányokkal összefonódó energetikai lobbik kora lejárt, és egyetértek azzal, hogy az energiapolitika már társadalmi prioritás, nem csak gazdasági. Osztom azt a véleményt, mely szerint a megújulóenergia-ágazat európai szintű szabályozása számos, a fejlődését hátráltató problémát meg kell oldjon, elő kell mozdítania a közberuházásokat és demokratikus felügyeletet és stabil beruházási keretet kell teremtenie az energiaágazat kollektív és demokratikus irányításához annak érdekében, hogy 2050-re teljesen önálló, hatékony és tiszta energiamodell jöjjön létre.

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE), na piśmie. – Dyrektywa w dziedzinie energii odnawialnej z 2009 roku ustanawia cel osiągnięcia 20% udziału tego typu energii w finalnym zużyciu energii do roku 2020, jak również zakłada, iż państwa członkowskie mają swobodę decydowania, w jaki sposób będą u siebie wspierać energię odnawialną.

Według sprawozdania Komisji większość państw członkowskich jest na dobrej drodze do osiągnięcia wyznaczonego w 2009 roku celu i już ponad 15% energii w UE pochodzi ze źródeł odnawialnych. Jednakże część państw unijnych ma i będzie mieć, ze względu na charakter swojej gospodarki, znaczne trudności z osiągnięciem zakładanych planów.

W sprawozdaniu Parlamentu Europejskiego zwrócono uwagę, że Unia potrzebuje spójnej długoterminowej strategii, aby zapewnić przyszłe inwestycje w zakresie energii odnawialnej. Ponadto dokument podkreślił znaczenie dostępu do kapitału i proponuje nowe mechanizmy finansowe, szczególnie w zakresie ułatwienia procedur administracyjnych czy systemów wsparcia.

Hannu Takkula (ALDE), kirjallinen. – Kokonaisuutena mietintö on hyvä ja tasapainoinen. Kohdat, joissa käsitellään biopolttoaineita ja bionesteitä koskevia kestävyyskriteereitä, ovat kuitenkin metsien osalta ongelmalliset. 84 ja 85 kohdassa viitataan melko negatiivisesti metsän biomassan käyttöä uusiutuvan biomassan energialähteenä. Varautuva suhtautuminen metsän käyttöön 84 kohdan alussa ei ole hyvä lähtökohta. Lisäksi 85 kohdassa on tulkinnanvaraa siitä, katsotaanko metsän biomassan olevan kestävää biomassaa vai ei. Euroopan metsävaltaisissa maissa metsävarat kasvavat puuraaka-aineen energiakäytöstä huolimatta. Metsänhoidon käytäntönä on se, että metsät kasvavat enemmän kuin niitä hakataan. Tämä tekee metsästä aidosti uusiutuvan raaka-aineen. Huolimatta kokonaisuutena onnistuneesta mietinnöstä metsäviittausten vuoksi äänestin mietintöä vastaan.

Dario Tamburrano (EFDD), per iscritto. – In questa relazione le energie rinnovabili vengono poste al centro del modello energetico dell'Unione europea e pertanto abbiamo votato a favore. Come vittoria ritroviamo nella relazione molte delle nostre istanze, quali la richiesta di presentare un obiettivo più ambizioso relativo alle fonti energetiche rinnovabili portandolo almeno al 30 %, da declinare in singoli obiettivi nazionali, nonché la creazione di un sistema di governance solido e trasparente, che valorizzi la partecipazione della cittadinanza.

Ancora, tra i punti presentati dal M5S e passati in plenaria, è l'inserimento nella direttiva di un capitolo specifico dedicato all'energia delle comunità locali e dei cittadini dove viene sottolineata la centralità dei cittadini come *prosumer* e i diritti fondamentali all'autoproduzione e all'autoconsumo, di stoccaggio e di rivendita dell'eccedenza dell'energia e quindi anche la necessità di delineare una definizione condivisa del termine di *prosumer*. Altri punti importanti chiesti in commissione e mantenuti sono la richiesta agli Stati membri di sviluppare una strategia energetica di comunità e definire un contesto di investimento più propizio per l'autoproduzione e l'autoconsumo insieme alla creazione di sportelli unici di supporto. Per i trasporti abbiamo chiesto e ottenuto di valutare le potenzialità insite nelle tecnologie basate sul *trolley-truck* (filocarro).

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), în scris. – Încălzirea globală a adus în prim plan necesitatea dezvoltării sectorului energiei din surse regenerabile. Uniunea Europeană și țările membre au sprijinit în mod formal acest proces în ultimele decenii, devenind principalele promotoare ale energiilor regenerabile la nivel mondial. Cu toate acestea, tranziția către modelul de producție durabilă de energie implică un efort important de reglementare, în special la nivel social, de mediu și de competitivitate. Începutul a fost făcut prin adoptarea Directivei 2009/28/CE privind energia din surse regenerabile, care contribuit la dezvoltarea și diversificarea acestui sector la nivel european. Este, însă, nevoie de un impuls politic mai ambițios pentru atingerea obiectivelor stabilite în orizontul anului 2020 și al perioadei următoare. Este nevoie, în prezent, de reglementarea utilizării biocarburanților în transporturi, pentru a evita un impact negativ asupra industriei alimentare, de un cadru stabil de investiții, de crearea de noi locuri de muncă de calitate în domeniu și de menținerea unor obiective obligatorii la nivel național. Fără acestea din urmă, va fi imposibil să înregistrăm progresele necesare pentru atingerea obiectivelor stabilite pentru orizontul anului 2030. De aceea, susțin adoptarea formei actuale a acestui raport.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – Le développement des énergies renouvelables requiert une nouvelle approche qui ferait d'elles la pierre angulaire du modèle énergétique de l'Union européenne. Notre responsabilité fondamentale est de combattre le changement climatique, une tâche historique dont nous devons nous acquitter. Nous devons également réduire notre dépendance à l'égard des ressources énergétiques provenant du reste du monde si nous aspirons à structurer notre modèle de production, créer des emplois de qualité et être le fer de lance du développement des technologies stratégiques sous-tendant notre transition énergétique.

La transition vers un modèle de production de l'énergie viable à long terme est une priorité sociale qui ne peut être confiée au seul marché. Au contraire, nous devons comprendre que la régulation et la participation démocratique sont indispensables si l'on veut éviter de graves externalités sociales et environnementales. Nous devons empêcher que des oligopoles de l'énergie puissent dicter l'avenir énergétique de l'Europe.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – This own-initiative report on the implementation of the Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) concentrates on the results achieved, their added value and the opportunities provided for European citizens and businesses, as well as reasons why certain Member States are struggling to meet ambitious targets set in the directive. While most of the Member States are well on track to achieving 20% renewables targets by 2020, and some are even ahead, a few will probably fail to deliver.

The European policies on renewable energy and sustainability are very important, especially for our future development. The rapporteur made a number of good points and, even though I do not agree on all the points in the report, I believe it is important to recognise the role of renewables in the EU's energy market and to support their further integration into the market. Therefore, I supported the report.

Isabelle Thomas (S&D), *par écrit*. – La modernisation du modèle énergétique de l'Union européenne passe par le développement des énergies renouvelables. Le vent, les marées et le soleil sont des ressources inépuisables. À contrario, le pétrole, le gaz et le charbon, outre leurs effets polluants, ne sont pas des ressources infinies. La transition énergétique doit venir à bout des changements climatiques et de notre dépendance vis-à-vis des ressources énergétiques importées, et créer des emplois.

Nous refusons de confier au seul marché la transition vers ce nouveau modèle. Au contraire, la participation démocratique et la régulation sont indispensables pour assurer le volet social et environnemental. L'avenir énergétique de l'Europe ne peut se laisser dicter par des multinationales, au risque d'entraîner des externalités négatives.

La gauche doit se poser en meneur de la transition énergétique. L'Union doit accélérer le développement des énergies propres. L'objectif des 20 % d'énergies renouvelables d'ici 2020 n'est donc qu'un premier pas. Les efforts doivent être maintenus afin d'atteindre 30 % d'énergies renouvelables d'ici 2030. Ce sont les conditions d'une Europe sociale et durable.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – U Direktivi o obnovljivoj energiji donesenoj 23. travnja 2009. godine utvrđen je obvezan cilj prema kojem do 2020. godine 20% potrošnje energije u Europskoj uniji mora dolaziti iz obnovljivih izvora energije. Obnovljivi izvori energije (energija vjetra, sunčeva energija, hidroenergija, energija oceana, geotermalna energija, biomasa i biogoriva) zamjena su za fosilna goriva i pridonose smanjenju emisija stakleničkih plinova, raznolikoj opskrbi energijom te smanjenju ovisnosti o nepouzdanim i nestabilnim tržištima fosilnih goriva, posebno nafte i plina.

Iako podržavam korištenje navedenih obnovljivih izvora energije, smatram da njihova regulacija treba ostati u nadležnosti država te da se ne treba rješavati na europskoj razini. Stoga sam glasovala suzdržano.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Poročilo o napredku na području energije iz obnovljivih virov sem podprla.

Evropska unija je na dobri poti, da doseže svoj cilj 20 % deleža zelene energije. Poročilo dokazuje, da je Evropa dobra na području zelene energije, zelena energija pa je dobra za Evropo. Obnovljivi viri energije so eden izmed najbolj učinkovitih načinov za zmanjšanje odvisnosti od fosilnih goriv in prispevajo k ustvarjanju nizkoogljičnega gospodarstva.

Poleg tega so obnovljivi viri energije stroškovno učinkoviti, povečujejo konkurenčnost na trgu ter spodbujajo raznovrstnost. Vseeno obstaja potreba po izboljšanju nacionalnih politik, Komisija pa mora okrepiti svojo vlogo pri spremljanju in podpiranju napredka na području energije iz obnovljivih virov.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor del informe de Paloma López Bermejo porque establece buenas bases para la revisión de la Directiva relativa a las energías renovables. Subraya las posibilidades de creación de empleos, los beneficios para la economía, al igual que la centralidad del desarrollo de las renovables para luchar contra el cambio climático. Fija objetivos ambiciosos y pide que sean vinculantes. También promueve el autoconsumo y la democratización del sistema energético.

Ulrike Trebesius (ECR), *schriftlich*. – Bei diesem Bericht handelt es sich um eine Zwischenbilanz der Implementierung der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aus dem Jahr 2009. Er enthält einige gute Elemente, z. B. den Aufruf, EU-weit enger zusammenzuarbeiten, und dass erneuerbare Energien kostenwirksam gefördert und wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen. Allerdings enthält der Bericht auch Elemente, die weit über den vorgesehenen Umfang hinausgehen. Zum Beispiel schlägt der Berichtersteller steuerliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung von erneuerbaren Energien vor oder eine stärkere Überwachung und Kontrolle seitens der EU-Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird das vom Rat beschlossene Erneuerbare-Energien-Ziel in dem Bericht von 27% auf 30% angehoben. ALFA ist der Ansicht, dass wir uns an den vom Rat beschlossenen Zielen orientieren sollten und dass Entscheidungen bezüglich der Implementierung von Beschlüssen den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen sein sollten. Deshalb habe ich den Bericht abgelehnt.

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – Our societies are living a transition towards a low-carbon economy, but there are strong vested interests close to national governments that make it difficult. It is thus fundamental that the EU maintains a strong position to ensure that countries make it easy for renewable energies. In Spain, both the PSOE and the PP have adopted policies that have deeply undermined the growth of renewable energy.

Auto-consumption of energy and binding national targets are very important to ensure the energy transition.

Mylène Troszczynski (ENF), *par écrit*. – Dans ce rapport, on y trouve quelques points intéressants:

— les usagers en situation de précarité énergétique;

— la formation (qui est un enjeu clef de ces politiques);

— l'association des citoyens aux plans nationaux pour les énergies renouvelables;

— l'examen de la situation des producteurs-consommateurs, pour lesquels les règles administratives et fiscales devraient être simplifiées.

Je suis moi-même favorable aux énergies renouvelables. Cependant, ce texte est un véritable condensé d'idéologie intégrationniste, voire fédéraliste.

J'ai donc voté contre.

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), *na piśmie*. – Unia Europejska musi gruntownie przemyśleć swoją politykę energetyczną. Odnawialne źródła energii są dobrym rozwiązaniem w celu zróżnicowania źródeł produkcji energii. Niemniej nie można narzucać wszystkim krajom członkowskim regulacji, które będą ingerować w ich koszyk energetyczny. Wszelkie przepisy muszą być dostosowane to możliwości poszczególnych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Przyjmowanie jakiegokolwiek dyrektywy nieuwzględniającej tego mija się z sensem. W związku z tym nie poparłem rezolucji.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – A megújuló energiák fejlesztése új megközelítést követel, mely az Európai Unió energiamodelljének fő pillérévé teszi azokat. Alapvető felelősségünk küzdeni az éghajlatváltozás ellen, és olyan történelmi kötelességünk, melyet teljesíteniünk kell. Csökkentenünk kell továbbá a világ más részeiből származó energiaforrásoktól való függőségünket, ha strukturálni kívánjuk termelési modellünket, minőségi munkahelyeket kívánunk teremteni és élen kívánunk járni azon stratégiai technológiák fejlesztésében, melyeken energetikai átmenetünk alapul. Voksommal a végső szavazásnál a frakció álláspontját követtem.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Votamos a favor del informe de Paloma López Bermejo porque establece buenas bases para la revisión de la Directiva relativa a las energías renovables. Subraya las posibilidades de creación de empleos, los beneficios para la economía, al igual que la centralidad del desarrollo de las renovables para luchar contra el cambio climático. Fija objetivos ambiciosos y pide que sean vinculantes. También promueve el autoconsumo y la democratización del sistema energético.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), raštu. — Palankiai vertinu Komisijos išsipareigojimus atsinaujinančiosios energijos srityje; atsižvelgdamas į Atsinaujinančiųjų išteklių energijos direktyvą manau, kad dabartinis privalomų nacionalinių tikslų, nacionalinių atsinaujinančiosios energijos planų ir kas dvejus metus vykdomos kontrolės derinys buvo pagrindinė varomoji jėga, skatinanti plėtoti atsinaujinančiosios energijos pajėgumus ES.

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), in writing. — I voted in favour of the renewable energy progress report. The report stresses the importance of simple, accessible, affordable and efficient administrative procedures. The development of renewable energies calls for a new approach that entails making them the main pillar of the European Union's energy model.

The report highlights the significance of an EU legislative proposal on energy market rules, as a more integrated market is key to the development of renewables and to reducing energy costs for families and industry. In addition, the report notes that increased regional cooperation on renewables is key to ensuring the further development of renewable energy sources.

I voted in favour because I believe that we have a fundamental responsibility to combat climate change – a historic duty that we must fulfil.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – He votado a favor del presente informe debido a que supone un importante respaldo al desarrollo del sector de las energías renovables y una importante llamada a los estados miembros que no están cumpliendo con los objetivos de la Directiva. El informe se hace eco del avance del sector pero también de los problemas que encuentran en determinados Estados miembros como el «impuesto al sol», la retroactividad de las medidas de apoyo, las dificultades en el acceso a la red, etc. Además el informe hace referencia a la necesidad de generar empleo de calidad y de incluir a los sindicatos y la sociedad civil en el desarrollo de estas energías. Asimismo se hacen proposiciones específicas sobre la definición de prosumers, el apoyo al cambio modal de transporte, el desarrollo de tecnologías de refrigeración renovables, la inversión pública en el sector, etc. Esto convierte al texto en una importante referencia para el desarrollo de la próxima directiva, es por todo esto por lo que he decidido votar a favor.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), schriftelijk. – De ontwikkeling van hernieuwbare energie vergt een nieuwe aanpak die van hernieuwbare energie de centrale pijler van het energiemodel van de Europese Unie maakt. We hebben de fundamentele verantwoordelijkheid om de klimaatverandering tegen te gaan; dit is een historische plicht waar we ons niet aan mogen onttrekken. Ook moeten we onze afhankelijkheid van energiebronnen uit de rest van de wereld verkleinen als we ons productiemodel willen ondersteunen, kwaliteitsbanen willen creëren en een voortrekkersrol willen spelen bij de ontwikkeling van strategische technologie voor de energietransitie.

De overgang naar een duurzaam energieproductiemodel is een sociale prioriteit die niet door de markt alleen kan worden aangepakt. We moeten ervan uitgaan dat regelgeving en democratische participatie noodzakelijk zijn om ernstige externe effecten op sociaal en milieugebied te voorkomen. We moeten voorkomen dat de toekomst van de energie in Europa door energie-oligopolies wordt bepaald. Ik heb vóór deze strategie gestemd.

Paavo Väyrynen (ALDE), kirjallinen. – Mietintö uusiutuvan energian tilannekatsauksesta on lähtökohtaisesti tasapainoinen kokonaisuus nykytilanteesta EU:ssa. Biopolttoaineita ja bionesteitä koskevissa kestävyyskriteereissä on kuitenkin kohdissa 84, 85 ja 88 mielestäni Suomen kannalta epäonnistuneita sanavalintoja, joissa muun muassa kehoitetaan suhtautumaan varoen metsän biomassan käyttöön EU:n pääasiallisena uusiutuvana energialähteenä, koska sillä: "... voi olla mahdollisesti haitallisia vaikutuksia ilmastoon ja ympäristöön...". Nämä kyseiset kohdat eivät mielestäni edistä Suomen tavoitteita biotaloudessa. Näiden muodostaman vaikean kokonaisuuden takia äänestin mietintöä koskevassa loppuäänestyksessä tyhjää.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), schriftlich. – Grundsätzlich geht es bei diesem Bericht um das sehr wichtige Thema der „erneuerbaren Energiequellen“. Auch ich bin der Überzeugung, dass wir in Zukunft ein nachhaltiges und vor allem auch unabhängiges Energiemodell benötigen. Jedoch wurde dieser Bericht leider zum Beispiel dafür, wie ein Vorschlag durch realitätsfremde Forderungen, welche weit über die tatsächlichen technischen Möglichkeiten hinausgehen, verzerrt werden kann. Es ist nun mal ein Fakt, dass sich der Energiemix einzelner Länder auf Grund der geografischen und industriellen Unterschiede nicht zentral bestimmen lässt. Da ich zwar für einen Weg hin zu mehr „erneuerbaren Energiequellen“ bin, aber dieser Bericht meiner Meinung nach auf Grund seiner Forderungen nicht positiv dazu beitragen kann, ziehe ich es vor, mich der Stimme zu enthalten.

Lieve Wierinck (ALDE), in writing. — It is clear that renewable energy is becoming increasingly important to our Union in two different ways. First of all, we have to safeguard the environment, following up on international agreements such as COP 21, to which we are a signatory. Secondly, we need to safeguard the EU's energy independence.

At EU level, as in Flanders, we are currently working hard on achieving this goal. Although the EU is moving in the right direction, I hope that this resolution will help to speed up the process and can provide extra support to those who are left with the responsibility to make it happen. I agree with the resolution's point on the necessity of a stable framework for investment. I strongly believe that renewable energy has the best chance of succeeding if we cooperate at EU level.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), γραπτώς. – Τοποθετήθηκα θετικά, υπερηφίζοντας την έκθεση προόδου για τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας, ένα κείμενο που υποστηρίχτηκε από τη μεγαλύτερη πλειοψηφία των ευρωβουλευτών και τις περισσότερες πολιτικές ομάδες, τόσο στην αρμόδια επιτροπή Βιομηχανίας, Έρευνας και Ενέργειας όσο και στις συνδεδεμένες επιτροπές Περιβάλλοντος, Δημόσιας Υγείας και Ασφάλειας των Τροφίμων, Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης και Γεωργίας και Ανάπτυξης της Υπαίθρου.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), por escrito. – Sin duda, apoyo este informe, ya que me parece de vital importancia conocer el estado de la producción y uso de las energías renovables en la UE, principalmente, porque la tendencia de las mismas continúa al alza y son uno de los recursos clave para poder hacer frente a la contaminación y frenar los daños ocasionados al medio ambiente.

En España, por ejemplo, el progreso en este ámbito está muy positivo, teniendo en cuenta que en 2013 y 2014 se ha producido un incremento del uso de energías renovables que supera significativamente la trayectoria mínima indicativa. Dicho progreso también ha tenido lugar en referencia a la electricidad, calefacción y refrigeración, transporte y sostenibilidad para biocombustibles.

Así pues, confío en que, con propuestas como esta, todos los Estados miembro logren alcanzar estos resultados e incluso mejorarlos.

Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), písemně. – Podporuji tuto zprávu. Jsem přesvědčen, že naší hlavní odpovědností je bojovat proti změně klimatu, což je historická povinnost, kterou musíme přijmout. Zároveň musíme omezit závislost energetických zdrojů na zbytku světa, pokud chceme být nejen v čele vývoje strategických technologií pro energetický přechod, ale také podpořit náš model výroby a vytvořit kvalitní pracovní místa. Jsem toho názoru, že přechod na udržitelný model výroby energie je společenskou prioritou, kterou nelze řešit pouze z hlediska trhu. Je třeba pochopit, že regulace a demokratická účast jsou nezbytné, abychom zabránili závažným sociálním a environmentálním vedlejším dopadům.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), písomne. – Správu týkajúcu sa pokroku v oblasti energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov som nepodporila. Správa zhodnotila doterajšiu implementáciu smernice o obnoviteľnej energii a vymenovala štáty, ktoré sa k svojim cieľom na rok 2020 v tejto oblasti blížia, prípadne ich už splnili. Pozitívom správy boli najmä odkazy na zlepšenú spoluprácu medzi členskými štátmi a regiónmi, ako aj potvrdenie, že rozhodnutie o tom, akú kombináciu zdrojov, resp. energetický mix budú členské štáty mať, je výlučne v ich kompetencii. Nanešťastie však správa až príliš často odkazovala na záväzné ciele, či vyzývala na predloženie ambiciózneho energetického balíku. Rovnako nesúhlasím s článkami, ktoré predpokladajú zvýšený dohľad Komisie nad členskými štátmi po roku 2020 a jej možnosť proti členským štátom zasiahnuť. Práve pre tieto dôvody som sa rozhodla hlasovať proti celej správe.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), por escrito. – Votei favoravelmente o relatório López Bermejo por partilhar das suas conclusões nomeadamente no que toca a saudar a Comissão Europeia pelos compromissos propostos no domínio das energias renováveis até 2020 e pela necessidade de desenvolver um quadro legislativo ambicioso para o período pós-2020.

Destaco que é fundamental assumir metas ambiciosas, em linha com o Acordo de Paris e produzir mais energia limpa e renovável, criar riqueza e emprego e reduzir a dependência estratégica de fornecedores externos.

Sublinho, nesse sentido, a valorização dos recursos endógenos num domínio estratégico como é a energia, uma valorização que é possível como o exemplo de Portugal bem ilustra.

Marco Zullo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. — Questa risoluzione, a cui ho dato voto favorevole, sostiene che, al fine di ridurre la dipendenza dalle importazioni energetiche dell'Unione europea, sia necessario investire in politiche per le energie rinnovabili e per l'efficienza energetica. In questo modo si intendono fronteggiare le sfide imposte dal cambiamento climatico favorendo un rinnovamento del modello produttivo ma anche garantendo la sicurezza energetica intesa come priorità sociale.

L'obiettivo sulle energie rinnovabili dell'UE – il 20 % del consumo totale entro il 2020 — è già stato raggiunto da molti Stati membri dell'UE. Altri, invece, sono in ritardo e devono fare di più. La relazione esamina il progresso compiuto dall'UE in materia di energie rinnovabili e vengono indicati quali siano gli ambiziosi obiettivi che la prossima revisione della direttiva sulle energie rinnovabili deve stabilire.

Viene data importanza all'autoproduzione e all'autoconsumo energetico, in quanto il ruolo dei cittadini e dei consumatori è decisivo per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi di efficienza energetica. Viene dunque posta enfasi sulla ristrutturazione degli edifici, il teleriscaldamento e i sistemi di raffreddamento.

Si invita inoltre l'UE a investire in programmi che promuovano nuovi progressi tecnici nel campo dell'efficientamento energetico. Sono convinto che la creazione di un mercato più integrato sia essenziale per lo sviluppo delle energie rinnovabili e la riduzione dei costi energetici.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Glasoval sem za poročilo o napredku na področju energije iz obnovljivih virov.

Evropska energetska politika mora v skladu s členom 194 PDEU zagotavljati delovanje energetskega trga in zanesljivost oskrbe z energijo ter spodbujati energijsko učinkovitost, varčevanje z energijo in razvijanje obnovljivih virov energije ter medsebojno povezovanje energetskih omrežij.

Zato se strinjam z ugotovitvami poročila, da mora prihodnja zakonodaja in ukrepi temeljiti na energiji iz obnovljivih virov, ki bo omogočala polno zastopnost tehnologij za to energijo na trgu.

9.14. Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz (A8-0199/2016 - Markus Pieper)

Ustne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ho votato a favore della relazione sull'efficienza energetica perché questo è stato un anno cruciale per le riflessioni e per la definizione di nuovi obiettivi per l'ambiente, per l'energia e per il clima. È stato l'anno della COP21, che ha fissato obiettivi ambiziosi per un ambiente che è evidentemente in sofferenza.

Eppure sembra che l'Europa non sia in grado di rispettare entro il 2020 l'obiettivo che si era posta di ridurre del 20 % le emissioni di CO₂. Chiediamoci dunque che cosa non sta funzionando. Credo che anche in tema di ambiente ed energia il problema dell'Europa sia stata la rigidità delle sue regole e della sua burocrazia, che si scontrano marcatamente con la crisi economica che l'Europa deve, nello stesso tempo, affrontare.

Gli obiettivi della politica energetica, come quelli della politica ambientale e tanti altri, per essere efficaci non possono prescindere dalla flessibilità, necessaria a renderli adatti ai cambiamenti di scenario economico e alle trasformazioni globali. La strada è realizzare efficienza energetica e puntare su economia verde come volano per l'economia.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin, dar ndóigh is tuarascáil fhíorthábhachtach í seo agus bhí sí conspóideach chomh maith. Ag an am gcéanna caithfear moladh a thabhairt don rapóirtéir ó mo ghrúpa féin, an Feisire Pieper, a rinne an-chuid oibre ar fad cé nár éirigh leis ag deireadh na dála comhréiteach a fháil leis na grúpaí maidir leis na vótaí go léir. Mar sin bhí vótaí an-tábhachtacha ag ár ngrúpa, agus nuair a chaill siad na vótaí sin mhol an grúpa go vótálaimis i gcoinne na tuarascála ag an deireadh.

Níor vótáil mé i gcoinne na tuarascála ag an deireadh mé féin; chuaigh mé i gcoinne mo ghrúpa. Ó mo thaobh féin de agus ós rud é go rabhas a bPáras agus go rabhas ag plé leis seo agus go bhfuilim ag caint faoin tábhacht a bhaineann le fuinneamh in-athnuaite agus mar sin de, ceapaim gur ceart vótáil i bhfabhar agus sin é a rinne mé ag deireadh na dála. Tá súil agam go bhféadfaimid an chonspóid a réiteach amach anseo.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Głosowaliśmy przeciwko obu sprawozdaniom w sprawie energii i budzi moje oburzenie, że grono dyletantów i ignorantów zabiera głos i decyduje w sprawach tak żywotnych. Pod okupacją Unii Europejskiej Europa nie rozwija się, Europa pozostaje w tyle. Jak możemy się rozwijać, kiedy gaz w Ameryce kosztuje cztery razy mniej niż w Europie, gdy w Chinach jest trzy razy tańszy niż w Europie? Jak Europa może w tych warunkach konkurować?

Nie tylko uważam, że Unia Europejska musi być zniszczona, ale uważam, że ci, którzy tak propagują tę walkę z globalnym ociepleniem, którzy niszczą energetykę europejską, powinni, po wyzwoleniu Europy spod okupacji Unii, stanąć przed sądem, zostać właściwie skazani za to, co zrobili z tym niegdyś przodującym regionem na świecie.

Pisemne wyjaśnienia dotyczące głosowania

Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD), per iscritto. – In armonia con le priorità europee, la direttiva sull'efficienza energetica del 2012 ha predisposto una serie di misure vincolanti per il raggiungimento del 20 % di efficienza energetica entro il 2020. Purtroppo, il testo non è stato implementato appieno da tutti gli Stati membri, a causa di interessi industriali ed economici, che spesso minano gli obiettivi di simili politiche. Per queste ragioni, ho espresso voto favorevole al rapporto d'implementazione della direttiva, ritenendo prioritario tutelare l'ambiente e la salute dei cittadini attraverso una migliore cooperazione tra gli Stati membri in ambito energetico.

Clara Eugenia Aguilera García (S&D), por escrito. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Marina Albiol Guzmán (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero un avance necesario exigir una mejora del 40% en los objetivos nacionales de eficiencia para 2030, corrigiendo la propuesta a la baja del Consejo, del 27%. Esto exigirá también una revisión del funcionamiento hasta la actualidad de la directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética, cuya inaplicación, excesiva flexibilidad y falta de concreción es adecuadamente resaltada en el documento.

Louis Aliot (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport traite de la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique (DEE) dans le cadre de l'évaluation de sa mise en œuvre et dans la perspective de sa révision.

Considérant que «l'efficacité énergétique doit être considérée comme une source d'énergie à part entière qui représente la quantité en Nw (négawatts) d'énergie économisée», ce texte invite à optimiser la consommation d'énergie pour la rendre plus efficace.

Bien que le texte invite à davantage de mesures contraignantes, l'accent est mis sur la flexibilité qui doit être laissée aux États membres dans la transposition de ces directives. Néanmoins, la DEE fixe des «objectifs sous la forme d'un niveau absolu de consommation d'énergie primaire et de consommation d'énergie finale» (article 3, paragraphe 1, point a), de la DEE). Or, dans le contexte économique actuel, cette austérité énergétique risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries. Notons enfin qu'en raison du Pacte de stabilité, il est quasi impossible pour les États membres d'effectuer les lourds investissements requis par la DEE elle-même. J'ai donc voté l'abstention sur ce texte.

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report which was an implementation report by Markus Pieper on the Energy Efficiency Directive.

The Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) establishes a framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency in the EU and sets a non-binding target of 20% energy efficiency improvements by 2020. The EU as a whole is expected to fall short of this non-binding target, although the Commission and the rapporteur are optimistic and claim we can still reach the target. This report further calls for full implementation of existing legislation, accelerated efforts and the removal of barriers to investment.

In the committee phase, my political group, GUE/NGL, tabled alternative compromise amendments with other progressive groups calling for a binding 40% target on energy efficiency for 2030. This is positive, as it displays political will and commitment to the Paris climate change agreement.

Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D), *γραφτώς*. – Ψήφισα υπέρ της έκθεση με θέμα την έκθεση εφαρμογής σχετικά με την οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση (2012/27/EE), διότι εξετάζει το πώς η οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση έχει τεθεί σε εφαρμογή από τα κράτη μέλη. Επιπρόσθετα, αναφέρεται στην πρόοδο που έχει επιτευχθεί για τους στόχους ενεργειακής απόδοσης ως το 2020, καθώς και το πλαίσιο για τους στόχους με ορίζοντα το 2030.

Pascal Arimont (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Zwischen 1991 und 2014 sind die Treibhausmissionen in der EU um 23% zurückgegangen. Im selben Zeitraum ist das BIP um 46% gestiegen. Dies zeigt, dass mit immer geringerer Klimabelastung Unternehmen und Bürger mehr Wachstum erzeugen und somit auch Arbeitsplätze schaffen und Steuereinnahmen generieren.

Die EU befindet sich auf einem guten Weg, ihre gesetzten Ziele für 2020 zu erreichen: 20% weniger CO₂ Emissionen, den Anteil der erneuerbaren Energieträger am Gesamtenergieverbrauch auf 20% zu steigern und 20% mehr Energieeffizienz zu erreichen.

Jedoch sind der hohe bürokratische Aufwand im Energiebereich wie auch die hohen Energiepreise für mittlere Gewerbetreibenden und private Haushalte besorgniserregend. Da zudem auch verschiedene, teilweise einander widersprechende, nationale und europäische Regelungen aufeinandertreffen, fordere ich zusammen mit dem Parlament die Kommission dazu auf, an einer kohärenteren Klima- und Energiepolitik zu arbeiten, sowie zusätzliche Anstrengungen für ein europaweites Strommarktdesign zu unternehmen.

Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport concerne les économies d'énergie à réaliser au sein de l'Union européenne. Si cela est une bonne chose en soi, dans le contexte économique actuel, cette austérité énergétique risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries. Je me suis donc abstenue sur ce rapport.

Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE), *in writing*. – The Energy Efficiency Directive establishes a set of binding measures to help the EU reach its 20% energy efficiency target by 2020. Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU fell by 23% between 1990 and 2014. The EU is making large strides towards meeting the targets set and this is largely in thanks to the ETS system. The complex reporting obligations and special national levies are a cause for concern and are largely impacted by separate national approaches to energy policy. A more coherent climate and energy policy is needed as well as an EU-wide electricity market design. The Energy Efficiency Directive plays a major role in this and the EU will reach its 20% efficiency target for 2020 at this rate. This is a recent directive and the Member States must be given time for the innovations to come to fruition. This report provides a necessary starting point to bring the energy saving aspects together and make a more coherent European wide policy.

Nicolas Bay (ENF), *par écrit*. – Le leitmotiv de ce texte est que «l'efficacité énergétique doit être considérée comme une source d'énergie à part entière qui représente la quantité en Nw (négawatts) d'énergie économisée» (considérant F). Présentée comme fondamentale, notamment pour atteindre les objectifs climatiques – de nouveau – fixés à l'issue de la COP21, la recherche permanente d'économies d'énergie est censée nous permettre de renforcer à la fois notre sécurité énergétique et notre compétitivité économique.

Ainsi est-on invité à optimiser sa consommation énergétique pour la rendre plus «efficiente» (d'après l'adjectif anglais «efficient»), en considérant que «les économies d'énergie constituent la première et la plus sûre source d'énergie en Europe» (paragraphe 33), «dans un paysage énergétique de plus en plus décentralisé» (paragraphe 30).

Néanmoins, la directive relative à l'efficacité énergétique (DEE) fixe des «objectifs sous la forme d'un niveau absolu de consommation d'énergie primaire et de consommation d'énergie finale» (article 3, paragraphe 1, point a), de la DEE): dans le contexte économique actuel, cette austérité énergétique risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries, d'autant que le rapporteur se félicite, dans l'exposé des motifs, des «bons résultats du système ETS» (ou SEQE), qui est pourtant un échec flagrant.

Hugues Bayet (S&D), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport, que j'ai approuvé, souligne que si la directive sur l'efficacité énergétique a entraîné de nombreuses améliorations positives au sein des États membres, sa mise en œuvre reste insuffisante notamment en matière de création d'emplois de qualité.

Il précise qu'il est essentiel d'engager la transition vers un système énergétique basé sur des énergies renouvelables permettant d'abandonner le plus rapidement possible les sources d'énergie fossile. Il demande ainsi la définition de plans de suppression progressive des aides aux combustibles fossiles et d'octroi de moyens financiers aux projets d'efficacité énergétique, afin de réaliser l'objectif de l'Union de «décarbonisation» du secteur de l'énergie d'ici 2050.

Brando Benifei (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione Pieper sull'attuazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica. I temi del risparmio energetico e dell'efficienza sono cruciali non solo per la protezione dell'ambiente e del clima, in linea con gli obiettivi stabiliti alla COP21 di Parigi, ma anche per lo sviluppo della competitività europea e per un aumento dell'occupazione. La direttiva sull'efficienza energetica del 2012 e quella sugli edifici del 2010 sono stati strumenti fondamentali per imprimere importanti impulsi innovatori per quanto riguarda i sistemi di obblighi e incentivi degli Stati membri. Tuttavia, molti paesi non hanno attuato tutte le disposizioni presenti. Il raggiungimento dell'obiettivo del 20 % del risparmio è a rischio e per questo occorre accelerare gli sforzi e rimuovere tutti gli ostacoli agli investimenti. Gli Stati devono sfruttare appieno il sistema dei sussidi. La Commissione deve avviare azioni supplementari per una coerente politica climatica ed energetica, stabilendo norme adeguate. Il testo chiede all'UE di predisporre una strategia a lungo termine per la riduzione della domanda energetica, prolungando e rendendo più ambiziosi gli obiettivi stabiliti dalle direttive vigenti che scadranno nel 2020.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor del informe porque subraya la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia energética como manera de luchar contra el cambio climático. Propone objetivos vinculantes por países. El aspecto vinculante es un punto clave porque obliga los países a cumplir con estos objetivos mientras que la flexibilidad deja la puerta abierta a objetivos insuficientes. Además, no se contenta del objetivo del 27% en el 2030 fijado por el Consejo y la Comisión sino propone el objetivo más ambicioso del 40%. Propone también centrar las medidas sobre los hogares en situación de pobreza energética, aspecto que nos parece de primera importancia.

Dominique Bilde (ENF), *par écrit*. – J'ai préféré m'abstenir sur ce rapport relatif à la mise en œuvre de la directive sur l'efficacité énergétique.

Certains points vont dans le bon sens, comme la reconnaissance des problèmes de compétitivité de nos industries à forte intensité d'énergie par rapport aux concurrents des pays tiers ou le fait que l'objectif d'efficacité énergétique s'accompagne d'une certaine latitude laissée aux États membres afin d'adapter leurs instruments au contexte national.

Cependant, des objectifs contraignants sont fixés par la DEE, notamment celui d'un niveau absolu de consommation d'énergie finale, alors même que les politiques d'austérité imposées par Bruxelles empêchent les États de fournir les investissements nécessaires.

Mara Bizzotto (ENF), *per iscritto*. – La relazione Pieper risulta faziosa e non condivisibile. In essa si lamenta la carente attuazione della direttiva efficienza energetica negli Stati membri, ma volutamente non si menziona mai la causa vera di tale carenza da parte degli Stati: il regime del Patto di Stabilità, imposto dall'UE, che impedisce gli investimenti necessari per adempiere alla normativa. Per questo motivo non ho sostenuto col mio voto questo testo.

José Blanco López (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D), *raštu*. – Balsavau dėl šio pranešimo, nes juo Parlamentas aptaria energijos vartojimo efektyvumo direktyvos įgyvendinimo ataskaitą.

Parlamentas pabrėžia, jog Europos Sąjunga eina tikrai teisingu keliu, kad pasiektų 2020 m. užsibrėžtus tikslus: sumažinti išmetamą CO₂ kiekį, padidinti visos suvartojamos energijos kiekį sudarančių atsinaujinančiųjų energijos išteklių dalį bei padidinti energijos vartojimo efektyvumą. Didžiaja dalimi tai nulėmė sėkminga ATLPs sistema. Ji ne tik teikia paskatas mažinti išmetamų kiekį, bet ir skatina investicijas į efektyvaus energijos vartojimo technologijas. Žinoma, kad tikslai buvo pasiekti tik iš dalies, nulėmė ekonomikos ir finansų krizė kai kuriose šalyse.

Tačiau susirūpinimą kelia su ataskaitų teikimu energetikos srityje susijusi biurokratija ir didelės kainos vidutiniams pramoniniams vartotojams ir namų ūkiams. Dėl energijos taupymo atsirandantis kainų mažinimo poveikis išnyksta dėl specialių valstybinių atskaitymų ir daug sąnaudų reikalaujančio ataskaitų teikimo.

Andrea Bocskor (PPE), *írásban*. – 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a széndioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa. Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését.

Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ennek ellenére a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem reális elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben. A fentiek miatt a végszavazásnál nem támogattam a jelentés elfogadását.

Simona Bonafè (S&D), *per iscritto*. – Nel quadro degli obiettivi stabiliti nel corso della COP21 di Parigi e delle azioni necessarie per il conseguimento di un'Unione dell'energia resiliente e dotata di una politica climatica efficace e lungimirante, l'efficienza energetica riveste sicuramente un ruolo di primaria importanza. Ciononostante, i risultati ad oggi ottenuti dalla direttiva sull'efficienza energetica appaiono insufficienti, con un divario considerevole in termini di reale implementazione fra i vari paesi europei. Alcuni Stati membri, infatti, non hanno ottemperato, o almeno non completamente, agli obblighi di stabilire normative interne che favoriscano l'efficienza energetica, dando luogo a un quadro generale sensibilmente eterogeneo e che delinea una certa difficoltà verso il raggiungimento degli obiettivi fissati per il 2020.

Questo trend deve sicuramente cambiare, ed è ciò che ha chiesto oggi il Parlamento europeo. Se vogliamo, infatti, che l'Unione europea continui a mantenere la sua leadership in materia di azione per il clima, riuscendo contemporaneamente ad aumentare la sicurezza energetica dei propri cittadini e a diminuire la dipendenza dall'approvvigionamento estero, occorre uno sforzo maggiore e più coordinato a livello europeo, basato su obiettivi vincolanti e che non si fermi al 2020, ma guardi al 2030 ed oltre, come richiesto a gran voce dal gruppo dei Socialisti e Democratici.

David Borrelli (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Abbiamo votato a favore della relazione sull'implementazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica perché nel corso del voto sugli emendamenti in plenaria non sono stati eliminati i richiami agli obiettivi ambiziosi e vincolanti a livello europeo e nazionale. Noi vogliamo che l'Unione europea fissi obiettivi vincolanti al 40 % per l'efficienza energetica e almeno al 30 % per le rinnovabili, tradotti sempre in specifici obiettivi nazionali. E bisognerà valorizzare il ruolo dei cittadini nel più ampio processo di transizione energetica verso un modello decentralizzato di produzione di energia basato sulle rinnovabili. È cruciale che l'unione dell'energia abbia davvero al centro i cittadini e permetta così a tutti gli europei di sottrarsi alle costrizioni e agli equilibri ballerini della geopolitica dell'energia.

Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report which was an implementation report by Markus Pieper on the Energy Efficiency Directive.

The Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) establishes a framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency in the EU and sets a non-binding target of 20% energy efficiency improvements by 2020. The EU as a whole is expected to fall short of this non-binding target, although the Commission and the rapporteur are optimistic and claim we can still reach the target. This report further calls for full implementation of existing legislation, accelerated efforts and the removal of barriers to investment.

In the committee phase, my political group, GUE/NGL, tabled alternative compromise amendments with other progressive groups calling for a binding 40% target on energy efficiency for 2030. This is positive, as it displays political will and commitment to the Paris climate change agreement.

Renata Briano (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'Unione europea è la realtà territoriale leader nel mondo per la riduzione delle emissioni dei gas serra, calati del 23 % negli ultimi vent'anni. Le imprese e i cittadini europei hanno iniziato a realizzare crescita, creando posti di lavoro e generando gettito fiscale, in maniera ecosostenibile. L'UE e gli Stati membri sono quindi sulla buona strada ma devono impegnarsi maggiormente per raggiungere gli obiettivi della Strategia Europea 2020. È necessaria la riduzione del 20 % delle emissioni di CO₂, dell'aumento del 20 % della quota di vettori energetici rinnovabili nei consumi totali e del miglioramento del 20 % dell'efficienza energetica.

La Commissione e il Parlamento devono sostenere gli sforzi per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi, in particolare lavorando per ridurre la burocrazia nel settore energetico e per ridurre gli elevati livelli dei prezzi per medie imprese e utenze domestiche: agli effetti di calmiera dei risparmi energetici si contrappongono infatti gli oneri fiscali specifici nazionali e una complessa procedura di rendiconto. Un progresso importante è l'efficientamento energetico: l'attuazione della direttiva sarà fondamentale per il risparmio dei cittadini e delle imprese, oltre che al raggiungimento degli obiettivi di Europa 2020. Sprecare meno ed efficientare le reti energetiche sono i pilastri fondamentali per un futuro ecosostenibile.

Steeve Briois (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport évalue la mise en œuvre de la directive relative à l'efficacité énergétique dans la perspective de sa révision. Le rapporteur met l'accent sur les potentielles économies d'énergies à réaliser, en particulier celles liées à la rénovation du parc immobilier. Bien qu'appelant à davantage de mesures contraignantes, ce texte insiste sur la flexibilité qui doit être accordée aux États membres dans la transposition des directives européennes. Une fois n'est pas coutume, ce texte aborde même la problématique du déficit de compétitivité de nos industries à forte intensité énergétique par rapport à leurs concurrents extra-communautaires, mais sans jamais contester le libre-échange généralisé qui exacerbe la concurrence internationale déloyale. Enfin, le texte inclut un paragraphe remettant en cause l'austérité actuelle qui empêche les États membres de financer les investissements nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs en matière d'efficacité énergétique. Je me suis tout de même abstenu sur ce texte, qui appelle à davantage de mesures contraignantes.

Daniel Buda (PPE), *în scris*. – Raportul referitor la punerea în aplicare a Directivei privind eficiența energetică conține mai multe puncte pozitive, cum ar fi importanța eficienței energetice pentru atingerea obiectivelor climatice, necesitatea unei mai bune monitorizări și clarificarea definiției IMM-urilor și a normelor privind ajutoarele de stat. Obligațiile de raportare excesive sunt criticate și se cere o concentrare mai puternică asupra eficienței energetice în loc de economisire a energiei.

Cu toate acestea, există o serie de prevederi importante, așa cum este cea referitoare la ținta de eficiență energetică de 40 % pentru 2030, care, din punctul meu de vedere, nu sunt rezonabile și nici tangibile. Astfel, am votat împotriva acestui raport, considerând că avem nevoie de ținte mult mai fezabile.

Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PPE), *in writing*. – Greenhouse gas emissions have steadily reduced by increasing the share of renewable energy sources in energy consumption. The Energy Efficiency Directive aims to encourage Member States to invest in energy efficient technologies. While the scheme may aid in starting the transition towards a more sustainable energy system, the Directive is poorly implemented, hindering its full potential.

The unambitious target of 27% for improving energy efficiency in 2030 can only be justified by an extremely unrealistic high discount rate. In light of the Paris climate change agreement, there should be a 2030 target that better reflects the level of cost-effective energy efficiency potential. This high discount rate overlooks the role of public bodies in driving energy efficiency improvements.

There should be new innovative and smart solutions to better utilise renewable energy and to reduce energy consumption. For these reasons, I voted against the resolution on the implementation report of the Energy Efficiency Directive. In devising energy efficiency plans, energy audits based on reducing energy consumption must be conducted to address energy poverty. There needs to be a more comprehensive approach to improving energy efficiency.

Soledad Cabezón Ruiz (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Alain Cadec (PPE), par écrit. – La mise en œuvre de la directive relative à l'efficacité énergétique est primordiale pour atteindre l'objectif de 20 % que l'Union européenne s'est fixée pour 2020. L'Union a fait énormément de progrès en la matière alors même que la directive n'est pas encore transposée dans le droit de tous les États membres. La première chose à faire est de contrôler l'application de la directive dans les États membres. Nous pourrions ainsi veiller à la cohérence de la politique de l'Union en matière d'efficacité énergétique. J'ai voté contre ce rapport, car je n'étais pas en faveur de la mise en place d'un objectif contraignant d'efficacité énergétique de 40 % à l'horizon 2030. Nous devons répondre de manière appropriée aux défis environnementaux. Ce n'est pas en se fixant des objectifs contraignants, impossibles à atteindre et qui brimeront la compétitivité de nos entreprises que nous arriverons à nos fins. Il est vrai que nous devons faire des efforts non négligeables en matière d'efficacité énergétique, mais nous devons le faire progressivement. D'autres composantes, telles que la compétitivité, les emplois et la croissance, doivent être prises en considération.

Nicola Caputo (S&D), per iscritto. – Oggi ho votato a favore della relazione in questione per far sì che sia attuata in pieno e in tempi più rapidi la legislazione comunitaria in materia di efficienza energetica e che venga raggiunto l'obiettivo chiave dell'UE, cioè quello di portare al 20 % il risparmio energetico entro il 2020. Ribadisco, inoltre, la richiesta del Parlamento di introdurre obiettivi vincolanti capaci di garantire che le energie rinnovabili rappresentino almeno il 30 % del consumo totale di energia entro il 2030.

Bisogna investire maggiormente in programmi di informazione e di sostegno negli Stati membri, che potrebbero aiutare ad aumentare la partecipazione agli attuali regimi obbligatori di efficienza energetica locali, nonché promuovere nuovi progressi tecnici in settori quali raffreddamento, illuminazione e isolamento.

Difatti, il ruolo dei consumatori è decisivo per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi di efficienza energetica, ad esempio attraverso la ristrutturazione degli edifici, il teleriscaldamento e i sistemi di raffreddamento. Sottolineo che la ristrutturazione ad alta efficienza energetica degli edifici dovrebbe essere una priorità, in modo da aiutare i residenti colpiti da povertà energetica.

Infine, è fondamentale conseguire i nostri obiettivi in materia di efficienza energetica, abbandonando le fonti energetiche fossili ed eliminando gradualmente i sussidi destinati a questi combustibili.

David Casa (PPE), in writing. – This report is very positive and brings forward a number of good points, but at the end I voted against this report as it contained a number of measures and targets which I believe would be difficult to achieve. In my view this would put unnecessary pressure on both energy producers and consumers without likely achieving our aim at the end.

Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), per iscritto. – Ho votato a favore della relazione sull'attuazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica. La relazione tiene conto dell'essenziale insuccesso della direttiva e della mancata implementazione ad opera di numerosi Stati membri. Condivido le proposte per la realizzazione di un migliore coordinamento reciproco ed efficientamento delle varie disposizioni legislative comunitarie, nonché il riferimento al contributo che le politiche di efficienza energetica dovrebbero apportare al raggiungimento degli obiettivi di occupazione e innovazione.

Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου (PPE), γραπτώς. – Τηρούμε αποχή καθώς η έκθεση εμπεριέχει τόσο θετικά, όσο και αρνητικά σημεία.

Κώστας Χρυσόγονος (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Η έκθεση με θέμα την έκθεση εφαρμογής σχετικά με την οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση αφορά ένα τυπικό ζήτημα ανάλυσης και συζήτησης για την πορεία της σχετικής έκθεσης, εν τούτοις αποτελεί μια σωστή προσπάθεια που προωθεί διαδικασίες σχετικές με ζητήματα όχι μόνο ενεργειακά και οικονομικά αλλά και περιβαλλοντικά. Θεωρώ πως κινείται στη σωστή κατεύθυνση και γι' αυτό τον λόγο ψήφισα θετικά.

Alberto Cirio (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Con dispiacere ho votato contro questa proposta che ritenevo, in parte, utile all'Unione. Dico con dispiacere poiché sono d'accordo in un miglior risparmio energetico da parte delle imprese, ma non sono per niente d'accordo nell'imporre un risparmio obbligatorio del 40%. Oltre ad un risparmio energetico, quello che serve all'Unione europea è una migliore efficienza del settore, ma non possiamo chiedere alle imprese di essere più efficienti se gli imponiamo una percentuale così elevata di risparmio. Così facendo mettiamo seriamente a rischio gli imprenditori che saranno costretti a ridurre notevolmente la produzione industriale ed i lavoratori che si troveranno potenzialmente disoccupati. Ho dunque votato contro questa proposta.

Deirdre Clune (PPE), *in writing*. – I supported this report, which reviewed the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive. The EU is on the way to reaching its 20% efficiency target for 2020, which demonstrates that energy efficiency is in the own interest of businesses and households.

Carlos Coelho (PPE), *por escrito*. – As emissões de gases com efeito de estufa diminuíram 23% na UE entre 1990 e 2014, tendo nesse mesmo período o PIB da UE aumentado 46%. A UE está, pois, no bom caminho para alcançar os objetivos fixados para 2020 de redução de 20% das emissões de CO₂, aumento para 20% da quota de energias renováveis no consumo total de energia e de 20% de aumento da eficácia energética.

O aumento da eficiência energética e a poupança de energia desempenha um papel importante para a proteção do ambiente e do clima, o reforço da competitividade da indústria, a criação de emprego, a segurança do aprovisionamento, o combate à pobreza energética.

Apoio o presente relatório pois considero que é necessário suprimir os obstáculos económicos, regulamentares e administrativos para permitir que os cidadãos participem no sistema energético.

Por outro lado, é essencial dar início, o mais rapidamente possível, à transição para um sistema de energia mais sustentável assente nas energias renováveis. O bom funcionamento de um mercado interno da energia, incluindo o dos serviços de eficiência energética, contribui para a otimização dos sistemas energéticos em benefício de todos os consumidores e para uma melhoria substancial da eficiência energética na Europa.

Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero un avance necesario exigir una mejora del 40% en los objetivos nacionales de eficiencia para 2030, corrigiendo la propuesta a la baja del Consejo, del 27%. Esto exigirá también una revisión del funcionamiento hasta la actualidad de la directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética, cuya inaplicación, excesiva flexibilidad y falta de concreción es adecuadamente resalada en el documento.

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), *per iscritto*. – In generale, gli Stati membri sono sulla buona strada nel conseguimento degli obiettivi 20-20-20. Una evoluzione positiva dipesa in gran parte dai risultati del sistema di incentivi per minori emissioni, capace di innescare investimenti in tecnologie più efficienti. Come spesso accade, però, il quadro non è uniforme e sono presenti sacche di resistenza forti, dove gli obiettivi sono a rischio.

Questo, in generale è dipeso maggiore o minore incidenza della crisi economica, ma anche dalla maggiore o minore capacità di coinvolgere imprese e i cittadini che, solo laddove percepiscono un interesse diretto dell'efficienza, si mostrano proattivi nell'applicazione delle norme. In generale dobbiamo agire in due direzioni. Da un punto di vista normativo, dobbiamo mettere in sicurezza le conquiste realizzate, che potrebbero essere perse se non si intervenisse subito con una revisione della direttiva che ne estenda le disposizioni oltre il 2030.

In secondo luogo, occorre che gli Stati membri in difficoltà agiscano per massimizzare la disponibilità e la sensibilità di consumatori e imprese verso il conseguimento degli obiettivi. Senza il loro sostegno e il loro coinvolgimento le norme saranno percepite solo come punitive e restrittive e questo metterà a rischio gli obiettivi.

Edward Czesak (ECR), na piśmie. – W UE emisje gazów cieplarnianych zmniejszyły się w latach 1990-2014 o 23%. W tym samym czasie PKB UE wzrósł o 46%. Przy coraz mniejszym obciążeniu klimatu przedsiębiorstwa i obywatele osiągają większy wzrost gospodarczy, tworzą więcej miejsc pracy i generują dochody podatkowe. Sprawozdanie postuluje przegląd dyrektywy pod kątem ukształtowania jej w bardziej spójny akt prawa Unii. Przedmiotowe sprawozdanie oferuje punkt wyjścia w tym zakresie, np. wymianę najlepszych praktyk między państwami członkowskimi oraz nowe możliwości finansowania (np. z planu Junckera). Mimo że jestem w stanie poprzeć te deklaracje, zgłosiłem przeciw sprawozdaniu ze względu na powtarzające się nawoływania do wprowadzenia wiążących celów, jeśli chodzi o efektywność energetyczną na poziomie UE i poszczególnych jej krajów.

Miriam Dalli (S&D), in writing. – The report outlines how the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive, which sets rules and obligations to help the EU reach its 2020 energy efficiency target, is being implemented by the Member States. The Commission should revise the text and prioritise and address energy poverty.

Andor Deli (PPE), írásban. – 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a széndioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa. Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését.

Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ennek ellenére a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem realis elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben.

Jean-Paul Denanot (S&D), par écrit. – L'énergie la moins chère est celle que l'on ne consomme pas. Partant, l'efficacité énergétique doit être considérée comme une source d'énergie à part entière qui représente la quantité en Nw (négawatts) d'énergie économisée, comme l'histoire récente du monde et de l'Europe l'a démontré de façon irréfutable. Dans ce secteur comme dans d'autres, les initiatives citoyennes et celles prises au niveau des collectivités sont des plus pertinentes et la législation européenne doit les accompagner et les faciliter. Avec les rédacteurs de cette résolution, j'estime que le potentiel d'économies d'énergie au niveau local devrait être bien mieux exploité, étant donné que les autorités locales et régionales ont un rôle central à jouer dans la réalisation de l'efficacité énergétique et de manière générale dans la transition énergétique. C'est à ce niveau aussi que l'on peut mieux traiter les questions d'égalité d'accès et de précarité énergétique pour lesquelles nous devons être extrêmement vigilants, afin que les économies résultantes de «l'efficacité énergétique» ne soient pas réservées à ceux (particuliers et entreprises) qui ont les moyens de faire les investissements nécessaires.

Mireille D'Ornano (ENF), par écrit. – Ce rapport relatif à la mise en œuvre de la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique (DEE) met l'accent sur la recherche permanente d'économies d'énergie, dans le but de renforcer à la fois notre sécurité énergétique et notre compétitivité économique. Il encourage notamment la rénovation du parc immobilier mal isolé, les administrations publiques devant montrer l'exemple, tout en laissant aux États membres une flexibilité dans la transposition des directives. Il souligne les problèmes de compétitivité de nos industries à forte intensité d'énergie, par rapport à leurs concurrents extra-communautaires. Néanmoins, la DEE fixe des «objectifs sous la forme d'un niveau absolu de consommation d'énergie primaire et de consommation d'énergie finale». Or une telle austérité énergétique risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries. Pour cette raison, je me suis abstenue.

Ангел Джамбазки (ECR), в писмена форма. – Гласувах против доклада за изпълнението на Директивата относно енергийната ефективност, защото смятам, че енергийната ефективност трябва да е приоритет на държавите членки, а не на Европейската комисия, която да създава допълнителна бюрократична тежест. Смятам, че пазарът би регулирал енергийната ефективност най-сполучливо.

Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI), γραπτώς. – Υπερψηφίζουμε. Η έκθεση αφορά την εφαρμογή ήδη υπάρχουσας οδηγίας και τη βελτίωσή της. Βεβαίως δεν αποφεύγει κάποιες λεκτικές υπερβολές και τη συνηθισμένη εχθρότητα κατά της Ρωσίας, αλλά είναι σε γενικές γραμμές απαραίτητη για την Ευρώπη και ωφέλιμη για το περιβάλλον.

Norbert Erdős (PPE), *írásban*. – 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a széndioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa. Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését.

Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ennek ellenére a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem reális elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben.

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE), *por escrito*. – As emissões de gases com efeito de estufa diminuíram 23 % na UE entre 1990 e 2014. No mesmo período, o PIB da UE aumentou 46 %. A União Europeia encontra-se no bom caminho para alcançar os objetivos fixados para 2020 de redução de 20 % das emissões de CO₂, de aumento para 20 % da quota de energias renováveis no consumo total de energia e de 20 % de aumento da eficiência energética.

As inquietações que têm surgido prendem-se com a burocracia em matéria de apresentação de relatórios e com os níveis elevados dos preços energéticos para os consumidores industriais médios e para as famílias.

A aplicação da Diretiva também é importante. A este respeito, importa salientar, em primeiro lugar, que a União Europeia irá alcançar o seu objetivo de eficiência de 20 % para 2020, mesmo se a maioria dos Estados-Membros não tiver aplicado integralmente a Diretiva. Isto demonstra a força do mercado.

Edouard Ferrand (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce texte. En raison du Pacte de stabilité, il est quasi impossible pour les États membres d'effectuer les lourds investissements requis par la DEE elle-même.

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – A eficiência energética é uma questão candente, particularmente para países como Portugal com um enorme défice energético e uma significativa dependência face ao exterior. O relatório aborda a aplicação da Diretiva relativa à eficiência energética. Aponta medidas interessantes e pertinentes, visando a poupança de energia. Fá-lo, porém, sempre no quadro estrito e redutor da chamada «União da Energia» e da visão liberalizadora e desreguladora que a norteia. O que constitui motivo fundamental de divergência face ao seu conteúdo.

O relatório refere que as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa diminuíram 23% na UE entre 1990 e 2014. Não refere, todavia, o contributo para tal da crise económica, mais do que qualquer transição de paradigma energético.

Cauciona o mercado e as suas perversidades.

Critica os elevados preços da energia para os consumidores industriais médios e para as famílias. Refere que os efeitos da redução dos custos através da poupança de energia são erodidos por impostos estatais. E passa ao lado dos lucros fabulosos e escandalosos dos monopólios e oligopólios privados que operam no sector. Assim como, evidentemente, passa também ao lado da necessidade do controlo público, democrático, do sector. Significando a sua propriedade e gestão públicas. Como meio imprescindível para alcançar desejados e proclamados objetivos económicos, sociais e ambientais.

Raffaele Fitto (ECR), *per iscritto*. – Ho votato a favore della relazione poiché come dimostrano i dati, le emissioni di gas a effetto serra, all'interno dell'Unione europea, sono calate del 23 % tra il 1990 e il 2014. Si va, dunque, verso il conseguimento degli obiettivi, fissati per il 2020, della riduzione del 20% delle emissioni di CO₂, dell'aumento del 20 % della quota di vettori energetici rinnovabili nei consumi totali e del miglioramento del 20 % dell'efficienza energetica.

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), *písomne*. – Európska únia je jedným zo svetových lídrov v oblasti znižovania emisií skleníkových plynov. Európska únia je na veľmi dobrej ceste, pokiaľ ide o dosiahnutie cieľov stanovených na rok 2020, medzi ktoré patrí 20 % zníženie emisií CO₂, zvýšenie podielu energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov v celkovej spotrebe energie na 20 % a 20 % zvýšenie energetickej efektívnosti. Do veľkej miery je to možné vďaka úspešnému systému obchodovania s emisiami. Sú tu však aj negatívne stránky v oblasti podávania správ v oblasti energetiky, medzi ktoré nepochybne patrí strata úspor energie v dôsledku rôznych štátnych poplatkov a nákladného podávania správ. Európska únia má totižto v súčasnosti v určitej miere protichodnú legislatívu a právne predpisy v oblasti ochrany klímy. Európska komisia by preto mala v budúcnosti vyvinúť úsilie pri vytváraní európskeho trhu s elektrickou energiou a legislatívy v oblasti energetickej politiky.

Lorenzo Fontana (ENF), *per iscritto*. – Voto contrario alla relazione in quanto non tiene conto della realtà dei fatti.

Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI), *γραπτώς*. – Υπερψηφίζω την έκθεση με θέμα την έκθεση εφαρμογής σχετικά με την οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση (2012/27/ΕΕ), καθώς αφορά την εφαρμογή ήδη υπάρχουσας οδηγίας και την βελτίωση της. Βεβαίως δεν αποφεύγει κάποιες λεκτικές υπερβολές και την συνηθισμένη εχθρότητα κατά της Ρωσίας, αλλά είναι σε γενικές γραμμές απαραίτητη για την Ευρώπη και ωφέλιμη για το περιβάλλον.

Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), *in writing*. – Increased energy efficiency and energy saving are key factors for, among others, environmental and climate protection, strengthening economic competitiveness and job creation. The fact that the EU is not on track to meet its 2020 energy efficiency target due to poor implementation of the EED, excessive flexibility and too many loopholes is extremely disappointing. The Commission projects on which we are on track reach 17.6% instead of 20% for 2020. We must keep calling on the Commission to propose a revised text eliminating loopholes and taking into account a target for 2030 of 40%. The 2030 target should be significantly higher and more ambitious than the one set by the European Council, which is only 27%.

Finally, I believe that the energy efficiency directive should prioritise measures to alleviate energy poverty.

Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), *írásban*. – Pozitív szavazatommal támogattam az energiahatékonysági irányelvről készült jelentést. 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a szén-dioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa.

Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését. Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ennek ellenére a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem reális elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben.

Iratxe García Pérez (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este informe por la mayoría del Parlamento Europeo a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra de un Partido Popular Europeo (PPE) que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Además, en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra en contra de aquellas medidas a favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética. Sin embargo, dichas medidas sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas que favorezcan a los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo. Por ello, espero que el informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete ante el Parlamento Europeo por los escándalos que le salpican.

Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), per iscritto. – L'efficienza energetica è un obiettivo fondamentale per raggiungere gli obiettivi in materia di sostenibilità ambientale fissati solennemente a Parigi pochi mesi fa, obiettivi che sono in linea con gli impegni assunti dall'UE da molti anni a livello internazionale. È pertanto molto importante poter effettuare oggi un monitoraggio sull'attuazione di una delle direttive più rilevanti della legislazione ambientale europea. La relazione che oggi votiamo riconosce l'effetto positivo che la direttiva ha avuto ma allo stesso tempo riconosce gli ostacoli che ancora si incontrano ad una sua piena attuazione. Mi associo quindi all'invito che la relazione rivolge in particolare alle autorità locali perché producano maggiori sforzi in questo senso.

Elena Gentile (S&D), per iscritto. – Ho votato a favore della risoluzione del PE sull'attuazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica (2012/27/UE), perché ritengo che sia molto importante inviare un segnale agli Stati membri affinché continuino a impegnarsi nel raggiungimento degli obiettivi di efficienza energetica dell'UE –risparmio del 20% entro il 2020– e attuino in pieno la legislazione comunitaria in vigore e in tempi più rapidi.

Nell'UE le emissioni di gas a effetto serra sono calate del 23% tra il 1990 e il 2014. Nel contempo il PIL dell'UE è aumentato del 46%. Con un'incidenza sempre minore sul clima le imprese e i cittadini realizzano crescita, creano posti di lavoro e generano gettito fiscale.

L'Unione europea è sulla buona strada, verso il conseguimento dell'obiettivo stabilito per il 2020 della riduzione del 20% delle emissioni di CO₂, dell'aumento del 20% della quota di vettori energetici rinnovabili nei consumi totali e del miglioramento del 20% dell'efficienza energetica. Tale evoluzione è dipesa in gran parte dai risultati positivi del sistema ETS. Esso presenta non solo incentivi per minori emissioni, ma innesca anche investimenti in tecnologie con maggiore efficienza energetica.

Sicuramente il raggiungimento degli obiettivi dipende anche in parte dalla crisi economica e finanziaria in alcuni paesi.

Arne Gericke (ECR), schriftlich. – Ich habe gegen den Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz gestimmt. Der europäische Rahmen ist zu starr, er fördert nicht Maßnahmen für mehr Energieeffizienz – er behindert sie. Das berücksichtigt der vorgelegte Bericht nicht.

Adam Gierek (S&D), na piśmie. – Wstrzymałem się od głosowania nad tym sprawozdaniem. Chciałbym zaznaczyć, iż Polska - owszem - zgodziła się na 20-procentowy wzrost efektywności energetycznej do roku 2020. Sądzę jednak, że polski prezydent, kiedy podpisywał się pod tym celem politycznym, nie wiedział, w jaki sposób ta efektywność będzie liczona. Nie wierzę, by mógł się zgodzić, że będzie ona wyznaczana dla całego państwa metodą fizykalną, tak jakby to było jakieś urządzenie, a przecież gospodarka to „dynamiczny mechanizm”, który się rozwija. Użytkowanie energii per capita w Polsce należy do najniższych w UE. Wiadomo zaś, że dobrobyt krajów unijnych jest proporcjonalny do wskaźnika użytkowania w nich energii liczonej na mieszkańca. Pytam się: czy ta polityka ograniczania ma na celu obniżenie poziomu życia w Polsce? Ograniczenie użytkowania energii również po 2030 r. jako wskaźnik efektywności można by odnieść jedynie do wówczas zastanej i niezmiennącej się gospodarki. Był i nadal jest to gruby błąd wprowadzony do dyrektywy efektywnościowej. Najlepszym sposobem wyjścia z tej pułapki byłoby odniesienie wskaźnika wzrostu efektywności do początkowego i końcowego PKB w formie stosownego ilorazu, wyrażonego w procentach.

Jens Gieseke (PPE), schriftlich. – Durch die bindenden und unrealistischen Ziele, Energie bis 2030 um bis zu 40% einzusparen, blockieren die linksgerichteten Parteien das gemeinsame EU-Ziel, Energie effizienter zu nutzen. Energieverbote werden sich negativ auf die Ziele von höherer Energieeffizienz auswirken. Statt Energieverbrauch zu verbieten, sollten wir lieber auf positive Anreize durch Steuererleichterungen setzen. Nur so kann realistische Energieeinsparung gelingen.

Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Hemos votado a favor del informe porque subraya la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia energética como manera de luchar contra el cambio climático. Propone objetivos vinculantes por países. El aspecto vinculante es un punto clave porque obliga los países a cumplir con estos objetivos mientras que la flexibilidad deja la puerta abierta a objetivos insuficientes. Además, no se contenta del objetivo del 27% en el 2030 fijado por el Consejo y la Comisión sino propone el objetivo más ambicioso del 40%. Propone también centrar las medidas sobre los hogares en situación de pobreza energética, aspecto que nos parece de primera importancia.

Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D), por escrito. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Antanas Guoga (ALDE), in writing. – I voted in favour. The Commission called for additional efforts towards a coherent climate and energy policy and a Europe-wide electricity market design. The implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive plays a major role here. It would demonstrate the power of the market. If businesses and citizens recognise that energy efficiency and energy saving are in their own interest, there is no need for European Union regulation. At the same time, however, the directive provides further encouragement for significant innovations in relation to obligations and incentives in the Member States.

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), por escrito. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

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Τάκης Χατζηγεωργίου (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Τηρήσαμε αποχή στην συγκεκριμένη έκθεση, διότι από τη μια στο κείμενο υπάρχουν θετικές αναφορές αναφορικά με την ανάγκη η εν λόγω οδηγία να είναι σύμφωνη με τους στόχους για την προστασία του κλίματος καθώς και με την ανάγκη προώθησης μέτρων για την καταπολέμηση της ενεργειακής φτώχειας και στήριξης των ευάλωτων ομάδων. Ωστόσο είναι ξεκάθαρο πως οι πολιτικές που προτείνονται και προωθούνται είναι στο πλαίσιο και εξυπηρετούν την υλοποίηση της Ενεργειακής Ένωσης, για την οποία έχουμε ασκήσει έντονη κριτική. Στόχος είναι να υπάρξει μια ισχυρή εσωτερική αγορά, για να καταστεί η ΕΕ ανταγωνιστικότερη στην παγκόσμια αγορά. Αρα οι πολιτικές που προωθούνται δεν εξυπηρετούν τις ανάγκες και τα συμφέροντα της κοινωνίας αλλά χρησιμοποιείται η ενέργεια ως εργαλείο για να υπηρετήσει τις ανάγκες της αγοράς.

Brian Hayes (PPE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this report as I had no objections to the results of the review.

György Hölvényi (PPE), *írásban*. – 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a széndioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa. Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését.

Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ugyanakkor a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem reális elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben.

Филиз Хюсменова (ALDE), *в писмена форма*. – Уважаеми колеги,

подкрепям доклада за изпълнението на Директивата относно енергийната ефективност. Повишаването на енергийната ефективност и постигането на икономии на енергия са ключови фактори за опазването на околната среда и климата, за подобряването на конкурентоспособността на икономиката, за създаването на работни места. Също така, те гарантират сигурността на енергийните доставки и борбата срещу енергийната бедност.

Инвестициите и мерките за енергийна ефективност, които предвижда Директивата за енергийната ефективност, ще спомогнат за подобряване на стандарта на живот чрез намаляване на горивната бедност, повишаване на производителността, подобряване на безопасността и здравето на хората.

Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), *în scris*. – Am votat în favoarea acestui raport referitor la rolul important al eficienței energetice, acela de îndeplinire a obiectivului Uniunii Europene privind creșterea cu 20% a producției și reducerea cu 20% a emisiilor de CO₂ până în 2020. Această Directivă reprezintă o ocazie de optimizare și creștere eficientă a consumului de energie într-un mod sustenabil pentru economie.

Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), *napisan*. – Glasao sam za Izvješće o Izvješću o napretku u području obnovljive energije budući da je Europa na dobrom putu da postigne svoje ciljeve do 2020. godine u spomenutom području. Upravo kombinacija obvezujućih nacionalnih ciljeva, nacionalnih planova u području energije iz obnovljivih izvora i dvogodišnjih izvješća o praćenju pokazala se ključnim pokretačem razvoja kapaciteta za obnovljivu energiju u Uniji jer su se troškovi energije iz obnovljivih izvora znatno smanjili u posljednjih nekoliko godina. Obnovljiva je energija sve konkurentnija konvencionalno proizvedenoj energiji, što otvara jedinstvenu priliku za stvaranje istinske europske energetske politike kojom bi se potaknula konkurentnost i smanjile emisije stakleničkih plinova.

Jean-François Jalkh (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport traite de la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique (DEE) dans le cadre de l'évaluation de sa mise en œuvre et dans la perspective de sa révision.

Le leitmotiv de ce texte est que «l'efficacité énergétique doit être considérée comme une source d'énergie à part entière qui représente la quantité en Nw (négawatts) d'énergie économisée». Le texte insiste sur la «flexibilité» qui doit être laissée aux États membres dans la transposition des directives, «pour que la combinaison d'outils et d'instruments soit adaptée au niveau national». En raison du Pacte de stabilité, il est quasi impossible pour les États membres d'effectuer les lourds investissements requis par la DEE elle-même. J'ai donc décidé de m'abstenir sur ce texte.

Ramón Jáuregui Atondo (S&D), *por escrito*. – he votado a favor de este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Benedek Jávor (Verts/ALE), *in writing*. – Ahead of the revision of the directive in question, I supported the report in which the European Parliament has highlighted the role of energy savings and improved efficiency in achieving the EU's energy and climate goals, including the mitigation of energy poverty.

The EP has sent a strong signal to Commission and called for the continuation of the framework beyond 2020. The EP has called for the EU's 2030 energy efficiency target to be brought in line with the commitments made in Paris, thus to be increased to 40% with the introduction of binding national targets. As for the existing directive, the implementation should be improved by removing loopholes, especially in Article 7. Synergies with the development of renewables must be exploited to the fullest.

These would ensure predictability and stability for investors, an adequate level of investments and thus we can avoid technological lock-in incompatible with the EU's long-term goals.

Petr Ježek (ALDE), *písemně*. – Ačkoli směrnice o energetické účinnosti nastartovala pozitivní vývoj v členských státech, nedostatečná implementace podřívá její potenciál. Členské státy byly vyzvány, aby podporovaly inteligentní měřiče a transparentní účtování jako způsob podpory zodpovědnějšího chování zákazníků s ohledem na spotřebu a investice do energetické účinnosti. K dosažení vytyčených cílů je ještě potřeba mnoho společného úsilí, podpořil jsem proto svým hlasem zprávu, která upozorňuje na nedostatky a urguje členské státy i Komisi, aby v implementaci směrnice podnikly efektivní a včasné kroky.

Philippe Juvin (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté en faveur de ce rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la directive relative à l'efficacité énergétique. Le texte souligne que l'Union est en bonne voie pour atteindre ses objectifs (20 % d'efficacité énergétique d'ici 2020), mais invite néanmoins les États membres à mieux appliquer la directive, car l'Union importe encore plus de la moitié de son énergie.

Εύα Καϊλή (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Υπερψήφισα την έκθεση σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας για την ενεργειακή απόδοση, καθώς θεωρώ πως είναι απαραίτητη από την πλευρά της Ένωσης η υιοθέτηση μιας στρατηγικής για μεγαλύτερη ενεργειακή απόδοση. Είναι πολύ σημαντικό το γεγονός ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση επιτυγχάνει τον στόχο του 20% για το 2020, παρόλο που η οδηγία δεν εφαρμόζεται πλήρως στα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη. Ο στόχος του 40% για το 2030 είναι αρκετά φιλόδοξος αλλά, ανάλογα και με την πορεία της οικονομίας στην Ένωση, ίσως καταστεί εφικτός.

Barbara Kappel (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Im Bericht sind einige sehr unterstützenswerte Forderungen enthalten, die für eine Stärkung der Energieeffizienz in Europa nützlich wären und dem Konsumenten helfen, Strom und Geld zu sparen. Gewisse Forderungen schießen jedoch weit über das Ziel hinaus und sind mit hohen Kosten und Aufwand bei der Umsetzung verbunden. Außerdem wird in diesem Bericht Energieeffizienz mit Energieeinsparung vermischt, gleichzeitig aber vermehrt Produktion aus erneuerbaren Quellen gefordert, was sich insofern widerspricht, als der Anteil dieser Energie nur unter gewissen Bedingungen ein Substitut für Energie aus herkömmlichen Quellen sein kann. Aus diesen Überlegungen enthalte ich mich zu diesem Bericht.

Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL), *písemně*. – Dne 23. 6. jsme na dodatečném plenárním zasedání Evropského parlamentu v Bruselu hlasovali o zprávě výboru ITRE o provádění směrnice o energetické účinnosti. I když byl za hlavní gesční výbor pro tuto zprávu určen výbor ITRE, výbor ENVI, jehož jsem členkou, vydal k problematice připravované směrnice o energetické účinnosti také zprávu svou. Pro tuto zprávu jsem pak byla stínovou zpravodajkou. Již ve výboru ENVI jsme se od začátku potýkali s velkým tlakem na stanovení závazných, nových a velmi ambiciózních cílů pro nové období v oblasti energetické účinnosti. Osobně souhlasím s názorem, že energetická účinnost je sama o sobě energetickým zdrojem, avšak vzhledem k tomu, co nás v současnosti učí celý skandál okolo falšování emisí v automobilovém průmyslu – *dieselgate* –, striktně trvám na tom, aby veškeré další určování emisních stropů či energetických cílů bylo vždy postaveno na reálných a pevných datech, predikcích a hlavně bylo členskými státy prakticky proveditelné a splnitelné. A to je přesně to, co mi v jednáních o textu této zprávy chybělo. Text zprávy určuje velmi ambiciózní cíl, ale už se jen velmi málo zajímá o problém, jak k němu úspěšně a hlavně včas dojít. Proto jsem jej nemohla s čistým svědomím podpořit.

Ádám Kósa (PPE), *írásban*. – 1990 és 2014 között az Európai Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett, ugyanakkor az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 23%-kal csökkent az időszakban. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve érnek el gazdasági növekedést, ebben pedig nagy szerepe van az energiahatékonyság javítását, a széndioxid-kibocsátás csökkentését és a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányának növelését célzó EU-s irányelveknek. Az Európai Unió jó úton halad a 2020-ra kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, az energiahatékonyságát pedig 20%-kal javítsa. Ez nagyban köszönhető a sikeres kibocsátáskereskedelmi rendszernek, mely ösztönzi a megújuló energiába történő befektetést és a kibocsátás csökkentését.

Üdvözlendő, hogy a Bizottság további erőfeszítéseket tesz az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika valamint egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében, és még ambiciózusabb célokat tűz ki. Ennek ellenére a 2030-ra vonatkozó, kötelező 40%-os energiahatékonysági célkitűzés túlzó, ugyanis nehezen vállalható terheket róna a tagállamokra, és nem reális elvárásokat támasztana velük szemben.

Béla Kovács (NI), *írásban*. – A jelentés kétségtelen erénye, hogy némileg támogatja a periféria országokat és a rászoruló fogyasztókat, illetve jogos kritikával illeti az erősen légszennyező biomassza és széntüzeléses fűtést. Ugyanakkor aggályos a szubszidiaritás megsértése tekintetében, ömlengős, gyengén szerkesztett anyag. Mindenáron felújítani akar, ott is, ahol van egyszerűbb megoldás, mint például az állami és közintézmények téli túlfűtésének, nyári túlűtésének korlátozása. Túldimensionálja a megújuló energiákat, melyek fontosak ugyan, de a környezetbarát alaperőművek kiváltására nem alkalmasak.

Ilhan Kyuchyuk (ALDE), *in writing*. – The Energy Efficiency Directive is key directive for the EU which recognises the importance of energy saving, strengthening environmental and climate protection, facilitating economic competitiveness, promoting job creation, providing security of energy supplies and last but not least tackling energy poverty. However, in order to fully implement the directive, the EU should promote better and smart management of energy consumption. To achieve this, the EU should conduct information campaigns as well as provide access to financial schemes to households, regional and local authorities. Another important step will be further improvement of the transparency and clarity of energy bills by establishing high-level principles for bills at EU level so that key information is available to consumers in a comparable format in order to help them adjust their consumption.

Gilles Lebreton (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu, car ce rapport encourage certes la transition énergétique et l'innovation technologique, mais paraît irréaliste sur plusieurs points. Il prône par exemple l'abandon de l'énergie fossile, ce qui paraît impossible à court et à moyen terme.

Marine Le Pen (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenue sur le rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la directive relative à l'efficacité énergétique (DEE). Le leitmotiv de ce texte est que l'efficacité énergétique doit être considérée comme une source d'énergie à part entière qui représente la quantité d'énergie économisée. Présentée comme fondamentale, notamment pour atteindre les objectifs climatiques, la recherche permanente d'économies d'énergies est censée nous permettre de renforcer à la fois notre sécurité énergétique et notre compétitivité économique. Cependant, la DEE fixe des «objectifs sous la forme d'un niveau absolu de consommation d'énergie primaire et de consommation d'énergie finale». Dans le contexte économique actuel, cette austérité énergétique risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries, d'autant que le rapporteur se félicite, dans l'exposé des motifs, des «bons résultats du système ETS», qui est pourtant un échec flagrant. Enfin, en raison du Pacte de stabilité, il est quasi impossible pour les États membres d'effectuer les lourds investissements requis par la DEE elle-même.

Philippe Loiseau (ENF), *par écrit*. – L'efficacité énergétique est le mot d'ordre du texte. Il se penche sur la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique (DEE), et évalue les conséquences et les modifications à apporter. Il prône une consommation énergétique efficiente, donc plus efficace. Pour ce faire, il présente de nombreuses mesures qui peuvent s'avérer plus contraignantes et austères. Il impose aux États membres par exemple des mesures rigoureuses, comme de lourds investissements, actuellement irréalisables. Cependant, le rapporteur invite aussi à laisser plus de souplesse et de flexibilité aux gouvernements dans l'application de ce programme et à reprendre des objectifs plus réalistes en matière d'efficacité énergétique... Je me suis donc ABSTENU.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero un avance necesario exigir una mejora del 40% en los objetivos nacionales de eficiencia para 2030, corrigiendo la propuesta a la baja del Consejo, del 27%. Esto exigirá también una revisión del funcionamiento hasta la actualidad de la directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética, cuya inaplicación, excesiva flexibilidad y falta de concreción es adecuadamente resaltada en el documento.

Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), *por escrito*. – La Unión va bien encaminada de cara a sus objetivos fijados para el año 2020 de medidas de protección del medioambiente. Esta evolución debe gran parte de su éxito al progreso del régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión.

Considero que la preocupación sobre este tema se debe centrar sobretudo en la burocracia asociada a los informes en el sector energético y en los altos precios de la energía, debidos a que la reducción de costes obtenida gracias al ahorro energético se ve neutralizada por los gravámenes especiales impuestos a nivel nacional y por las complicadas obligaciones de información.

Para solventar estos problemas, defiendo que la Comisión redoble sus esfuerzos dirigidos a elaborar una política climática y energética coherente y diseñar un mercado de la electricidad de alcance europeo. Voto a favor de este informe por lo dicho y porque además, la aplicación de la Directiva ofrecerá también otros estímulos innovadores importantes en relación con las obligaciones y los incentivos en los Estados miembros.

Mairead McGuinness (PPE), *in writing*. – I did not support this report as it does not respect the principle of subsidiarity.

Petr Mach (EFDD), *písemně*. – Hlasoval jsem proti. Nesouhlasím s tím, že snižování cen fosilních paliv je negativní jev. Naopak znamená více ušetřených peněz pro občany i firmy a růst ekonomiky. Už vůbec nesouhlasím s tvrzením, že „nižší ceny paliv a vyhlídky na hospodářský růst by mohly ještě více ohrozit dosažení 20% cíle“. Jen bohatá ekonomika si může dovolit investovat do inovací, nebráním se proto snižování cen. Je vidět, že Evropská komise chce prosazovat svou politiku i za cenu ochuzení obyvatelstva a s naprosto nejistým nebo žádným výsledkem.

Andrejs Mamikins (S&D), *rakstiski*. – 1990. –2014. gada periodā siltumnīcefekta gāzu emisijas Eiropas Savienībā ir samazinājušās par 23 %, kas liek lielākoties secināt, ka līdz 2020. gadam tiks panākti izvirzītie mērķi par CO₂ emisiju 20 % lielo samazinājumu, atjaunojamo energoresursu daļas kopējā enerģētiskā patēriņa pieaugumu līdz 20 % un energoefektivitātes pieaugumu par 20 %.

Loģiski, ka nav iespējams garantēt jomas caurskatāmību bez nepieciešamās informācijas sniegšanas un nacionālo ziņojumu sagatavošanas un turpmākas apkopošanas pārnacionālajā līmenī. Tomēr pievienojos domai, ka birokrātisma līmenis šajā ziņā ir pārāk augsts, kas zināmā mērā apgrūtina energoefektivitātes direktīvas un attiecīgo stratēģiju mērķu panākšanu.

Paralēli pievienojos arī secinājumam, ka starpvalstu sadarbībai šajā ziņā jābūt pēc iespējas aktīvākai, kas attiecas arī uz tiesību aktu savstarpējas saskaņotības palielināšanas nepieciešamību.

Gribētos vēl atzīmēt, ka lielā mērā tieši ES energoefektivitātes politikas dēļ bija iespējams renovēt tūkstošiem māju manā valstī – Latvijā –, tādējādi samazinot iedzīvotāju izmaksas un [nereti neatjaunojamo] kurināmo resursu patērišanu. Esmu visai gandarīts, ka pastāv attiecīga politika Savienības līmenī un esmu pārliecināts, ka turpmākajos gados tiks panākts daudz vairāk.

Vladimír Maňka (S&D), *písomne*. – Systém obchodovania s emisiami a podpora investícií do účinných a efektívnych energetických technológií pomáhajú Únii pri naplňaní cieľov EÚ znížiť do roku 2020 emisie CO₂ o 20 % a zvýšiť podiel energie vyrábanej z obnoviteľných zdrojov. Napriek tomu stále existujú výrazné rozdiely medzi jednotlivými krajinami pri dosahovaní týchto cieľov. Podporujem návrh, aby Komisia a členské štáty zvýšili pozornosť pri vykonávaní politiky v oblasti klímy a energetiky a zvýšili svoje kontrolné mechanizmy pri ich dodržiavaní.

Νότης Μαριάς (ECR), *γραπτώς*. – Καταψηφίζω την έκθεση σχετικά με την έκθεση που αφορά την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας για την ενεργειακή απόδοση, για τους λόγους που ανέφερα αναλυτικά στην ομιλία μου στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις Βρυξέλλες στις 23/6/2016 καθώς και διότι η εν λόγω έκθεση δεν είναι πλήρης και τεκμηριωμένη.

Dominique Martin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Je me suis abstenu sur ce rapport.

Dans le cadre de l'évaluation et de la perspective de la révision de la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique (DEE), ce rapport envisage la recherche permanente d'économies d'énergies afin de nous permettre de renforcer à la fois notre sécurité énergétique et notre compétitivité économique. Il y a de nombreux points positifs dans ce rapport qui insiste sur la «flexibilité» qui doit être laissée aux États membres dans la transposition des directives, «pour que la combinaison d'outils et d'instruments soit adaptée au niveau national». Par ailleurs, il fait mention des problèmes de compétitivité que connaissent nos industries à forte intensité d'énergie par rapport à leurs concurrents hors de l'Union européenne, ce que nous approuvons.

Néanmoins, nous nous opposons à l'austérité énergétique fixée par la DDE, car elle risque de nuire encore davantage à nos industries. Nous ne soutenons pas non plus la position du rapporteur qui se félicite des «bons résultats du système ETS» (ou SEQE), qui s'avère pourtant être un échec retentissant.

Gabriel Mato (PPE), *por escrito*. – Hemos dado pasos, pero aún debemos tomar medidas valientes y decididas para lograr una mayor eficiencia energética. Todavía nuestros ciudadanos se encuentran trabas, como la existencia de normativas a veces contradictorias en materia de protección climática, la complejidad de la legislación en el ámbito de la eficiencia energética y los diferentes enfoques nacionales de la política energética, factores que pueden ejercer una influencia masiva en la política europea.

Por consiguiente, creo necesario y voto a favor del llamamiento que hacemos desde este Parlamento a la Comisión para que redoble sus esfuerzos dirigidos a elaborar una política climática y energética coherente y diseñar un mercado de la electricidad de alcance europeo.

Debemos esforzarnos para lograr que la Directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética se aplique de forma eficaz, haciendo aquellos cambios en el texto que faciliten superar las trabas que se han encontrado en su aplicación.

Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), *γραπτώς*. – Στόχοι της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης μέχρι το 2020 αποτελούν η μείωση των εκπομπών του διοξειδίου του άνθρακα, η καλύτερη αξιοποίηση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας στη συνολική ενεργειακή κατανάλωση και η αύξηση της ενεργειακής απόδοσης. Παράλληλα, βασικός στόχος αποτελεί και η μεγαλύτερη επένδυση σε νέες τεχνολογίες ενεργειακής απόδοσης.

Θεωρώ ότι η παρούσα γραφειοκρατία στον τομέα της ενέργειας όπως και οι υψηλές τιμές στην κατανάλωσή της από μικρές και μεσαίες επιχειρήσεις μαζί με την πολυπλοκότητα της νομοθεσίας αναφορικά με την ενεργειακή απόδοση μειώνουν την αποτελεσματικότητα του συστήματος. Επομένως η οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση, η οποία έχει ως στόχο την απλούστευση της νομοθεσίας και την απόκτηση συνεκτικότητας, αποτελεί ένα θετικό βήμα προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση. Παράλληλα, η οδηγία προωθεί και ενθαρρύνει καινοτομίες και προσφέρει νέα κίνητρα στα κράτη μέλη για πλήρη συμμόρφωση αλλά και εκσυγχρονισμό στον τομέα της ενέργειας.

Georg Mayer (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Die Energieeffizienz ist ein wichtiges Thema für eine nachhaltige Zukunft Österreichs und man kann sich gar nicht genug damit beschäftigen. Jedoch sind einige Forderungen in diesem Bericht schlicht nicht umsetzbar. Darüber hinaus werden verschiedene Begriffe vermischt, was auf die Qualität des Berichtes zurückfällt. Daher habe ich mich hier enthalten.

Joëlle Mélin (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport traite de la directive d'octobre 2012 sur l'efficacité énergétique dans le cadre de l'évaluation de sa mise en œuvre et dans la perspective de sa révision. L'efficacité énergétique, autrement dit l'économie d'énergie, doit être vue, selon le texte, comme une ressource d'énergie. En demandant des contraintes, le texte insiste sur la flexibilité devant être laissée aux États membres dans la transposition des directives. En somme, la pondération du rapport à plusieurs points de vue, dans une perspective réaliste, est tout à son honneur. S'il n'ignore pas les difficultés des industries, le rapport pose comme absolus les objectifs de réductions des dépenses énergétiques qui risquent pourtant de nuire davantage à celles-ci.

En conséquence, je me suis abstenue.

Nuno Melo (PPE), *por escrito*. – A UE está a cumprir globalmente os seus objetivos climáticos e energéticos para 2020 — segundo projeções que partem do princípio da plena aplicação de toda a legislação relevante até 2020 (redução das emissões de CO₂, aumento da percentagem de utilização de fontes de energia renováveis, impulsionar a eficiência energética) — e deve manter o seu papel de pioneira a nível global.

Temos, pois, que todos em conjunto continuar a contribuir para a consecução dos objetivos estipulados, para tornar o planeta mais sustentável para as gerações vindouras. Daí o meu voto favorável.

Louis Michel (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. — Het efficiënte gebruik van energie is van cruciaal belang voor het behalen van onze klimaat- en energiedoelstellingen. Alhoewel de EU globaal op schema zit om haar 2020-doelstellingen te verwezenlijken, stellen we vast dat de richtlijn energie-efficiëntie en de gebouwenrichtlijn nog niet ten volle zijn uitgevoerd. Efficiënt omspringen met energie is nochtans de meest noodzakelijke opstap naar een duurzame energiemarkt die ons onafhankelijker zal maken van energie-import, innovatie zal stimuleren en nieuwe banen zal helpen te creëren. Bovendien hebben zowel burgers als bedrijven belang bij een lagere energierekening.

In het kader van de EU-engagementen op de klimaattop in Parijs is het wenselijk dat de EU haar streefcijfers voor energiebesparing aanscherpt door nieuwe en innovatieve oplossingen aan te reiken die enerzijds het energieverbruik beperken en anderzijds een rationeler gebruik van hernieuwbare energie beogen. De bouwsector heeft bijvoorbeeld nog tal van mogelijkheden om zich om te vormen tot een energie-efficiëntere sector. Daarom is het wenselijk dat de Commissie, de EIB en de lidstaten technische bijstand en steun geven aan woonprojecten die doordachte isolatietechnieken, modernere verwarmingssystemen en het gebruik van particuliere hernieuwbare energiebronnen implementeren.

Marlene Mizzi (S&D), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of this implementation report, which looks at how the Energy Efficiency Directive (agreed in 2012) is being implemented by the Member States, and the progress to reaching the 2020 20% energy efficiency target, as well as looking forward to the 2030 framework and target. However, I had reservations and did not support some parts which in my opinion are too restrictive, not very realistic and do not take into account the particularities of the different Member States.

Sorin Moisă (S&D), *in writing*. – This report has shed some light on a series of problems regarding cost reductions achieved through energy savings. I supported this motion for a resolution that calls upon the Commission to generate clever solutions to problems such as increased energy prices for households and small businesses or complex reporting obligations. In view of a coherent climate and energy policy, the Commission needs to make additional efforts to detect any ambiguities, inconsistencies or inadequacies between EU-wide rules on climate protection, legislation linked with energy efficiency and national approaches to energy policy.

Csaba Molnár (S&D), írásban. – A Bizottság 2015. november 18-án tette közzé jelentését az energiahatékonyságról szóló, 2012/27/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv végrehajtásáról. Az Ipari, Kutatási és Energiaügyi Bizottság e jelentéssel kapcsolatos állásfoglalás elfogadására tesz javaslatot. A tervezet leszögezi: az Unióban az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 1990 és 2014 között 23%-kal csökkent. Ugyanebben az időszakban az Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett. Megállapítja: az Unió jó úton halad azon 2007-ben kitűzött célok elérése felé, hogy CO₂-kibocsátását 20%-kal csökkentse, a megújuló energiahordozók teljes energiafogyasztáson belüli arányát 20%-ra növelje, és energiahatékonyságát 20%-kal javítsa.

Aggodalmát fejezi ki ugyanakkor amiatt, hogy az energiamegtakarítás költségmérséklő hatását az állami különleges adók és a bonyolult jelentéstételi rendszer gyakran megszüntetik. Ennek oka a részben egymásnak ellentmondó uniós éghajlatvédelmi jogszabályokban, az energiahatékonysággal összefüggő jogszabályok összetettségében és a nemzeti energiapolitikai lépésekben keresendő, amelyek az európai megközelítést egyes vonatkozásait jelentős mértékben befolyásolják. Fölkérni javasolja ezért az Európai Bizottságot, hogy tegyen további erőfeszítéseket az egységes éghajlat- és energiapolitika és egy európai szintű villamosenergia-piac kialakítása érdekében. A tervezetet megszavaztam.

Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (PPE), por escrito. – A Diretiva 2012/27/UE relativa à eficiência energética estabelece um quadro comum de medidas de promoção na União Europeia a fim de assegurar a realização do objetivo da União de atingir 20 % em matéria de eficiência energética até 2020.

Alcançar bons níveis de eficiência energética é igualmente fundamental para atingir os objetivos climáticos delineados na Cimeira de Paris de Dezembro de 2015 e para a redução da dependência energética da União Europeia face à importação.

Embora a aplicação da Diretiva tenha desencadeado um conjunto de alterações positivas nos Estados-Membros, as deficiências na sua aplicação põem em causa a sua plena eficácia e o cumprimento dos objetivos delineados neste âmbito. Neste sentido, a Diretiva deve ser revista em alguns dos seus aspetos por forma a promover uma transição para um sistema de energia mais sustentável e seguro, bem como para assegurar que os consumidores têm acesso à informação sobre as condições e fontes de fornecimento de energia, nomeadamente através de uma maior transparência e clareza na faturação.

Neste sentido, voto a favor do presente relatório na medida em que considero essencial a revisão e a plena aplicação da Diretiva para que os objetivos de eficiência energética sejam alcançados.

Sophie Montel (ENF), par écrit. – De lourds investissements sont demandés par ce rapport. Si on peut souscrire à cette nécessité d'investir davantage, ceci est rendu impossible par l'absurde politique d'austérité menée en Europe. Je m'abstiens donc contre ce texte.

Nadine Morano (PPE), par écrit. – J'ai voté contre ce rapport qui propose, en matière d'efficacité énergétique, un objectif contraignant de 40 % à l'horizon 2030. L'efficacité énergétique est un levier important pour consommer moins d'énergie et lutter contre le réchauffement climatique. Nous devons la renforcer à l'aide d'incitations, notamment fiscales et en fixant des objectifs raisonnables, réalistes et atteignables. Comme pour les énergies renouvelables, l'efficacité énergétique ne doit pas être promue par la contrainte.

Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D), per iscritto. – Soppesata l'importanza delle nuove fonti di energia, di natura rinnovabile e maggiormente efficienti, all'interno di un contesto globale caratterizzato da grandi sfide climatiche, accogliamo con favore la proposta della commissione. È da sottolineare, tuttavia, il rispetto, da parte degli Stati membri degli obbiettivi climatici ed energetici prefissati, attualmente minati da ostacoli quali mancanza di investimenti, inefficace implementazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica ed il calo dei prezzi dei combustibili fossili assieme ai relativi sussidi.

In seguito alla partecipazione della EU alla Conferenza sul Clima di Parigi, ci siamo imposti di ridurre la precarietà energetica europea, esemplificata da una spesa annua di 358 miliardi per le importazioni di energia, nel medio periodo. Ciò sarà possibile tramite una maggiore efficienza, in particolare nel settore dell'edilizia, rappresentante quasi la metà del consumo finale di energia e il 36% delle emissioni di CO₂, affinché vi sia una de carbonizzazione energetica del 40% entro il 2030 e una totale entro il 2050, tale da apportare un forte miglioramento del tenore di vita e un aumento complessivo dell'occupazione.

Di conseguenza, suggeriamo alla Commissione un testo rivisitato nel quale sia data priorità agli obiettivi energetici per il 2030 e a direttive più ambiziose contro la povertà energetica europea.

József Nagy (PPE), *írásban*. – Szavazatommal támogattam a jelentést, mivel az energiahatékonyság és az energiabiztonság befektetés a jövőbe. Meggyőződésem, hogy az Európai Unió eddig elért eredményei – 1990-2014 között 23%-kal csökkent az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása – arra ösztönöznek bennünket, hogy ezen az úton tovább haladva rugalmas és reális célokat tűzzünk ki. Segíteni kell, hogy az energiapiacra olyan beruházások valósuljanak meg, amik a fenntartható növekedést és munkahelyteremtést veszik prioritásnak. Óriási feladat áll előttünk.

Victor Negrescu (S&D), *in writing*. – I have voted for this implementation report that looks at how the energy efficiency directive (agreed in 2012) is being implemented by the Member States, and the progress to reaching the 2020 20% energy efficiency target, as well as looking forward to the 2030 framework and target.

Norica Nicolai (ALDE), *în scris*. – Am susținut prin vot acest raport, întrucât am convingerea că folosirea eficientă a energiei este un punct de interes comun pentru toate statele membre ale Uniunii Europene și are ca scop un deziderat pe care îl urmărim cu toții: reducerea dependenței energetice de diverse alte state.

De asemenea, ne confruntăm, și vorbesc în numele tuturor statelor membre, cu fenomene climatice extreme, care nu mai pot fi ignorate. Plecând de la această problemă, raportul adoptat astăzi promovează utilizarea eficientă a energiei și invită Comisia Europeană, împreună cu statele membre, să consolideze și să promoveze noi tehnologii care diminuează pierderile energetice, să încurajeze programele de renovare energetică a clădirilor și, nu în ultimul rând, de folosire a energiei din surse regenerabile.

Luděk Niedermayer (PPE), *písemně*. – Podpořil jsem zprávu, která poukazuje na důležitost energetické účinnosti pro udržitelný ekonomický rozvoj EU a vyzývá k přijetí ambiciózního závazného cíle energetické účinnosti pro rok 2030 ve výši 40 %. Jsem přesvědčen, že takto nastavený cíl představuje nákladově efektivní energetickou účinnost, z níž budou mít prospěch firmy i spotřebitelé. Zpráva také správně upozorňuje na to, že sedm členských států nezavedlo energetické audit. Jsem rád, že ČR mezi těmito státy není.

Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL), *in writing*. — I voted in favour of this report which was an implementation report by Markus Pieper on the Energy Efficiency Directive.

The Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) establishes a framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency in the EU and sets a non-binding target of 20% energy efficiency improvements by 2020. The EU as a whole is expected to fall short of this non-binding target, although the Commission and the rapporteur are optimistic and claim we can still reach the target. This report further calls for full implementation of existing legislation, accelerated efforts and the removal of barriers to investment.

In the committee phase, my political group, GUE/NGL, tabled alternative compromise amendments with other progressive groups calling for a binding 40% target on energy efficiency for 2030. This is positive, as it displays political will and commitment to the Paris climate change agreement.

Franz Obermayr (ENF), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe neutral abgestimmt, da der Grundansatz der Energieeffizienz voll zu unterstützen ist, ein Teil der Forderungen allerdings weit über das Maß hinausgeht. Vor allem wird hier der Begriff der Energieeffizienz teilweise mit Energieeinsparung vermischt. Hinzu kommt, dass bei einer Sanierung des kompletten lokalen Baubestandes Österreichs eine enorme, kaum stemmbare, wirtschaftliche Belastung entstünde.

Rolandas Paksas (EFDD), *raštu*. – Pritariu pateiktam pranešimui.

Kaip žinia, energijos vartojimo sumažinimas ir energijos nuostolių pašalinimas yra labai svarbūs ES tikslai. Efektyvus energijos vartojimas yra perėjimo prie efektyvaus išteklių naudojimo ekonomikos pagrindas.

Pabrėžtina, kad racionaliai ir ūkiškai naudojami energetiniai ištekliai nepaprastai svarbūs mažinant ES priklausomybę nuo energijos importo, kuriant darbo vietas, mažinant energijos nepriteklių, užtikrinant patogumus ir sveikatą, skatinant ekonomiką bei kovojant su visuotiniu klimato atšilimu. Manau, kad Komisija 2030 metams turėtų apsvarstyti galimybę nustatyti privalomą 40 proc. energijos vartojimo efektyvumo tikslą. Atkreiptinas dėmesys į tai, kad Energijos vartojimo efektyvumo direktyva įgyvendinama nepatenkinamai, tačiau suteikia pagrindą taupyti energiją, o energijos taupymas ne tik padeda sumažinti išlaidas, bet taip pat prisideda prie planetos išteklių išsaugojimo.

Aldo Patriciello (PPE), *per iscritto*. – È noto che l'Unione europea si è impegnata, entro il 2020, a raggiungere l'obiettivo della riduzione del 20% delle emissioni di CO₂, dell'aumento del 20% della quota di vettori energetici rinnovabili nei consumi totali e del miglioramento del 20% dell'efficienza energetica.

Considerato che nel periodo che va dal 1990 al 2014 le emissioni di gas ad effetto serra si sono ridotte di oltre il 20% mentre, al contempo, il PIL è cresciuto quasi del doppio, posso ipotizzare che gli scopi summenzionati siano raggiungibili.

Tuttavia, pur giudicando utile l'analisi svolta dal mio collega, ritengo che essa non sia interamente conforme al mio pensiero. Pertanto, pur appoggiando l'invito rivolto alla Commissione di implementare gli interventi per la gestione di una coerente politica climatica ed energetica, non mi sento di sostenere quanto esposto nel documento in esame e voto negativamente.

Piernicola Pedicini (EFDD), *per iscritto*. – Il target dell'UE per il raggiungimento del 20% di efficienza energetica entro il 2020 era un obiettivo ambizioso ma realizzabile. Se lo raggiungeremo sarà soltanto per la crisi economica e industriale che ha colpito l'UE negli ultimi otto anni. Alcuni settori, come quelli dell'edilizia e dei trasporti, necessitano di maggiori sforzi.

La Commissione dovrebbe guidare gli Stati membri nell'applicazione della direttiva e intervenire prontamente con richieste motivate di adattamento dei piani nazionali. Negli emendamenti presentati in commissione ENVI avevo espresso la necessità di stabilire un obiettivo vincolante del 40% di efficienza energetica entro il 2030 da attuare tramite target nazionali e chiesto di stabilire obiettivi di efficienza energetica vincolanti anche al 2050 in linea con gli impegni ambiziosi stabiliti dagli accordi di Parigi di mantenere l'aumento della temperatura globale sotto 1.5°C.

Inoltre ho più volte ribadito le mie preoccupazioni per il crescente inquinamento causato dagli impianti di riscaldamento domestici alimentati da biomasse solide che producono grandi quantità di polveri sottili, ossidi d'azoto, monossido di carbonio e diossine estremamente negative per la qualità dell'aria e quindi dannosi per la salute umana.

L'implementazione di soluzioni alternative efficienti ed ecologiche deve essere in sinergia con la transizione verso un'economia circolare a basse emissioni di carbonio. Il mio voto di oggi riflette questa posizione.

Marijana Petir (PPE), *napisan*. – Ovo Izvješće sadržava vrlo dobre elemente poput vrednovanja važnosti energetske učinkovitosti u postizanju ciljeva energetske i klimatske politike EU-a, zagovaranja fleksibilnosti toga sustava kako bi se ta politika što lakše provela u državama članicama, naglašavanja važnosti smanjivanja nepotrebne birokracije, pojednostavljenje propisa o izvješćivanju te učinkovitijeg usklađivanja europskog zakonodavstva. Međutim, osim toga, a posebno u segmentu određivanja obvezujućeg cilja od 40% energetske učinkovitosti, upravo se narušava tražena fleksibilnost.

Osobno bih voljela da je moguće postići taj cilj, no moramo uvijek imati na umu da se europsko zakonodavstvo odnosi na države članice koje se protežu kroz različite geografske regije i klimatske zone, od jedne Finske na sjeveru pa sve do Španjolske i Malte na jugu Europe. Upravo mogućnost fleksibilnosti izborom i kombinacijom različitih mjera koje najviše odgovaraju pojedinoj državi članici i njezinim komparativnim prednostima za ostvarivanje energetskih i klimatskih ciljeva tu politiku čini smislenijom. Zbog tih nekonzistentnosti nisam mogla podržati ovu rezoluciju jer šalje pogrešnu poruku građanima Unije, državama članicama i investitorima.

Pina Picierno (S&D), *per iscritto*. – L'efficienza e il risparmio energetico sono fattori importanti per la protezione dell'ambiente e del clima, per il rafforzamento della competitività economica e la creazione di posti di lavoro, per la sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti e per affrontare il problema della povertà energetica.

Questa relazione sull'attuazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica del 2012 riconosce che siamo in ritardo rispetto agli obiettivi prefissati per il 2020 e allo stesso tempo richiede un approccio decisamente più ambizioso per il 2030, ribadendo la posizione del Parlamento sulla necessità di un target del 40%, invece del modesto 27% proposto dal Consiglio. Inoltre si chiede che questi obiettivi siano considerati vincolanti per gli Stati membri, in modo da renderne più certo il conseguimento.

La relazione prevede anche una serie di misure per affrontare il problema della povertà energetica, ad esempio la priorità che gli Stati membri dovranno accordare alla riqualificazione energetica di edifici popolari o appartenenti ai nuclei familiari più vulnerabili.

Il gruppo S&D ha svolto un ottimo lavoro, migliorando di molto il testo in sede di commissione e guidando la coalizione di gruppi politici che ne ha garantito l'adozione in plenaria. Perciò ringrazio i miei colleghi e voto a favore della relazione.

Tonino Picula (S&D), năpisan. – Emisije stakleničkih plinova u EU-u smanjile su se od 1990. do 2014. za 23%. U istom razdoblju BDP EU-a povećao se za 46%. Uz sve manji utjecaj na klimu poduzeća i građani ostvaruju veći rast, uslijed čega se otvaraju radna mjesta i stvara prihod od poreza.

Slažem se sa mišljenjem Odbora za okoliš, javno zdravlje i sigurnost hrane koji smatra da je EU, nakon postizanja sporazuma na konferenciji COP 21 u Parizu, više nego ikada obvezan dostići svoje klimatske ciljeve, a energetska učinkovitost jedan je od najučinkovitijih načina smanjenja emisija ugljičnog dioksida.

Ugrožen je cilj od 20% smanjenja emisija ugljičnog dioksida. Do 2020. godine očekuje se samo 17.6% uštede primarne energije. Nažalost, cilj od 20% se neće postići ako se postojeće zakonodavstvo EU-a ne provede u potpunosti, ne uložiti veći napor i ne uklone prepreke za ulaganja.

Želim zbog postavljanja cilja od barem 27% poboljšanja energetske učinkovitosti do 2030. koji je usvojilo Europsko vijeće i koji je, usporedimo li ga s obvezujućim u Parlamentu usvojenim ciljem od 40% koji se mora provesti u obliku individualnih nacionalnih mjera, neambiciozan. Pozivam Komisiju da provede sveobuhvatnu analizu troškova i usvoji perspektivu društvenog interesa u skladu s vlastitim Smjernicama za bolju regulativu.

Miroslav Poche (S&D), pismeně. – Jako stínový zpravodaj pro tuto zprávu výslednou podobu nesmírně vítám, neboť se podařilo posílit řadu prvků, které původní návrh opomíjel. Současná směrnice o energetické účinnosti je dobrým základem pro dosažení evropských klimatických a energetických cílů, včetně ambiciózních závazků COP 21. Toho ovšem dosáhneme pouze za předpokladu, že se odstraní některé její nedostatky, zejména přílišná flexibilita. Výsledkem současného stavu je, že zaostáváme za plněním stanovených cílů, a pokud se nic nezmění, nenavýšíme do roku 2020 energetickou účinnost o 20 %. Ve zprávě požadujeme závazný 40% cíl v otázce energetické účinnosti, neboť pokud z tohoto požadavku slevíme, uzavřeme si tak cestu k vyšším úsporám, k podpoře inovací i k posílení naší nezávislosti na importu. Zpráva dále věnuje velkou pozornost boji proti energetické chudobě. V neposlední řadě upozorňuje Komise na potřebu nutně řešit konkurující si právní předpisy, což se týká především legislativy k energetické účinnosti, k podpoře obnovitelných zdrojů a k systému obchodu s emisními povolenkami. V tomto ohledu považuji za naprosto zásadní, aby došlo k analýze vzájemných dopadů a aby Komise přišla s návrhem, který bude tuto situaci efektivně řešit.

Salvatore Domenico Pogliese (PPE), per iscritto. – L'Unione europea è sulla buona strada verso il conseguimento dell'obiettivo stabilito per il 2020, il quale prevede la riduzione del 20 % delle emissioni di CO₂, l'aumento del 20% della quota di vettori energetici rinnovabili e il miglioramento del 20% dell'efficienza energetica. Il raggiungimento di tale obiettivo potrebbe essere messo a rischio qualora gli Stati membri non procedono alla piena attuazione dell'attuale legislazione UE.

L'UE dovrebbe, pertanto, investire maggiormente in programmi di informazione e di sostegno negli Stati membri, che potrebbero aiutare ad aumentare la partecipazione agli attuali regimi obbligatori di efficienza energetica locali, nonché promuovere nuovi progressi tecnici in settori quali il raffreddamento, l'illuminazione e l'isolamento. Per tutto ciò, ho votato a favore della relazione.

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR), na piśmie. – W UE emisje gazów cieplarnianych zmniejszyły się w latach 1990-2014 o 23%. W tym samym czasie PKB UE wzrósł o 46%. Przy coraz mniejszym obciążeniu klimatu przedsiębiorstwa i obywatele osiągają większy wzrost gospodarczy, tworzą więcej miejsc pracy i generują dochody podatkowe. Sprawozdanie postuluje przegląd dyrektywy pod kątem przekształcenia jej w bardziej spójny akt prawa Unii. Przedmiotowe sprawozdanie oferuje punkt wyjścia w tym zakresie, np. wymianę najlepszych praktyk między państwami członkowskimi oraz nowe możliwości finansowania (np. z planu Junckera). Niestety ciągle powtarzają się nawoływania do wprowadzenia wiążących celów, jeśli chodzi o efektywność energetyczną na poziomie UE i poszczególnych jej krajów. Niniejszym nie

mogłem poprzeć sprawozdania.

Jiří Pospíšil (PPE), *písemně*. – Podporuji obecně snahu o ochranu životního prostředí. Tuto zprávu jsem ovšem nemohl podpořit, protože při hlasování o pozměňovacích návrzích bohužel převážil radikální postoj, který vůbec nezohledňuje dopad klimatických cílů na evropské hospodářství. Mnou podporovaný kompromis byl bohužel zamítnut, a usnesení jako celek jsem proto nemohl podpořit. Takto předložený návrh by totiž znamenal oslabení konkurenceschopnosti evropských podniků oproti zemím, které si s ochranou životního prostředí vůbec hlavu nelámou. Pro životní prostředí by ale nebylo dobré, aby průmysl v zemích s úctou k životnímu prostředí zanikl a přesunul se právě do zemí, které patří k hlavním znečišťovatelům.

Franck Proust (PPE), *par écrit*. – J'ai voté pour ce texte qui indique que l'Union européenne est en bonne voie. Surtout, il est important de voir que ce sont bien essentiellement les entreprises et les ménages qui se sont saisis de cette nécessité énergétique, la directive n'étant pas encore complètement mise en œuvre dans la plupart des États membres. Il leur est donc demandé de l'appliquer entièrement et de tout mettre en œuvre pour remplir les objectifs de l'Union européenne.

Paulo Rangel (PPE), *por escrito*. – A União Europeia tem, hoje, um papel fundamental na promoção da responsabilidade intergeracional, incumbindo-lhe fomentar, em particular, um sistema energético em que as atuais gerações se empenhem na luta contra as alterações climáticas, em benefício das gerações vindouras.

Nessa linha de raciocínio, o presente relatório salienta, e bem, a importância da eficiência energética no cumprimento dos chamados «climate targets», bem como a necessidade de um sistema energético flexível e desburocratizado, que monitorize e clarifique a definição de PME e de auxílios de Estado.

No entanto, sou do entendimento de que o relatório peca por defeito. Por um lado, consagra uma solução insatisfatória quanto à meta de 40% de eficiência energética para 2030 (aliás vertida nas resoluções de 5 de fevereiro de 2014, de 26 de novembro de 2014 e de 15 de outubro de 2015). Concomitantemente, o documento é parco quanto aos termos da descarbonização em 2050, porquanto, neste domínio, poder-se-ia ter ido bem mais longe. Enfim, e o que não é menos, o relatório não contempla os objetivos mínimos de financiamento que, a meu ver, deveriam ser impostos ao nível dos Estados-Membros.

Nesse sentido, o meu voto é desfavorável.

Dominique Riquet (ALDE), *par écrit*. – Ce rapport est à mettre en parallèle avec celui sur les progrès accomplis dans le secteur des énergies renouvelables. Au vu de l'objectif de 20 %, qui ne sera probablement pas atteint si les États membres continuent sur leur lancée, nous, députés européens, avons rappelé la nécessité d'engager davantage la transition au sein de l'Union vers un système énergétique basé sur les énergies renouvelables, pour baisser notamment notre dépendance aux énergies fossiles.

À ce titre, nous avons appelé à réduire autant que possible les charges administratives excessives qui pèsent sur les ménages, mais surtout sur les entreprises, limitant ainsi le potentiel de croissance, de création d'emplois et d'innovation dans ce secteur.

Par ailleurs, nous avons rappelé la nécessité pour la Commission et les États membres de garantir un cadre réglementaire stable pour les différents acteurs en ce qui concerne les énergies renouvelables, d'assurer la cohérence entre les différentes politiques de l'Union et le besoin de renforcer les investissements dans le secteur.

En accord avec ces lignes politiques, j'ai voté en faveur de ce texte.

Robert Rochefort (ALDE), *par écrit*. – J'ai apporté mon soutien à cette résolution qui porte sur la mise en œuvre de la directive efficacité énergétique de 2012, directive qui constitue la pièce centrale de la stratégie de l'Union dans ce domaine. L'efficacité énergétique et les économies d'énergie qu'elle induit présentent des avantages nombreux pour la protection de l'environnement et du climat, le renforcement de la compétitivité de nos économies, la création d'emplois, la lutte contre la précarité énergétique ou encore l'indépendance énergétique. Or la réalisation de l'objectif de 20 % d'efficacité énergétique d'ici à 2020 n'est pas assurée. C'est pourquoi nous appelons à ce que la directive, qui constitue le cadre européen de référence, soit pleinement et correctement mise en œuvre, notamment au niveau de la conformité des plans nationaux mis en place par les États membres. Ce n'est pas le moment de baisser le niveau d'ambition. Enfin, nous demandons davantage de cohérence dans la législation en matière d'énergie ainsi que des mesures adaptées pour les foyers les plus modestes.

Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D), *por escrito*. – Comparto el enfoque adoptado en este Informe por la mayoría de la Eurocámara a favor de un objetivo vinculante del 40% de eficiencia energética en 2030, conforme a lo defendido en la reciente Cumbre del Clima de París. Esto, a pesar de la posición del Consejo y del voto en contra del PPE, que quería limitarlo a un 30% no vinculante.

Desde la que consideramos una perspectiva errónea en la aplicación de la Directiva de Eficiencia Energética, al perseguir un objetivo del 17,6% en lugar del 20% estipulado para 2020, no compartimos el enfoque del ponente en favor de una mayor flexibilidad.

Como en el Informe Bermejo, votado también hoy, el PPE se muestra contrario a las medidas en favor de lucha contra la pobreza energética que, sin embargo, sí han recibido el respaldo de la mayoría del Parlamento. En este sentido, solicitamos a los Estados que garanticen medidas en favor de los consumidores con rentas bajas.

El resultado final es positivo por lo que ha merecido mi voto favorable. Espero que el Informe sea tomado en consideración por la Comisión, siempre a la espera de la comparecencia del Comisario Cañete en esta Cámara por los escándalos que le salpican.

Claude Rolin (PPE), *par écrit*. – À la veille de la révision du cadre législatif, qui aura lieu à l'automne, le Parlement européen a réaffirmé, jeudi 23 juin, ses ambitions élevées en matière d'efficacité énergétique à l'horizon 2030.

La résolution sur l'efficacité énergétique insiste sur la nécessité d'une pleine mise en œuvre de la législation européenne existante pour atteindre l'objectif de l'Union en matière d'efficacité énergétique à l'horizon 2020 (un gain de 20 % d'ici 2020). En outre, le Parlement a réitéré son ambition d'un objectif de 40 % d'efficacité énergétique à l'horizon 2030, assorti d'objectifs nationaux contraignants pour que les États membres redoublent d'efforts. Ce dont je me réjouis!

Le texte adopté demande également à l'Union européenne d'investir davantage dans les programmes d'information et de soutien dans les États membres pour encourager la participation des acteurs locaux dans les programmes en matière d'efficacité énergétique et promouvoir de nouvelles solutions dans la réfrigération, l'éclairage, l'isolation...

Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE), *raštu*. – Greta perėjimo prie atsinaujinančių energijos išteklių, kita esmine Europos energetikos problema lieka energijos vartojimo efektyvumas. Tai svarbu tiek Šiaurės, tiek ir Pietų kraštams. Džiugu, kad Komisija rimtai žiūri į šį klausimą, kad jis kaip horizontalus prioritetas egzistuoja daugelyje struktūrinių programų, o energijos efektyvumo direktyva nustatyti rodikliai yra po truputį vykdomi.

Su dideliu pasitenkinimu pritariu šiai ataskaitai. Kartu noriu pabrėžti ir nemažai liekančių problemų. Pradėti reiktų nuo to, jog energijos efektyvumo priemonių diegimas daugelyje valstybių narių susiduria su sunkumais. Sunkumais, sąlygotais tiek administracinių gebėjimų, tiek ir finansinės paramos trūkumo. Šioje vietoje kviečiu Komisiją rimčiau pasižiūrėti į šią problemą, ypač J.-C. Junkerio plano vykdymo kontekste. Juk efektyvesnis energijos vartojimas, mažesnės išlaidos energetikai, ypač tai, kuri didele dalimi vis dar tebesiremia iškastiniu ir įvežtiniu kuru, gali duoti didžiulį papildomą efektą visos ekonomikos plėtrai. Be to, kviečiu Komisiją daugiau dėmesio skirti energijos efektyvumo skatinimui ir išorinėms Europos Sąjungos politikos srityse, visų pirma – santykiuose su mūsų rytiniais kaimynais, kur šie klausimai yra labai apleisti.

Massimiliano Salini (PPE), *per iscritto*. – Il testo discusso in commissione ITRE e presentato in plenaria dall'on. Pieper riguarda l'attuazione della direttiva sull'efficienza energetica 2012/27. Questa direttiva stabilisce un quadro strategico volto alla promozione dell'efficienza energetica nell'UE e impone un target del 20% non vincolante per l'efficienza energetica da raggiungere entro il 2020. Sebbene ci sia ancora molto da fare per appianare le differenze tra gli Stati membri nel settore energetico, la Commissione ha riconosciuto l'impegno e gli sforzi compiuti al fine di migliorare l'efficienza energetica.

Il testo presentato e discusso in commissione ITRE, di cui sono membro, contiene spunti interessanti relativi all'implementazione della legislazione, con un'attenzione particolare al periodo che seguirà il 2020 e alle strategie da mettere in campo su come garantire la stabilità e la sicurezza necessaria agli investitori.

La relazione si riferisce inoltre alle misure contenute nel testo della Commissione europea, apportando tuttavia dei cambiamenti con i quali non mi trovo d'accordo. Coerentemente con le posizioni che ho sempre sostenuto in materia di efficienza energetica, come ad esempio il raggiungimento di target ambiziosi ma flessibili, e in linea con il gruppo PPE, ho votato contro la relazione Pieper.

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor del informe porque subraya la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia energética como manera de luchar contra el cambio climático. Propone objetivos vinculantes por países. El aspecto vinculante es un punto clave porque obliga los países a cumplir con estos objetivos mientras que la flexibilidad deja la puerta abierta a objetivos insuficientes. Además, no se contenta del objetivo del 27% en el 2030 fijado por el Consejo y la Comisión sino propone el objetivo más ambicioso del 40%. Propone también centrar las medidas sobre los hogares en situación de pobreza energética, aspecto que nos parece de primera importancia.

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), *in writing*. – Much more work is needed on the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive. Energy dependency and energy poverty remain huge challenges, both of which can be partly addressed by improved energy efficiency. I applaud the work of my S&D colleagues on this report and their efforts to provide an analysis of the current situation with an important focus on energy poverty.

Sven Schulze (PPE), *schriftlich*. – Ich habe gegen den „Bericht über die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz“ gestimmt, da wir in der EVP wichtige Punkte für die Umsetzung leider nicht durchsetzen konnten. Die EU ist schon auf gutem Weg, ihr Effizienzziel zu erreichen, und Energieeffizienz wird uns unterstützen, unsere Klimaziele zu erreichen. Wir müssen jedoch trotzdem noch an vielem arbeiten, zum Beispiel unsere Zusammenarbeit bei erneuerbaren Energiequellen verbessern und uns klare Ziele setzen.

Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero un avance necesario exigir una mejora del 40% en los objetivos estatales de eficiencia para 2030, corrigiendo la propuesta a la baja del Consejo, del 27%. Esto exigirá también una revisión del funcionamiento hasta la actualidad de la directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética, cuya inaplicación, excesiva flexibilidad y falta de concreción es adecuadamente resaltada en el documento.

Czesław Adam Siekierski (PPE), *na piśmie*. – Zwiększenie efektywności energetycznej o 20% do roku 2020 stanowi jeden z istotnych celów UE w zakresie jej polityki energetycznej. Działania podejmowane w tym kierunku są istotne z uwagi na ekonomiczny aspekt cen wytwarzania energii, kwestie środowiskowe i handlowe (połowa zapotrzebowania energetycznego UE pochodzi z importu). Opracowywanie systemów zwiększenia efektywności energetycznej stanowi stymulację dla poszukiwania nowych i innowacyjnych rozwiązań, co z kolei ożywia europejski rynek pracy i przynosi korzyści klimatyczne i środowiskowe.

Jednym z obszarów, gdzie zwiększenie efektywności jest szczególnie istotne, jest sektor mieszkaniowy. Konieczne są tu inwestycje mające na celu modernizację istniejących budynków oraz stosowanie zachęt do zwiększania oszczędności energii w przypadku systemów ogrzewania i chłodzenia. W dłuższej perspektywie z tego rodzaju zmianami wiąże się również lepsze i bardziej efektywne gospodarowanie zasobami, co również przekłada się na realne oszczędności.

Zwiększenie efektywności energetycznej powinno stanowić atrakcyjną szansę dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw na zwiększenie ich konkurencyjności przez ograniczenie wydatków na różne źródła energii. W kontekście społecznym natomiast lepsze wykorzystanie zasobów energetycznych oraz zapewnienie energii po rozsądnych cenach stanowi kluczowy element walki z ubóstwem energetycznym na terenie UE. Należy jednak pamiętać, że zwiększenie efektywności energetycznej ma na celu zmniejszenie jej zużycia przy zachowaniu poziomu życia i produkcji, nie ma być natomiast pretekstem do jej marnotrawienia.

Monika Smolková (S&D), *písomne*. – Chcem sa poďakovať spravodajcovi za predloženie správy o vykonávaní smernice o energetickej efektívnosti, vďaka ktorej sa EÚ a členským štátom podarilo dosiahnuť mnoho pozitívnych zmien. Veľmi pozitívne vnímam skutočnosť, že EÚ je na dobrej ceste, pokiaľ ide o dosiahnutie cieľov stanovených do roku 2020, medzi ktoré patrí 20 % zníženie emisií CO₂, zvýšenie podielu energie z obnoviteľných zdrojov v celkovej spotrebe energie na 20 % a 20 % zvýšenie energetickej efektívnosti. Napriek tomu ma znepokojujú informácie, že ak sa zachová súčasné tempo, EÚ do roku 2020 nedosiahne cieľ úspory energie o 20 %, a že skutočná miera bude o 1 až 2 % nižšia. Myslím si, že členské štáty, ktoré nedosahujú požadované výsledky, by mali urýchlene implementovať existujúce právne predpisy a odstrániť prekážky brániace investíciám. Očakávam, že EÚ a členské štáty urobia všetko preto, aby sa čo najskôr odstránili nedostatky, medzi ktoré patrí byrokracia súvisiaca s podávaním správ v oblasti energetiky a vysoká úroveň cien energií pre stredne veľkých živnostníkov a súkromné domácnosti. Verím, že prijatím efektívnych opatrení na úrovni členských štátov EÚ sa nám podarí do roku 2020 splniť európsky cieľ a tak dosiahnuť 20 % úsporu energie.

Michaela Šojdrová (PPE), *písemně*. – Usnesení ke zprávě o provádění směrnice o energetické účinnosti jsem nepodpořila. Usnesení reaguje na zprávu Komise, která vyhodnocuje pokrok členských států v zavádění opatření na dosažení cíle energetické účinnosti do roku 2020. Evropská unie si stanovila nezávazný cíl 20% úspor ve spotřebě energie, přičemž směrnice o energetické účinnosti obsahuje nástroje jeho dosažení. Usnesení vítá flexibilitu směrnice – členské státy si mohou vybrat pro ně nejlepší nástroj zvyšování energetické efektivity. Nicméně i sama Komise a EP (EP v usnesení) s politováním konstatují, že tento cíl do roku 2020 splněn nebude. Usnesení rovněž poukazuje na fakt, že nástroje na dosažení jednotlivých energeticko-klimatických cílů do roku 2020 si často konkurují, a jsou tedy neefektivní. Rovněž správně poukazuje na problémy plynoucí z přidávání dodatečných požadavků členskými státy, zejména byrokratických, na podniky a spotřebitele, které evropská legislativa nevyžaduje.

Hlavním problémem usnesení ale je, že levicové frakce do něj prosadily zmínku o klimatických cílech do roku 2030. Členské státy si v říjnu 2014 odsouhlasily nezávazný cíl zvýšení energetické účinnosti o 27 % do roku 2030 (s možným navýšením na 30 %). Usnesení ale žádá závazný cíl 40 %. Tato formulace byla pro poslanecký klub PPE nepřijatelná, a proto jsem spolu s kolegy návrh usnesení nepodpořila.

Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), *písmo*. – V Evropské unii se se emise toplogrednih plinov med letoma 1990 in 2014 zmanjšale za 23 %. V istem času se je BDP v EU povečal za 46 %.

Podjetja in državljanii ustvarijo vedno večjo rast, delovna mesta in davčne prihodke, hkrati pa se vedno bolj zmanjšuje podnebni vpliv, kar je pozitivna novica. Evropska unija je na zelo dobri poti, da bo izpolnila cilje do leta 2020, kar je mogoče v največji meri pripisati uspešnemu sistemu za trgovanje z emisijami. Ta ne spodbuja le k zmanjševanju emisij, temveč tudi k naložbam v energetske učinkovite tehnologije. K doseganju ciljev pa je brez dvoma delno prispevala tudi gospodarska in finančna kriza v nekaterih državah.

Uspešnost Evropske unije na področju zmanjšanja toplogrednih plinov je pohvale vredna, vendar to ne pomeni, da ne bi mogli storiti še več za izboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti. Obravnavano poročilo je dobro, saj poziva Evropsko komisijo, naj določi obvezujoč cilj zmanjšanja toplogrednih plinov do leta 2030 na 40 % ter tako sledi ciljem dogovorjenim v Parizu na COP 21.

Zaradi navedenega sem glasoval za sprejetje poročila.

Ivan Štefanec (PPE), *písmo*. – Je potrebné poznamenat', že občania si musia uvedomiť dôležitosť a efektívnosť energetickej úspory bez toho, aby bola vykonaná smernica o energetickej efektívnosti.

Davor Ivo Stier (PPE), *napisan*. – Direktivom o energetskeji učinkovitosti prepoznaje se važnost štednje energije. Europska unija ispunjava svoje klimatske i energetske ciljeve za 2020., koji uključuju smanjenje emisija ugljičnog dioksida, povećanje udjela obnovljivih izvora energije, poboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti, te treba zadržati vodeću ulogu u tom pogledu.

Za zaštitu okoliša i klime, kao i za jačanje gospodarske konkurentnosti, otvaranje radnih mjesta te borbu protiv energetske siromaštva, ključno je povećati energetske učinkovitosti te osigurati štednju energiju. Nadalje, važno je prepoznati važnost uključivanja građanskih inicijativa, primjerice zadruga i projekata zajednice za energetske učinkovitosti. Kako bi se građanima olakšalo aktivno sudjelovanje u energetske sustavu, važno je ukloniti gospodarske, regulatorne i administrativne prepreke.

Patricija Šulin (PPE), *písmo*. – Glasovala sem proti poročilu o poročilu o izvajanju direktive o energetskeji učinkovitosti.

Gre za izjemno pomembno poročilo in poročevalec Pieper je opravil odlično delo, saj mu je uspeli doseči kompromis. A vendarle sem glasovala proti poročilu, saj je bilo znotraj glasovanja o amandmajih nekaj izglasovanih nekaj amandmajev, s katerimi pozivamo Komisijo, naj določi zavezujoč 40 % cilj za energetske učinkovitosti za leto 2030, ki bo odražal potencial stroškovne učinkovite energetske učinkovitosti, s čimer se ne morem strinjati.

Veliko bolje bi namreč bilo, da bi določili najmanj 30-odstotni cilj izboljšanja energetske učinkovitosti do leta 2030, da bi dosegli višji, 40-odstotni cilj, ki bo odražal polni gospodarski potencial.

Νεοκλής Σουλικιώτης (GUE/NGL), γραπτώς. – Στο κείμενο υπάρχουν θετικές αναφορές, τις οποίες στηρίξαμε, αναφορικά με την ανάγκη η εν λόγω οδὴ να είναι σύμφωνη με τους στόχους για την προστασία του κλίματος καθώς και για την ανάγκη πρόωξης μέτρων για την καταπολέμηση της ενεργειακής φτώχειας και στήριξης των ευάλωτων ομάδων.

Εν τούτοις είναι ξεκάθαρο πως οι πολιτικές που προτείνονται και προωθούνται είναι στο πλαίσιο και εξυπηρετούν την υλοποίηση της Ενεργειακής Ένωσης, για την οποία έχουμε ασκήσει έντονη κριτική. Παρά λοιπόν τους επιμέρους θετικούς στόχους που αναφέρονται ο σκοπός είναι να υλοποιηθεί πλήρως η τρίτη δέσμη μέτρων, ώστε να υπάρξει μια ισχυρή εσωτερική αγορά, για να καταστεί η ΕΕ ανταγωνιστικότερη στην παγκόσμια αγορά. Στο πλαίσιο λοιπόν αυτό, οι πολιτικές που προωθούνται δεν εξυπηρετούν τις ανάγκες και τα συμφέροντα της κοινωνίας αλλά μετατρέπουν την ενέργεια σε εργαλείο που καλείται να υπηρετήσει τις ανάγκες της αγοράς. Για τους λόγους αυτούς τηρήσαμε αποχή.

Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI), γραπτώς. – Το 1968 ερευνητές προειδοποιούσαν το Αμερικανικό Ινστιτούτο Πετρελαίου ότι οι εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα από τα ορυκτά καύσιμα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν σε παγκόσμιες περιβαλλοντικές αλλαγές. 48 χρόνια αργότερα και ενώ η επιστήμη και η τεχνολογία έχουν κάνει άλματα, ακόμη δεν εφαρμόζονται κατάλληλες τεχνολογίες για τη βέλτιστη αξιοποίηση των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας. Αναρωτηθήκαμε γιατί;

Η συνειδητή απόκρυψη επιστημονικών ευρημάτων, η συγκάλυψη πληροφοριών και η εσκεμμένη παραπλάνηση της κοινής γνώμης επέβαλαν την κοντόφθαλμη πολιτική της προσωρινής κερδοφορίας των μεγάλων εταιρειών εις βάρος αντίστοιχων βιώσιμων επιλογών. Πετρελαϊκοί γίγαντες και εμπορικοί όμιλοι δαπανούν 115 εκατομμύρια δολάρια ετησίως μπλοκάροντας κλιματικές πολιτικές. Ταυτόχρονα ασκούν πιέσεις ώστε το φυσικό αέριο να αναδειχθεί ως η βασική τεχνολογία με την οποία η Ευρώπη θα μειώσει οικονομικά τις εκπομπές διοξειδίου του άνθρακα.

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αντιμετωπίζει την κατάσταση θέτοντας χαμηλούς στόχους και ασκώντας μετριοπαθείς πολιτικές. Εγκληματούμε. Όχι μόνο εις βάρος του περιβάλλοντος, αλλά κυρίως εις βάρος των παιδιών μας. Η πολιτική δεν πρέπει να γίνεται υποχείριο των κέντρων οικονομικής εξουσίας και αισχρής κερδοφορίας. Πρέπει να στηριχθεί ουσιαστικά η ανάπτυξη και εφαρμογή των ανανεώσιμων πηγών ενέργειας και να τιμωρηθούν οι υπαίτιοι κωλυσιεργίας.

Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Szavazatommal támogattam a jelentést, mivel úgy vélem, hogy az energiahatékonyság kérdésével az energiaszegénység felszámolása a középpontba helyezhető. Úgy vélem, hogy az energiahatékonyság 20%-os javítása nem lenne szabad, hogy gondot okozzon a tagállamoknak, sőt ennél ambiciózusabb célszámot (40%) is el tudunk érni a későbbiekben. Természetesen mindez akkor valószínűsíthető meg, ha a tagállamok valóban stratégiájuk középpontjába helyezik e célt. Első lépésként a lakossági energiahatékonyság növelést tartom a legfontosabbnak, mellyel csökkenthetjük az energiaszegénységet. Egyetértek azzal, hogy az ETS szerepe mind a kibocsátásban, mind pedig a hatékonyságnövelésben fontos. Úgy vélem, hogy az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátásának csökkentése bátorítja az energiahatékony technológiákba történő befektetéseket is.

A büntetés és ellehetetlenítés politikája helyett viszont az innovációt ösztönző politikát kell előtérbe helyeznünk! Egyetértek azzal, hogy a célkitűzések nehézkes teljesítését részben az is magyarázhatja, hogy több ország gazdasági és pénzügyi válságba került. Rendet kell tenni a részben egymásnak ellentmondó uniós éghajlatvédelmi jogszabályokban, az energiahatékonysággal összefüggő jogszabályok összetettségében és a nemzeti energiapolitikai lépésekben, amelyek az európai megközelítés egyes vonatkozásait jelentős mértékben befolyásolják. Érdekes elemnek tartom a jelentésben azt a megállapítást, mely szerint az importált földgáz 61%-át épületekben (főként lakóépületekben) használják fel, ezért egy ambiciózus épületfelújítási politikával 60%-kal lehetne csökkenteni rövidtávon. Ideje véget vetni az energiapazarlásnak és a fosszilis fűtőanyagoknak!

Adam Szejnfeld (PPE), na piśmie. – Konsumenci muszą być przygotowani na ogromny wzrost cen energii, jeśli Unia pójdzie szybką ścieżką sugerowaną przez lewicowe grupy polityczne w Parlamencie Europejskim w sprawie polityki w zakresie efektywności energetycznej. Oszczędności energii na poziomie 40%, jakich oczekują te partie, są niezwykle kosztowne i trudne do zrealizowania w krótkim czasie.

Direktywa w sprawie efektywności już wygenerowała istotny postęp. Zdecydowanie popieram politykę wyższej efektywności energetycznej, ale powinna to być polityka, która motywuje do efektywnego wykorzystywania energii. Jestem jednak przeciwko zakazowi korzystania z energii w ogóle, co nastąpiłoby, gdybyśmy ślepo podążali za nierealnymi zapisami sprawozdania Parlamentu dotyczącego wdrożenia dyrektywy w sprawie efektywności energetycznej.

Ponadto aby uzyskać większą efektywność energetyczną, oprócz zakazów i zakazów potrzeba lepszej koordynacji i współpracy państw członkowskich. Z tych też powodów zdecydowałem się zgłaszać przeciwko sprawozdaniu Parlamentu Europejskiego.

Dario Tamburrano (EFDD), per iscritto. – Abbiamo votato a favore della relazione poiché include molte delle nostre richieste fatte in commissione. La relazione considera l'efficienza energetica fondamentale per conseguire gli obiettivi UE in materia di clima ed energia. Sottolinea che l'efficienza è di primaria importanza per ridurre la nostra dipendenza dalle importazioni di energia, creare posti di lavoro, ridurre la povertà energetica, migliorare il benessere e la salute e stimolare l'economia; chiede che si eliminino gradualmente i sussidi ai combustibili fossili e incanalare le risorse liberate per migliorare l'efficienza energetica e il processo verso la decarbonizzazione.

Vittorie importanti del M5S sono state l'inclusione nella relazione dell'obiettivo UE vincolante al 40% per il 2030, con specifici obiettivi nazionali, e la richiesta di considerare l'efficienza energetica come prioritaria per aumentare la resilienza del sistema energetico. Abbiamo anche chiesto di considerare l'energia risparmiata come fonte a se stante, espressa in «negawatt».

Anche in questa relazione è passata la nostra richiesta a UE e Stati membri di riconoscere l'importanza delle autorità locali e dei cittadini come soggetti essenziali per l'efficienza energetica verso la transizione ad una economia più sostenibile. Quindi in generale la relazione risulta ambiziosa e progressista, anche se include ancora alcune impostazioni conservatrici.

Claudia Țapardel (S&D), în scris. – Uniunea Europeană a întreprins în ultimele trei decenii un amplu proces de combatere a gazelor cu efecte de seră, în vederea încetinirii încălzirii globale. Astfel, în perioada 1990-2014, emisiile de gaze cu efect de seră au scăzut cu 23%, în timp ce PIB UE a crescut cu 46%. Până în 2020, obiectivele asumate la nivelul UE presupun reducerea cu 20% a emisiilor de dioxid de carbon, creșterea la 20% a ponderii energiilor regenerabile din totalul energiei consumate și creșterea cu 20% a eficienței energetice. Totuși, în momentul de față, estimarea Comisiei este că se va ajunge la un nivel al eficienței energetice de doar 17,6%, ceea ce periclitează în mod serios atingerea obiectivului de 40% stabilit pentru 2030. Cauzele acestei situații includ birocrația în raportarea din domeniul energiei, nivelurile ridicate ale prețurilor energiei pentru IMM și gospodării și prevederile speciale de la nivel național. În aceste condiții, este nevoie de o clarificare a cadrului european în domeniul eficienței energetice, dar și de o serie de măsuri menite să impulsioneze înlocuirea energiilor poluate cu energii regenerabile la nivelul statelor membre, în afara cadrului deja creat de certificatele ETS. În consecință, susțin actuala formă a raportului de față.

Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – J'ai voté pour le texte. L'efficacité énergétique est déterminante pour atteindre nos objectifs en matière de climat dans le cadre des objectifs entérinés par la COP21 à Paris. Elle est d'une importance primordiale pour réduire notre dépendance à l'égard des importations d'énergie, créer des emplois, réduire la pauvreté énergétique, améliorer le confort et la santé, et stimuler notre économie.

Je signale que la directive sur l'efficacité énergétique a entraîné de nombreuses améliorations positives au sein des États membres, mais qu'une mise en œuvre insuffisante entrave son véritable potentiel.

Pavel Telička (ALDE), *in writing*. – The main objective of this implementation report is to assess implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU). The issue of energy efficiency is also closely related to development in the field of renewables. While the Energy Efficiency Directive entered into force relatively recently, some conclusions can be drawn. While many Member States are on track to achieving 20% efficiency target for 2020, full implementation is highly unlikely. The report further highlights the need to focus on improvements in the building sector, which accounts for 40% of total energy consumption and 36% of CO₂ emissions in the EU, the need to protect vulnerable consumers, improve conditions and provide technical support to those who wish to become prosumers. The rapporteur has pointed out that energy efficiency should be treated as an energy resource, thus decreasing EU dependency on energy imports from third countries, especially gas imports. I voted in favour of this report.

Isabelle Thomas (S&D), *par écrit*. – L'efficacité énergétique est la priorité de l'Union européenne pour combattre le réchauffement climatique. L'amélioration de l'efficacité énergétique de 20 % – avec l'augmentation de 20 % de la part des énergies renouvelables et la réduction de 20 % des émissions de CO₂ – constitue un des objectifs européens pour 2020 en termes de développement durable.

Entre 1990 et 2014, les émissions de gaz à effet de serre ont diminué de 23 %. Parallèlement, le PIB de l'Union a augmenté de 46 %. Cela est donc la preuve, s'il en fallait une, qu'en réduisant leurs incidences sur l'environnement les citoyens et les entreprises ont généré un surplus de croissance. Contrairement aux affirmations des partisans du moins-disant environnemental, la transition écologique et la maîtrise de l'énergie ne sont pas un frein à la croissance économique, mais un adjuvant.

L'objectif d'efficacité de 40 % d'ici 2030 fixé par le Parlement – au lieu des 27 % initialement prévus – est donc salubre. Une politique environnementale au rabais ne peut satisfaire la volonté de construire une Europe durable et prospère. C'est en empruntant le chemin de la transition écologique que l'Europe joindra efficacement ses objectifs économiques, sociaux et environnementaux.

Ruža Tomašić (ECR), *napisan*. – Direktiva o energetske učinkovitosti stupila je na snagu u prosincu 2012. godine. Njome se države članice obvezuju na postavljanje okvirnih nacionalnih ciljeva u pogledu energetske učinkovitosti do 2020. godine temeljenih na potrošnji bilo primarne bilo konačne energije. Direktivom se također utvrđuju pravno obvezujuća pravila za krajnje korisnike i dobavljače energije. Države članice mogu te minimalne zahtjeve postrožiti radi što veće uštede energije. Međutim, smatram da je neprihvatljivo da Europska unija uspostavlja obvezujuću politiku o energetske učinkovitosti i da regulacija energetske učinkovitosti treba biti u nadležnosti država članica te sam glasovala protiv Izjave o provedbi Direktive o energetske učinkovitosti.

Romana Tomc (PPE), *pisno*. – Energetska politika je zelo pomembna za Evropsko unijo. Smo na dobri poti, da dosežemo svoj cilj 20 % deleža učinkovitosti do leta 2020 in to kljub temu, da direktiva ni bila izvedena v celoti v večini držav članic. To dokazuje, da je energetska učinkovitost v interesu podjetij in gospodinjstev.

Poročilo vsebuje številne pozitivne točke kot je pomen energetske učinkovitosti za doseganje naših podnebnih ciljev, prožnost v členu 7, potrebo za boljše spremljanje in razjasnitev opredelitve malih in srednjih podjetij ter pravila o državni pomoči.

Kljub temu sem predlog direktive zavrnila.

Direktiva pa daje prevelik poudarek na varčevanju z energijo namesto na energetske učinkovitosti. Zaradi ključnih elementov, ki niso bili sprejeti, tudi jaz ne morem podpreti tega poročila.

Estefanía Torres Martínez (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor del informe porque subraya la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia energética como manera de luchar contra el cambio climático. Propone objetivos vinculantes por países. El aspecto vinculante es un punto clave porque obliga los países a cumplir con estos objetivos mientras que la flexibilidad deja la puerta abierta a objetivos insuficientes. Además, no se contenta del objetivo del 27% en el 2030 fijado por el Consejo y la Comisión sino propone el objetivo más ambicioso del 40%. Propone también centrar las medidas sobre los hogares en situación de pobreza energética, aspecto que nos parece de primera importancia.

Evžen Tošenovský (ECR), *písemně*. – Zprávu jsem nepodpořil, protože dlouhodobě nesouhlasím se stanovením závazných cílů pro energetickou účinnost. Zpráva navíc požaduje jejich další navýšení na 40 %.

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), *in writing*. – Our societies are experiencing a transition towards a low-carbon economy, but there are strong vested interests close to national governments that make it difficult. It is thus fundamental that the EU maintains a strong position to ensure that countries make it easy for renewable energies.

Moreover, all countries should put in place policies that protect the most vulnerable of our citizens, particularly those who suffer from energy poverty.

Myłène Troszczyński (ENF), *par écrit*. – Ce texte fait un constat réaliste des problèmes de compétitivité de nos industries à forte intensité d'énergie par rapport à leurs concurrents extra-communautaires, mais il prône une austérité énergétique qui risque de nuire encore davantage à ces industries.

J'ai donc choisi l'abstention.

István Ujhelyi (S&D), *írásban*. – Az Unióban az üvegházhatású gázok kibocsátása 1990 és 2014 között 23%-kal csökkent. Ugyanebben az időszakban az Unió GDP-je 46%-kal emelkedett. A vállalkozások és a polgárok az éghajlatot egyre kevésbé terhelve bővítik a növekedést, ezáltal munkahelyeket teremtenek és adóbevételeket generálnak. Voksommal a végső szavazásnál a frakció álláspontját követtem.

Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – Hemos votado a favor del informe porque subraya la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia energética como manera de luchar contra el cambio climático. Propone objetivos vinculantes por países. El aspecto vinculante es un punto clave porque obliga los países a cumplir con estos objetivos mientras que la flexibilidad deja la puerta abierta a objetivos insuficientes. Además, no se contenta del objetivo del 27% en el 2030 fijado por el Consejo y la Comisión sino propone el objetivo más ambicioso del 40%. Propone también centrar las medidas sobre los hogares en situación de pobreza energética, aspecto que nos parece de primera importancia.

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE), *raštu*. — Palankiai vertina naujus novatoriškus ir pažangius sprendimus, kaip derinti elektros energijos pasiūlą ir paklausą. Pažymi, kad Komisija rengia Energijos vartojimo efektyvumo direktyvos 9–11 straipsnių įgyvendinimo gaires, siekdama padėti vartotojams geriau kontroliuoti jų suvartojamos energijos kiekį; mano, kad techninis įgyvendinamumas ir pažangiųjų skaitiklių įrengimas – atsižvelgiant į sąnaudų efektyvumą ir sąnaudų skaidrumą – yra esminė energijos taupymo sąlyga

Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), *in writing*. – I voted in favour of the report on the implementation report on the Energy Efficiency Directive. The report emphasises that improving energy efficiency is crucial to achieving our climate targets. The report stresses that this is essential to start the transition towards a more sustainable energy system based on renewables and away from fossil fuels as soon as possible. The report recalls that the transition towards a more sustainable energy is also vital to job creation and sustainable growth. I voted in favour of the report because I strongly believe that the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive is a major progress towards achieving the EU's climate and energy targets.

Ángela Vallina (GUE/NGL), *por escrito*. – He votado a favor de este informe porque considero un avance necesario exigir una mejora del 40% en los objetivos nacionales de eficiencia para 2030, corrigiendo la propuesta a la baja del Consejo, del 27%. Esto exigirá también una revisión del funcionamiento hasta la actualidad de la Directiva relativa a la eficiencia energética, cuya inaplicación, excesiva flexibilidad y falta de concreción es adecuadamente resaltada en el documento.

Hilde Vautmans (ALDE), *schriftelijk*. – In de EU is de uitstoot van broeikasgassen tussen 1990 en 2014 met 23 % gedaald. In diezelfde periode is het bbp van de EU met 46 % gestegen. Met steeds geringere gevolgen voor het klimaat zorgen bedrijven en burgers voor meer groei, en creëren op die manier nieuwe banen en genereren belastinginkomsten. De Europese Unie ligt zeer goed op koers met het oog op de verwezenlijking van de voor 2020 gestelde doelen, te weten 20 % minder CO₂-uitstoot, verhoging van het aandeel van hernieuwbare energiebronnen in het totale energieverbruik tot 20 %, en 20 % meer energie-efficiëntie. Dit is grotendeels te danken aan de succesvolle ETS-regeling. Deze regeling zet niet alleen aan tot vermindering van de emissies, maar ook tot investeringen in energie-efficiënte technologie. Ik heb vóór dit verslag gestemd en ben ook tevreden dat Vlaanderen dankzij haar nieuwe beleidsmaatregelen weer een tandje bijsteekt.

Paavo Väyrynen (ALDE), kirjallinen. – Mietintö energiatehokkuusdirektiivin täytäntöönpanokertomuksesta on kannatettava, koska siinä kiinnitetään huomiota paitsi energiatehokkuuden lisäämiseen, myös energian säästämiseen. Niin ikään kansallisten erityispiirteiden huomioiminen ja kunnianhimoiset ilmastotavoitteet ovat EU:n osalta oikeita toimia. Parissa kohtaa poikkesin ryhmäni linjasta muun muassa sen takia, etten kannata ylimääräisen raportoinnin lisäämistä jäsenvaltioille. Kokonaisuudessa näiden syiden takia kannatin mietinnön hyväksymistä.

Harald Vilimsky (ENF), schriftlich. – Der Bericht behandelt die Umsetzung der Richtlinie zur Energieeffizienz. Die nachhaltige Energiegewinnung, sowie die optimale Ausnutzung der vorhandenen Ressourcen, stellt eine der größten Herausforderungen für das 21. Jahrhundert dar. Dieser Bericht vermischt jedoch verschiedene Begriffe und differenziert somit nicht. Auch wird vergessen, im Bericht auf die verschiedenen Regionen der Europäischen Union einzugehen. Energieeffizienz bedeutet in Finnland ganz etwas anderes als in Spanien. Daher habe ich mich der Stimme enthalten.

Lieve Wierinck (ALDE), in writing. – Ensuring the future of energy in the EU requires a combination of approaches. While renewable energy plays an important role in this future, we also have to work on energy efficiency. That is why I voted in favour of this resolution. It sends a positive message, stressing the progress that has been made and recognises the role of ETS and the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive herein. It also recognises some problems, such as the complexity of the relevant legislation. I therefore strongly welcome its call on the Commission to work towards a coherent electricity market design for the EU.

While the EU plays an important role as legislator, in the end it is the market itself that will be the key to the solution. As long as we ensure that energy efficiency is in the industry's interest, the market will become more energy efficient by itself. I agree with the resolution that the correct incentive is very important in this regard.

Anna Záborská (PPE), písomne. – Energetická účinnosť je jedným z kľúčových parametrov pri zabezpečení zásobovania energiou. Európske aj národné politiky v tejto oblasti by preto mali vytvárať prostredie, v ktorom sa vyplatia investície do zvyšovania účinnosti zdrojov. Táto iniciatívna správa ponúka veľké množstvo politických odporúčaní, ktoré vychádzajú z prehodnotenia existujúcich opatrení na európskej úrovni. Spoločné politiky v tejto oblasti sú nevyhnutné kvôli vysokej a ďalej sa zvyšujúcej miere prepojenia distribučných sietí a vzájomnej závislosti. Dôraz na účinnosť je preto v záujme všetkých členských štátov a predstavuje nevyhnutný predpoklad na znižovanie energetickej závislosti EÚ od Ruska. Preto som túto správu v hlasovaní podporila.

Θεόδωρος Ζαγοράκης (PPE), γραπτώς. – Έδωσα τη θετική μου ψήφο στην οδηγία για την ενεργειακή απόδοση της Επιτροπής Βιομηχανίας, Έρευνας και Ενέργειας. Το κείμενο του συναδέλφου Pieper λαμβάνει υπόψη σημαντικά θετικά, αλλά και ανεπαρκή σημεία, κυρίως κατά την εφαρμογή της. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, το περιεχόμενο το έχουν κρίνει θετικά τα περισσότερα μέλη της αρμόδιας επιτροπής.

Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), por escrito. – Estoy muy a favor de este informe, ya que considero que, es muy importante tener presente los niveles de energía utilizados en la UE, los cuales no deberían superar ciertos máximos, de modo que se logre reducir la contaminación y los daños al medio ambiente.

Por ello, es necesario crear un marco legislativo claro y consistente a este respecto, en el que quede reflejada la regulación sobre eficiencia energética, de modo que los niveles de eficiencia sean comunes a todos los estados de la UE y, así, todos podamos contribuir en la misma medida a un objetivo común como es la mejora del medio ambiente.

En España, por ejemplo, durante el año 2014 se reportaron unos niveles de energía primaria y final inferiores a los niveles objetivo a 2020, lo cual indica que estamos muy concienciados y respalda en mayor medida mi apoyo a este informe.

Jana Žitňanská (ECR), písomne. – Správu pána poslanca Pieper o vykonávaní smernice o energetickej efektívnosti som nepodporila. Samotná správa chápe energetickú efektívnosť ako zdroj energie a definuje ju ako spôsob ochrany životného prostredia a pomoc pri znižovaní energetickej závislosti Európskej únie. Samozrejme, v súčasnej dobe, keď je dôležité hľadať cesty, ako znížiť energetickú závislosť Európskej únie od zdrojov zo zahraničia, je potrebné pracovať aj s pozitívami vylepšenej energetickej efektívnosti. Na druhej strane však správa obsahovala aj niekoľko výziev na stanovenie záväzných cieľov pre energetickú efektívnosť tak na európskej, ako aj na národnej úrovni, čo nepodporujem. Rovnako sa nestotožňujem s výzvami na stanovenie čoraz ambicioznejších cieľov, keďže členské štáty nečelia rovnakej domácej situácii a teda stanovenie záväzných ambiciózných cieľov, napríklad čo sa týka obnovy budov, by tak mohlo v niektorých členských štátoch spôsobiť problémy najmä v chudobnejších oblastiach.

Carlos Zorrinho (S&D), *por escrito*. – Votei favoravelmente o relatório Pieper por concordar com este relatório de balanço relativo à aplicação da Directiva sobre eficiência energética, nomeadamente a constatação de que ainda há muito por fazer no âmbito do desempenho energético dos edifícios e o apelo à apresentação de um quadro regulamentar forte que consista na adoção de objetivos e medidas destinadas a incentivar e permitir o investimento na eficiência energética e na redução dos custos e do consumo energético, apoiando simultaneamente a competitividade e a sustentabilidade.

Tal como defendo no âmbito da energia renovável, também no domínio da eficiência energética é fundamental assumir metas ambiciosas, em linha com o Acordo de Paris e produzir mais energia limpa e renovável, criar riqueza e emprego e reduzir a dependência estratégica de fornecedores externos. Para tal defendo que a eficiência energética deva ser entendida como a medida mais sustentável no âmbito da obrigação de reduzir o nosso consumo de energia.

Marco Zullo (EFDD), *per iscritto*. — Ho votato a favore di questa relazione perché, nell'ambito della politica sull'energia e il clima dell'UE, ha grande importanza stabilendo una serie di misure vincolanti per guidare l'UE nel raggiungere gli obiettivi dell'aumento del 20% dell'efficienza energetica, dell'aumento del 20% della produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili e della riduzione del 20% delle emissioni di CO₂, il tutto entro il 2020.

Purtroppo la direttiva non è stata implementata appieno nei vari Stati membri e benché sia possibile che l'obiettivo di riduzione delle emissioni venga comunque raggiunto, il merito sarà della crisi economica e industriale che ha colpito l'UE negli ultimi otto anni più che del lavoro fatto dai vari Stati membri.

Il relatore del PPE aveva cercato di impostare la lettura di questo insuccesso della direttiva con una prospettiva che mettesse in contrapposizione gli interessi industriali con gli obiettivi climatici e ambientali, richiedendo ripetute deregolamentazioni e flessibilità nella revisione della direttiva attesa per l'autunno.

Il lavoro politico ed emendativo nostro e delle altre forze più progressiste e verdi ha però permesso una valutazione più critica dei problemi di implementazione della direttiva, come la mancanza di obiettivi vincolanti, mettendo in minoranza le forze più conservatrici e migliorando notevolmente il testo.

Milan Zver (PPE), *pisno*. – Večja energetska učinkovitost in prihranki energije so pomembni za varstvo okolja in podnebja, krepitev gospodarske konkurenčnosti, ustvarjanje novih delovnih mest in zanesljivo oskrbo z energijo. To lahko dosežemo s politiko, ki spodbuja učinkovito uporabo energije z znižanjem ustreznih davkov in dodatnim financiranjem.

Poročilo o izvajanju direktive o energetske učinkovitosti, kot ga je zagovarjala levica (z zavezujočim ciljem 40 % prihranka do leta 2030 za posamezne države članice) pa je nerealistično in ne pripomore k bolj učinkoviti uporabi energije.

Rezultat takega zavezujočega cilja bi lahko bilo veliko povišanje cen energije in vzpostavitev gradbenih kvot, ki si jih ne morejo privoščiti niti lokalne oblasti niti stanovalci.

Przewodniczący. — Niniejszym zamykam głosowanie.

10. Berichtigungen des Stimmverhaltens und beabsichtigtes Stimmverhalten: siehe Protokoll

11. Vorlage von Dokumenten: siehe Protokoll

12. Berichtigung (Artikel 231 der Geschäftsordnung): siehe Protokoll

13. Beschlüsse über bestimmte Dokumente: siehe Protokoll

14. Übermittlung der in dieser Sitzung angenommenen Texte: siehe Protokoll

15. Zeitpunkt der nächsten Sitzungen: siehe Protokoll

16. Unterbrechung der Sitzungsperiode

(Posiedzenie zostało zamknięte o godz. 13.15)

Legende der verwendeten Zeichen

*	Konsultationsverfahren
***	Zustimmungsverfahren
***I	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, erste Lesung
***II	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, zweite Lesung
***III	Ordentliches Gesetzgebungsverfahren, dritte Lesung

(Das angegebene Verfahren entspricht der von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Rechtsgrundlage.)

Abkürzungen der Ausschüsse

AFET	Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
DEVE	Entwicklungsausschuss
INTA	Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
BUDG	Haushaltsausschuss
CONT	Haushaltskontrollausschuss
ECON	Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Währung
EMPL	Ausschuss für Beschäftigung und soziale Angelegenheiten
ENVI	Ausschuss für Umweltfragen, öffentliche Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit
ITRE	Ausschuss für Industrie, Forschung und Energie
IMCO	Ausschuss für Binnenmarkt und Verbraucherschutz
TRAN	Ausschuss für Verkehr und Fremdenverkehr
REGI	Ausschuss für regionale Entwicklung
AGRI	Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und ländliche Entwicklung
PECH	Fischereiausschuss
CULT	Ausschuss für Kultur und Bildung
JURI	Rechtsausschuss
LIBE	Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres
AFCO	Ausschuss für konstitutionelle Fragen
FEMM	Ausschuss für die Rechte der Frau und die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter
PETI	Petitionsausschuss
DROI	Unterausschuss Menschenrechte
SEDE	Unterausschuss Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Abkürzungen der Fraktionen

PPE	Fraktion der Europäischen Volkspartei (Christdemokraten)
S&D	Fraktion der Progressiven Allianz der Sozialdemokraten im Europäischen Parlament
ECR	Fraktion der Europäischen Konservativen und Reformer
ALDE	Fraktion der Allianz der Liberalen und Demokraten für Europa
GUE/NGL	Konföderale Fraktion der Vereinigten Europäischen Linken/Nordische Grüne Linke
Vers/ALE	Fraktion der Grünen/Freie Europäische Allianz
EFDD	Fraktion Europa der Freiheit und der direkten Demokratie
ENF	Fraktion Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit
NI	Fraktionslos



C/2024/1623

22.2.2024

Mitteilung der Kommission über die Anwendung des Regionalen Übereinkommens über Pan-Europa-Mittelmeer-Präferenzursprungsregeln bzw. der Ursprungsprotokolle zur diagonalen Kumulierung zwischen den Vertragsparteien dieses Übereinkommens

(C/2024/1623)

Zur Anwendung der diagonalen Ursprungskumulierung zwischen den Vertragsparteien des Regionalen Übereinkommens ⁽¹⁾ über Pan-Europa-Mittelmeer-Präferenzursprungsregeln ⁽²⁾ (im Folgenden das „Übereinkommen“) teilen die betreffenden Parteien einander über die Europäische Kommission die mit den anderen Parteien vereinbarten Ursprungsregeln mit.

Es sei daran erinnert, dass die diagonale Kumulierung nur zulässig ist, wenn die Partei der Endfertigung und die Partei der Endbestimmung mit allen am Erwerb der Ursprungsseignschaft beteiligten Parteien, d. h. mit den Parteien, in denen die verwendeten Vormaterialien ihren Ursprung haben, Freihandelsabkommen mit denselben Ursprungsregeln geschlossen haben. Vormaterialien mit Ursprung in einer Partei, die kein Abkommen mit der Partei der Endfertigung und/oder der Partei der Endbestimmung geschlossen hat, sind als Vormaterialien ohne Ursprungsseignschaft zu behandeln. Konkrete Beispiele hierfür werden in den Erläuterungen zu den Ursprungsprotokollen Pan-Europa-Mittelmeer gegeben ⁽³⁾.

Auf der Grundlage der von den Parteien gemachten Mitteilungen an die Europäische Kommission enthalten die beigefügten Tabellen folgende Angaben:

Tabelle 1 – Vereinfachte Übersicht über die Kumulierungsmöglichkeiten zum 6. Juli 2023.

Tabellen 2 und 3 – Datum der Anwendung der diagonalen Kumulierung.

In Tabelle 1 markiert ein „X“ ein zwischen zwei Parteien bestehendes Freihandelsabkommen mit Ursprungsregeln, die eine Kumulierung nach dem Muster der Pan-Europa-Mittelmeer-Ursprungsregeln vorsehen. Um eine diagonale Kumulierung mit einem dritten Partner anwenden zu können, müssen alle Felder der Tabelle zwischen den drei Partnern mit einem „X“ markiert sein. Bei der diagonalen Kumulierung gibt es jedoch einige Ausnahmen. In diesen Fällen verweist eine (1), eine (2) oder ein (*) neben dem „X“ auf die jeweilige Ausnahme.

Die in Tabelle 2 aufgeführten Daten beziehen sich auf:

- den Beginn der Anwendung der diagonalen Kumulierung auf Grundlage der Anlage I Artikel 3 des Übereinkommens, wenn sich das betreffende Freihandelsabkommen auf das Übereinkommen bezieht. In diesem Fall steht vor dem Datum ein „(C)“;
- den Beginn der Anwendung der Ursprungsprotokolle zur diagonalen Kumulierung, die dem betreffenden Freihandelsabkommen beigefügt sind (in den übrigen Fällen).

Die Datumsangaben in Tabelle 3 beziehen sich auf das Datum der Anwendung der den Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der EU, der Türkei und den Teilnehmern des Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozesses der EU beigefügten Protokolle zu den Ursprungsregeln, die eine diagonale Kumulierung vorsehen. Sobald in ein Freihandelsabkommen zwischen in dieser Tabelle aufgeführten Parteien ein Verweis auf das Übereinkommen aufgenommen wird, ist in Tabelle 2 eine Datumsangabe eingesetzt worden, der ein „(C)“ vorangestellt ist.

Unter die Zollunion zwischen der EU und der Türkei fallende Vormaterialien mit Ursprung in der Türkei können als Vormaterialien mit Ursprungsseignschaft zum Zweck der diagonalen Kumulierung zwischen der Europäischen Union und den an dem Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess beteiligten Ländern, mit denen Ursprungsprotokolle gelten, behandelt werden.

⁽¹⁾ Vertragsparteien sind die Europäische Union, Albanien, Algerien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, Ägypten, die Färöer, Georgien, Island, Israel, Jordanien, Kosovo (gemäß der Resolution 1244(1999) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen), Libanon, Nordmazedonien, die Republik Moldau, Montenegro, Marokko, Norwegen, Serbien, die Schweiz (einschließlich Liechtensteins), Syrien, Tunesien, die Türkei, die Ukraine sowie das Westjordanland und der Gazastreifen.

⁽²⁾ ABl. L 54 vom 26.2.2013, S. 4.

⁽³⁾ ABl. C 83 vom 17.4.2007, S. 1.

Für die in der Tabelle genannten Vertragsparteien gelten folgende Codes:

— Europäische Union	EU
— EFTA-Länder:	
— Island	IS
— Schweiz (einschließlich Liechtenstein) ⁽¹⁾	CH (+ LI)
— Norwegen	NO
— Färöer	FO
— Die Teilnehmer am Barcelona-Prozess:	
— Algerien	DZ
— Ägypten	EG
— Israel	IL
— Jordanien	JO
— Libanon	LB
— Marokko	MA
— Westjordanland und Gazastreifen	PS
— Syrien	SY
— Tunesien	TN
— Türkei	TR
— Die am Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess der EU teilnehmenden Staaten:	
— Albanien	AL
— Bosnien und Herzegowina	BA
— Nordmazedonien	MK
— Montenegro	ME
— Serbien	RS
— Kosovo *	KO
— die Republik Moldau	MD
— Georgien	GE
— Ukraine	UA

⁽¹⁾ Die Schweiz und das Fürstentum Liechtenstein bilden eine Zollunion.

* Diese Bezeichnung berührt nicht die Standpunkte zum Status und steht im Einklang mit der Resolution 1244/99 des VN-Sicherheitsrates und dem Gutachten des Internationalen Gerichtshofs zur Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Kosovo.

Diese Mitteilung ersetzt die Mitteilung 2021/C 418/12 (ABl. C 418 vom 15.10.2021, S. 24).

Tabelle 1

Vereinfachte Übersicht über die Möglichkeiten der diagonalen Kumulierung in der Pan-Europa-Mittelmeer-Zone zum 1.8.2021

		EFTA-Länder				Teilnehmer am Barcelona-Prozess											Teilnehmer am Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess der EU									
	EU	CH (+LI)	IS	NO	FO	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	TR	AL	BA	KO	ME	MK	RS	MD	GE	UA		
EU		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X ⁽¹⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
CH (+LI)	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		
IS	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		
NO	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		
FO	X	X	X	X											X											
DZ	X																									
EG	X	X	X	X					X		X			X	X											
IL	X	X	X	X					X						X											
JO	X	X	X	X			X	X			X			X												
LB		X	X	X																						
MA	X	X	X	X			X		X					X	X											
PS	X	X	X	X											X											
SY															X											
TN	X	X	X	X			X		X		X				X											
TR	X ⁽¹⁾	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X		X ^(*)	X ^(*)	^(*)	X ^(*)	X ^(*)	X ^(*)	X	X ⁽²⁾			
AL	X	X	X	X											X ^(*)		X	X	X	X	X	X				
BA	X	X	X	X											X ^(*)	X		X	X	X	X	X				
KO	X														^(*)	X	X		X	X	X	X				
ME	X	X	X	X											X ^(*)	X	X	X		X	X	X				
MK	X	X	X	X											X ^(*)	X	X	X	X		X	X		X		

RS	X	X	X	X											X (*)	X	X	X	X	X		X		
MD	X														X	X	X	X	X	X				X
GE	X	X	X	X											X (?)									X
UA	X	X	X	X															X		X	X		

(*) Eine diagonale Kumulierung zwischen Albanien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, dem Kosovo, Nordmazedonien, Montenegro, Serbien und der Türkei ist möglich. Siehe Tabelle 3 für die Möglichkeit einer diagonalen Kumulierung zwischen der Europäischen Union, Albanien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, dem Kosovo, Nordmazedonien, Montenegro, Serbien und der Türkei.

(¹) Für Waren, die unter die Zollunion EU-Türkei fallen, ist das Anfangsdatum der 27. Juli 2006.
Für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse ist das Anfangsdatum der 1. Januar 2007 (keine Kumulierung mit MD und GE).
Für Kohle und Stahlerzeugnisse ist das Anfangsdatum der 1. März 2009 (keine Kumulierung mit MD und GE).

(²) Bezogen auf die Erzeugnisse

- gemäß den Kapiteln 1 bis 24 des Harmonisierten Systems zur Bezeichnung und Codierung der Waren und
- die unter Anhang 1 des Freihandelsabkommens zwischen der Republik Türkei und Georgien fallenden Erzeugnisse kann die Ursprungskumulierung kann nur bei Ursprung in der Republik Türkei und Georgien angewandt werden.

Tabelle 2

Beginn der Anwendung der Ursprungsregeln zur diagonalen Kumulierung in der Paneuropa-Mittelmeer-Zone

	IS	CH (+LI)	EU	Teilnehmer am Barcelona-Prozess										Teilnehmer am Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess der EU					
			EU																
	1.1.2006 (C) 1.5.2015	1.1.2006 (C) 1.2. 2016		CH(+LI)	1.1.2006 (C) 1.2.2016														
	1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013																		
		1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013		IS	1.1.2006 (C) 1.5.2015														
	1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013	1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013		NO	1.1.2006 (C) 1.5.2015														
	1.11.2005	1.1.2006		FO	1.12.2005 (C) 12.5.2015														
				DZ	1.11.2007														
	1.8.2007	1.8.2007		EG	1.3.2006 (C) 1.2.2016														
	1.7.2005	1.7.2005		IL	1.1.2006														
	17.7.2007	17.7.2007		JO	1.7.2006 (C) 1.9.2021														
	1.1.2007	1.1.2007		LB															
	1.3.2005	1.3.2005		MA	1.1.2.2005														
	1.5.2016	1.5.2016		PS	1.7.2009 (C) 1.3.2016														
				SY															
	1.3.2006	1.6.2005		TN	1.8.2006														
	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019		TR	(1)														
	(C) 1.5.2015	(C) 1.5.2015		AL	(C) 1.5.2015														
	(C) 1.1.2015	(C) 1.1.2015		BA	(C) 9.12.2016														
				KO	(C) 1.4.2016														
	(C) 1.10.2012	(C) 1.9.2012		ME	(C) 1.2.2015														
	1.5.2015	1.2.2016		MK	(C) 1.5.2015														
	(C) 1.5.2015	(C) 1.5.2015		RS	(C) 1.2.2015														
				MD	(C) 12.2016														
	(C) 1.9.2017	(C) 1.5.2018		GE	(C) 1.6.2018														
	1.6.2012	1.6.2012		UA	(C) 1.1.2019														

IL	EG	DZ	FO	NO
1.1.2006	1.3.2006 (C) 1.2.2016	1.11.2007	1.12.2005 (C) 12.5.2015	1.1.2006 (C) 1.5.2015
1.7.2005	1.8.2007		1.1.2006	1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013
1.7.2005	1.8.2007		1.11.2005	1.8.2005 (C) 1.7.2013
1.7.2005	1.8.2007		1.12.2005	
				1.12.2005
				1.8.2007
				1.7.2005
9.2.2006	6.7.2006			17.7.2007
				1.1.2007
	6.7.2006			1.3.2005
				1.5.2016
	6.7.2006			1.8.2005
1.3.2006	1.3.2007		(C) 1.10.2017	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019
				(C) 1.5.2015
				(C) 1.1.2015
				(C) 1.11.2012
				1.5.2015
				(C) 1.5.2015
				(C) 1.9.2017
				1.9.2012

ME	KO	BA	AL	TR
(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.4.2016	(C) 9.12.2016	(C) 1.5.2015	(¹)
(C) 1.9.2012		(C) 1.1.2015	(C) 1.5.2015	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019
(C) 1.10.2012		(C) 1.1.2015	(C) 1.5.2015	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019
(C) 1.11.2012		(C) 1.1.2015	(C) 1.5.2015	1.9.2007 (C) 1.12.2019
				(C) 1.10.2017
				1.3.2007
				1.3.2006
				1.1.2006
				(C) 26.3.2021
				1.1.2007
				1.7.2005
(C) 1.6.2021	1.9.2019	(C) 1.8.2021	(C) 3.5.2021	
(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.2.2015		(C) 3.5.2021
(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.4.2014		(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.8.2021
(C) 1.4.2014		(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	1.9.2019
	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.6.2021
(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.8.2018
(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.2.2015	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.6.2019
(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.4.2014	(C) 1.10.2017
				(C) 29.4.2021

(¹) Für Waren, die unter die Zollunion EU-Türkei fallen, ist das Anfangsdatum der 27. Juli 2006.
Für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse ist das Anfangsdatum der 1. Januar 2007.
Für Kohle und Stahlerzeugnisse ist das Anfangsdatum der 1. März 2009.

Tabelle 3

Beginn der Anwendung der Protokolle zu den Ursprungsregeln, die eine diagonale Kumulierung zwischen der Europäischen Union, Albanien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, dem Kosovo, Nordmazedonien, Montenegro, Serbien und der Türkei vorsehen

	EU	AL	BA	KO	MK	ME	RS	TR
EU		1.1.2007	1.7.2008	1.4.2016	1.1.2007	1.1.2008	8.12.2009	(¹)
AL	1.1.2007		22.11.2007	1.4.2014	26.7.2007	26.7.2007	24.10.2007	1.8.2011
BA	1.7.2008	22.11.2007		1.4.2014	22.11.2007	22.11.2007	22.11.2007	14.12.2011
KO	1.4.2016	1.4.2014	1.4.2014		1.4.2014	1.4.2014	1.4.2014	1.9.2019
MK	1.1.2007	26.7.2007	22.11.2007	1.4.2014		26.7.2007	24.10.2007	1.7.2009
ME	1.1.2008	26.7.2007	22.11.2007	1.4.2014	26.7.2007		24.10.2007	1.3.2010
RS	8.12.2009	24.10.2007	22.11.2007	1.4.2014	24.10.2007	24.10.2007		1.9.2010
TR	(¹)	1.8.2011	14.12.2011	1.9.2019	1.7.2009	1.3.2010	1.9.2010	

(¹) Für Waren, die unter die Zollunion EU-Türkei fallen, ist das Anfangsdatum der 27. Juli 2006. Gilt nicht für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse und für Kohle und Stahlerzeugnisse.



MITTEILUNG DER KOMMISSION

Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes im Sinne des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union

(C/2024/1645)

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1. EINLEITUNG

1.1. Zweck der Bekanntmachung

1. Die Kommission verwendet den Begriff der Marktabgrenzung bei der Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union, und zwar
 - a) bei der Durchsetzung der Kartellvorschriften nach den Artikeln 101 und 102 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden „AEUV“) gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 des Rates ⁽¹⁾,
 - b) bei der Fusionskontrolle gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates ⁽²⁾ (im Folgenden „Fusionskontrollverordnung“),
 - c) bei der Durchsetzung der entsprechenden Vorschriften, die im Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum ⁽³⁾ (im Folgenden „EWR-Abkommen“) enthalten sind.
2. In denjenigen Fällen ⁽⁴⁾, in denen es wichtig ist, die relative Wettbewerbsstärke von Unternehmen ⁽⁵⁾ zu ermitteln, nimmt die Kommission in der Regel eine Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes vor.
3. Mit dieser Bekanntmachung sollen Orientierungshilfen dafür gegeben werden, wie die Kommission den Begriff des relevanten Marktes bei der Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union anwendet. Die Wettbewerbspolitik erhält gut funktionierende Märkte und wirkt Marktversagen entgegen, wodurch ein Beitrag zum grünen und zum digitalen Wandel und zur Resilienz des Binnenmarkts geleistet wird ⁽⁶⁾. Sie soll sicherstellen, dass die Märkte wettbewerbsfähig, offen und dynamisch bleiben. Dementsprechend kann die Wettbewerbspolitik dazu beitragen, übermäßige Abhängigkeiten zu verhindern und die Resilienz der Wirtschaft der Union zu stärken, indem solide und vielseitige Lieferketten ermöglicht werden ⁽⁷⁾, und den Rechtsrahmen der Union für ökologische Nachhaltigkeit ergänzen, indem Nachhaltigkeitsfaktoren in dem für die Beurteilung des Wettbewerbs relevanten Umfang, auch bei der Marktabgrenzung, berücksichtigt werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund tragen die aktualisierten Orientierungshilfen in dieser Bekanntmachung den wesentlichen Entwicklungen in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren Rechnung. Zu diesen Entwicklungen zählen die Digitalisierung und neue Formen des Waren- und Dienstleistungsangebots sowie der zunehmend vernetzte und globalisierte Handel.
4. Die Kommission legt die von ihr angewandte Methodik sowie die wichtigsten Kriterien und Anhaltspunkte dar, auf die sie sich bei der Abgrenzung relevanter Märkte stützt, um die Transparenz ihrer Politik und Beschlussfassung bei der Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union zu erhöhen. Darüber hinaus will sie die Belastung der Ressourcen in ihren eigenen Dienststellen und bei externen Akteuren verringern, sodass wettbewerbsrechtliche Prüfungen effizienter werden.
5. Die Erhöhung der Transparenz und folglich der Vorhersehbarkeit der nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht der Union durchgeführten Prüfungen der Kommission werden auch zu mehr Rechtssicherheit für Unternehmen und ihre Berater führen, die so in einem bestimmten Fall besser beurteilen können, wie die relevanten Märkte abzugrenzen sind und wie wahrscheinlich es ist, dass die Kommission wettbewerbsrechtliche Bedenken feststellt. Sie werden diese Faktoren bei ihrer internen Entscheidungsfindung berücksichtigen können, wenn sie beispielsweise den Erwerb anderer Unternehmen, die Gründung von Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, den Abschluss bestimmter

⁽¹⁾ Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002 zur Durchführung der in den Artikeln 81 und 82 des Vertrags niedergelegten Wettbewerbsregeln (ABl. L 1 vom 4.1.2003, S. 1).

⁽²⁾ Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates vom 20. Januar 2004 über die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen (ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1).

⁽³⁾ In dieser Bekanntmachung gelten Bezugnahmen auf die Artikel 101 und 102 AEUV und auf die Fusionskontrollverordnung, insbesondere auf deren Artikel 2, als Bezugnahmen auf die entsprechenden Bestimmungen des EWR-Abkommens (siehe die Artikel 53 und 54 sowie Anhang XIV des EWR-Abkommens).

⁽⁴⁾ Im Allgemeinen spielt die Marktabgrenzung in der Durchsetzungspraxis der Kommission nach den Artikeln 106 und 107 AEUV nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. In diesen Fällen konzentriert sich die Beurteilung auf den betreffenden Wirtschaftszweig/Sektor und weniger auf die Ermittlung des Wettbewerbsdrucks, dem die Unternehmen ausgesetzt sind. Ist jedoch in bestimmten nach Artikel 106 oder 107 AEUV geprüften Fällen die Beurteilung der Marktmacht und dementsprechend des relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung, so kann der in dieser Bekanntmachung dargelegte Ansatz für die Beurteilung relevant sein. Angesichts der eingeschränkteren Anwendung der Marktabgrenzung bei diesen beiden Arten von Beurteilungen werden die spezifischen Aspekte dieser beiden Arten von Beurteilungen in dieser Bekanntmachung nicht weiter erörtert.

⁽⁵⁾ Im Wettbewerbsrecht der Union umfasst der Begriff des Unternehmens jede Einheit, die eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit ausübt, d. h. eine Tätigkeit, die darin besteht, Güter oder Dienstleistungen auf einem bestimmten Markt anzubieten, unabhängig von der Rechtsform der Einheit und der Art ihrer Finanzierung. Siehe Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 23. April 1991, Höfner und Elser/Macrotron, C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, Rn. 21, und Urteil des Gerichts vom 12. Dezember 2006, SELEX Sistemi Integrati/Kommission, T-155/04, ECLI:EU:T:2006:387, Rn. 50.

⁽⁶⁾ Siehe Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament, den Rat, den Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss und den Ausschuss der Regionen „Eine Wettbewerbspolitik für neue Herausforderungen“, COM(2021) 713 vom 18. November 2021, S. 6.

⁽⁷⁾ Ebd., S. 16.

Vereinbarungen oder ein bestimmtes einseitiges Verhalten in Betracht ziehen. Mithilfe der in dieser Bekanntmachung bereitgestellten Orientierungshilfen werden Unternehmen auch leichter voraussehen können, welche Art von Informationen die Kommission für die Zwecke der Marktabgrenzung für relevant hält.

1.2. Rolle der Marktabgrenzung

6. Die Marktabgrenzung ist ein Instrument, das die Kommission nutzt, um einen Bereich zu ermitteln und abzugrenzen, in dem Unternehmen miteinander im Wettbewerb stehen. Der Hauptzweck der Marktabgrenzung besteht darin, in systematischer Weise zu ermitteln, welchem wirksamen und unmittelbaren Wettbewerbsdruck die beteiligten Unternehmen ⁽⁸⁾ beim Angebot bestimmter Produkte ⁽⁹⁾ in einem bestimmten Gebiet ausgesetzt sind. Bei der Marktabgrenzung werden die relevanten Wettbewerber des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) beim Angebot der jeweiligen Produkte sowie die relevanten Kunden ermittelt. Nur Produkte, die innerhalb des relevanten Zeitrahmens einen wirksamen und unmittelbaren Wettbewerbsdruck ausüben, gehören zu demselben relevanten Markt wie die Produkte der beteiligten Unternehmen, während anderer weniger wirksamer oder lediglich potenzieller Wettbewerbsdruck bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt wird.
7. Dieselben Erwägungen gelten für die Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte für den Kauf bestimmter Produkte in einem bestimmten Gebiet (im Folgenden „Einkaufsmärkte“) ⁽¹⁰⁾. In dem Fall besteht der Hauptzweck der Marktabgrenzung darin, in systematischer Weise zu ermitteln, welchem wirksamen und unmittelbaren Wettbewerbsdruck das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen beim Kauf dieser Produkte ausgesetzt ist/sind ⁽¹¹⁾. Dementsprechend werden bei der Marktabgrenzung die relevanten Wettbewerber des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) beim Erwerb der Produkte sowie die relevanten Anbieter ermittelt. Im verbleibenden Teil dieser Bekanntmachung werden Einkaufsmärkte nicht weiter erörtert, aber die in dieser Bekanntmachung enthaltenen Orientierungshilfen gelten auch für Einkaufsmärkte, wobei ihren Besonderheiten ⁽¹²⁾ und den Gegebenheiten des jeweils einschlägigen Falles Rechnung zu tragen ist.
8. Die Kommission stützt sich im Allgemeinen auf die Marktabgrenzung, wenn die Notwendigkeit besteht, die relative Wettbewerbsstärke von Unternehmen im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung ⁽¹³⁾ zu beurteilen, und insbesondere, um die Frage zu beantworten, ob ein Unternehmen über Marktmacht ⁽¹⁴⁾ verfügt. Die Marktabgrenzung ist somit ein Zwischenschritt, mit dem in geeigneten Fällen die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung strukturiert und erleichtert werden soll; sie stellt jedoch keinen obligatorischen Schritt bei allen Beurteilungen nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht der Union dar. Im Rahmen der anschließenden wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung und Analyse der Marktmacht nimmt die Kommission eine umfassende Beurteilung jeder

⁽⁸⁾ Für die Zwecke dieser Bekanntmachung ist unter einem „beteiligten Unternehmen“ ein Unternehmen zu verstehen, dessen Wettbewerbsstärke beurteilt wird. Die beteiligten Unternehmen sind in der Regel die Parteien einer Vereinbarung bei Untersuchungen nach Artikel 101 AEUV, das/die Unternehmen, das/die Gegenstand einer Untersuchung nach Artikel 102 AEUV ist/sind, oder die an einem Zusammenschluss beteiligten Unternehmen bei Untersuchungen nach der Fusionskontrollverordnung. Je nach den Gegebenheiten des jeweiligen Falles kann es sich auch um den Beschwerdeführer in einer Wettbewerbssache, ein Unternehmen auf einem vor- oder nachgelagerten Markt oder jedes andere für die Wettbewerbssache relevante Unternehmen handeln.

⁽⁹⁾ Für die Zwecke dieser Bekanntmachung umfasst der Begriff „Produkt“ gegebenenfalls auch Dienstleistungen oder Technologien. Der Begriff „Produktion“ umfasst dementsprechend auch die Erbringung oder Bereitstellung solcher Dienstleistungen und die Lizenzierung oder Entwicklung von Technologien.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.10201 – Ahold Delhaize/Deen Assets, Rn. 20-25, und M.9847 – Aldi/FPLPH Assets, Rn. 19-22, und M.9409 – Aurubis/Metallo, Abschnitt 7.1. Der Standpunkt der Kommission bezüglich der Marktabgrenzung in einem der in dieser Bekanntmachung genannten Fälle greift der Marktabgrenzung in künftigen Fällen nicht vor (siehe Randnummer 14).

⁽¹¹⁾ Ob die Kommission die relative Wettbewerbsstärke von Unternehmen, die bestimmte Produkte in einem bestimmten Gebiet kaufen, untersucht, hängt vom Einzelfall und den möglichen Schadenstheorien ab. Weitere Einzelheiten zu solchen Schadenstheorien finden sich in den Leitlinien der Kommission zur materiellen Würdigung in Wettbewerbsverfahren – siehe z. B. die Leitlinien der Kommission zur Anwendbarkeit des Artikels 101 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union auf Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit (ABl. C 259 vom 21.7.2023, S. 1, im Folgenden „Leitlinien für die Beurteilung von Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit“), Rn. 273-309, und die Leitlinien der Kommission zur Bewertung horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse gemäß der Ratsverordnung über die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen (ABl. C 31 vom 5.2.2004, S. 5, im Folgenden „Leitlinien zur Bewertung horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse“), Rn. 61-63. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9409 – Aurubis/Metallo, Rn. 376 und 397-398.

⁽¹²⁾ Beispielsweise konzentriert sich die Substitutionsbeurteilung auf den Einkaufsmärkten auf Alternativen, die den Anbietern zur Verfügung stehen, statt auf Alternativen, die den Kunden zur Verfügung stehen.

⁽¹³⁾ Für die Zwecke dieser Bekanntmachung bezeichnet der Begriff „wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung“ die sich nicht auf die Marktabgrenzung beziehenden Teile der inhaltlichen Beurteilung einer Wettbewerbssache durch die Kommission. Dazu gehört insbesondere die Beurteilung des Vorliegens einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung und gegebenenfalls die Beurteilung der voraussichtlichen Auswirkungen des Verhaltens des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) oder die voraussichtlichen Auswirkungen eines Zusammenschlusses auf den Wettbewerb.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Nach den Leitlinien für die Beurteilung von Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit (Fußnote 40) ist „Marktmacht ... die Fähigkeit, die Preise über einen gewissen Zeitraum hinweg gewinnbringend oberhalb des Wettbewerbsniveaus oder die Produktionsmenge, Produktvielfalt oder Innovation für einen gewissen Zeitraum gewinnbringend unterhalb des Wettbewerbsniveaus zu halten“.

Art von relevantem Wettbewerbsdruck vor, dem das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen auf den sachlich und räumlich relevanten Märkten ausgesetzt ist/sind; dies kann auch eine Beurteilung der Schranken für den Marktzutritt oder die Expansion, der Auswirkungen von Skaleneffekten (auch solcher, die aus Tätigkeiten außerhalb des jeweiligen Marktes resultieren) oder von Netzwerkeffekten, des Zugang zu bestimmten Vermögenswerten und Vorleistungen sowie der Produktdifferenzierung umfassen ⁽¹⁵⁾. Bei dieser Beurteilung können auch hinreichend vorhersehbare Veränderungen des Wettbewerbsdrucks berücksichtigt werden, wenn die Wettbewerbssache eine vorausschauende Beurteilung erfordert. Da es sich bei der Marktabgrenzung um einen Zwischenschritt der umfassenden Beurteilung handelt, muss die Marktabgrenzung zum Zeitpunkt des betreffenden Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses aktuell sein und auf dem jeweiligen Sachverhalt beruhen (siehe nähere Erläuterungen unter Randnummer 14).

9. Die Verwendung der Marktabgrenzung durch die Kommission steht in engem Zusammenhang mit den Zielen, die mit den verschiedenen wettbewerbsrechtlichen Instrumenten der Union verfolgt werden:
 - a) Bei Prüfungen nach Artikel 102 AEUV grenzt die Kommission in der Regel den relevanten Markt ab, wenn sie das Vorliegen einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung beurteilt ⁽¹⁶⁾.
 - b) Bei Prüfungen nach der Fusionskontrollverordnung grenzt die Kommission den relevanten Markt in der Regel dann ab, wenn sie die Auswirkungen eines Zusammenschlusses auf den Wettbewerb beurteilt ⁽¹⁷⁾.
 - c) Bei Prüfungen nach Artikel 101 AEUV stützt sich die Kommission insbesondere auf die Marktabgrenzung, um festzustellen, ob eine spürbare Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs vorliegt, oder um festzustellen, ob die Voraussetzung des Artikels 101 Absatz 3 Buchstabe b AEUV für eine Freistellung von der Anwendung des Artikels 101 Absatz 1 AEUV erfüllt ist ⁽¹⁸⁾. In der Praxis stützt sich die Kommission bei der Prüfung von Vereinbarungen ⁽¹⁹⁾, die eine Verhinderung, Einschränkung oder Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs bewirken, typischerweise auf eine Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes. Dagegen nimmt die Kommission bei der Prüfung von Vereinbarungen, die eine Verhinderung, Einschränkung oder Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs bezwecken, wie z. B. Kartellvereinbarungen, in der Regel keine Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes vor und ist auch nicht dazu verpflichtet ⁽²⁰⁾.
10. Die Marktabgrenzung ermöglicht die Berechnung der Marktanteile, die die Kommission neben anderen Elementen zur Beurteilung der Wettbewerbsstärke eines Unternehmens für die Zwecke der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung heranziehen kann. Bei der Analyse der Marktmacht kann die Kommission auch Trends, die sich fortsetzen dürften, und vorhersehbare Entwicklungen in Bezug auf die Marktanteile sowie Wettbewerbsdruck, der sich nicht allein aus den Marktanteilen ableiten lässt, berücksichtigen (siehe nähere Erläuterungen unter den Randnummern 106 und 113). Die Kommission kann die Marktanteile auch als erstes Screening-Instrument einsetzen, um zu beurteilen, ob wettbewerbsrechtliche Bedenken auftreten können. Marktanteilsschwellenwerte

⁽¹⁵⁾ Weitere Erläuterungen in den Leitlinien der Kommission zur materiellen Würdigung in Wettbewerbssachen sind z. B. den Leitlinien zur Bewertung horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse (Abschnitte III und IV) und den Leitlinien für die Beurteilung von Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit (beispielsweise Randnummer 236) zu entnehmen.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 21. Februar 1973, Europemballage Corporation und Continental Can Company/Kommission, C-6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, Rn. 32.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 21. Februar 1973, Europemballage Corporation und Continental Can Company/Kommission, C-6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, Rn. 32, Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 31. März 1998, Frankreich u. a./Kommission („Kali & Salz“), C-68/94 und C-30/95, ECLI:EU:C:1998:148, Rn. 143, Urteil des Gerichts vom 6. Juni 2002, Airtours/Kommission, T-342/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:146, Rn. 19, Urteil des Gerichts vom 7. Mai 2009, NVV u. a./Kommission, T-151/05, ECLI:EU:T:2009:144, Rn. 51. Gegebenenfalls kann die Beurteilung der Auswirkungen eines Zusammenschlusses auf den Wettbewerb eine Beurteilung potenzieller Effizienzgewinne umfassen, z. B. solcher, die sich aus Kosteneinsparungen aufgrund eines größeren Produktionsumfangs ergeben, wobei insbesondere zu prüfen ist, ob die Effizienzgewinne den Verbrauchern auf den relevanten Märkten zugutekommen würden, auf denen ansonsten Wettbewerbsbedenken entstehen würden (Rn. 79 der Leitlinien zur Bewertung horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse; siehe auch die Verweise in den Randnummern 53 und 115 der Leitlinien zur Bewertung nichthorizontaler Zusammenschlüsse).

⁽¹⁸⁾ Die Unionsgerichte haben in diesem Zusammenhang festgestellt, dass die Kommission verpflichtet ist, den Markt in einem Beschluss nach Artikel 101 AEUV abzugrenzen, wenn ohne eine solche Abgrenzung nicht bestimmt werden kann, ob die Verhaltensweise, um die es geht, eine Verhinderung, Einschränkung oder Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs innerhalb des Binnenmarktes bezweckt oder bewirkt (Urteil des Gerichts vom 6. Juli 2000, Volkswagen/Kommission, T-62/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:180, Rn. 230, Urteil des Gerichts vom 8. Juli 2004, Mannesmannröhren-Werke/Kommission, T-44/00, ECLI:EU:T:2004:218, Rn. 132). Weitere Beispiele für Fälle, in denen die Marktabgrenzung nach Artikel 101 AEUV relevant wäre, finden sich auch unter Randnummer 10 dieser Bekanntmachung.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Sofern nichts anderes angegeben ist, umfassen die Bezugnahmen auf Vereinbarungen im Zusammenhang mit Artikel 101 AEUV auch aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltensweisen und Beschlüsse von Unternehmensvereinigungen.

⁽²⁰⁾ Urteil des Gerichts vom 8. Juli 2004, Mannesmannröhren-Werke/Kommission, T-44/00, ECLI:EU:T:2004:218, Rn. 132, Urteil des Gerichts vom 28. Juni 2016, Telefónica/Kommission, T-216/13, ECLI:EU:T:2016:369, Rn. 214.

zählen zu den Parametern, die verwendet werden, um den Geltungsbereich der Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen zur Anwendung des Artikels 101 Absatz 3 AEUV auf bestimmte Gruppen von Vereinbarungen zu bestimmen ⁽²¹⁾, um zu prüfen, ob eine Beeinträchtigung des Handels im Sinne der Artikel 101 und 102 AEUV vorliegen könnte ⁽²²⁾, und um Zusammenschlüsse zu ermitteln, bei denen in Bezug auf sämtliche oder bestimmte Märkte von vornherein davon ausgegangen wird, dass es nach der Fusionskontrollverordnung keinen Anlass zu wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken gibt ⁽²³⁾.

1.3. Allgemeine Grundsätze der Marktabgrenzung

11. Die Kommission wendet eine Reihe von Grundsätzen an, wenn sie im Rahmen der Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union relevante Märkte abgrenzt. Diese Grundsätze sind in den Randnummern 12 bis 21 dargelegt.
12. Erstens umfasst der relevante Markt, auf dem die Kommission die Wettbewerbsdynamik beurteilt, im Einklang mit der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs und des Gerichts der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden „Unionsgerichte“) und der Beschlusspraxis der Kommission eine sachliche und eine räumliche Dimension ⁽²⁴⁾.
 - a) Der sachlich relevante Markt umfasst alle Produkte, die die Kunden angesichts der Eigenschaften der fraglichen Produkte, ihrer Preise und ihres Verwendungszwecks unter Berücksichtigung der Wettbewerbsbedingungen und der Struktur des Angebots und der Nachfrage auf dem Markt als mit dem Produkt bzw. den Produkten des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) austauschbar oder substituierbar ansehen ⁽²⁵⁾.
 - b) Der räumlich relevante Markt ist das geografische Gebiet, in dem die beteiligten Unternehmen als Anbieter oder Nachfrager relevanter Produkte auftreten, in dem die Wettbewerbsbedingungen hinreichend homogen sind, um die Auswirkungen des zu untersuchenden Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses beurteilen zu können, und das sich von anderen geografischen Gebieten unterscheidet, und zwar insbesondere durch deutlich unterschiedliche Wettbewerbsbedingungen ⁽²⁶⁾.
13. In bestimmten Fällen können auch zeitliche Erwägungen bei der Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung sein, z. B. wenn Faktoren wie Saisonabhängigkeit oder Erwägungen zur Spitzen- und Nebenzeit die Kundenpräferenzen oder die Angebotsstruktur wesentlich beeinflussen ⁽²⁷⁾.

⁽²¹⁾ Marktanteilsschwellenwerte beschränken die Anwendbarkeit des in den Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen vorgesehenen geschützten Bereichs (Safe Harbour) auf Vereinbarungen zwischen Unternehmen, die einen Anteil an dem relevanten Markt bzw. den relevanten Märkten halten, der die in den Verordnungen festgelegten Schwellenwerte nicht überschreitet. Siehe beispielsweise Artikel 3 der Verordnung (EU) 2022/720 der Kommission vom 10. Mai 2022 über die Anwendung des Artikels 101 Absatz 3 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union auf Gruppen von vertikalen Vereinbarungen und abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen, C/2022/3015 (ABl. L 134 vom 11.5.2022, S. 4), Artikel 6 der Verordnung (EU) 2023/1066 der Kommission vom 1. Juni 2023 über die Anwendung des Artikels 101 Absatz 3 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union auf bestimmte Gruppen von Vereinbarungen über Forschung und Entwicklung (ABl. L 143 vom 2.6.2023, S. 9), Artikel 3 der Verordnung (EU) 2023/1067 der Kommission vom 1. Juni 2023 über die Anwendung des Artikels 101 Absatz 3 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union auf bestimmte Gruppen von Spezialisierungsvereinbarungen (ABl. L 143 vom 2.6.2023, S. 20).

⁽²²⁾ Bekanntmachung der Kommission: Leitlinien über den Begriff der Beeinträchtigung des zwischenstaatlichen Handels in den Artikeln 81 und 82 des Vertrags (im Folgenden „Leitlinien über den Begriff der Beeinträchtigung des Handels“) (ABl. C 101 vom 27.4.2004, S. 81), Abschnitt 2.4. Die Kommission kann bei der Prüfung, ob eine Beeinträchtigung des Handels vorliegen könnte, Marktanteile zugrunde legen, doch erfordert diese Prüfung nicht unbedingt eine Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte und eine Errechnung der Marktanteile (siehe Randnummer 48 der Leitlinien über den Begriff der Beeinträchtigung des Handels), und die Kommission ist hierzu nicht verpflichtet.

⁽²³⁾ Siehe hierzu die Definition der Begriffe „betroffene Märkte“ und Märkte „auf denen der angemeldete Zusammenschluss ... erhebliche Auswirkungen haben könnte“ in Anhang I Nummer 25 Buchstabe g und Anhang I Abschnitt 6.3 der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2023/914 der Kommission vom 20. April 2023 zur Durchführung der Fusionskontrollverordnung (im Folgenden „Durchführungsverordnung zur Fusionskontrollverordnung“) (ABl. L 119 vom 5.5.2023, S. 22) und die Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die vereinfachte Behandlung bestimmter Zusammenschlüsse gemäß der Fusionskontrollverordnung (ABl. C 160 vom 5.5.2023, S. 1), Rn. 5 und 8.

⁽²⁴⁾ Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 14. Februar 1978, United Brands/Kommission, C-27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, Rn. 10 und 11.

⁽²⁵⁾ Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 30. Januar 2020, Generics (UK) u. a., C-307/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:52, Rn. 129, und Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 13. Februar 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche/Kommission, C-85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Rn. 51. Siehe auch Anhang I Nummer 25 Buchstabe b der Durchführungsverordnung zur Fusionskontrollverordnung.

⁽²⁶⁾ Urteil des Gerichts vom 30. September 2003, Cableuropa u. a./Kommission, T-346/02 und T-347/02, ECLI:EU:T:2003:256, Rn. 115, Urteil des Gerichts vom 7. Mai 2009, NVV u. a./Kommission, T-151/05, ECLI:EU:T:2009:144, Rn. 52, und Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 14. Februar 1978, United Brands/Kommission, C-27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, Rn. 11. Siehe auch Artikel 9 Absatz 7 der Fusionskontrollverordnung und Anhang I Nummer 25 Buchstabe c der Durchführungsverordnung zur Fusionskontrollverordnung.

⁽²⁷⁾ Für die Marktabgrenzung relevant waren zeitliche Erwägungen beispielsweise in der Sache M.5467 – RWE/Essent (Erwägungsgrund 32), in der die Kommission zwischen Spitzen- und Nebenzeiten für die Stromerzeugung und den Stromgroßhandel unterschieden hat, und in der Sache M.8869 – Ryanair/Laudamotion (Erwägungsgründe 96 und 97), in der die Kommission zwischen der Sommer- und der Wintersaison im Fluggastverkehr unterschied.

14. Zweitens beruht die Marktabgrenzung auf dem jeweiligen Sachverhalt ⁽²⁸⁾. Die relevanten Märkte im Sinne des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union unterscheiden sich von einem Wirtschaftszweig zum anderen, auf verschiedenen Stufen der Lieferkette und manchmal in verschiedenen geografischen Gebieten. Liegen frühere Beschlüsse der Kommission in Bezug auf einen bestimmten Markt vor, so kann die Kommission bei ihrer Analyse von diesen früheren Beschlüssen ausgehen und prüfen, ob die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes, die in diesen früheren Beschlüssen zugrunde gelegt wurde, auf die jeweils vorliegende Wettbewerbssache angewandt werden kann. Die Kommission ist jedoch nicht verpflichtet, die in früheren Kommissionsbeschlüssen erfolgte Abgrenzung eines relevanten Marktes auf spätere Wettbewerbssachen anzuwenden ⁽²⁹⁾, und wird stets sorgfältig mögliche Veränderungen berücksichtigen, die auf breitere Trends wie die Digitalisierung, Veränderungen in Bezug auf die Wertschöpfungsketten oder die Beschaffung seitens der Kunden oder auf Entwicklungen des Globalisierungsgrads des Handels zurückzuführen sind.
15. Drittens berücksichtigt die Kommission bei der Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes die verschiedenen Wettbewerbsparameter, die die Kunden in dem untersuchten Gebiet und Zeitraum für relevant halten. Zu diesen Parametern können der Preis des Produkts, aber auch sein Innovationsgrad und verschiedene Qualitätsaspekte – etwa seine Nachhaltigkeit, Ressourceneffizienz, Langlebigkeit, der Wert und die Vielfalt der durch das Produkt gebotenen Nutzungsmöglichkeiten, die Möglichkeit, das Produkt in andere Produkte zu integrieren, das vermittelte Bild oder die gebotene Sicherheit und der gebotene Schutz der Privatsphäre – sowie seine Verfügbarkeit, auch in Bezug auf Vorlaufzeiten, Widerstandsfähigkeit der Lieferketten, Zuverlässigkeit der Lieferung und Transportkosten, gehören. Die relative Bedeutung dieser Parameter für die Kunden kann sich im Laufe der Zeit ändern.
16. Viertens ist die Marktabgrenzung, sofern sie erforderlich ist, nur ein Schritt der durch die Kommission vorgenommenen Prüfung nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht der Union. Die Kommission entscheidet erst nach Vornahme einer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung, ob wettbewerbsrechtliche Bedenken bestehen ⁽³⁰⁾. Die Marktabgrenzung stellt daher einen Zwischenschritt der Beurteilung dar und greift dem Ergebnis der von der Kommission vorgenommenen Prüfung nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht der Union nicht vor.
17. Fünftens führt die Marktabgrenzung zu einer Unterscheidung zwischen von innerhalb und von außerhalb des Marktes ausgehendem Wettbewerbsdruck, wobei nur der wirksame und unmittelbare Wettbewerbsdruck auf dem relevanten Markt berücksichtigt wird. Bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung trägt die Kommission jedoch allen Arten von Wettbewerbsdruck Rechnung (unabhängig davon, ob dieser wirksam und unmittelbar ist oder nicht), wobei sie berücksichtigt, dass von außerhalb des Marktes auf das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen einwirkender Wettbewerbsdruck weniger direkt ist. Nähere Erläuterungen zum Zusammenhang mit der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung sind Randnummer 8 zu entnehmen.
18. Sechstens werden im Rahmen verschiedener Wettbewerbssachen und der entsprechenden Prüfungen häufig die gleichen Märkte abgegrenzt, wenn es sich hinsichtlich der Produkte und des räumlichen Gebiets um dieselbe wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit handelt ⁽³¹⁾. Da mit der Marktabgrenzung der wirksame und unmittelbare Wettbewerbsdruck ermittelt werden soll, der für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung eines bestimmten Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses relevant ist, kann das Ergebnis der Marktabgrenzung in Abhängigkeit von den nachfolgend aufgeführten Faktoren jedoch unterschiedlich ausfallen:

⁽²⁸⁾ Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, E-12/20, Rn. 173: „[D]ie Marktabgrenzung [muss] fallweise erfolgen“.

⁽²⁹⁾ Das Gericht stellte in dieser Hinsicht in seinem Urteil vom 7. Mai 2009, NVV u. a./Kommission, T-151/05, ECLI:EU:T:2009:144, Rn. 136, Folgendes klar: „Insbesondere können die Kläger nicht deswegen ein berechtigtes Vertrauen haben, weil die Kommission in einer früheren Entscheidung Märkte in bestimmter Weise definiert hat, da die in einer solchen Entscheidung getroffenen Feststellungen weder die Kommission noch gar das Gericht binden“. Siehe auch Urteil des Gerichts vom 14. Dezember 2005, General Electric/Kommission, T-210/01, ECLI:EU:T:2005:456, Rn. 120, Urteil des Gerichts vom 18. Mai 2022, Wieland-Werke/Kommission, T-251/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:296, Rn. 79, Urteil des Gerichts vom 13. Mai 2015, Niki Luftfahrt/Kommission, T-162/10, ECLI:EU:T:2015:283, Rn. 144, Urteil des Gerichts vom 25. März 2015, Slovenská pošta/Kommission, T-556/08, ECLI:EU:T:2015:189, Rn. 197, Urteil des Gerichts vom 23. Mai 2019, KPN/Kommission, T-370/17, ECLI:EU:T:2019:354, Rn. 79. Siehe auch Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, E-12/20, Rn. 97.

⁽³⁰⁾ Siehe Fußnote 13.

⁽³¹⁾ So wurde beispielsweise im Luftverkehrssektor der sachlich relevante Markt für Passagierflüge auf der Grundlage des Ansatzes „Städtepaar Ausgangsort/Zielort (O & D)“ abgegrenzt. Dieser Ansatz wurde in der Folge auch auf andere Wettbewerbssachen angewandt. Siehe z. B. die Fusionskontrollsachen M.3280 – Air France/KLM, Erwägungsgründe 9 und 16, M.3770 – Lufthansa/Swiss, Erwägungsgründe 12 ff., M.6447 – IAG/bmi, Erwägungsgrund 31, M.7333 – Alitalia/Etihad, Erwägungsgrund 63, M.7541 – IAG/Aer Lingus, Erwägungsgrund 14, die Kartellsachen AT.36201 – PO/Lufthansa+SAS+United (Artikel 85) und AT.39596 – British Airways/American Airlines/Iberia, sowie das Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 11. April 1989, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen u. a./Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, C-66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, Rn. 40, das Urteil des Gerichts vom 19. Mai 1994, Air France/Kommission, T-2/93, ECLI:EU:T:1994:55, Rn. 84, und das Urteil des Gerichts vom 4. Juli 2006, easyJet/Kommission, T-177/04, ECLI:EU:T:2006:187, Rn. 56. Ein weiteres Beispiel sind Online-Werbedienste, bei denen der sachlich relevante Markt durchweg als separater, von Offline-Werbeflächen getrennter Markt für die Bereitstellung von Online-Werbeflächen abgegrenzt wurde, während der räumlich relevante Markt durchweg landesweit oder entsprechend der Sprachgrenzen innerhalb des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraums (EWR) abgegrenzt wurde (siehe z. B. die Sachen M.4731 – Google/DoubleClick, Erwägungsgründe 56 und 83-84, M.5727 – Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, Erwägungsgründe 61 und 91-93, und M.7217 – Facebook/Whatsapp, Erwägungsgründe 79 und 81-83).

- a) *Das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen:* Da die Tätigkeiten des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) den Ausgangspunkt für die Substitutionsanalyse bilden, können die Märkte je nach den beteiligten Unternehmen unterschiedlich abgegrenzt werden. Dies kann z. B. der Fall sein, wenn der Wettbewerbsdruck, den die Unternehmen aufeinander ausüben, asymmetrisch ist, d. h. wenn ein Unternehmen Wettbewerbsdruck auf ein anderes Unternehmen ausübt, was umgekehrt nicht der Fall ist ⁽³²⁾. In diesem Fall kann die Heranziehung der Produkte verschiedener Unternehmen als Ausgangspunkt für die Substitutionsanalyse – z. B. weil die am Zusammenschluss beteiligten Unternehmen unterschiedlich sind oder weil das Verhalten eines anderen Unternehmens Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist – zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen hinsichtlich der Marktabgrenzung führen.
- b) *Der Bezugszeitraum:* Die Kommission berücksichtigt die zum Zeitpunkt des jeweils geprüften Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses vorherrschenden Wettbewerbsbedingungen (dazu können auch hinreichend vorhersehbare Entwicklungen gehören, wenn die Wettbewerbssache eine vorausschauende Beurteilung erfordert (siehe Randnummer 21)). Dementsprechend können sich die Ergebnisse der Marktabgrenzung im Laufe der Zeit ändern, wenn sich die Wettbewerbsdynamik ändert. Dies kann beispielsweise der Fall sein, wenn sich die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in verschiedenen geografischen Gebieten mit der Zeit annähern und hinreichend homogen werden, sodass Gebiete, die ursprünglich Teil unterschiedlicher räumlich relevanter Märkte waren, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt in denselben räumlich relevanten Markt ⁽³³⁾ einbezogen werden, oder wenn vorhergesagte Marktentwicklungen eintreten, die zuvor als weit entfernt oder ungewiss angesehen wurden.
- c) *Die zu prüfenden wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken:* Der in einem konkreten Fall relevante wirksame und unmittelbare Wettbewerbsdruck kann von den zu prüfenden wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken abhängen. Dieser Wettbewerbsdruck kann beispielsweise davon abhängen, ob geprüft wird, ob der Zusammenschluss zu Preiserhöhungen für bestehende Produkte führen würde oder ob derselbe Zusammenschluss geringere Investitionen in die Produktentwicklung zur Folge hätte ⁽³⁴⁾. Darüber hinaus könnte es erforderlich sein, den üblichen Ansatz für die Marktabgrenzung anzupassen, wenn die bestehende Marktmacht geeignet ist, die Analyse zu verfälschen (z. B. in Bezug auf eine auf Artikel 102 AEUV gestützte Schadenstheorie) ⁽³⁵⁾.

19. Siebte wird der Begriff „relevanter Markt“ im Wettbewerbsrecht der Union anders verwendet als der Begriff „Markt“ in anderen Zusammenhängen, insbesondere im geschäftlichen Kontext. Unternehmen verwenden häufig den Begriff „Markt“ für das Gebiet oder den Ort, wo sie ihre Produkte verkaufen, oder allgemein für die Branche oder den Wirtschaftszweig, der bzw. dem sie angehören. So können Unternehmen z. B. angeben, auf einem globalen Markt tätig zu sein, wenn sie der Ansicht sind, dass sie weltweit mit Unternehmen aus allen Kontinenten um Einnahmen konkurrieren. Dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass die Produkte aller weltweit tätigen Unternehmen

⁽³²⁾ Siehe beispielsweise die Sachen M.6497 – Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria und M.8808 – T-Mobile Austria/UPC Austria. In der ersten Sache ging die Kommission von einem Mobilfunk-Datendienste umfassenden Kandidatenmarkt aus und stellte fest, dass Mobilfunk-Datendienste nur begrenzt durch Festnetz-Internetzugangsdienste substituierbar sind (Erwägungsgrund 57). In der zweiten Sache prüfte die Kommission, ob mobile Internetzugangsdienste in gleicher Weise wie Festnetzanschlüsse für den Internet-Zugang zu Hause genutzt werden könnten, und kam zu dem Schluss, dass der sachlich relevante Markt sowohl Festnetz- als auch Mobilfunktechnologien für Privatkunden umfasste (Erwägungsgrund 39). Siehe auch Urteil des Gerichts vom 30. Januar 2007, France Télécom/Kommission, T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T-2007:22, Rn. 88-89, Urteil des Gerichts vom 1. Juli 2010 – AstraZeneca/Kommission, T-321/05, ECLI:EU:T-2010:266, Rn. 97, und Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, E-12/20, Rn. 117.

⁽³³⁾ Siehe beispielsweise die Sache M.2033 – Metso/Svedala aus dem Jahr 2001 (Erwägungsgrund 114), in der die Kommission den räumlich relevanten Markt für Brecher, eine Ausrüstung für den Bergbau, EWR-weit abgrenzte. In der späteren Sache M.9585 – Outotec/Metso (Mineraliensparte) aus dem Jahr 2020 (Erwägungsgründe 258-261) grenzte die Kommission den räumlich relevanten Markt für das Angebot von Ausrüstung für den Bergbau, d. h. Mahl-, Flotations-, Filtrations- und Eisenerzpelletierungsausrüstung, weltweit ab. Ferner stellte die Kommission in der Sache M.580 – ABB/Daimler-Benz aus dem Jahr 1995 (Erwägungsgründe 22-41) fest, dass auf dem Markt für Eisenbahntechnik nationale oder regionale Spezifikationen bestanden, die Marktzutrittschranken für Exporte außerhalb der Heimatregion darstellten, und dass die Kunden Lieferanten mit Sitz in derselben Region oder in demselben Mitgliedstaat bevorzugten. Später kam die Kommission in der Sache M.5754 – Alstom Holdings/Areva T&D aus dem Jahr 2010 (Erwägungsgrund 35), jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass der relevante Markt mindestens den gesamten EWR umfasste.

⁽³⁴⁾ Die Kommission grenzte in der Sache M.7932 – Dow/DuPont zunächst nationale Märkte für formulierte Pflanzenschutzmittel ab, um den Produkt- und Preiswettbewerb zu beurteilen (Erwägungsgründe 319 und 332). Bei dieser Beurteilung stützte sich die Kommission auf Marktanteile, die auf der Ebene von Kombinationen aus Pflanzen und Schädlingen auf nationaler Ebene berechnet wurden, verwendete aber auch die Marktanteile für Gruppen von Kombinationen aus Pflanzen und Schädlingen auf EWR-Ebene, da diese über die Stärke der Marktteilnehmer auf der Ebene ihres Wirkstoffportfolios Aufschluss geben, sowie die weltweiten Marktanteile der FuE-Anbieter, die Informationen über die relative Stärke der Anbieter liefern, die neue Wirkstoffe auf den Markt bringen (Erwägungsgrund 362). Anschließend analysierte die Kommission den Innovationswettbewerb in der gesamten Branche und in Innovationsräumen, die aus Gruppen von Kombinationen aus Pflanzen und Schädlingen auf globaler oder zumindest EWR-Ebene bestehen, um zu beurteilen, wie Agrochemieunternehmen miteinander konkurrieren, um neue Wirkstoffe zu finden und zu entwickeln (Erwägungsgründe 352 und 361).

⁽³⁵⁾ Siehe Fußnote 55, in der die Gründe für den „Zellophan-Fehlschluss“ (cellophane fallacy) ausführlicher erläutert werden.

für Kunden im EWR substituierbar sind oder dass die Kunden weltweit mit hinreichend homogenen Wettbewerbsbedingungen konfrontiert sind, was für die Marktabgrenzung der Kommission nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht der Union die relevanten Kriterien sind (siehe nähere Erläuterung in Abschnitt 2). Breitere Dynamiken außerhalb der für wettbewerbsrechtliche Zwecke abgegrenzten relevanten Märkte, wie z. B. unterschiedliche Größenvorteile, von denen verschiedene Unternehmen aufgrund ihrer weltweiten Aktivitäten auf mehreren sachlichen oder räumlichen Märkten profitieren, sind für den Zwischenschritt der Marktabgrenzung für wettbewerbsrechtliche Zwecke nicht relevant, können aber für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung von Bedeutung sein; wenn dies der Fall ist, werden sie in dem Zusammenhang gebührend berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus ist der Begriff „Markt“ oder die Abgrenzung eines „Marktes“ in anderen Rechtsbereichen als dem Wettbewerbsrecht, z. B. im Bereich der elektronischen Kommunikation ⁽³⁶⁾, für die Zwecke des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union nicht ausschlaggebend.

20. Achters ist die Kommission nicht dazu verpflichtet, eine endgültige Schlussfolgerung zum genauen Umfang des Marktes zu ziehen, wenn die Kommission bei verschiedenen plausiblen Marktabgrenzungen zum selben Ergebnis käme. Sowohl in Fällen, in denen unabhängig von der zugrunde gelegten Marktabgrenzung Wettbewerbsbedenken bestehen ⁽³⁷⁾, als auch in Fällen, in denen unabhängig von der zugrunde gelegten Marktabgrenzung keine Wettbewerbsbedenken bestehen ⁽³⁸⁾, kann die Kommission die Marktabgrenzung offenlassen ⁽³⁹⁾. Lässt sie die Marktabgrenzung offen, nimmt die Kommission in der Regel die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung für alle plausiblen alternativen Marktabgrenzungen vor, wobei jedoch die Tiefe ihrer Wettbewerbsanalyse von einem geprüften alternativen Markt zum anderen variieren kann ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

⁽³⁶⁾ Siehe insbesondere die Empfehlung (EU) 2020/2245 der Kommission vom 18. Dezember 2020 über relevante Produkt- und Dienstmärkte des elektronischen Kommunikationssektors, die gemäß der Richtlinie (EU) 2018/1972 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über den europäischen Kodex für die elektronische Kommunikation für eine Vorabregulierung in Betracht kommen (bekannt gegeben unter Aktenzeichen C(2020) 8750) (ABl. L 439 vom 29.12.2020, S. 23).

⁽³⁷⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10078 – Cargotec/Konecranes (Rn. 126 und 376), in der die Kommission in Bezug auf Portalhubwagen (straddle carriers) und Shuttle-Portalhubwagen (shuttle carriers) sowohl die Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes (der entweder als Gesamtmarkt abgegrenzt oder in Portalhubwagen und Shuttle-Portalhubwagen unterteilt werden könnte) als auch die des räumlich relevanten Marktes (EWR-weit oder weltweit) offenließ, da das Vorhaben bei all diesen plausiblen Marktabgrenzungen Anlass zu Bedenken gab.

Darüber hinaus kann die Kommission bei Prüfungen nach der Fusionskontrollverordnung die Marktabgrenzung in Fällen offenlassen, in denen im Zuge einer ersten Untersuchung nur in Bezug auf einen von mehreren plausiblen relevanten Märkten ernsthafte Bedenken auftreten, die beteiligten Unternehmen aber anbieten, Verpflichtungen einzugehen, die geeignet sind, den Zusammenschluss mit dem Binnenmarkt vereinbar zu machen. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8785 – The Walt Disney Company/Twenty-First Century Fox, Erwägungsgrund 85.

Auch in Verpflichtungsbeschlüssen nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 kann die Kommission die Marktabgrenzung offenlassen, wenn die beteiligten Unternehmen nach einer ersten Untersuchung anbieten, Verpflichtungen einzugehen, die geeignet sind, die anfänglichen Bedenken auszuräumen. Siehe z. B. die Sache AT.37966 – Distrigaz, Erwägungsgrund 11, und die Sache AT.40153 – E-Book-Vertriebsvereinbarungen und damit verbundene Angelegenheiten (Amazon), Erwägungsgrund 48.

⁽³⁸⁾ Siehe z. B. Urteil des Gerichts vom 26. Oktober 2017, KPN/Kommission, T-394/15, ECLI:EU:T:2017:756, Rn. 60, und Urteil des Gerichts vom 8. Juli 2003, Verband der freien Rohrwerke u. a./Kommission, T-374/00, ECLI:EU:T:2003:188, Rn. 107 und 110. Siehe z. B. auch die Sache M.9695 – LVMH/Tiffany, Rn. 25, 31, 46, 52, 57, 58 und 72, in der die Kommission die genaue Abgrenzung des sachlich und räumlich relevanten Marktes für verschiedene Kategorien von Luxuswaren offenließ, da unabhängig von der genauen Abgrenzung des sachlich und räumlich relevanten Marktes keine wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken auftraten.

⁽³⁹⁾ Bei differenzierten Produktmärkten schließt die Abgrenzung eines relevanten Gesamtmarktes nicht die Möglichkeit aus, in bestimmten Marktsegmenten unterschiedliche Wettbewerbsdynamiken zu ermitteln, aber dennoch die genaue Abgrenzung der Segmente offen zu lassen. Insbesondere könnte die wettbewerbsrechtliche Analyse eines Zusammenschlusses zu der Feststellung führen, dass der Zusammenschluss den Wettbewerb nicht in allen Teilen des relevanten Marktes in gleicher Weise beeinträchtigt, ohne dass dies die Abgrenzung dieses Marktes selbst berührt oder infrage stellt (siehe Urteil des Gerichts vom 18. Mai 2022, Wieland-Werke/Kommission, T-251/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:296, Rn. 40, 41 und 64 ff.).

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Beispielsweise kann die Kommission ihre wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung bei Zusammenschlüssen, bei denen es zu horizontalen Überschneidungen kommt, auf die relevanten Märkte konzentrieren, auf denen die Überschneidungen zwischen den beteiligten Unternehmen am größten sind und auf denen der wirksame und unmittelbare Wettbewerbsdruck innerhalb des Marktes geringer ist. Die Kommission kann dann unter Umständen feststellen, dass die Überschneidungen, wenn sie auf diesen relevanten Märkten keine wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken aufwerfen, auch auf den alternativen relevanten Märkten keine wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken aufwerfen. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10339 – KKR/Landal (Erwägungsgründe 23 ff.), in der sich die Prüfung der Kommission auf den engsten alternativen sachlich relevanten Markt konzentrierte, der als Markt für Ferienparks abgegrenzt wurde und auf dem die Überschneidungen zwischen den Tätigkeiten der beteiligten Unternehmen am größten waren.

21. Neuntens kann die Kommission voraussichtliche Veränderungen der Struktur eines Marktes berücksichtigen, wenn die Wettbewerbssache eine vorausschauende Beurteilung erfordert. Strukturelle Marktveränderungen unterscheiden sich insofern von Erwägungen im Zusammenhang mit dem Markteintritt potenzieller Wettbewerber („potenzieller Wettbewerb“) ⁽⁴¹⁾, als sie sich auf die allgemeine Dynamik von Angebot und Nachfrage auf einem Markt und damit auf die allgemeinen Reaktionen auf Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen auswirken. Solche strukturellen Marktveränderungen sollten von Veränderungen unterschieden werden, die nur einzelne Unternehmen oder Kunden betreffen, die Produkte auf den relevanten Märkten anbieten oder nachfragen. Strukturelle Marktveränderungen können sich auf die Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes auswirken, z. B. wenn mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit festgestellt werden kann, dass die Markteinführung neuer Arten von Produkten unmittelbar bevorsteht ⁽⁴²⁾, oder auf die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes, z. B. bei bevorstehenden technologischen Veränderungen oder bevorstehenden Änderungen des Rechtsrahmens ⁽⁴³⁾. Die Kommission berücksichtigt die erwarteten kurz- oder mittelfristigen strukturellen Marktveränderungen, wenn diese innerhalb des für die Prüfung relevanten Zeitraums zu effektiven Veränderungen der allgemeinen Dynamik von Angebot und Nachfrage führen würden ⁽⁴⁴⁾. Die Kommission kann diese Veränderungen nur dann berücksichtigen, wenn es zuverlässige Anhaltspunkte ⁽⁴⁵⁾ dafür gibt, dass die erwarteten strukturellen Veränderungen mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit stattfinden werden. Die Anhaltspunkte müssen über bloße Annahmen hinausgehen, dass beobachtete Trends anhalten oder bestimmte Unternehmen ihr Verhalten ändern werden.

2. ALLGEMEINE METHODIK

22. Wie in Abschnitt 1.2 erläutert, besteht der Hauptzweck der Marktabgrenzung darin, in einem Zwischenschritt einen Rahmen für die Strukturierung und Erleichterung der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung zu bieten, indem systematisch der wirksame und unmittelbare Wettbewerbsdruck ermittelt wird, dem die beteiligten Unternehmen ausgesetzt sind, wenn sie Kunden in einem bestimmten Gebiet bestimmte Produkte anbieten.
23. Der Wettbewerbsdruck, dem die Unternehmen ausgesetzt sind, ist hauptsächlich auf die drei Faktoren Nachfragesubstitution, Angebotssubstitution und potenzieller Wettbewerb zurückzuführen:
- a) Die Nachfragesubstitution stellt die unmittelbarste und wirksamste disziplinierende Kraft dar, die auf die Anbieter eines gegebenen Produkts einwirkt ⁽⁴⁶⁾. Der Einfluss eines Unternehmens auf die vorherrschenden Verkaufsbedingungen, wie z. B. die Preise, das Innovationsniveau und die angebotene Qualität, hängt davon ab, inwieweit seine Kunden ohne Weiteres zu verfügbaren Produkten wechseln können, die die Kunden als Substitute betrachten ⁽⁴⁷⁾. Bei der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes ist daher die Nachfragesubstitution der wichtigste Gesichtspunkt.

⁽⁴¹⁾ Siehe Randnummer 23.

⁽⁴²⁾ So kann beispielsweise bei Arzneimitteln der sachlich relevante Markt, wie unter Randnummer 91 dieser Bekanntmachung näher erläutert, um in der Entwicklung befindliche Produkte (im Folgenden „Pipeline-Produkte“) erweitert werden, die sich in klinischer Prüfung befinden, oder er kann angesichts des bevorstehenden Markteintritts des Generikums eines Originalpräparats auf ein bestimmtes Molekül beschränkt werden (siehe Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 30. Januar 2020, Generics (UK) u. a., C-307/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:52, Rn. 131).

⁽⁴³⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.2478 – IBM Italia/Business Solutions/JV, Erwägungsgrund 25, in der die Kommission ausführte, dass sie in der Vergangenheit, etwa in der Sache M.2195 – Cap Gemini/Vodafone, davon ausgegangen war, dass IT-Dienstleistungen auf nationaler Ebene erbracht werden. Sie stellte jedoch fest, dass bei IT-Dienstleistungen ein Trend zur Internationalisierung von Angebot und Nachfrage zu beobachten ist, der zum Teil auf die Nutzung des Internets zurückzuführen ist, das die Leistungserbringung aus der Ferne ermöglicht. Dieser Trend zur Internationalisierung wurde später in der Sache M.6237 – Computer Sciences Corporation/iSOFT Group (Erwägungsgründe 17 und 18) bestätigt, in der die Kommission feststellte, dass große Anbieter von IT-Diensten weltweit tätig sind und Kunden häufig weltweite/EWR-weite Ausschreibungen durchführen. In diesen Fällen wurde die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes offengelassen.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Siehe Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 30. Januar 2020, Generics (UK) u. a., C-307/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:52, Rn. 134-135, in dem der Gerichtshof festgestellt hat, dass der Markt angesichts des bevorstehenden Markteintritts des Generikums eines Originalpräparats auf ein bestimmtes Molekül beschränkt werden könne, weil „die Generikahersteller ... in der Lage [seien], sofort oder kurzfristig in den Markt einzutreten, insbesondere wenn sie vorher eine erfolversprechende Strategie für den Eintritt in den Markt entwickelt [hätten] und die für deren Umsetzung erforderlichen Schritte unternommen [hätten], z. B. eine Genehmigung für das Inverkehrbringen beantragt oder schon erlangt oder Bezugsverträge mit Dritthändlern abgeschlossen [hätten]“ und unter der Voraussetzung, dass Umstände vorliegen, „die erkennen lassen, für wie unmittelbar bevorstehend der Hersteller des Originalpräparats den drohenden Markteintritt von Generikaherstellern gehalten hat“.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Siehe Abschnitt 3.4 für weitere Einzelheiten dazu, wie die Kommission Nachweise zum Zwecke der Marktabgrenzung zusammenträgt und bewertet.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Urteil des Gerichts vom 4. Juli 2006, easyJet/Kommission, T-177/04, ECLI:EU:T:2006:187, Rn. 99.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Auf bestimmten Märkten wird die Nachfrage möglicherweise nicht – oder nicht nur – vom Endverbraucher eines Produkts bestimmt, sondern (auch) von anderen Akteuren geprägt, deren Interessen nicht notwendigerweise mit denen des Endverbrauchers übereinstimmen. Auf den Arzneimittelmärkten beispielsweise sind Patienten die Endverbraucher von Arzneimitteln, Ärzte wählen das verschreibungspflichtige Arzneimittel aus oder beraten Patienten, welches nicht verschreibungspflichtige Arzneimittel sie verwenden sollen, und Versicherungssysteme decken in der Regel die Gesamtheit oder einen Teil der Kosten für das verabreichte Arzneimittel ab. Die Kommission berücksichtigt solche Besonderheiten bei der Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes.

- b) Auch die Angebotssubstitution kann in bestimmten Fällen für die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung sein, und zwar dann, wenn sie ebenso wirksam und unmittelbar ist wie die Nachfragesubstitution und zu ähnlichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen für die betreffenden Produkte führt. Nach Erfahrung der Kommission ist die Angebotssubstitution nur in bestimmten Fällen für die Marktabgrenzung relevant.
- c) Der potenzielle Wettbewerb hingegen stellt einen weniger direkten und weniger gewissen Wettbewerbsdruck dar, der die Kriterien der Wirksamkeit und der Unmittelbarkeit der Substitution nicht erfüllt ⁽⁴⁸⁾. Daher ist potenzieller Wettbewerb für die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes nicht von Bedeutung, und es ist nicht angemessen, den aktuellen Absatz eines potenziellen Wettbewerbers von Produkten, die aus Sicht der Kunden nicht durch das/die Produkt(e) des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) substituierbar sind ⁽⁴⁹⁾, in den sachlich relevanten Markt einzubeziehen oder den räumlich relevanten Markt um die Gebiete zu erweitern, in denen der potenzielle Wettbewerber bereits mit seinen Produkten tätig ist ⁽⁵⁰⁾. Das Vorhandensein potenziellen Wettbewerbs erfordert eine Analyse zusätzlicher Faktoren, einschließlich der Wahrscheinlichkeit, des Zeitrahmens und des Umfangs eines möglichen Markteintritts. Bei der Beurteilung der Auswirkungen von potenziellem Wettbewerb muss analysiert werden, wie dieser sich auf das Verhalten des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) auswirkt bzw. auswirken kann. Dies wird im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung analysiert.

- 24. Die Beurteilung der Nachfrage- und Angebotssubstitution trägt zur Ermittlung der Produkte auf dem relevanten Markt und damit der auf dem Markt tätigen Anbieter bei. Die Ermittlung der Kunden, die wahrscheinlich mit ähnlichen Auswirkungen des betreffenden Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses konfrontiert werden, kann ebenfalls ein wichtiges Element für die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes sein, um einen geeigneten Rahmen für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung zu schaffen. Dabei konzentriert sich die Kommission auf die Frage, inwieweit die Kunden mit ähnlichen oder unterschiedlichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen konfrontiert sind. Eine solche Beurteilung ist häufig für die Abgrenzung des sachlich und räumlich relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung, wenn die Anbieter mit einzelnen Kunden verhandeln oder bestimmte Kunden oder Kundengruppen diskriminieren ⁽⁵¹⁾.

2.1. Allgemeine Methodik zur Abgrenzung der sachlich relevanten Märkte

2.1.1. Nachfragesubstitution

- 25. Wie in der Randnummer 23 dargelegt, verfolgt die Kommission bei der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes hauptsächlich den Ansatz, die Substituierbarkeit von Produkten aus Sicht des Kunden zu beurteilen (Nachfragesubstitution). Eine hinreichend starke Nachfragesubstitution besteht, wenn die Kunden ohne Weiteres von den Produkten des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) zu leicht verfügbaren alternativen Produkten wechseln würden. Die Kommission bezieht diese Produkte in denselben sachlich relevanten Markt ein, da von ihnen ein wirksamer und unmittelbarer Wettbewerbsdruck ausgeht.
- 26. Die Kommission bestimmt die Palette der Produkte, die die Kunden des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) als wirksame und unmittelbare Substitute ansehen, sowie den Grad der Substituierbarkeit der Produkte des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) unter Berücksichtigung vielfältiger Anhaltspunkte. Zu diesen Anhaltspunkten gehören je nach den Erfordernissen und Besonderheiten des jeweiligen Falls Indikatoren für die Gründe, aus denen Kunden ein Produkt durch ein anderes ersetzen bzw. nicht ersetzen würden, wie etwa Kundenpräferenzen in Bezug auf Produktmerkmale, Preise, Produktfunktionen und Verwendungszweck sowie Hindernisse für einen Anbieterwechsel und die Kosten eines Anbieterwechsels. Sie umfassen auch direkte Indikatoren für die Substituierbarkeit wie Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere oder eine hypothetische Substitution. Weitere Einzelheiten zu den Anhaltspunkten, auf die sich die Kommission bei der Beurteilung der Nachfragesubstitution stützt, sind Abschnitt 3.2 zu entnehmen.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Das Gericht hat Folgendes erklärt: „Obwohl der potenzielle Wettbewerb und die Angebotssubstitution begrifflich zwei verschiedene Fragen betreffen, ... überschneiden sich diese Fragen doch teilweise, da der Unterschied vor allem in der – vorhandenen oder aber nicht vorhandenen – Unmittelbarkeit der Wettbewerbsbeschränkung liegt.“ (Urteil des Gerichts vom 30. September 2003, Atlantic Container Line u. a./Kommission, T-191/98, T-212/98 bis T-214/98, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245, Rn. 834).

⁽⁴⁹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7555 – Staples/Office Depot (Erwägungsgründe 372-374), in der die Kommission geprüft hat, ob Amazon ein potenzieller neuer Marktteilnehmer im B2B-Vertragkanal für Büroartikel war, und die Verkäufe von Amazon auf anderen Produktmärkten, wie dem Einzelhandelskanal für Büroartikel, nicht in die Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen hat.

⁽⁵⁰⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8677 – Siemens/Alstom (Erwägungsgründe 485-533), in der die Kommission den Wettbewerbsdruck, der durch den potenziellen Eintritt asiatischer Anbieter von Hoch- und Höchstgeschwindigkeitszügen in den EWR-Markt entstehen würde, im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung beurteilt und die Verkäufe der asiatischen Anbieter von Hoch- und Höchstgeschwindigkeitszügen außerhalb des räumlich relevanten Marktes bei der Berechnung der Marktanteile nicht berücksichtigt hat.

⁽⁵¹⁾ Weitere Einzelheiten dazu, wie die Kommission die Marktabgrenzung bei Diskriminierung von Kunden oder Kundengruppen vornimmt, sind Abschnitt 4.2. zu entnehmen.

27. Die Hauptfrage, die es bei der Prüfung dieser Anhaltspunkte zu beantworten gilt, lautet: In welchem Umfang und zu welchen leicht verfügbaren Substituten (falls vorhanden) würden die Kunden des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) bei einer Verschlechterung der Angebotsbedingungen für die Produkte des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) im Vergleich zu anderen Produkten wechseln ⁽⁵²⁾? Für operative und praktische Zwecke konzentriert sich diese Beurteilung in der Regel auf Reaktionen auf Preiserhöhungen, kann aber auch Änderungen anderer Wettbewerbsparameter wie der Qualität des Produkts oder seines Innovationsgrads berücksichtigen, wie unter Randnummer 15 dargelegt.
28. Konzeptionell bedeutet dieser Ansatz, dass einem als Ausgangspunkt dienenden Kandidatenmarkt, der anfänglich die Produkte oder Produktarten des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) umfasst, die im Fokus der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung stehen, in der Folge leicht verfügbare Substitute (sofern vorhanden) hinzugefügt werden, bis die ermittelten Produkte einen sachlich relevanten Markt bilden.
29. Das oft verwendete theoretische Kriterium für die Feststellung, ob es sich bei dem Kandidatenmarkt um einen sachlich relevanten Markt handelt, ist die Frage, ob ein hypothetischer Monopolist auf dem Kandidatenmarkt Marktmacht ausüben könnte. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, ist zu prüfen, ob es für einen hypothetischen Monopolisten auf dem Kandidatenmarkt profitabel wäre, eine geringfügige, aber signifikante und anhaltende Preiserhöhung (small but significant non-transitory price increase) vorzunehmen (im Folgenden „SSNIP-Test“) ⁽⁵³⁾.
30. Wenn Unternehmen in Bezug auf andere Parameter als den Preis konkurrieren, wie z. B. Qualität oder das Innovationsniveau, ist die Anwendung des SSNIP-Tests schwierig, insbesondere wenn es sich um zu einem monetären Nullpreis angebotene Produkte ⁽⁵⁴⁾ und um hochinnovative Branchen handelt. Je nach der bei der Untersuchung zugrunde gelegten Schadenstheorie treten weitere Schwierigkeiten auf. Liegt der Schwerpunkt der Beurteilung auf der Veränderung der Marktmacht des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s), z. B. bei der Prüfung, ob ein horizontaler Zusammenschluss zu nichtkoordinierten Effekten führen würde, kann der SSNIP-Test in der Regel anhand des geltenden Marktpreises vorgenommen werden. Dies ist jedoch möglicherweise nicht der Fall, wenn der Schwerpunkt auf der Beurteilung der bestehenden Marktmacht des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) liegt, z. B.

⁽⁵²⁾ Bei Einkaufsmärkten wäre der Anbieter der Ausgangspunkt für die Analyse von Fällen, in denen mit einem Wechsel reagiert wird, wobei anhand des Tests ermittelt wird, welche alternativen Vertriebswege und Verkaufsstellen es für die Produkte des Anbieters gibt.

⁽⁵³⁾ Bei der im Rahmen des SSNIP-Tests betrachteten Preiserhöhung handelt es sich in der Regel um eine Erhöhung um 5 % bis 10 %, die bei einem oder mehreren Produkten auf dem Kandidatenmarkt, einschließlich mindestens eines Produkts des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s), vorgenommen wird. Der Umfang der Preiserhöhung und wie sie angewendet wird können jedoch vom konkreten Fall abhängen. Erwirtschaften die beteiligten Unternehmen beispielsweise nur einen vergleichsweise geringen Mehrwert in der Lieferkette (da Rohstoffe oder gekaufte Komponenten einen hohen Anteil am Gesamtpreis ausmachen), lässt sich die Frage, ob ein hypothetischer Monopolist Marktmacht ausüben kann, möglicherweise besser anhand seines Einflusses auf diesen Mehrwert beantworten. Daher kann die Kommission in solchen Fällen den SSNIP-Test auf den Mehrwert statt auf den Verkaufspreis anwenden. In der Sache M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata (Erwägungsgründe 135 bis 140 und 144) hat die Kommission dieses Konzept angewendet und sich bei der Beurteilung von Anhaltspunkten im Zusammenhang mit Importen auf den Mehrwert (oder die „regionalen Prämien“) sowie auf die Entwicklung der Preise und Margen für Zink in verschiedenen Regionen konzentriert.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ In der Sache AT.40099 – Google Android (Erwägungsgründe 284-305) hat die Kommission geprüft, ob Hersteller, Nutzer und Anwendungsentwickler im Falle einer bei Android-App-Stores eintretenden geringfügigen, aber signifikanten und anhaltenden Qualitätsminderung (small but significant non-transitory decrease of quality – SSNDQ) von Android-App-Stores zu App-Stores für andere lizenzpflichtige Betriebssysteme für intelligente Mobilgeräte wechseln würden. Im Allgemeinen wird der SSNDQ-Test als Rahmenkonzept für eine qualitative Beurteilung der Nachfragesubstitution verwendet. Die Kommission prüft in der Regel nicht, ob eine solche geringfügige, aber signifikante und anhaltende Qualitätsminderung für einen hypothetischen Monopolisten profitabel wäre. Darüber hinaus ist eine quantitative Anwendung des SSNDQ-Tests mit verschiedenen Schwierigkeiten verbunden, u. a. was die Quantifizierung der Qualität angeht. In seinem Urteil vom 14. September 2022 – Google und Alphabet/Kommission, T-604/18, ECLI:EU:T:2022:541, Rn. 177 und 180, bestätigte das Gericht, dass „der SSNDQ-Test ... ein relevanter Anhaltspunkt für die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes“ sei, und stellte gleichzeitig fest, dass „die Festlegung eines genauen quantitativen Standards für die Verschlechterung der Qualität des Zielprodukts keine Voraussetzung für die Anwendung des SSNDQ-Tests“ sein könne. „Es kommt [e] allein auf die Annahme einer geringfügigen, wenn auch signifikanten und nicht vorübergehenden Verschlechterung an“.

bei der Abgrenzung von Märkten zum Zwecke der Beurteilung des Vorliegens einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung nach Artikel 102 AEUV⁽⁵⁵⁾. Darüber hinaus können praktische Sachzwänge die empirische Anwendung des SSNIP-Tests bei der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes in realen Fällen erschweren. So kann es unter Umständen unmöglich sein, zuverlässige Informationen über die Höhe der Verluste zu erheben, die einem hypothetischen Monopolisten bei Umsetzung einer geringfügigen, aber signifikanten und anhaltenden Preiserhöhung entstehen würden.

31. Daher kann sich die Kommission bei der Beurteilung des relevanten Marktes zwar auf die Grundsätze des SSNIP-Tests stützen, doch ist sie nicht verpflichtet, den SSNIP-Test empirisch anzuwenden; für die Marktabgrenzung können andere Arten von Anhaltspunkten ebenso relevant sein, wie in Abschnitt 3 näher beschrieben wird⁽⁵⁶⁾. In den meisten Fällen dient der SSNIP-Test nur als Rahmenkonzept für die Auslegung der verfügbaren Anhaltspunkte.

2.1.2. Angebotssubstitution

32. Die Substituierbarkeit von Produkten aus der Sicht der Anbieter (Angebotssubstitution) kann für die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung sein, wenn Anbieter dieselben Vermögenswerte und Verfahren zur Herstellung verwandter Produkte einsetzen, die für die Kunden keine Substitute darstellen, und wenn dies zu ähnlichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen für die gesamte Palette dieser verwandten Produkte führt. Dann kann es angebracht sein, solche verwandten Produkte in den sachlich relevanten Markt einzubeziehen, sofern die Angebotssubstitution über die Produktpalette hinweg einen ebenso wirksamen und unmittelbaren Wettbewerbsdruck bewirkt wie die Nachfragesubstitution.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Umfasst der Kandidatenmarkt (im Wesentlichen) das Produkt bzw. die Produkte eines einzigen Unternehmens, so wird ein anhand des geltenden Marktpreises durchgeführter SSNIP-Test grundsätzlich darauf hindeuten, dass der relevante Markt größer sein muss als der Kandidatenmarkt, da es für ein Unternehmen mit Gewinnmaximierungsabsicht per definitionem nicht profitabel ist, den Preis über seinen geltenden (gewinnmaximierenden) Preis anzuheben.

Dies kann zum sogenannten „Zellophan-Fehlschluss“ (cellophane fallacy) führen, der nach der vom Obersten Gerichtshof der USA vorgenommenen Abgrenzung des Marktes für Cellophan und andere Verpackungsmaterialien benannt wurde (Vereinigte Staaten/E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)). Der Begriff bezeichnet den Umstand, dass auf der Grundlage eines anhand des geltenden Preises vorgenommenen SSNIP-Tests zu Unrecht der Schluss gezogen wird, dass der relevante Markt mehr umfassen muss als das Produkt bzw. die Produkte eines marktbeherrschenden Unternehmens (vgl. die Erläuterungen zu diesem Begriff in der Sache AT.39523 – Slovak Telekom, Erwägungsgründe 158 bis 171). Ein solcher Fehlschluss kann auch dann auftreten, wenn die Preise aufgrund der gemeinsamen Gewinnmaximierung durch eine Gruppe von Unternehmen über dem Wettbewerbsniveau festgelegt werden.

Wird die Marktabgrenzung in einem Fall vorgenommen, der eine Beurteilung des Umfangs der bestehenden Marktmacht erfordert, etwa im Rahmen der Beurteilung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung in einem Verfahren nach Artikel 102 AEUV, ist daher zu berücksichtigen, dass der geltende Preis möglicherweise bereits über dem Wettbewerbsniveau liegt. In solchen Fällen kann die Kommission den SSNIP-Test auf der Grundlage eines kontrafaktischen Preises durchführen, der bei wirksamem oder wirksamerem Wettbewerb verlangt würde, oder sie kann sich auf andere Anhaltspunkte stützen, um den relevanten Markt abzugrenzen.

In Fällen, in denen der Schwerpunkt auf der Beurteilung einer Veränderung der Marktmacht liegt, insbesondere der Veränderung der Marktmacht infolge der Beseitigung des Wettbewerbs zwischen den an einem Zusammenschluss mit horizontalen Überschneidungen beteiligten Unternehmen, umfasst der Kandidatenmarkt hingegen mindestens die relevanten Produkte oder Produktarten der sich zusammenschließenden Unternehmen, und der SSNIP-Test kann in der Regel anhand des geltenden Preises vorgenommen werden. Daher führt die Marktabgrenzung in Fällen, in denen eine Änderung der Marktmacht beurteilt wird, nicht immer zu den gleichen Ergebnissen wie in Fällen, in denen die bestehende Marktmacht beurteilt wird.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ In seinem Urteil vom 11. Januar 2017, *Topps Europe/Kommission*, T-699/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:2, Rn. 82, stellte das Gericht fest, dass die Kommission keinen offensichtlichen Beurteilungsfehler begangen habe, als sie ihre Schlussfolgerungen zum relevanten Markt auf ihre Beurteilung der gesammelten Anhaltspunkte gestützt hat, ohne einen SSNIP-Test vorzunehmen. Ebenso stellte das Gericht in seinem Urteil vom 5. Oktober 2020, *HeidelbergCement und Schwenk Zement/Kommission*, T-380/17, ECLI:EU:T:2020:471, Rn. 331, in Bezug auf die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes fest, dass der SSNIP-Test, wie die Kommission unter Randnummer 143 der Klageerwiderung zu Recht feststelle, nicht die einzige ihr zur Verfügung stehende Methode für die Abgrenzung räumlich relevanter Märkte sei. Siehe auch das Urteil des Gerichts vom 22. Juni 2022, *thyssenkrupp/Kommission*, T-584/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:386, Rn. 76 und 155, sowie das Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, *Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde*, E-12/20, Rn. 95.

33. Die notwendigen Voraussetzungen für eine Erweiterung des Marktes auf der Grundlage einer Angebotssubstitution sind, dass die meisten, wenn nicht alle Anbieter in der Lage sind, die Produktion auf andere verwandte Produkte umzustellen⁽⁵⁷⁾, und dabei nur unbedeutende zusätzliche versunkene Kosten oder Risiken tragen müssen, dass sie bei Änderungen der relativen Preise oder der relativen Nachfrage den Anreiz hätten, dies zu tun, und dies tatsächlich tun würden und dass sie alle Produkte der Produktpalette tatsächlich innerhalb kurzer Zeit anbieten können⁽⁵⁸⁾.
34. Eine hinreichend starke Angebotssubstitution zeigt sich typischerweise in Fällen, in denen Unternehmen verschiedene Qualitäten oder Güteklassen eines bestimmten Produktes verkaufen. So stellte die Kommission beispielsweise in einem Fall, der die Herstellung von Edelstahl betraf⁽⁵⁹⁾, bezüglich der Nachfrage fest, dass die Kunden nicht unterschiedliche Güteklassen oder Güteklassenfamilien von Edelstahl für denselben Zweck verwenden konnten. Es war den Herstellern jedoch möglich, die Produktion in kurzer Zeit von einer Güteklasse auf eine andere umzustellen und mit begrenzten zusätzlichen Kosten dieselbe Ausrüstung zu verwenden. Da es keine besonderen Vertriebsschwierigkeiten gab, konnten die Edelstahlhersteller deshalb mit anderen um Aufträge für die verschiedenen Güteklassen konkurrieren. Die Kommission bezog daher die verschiedenen Güteklassen von Edelstahl in denselben relevanten Markt ein.
35. Die Angebotssubstitution kann für die Marktabgrenzung auch dann relevant sein, wenn Kunden maßgeschneiderte Produkte kaufen, z. B. wenn sie Ausschreibungen für Bauvorhaben oder die Beschaffung von Zügen oder Gasturbinen durchführen. In solchen Fällen besteht möglicherweise keine oder nur eine begrenzte Substituierbarkeit der Nachfrage nach den maßgeschneiderten Produkten für verschiedene Kunden. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Nachfragesubstitution könnte jedes dieser maßgeschneiderten Produkte dann seinen eigenen relevanten Markt bilden. Wenn der Wettbewerbsdruck auf das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen in solchen Fällen jedoch aus der Fähigkeit anderer Anbieter resultiert, das spezifische maßgeschneiderte Produkt herzustellen, können die Wettbewerbsbedingungen für die verschiedenen Kunden dennoch ähnlich sein. Wenn dieselben Anbieter beispielsweise im Rahmen verschiedener Ausschreibungen Angebote unterbreiten können, die den Spezifikationen verschiedener Kunden entsprechen, und dies in der Regel auch tun, können die verschiedenen maßgeschneiderten Produkte daher in denselben sachlich relevanten Markt einbezogen werden.
36. Wenn nur einige der Anbieter in der Lage sind und einen Anreiz haben, die Produktion umzustellen und die Produkte innerhalb kurzer Zeit anzubieten, und dies tatsächlich tun würden, ist es nicht angebracht, die Produktpalette in denselben relevanten Markt einzubeziehen⁽⁶⁰⁾. Bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt die Kommission jedoch den Wettbewerbsdruck, der von den Anbietern ausgeht, die die Voraussetzungen erfüllen; wenn der Fall eine vorausschauende Beurteilung erfordert, berücksichtigt sie auch, ob zu erwarten ist, dass diese Anbieter ihren Absatz der betreffenden Produkte in Zukunft steigern werden. Die Kommission hat diesen Ansatz beispielsweise bei einer den Markt für metallbeschichteten Stahl betreffenden Prüfung herangezogen⁽⁶¹⁾. Die Kommission kam zu dem Schluss, dass die Bedingungen für eine Angebotssubstitution in Bezug auf Weißblech und elektrolytisch verchromten Stahl in diesem Fall nicht erfüllt waren, da nur ein konkurrierender Anbieter in der Lage war, diese Produkte auf derselben Fertigungslinie herzustellen, und die Herstellung beider Produkte auf umstellbaren Fertigungslinien auf dem Markt keine wesentliche Rolle spielte. Bei ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigte die Kommission jedoch den Wettbewerbsdruck, der von dem Anbieter ausging, der in der Lage war, Weißblech und elektrolytisch verchromten Stahl auf umstellbaren Fertigungslinien herzustellen.
37. Wenn eine Angebotssubstitution es erforderlich machen würde, vorhandene materielle und immaterielle Vermögenswerte außerhalb des normalen Geschäftsverlaufs erheblich anzupassen, mehr als geringfügige zusätzliche Investitionen, versunkene Kosten oder Risiken zu tragen, dauerhafte strategische Entscheidungen zu treffen oder Zeitverzögerungen hinzunehmen, erweitert die Kommission den relevanten Markt nicht auf der Grundlage einer Angebotssubstitution. Selbst wenn die Hersteller bereits in der Herstellung der gesamten Palette verwandter Produkte tätig sind, kann die Kommission den relevanten Markt nicht auf der Grundlage einer

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, E-12/20, Rn. 160.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ D. h. der Hersteller muss in der Lage sein, dem Kunden das Produkt innerhalb eines Zeitraums zu verkaufen, der nicht wesentlich länger ist als der Zeitraum, den der Kunde für den Wechsel zu einem anderen substituierbaren Produkt/anderen substituierbaren Produkten auf dem Kandidatenmarkt benötigt. Diese Beurteilung hängt von den jeweils untersuchten Produkten ab.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Siehe Sache M.6471 – Outokumpu/INOXUM, Erwägungsgründe 120 und 121.

⁽⁶⁰⁾ Urteil des Gerichts vom 28. April 2010, Amann & Söhne und Cousin Filterie /Kommission, T-446/05, ECLI:EU:T:2010:165, Rn. 79, und Urteil des EFTA-Gerichtshofs vom 5. Mai 2022, Telenor und Telenor Norge/EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde, E-12/20, Rn. 160. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina, Erwägungsgrund 159.

⁽⁶¹⁾ Siehe Sache M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV, Erwägungsgründe 276-278 und 1287-1293 für eine den Markt für Weißblech betreffende Prüfung.

Angebotssubstitution erweitern. So können bestimmte Käsehersteller zwar in der Lage sein, mehrere Käsesorten herzustellen, doch bevor ein Hersteller einer Käsesorte seine Produktion umstellen und mit dem Verkauf einer anderen Käsesorte beginnen kann, können erhebliche Kosten und Vorlaufzeiten anfallen⁽⁶²⁾. In solchen Fällen berücksichtigt die Kommission die Auswirkungen einer solchen Umstellung in der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung als von potenziellem Wettbewerb ausgehenden Wettbewerbsdruck.

2.2. Allgemeine Methodik zur Abgrenzung der räumlich relevanten Märkte

38. Die räumlich relevanten Märkte können je nach den Umständen des Falles von lokal bis global reichen. Wie unter Randnummer 12 Buchstabe b dargelegt, verfolgt die Kommission bei der Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes den Ansatz, die Wettbewerbsbedingungen zu prüfen. Ein üblicher Ausgangspunkt ist die Ermittlung der Gebiete, in denen das betreffende Verhalten oder der betreffende Zusammenschluss wahrscheinlich Auswirkungen haben wird, indem der Standort des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) und seiner/ihrer Kunden ermittelt wird. Die Kommission untersucht dann, ob die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in einem bestimmten Gebiet hinreichend homogen sind⁽⁶³⁾, um die Auswirkungen des Verhaltens oder des Zusammenschlusses beurteilen zu können, und ob sich dieses Gebiet durch deutlich unterschiedliche Wettbewerbsbedingungen von anderen Gebieten unterscheidet.
39. Die Kommission beurteilt die Wettbewerbsbedingungen anhand vielfältiger Anhaltspunkte. Je nach den Erfordernissen und Besonderheiten des konkreten Falls kann es sich dabei um Folgendes handeln: die Präsenz derselben oder unterschiedlicher Anbieter in verschiedenen geografischen Gebieten, Ähnlichkeiten oder Unterschiede bei ihren Marktanteilen und Preisen, Ähnlichkeiten oder Unterschiede bei Kundenpräferenzen und Kaufverhalten, Hindernisse und Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Belieferung von Kunden in einem anderen Gebiet, entfernungsbedingte Faktoren, die sich auf die Kosten, die verfügbaren Mengen oder die Zuverlässigkeit der Belieferung auswirken, sowie Handelsströme und die Lieferstruktur. Weitere Einzelheiten zu den Anhaltspunkten, auf die sich die Kommission bei der Beurteilung räumlich relevanter Märkte stützt, sind Abschnitt 3.3 zu entnehmen.
40. In der Regel analysiert die Kommission auch die Nachfragesubstitution zwischen Anbietern, die an verschiedenen Standorten oder in verschiedenen Gebieten ansässig sind. Dies ist besonders wichtig in Fällen, in denen der Standort des Kunden als solcher für die Bedingungen, unter denen die Produkte angeboten werden, keine Rolle spielt, d. h. wenn die Anbieter nicht mit einzelnen Kunden verhandeln oder die Kunden nicht aufgrund ihres Standorts oder geografischen Gebiets diskriminieren. In diesem Fall wird der räumlich relevante Markt in der Regel auf der Grundlage des Standorts des Anbieters abgegrenzt⁽⁶⁴⁾, und die Kommission kann im Einklang mit der in Abschnitt 2.1.1 beschriebenen Methodik besonderes Augenmerk darauf legen festzustellen, welche Anbieter in welchen Gebieten enge Substitute für das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen sind. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist die von der Kommission in früheren Fällen im Luftverkehrssektor vorgenommene Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte für die Fluggastbeförderung nach dem Ansatz „Flughafen für Flughafen“. Die Analyse der Kommission konzentrierte sich auf die Feststellung, ob einige der relevanten Flughäfen aus Sicht der Fluggäste durch andere Flughäfen substituierbar waren⁽⁶⁵⁾.

⁽⁶²⁾ Siehe beispielsweise die Sache M.9413 – Lactalis/Nuova Castelli (Erwägungsgründe 47 und 48), in der die Marktuntersuchung ergab, dass Mozzarella-Hersteller weder ohne erhebliche Kosten noch innerhalb kurzer Zeit die Herstellung von Ricotta aufnehmen könnten und Ricotta-Hersteller nicht ohne erhebliche Kosten und Verzögerungen die Herstellung und den Verkauf von Mascarpone aufnehmen könnten.

⁽⁶³⁾ In der Rechtsprechung der Unionsgerichte werden durchgängig „hinreichend homogene“ – im Gegensatz zu identischen – Wettbewerbsbedingungen als Kriterium für die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes genannt. Siehe Urteil des Gerichtshofs vom 14. Februar 1978, *United Brands/Kommission*, C-27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, Rn. 11 und 44, Urteil des Gerichts vom 8. Juli 2003, *Verband der freien Rohrwerke u. a./Kommission*, T-374/00, ECLI:EU:T:2003:188, Rn. 141, Urteil des Gerichts vom 30. September 2003, *Cableuropa u. a./Kommission*, T-346/02 und T-347/02, ECLI:EU:T:2003:256, Rn. 115, Urteil des Gerichts vom 7. Mai 2009, *NVV u. a./Kommission*, T-151/05, ECLI:EU:T:2009:144, Rn. 52, Urteil des Gerichts vom 5. Oktober 2020, *HeidelbergCement und Schwenk Zement/Kommission*, T-380/17, ECLI:EU:T:2020:471, Rn. 294.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ Der räumlich relevante Markt würde dann als das Gebiet abgegrenzt, in dem diese Anbieter ansässig sind und Produkte liefern, die durch die Kunden substituierbar sind. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.1628 – *TotalFina/Elf* (Erwägungsgründe 222 ff.), in der die Kommission den relevanten Markt als den Markt für die Into-plane-Lieferung von Flugturbinenkraftstoff an bestimmten Flughäfen abgegrenzt hat, und insbesondere Erwägungsgrund 228, in dem auf Hindernisse für den Wechsel zu alternativen Anbietern an einem anderen Flughafen hingewiesen wird. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.9014 – *PKN Orlen/Grupa Lotos*, Erwägungsgründe 1045-1052. Ebenso hat die Kommission in Fällen, die den Einzelhandel mit Konsumgütern des täglichen Bedarfs betreffen, den räumlich relevanten Markt als lokales Gebiet abgegrenzt, das durch eine maximale Fahrtzeit für die Kunden auf der Grundlage von Erwägungen im Zusammenhang mit der Nachfragesubstitution bestimmt wurde (siehe z. B. die Sache M.8468 – *Norgesgruppen/Axfood/Eurocash*, Erwägungsgründe 24 ff.), und alle Einzelhandelsgeschäfte in diesem Gebiet in diesen relevanten Markt einbezogen.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.8633 – *Lufthansa/Certain Air Berlin Assets*, Erwägungsgründe 59 ff., M.8672 – *Easyjet/Certain Air Berlin Assets*, Erwägungsgründe 53 ff. und M.8869 – *Ryanair/Laudamotion*, Erwägungsgründe 223 ff. Bei der Marktabgrenzung wurde geprüft, ob einer oder mehrere Flughäfen in den relevanten Markt einbezogen werden sollten. Der relevante Markt wurde daher um den Standort der Anbieter und nicht um den Standort der Kunden herum abgegrenzt.

41. In Fällen, in denen Anbieter mit einzelnen Kunden verhandeln oder Kunden aufgrund ihres Standorts oder geografischen Gebiets diskriminieren können, grenzt die Kommission den räumlich relevanten Markt in der Regel auf der Grundlage des Kundenstandorts ab ⁽⁶⁶⁾. In solchen Fällen kann auch die Nachfragesubstitution zwischen verschiedenen geografischen Gebieten – z. B. durch die Umstellung auf zusätzliche Importe – von Bedeutung sein. Wenn Kunden in zwei Gebieten größtenteils dieselben Anbieter als Alternativen betrachten und ihre Einkaufsmengen leicht auf andere Anbieter verlagern können, kann dies zusammen mit anderen Faktoren darauf hindeuten, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in den beiden Gebieten hinreichend homogen sind und die Auswirkungen des Verhaltens oder des Zusammenschlusses ähnlich genug ausfallen, um die beiden Gebiete in denselben räumlich relevanten Markt einzubeziehen. Wenn Kunden in zwei Gebieten hingegen unterschiedliche Anbieter als Alternativen ansehen oder die Mengen, die sie statt von dem einen von dem anderen Anbieter beziehen können und auch tatsächlich beziehen, begrenzt sind (z. B. aufgrund von Kundenpräferenzen oder begrenzten verfügbaren Importmengen), deutet dies darauf hin, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in den beiden Gebieten nicht hinreichend homogen sind ⁽⁶⁷⁾.
42. Folglich führt das bloße Vorhandensein von Importen oder die Möglichkeit, in einem bestimmten geografischen Gebiet zu Importen zu wechseln, nicht zwangsläufig zu einer Erweiterung des räumlich relevanten Marktes um das Gebiet, aus dem die Waren exportiert werden oder werden könnten. Kunden, die in dem Gebiet ansässig sind, aus dem die Waren exportiert werden oder werden könnten, können mit anderen Wettbewerbsbedingungen konfrontiert sein als Kunden, die in dem Gebiet ansässig sind, in das die Importe eingeführt werden. Unter diesen Umständen könnten bei einer weiten Abgrenzung der räumlich relevanten Märkte, bei der die Export- und Zielgebiete der importierten Waren eingeschlossen werden, fälschlicherweise Gebiete in den relevanten Markt einbezogen werden, in denen Kunden von dem betreffenden Verhalten oder Zusammenschluss wahrscheinlich in unterschiedlicher Weise betroffen wären. Dies würde die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung eher behindern als erleichtern.
43. In Fällen, in denen zwar erhebliche Importe zu verzeichnen sind, aber der Handel zwischen bestimmten geografischen Gebieten oder andere Angebots- und Nachfrageerwägungen nicht ausreichen, um auf hinreichend homogene Wettbewerbsbedingungen zu schließen, weitet die Kommission daher den räumlich relevanten Markt nicht auf das Gebiet aus, aus dem die Waren exportiert wurden. Wenn der räumlich relevante Markt auf der Grundlage des Kundenstandorts abgegrenzt wird, berechnet die Kommission die Marktanteile im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung jedoch auf der Grundlage aller Verkäufe an Kunden auf dem räumlich relevanten Markt, wobei die Verkäufe sowohl von lokalen Anbietern als auch von Importeuren berücksichtigt werden. Der Wettbewerbsdruck, der von Importen in den relevanten Markt ausgeht, wird von der Kommission auch auf andere Weise bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt, beispielsweise indem in Fällen, die eine vorausschauende Beurteilung erfordern, geprüft wird, ob die Importe in Zukunft wahrscheinlich steigen werden ⁽⁶⁸⁾.
44. Ein Beispiel dafür, wie die Kommission die Handelsströme bei der Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes und in der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt, ist ihre Beurteilung des Marktes für fertige Flacherzeugnisse aus Karbonstahl ⁽⁶⁹⁾. Die Kommission kam zu dem Schluss, dass die räumlich relevanten Märkte für mehrere Arten fertiger Flacherzeugnisse aus Karbonstahl nicht über den EWR hinausgingen, da sich die Marktstrukturen in verschiedenen Regionen der Welt unterschieden, die Beschaffung zu einem sehr großen Teil auf regionaler Ebene erfolgte, und die Preise der Produkte von Region zu Region sehr unterschiedlich waren. Gleichwohl wurde der von den Importen ausgehende Wettbewerbsdruck im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung eingehend geprüft.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ Dieser Ansatz wird häufig in Fällen verwendet, in denen es um Industrieprodukte geht. Siehe z. B. den Ansatz in verschiedenen Wettbewerbssachen, die Stahlerzeugnisse betrafen, z. B. die Sachen M.6471 – Outokumpu/Inoxum (Erwägungsgründe 244-260), M.8444 – ArcelorMittal/Ilva oder M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgründe 162-191), in der die Kommission den Markt für Hochleistungsgasturbinen mit einer Frequenz von 50 Hz als weltweiten Markt ohne China und Iran abgrenzte, da es für einige weltweit tätige Anbieter Hindernisse für die Belieferung von Kunden in diesen beiden Gebieten gab. Siehe auch die Sache AT.40099 – Google Android (Erwägungsgründe 406-410), in der die Kommission den Markt für die Lizenzierung von Betriebssystemen für intelligente Mobilgeräte und Android-App-Stores als weltweiten Markt ohne China abgrenzte, da die Geschäftstätigkeit des Unternehmens in China durch Regulierung eingeschränkt wurde.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9592 – Freudenberg/L&B (Erwägungsgründe 50-53), in der die Kommission feststellte, dass die Märkte für Vliesstoffe und andere Gewebe mindestens EWR-weit abzugrenzen sind. Sie genehmigte den Zusammenschluss, da die asiatischen Konkurrenten weiterhin ausreichenden Wettbewerbsdruck auf die beteiligten Unternehmen ausüben würden (siehe Erwägungsgründe 98-137 für Vliesstoff-Erstträger für Teppiche für Bauanwendungen und Erwägungsgründe 152-180 für Vliesstoff-Erstträger für Teppiche für Automobilanwendungen).

⁽⁶⁹⁾ Siehe in der Sache M.8444 – ArcelorMittal/Ilva, Abschnitt 7.2.4 (Erwägungsgründe 320-326) für die Abgrenzung des räumlichen Marktes und die Abschnitte 9.4.5.2 bis 9.4.5.9 (Erwägungsgründe 637-750) für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung des durch Importe bewirkten Wettbewerbsdrucks. Im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung führte die Kommission eine eingehende Analyse des durch Importe bewirkten Wettbewerbsdrucks durch und stellte unter anderem fest, dass erhebliche Importmengen als solche kein Indikator für einen ausreichenden Preisdruck waren, dass Importe für Kunden im EWR eine weniger zuverlässige Bezugsquelle als inländische Produkte darstellten und dass empirische Nachweise darauf hindeuteten, dass Importe als Reaktion auf Preiserhöhungen wahrscheinlich nicht ausreichten, um Preiserhöhungen zu verhindern.

3. VORGEHENSWEISE BEI DER MARKTABGRENZUNG

3.1. Allgemeiner Ansatz für die Marktabgrenzung in der Praxis

45. In der Praxis ist die Kommission in der Regel in der Lage, vorläufig die plausibelsten sachlich und räumlich relevanten Märkte zu ermitteln, auf denen ein bestimmtes Verhalten oder ein bestimmter Zusammenschluss zu beurteilen ist. Dies kann auf der Grundlage leicht zugänglicher Informationen, der in früheren Kommissionsbeschlüssen in denselben oder ähnlichen Wirtschaftszweigen abgegrenzten relevanten Märkte oder der von dem/den beteiligten Unternehmen übermittelten Informationen erfolgen. Oft wird die Anzahl solcher plausiblen alternativen relevanten Märkte begrenzt sein. Anschließend passt die Kommission ihre ersten Arbeitshypothesen bezüglich der sachlich und räumlich relevanten Märkte gegebenenfalls unter Berücksichtigung der bei ihrer Untersuchung zusammengetragenen Nachweise an. In vielen Fällen reicht eine oberflächliche Prüfung der plausiblen alternativen Marktabgrenzungen aus, um die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung im Kommissionsbeschluss zu strukturieren und zu erleichtern, ohne dass eine eingehende Analyse zur Abgrenzung jedes einzelnen relevanten Marktes erforderlich wäre. Die Kommission kann in ihren Beschlüssen alternative Marktabgrenzungen darlegen und berücksichtigen; dabei kann sie je nach den Merkmalen der Sache mit weiter oder enger abgegrenzten Märkten beginnen.
46. In den folgenden Abschnitten 3.2 und 3.3 werden verschiedene Faktoren beschrieben, die für die Abgrenzung sachlich und räumlich relevanter Märkte von Bedeutung sein können. In Abschnitt 3.4 wird dargelegt, wie die Kommission Nachweise für diese verschiedenen Faktoren zusammenträgt und bewertet. Das heißt aber nicht, dass die Kommission in jedem einzelnen Fall für alle genannten Faktoren Nachweise einholen und alle Faktoren beurteilen muss. In der Praxis reichen häufig Nachweise für einige dieser Faktoren aus, damit die Kommission den relevanten Markt abgrenzen kann.

3.2. Anhaltspunkte für die Abgrenzung sachlich relevanter Märkte

47. Im Einklang mit den in Abschnitt 2 dargelegten Grundsätzen stellt die Kommission bei der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes in erster Linie auf Anhaltspunkte für eine Nachfragesubstitution ab. Sie kann aber auch Anhaltspunkte für eine Angebotssubstitution berücksichtigen, wenn die in Abschnitt 2.1.2 genannten Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind. Die in den Abschnitten 3.2.1 und 3.2.2 aufgeführten Kategorien von Anhaltspunkten können von Bedeutung sein, um die Nachfrage- und Angebotssubstitution für die Zwecke der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes zu beurteilen.

3.2.1. Anhaltspunkte für eine Nachfragesubstitution

3.2.1.1. Produktmerkmale, Preise, vorgesehener Verwendungszweck und allgemeine Kundenpräferenzen

48. Anhaltspunkte wie Produktmerkmale (einschließlich Produktqualität oder Innovationsgrad), Preise, Produktfunktionen und Verwendungszweck, die in vielen Fällen ohne Weiteres zur Verfügung stehen, sind in der Regel hilfreich, um das Spektrum möglicher Substitute zu ermitteln, die den Kunden des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) zur Verfügung stehen.
49. Zur Beurteilung, ob zwei Produkte Nachfragesubstitute sind, reicht es aber möglicherweise nicht aus, zu prüfen, ob die Produkte aufgrund beobachtbarer Merkmale ähnlich sind, ob ihre Preise und ihre Preisstrukturen vergleichbar sind ⁽⁷⁰⁾ oder ob sie demselben Verwendungszweck ⁽⁷¹⁾ dienen. Umgekehrt reichen Unterschiede bei den Produktmerkmalen, den Preisen und dem Verwendungszweck für sich genommen möglicherweise nicht immer aus, um festzustellen, dass zwei Produkte unterschiedlichen sachlich relevanten Märkten angehören ⁽⁷²⁾. Dies liegt daran, dass solche Erwägungen möglicherweise nicht genau widerspiegeln, welchen Wert die Kunden den verschiedenen Produkteigenschaften beimessen und wie die Kunden auf Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen (z. B. Preiserhöhungen) reagieren würden.

⁽⁷⁰⁾ Was Anhaltspunkte in Bezug auf die Preisentwicklung im Laufe der Zeit betrifft, so können viele verschiedene Faktoren, die nichts mit Nachfragesubstitution zu tun haben, zu gleichgerichteten Preisbewegungen führen. Liegt jedoch keine gleichgerichtete oder eine abweichende Preisentwicklung vor, deutet dies in der Regel darauf hin, dass die Produkte wahrscheinlich keine Nachfragesubstitute sind. Daher sind Analysen gleichgerichteter Preisbewegungen (z. B. quantitative Techniken wie Preiskorrelations- oder Stationaritätsanalysen) grundsätzlich aussagekräftiger, wenn sie darauf hindeuten, dass zwei Produkte nicht demselben Markt angehören.

⁽⁷¹⁾ Die Kommission hat in der Vergangenheit beispielsweise für bestimmte Lebensmittel trotz desselben Verwendungszwecks (menschliche Ernährung) getrennte Märkte abgegrenzt. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7220 – Chiquita Brands International/Fyffes (Erwägungsgründe 29-34), in der die Kommission den Markt für Bananen als einen von anderem frischem Obst getrennten sachlich relevanten Markt abgrenzte.

⁽⁷²⁾ Siehe beispielsweise die Sache AT.38477 – British Airways/SN Brussels (Erwägungsgründe 18-21 und 23), in der die verfügbaren Anhaltspunkte trotz der Unterschiede bei den Produktmerkmalen von Schienen- und Luftverkehrsdiensten auf der Strecke Brüssel-London auf einen intermodalen Wettbewerb hindeuteten, weshalb die Kommission zu der Schlussfolgerung gelangte, dass der relevante Markt über die direkten Luftverkehrsdienste hinausging und auch Schienenverkehrsdienste umfasste.

50. Die Kommission prüft daher die Gründe, aus denen Kunden ein Produkt durch ein anderes ersetzen bzw. nicht ersetzen würden, um die wichtigsten Parameter für die Entscheidungen der Kunden zu ermitteln. Wie unter Randnummer 15 dargelegt, können die Entscheidungen der Kunden nicht nur durch den Preis, sondern durch viele weitere Parameter wie das Innovationsniveau des Produkts oder verschiedene Qualitätsaspekte bestimmt werden. Beispielsweise können die Kunden berücksichtigen, ob ein Produkt mit mehr oder weniger nachhaltigen Technologien hergestellt wird ⁽⁷³⁾. Unterschiede zwischen Vertriebskanälen (z. B. online und offline) ⁽⁷⁴⁾ oder der Rechtsrahmen ⁽⁷⁵⁾ können ebenfalls zum Tragen kommen. Darüber hinaus können die Entscheidungen der Kunden durch Verhaltensmuster beeinflusst werden, wie z. B. die Tendenz, die angebotene Standardoption zu wählen. Die Ermittlung der Parameter, die für die Entscheidung der Kunden die größte Bedeutung haben, ermöglicht es der Kommission, die Produkte anhand dieser Parameter zu vergleichen und dadurch Erkenntnisse für die Beurteilung des Grads ihrer Substituierbarkeit zu gewinnen.

3.2.1.2. Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere Substitution

51. In bestimmten Fällen kann es Anhaltspunkte für eine Substitution zwischen verschiedenen Produkten geben, die durch in der Vergangenheit eingetretene Veränderungen, Ereignisse oder Schocks auf dem Markt bedingt ist. Solche Anhaltspunkte können insbesondere über eine Nachfragesubstitution Aufschluss geben, insbesondere wenn die Substitution auf eine exogene ⁽⁷⁶⁾ Veränderung der relativen Angebotsbedingungen des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) (z. B. einen unerwarteten Kostenschock) oder ein ähnliches Ereignis zurückzuführen ist. Auch die Einführung neuer Produkte kann aufschlussreich sein, wenn sich genau ermitteln lässt, bei welchen Produkten eine Absatzverschiebung in Richtung des neuen Produkts eingetreten ist ⁽⁷⁷⁾. Ebenso können Mengenänderungen, die auf den Marktaustritt eines Anbieters oder die (vorübergehende) Nichtverfügbarkeit bestimmter Produkte (z. B. aufgrund von Produktionsausfällen oder Störungen der Lieferketten) zurückzuführen sind, Aufschluss über Substitutionsmuster geben ⁽⁷⁸⁾. Die Reaktionen auf eine bedeutende Veränderung, wie etwa die vollständige Nichtverfügbarkeit eines Produkts oder die Einführung eines neuen Produkts, lassen jedoch nicht immer darauf schließen, wie die Kunden auf geringere Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen reagieren würden.
52. In einigen Fällen können Unternehmen auch im normalen Geschäftsverlauf relevante Informationen über Nachfragesubstitute sammeln. So verfügen sie möglicherweise über Daten über hinzugewonnene oder verlorene Kunden und wissen, welche Wettbewerber diese Kunden gewonnen oder verloren haben. Dagegen sind Hinweise darauf, dass sich Kunden aufgrund von Faktoren von einem Produkt abwenden, die nichts mit Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen zu tun haben (z. B. aufgrund einer Änderung der Präferenzen oder Verbrauchsmuster im Laufe der Zeit), weniger aussagekräftig für die Nachfragesubstitution ⁽⁷⁹⁾.

⁽⁷³⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10702 – KPS Capital Partners/Real Alloy Europe (Erwägungsgründe 59-61), in der die Kommission den Markt für das Recycling von Salzsäure unter Berücksichtigung der für die Produktion verwendeten Technologie, d. h. abfallfreie oder nicht abfallfreie Recycling-Technologie, beurteilte. Siehe auch die Sache M.10658 – Norsk Hydro/Alumetal (Erwägungsgründe 132-137), in der die Kommission prüfte, ob CO₂-arme fortgeschrittene Aluminiumgießereilegierungen einen sachlich relevanten Markt darstellen, der sich von dem der übrigen fortgeschrittenen Aluminiumgießereilegierungen unterscheidet, und schließlich die diesbezügliche Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes offenließ.

⁽⁷⁴⁾ Um festzustellen, ob Online- und Offline-Vertriebskanäle demselben sachlich relevanten Markt angehören (oder nicht), kann die Kommission prüfen, ob die Kunden der Auffassung sind, dass diese Kanäle unterschiedliche Merkmale aufweisen (z. B. in Bezug auf Preisniveau, Kundendienstqualität, Lieferzeiten und Logistikkosten, Öffnungszeiten, Notwendigkeit, das Produkt vor dem Kauf zu erleben) und Unterschiede bei den über diese beiden Kanäle angebotenen Produktpaletten bestehen. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8394 – Essilor/Luxottica (Erwägungsgründe 83-89 und 139), in der die Kommission prüfte, ob der Markt für den Augenoptik-Einzelhandel nach Online- und Offline-Handel unterteilt werden sollte.

⁽⁷⁵⁾ Beispielsweise könnten Apotheker aufgrund von Vorschriften verpflichtet sein, unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen anstelle des Originalpräparats automatisch ein billigeres Generikum abzugeben.

⁽⁷⁶⁾ Eine exogene Veränderung des Angebots oder ein exogener Angebotsschock sind auf unerwartete Ereignisse zurückzuführen, die sich nicht unmittelbar auf die Nachfrage auswirken.

⁽⁷⁷⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.5335 – Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Erwägungsgründe 96, 100 und 101), in der die Kommission prüfte, ob der Flughafen Antwerpen ein Substitut für den Flughafen Brüssel war. In diesem Zusammenhang berücksichtigte die Kommission den Einstieg von VLM Airlines auf der Strecke Antwerpen–Manchester, mit dem die Fluggesellschaft den Wettbewerb mit den Flügen von SN auf der Strecke Brüssel–Manchester aufnahm.

⁽⁷⁸⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.6576 – Munksjö/Ahlstrom (Erwägungsgrund 189), in der die Kommission bei der Beurteilung des sachlich relevanten Marktes für vorimprägniertes Papier berücksichtigte, dass ein Wettbewerber die Produktion von vorimprägniertem Papier eingestellt hatte, und prüfte, welche Wettbewerber dessen Kunden hinzugewonnen hatten.

⁽⁷⁹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.6576 – Munksjö/Ahlstrom (Erwägungsgrund 248), in der die Kommission feststellte, dass eine in der Möbelindustrie beobachtete Verschiebung von Standard-Dekorpapier hin zu vorimprägniertem Papier weitgehend auf strategische Investitionsentscheidungen eines weiter unten in der Wertschöpfungskette tätigen Großkunden zurückzuführen war und daher nicht durch kurzfristige Änderungen der relativen Preise für vorimprägniertes Papier bewirkt oder verstärkt wurde.

53. Liegen ausreichende Daten über eine frühere Substitution vor, können möglicherweise quantitative Messgrößen für die Substituierbarkeit verschiedener Produkte abgeleitet werden. So kann möglicherweise eine Umlenkungskennziffer (diversion ratio) für die in Betracht kommenden Substitute abgeleitet werden. Die Umlenkungskennziffer gibt an, wie groß der Anteil der verlorenen Absatzmenge des betreffenden Produkts ist, der aufgrund von Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen auf jedes in Betracht kommende Substitut umgelenkt wird. Ferner können möglicherweise die Preiselastizität und die Kreuzpreiselastizität⁽⁸⁰⁾ der Nachfrage nach einem Produkt mithilfe ökonometrischer Methoden geschätzt werden⁽⁸¹⁾ ⁽⁸²⁾. Derartige quantitative Anhaltspunkte müssen hinreichend belastbar sein.

3.2.1.3. Anhaltspunkte für eine hypothetische Substitution

54. Die Kommission kann sich auch auf Informationen darüber stützen, wie die Kunden wahrscheinlich auf hypothetische Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen reagieren würden („hypothetische Substitution“). Antworten, die Kunden und Wettbewerber auf Fragen zu einer solchen hypothetischen Substitution geben, und die Begründungen dieser Antworten können für die Ermittlung von Substituten aufschlussreich sein. In einigen Fällen können Anhaltspunkte für eine hypothetische Substitution auch aus Befragungen einer repräsentativen Kundenstichprobe stammen. Anhaltspunkte für eine hypothetische Substitution können die einzigen verfügbaren direkten (quantitativen) Belege für die Substitution der Nachfrage darstellen und für die Beurteilung aussagekräftig sein. Gleichwohl können Anhaltspunkte für eine hypothetische Substitution weniger zuverlässig sein als Anhaltspunkte für eine tatsächliche Substitution, beispielsweise weil eine hypothetische Nachfragesubstitution keine tatsächlichen Folgen für die Kunden hat oder andere Verhaltensmuster zum Tragen kommen. Insbesondere die Einschätzung von Marktteilnehmern bezüglich der Wahrscheinlichkeit oder der Größenordnung eines hypothetischen Wechsels zu einem alternativen Produkt ist möglicherweise nicht zuverlässig, umfassend oder genau genug, um der Kommission eine Schätzung der Elastizitäten der Nachfrage zu ermöglichen. Dies ist jedoch im konkreten Fall zu beurteilen und hängt von der Aussagekraft der verfügbaren Anhaltspunkte ab.
55. In Wirtschaftszweigen, die sich rasch verändern, insbesondere jenen, die durch schnelle technologische Fortschritte gekennzeichnet sind (etwa im digitalen Sektor), können neue oder neu entwickelter Produkte oder Verfahren sowie technologische oder regulatorische Veränderungen zu strukturellen Veränderungen des Marktes führen, die sich auf die bestehende Wettbewerbsdynamik und die allgemeinen Reaktionen auf die relativen Angebotsbedingungen auswirken. In solchen Fällen kann die Kommission die erwarteten Änderungen der Substitutionsmöglichkeiten, die sich aus der Veränderung der Wettbewerbsdynamik ergeben, unter den unter Randnummer 21 genannten Voraussetzungen berücksichtigen.

3.2.1.4. Anhaltspunkte für Wettbewerbsdruck auf der Grundlage der Einschätzungen von Branchenakteuren

56. Unternehmen beobachten den Wettbewerb in der Regel im Zuge ihrer normalen Geschäftstätigkeit. Der Wettbewerb kann auch von Branchenverbänden oder Experten beobachtet werden. Auch wenn solche Einschätzungen von Branchenakteuren zu den Marktgrenzen nicht unbedingt dem Begriff des relevanten Marktes im Sinne des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union entsprechen, können Informationen darüber, welche Unternehmen einander als (enge) Wettbewerber betrachten, sowie die Einschätzungen anderer Marktteilnehmer und Branchenexperten bezüglich des Wettbewerbsdrucks nützliche Informationen für die Beurteilung der Nachfragesubstitution liefern. Dies gilt insbesondere dann, wenn für die Schlussfolgerung, dass bestimmte Unternehmen (enge) Wettbewerber sind, Gründe angegeben werden, die den Kriterien der Kommission für die Marktabgrenzung entsprechen, d. h., dass sie damit begründet wird, dass Kunden die Produkte der Unternehmen als Substitute ansehen.

⁽⁸⁰⁾ Die Preiselastizität der Nachfrage nach einem Produkt A gibt an, wie sich die Änderung des Preises um 1 Prozent auf die Nachfrage nach A auswirkt (d. h. die erwartete prozentuale Änderung der nachgefragten Menge). Die Kreuzpreiselastizität zwischen den Produkten A und B gibt an, wie die Nachfrage nach Produkt A auf eine Änderung des Preises von Produkt B um 1 Prozent reagiert.

⁽⁸¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.5658 – Unilever/Sara Lee, in der die Kommission ökonometrische Schätzungen der aus Scanner-Daten abgeleiteten Nachfrageelastizitäten für einen SSNIP-Test verwendete, um festzustellen, ob Deodorants für Männer und nicht speziell für Männer bestimmte Deodorants demselben sachlich relevanten Markt angehören.

Die Kommission kann Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere Substitution nicht nur für die Marktabgrenzung, sondern auch für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Würdigung heranziehen, insbesondere um festzustellen, ob die beteiligten Unternehmen enge Wettbewerber sind, oder um eine quantitative Beurteilung der voraussichtlichen Auswirkungen durchzuführen. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8792 – T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL (Erwägungsgründe 704-720 und 798-823).

⁽⁸²⁾ Nachweise für Umlenkungsquoten oder (Kreuz-)Preiselastizitäten der Nachfrage können für die Ermittlung der Substitute, die für die Einbeziehung in den Kandidatenmarkt in Betracht kommen, und für die Anwendung des SSNIP-Tests relevant sein.

3.2.1.5. Hindernisse und Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Verlagerung der Nachfrage auf potenzielle Substitute

57. Es kann verschiedene Hindernisse für eine Substitution geben und sie kann mit verschiedenen Kosten verbunden sein. Diese Hindernisse und Kosten können unterschiedlichste Ursachen haben, z. B. vertragliche Verpflichtungen, Kosten der Suche nach alternativen Produkten, Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Qualität und der Reputation alternativer Produkte, Kosten des für die Nutzung anderer Produkte erforderlichen Lernprozesses oder Kosten der Anpassung eigener Produktionsprozesse, Markenbekanntheit, regulatorische Hindernisse oder andere Formen staatlicher Eingriffe, Netzwerkeffekte ⁽⁸³⁾, Kosten der Datenübertragbarkeit, Grad der Interoperabilität ⁽⁸⁴⁾ mit anderen Produkten oder andere Abhängigkeiten in Bezug auf Daten, Produktintegration oder Komplementaritäten bei der Nutzung.
58. Ein Wechsel kann auch dadurch behindert werden, dass Kunden nicht zwischen verschiedenen Vertriebskanälen wechseln können. So kann sich beispielsweise der Wettbewerbsdruck auf Anbieter von Kfz-Bauteilen für den Erstausrüstungsmarkt vom Wettbewerbsdruck auf Anbieter solcher Bauteile für den Ersatzteilmarkt unterscheiden, da die Abnehmer von Bauteilen für den Ersatzteilmarkt die Bauteile nicht zu den Konditionen erhalten können, die den Erstausrüstern geboten werden. Dies kann dazu führen, dass zwei getrennte sachlich relevante Märkte abgegrenzt werden.

3.2.1.6. Durchführung des SSNIP-Tests

59. In einigen Fällen kann der relevante Markt auch auf der Grundlage einer quantitativen Beurteilung abgegrenzt werden, durch die festgestellt wird, ob eine SSNIP für einen hypothetischen Monopolisten profitabel wäre ⁽⁸⁵⁾. Der SSNIP-Test kann z. B. im Rahmen einer „Critical-Loss-Analyse“ durchgeführt werden ⁽⁸⁶⁾. Bei einer solchen Analyse wird in der Regel der maximale Rückgang der Absatzmenge ermittelt, bei dem eine SSNIP für einen hypothetischen Monopolisten noch profitabel ist. Dann wird dieser kritische Absatzrückgang („critical loss“) mit einer Schätzung des erwarteten tatsächlichen Absatzrückgangs („actual loss“) infolge der SSNIP verglichen. Ist der kritische Absatzrückgang größer als der erwartete tatsächliche Absatzrückgang, wäre eine SSNIP profitabel, was darauf hindeutet, dass die Produkte auf dem Kandidatenmarkt einen sachlich relevanten Markt bilden. Im gegenteiligen Fall muss der Kandidatenmarkt möglicherweise erweitert werden. Die Einzelheiten der Analyse hängen von den konkreten Umständen des Einzelfalls ab. Bei einer Critical-Loss-Analyse berücksichtigt die Kommission auch, dass eine hohe prozentuale Gewinnspanne nicht nur einen geringen kritischen Absatzrückgang impliziert, sondern auch darauf hindeuten kann, dass die tatsächliche Nachfrageelastizität – und damit der tatsächliche Absatzrückgang – wahrscheinlich gering ist und umgekehrt ⁽⁸⁷⁾.

3.2.2. Anhaltspunkte für eine Angebotssubstitution

3.2.2.1. Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere Substitution

60. Bei der Beurteilung der Angebotssubstitution kann die Kommission Anhaltspunkte für das Bestehen von Überkapazitäten sowie die Fähigkeit und den Anreiz von Unternehmen, Produktion und Angebot kurzfristig umzustellen, berücksichtigen. Besonders aussagekräftig sind Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass bereits früher als Reaktion auf exogene Veränderungen der Angebots- oder der Nachfragebedingungen eine Umstellung der Produktion oder des Angebots auf die betreffenden Produkte erfolgt ist (z. B. Umstellung der Produktion auf andere Qualitäten oder Güteklassen im normalen Geschäftsverlauf). Ohne Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere Angebotssubstitution kann die Kommission es hingegen für weniger wahrscheinlich halten, dass sich eine solche Substitution genauso wirksam und unmittelbar auswirkt wie eine Nachfragesubstitution.⁷

⁽⁸³⁾ Netzwerkeffekte sind gegeben, wenn sich der Wert eines Produktes A aufgrund der Änderung der Zahl der Kunden dieses Produkts (in dieselbe oder die umgekehrte Richtung gehend) ändert.

⁽⁸⁴⁾ Dies wäre z. B. der Fall, wenn eine Gruppe von Produkten nicht in Kombination mit einem anderen Produkt funktioniert, sodass ein Wechsel zusätzliche Kosten für die Kunden nach sich zieht.

⁽⁸⁵⁾ Die Kommission wandte den SSNIP-Test beispielsweise in der Sache M.5658 – Unilever/Sara Lee (Erwägungsgründe 92-94 und Abschnitt 5.3 des technischen Anhangs) an.

⁽⁸⁶⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9076 – Novelis/Aleris (Anhang I Abschnitt 2.1.2). Die Kommission nahm auch in der Sache M.4734 – Ineos/Kerling (Erwägungsgründe 95-105) eine Critical-Loss-Analyse vor, stellte aber letztlich fest, dass die Ergebnisse nicht aussagekräftig waren.

⁽⁸⁷⁾ Wenn die beobachteten prozentualen Gewinnspannen hoch sind, führt der Mengenrückgang zu einem relativ hohen Gewinnverlust bei den entgangenen Mengen. Dies impliziert, dass ein geringer kritischer Rückgang der Menge eine Preiserhöhung durch den hypothetischen Monopolisten unprofitabel macht. Andererseits können beobachtete hohe Gewinnspannen bedeuten, dass auch der tatsächliche Rückgang relativ gering sein dürfte, da die Unternehmen andernfalls die Preise nicht auf das beobachtete Niveau angehoben hätten und eine Senkung der Preise als profitabel erachten würden.

3.2.2.2. Hindernisse und Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Umstellung des Angebots

61. Bei der Prüfung der Möglichkeit, den Markt auf der Grundlage einer Angebotssubstitution zu erweitern, berücksichtigt die Kommission mehrere Hindernisse und Kosten. So untersucht sie beispielsweise, ob Unternehmen zur Umstellung ihrer Produktion oder ihres Angebots spezifische Kapitalinvestitionen oder spezifische Investitionen in Produktionsprozesse, Aus- und Fortbildung, Humankapital, in die Etablierung von Marken(namen), den Zugang zu Daten, die Umrüstung oder andere Investitionen tätigen müssen. Informationen über rechtliche oder administrative Hindernisse wie die Erforderlichkeit bestimmter Lizenzen oder über strategische Hindernisse, die die Umstellung der Produktion oder des Angebots betreffen können, wie etwa vertragliche Bindungen oder Ausschließlichkeitsvereinbarungen, können ebenfalls relevant sein. Ferner prüft die Kommission die Anreize für Unternehmen und ihre Bereitschaft, ihre Produktion oder ihr Angebot umzustellen, einschließlich der Frage, ob eine solche Umstellung bei anderen Produkten einen Absatzrückgang zur Folge hätte. Wenn solche Hindernisse oder Kosten nicht unbedeutend sind, berücksichtigt die Kommission im Zuge der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung, wie unter Randnummer 37 erläutert, den (etwaigen) Wettbewerbsdruck, den diese Unternehmen ausüben, anstatt den relevanten Markt zu erweitern.

3.3. Anhaltspunkte für die Abgrenzung räumlich relevanter Märkte

62. Die Kommission ist in der Regel in der Lage, auf der Grundlage vorläufiger Informationen über das Kaufverhalten und die Präferenzen der Kunden der relevanten Produkte vorläufig zu beurteilen, ob es sich um einen lokalen, nationalen, regionalen, EWR-weiten⁽⁸⁸⁾, über den EWR hinausgehenden oder weltweiten Markt handelt. Anschließend prüft die Kommission, ob die Wettbewerbsbedingungen auf dem gesamten Kandidatenmarkt hinreichend homogen sind, um die Auswirkungen des Verhaltens oder des Zusammenschlusses beurteilen zu können, und ob sich der Kandidatenmarkt durch deutlich unterschiedliche Wettbewerbsbedingungen von anderen Gebieten unterscheidet.

3.3.1. Kategorien von Anhaltspunkten für die Abgrenzung räumlich relevanter Märkte

63. Die in diesem Abschnitt beschriebenen Kategorien von Anhaltspunkten können für die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes von Bedeutung sein.

3.3.1.1. Identität der verfügbaren Anbieter, Marktanteile und Preise

64. Wenn Kunden in verschiedenen geografischen Gebieten Zugang zu denselben tatsächlichen und potenziellen Anbietern haben und diese Anbieter in den verschiedenen Gebieten über ähnliche Marktanteile verfügen, ist dies in der Regel ein erster Hinweis darauf, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen hinreichend homogen sind, um diese Gebiete in denselben räumlich relevanten Markt einzubeziehen. Wenn sich die Marktanteile dieser Anbieter in den einzelnen geografischen Gebieten aber erheblich unterscheiden, deutet dies üblicherweise darauf hin, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in diesen Gebieten nicht hinreichend homogen sind.
65. Eine vorläufige Analyse der Preise und der Preisunterschiede kann ebenfalls nützliche Anhaltspunkte liefern. Homogene Wettbewerbsbedingungen in verschiedenen Gebieten dürften im Allgemeinen zu einem ähnlichen Preisniveau für dieselben Produkte führen. Eine solche Ähnlichkeit kann auch das Ergebnis einer funktionierenden Arbitrage zwischen verschiedenen Gebieten sein, d. h. des Prozesses, bei dem höhere Preise in einem Gebiet Arbitrageure veranlassen können, in dem Gebiet mit niedrigen Preisen zu kaufen und in dem Gebiet mit hohen Preisen weiterzuverkaufen, bis sich die Preise so weit angenähert haben, dass eine solche Arbitrage unprofitabel wird. Die Kommission kann auch prüfen, ob sich die Angebotsbedingungen je nach Standort der Kunden unterscheiden, da dies Auswirkungen darauf haben kann, ob der Markt anhand der Standorte der Anbieter abgegrenzt werden kann⁽⁸⁹⁾.

⁽⁸⁸⁾ Aus praktischen Gründen legt die Kommission bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung in der Regel die Arbeitshypothese zugrunde, dass Märkte, bei denen es starke Anzeichen dafür gibt, dass sie weiter als nationale, aber enger als weltweite Märkte abzugrenzen sind, EWR-weite Märkte sind.

⁽⁸⁹⁾ Siehe Randnummern 40-41. Siehe auch Randnummer 73.

66. Gleichwohl sind Analysen von Marktanteilen und Preisen für sich genommen für die Abgrenzung des räumlichen Marktes möglicherweise nicht entscheidend ⁽⁹⁰⁾. Daher untersucht die Kommission üblicherweise die Gründe für eine bestimmte Marktanteils- oder Preisstruktur und prüft auch andere Indikatoren.

3.3.1.2. Präferenzen und Kaufverhalten der Kunden

67. Unterschiede in Kultur, Sprache, Lebensstil, Demografie oder im sozioökonomischen Hintergrund können zu lokalen, nationalen oder regionalen Präferenzen für bestimmte Produkte oder Marken führen ⁽⁹¹⁾. Dies kann sich auf die Wettbewerbsposition verschiedener Unternehmen in verschiedenen Gebieten auswirken. Unterschiede bei den Kundenpräferenzen in den verschiedenen Gebieten dürften zu unterschiedlichem Kaufverhalten führen und somit ein erhebliches Potenzial haben, die Grenzen des räumlich relevanten Marktes zu bestimmen.
68. Insbesondere wenn die Gruppe von Produkten, die die Kunden als Substitute für die Produkte des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) ansehen, je nach geografischem Gebiet unterschiedlich ist, deutet dies im Allgemeinen stark darauf hin, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen nicht homogen genug sind, um davon auszugehen, dass die jeweiligen Gebiete demselben räumlichen Markt angehören.
69. Die Untersuchung der aktuellen geografischen Struktur des Kaufverhaltens der Kunden kann nützliche Hinweise auf Ähnlichkeiten oder Unterschiede der Kundenpräferenzen und Wettbewerbsbedingungen liefern. Wenn beispielsweise Kunden im gesamten EWR unabhängig von ihrem Standort zu ähnlichen Bedingungen Zugang zu denselben Anbietern haben (z. B. wenn sie von Unternehmen mit Sitz an einem beliebigen Ort im EWR zu ähnlichen Bedingungen kaufen oder wenn sie ihren Bedarf im Wege von Ausschreibungen decken, bei denen dieselbe Gruppe von Unternehmen zur Teilnahme aufgefordert wird und Angebote abgibt) wird der räumliche Markt wahrscheinlich EWR-weit ⁽⁹²⁾ sein, sofern andere Faktoren dieser Feststellung nicht widersprechen. Wenn Kunden in aller Welt unabhängig von ihrem Standort zu ähnlichen Bedingungen Zugang zu denselben Anbietern haben, z. B. wenn sie von Unternehmen mit Sitz an einem beliebigen Ort der Welt zu ähnlichen Bedingungen einkaufen, dürfte der räumlich relevante Markt weltweit sein ⁽⁹³⁾. Von einem weltweit abgegrenzten Markt können

⁽⁹⁰⁾ Ebenso sind quantitative Verfahren zur Bewertung gleichgerichteter Preisbewegungen wie Preiskorrelations- oder Stationaritätsanalysen für sich genommen für die Abgrenzung des räumlichen Marktes in der Regel nicht ausschlaggebend. Wie in Fußnote 70 dargelegt, können nicht nur eine funktionierende Arbitrage, sondern auch viele andere Faktoren zu gleichgerichteten Preisbewegungen führen. Daher könnten gleichgerichtete Preisbewegungen fälschlicherweise darauf hindeuten, dass zwei Gebiete demselben räumlich relevanten Markt angehören, obwohl die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in diesen Gebieten nicht hinreichend homogen sind. Allerdings deutet das Fehlen eines Gleichlaufs der Preise in der Regel darauf hin, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen nicht hinreichend homogen sind. Die Analyse gleichgerichteter Preisbewegungen ist deshalb grundsätzlich aussagekräftiger, wenn sie darauf hindeutet, dass verschiedene Gebiete nicht demselben Markt angehören.

⁽⁹¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache AT.39740 – Google-Suche (Shopping) (Erwägungsgründe 253-254), in der die Kommission beispielsweise den Markt für allgemeine Suchdienste aufgrund von Sprachpräferenzen als national abgrenzte, obwohl diese Dienste für Nutzer in aller Welt zugänglich sind. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.7220 – Chiquita/Fyffes (Erwägungsgründe 119-131), in der die Kommission den Markt aufgrund von nationalen Präferenzen auf nationaler Ebene abgrenzte, obwohl sie einräumte, dass Bananen überwiegend von außerhalb des EWR ansässigen Unternehmen angeboten werden. Dies zeigt auch, dass die Präsenz eines einzigen Anbieters oder derselben Anbieter im EWR oder weltweit mit einer Abgrenzung der räumlich relevanten Märkte auf nationaler Ebene vereinbar sein kann.

⁽⁹²⁾ Beispiele dafür sind Abgrenzungen von Märkten für die Herstellung und Lieferung von Grundmetallerzeugnissen wie Aluminium oder Stahl. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9076 – Novelis/Aleris, in der die Untersuchung der Kommission bestätigte, dass bei den Kunden eine allgemeine Präferenz für den Bezug von Aluminiumkarosserieblechen aus dem EWR festzustellen war, sodass der räumlich relevante Markt als EWR-weiter Markt abgegrenzt wurde. Aus ähnlichen Gründen wurde in der Sache M.6471 – Outokumpu/Inoxum (Erwägungsgründe 241-243 und 244-260), der räumlich relevante Markt für kaltgewalzten Edelstahl und weißes Warmband nicht weiter als der EWR gefasst. Auch für feuerfeste Produkte wurde neben anderen Faktoren aufgrund der starken allgemeinen Präferenz der Kunden für den Bezug von Anbietern mit Sitz im EWR ein EWR-weiter Markt abgegrenzt (siehe Sache M.8286 – RHI/Magnesita Refratarios, Erwägungsgründe 55, 56, 57 und 61).

⁽⁹³⁾ Beispielsweise auf den Märkten für Produkte für die zivile Luft- und Raumfahrt beziehen Kunden Originalausrüstung für Luftfahrzeuge sowie Luft- und Raumfahrtsysteme und -komponenten weltweit von denselben Anbietern. Die Kommission stellte daher fest, dass der räumlich relevante Markt für diese Produkte weltweit abzugrenzen ist. Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.8658 – UTC/Rockwell Collins (Erwägungsgründe 204, 205 und 207), M.8425 – Safran/Zodiac Aerospace (Erwägungsgrund 298), M.8948 – Spirit/Asco (Erwägungsgründe 37 und 38).

auch bestimmte Gebiete aufgrund hoher Zutrittsschranken oder anderer Hindernisse für die globale Beschaffung seitens der Kunden ausgeschlossen werden ⁽⁹⁴⁾. In solchen Fällen und in Fällen, in denen die räumlich relevanten Märkte anhand des Kundenstandorts abgegrenzt werden, werden alle Importe aus den ausgeschlossenen Gebieten in den abgegrenzten räumlich relevanten Markt in die Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen ⁽⁹⁵⁾, und im Rahmen der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung sollte analysiert werden, inwieweit diese Importe auf dem relevanten Markt Wettbewerbsdruck auf das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen ausüben können.

3.3.1.3. Hindernisse und Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Belieferung von Kunden in verschiedenen Gebieten

70. Die Kommission prüft, ob Anbieter willens und in der Lage sind, ihre Produkte auf dem gesamten Kandidatenmarkt zu wettbewerbsfähigen Bedingungen anzubieten, oder ob es Hindernisse oder Kosten gibt, aufgrund deren es für einen Anbieter unmöglich oder unattraktiv ist, Kunden in Gebieten, die aktuell nicht zu seinen Liefergebieten zählen, zu wettbewerbsfähigen Bedingungen zu beliefern. Im Rahmen dieser Prüfung wird untersucht, ob die Anbieter aufgrund von Kundenpräferenzen eine lokale Präsenz oder einen Zugang zu einem Vertriebsnetz oder zu relevanten Vertriebskanälen benötigen, um ihre Produkte auf dem gesamten Kandidatenmarkt zu verkaufen. Dies umfasst auch eine Untersuchung des Rechtsrahmens, d. h. aller Arten von Hindernissen, die durch staatliche Maßnahmen entstehen und sich auf Anbieter aus anderen Gebieten auswirken können. Solche Hindernisse können Vorschriften für die Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge, staatliche Subventionen, Preisregulierung, Kontingente und Zölle, die den Handel oder die Produktion beschränken, technische Normen, sprachliche Anforderungen, gesetzliche Monopole, Beschränkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit, Anforderungen hinsichtlich behördlicher Genehmigungen (z. B. Lizenzen und Genehmigungen) oder andere sektorspezifische Vorschriften umfassen. Sie können das Ausmaß, in dem Anbieter in einem bestimmten Gebiet dem Wettbewerbsdruck von nicht in diesem Gebiet ansässigen Anbietern ausgesetzt sind, wirksam begrenzen und somit zu unterschiedlichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen führen. Dieselben Hindernisse können Kunden auch daran hindern, Produkte bei Anbietern in anderen Gebieten zu kaufen.
71. Umgekehrt kann der Rechtsrahmen, insbesondere die Harmonisierung der Rechtsvorschriften, z. B. auf Ebene der Union oder weltweit, Handelshemmnisse verringern und darauf hindeuten, dass räumliche Märkte weiter sind oder in Zukunft sein dürften. Die Kommission berücksichtigt bei der Abgrenzung räumlich relevanter Märkte den Prozess der Marktintegration. Wenn rechtliche Hindernisse beseitigt werden, beurteilt die Kommission einschlägige Anhaltspunkte für strukturelle Veränderungen des Marktes, z. B. in Bezug auf Preise, Marktanteile oder Handelsstrukturen.

3.3.1.4. Entfernungsabhängige Faktoren, Transportkosten und Einzugsgebiete

72. Auf einigen Märkten kann die Wettbewerbsposition der Anbieter von der Entfernung zwischen den einzelnen Anbietern und dem Kunden abhängen. So können beispielsweise die Transportkosten einen erheblichen Teil der Kosten für bestimmte Produkte ausmachen, was dazu führen kann, dass in größerer Entfernung vom Kunden ansässige Anbieter einen erheblichen Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber näher gelegenen Anbietern haben. Andere Faktoren wie Erwägungen bezüglich der Versorgungssicherheit, Nachhaltigkeit ⁽⁹⁶⁾, Verderblichkeit von Produkten oder Zugänglichkeit können ähnliche Auswirkungen haben. Darüber hinaus kann auf Verbrauchermärkten die Entfernung zum Anbieter oder die Zeit, die benötigt wird, um zu ihm zu gelangen, eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Dies ist in der Regel beispielsweise bei Flughäfen, Supermärkten oder Tankstellen der Fall.
73. In solchen Situationen dürften die Märkte in dem Sinne in räumlicher Hinsicht differenziert sein, dass sich die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in Abhängigkeit von der Entfernung zwischen den jeweiligen Anbietern und dem Kunden verändern ⁽⁹⁷⁾. Die Kommission kann dann den räumlichen Markt auf der Grundlage von Einzugsgebieten abgrenzen. Je nach den Besonderheiten des Falles und abhängig davon, ob die Anbieter ihre

⁽⁹⁴⁾ Somit kann die Kommission einen weltweiten Markt abgrenzen und davon nur bestimmte Gebiete mit unterschiedlichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen ausschließen, wie sie es in der in Fußnote 67 beschriebenen Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgründe 162-191) getan hat. Auch in der Sache M.8677 – Siemens/Alstom (Erwägungsgrund 133) stellte die Kommission fest, dass der räumlich relevante Markt sowohl für Hochgeschwindigkeitszüge als auch für Höchstgeschwindigkeitszüge ein weltweiter Markt ohne China, Südkorea und Japan sein könnte, da es in diesen drei Ländern unüberwindbare Zutrittsschranken für ausländische Anbieter gab. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata (Erwägungsgründe 43, 44 und 45), in der die Kommission potenzielle räumlich relevante Märkte beurteilte, die als weltweite Märkte ohne China abgegrenzt wurden, weil die Ausfuhren aus China begrenzt waren, Branchenanalysten Zahlen für China und die übrige Welt getrennt meldeten und eine Reihe von Marktteilnehmern eine solche geografische Unterteilung befürwortete.

⁽⁹⁵⁾ Siehe Randnummer 109.

⁽⁹⁶⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10047 – Schwarz Group/Suez Waste management companies (Erwägungsgründe 56-58), in der die Kommission die Umweltkosten als einen der relevanten Faktoren für die Abgrenzung des räumlichen Marktes für die Sortierung von Leichtverpackungen betrachtete.

⁽⁹⁷⁾ Siehe auch Abschnitt 4.1 zur Marktabgrenzung bei erheblicher Differenzierung.

Produkte je nach Standort oder geografischem Gebiet des Kundenstandorts zu unterschiedlichen Bedingungen anbieten, können Einzugsgebiete ausgehend von den Kunden oder den Anbietern abgegrenzt werden. Ohne eine solche Diskriminierung berücksichtigt die Kommission häufig Einzugsgebiete, die anhand der Anbieterstandorte abgegrenzt werden. Dagegen ist es auf Märkten mit kundenspezifischen Preisen in der Regel vorzuziehen, die Wettbewerbsbedingungen an verschiedenen Kundenstandorten zu beurteilen und Einzugsgebiete ausgehend von den Kundenstandorten abzugrenzen ⁽⁹⁸⁾. Ist dies nicht möglich, z. B. weil die Kunden zahlreich und ihre Standorte verstreut sind oder weil keine Informationen über den Standort der Kunden von Wettbewerbern zur Verfügung stehen, kann die Kommission Einzugsgebiete von Anbieterstandorten abgrenzen.

74. Einzugsgebiete werden in der Regel entweder anhand der Fahrtfernung oder der Fahrzeit der Kunden (in diesem Fall werden sie als Isochronen bezeichnet) oder anhand der Lieferentfernung oder der Lieferzeit ab einem Standort als Gebiete abgegrenzt, in denen ein bestimmter Anteil des Absatzes erzielt wird. Die Kommission stützt sich in der Regel auf Einzugsgebiete, die für das Kaufverhalten der meisten Kunden repräsentativ sind ⁽⁹⁹⁾. Dies lässt sich aus der tatsächlichen Verteilung der Entfernungen oder Zeiten für Lieferungen oder Fahrten ableiten und/oder auf der Grundlage der Einschätzungen der Marktteilnehmer feststellen. Die Kommission legt deshalb in der Regel Gebiete, auf die 80 % des Absatzes oder der Kunden entfallen, als Einzugsgebiete zugrunde ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. Je nach marktspezifischen Erwägungen kann sich die Kommission auch auf alternative Spannen stützen. Die Kommission hat räumliche Märkte mitunter bereits auf der Grundlage von Einzugsgebieten abgegrenzt, auf die 70 % und/oder 90 % des Absatzes entfallen ⁽¹⁰¹⁾.

3.3.1.5. Handelsströme und Lieferstruktur

75. Eine Analyse der Struktur und der Entwicklung von Liefer- und Handelsströmen sowie der Triebkräfte dieser Ströme kann Anhaltspunkte dafür liefern, ob Hindernisse bestehen. Die Reaktion solcher Ströme auf Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen kann auch einen Hinweis darauf geben, wie stark der Wettbewerbsdruck ist, den Anbieter, die außerhalb des räumlichen Kandidatenmarktes ansässig sind, auf das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen ausüben. In einigen Fällen kann es möglich sein, diesen Druck zu quantifizieren, z. B. durch eine ökonometrische Schätzung der Importelastizitäten oder durch Ereignisstudien, die zeigen, wie Importe auf Preisänderungen reagieren ⁽¹⁰²⁾. Die bloße Existenz von Handelsströmen oder ihre Reaktion auf Veränderungen der relativen Angebotsbedingungen bedeutet jedoch nicht zwangsläufig, dass die Wettbewerbsbedingungen in dem Gebiet, von dem die Handelsströme ausgehen, und die Bedingungen auf dem in Betracht gezogenen räumlichen Markt hinreichend homogen sind, um eine Erweiterung des räumlich relevanten Marktes zu rechtfertigen. Ist dies nicht der Fall, berücksichtigt die Kommission bei ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung (auch in Bezug auf Marktanteile und eine mögliche künftige Expansion) den von Importeuren auf das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen ausgeübten (etwaigen) Wettbewerbsdruck, anstatt den räumlich relevanten Markt zu erweitern (siehe auch Randnummer 43).

3.4. Erhebung und Auswertung von Nachweisen

76. Die Kommission stützt sich bei der Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte auf verschiedene Informationsquellen und Arten von Nachweisen. Sie kann dafür sowohl qualitative als auch quantitative Informationen heranziehen. Bestimmte Arten von Nachweisen können in einem Fall entscheidend sein, in anderen Fällen, die einen anderen Wirtschaftszweig, ein anderes Produkt oder andere Umstände betreffen, jedoch nur von begrenzter Bedeutung oder unerheblich sein. In den meisten Fällen, insbesondere in Fällen, in denen eine eingehende Prüfung

⁽⁹⁸⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7408 – Cargill/ADM Chocolate Business (Erwägungsgründe 99-102 und 113-114), in der die Kommission aggregierte Anteile am Markt für Industrieschokolade ausgehend von Einzugsgebieten analysierte, die anhand der einzelnen Kunden abgegrenzt wurden. Siehe z. B. auch die Sache M.7567 – Ball/Rexam (Erwägungsgründe 642-644 und 663-670), in der die Kommission in Bezug auf den Markt für Getränkedosen die Kapazitäts- und Verkaufsmengenanteile für jedes der ausgehend von den Kunden abgegrenzten Einzugsgebiete beurteilt hat.

⁽⁹⁹⁾ Die Heranziehung von Einzugsgebieten, die das Kaufverhalten aller Kunden widerspiegeln, würde aufgrund von Ausreißern häufig zu unplausibel großen Einzugsgebieten führen.

⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.7408 – Cargill/ADM Chocolate Business (Erwägungsgründe 63-78) in Bezug auf den Markt für Industrieschokolade und M.7567 – Ball/Rexam (Erwägungsgrund 248) in Bezug auf den Markt für Getränkedosen.

⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7878 – Heidelberg Cement/Schwenk/Cemex Hungary/Cemex Croatia (Erwägungsgründe 182, 189 und 190), in der die Kommission feststellte, dass kreisförmige Einzugsgebiete der Werke der beteiligten Unternehmen, auf die 90 % der Lieferungen entfielen, sinnvoller waren als Einzugsgebiete, auf die 70 % der Lieferungen entfielen; sie berücksichtigte aber auch abgewandelte Einzugsgebiete, die auf Straßenentfernungen und Lieferstrukturen basierten. In jedem Fall kann die Kommission im Rahmen ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung auch die Sensibilität der Marktanteile gegenüber der Abgrenzung des Einzugsgebiets prüfen.

⁽¹⁰²⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata (Erwägungsgründe 141-148), in der die Kommission die Reaktion der Importe auf Änderungen des relativen Preises für Zinkmetall im EWR beurteilte.

erforderlich ist, berücksichtigt die Kommission bei ihren Beschlüssen eine Reihe von Faktoren (siehe Abschnitte 3.2 und 3.3) und verschiedene Quellen. Die Kommission ist empirischen Nachweisen gegenüber offen, um alle verfügbaren Informationen zu nutzen, die im konkreten Fall von Bedeutung sein können, und nimmt auf der Grundlage dieser Nachweise eine umfassende Beurteilung vor ⁽¹⁰³⁾. Sie folgt keiner starren Rangordnung für die verschiedenen Informationsquellen und Nachweisarten ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾.

77. Die von der Kommission zur Abgrenzung der Märkte herangezogenen Nachweise sollten belastbar sein ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾. Dies dürfte z. B. der Fall sein, wenn die Nachweise von Behörden stammen oder durch verschiedene Quellen gestützt werden, unter anderem durch Marktteilnehmer mit widerstreitenden Interessen wie Anbieter und ihre direkten Kunden. Ferner zieht die Kommission möglichst Nachweise mit geringem zeitlichem Abstand zum untersuchten Zeitraum heran; dies gilt insbesondere für die Beurteilung von Märkten in Wirtschaftszweigen, die im Wandel begriffen sind. Erfordert der Fall eine vorausschauende Beurteilung und beruht die Marktabgrenzung auf Veränderungen der Wettbewerbsdynamik im untersuchten Zeitraum, so müssen solche Veränderungen durch belastbare Nachweise untermauert werden, die mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit belegen, dass die erwarteten Veränderungen tatsächlich eintreten werden. Bei der Durchführung solcher vorausschauenden Beurteilungen können einige Arten von Nachweisen oder Informationsquellen weniger belastbar oder gar nicht verfügbar sein. So sind beispielsweise bei der Beurteilung neuer Produkte, die sich in der Entwicklung befinden, möglicherweise keine Nachweise für eine frühere Substitution verfügbar. Im Gegensatz dazu können im normalen Geschäftsverlauf erstellte interne Unterlagen von Marktteilnehmern oder unabhängige Branchenberichte, die robuste Prognosen enthalten, für die Zwecke einer vorausschauenden Beurteilung von besonderer Bedeutung sein.
78. Nachweise haben eine größere Beweiskraft, wenn festgestellt werden kann, dass sie nicht durch die Untersuchung der Kommission beeinflusst werden konnten, z. B. Nachweise aus der Zeit vor den Gesprächen über einen Zusammenschluss oder ein Verhalten und vor der Untersuchung der Kommission. Bei widersprüchlichen Nachweisen prüft die Kommission erforderlichenfalls die relevanten Aussagen oder Daten z. B. anhand unabhängiger und belastbarer Quellen, sofern diese verfügbar sind. Stehen keine unabhängigen und zuverlässigen Quellen zur Verfügung, so beurteilt die Kommission, welche Nachweise einen höheren Beweiswert haben. Dabei berücksichtigt sie die Informationsquellen sowie den Kontext, in dem die Informationen generiert oder der Kommission zur Verfügung gestellt wurden (d. h., wie und wann das geschehen ist).
79. Die Kommission stützt sich gegebenenfalls nicht nur auf die Vorbringen des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s), sondern erhebt Nachweise, indem sie schriftliche Auskunftsverlangen an die Marktteilnehmer, einschließlich der beteiligten Unternehmen, richtet oder sie befragt. In diesem Zusammenhang tritt die Kommission hauptsächlich an die wichtigsten Wettbewerber und Kunden in der Branche heran, um empirische Nachweise und Einschätzungen bezüglich der Grenzen der sachlich und räumlich relevanten Märkte zu erhalten. Auskunftsverlangen können zu Geldbußen führen, wenn die Antworten irreführend oder unrichtig sind, was dazu beiträgt, dass korrekte Informationen zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Die Kommission kann auch einschlägige Handels- oder Kundenverbände, auf vorgelagerten oder verbundenen Märkten tätige Unternehmen und andere wichtige Interessenträger wie lokale, nationale oder internationale Behörden und Stellen oder Nichtregierungsorganisationen kontaktieren.

⁽¹⁰³⁾ In seinem Urteil vom 6. Juli 2010, *Ryanair/Kommission*, T-342/07, ECLI:EU:T:2010:280, Rn. 136, erklärte das Gericht: „Es ist Sache der Kommission, das Ergebnis des zur Beurteilung der Wettbewerbssituation herangezogenen Indizienbündels insgesamt zu bewerten. Dabei kann es sein, dass bestimmte Umstände privilegiert und andere außer Acht gelassen werden.“ Dasselbe gilt mutatis mutandis für die Marktabgrenzung.

⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ In seinem Urteil vom 11. Januar 2017, *Topps Europe/Kommission*, T-699/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:2, Rn. 82, führte das Gericht aus, die Kommission müsse bei der Marktabgrenzung keiner starren Rangordnung für die verschiedenen Informationsquellen und Arten von Nachweisen folgen. Dies wurde im Urteil des Gerichts vom 22. Juni 2022, *thyssenkrupp/Kommission*, T-584/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:386, Rn. 78 und 156, bestätigt.

⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Was den Beweiswert der verschiedenen Nachweise anbelangt, ist das alleinige Kriterium für die Beurteilung der beigebrachten Nachweise ihre Glaubhaftigkeit (siehe z. B. Urteil des Gerichts vom 13. September 2013, *Total Raffinage Marketing/Kommission*, T-566/08, ECLI:EU:T:2013:423, Rn. 43). Auch die Art des jeweiligen Verfahrens spielt eine Rolle. Insbesondere in Bezug auf die Fusionskontrolle wird in der Rechtsprechung der EU-Gerichte festgestellt, dass die Kommission angesichts des Beschleunigungsgebots und der strengen Fristen, die sie einhalten muss, nicht verpflichtet sein kann, alle bei ihr eingehenden Informationen zu überprüfen, sofern keine Indizien für die Unrichtigkeit der mitgeteilten Informationen vorliegen. Siehe Urteil des Gerichts vom 20. Oktober 2021, *Polskie Linie Lotnicze „LOT“/Kommission*, T-240/18, ECLI:EU:T:2021:723, Rn. 87 und 88, und die darin zitierte Rechtsprechung.

80. Zur Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes kann die Kommission auch interne Unterlagen von relevanten Marktteilnehmern anfordern, insbesondere von dem/den beteiligten Unternehmen. Interne Unterlagen sind besonders relevant, wenn sie – im Gegensatz zu Unterlagen, die im Hinblick auf die Untersuchung oder während der Untersuchung der Kommission erstellt wurden – im normalen Geschäftsverlauf erstellt wurden, da sie möglicherweise besser zeigen, wie die jeweiligen Unternehmen den Markt sehen. Dazu können auch Marketingstudien zählen, die Unternehmen in der Vergangenheit als Grundlage für Entscheidungen über die Preisgestaltung für ihre Produkte oder über Marketingmaßnahmen u. ä. in Auftrag gegeben haben. Befragungen der Kunden zu ihrem Nutzungsverhalten und ihren Einstellungen, Daten über das Kaufverhalten der Kunden, Einschätzungen der Anbieter und Marktforschungsstudien, die von dem/den beteiligten Unternehmen und seinen/ihren Wettbewerbern vorgelegt wurden, können berücksichtigt werden, um festzustellen, ob ein wirtschaftlich signifikanter Teil der Kunden zwei Produkte als substituierbar ansieht. Nachweise dafür, dass ein Unternehmen das Verhalten bestimmter Wettbewerber beobachtet, oder strategische Unterlagen, auf die das Unternehmen Geschäftsentscheidungen stützt (z. B. Geschäftspläne oder Bewertungen von Stärken, Schwächen, Chancen oder Risiken), können ebenfalls Hinweise auf die Stärke des von verschiedenen konkurrierenden Unternehmen ausgeübten Wettbewerbsdrucks geben⁽¹⁰⁶⁾. Bei der Beurteilung der Relevanz der einzelnen Unterlagen sollte deren Kontext berücksichtigt werden. Dazu gehören das Datum der Unterlagen, die Identität der Verfasser und der potenziellen Adressaten (z. B. Funktion, Fachwissen und/oder Seniorität) und der Zweck der Unterlagen.
81. In einigen Fällen können Ad-hoc-Erhebungen, die zum Zweck der Untersuchung anhand einer repräsentativen Auswahl von Kunden oder Anbietern durchgeführt werden, nützliche Informationen über den relevanten Markt liefern⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. Nach Maßgabe des Sachverhalts und der verfügbaren Nachweise aus anderen Quellen und unter Berücksichtigung administrativer Zwänge (z. B. des Zeitrahmens der Untersuchung) kann die Kommission beschließen, in einem konkreten Fall eine Erhebung durchzuführen oder in Auftrag zu geben. Erhebungen müssen sorgfältig konzipiert werden, um zu gewährleisten, dass die Befragten aussagekräftige Antworten geben⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.
82. Die Kommission kann sich auch auf öffentliche Informationen, Markt- oder Branchenberichte, Berichte von Finanzanalysten sowie Marktstatistiken oder Wirtschaftsstudien stützen, einschließlich solcher, die von externen Beratern erstellt wurden⁽¹⁰⁹⁾. In Fällen, in denen regulierte Märkte betroffen sind, z. B. in den Bereichen Telekommunikation, Energie oder Gesundheitsversorgung, kann die Kommission auch Daten und Einschätzungen der für den jeweiligen Bereich zuständigen Regulierungsbehörden einholen.
83. Wenn angebracht, kann die Kommission auch bei beteiligten Unternehmen, deren Kunden oder deren Wettbewerbern informelle Besuche oder offizielle Nachprüfungen vor Ort durchführen, um bessere Erkenntnisse über die Herstellung oder Lieferung von Produkten zu gewinnen.

4. MARKTABGRENZUNG UNTER BESONDEREN UMSTÄNDEN

84. In diesem Abschnitt wird auf gewisse Aspekte der Marktabgrenzung eingegangen, die bei bestimmten Industrie- oder Wirtschaftszweigen oder bestimmten Arten von Märkten zum Tragen kommen. Sofern in diesem Abschnitt nichts anderes bestimmt ist, gelten die in dieser Bekanntmachung dargelegten allgemeinen Grundsätze für die Abgrenzung des sachlich und räumlich relevanten Marktes auch für die in diesem Abschnitt genannten Industrie- oder Wirtschaftszweige oder Arten von Märkten.

⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7902 – Marriott International/Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide (Erwägungsgrund 28), in der die Kommission ihre Schlussfolgerung, dass Kettenhotels und unabhängige Hotels auf demselben Markt tätig waren, darauf stützte, dass sich die beteiligten Unternehmen mit beiden Arten von Hotels verglichen. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.6663 – Ryanair/Aer Lingus III (Erwägungsgründe 98-103), in der die Kommission die Preisbeobachtung, die Ryanair und Aer Lingus für Passagierflugstrecken vornahm, bei der Beurteilung der Frage, ob verschiedene Flughäfen in denselben Städten Substitute waren, als Nachweis heranzog.

⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.4439 – Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Erwägungsgründe 36 und 94, Erwägungsgrund 99 Nummer 9 und Anhang I), in der sich die Kommission auf eine Kundenbefragung am Flughafen Dublin stützte, die sie bei einem unabhängigen Berater in Auftrag gegeben hatte. Die Kommission zog die Ergebnisse dieser Umfrage als indirekte Nachweise heran, um zu beurteilen, ob bestimmte Flughäfen für Kunden substituierbar sind.

⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ So ist es beispielsweise grundsätzlich vorzuziehen, nach in jüngerer Zeit getroffenen Entscheidungen anstatt nach hypothetischen Entscheidungen zu fragen. Die Fragen sollten klar sein und die Antworten nicht in eine bestimmte Richtung lenken. Außerdem sollten genügend Antwortmöglichkeiten angeboten werden.

⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Die Quelle und der Kontext, in dem solche Studien erstellt werden, sind ebenfalls relevant. Insbesondere Studien, die im Zusammenhang mit einem bestimmten Fall erstellt wurden, werden besonders genau geprüft, da Nachweise weniger Beweiskraft haben, wenn sie durch die Untersuchung der Kommission beeinflusst wurden.

4.1. Marktabgrenzung bei erheblicher Differenzierung

85. Produkte können erheblich differenziert sein, sodass bestimmte Produkte engere Substitute als andere sind. Die Differenzierung kann auf Produkt- oder geografischer Ebene erfolgen. Produktdifferenzierung liegt vor, wenn Produkteigenschaften wie Design, Markenimage, technische Spezifikationen, Haltbarkeit, Serviceniveau oder andere spezifische Merkmale für die Wahl des Kunden ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ von Bedeutung sind ⁽¹¹¹⁾. Geografische Differenzierung liegt vor, wenn der Standort des jeweiligen Kunden und der des Anbieters die Wahl des Kunden beeinflussen ⁽¹¹²⁾.
86. Werden für die Marktabgrenzung die den Kunden tatsächlich zur Verfügung stehenden Substitute analysiert, kann dies dazu führen, dass die Kommission innerhalb eines Kontinuums differenzierter Produkte getrennte relevante Märkte ermittelt. In anderen Fällen wiederum ist es möglich, dass die Kommission einen relativ weit gefassten relevanten Markt abgrenzt, der differenzierte Produkte einschließt ⁽¹¹³⁾.

⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Siehe z. B. das Urteil vom 18. Mai 2022, Wieland-Werke/Kommission, T-251/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:296 bezüglich des Marktes für Walzprodukte aus Kupfer und Kupferlegierungen, in dem das Gericht unter Randnummer 39 feststellte, dass der Kläger nicht bestreitet, dass es sich bei Walzzeugnissen nicht um homogene Produkte handelt, sondern um Produkte, die nach einer Vielzahl von Kriterien (Zusammensetzung, Grad der Veredelung, Endanwendungen usw.) differenziert sind. Jedes dieser Kriterien ermögliche eine Segmentierung des Gesamtmarktes für Walzzeugnisse, doch keines von ihnen sei von vornherein von übergeordneter Bedeutung oder rechtfertige die Abgrenzung eines separaten sachlich relevanten Marktes.

⁽¹¹¹⁾ Zum Beispiel in der Telekommunikationsbranche, in der unterschiedliche Arten von Kunden unterschiedliche Verbrauchsgewohnheiten haben können, die sich auf ihre Wahl des Anbieters auswirken. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8792 – T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL, in der sich die Kommission auf eine weit gefasste Marktabgrenzung mit Produktdifferenzierung nach Kundengruppen aufgrund von Unterschieden bei den monatlichen Ausgaben, dem Vertragsabschluss und der Vertragsdauer, der Vertragsausführung und den Bedürfnissen der Kunden stützte. In diesem speziellen Fall kam die Kommission zu dem Schluss, dass zwar ein Gesamtmarkt für die Erbringung von Mobilfunkdiensten für alle Endkunden besteht, der jedoch zwei getrennte Kundengruppen umfasst: Privat- und Geschäftskunden.

⁽¹¹²⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7155 – SSAB/Rautaruukki (Erwägungsgrund 102), in der die Kommission die Auffassung vertrat, dass die starke geografische Differenzierung bei Flachstahlerzeugnissen, die sich durch eine Analyse der unterschiedlichen Preise zwischen den nordischen Ländern, dem europäischen Festland und dem Vereinigten Königreich nachweisen ließ, eine Prüfung der Auswirkungen des Zusammenschlusses in den nordischen Länder rechtfertigte. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.7878 – Heidelberg Cement/Schwenk/Cemex Hungary/Cemex Croatia (Erwägungsgründe 174-176 und 229-239), in der die Kommission erläuterte, dass sich selbst in einem räumlich relevanten Markt, der als ein Gebiet abgegrenzt ist, in dem die Wettbewerbsbedingungen hinreichend homogen sind, die Wettbewerbsbedingungen schrittweise von einem Standort zum anderen ändern können und dass solche Unterschiede bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt werden müssen. Dieser Ansatz wurde durch Urteil des Gerichts vom 5. Oktober 2020, HeidelbergCement und Schwenk Zement/Kommission, T-380/17, ECLI:EU:T:2020:471, Rn. 325, bestätigt. Siehe auch z. B. die Sachen M.8444 – ArcelorMittal/Ilva und M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV, in denen der räumlich relevante Markt für fertige Flacherzeugnisse aus Karbonstahl als EWR-weiter Markt angesehen wurde und innerhalb des EWR räumlich differenziert wurde (was in der letztgenannten Sache durch das Urteil des Gerichts vom 22. Juni 2022, thyssenkrupp/Kommission, T-584/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:386, Rn. 145-258 bestätigt wurde).

⁽¹¹³⁾ In solchen Fällen kann die Kommission bei ihrer Beurteilung die Wettbewerbsdynamik in bestimmten Marktsegmenten berücksichtigen. Siehe das Urteil vom 18. Mai 2022, Wieland-Werke/Kommission, T-251/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:296 bezüglich des Marktes für Walzprodukte aus Kupfer und Kupferlegierungen, in dem das Gericht unter Randnummer 40 erläuterte, dass darüber hinaus im Kontext differenzierter Produktmärkte zu berücksichtigen sei, dass das Bestehen eines Gesamtmarktes nicht die Möglichkeit beeinträchtigt, in einigen Marktsegmenten eine unterschiedliche Wettbewerbsdynamik festzustellen.

87. In bestimmten Fällen kann das Vorhandensein von Substitutionsketten ⁽¹¹⁴⁾ zur Folge haben, dass die Kommission relevante Märkte abgrenzt, auf denen die Produkte oder geografischen Gebiete in den Randzonen des Marktes nicht direkt substituierbar sind ⁽¹¹⁵⁾. In früheren Fällen hat die Kommission jedoch aufgrund ihrer Analyse des Sachverhalts im Allgemeinen eine solche weiter gefasste Marktdefinition abgelehnt ⁽¹¹⁶⁾.

4.2. Marktabgrenzung bei Diskriminierung von Kunden oder Kundengruppen

88. Eine Diskriminierung von Kunden oder Kundengruppen liegt vor, wenn verschiedenen Kunden oder Kundengruppen ein und dasselbe Produkt aus Gründen, die nicht mit den Kosten zusammenhängen, zu unterschiedlichen Bedingungen (z. B. unterschiedliche Preise oder Qualitätsniveaus) angeboten wird ⁽¹¹⁷⁾. Dies kann dazu führen, dass eine gesonderte Gruppe von Kunden des betreffenden Produkts einen enger gefassten, eigenständigen Markt bildet. Dies ist typischerweise dann der Fall, wenn drei Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind ⁽¹¹⁸⁾:

- a) Zum Zeitpunkt des Verkaufs des betreffenden Produkts ist eindeutig feststellbar, welcher Gruppe der jeweilige Kunde angehört,
- b) Handel zwischen Kunden oder Arbitrage durch Dritte ist unwahrscheinlich, und
- c) die Diskriminierung von Kunden oder Kundengruppen ist nicht vorübergehender Natur.

89. Im Falle einer Diskriminierung von Kunden oder Kundengruppen können sich die Wettbewerbsbedingungen bei verschiedenen Kundengruppen so unterscheiden, dass das betreffende Verhalten oder der betreffende Zusammenschluss unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf verschiedene Kundengruppen haben kann. Dies kann die Abgrenzung separater relevanter Märkte für jeden Kunden oder jede Kundengruppe rechtfertigen ⁽¹¹⁹⁾. Eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Standorts der Kunden kann auch ein Grund für die Abgrenzung des räumlich relevanten Marktes gemäß dem jeweiligen Standort sein ⁽¹²⁰⁾.

4.3. Marktabgrenzung bei signifikanter Forschung und Entwicklung

90. Innovation ist oft ein Schlüsselparameter für den Wettbewerb. Die Kommission berücksichtigt die Besonderheiten hochinnovativer Wirtschaftszweige, die durch häufige und signifikante Forschung und Entwicklung („FuE“) gekennzeichnet sind. Diese Besonderheiten, die in jedem Wirtschaftszweig vorhanden sein können, werden in der Regel in der Phase der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung berücksichtigt, können aber auch für die Marktabgrenzung relevant sein. Da das Ergebnis der Innovationsanstrengungen in Bezug auf Endprodukte ungewiss sein kann, kann die Kommission bei ihrer Beurteilung verschiedene potenzielle Ergebnisse von FuE-Prozessen berücksichtigen.

⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Zum Beispiel kann, auch wenn die Kunden von Produkt A das Produkt C möglicherweise nicht als eine Alternative betrachten, eine Substitutionskette vorliegen, wenn die Kunden von Produkt A das Produkt B und die Kunden von Produkt B das Produkt C als Substitut ansehen. Produkt A kann dann über eine solche Substitutionskette unter von Produkt C ausgehendem indirektem Wettbewerbsdruck stehen.

⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9413 – Lactalis/Nuova Castelli (Erwägungsgrund 89), in der die Kommission feststellte, dass es Anhaltspunkte für das Vorliegen einer Substitutionskette zwischen Markenkäse und Käse von Eigenmarken und für einen Wettbewerb zwischen diesen Produkten gab, obwohl sie nicht ausschließen konnte, dass Markenprodukte in erster Linie auf einem anderen Markt miteinander konkurrieren, und die Marktabgrenzung offenließ.

⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.5335 – Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Erwägungsgrund 33), in der die Kommission die Existenz einer Substitutionskette zwischen verschiedenen Tickettypen zurückwies, da dies nicht durch Nachweise bestätigt wurde. Die Preisanalyse der Kommission zeigte, dass die Preise an den gegenüberliegenden Enden der geltend gemachten Substitutionskette sehr unterschiedlich waren und nicht voneinander abhingen. Siehe auch z. B. die Sache M.6905 – Ineos/Solvay/JV (Erwägungsgründe 260, 261, 262 und 338), in der die Kommission das Vorliegen von Überschneidungen zwischen den Liefergebieten der wichtigsten S-PVC-Anbieter und somit die Existenz einer Substitutionskette im gesamten EWR zurückwies; dabei stützte sie sich auf eine quantitative Analyse, die einen Mangel an Arbitrage und unterschiedliche Preistrends zwischen den verschiedenen sich überschneidenden Einzugsgebieten aufzeigte.

⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Dieser Abschnitt betrifft Situationen, in denen Unternehmen Kunden oder Kundengruppen auf der Grundlage beobachtbarer Kundenkriterien (z. B. Identität, Standort, Alter, Geschlecht der Kunden) diskriminieren können. Wenn Unternehmen allen Kunden die gleichen Wahlmöglichkeiten bieten und die Kunden aufgrund ihrer durch ihre Präferenzen bestimmten Auswahl verschiedenen Gruppen zuzuordnen sind, kann die Kommission für verschiedene zur Wahl stehende Produkte getrennte sachlich relevante Märkte (oder verschiedene Marktsegmente) abgrenzen (z. B. Business- und Economy-Flugtickets oder Prepaid- und Postpaid-Handytarife).

⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Dies kann auch dann der Fall sein, wenn diese Voraussetzungen erst in Zukunft erfüllt sein werden, z. B. weil sich die Wettbewerbsbedingungen durch den geprüften Zusammenschluss ändern.

⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Sind die Wettbewerbsbedingungen und die wahrscheinlichen Auswirkungen auf diese Kunden oder Kundengruppen ähnlich (z. B. aufgrund einer Angebotssubstitution), so kann die Kommission diese Kunden oder Kundengruppen dennoch in denselben relevanten Markt einbeziehen (siehe Abschnitt 2.1.2).

⁽¹²⁰⁾ Beispiele für Abgrenzungen sachlich und räumlich relevanter Märkte, die von Preisdiskriminierung betroffen sind, finden sich in den Sachen M.5830 – Olympic/Aegean Airlines (Erwägungsgrund 58) und M.7155 – SSAB/Rautaruukki (Erwägungsgründe 101 und 102).

91. Ein gutes Beispiel für Fälle, in denen die Kommission diese Besonderheiten bei der Marktabgrenzung berücksichtigen kann, sind sogenannte Pipeline-Produkte. Auch wenn diese Produkte den Kunden noch nicht zur Verfügung stehen, ist an ihrem FuE-Prozess möglicherweise hinreichend absehbar, durch welche anderen Produkte das Pipeline-Produkt wahrscheinlich substituierbar ist, wenn die Entwicklung des Pipeline-Produkts erfolgreich abgeschlossen ist und das Produkt auf den Markt gebracht wird. Die Kommission kann zu dem Schluss gelangen, dass ein solches Pipeline-Produkt Teil eines bestehenden sachlich relevanten Marktes ⁽¹²¹⁾ ist oder einem neuen sachlich relevanten Markt angehört, der sich auf das Pipeline-Produkt und seine Substitute beschränkt ⁽¹²²⁾. Der vorgesehene Verwendungszweck des Pipeline-Produkts und seine voraussichtliche Substituierbarkeit durch andere Produkte spielen bei der Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes eine besondere Rolle. Die geografische Dimension eines relevanten Marktes, der Pipeline-Produkte enthält, muss möglicherweise die geografische Dimension der zugrunde liegenden FuE-Anstrengungen widerspiegeln. Er könnte daher weiter gefasst sein als der räumlich relevante Markt für vermarktete Produkte ⁽¹²³⁾.
92. In einigen Fällen hingegen sind FuE-Prozesse (noch) nicht unbedingt eng mit einem bestimmten Produkt ⁽¹²⁴⁾ verknüpft, sondern erfolgen in frühen Forschungsstadien, die verschiedenen Zwecken dienen und längerfristig in verschiedene Produkte einfließen können. Auch wenn der Umstand, dass solche frühzeitigen Innovationsanstrengungen nicht unmittelbar zu handelbaren Produkten führen, es schwieriger machen kann, einen sachlich relevanten Markt im engeren Sinne abzugrenzen, kann es zur Beurteilung der Frage, ob ein Zusammenschluss oder ein Verhalten zu geringerem Innovationswettbewerb führen könnte, dennoch angezeigt sein, eine Abgrenzung festzulegen, innerhalb derer Unternehmen bei ihren frühen Innovationsanstrengungen miteinander im Wettbewerb stehen ⁽¹²⁵⁾. Bei einer solchen Beurteilung können Faktoren wie die Art und der Umfang der Innovationsanstrengungen, die Ziele der verschiedenen Forschungsansätze, die Spezialisierung der einzelnen beteiligten Teams oder die Ergebnisse früherer Innovationsanstrengungen des Unternehmens relevant sein, um die Abgrenzung vornehmen zu können, innerhalb derer der Innovationswettbewerb stattfindet. Bei dieser Abgrenzung sollten die geografischen Gebiete, in denen Forschung und Entwicklung betrieben wird, neben etwaigen anderen geografischen Besonderheiten berücksichtigt werden ⁽¹²⁶⁾.
93. Die allgemeinen Faktoren für die Abgrenzung des sachlich und räumlich relevanten Marktes gemäß Abschnitt 3 können bei Vorliegen signifikanter FuE-Tätigkeiten für die Abgrenzung von Märkten relevant sein, je nachdem, inwieweit diese Faktoren sichtbar sind. In diesem Zusammenhang kann zwischen FuE-Prozessen, die eng mit einem bestimmten Produkt oder Pipeline-Produkt verknüpft sind, und frühen Innovationsanstrengungen, bei denen dies nicht der Fall ist, ein Kontinuum bestehen. Dies kann insbesondere in der Phase der Fall sein, in der FuE-Prozesse zielgerichteter werden, aber noch immer zu multiplen und alternativen potenziellen Ergebnissen

⁽¹²¹⁾ Insbesondere zusammen mit Produkten mit demselben Verwendungszweck. Einschlägige Beispiele solcher Beurteilungen sind in der pharmazeutischen Industrie zu finden. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7275 – Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business (Erwägungsgründe 23-31), in der die Kommission bei ihrer Beurteilung der Auffassung war, dass die bei den beteiligten Unternehmen in der Entwicklung befindlichen BRAF- und MEK-Hemmer dem Markt für gezielte Therapien zur Behandlung fortgeschrittener Melanome angehörten, auf dem bereits bestehende Produkte vermarktet wurden. Weitere Beispiele betreffen High-Tech-Produkte wie Hochleistungsgasturbinen, die Gegenstand der Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgründe 985-991) waren, in der die Kommission die Hochleistungsgasturbine aus der Produktpipeline von Alstom als Teil des bestehenden Produktmarkts für Hochleistungsgasturbinen ansah.

⁽¹²²⁾ Insbesondere in Fällen, in denen verschiedene Unternehmen dieselben oder vergleichbare Pipeline-Produkte entwickeln oder diese Produkte die Dynamik der Branche aufgrund ihrer Merkmale erheblich verändern dürften. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9461 – AbbVie/Allergan (Erwägungsgründe 48-54 und 56-60), in der die Kommission einen plausiblen Markt ermittelte, der sich auf IL-23-Hemmer für die Behandlung von Colitis ulcerosa und Morbus Crohn beschränkte, weil diese Produkte, die sich damals noch in der Entwicklung befanden, selbst wenn sie noch von keinem Unternehmen vermarktet wurden, als sehr vielversprechend galten.

⁽¹²³⁾ Insbesondere in der pharmazeutischen Industrie ist die Kommission in früheren Fällen davon ausgegangen, dass der räumliche Umfang des Marktes weltweit oder zumindest EWR-weit ist, wenn die Forschung und Entwicklung für die relevanten Pipeline-Produkte mindestens EWR-weit erfolgt. Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.7275 – Novartis/GSK Oncology Business (Erwägungsgrund 32) und M.7480 – Actavis/Allergan (Erwägungsgrund 17).

⁽¹²⁴⁾ Wie in Fußnote 9 angemerkt, umfasst der Begriff „Produkt“ auch Technologien. Dieser Abschnitt ist auch für die Abgrenzung von Märkten, auf denen solche Technologien zum Einsatz kommen, von besonderer Bedeutung. Technologien können unabhängig von materiellen Gütern oder Dienstleistungen als Rechte des geistigen Eigentums lizenziert oder verkauft werden und können somit für die Zwecke dieser Bekanntmachung als Produkte angesehen werden.

⁽¹²⁵⁾ Ein Beispiel dafür ist die anhand von „Innovationsbereichen“ vorgenommene Abgrenzung in der Sache M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (siehe insbesondere Abschnitt 4.4 des Beschlusses in dieser Sache). Die Sache M.7932 – Dow/DuPont betraf einen Zusammenschluss von zwei im Bereich des Pflanzenschutzes tätigen Unternehmen, die auf Branchenebene über die Vermögenswerte und Fähigkeiten verfügten, um neue Produkte zu entdecken und zu entwickeln, die aufgrund der FuE-Anstrengungen auf den Markt gebracht werden können. Somit waren diese Unternehmen am Innovationswettbewerb beteiligt.

⁽¹²⁶⁾ Siehe Sache M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (Erwägungsgründe 353 ff.). Innovationsanstrengungen sind in der Regel globaler Natur, und in Ermangelung offensichtlicher nationaler oder anderer geografischer Besonderheiten sind die räumlich relevanten Märkte oft weltweit oder in keinem Fall enger gefasst als der EWR.

führen können, die noch nicht präzise genug sind, um als spezifische Pipeline-Produkte mit einem bestimmten Verwendungszweck und endgültigen Merkmalen angesehen werden zu können. In diesem Fall kann der Ansatz der Kommission bei der Marktabgrenzung – je nachdem, an welcher Stelle des Kontinuums der betreffende FuE-Prozess angesiedelt ist – näher am Ansatz für Pipeline-Produkte oder am Ansatz für frühzeitige Innovationsanstrengungen liegen.

4.4. Marktabgrenzung bei mehrseitigen Plattformen

94. Mehrseitige Plattformen ermöglichen Interaktionen zwischen verschiedenen Nutzergruppen und führen zu einer Situation, in der die Nachfrage einer Nutzergruppe die Nachfrage der anderen Nutzergruppen beeinflusst ⁽¹²⁷⁾. So kann sich die Reaktion einer Gruppe auf eine Änderung der Angebotsbedingungen auch auf andere Gruppen auswirken, was zu Rückkopplungsschleifen zwischen den verschiedenen Seiten der Plattform, d. h. zu indirekten Netzwerkeffekten, führt ⁽¹²⁸⁾. Plattformen internalisieren diese indirekten Netzwerkeffekte zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen in der Regel, wenn sie ihre Angebotsbedingungen festlegen.
95. Im Falle von mehrseitigen Plattformen kann die Kommission einen sachlich relevanten Markt für sämtliche von einer Plattform angebotenen Produkte abgrenzen, der alle (oder mehrere) Nutzergruppen ⁽¹²⁹⁾ umfasst, oder sie kann für die auf jeder Seite der Plattform angebotenen Produkte getrennte (wenn auch miteinander verbundene) sachlich relevante Märkte abgrenzen ⁽¹³⁰⁾. Nach Maßgabe des Sachverhalts kann es zweckmäßiger sein, getrennte Märkte abzugrenzen, wenn auf den verschiedenen Seiten der Plattform erhebliche Unterschiede bei den Substitutionsmöglichkeiten bestehen. Um zu prüfen, ob solche Unterschiede bestehen, kann die Kommission verschiedene Faktoren berücksichtigen, z. B. die Frage, ob verschiedene Unternehmen substituierbare Produkte für jede Nutzergruppe anbieten, den Grad der Produktdifferenzierung auf jeder Seite (oder die diesbezügliche Wahrnehmung jeder Nutzergruppe), verhaltensbezogene Faktoren wie Homing-Entscheidungen ⁽¹³¹⁾ jeder Nutzergruppe und die Art der Plattform (z. B. ob es sich um eine Transaktions- oder um eine Matching-Plattform handelt). In beiden Fällen berücksichtigt die Kommission, soweit erforderlich, die indirekten Netzwerkeffekte zwischen Nutzergruppen auf verschiedenen Seiten der Plattform bei der Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte oder in ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung.
96. In der Praxis kann die Beurteilung der Nachfragesubstitution und insbesondere die Anwendung des SSNIP-Tests bei Vorliegen indirekter Netzwerkeffekte schwieriger sein als in Situationen, in denen keine solche Nachfrageinterdependenz zwischen Nutzergruppen besteht.
97. Mehrseitige Plattformen können einer Nutzergruppe ein Produkt zum monetären Nullpreis oder sogar zu einem negativen Preis anbieten, um Nutzer für auf den anderen Seiten der Plattform angebotene Produkte zu gewinnen und ihre Produkte auf diesen Seiten zu monetarisieren. Monetäre Nullpreise können integraler Bestandteil der Geschäftsstrategie mehrseitiger Plattformen sein. Die Bereitstellung eines Produkts zum Nullpreis bedeutet nicht, dass es für dieses Produkt keinen relevanten Markt gibt.

⁽¹²⁷⁾ Typische Beispiele für mehrseitige Plattformen sind Zahlungskartensysteme (siehe Sache AT.34579 – Mastercard) und werbefinanzierte Plattformen (siehe Sache M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn).

⁽¹²⁸⁾ So verringert beispielsweise ein Preisanstieg auf Seite A der Plattform die Nachfrage bei den Nutzern auf dieser Seite. Der Nachfragerückgang auf Seite A kann dann die Nachfrage bei den Nutzern auf Seite B beeinflussen, was wiederum die Nachfrage bei den Nutzern auf Seite A (oder auf einer dritten Seite C) beeinflussen kann. Siehe z. B. die Sachen AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) (Erwägungsgrund 159) und AT.40099 – Google Android (Erwägungsgründe 464, 469 und 638).

⁽¹²⁹⁾ In der Sache M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, Abschnitt 3.7, grenzte die Kommission einen einzigen Markt für Online-Rekrutierungsdienste ab, der sowohl Arbeitssuchende als auch Personalverantwortliche umfasst.

⁽¹³⁰⁾ In der Zahlungskartensysteme betreffenden Sache AT.34579 – Mastercard, Abschnitte 6.2.3 und 6.2.4, sah die Kommission das Issuing und das Acquiring als getrennte sachlich relevante Märkte an.

⁽¹³¹⁾ Nutzer können entscheiden, ob sie für ein bestimmtes Produkt eine Plattform (Single-Homing) oder mehrere Plattformen parallel nutzen (Multi-Homing). In einigen Fällen wirken sich Homing-Entscheidungen von Nutzern auf einer Seite der Plattform auf die verfügbaren Alternativen zur Interaktion mit diesen Nutzern durch Nutzer auf anderen Seiten der Plattform und somit auf die Substitutionsmöglichkeiten auf den anderen Seiten der Plattform aus.

98. In solchen Fällen sind nichtpreisliche Parameter für die Beurteilung der Substitution besonders relevant. Dann konzentriert sich die Kommission auf Faktoren wie Produktfunktionen⁽¹³²⁾, Verwendungszweck⁽¹³³⁾, Anhaltspunkte für eine frühere oder eine hypothetische Substitution⁽¹³⁴⁾, Kosten eines Wechsels oder Hindernisse für einen Wechsel, z. B. in Bezug auf die Interoperabilität mit anderen Produkten, Datenübertragbarkeit und Lizenzierungsaspekte⁽¹³⁵⁾. Die Kommission kann auch Alternativen zum SSNIP-Test in Betracht ziehen und beispielsweise die Wechselbereitschaft von Kunden des zum Nullpreis angebotenen Produkts als Reaktion auf eine geringfügige, aber signifikante und anhaltende Qualitätsminderung (small but significant non-transitory decrease of quality – SSNDQ) prüfen⁽¹³⁶⁾.

4.5. Marktabgrenzung bei Anschlussmärkten, gebündelten Produkten und digitalen Ökosystemen

99. In bestimmten Fällen führt der Verbrauch eines langlebigen Produkts (Primärprodukt) zum Verbrauch eines anderen verbundenen Produkts (Sekundärprodukt). Dies wird häufig als „Anschlussmarkt“ bezeichnet. In diesen Fällen berücksichtigt die Kommission bei der Abgrenzung der relevanten Märkte für die Primär- und Sekundärprodukte und/oder bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung auch den von den Marktbedingungen auf den jeweiligen verbundenen Märkten ausgehenden Wettbewerbsdruck.
100. Es gibt im Allgemeinen drei Möglichkeiten zur Abgrenzung der sachlich relevanten Märkte bei Primär- und Sekundärprodukten:
- a) als Systemmarkt, der sowohl das Primär- als auch das Sekundärprodukt umfasst⁽¹³⁷⁾,
 - b) als mehrere Märkte, d. h. einen Markt für das Primärprodukt und jeweils getrennte Märkte für die mit den einzelnen Marken des Primärprodukts verbundenen Sekundärprodukte⁽¹³⁸⁾,
 - c) als duale Märkte, d. h. den Markt für das Primärprodukt einerseits und den Markt für das Sekundärprodukt andererseits⁽¹³⁹⁾.
101. Die Abgrenzung eines Systemmarkts könnte (umso) angemessener sein,
- a) je größer die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist, dass die Kunden beim Kauf des Primärprodukts die Kosten seiner gesamten Lebensdauer berücksichtigen,
 - b) je höher die Ausgaben für das Sekundärprodukt bzw. die Sekundärprodukte (oder der Wert des Sekundärprodukts bzw. der Sekundärprodukte) im Vergleich zu den Ausgaben für das Primärprodukt (oder dem Wert des Primärprodukts) sind,
 - c) je höher der Grad der Substituierbarkeit zwischen Primärprodukten ist und je niedriger die Kosten eines Wechsels zwischen verschiedenen Primärprodukten sind,
 - d) wenn es keine oder nur wenige Anbieter gibt, die nur auf das Sekundärprodukt bzw. die Sekundärprodukte spezialisiert sind⁽¹⁴⁰⁾.
102. Ansonsten könnte es angemessener sein, duale Märkte oder mehrere Märkte abzugrenzen; dies hängt vor allem vom Grad der Substituierbarkeit der Sekundärprodukte der verschiedenen Anbieter ab. Wenn beispielsweise die Sekundärprodukte verschiedener Anbieter mit allen oder den meisten Primärprodukten kompatibel sind, kann die Abgrenzung dualer Märkte angemessener sein, während in Fällen, in denen die Kunden des Primärprodukts an die Verwendung einer nur begrenzten Anzahl von Sekundärprodukten gebunden sind, die Abgrenzung mehrerer Märkte angemessener sein kann.

⁽¹³²⁾ Siehe z. B. die Marktabgrenzung bei Kommunikationsdiensten für Endkunden und Diensten sozialer Netzwerke in der Sache M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp (Erwägungsgründe 24-33 und 51-61).

⁽¹³³⁾ Siehe z. B. die Marktabgrenzung bei allgemeinen Suchdiensten in der Sache AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) (Erwägungsgründe 163-183).

⁽¹³⁴⁾ Siehe z. B. die Marktabgrenzung bei Karrierenetzwerkdiensten in der Sache M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn (Erwägungsgründe 108-110).

⁽¹³⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache AT.40099 – Google Android und insbesondere die Marktabgrenzung bei Android-App-Stores (Erwägungsgründe 284-305) und bei lizenzpflichtigen Betriebssystemen für intelligente Mobilgeräte (Erwägungsgrund 239).

⁽¹³⁶⁾ Siehe Fußnote 54, in der ein Beispiel für einen solchen SSNDQ-Text angeführt ist.

⁽¹³⁷⁾ In der Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business), Abschnitt 7.2.3.3, grenzte die Kommission einen Markt für den Verkauf von Gasturbinen und die anschließende Wartung ab.

⁽¹³⁸⁾ In der Sache AT.39097 – Watch Repair (Erwägungsgründe 86-91) grenzte die Kommission mehrere getrennte Märkte für jeweils mit einer bestimmten Uhrenmarke verbundene Ersatzteile ab.

⁽¹³⁹⁾ In der Sache M.9408 – Assa Abloy/Agta Record (Erwägungsgrund 127) grenzte die Kommission einen einzigen Markt für Kundendienstleistungen ab, ohne nach den einzelnen Dienstleistungserbringern zu unterscheiden.

⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Siehe in diesem Zusammenhang das Urteil des Gerichts vom 15. Dezember 2010, CEAHR/Kommission, T-427/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:517, Rn. 78-109, insbesondere Rn. 79, 95 und 108, sowie die Wettbewerbsache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgrund 95).

103. In anderen Fällen, in denen der Verbrauch eines oder mehrerer Produkte nicht von einem Primärprodukt abhängig ist, können Kunden es dennoch vorziehen, mehrere Produkte gebündelt zu konsumieren. In solchen Fällen kann die Kommission prüfen, ob es einen sachlich relevanten Markt für die gebündelten Produkte gibt, der sich von den Märkten für die einzelnen Produkte unterscheidet, und zu diesem Zweck die Substituierbarkeit zwischen dem Bündel und den einzelnen Produkten untersuchen (z. B. indem sie prüft, ob die Kunden im Falle einer Verschlechterung der Angebotsbedingungen des Bündels die einzelnen Produkte getrennt beziehen würden) ⁽¹⁴¹⁾.
104. Bei (digitalen) Ökosystemen kann unter bestimmten Umständen davon ausgegangen werden, dass sie ein primäres Kernprodukt und mehrere (digitale) Sekundärprodukte umfassen, deren Verwendung – z. B. aus technologischen Gründen oder Gründen der Interoperabilität – mit dem Kernprodukt verbunden ist ⁽¹⁴²⁾. Bei der Prüfung (digitaler) Ökosysteme kann die Kommission daher ähnliche Grundsätze wie bei Anschlussmärkten anwenden, um den sachlich relevanten Markt bzw. die sachlich relevanten Märkte abzugrenzen ⁽¹⁴³⁾. Wenn die (digitalen) Sekundärprodukte gebündelt angeboten werden, kann die Kommission auch prüfen, ob die gebündelten Produkte einen eigenen relevanten Markt bilden. Obwohl eine von einem Anschlussmarkt oder gebündelten Produkten ausgehende Marktabgrenzung nicht auf alle (digitalen) Ökosysteme anwendbar ist, berücksichtigt die Kommission gegebenenfalls Faktoren wie Netzwerkeffekte, Wechselkosten (einschließlich Faktoren, die zu einer Kundenbindung führen können) und (Einzel- oder Multi-)Homing-Entscheidungen bei der Abgrenzung des sachlich relevanten Marktes bzw. der sachlich relevanten Märkte.

5. MARKTANTEILE

105. Die Marktabgrenzung ermöglicht es der Kommission, die auf einem relevanten Markt tätigen Anbieter und Kunden zu ermitteln. Anschließend kann sie die Gesamtgröße des Marktes und den Marktanteil jedes Anbieters in der Regel auf der Grundlage der Verkäufe (und bei Kunden der Käufe) der relevanten Produkte in dem relevanten geografischen Gebiet berechnen.
106. Die Marktanteile spiegeln die relative Stellung der Anbieter auf dem Markt wider und können somit bei der Beurteilung der Marktmacht äußerst nützlich sein. Die Marktanteile sind jedoch nicht der einzige Indikator für die Marktstärke eines Unternehmens ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾. Andere Faktoren wie Schranken für den Marktzutritt oder die Expansion, einschließlich der aus Skalen- oder Netzwerkeffekten resultierenden Schranken, der Zugang zu bestimmten Vermögenswerten und Vorleistungen sowie die Produktdifferenzierung und der Grad der Substituierbarkeit können je nach den Gegebenheiten des Falles ebenfalls relevant sein. Dies wird in verschiedenen Leitlinien der Kommission zur materiellen Würdigung in Wettbewerbssachen näher erläutert ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾.
107. Die Kommission stützt sich in der Regel auf Marktanteile, die anhand der Verkäufe auf dem Handelsmarkt bestimmt werden ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾. Bei Einkaufsmärkten hingegen stützt sie sich in der Regel auf anhand der Einkäufe (auf dem Handelsmarkt) ermittelte Marktanteile. Im Allgemeinen liefern sowohl der Wert als auch die Menge der Ein- oder Verkäufe nützliche Informationen.

⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.5462 – Thomas Cook Group/Gold Metal International (Erwägungsgründe 9-16), in der die Kommission die Frage offenließ, ob Pauschalreisen und Urlaubsreisen, bei denen der Verbraucher die verschiedenen Reisebausteine einzeln kauft, getrennte Märkte bilden. Auch in der Sache M.7555 – Staples/Office Depot (Erwägungsgrund 91) kam die Kommission zu dem Schluss, dass es aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach einen separaten sachlich relevanten Markt für Verträge über die Lieferung der herkömmlichen Bürobedarfgruppen (Schreibwaren, Papier sowie Tinte und Toner) aus einer Hand (one-stop-shop supply) gab.

⁽¹⁴²⁾ In seinem Urteil vom 14. September 2022, Google und Alphabet/Kommission, T-604/18, ECLI:EU:T:2022:541, führte das Gericht unter Randnummer 116 Folgendes aus: „... in einem digitalen ‚Ökosystem‘ ... [können] Produkte oder Dienstleistungen, die zu den relevanten, dieses Ökosystem bildenden Märkten gehören, ineinandergreifen oder aufgrund ihrer horizontalen oder vertikalen Komplementarität miteinander verbunden sein. Zusammengekommen können diese relevanten Märkte in Anbetracht des Systems, das ihre Komponenten zusammenbringt, und des möglichen Wettbewerbsdrucks, der innerhalb dieses Systems besteht oder von anderen Systemen ausgeht, auch eine globale Dimension haben.“ Ein Beispiel für ein digitales Ökosystem wäre ein Ökosystem, das sich aus Produkten für ein mobiles Betriebssystem, einschließlich Hardware, App-Store und Software-Anwendungen, zusammensetzt.

⁽¹⁴³⁾ Siehe die Sache AT.40099 – Google Android (Erwägungsgrund 299) zur Abgrenzung des Marktes für App-Stores, in der die Kommission zu dem Schluss kam, dass die Voraussetzungen für die Abgrenzung eines Systemmarkts, der App-Stores und Betriebssysteme für intelligente Mobilgeräte umfasst, nicht gegeben waren.

⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Siehe z. B. Urteile des Gerichts vom 9. Juli 2007, Sun Chemical Group u. a./Kommission, T-282/06, ECLI:EU:T:2007:203, Rn. 140, und vom 6. Juli 2010, Ryanair/Kommission, T-342/07, ECLI:EU:T:2010:280, Rn. 42.

⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Leitlinien zur Bewertung horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse, Abschnitte III und IV. Siehe auch die Leitlinien für die Beurteilung von Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit, z. B. Nummer 236.

⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Der Begriff „Verkäufe auf dem Handelsmarkt“ bezieht sich auf Verkäufe an Dritte im Gegensatz zu gruppeninternen Verkäufen.

108. Zusätzlich zu den Ein- oder Verkäufen auf dem Handelsmarkt können je nach Produkt oder Branche auch andere Parameter ergänzende oder nützlichere Informationen für die Bestimmung der Marktanteile bieten. Hierzu gehören unter anderem: die Kapazität oder die Produktion ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ (insbesondere bei Märkten, bei denen die Kapazität von strategischer Bedeutung ist) ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾, die Zahl der Anbieter (insbesondere auf Märkten mit offiziellen Ausschreibungen oder bei innovativen Produkte in der Entwicklungsphase), die Zahl der vergebenen Aufträge ⁽¹⁴⁹⁾, Nutzungsdaten wie die Zahl der (aktiven) Nutzer ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾, die Zahl der Website-Besuche ⁽¹⁵¹⁾ oder Streams, die verbrachte Zeit oder Zuschauerzahlen ⁽¹⁵²⁾, die Zahl der Downloads ⁽¹⁵³⁾ und Aktualisierungen, die Zahl der Interaktionen ⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ oder das Volumen oder der Wert der über eine Plattform abgewickelten Transaktionen (insbesondere wenn der Zugang zu den Produkten überwiegend zu einem monetären Nullpreis gewährt wird, wie dies auf digitalen Märkten oder allgemein bei mehrseitigen Plattformen der Fall sein kann), Flotteneinheiten, Sitzplatzkapazität, Zahl der Flüge oder Zugangsrechte wie Zeiträumen auf bestimmten Flughäfen (z. B. auf den Verkehrsmärkten) ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ oder Reserven (z. B. im Bergbausektor) ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾. Auf Märkten, die durch häufige und signifikante FuE-Investitionen gekennzeichnet sind, können die Höhe der FuE-Ausgaben oder die Zahl der Patente oder Patentzitate als relevante Messgrößen für die Beurteilung der relativen Wettbewerbsposition von Unternehmen herangezogen werden ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾. Die von den Marktteilnehmern im Rahmen ihrer allgemeinen Geschäftstätigkeit intern verwendeten Parameter erweisen sich in der Regel als besonders relevant.
109. Wenn die Märkte anhand der Kundenstandorte abgegrenzt werden, werden alle Verkäufe an Kunden im räumlich relevanten Markt in die Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen. Dementsprechend werden die Verkäufe von Anbietern aus anderen Gebieten an Kunden im räumlich relevanten Markt (d. h. Importe in den relevanten Markt) bei der Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen, während Verkäufe von Anbietern mit Standort im relevanten Markt an Kunden in anderen Gebieten (d. h. Ausfuhren aus dem relevanten Markt) nicht berücksichtigt werden ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾. Dagegen werden bei der Abgrenzung der Märkte anhand der Anbieterstandorte alle Verkäufe der Anbieter im relevanten Markt in die Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen, unabhängig vom Standort des Kunden ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾. Verkäufe von Anbietern außerhalb des räumlich relevanten Marktes werden bei der Berechnung der Marktanteile in diesem Fall nicht berücksichtigt.
110. Wenn die Produkte erheblich differenziert sind (wie in Abschnitt 4.1 erläutert), können die Marktanteile einen weniger zuverlässigen Indikator für Marktmacht liefern, und die Kommission prüft im Rahmen ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung im Allgemeinen auch, ob die beteiligten Unternehmen und andere Anbieter in engem Wettbewerb stehen. Obwohl die Marktabgrenzung nach wie vor ein wichtiger Schritt ist, könnte eine Analyse der

⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Die Kapazitäts- oder Produktionsanteile werden in der Regel anhand der Anbieter berechnet, die in dem vom räumlich relevanten Markt abgedeckten Gebiet ansässig sind.

⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8674 – BASF/Solvay's Polyamide Business (Erwägungsgrund 455 Buchstabe b) in Bezug auf die Nylonwerterschöpfungskette, die Sache M.7744 – HeidelbergCement/Italcementi (Erwägungsgrund 61) bezüglich eines Zusammenschlusses auf dem Grauzementmarkt und die Sache M.4000 – Inco/Falconbridge (Erwägungsgründe 315 ff.) bezüglich eines Zusammenschlusses auf dem Nickelmärkte. Siehe z. B. auch die Sache M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV (Erwägungsgründe 474 bis 481) und das Urteil des Gerichts vom 22. Juni 2022, thyssenkrupp/Kommission, T-584/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:386, Rn. 591.

⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ Siehe z. B. den Beschluss in der Sache M.8134 – Siemens/Gamesa (Erwägungsgründe 75-80), in dem erläutert wird, dass die Zahl der für Windkraftanlagen vergebenen Aufträge in diesem Fall aufgrund der zeitlichen Verzögerung zwischen der Auftragsvergabe und der Installation eine aussagekräftigere Messgröße war als die installierte Basis an Windkraftanlagen.

⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp (Erwägungsgründe 95-98).

⁽¹⁵¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) (Erwägungsgründe 273-284).

⁽¹⁵²⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9064 – Telia Company/Bonnier Broadcasting Holding in Bezug auf den Vorleistungsmarkt für frei empfangbare und Standard-Pay-TV-Kanäle, Fußnoten 315, 316, 324, 327, 333 und 339.

⁽¹⁵³⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache AT.40099 – Google Android (Erwägungsgründe 591-593).

⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10262 – Facebook/Kustomer (Erwägungsgründe 176-179) in Bezug auf den Markt für B2C-Kommunikationsdienste.

⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sachen M.4439 – Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Erwägungsgründe 340-347), M.8869 – Ryanair/LaudaMotion (Erwägungsgründe 303-306) und M.9287 – Connect Airways/Flybe (Erwägungsgründe 447-453).

⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.4000 – Inco/Falconbridge (Erwägungsgründe 490-494) und die Sache M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV (Erwägungsgründe 472-481).

⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (Anhang 1 des Beschlusses) und die Sache M.8084 – Bayer/Monsanto (Erwägungsgründe 1153 ff.).

⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Siehe ferner Randnummer 43.

⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ So werden beispielsweise in Fällen, in denen es um den Einzelhandelsvertrieb von Konsumgütern des täglichen Bedarfs geht, alle Verkäufe der relevanten Einzelhandelsgeschäfte mit Standort in den relevanten Märkten in die Berechnung der Marktanteile einbezogen. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.8468 – Norgesgruppen/Axfood/Eurocash (Erwägungsgründe 32 ff.).

wettbewerblichen Nähe zwischen den einzelnen Anbietern bei der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung differenzierter Märkte relevanter sein als die Beurteilung der Marktanteile ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾. Zu diesem Zweck kann sich die Kommission gegebenenfalls auf die Anteile an Segmenten des relevanten Marktes stützen und diese bei der Beurteilung der wettbewerblichen Nähe zwischen den beteiligten Unternehmen sowie zwischen diesen Unternehmen und ihren Wettbewerbern berücksichtigen ⁽¹⁶¹⁾.

111. Darüber hinaus können bei erheblich differenzierten Produkten die anhand des Werts oder der Menge der Verkäufe bestimmten Marktanteile sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen. Die Kommission betrachtet in der Regel die Verkaufswerte als Ausgangspunkt ⁽¹⁶²⁾. Dennoch können die Verkaufsmengen die Verkaufswerte ergänzen und in einigen Fällen besser geeignet sein, die Auswirkungen des zu untersuchenden Verhaltens oder Zusammenschlusses zu beurteilen. So ist es z. B. möglich, dass bei einem Zusammenschluss, an dem zwei Unternehmen beteiligt sind, die ein Produkt zu einem wesentlich niedrigeren Preis als andere Unternehmen anbieten, auf die aber ein erheblicher Teil der Kunden entfällt, die Bedeutung der Unternehmen im Wettbewerb und ihre Wettbewerbsinteraktionen unterbewertet werden, wenn allein der Wert der Verkäufe herangezogen wird ⁽¹⁶³⁾.
112. Die Angaben zu den Marktanteilen können von dem/den beteiligten Unternehmen in Form von Schätzungen übermittelt werden, wenn ihm/ihnen keine genauen diesbezüglichen Informationen vorliegen. Die Kommission greift zusätzlich oder alternativ auch auf andere Informationsquellen zur Marktgröße und zu den Marktanteilen zurück, wenn dies für ihre Beurteilung erforderlich ist. Dazu können Studien oder Berichte von Behörden, Wirtschaftsberatern oder Handelsverbänden, interne Unterlagen des/der beteiligten Unternehmen(s) oder Schätzungen von Marktteilnehmern gehören. Insbesondere wenn das/die beteiligte(n) Unternehmen keine zuverlässigen Schätzungen vorgelegt hat/haben oder keine zuverlässigen Informationen aus anderen Quellen verfügbar sind, kann die Kommission eine vollständige oder teilweise Marktrekonstruktion vornehmen, indem sie Auskunftsverlangen an die relevanten Marktteilnehmer richtet und die Anbieter oder Kunden auf dem relevanten Markt auffordert, Daten zu den Mengen oder Werten ihrer eigenen Verkäufe oder Einkäufe oder andere relevante Angaben bereitzustellen. Nach den Erfahrungen der Kommission sind solche Marktrekonstruktionen im Allgemeinen besser für Märkte geeignet, auf denen eine begrenzte Zahl von Anbietern tätig ist.
113. In der Regel stützt sich die Kommission auf Marktanteile, die für einjährige Bezugszeiträume berechnet wurden. Die Kommission erhebt solche Daten in der Regel für einen Zeitraum von mindestens drei Jahren oder im Rahmen der Durchsetzung der Kartellvorschriften in der Regel für Zeiträume, die der Dauer des untersuchten Verhaltens entsprechen. Der Bezugszeitraum, für den die Marktanteile berechnet werden, kann jedoch in Abhängigkeit von den Merkmalen des relevanten Marktes von dem üblichen Einjahreszeitraum abweichen. Insbesondere auf Märkten, die durch eine sporadische oder unstete Nachfrage oder durch die Saisonabhängigkeit von Angebot und/oder Nachfrage gekennzeichnet sind, oder auf Märkten, auf denen strukturelle Veränderungen stattfinden, kann es angezeigt sein, längere oder kürzere Bezugszeiträume für die Berechnung der Marktanteile zugrunde zu legen ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾. Auf Märkten, auf denen strukturelle Veränderungen wie regulatorische oder

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ So kann die Kommission beispielsweise die Intensität des Wettbewerbs zwischen Unternehmen beurteilen, indem sie ihre Analyse auf die Anteile der Unternehmen an dem betreffenden Marktsegment, die Ähnlichkeit der Preise und andere für den Wettbewerb relevante Faktoren oder auf Messgrößen für die Substituierbarkeit zwischen verschiedenen Produkten wie beobachtete Wechsel und damit verbundene Messgrößen wie Umlenkungskennziffern oder geschätzte Nachfrageelastizitäten konzentriert. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.5658 – Unilever/Sara Lee, in der die Kommission eine erhebliche Differenzierung auf dem Markt für Deodorants feststellte und im Rahmen ihrer wettbewerbsrechtlichen Würdigung auf der Grundlage geschätzter Nachfrageelastizitäten eine quantitative Bewertung wahrscheinlicher Preiseffekte vornahm.

⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9409 – Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding (Erwägungsgründe 227 und 468), in der die Kommission feststellte, dass der relevante Markt für zur Schmelzung und Raffination bestimmten Kupferschrott insbesondere im Hinblick auf Materialzusammensetzung und Ursprung stark differenziert war und aus mehreren Segmenten bestand. Daher zog die Kommission die Marktanteile in diesen spezifischen Segmenten für die Beurteilung der wettbewerblichen Nähe zwischen den an dem Zusammenschluss beteiligten Unternehmen sowie zwischen diesen Unternehmen und ihren Wettbewerbern heran.

⁽¹⁶²⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgrund 426).

⁽¹⁶³⁾ Der Wettbewerb zwischen Anbietern von nicht differenzierten Eigenmarkenprodukten kann z. B. besser anhand der mengenbasierten Marktanteile erfasst werden. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9413 – Lactalis/Nuova Castelli (Erwägungsgrund 137).

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Beispiele für längere Bezugszeiträume aufgrund sporadischer Nachfrage sind auf den Ausschreibungsmärkten zu finden. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business) (Erwägungsgründe 420-422), in der die Marktanteile für einen Zeitraum von fünf bzw. zehn Jahren berechnet wurden. In der Sache M.8677 – Siemens/Alstom (Erwägungsgrund 141) wurde ein Bezugszeitraum von zehn Jahren zugrunde gelegt, während in den Sachen M.9343 – Hyundai Heavy Industries Holdings/Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (Erwägungsgründe 362ff.) und M.10078 – Cargotec/Konecranes (Erwägungsgrund 533) ein Bezugszeitraum von elf Jahren zugrunde gelegt wurde, der in mehrere Teilzeiträume aufgeteilt wurde. Daten für kürzere Bezugszeiträume (die relevante Saison) aus mehreren Jahren wurden beispielsweise in Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Fluggesellschaften verwendet, siehe z. B. die Sache M.8869 – Ryanair/Laudamotion (Erwägungsgrund 304).

technologische Veränderungen stattfinden oder bei denen eine vorausschauende Beurteilung angebracht sein könnte, um die Marktdynamik zu erfassen, können zukünftige Marktanteile geschätzt werden, um diesen erwarteten Veränderungen Rechnung zu tragen ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾.

6. SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN

114. Die Kommission wird ihre Auslegung des Begriffs des sachlich und des räumlich relevanten Marktes in ihrer Beschlusspraxis weiterentwickeln und dabei den Marktentwicklungen und der Wettbewerbsdynamik, den Entwicklungen im Bereich der bewährten Verfahren zur Marktabgrenzung sowie der Rechtsprechung der Unionsgerichte Rechnung tragen.
 115. Die Auslegung des Begriffs „relevanter Markt“ durch die Kommission in dieser Bekanntmachung lässt die Auslegung dieses Begriffs durch die Unionsgerichte in konkreten Fällen unberührt.
 116. Diese Bekanntmachung ersetzt die 1997 angenommene Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die Definition des relevanten Marktes im Sinne des Wettbewerbsrechts der Gemeinschaft ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾.
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⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ Siehe z. B. die Sache M.9674 – Vodafone Italia/TIM/INWIT JV (Erwägungsgründe 81 und 147), in der für den Markt für an Makrostandorten erbrachte Dienstleistungen für Mobilfunknetzbetreiber Marktanteile für die Jahre 2017-2027 berechnet und geschätzt wurden, also mehrere in der Zukunft liegende Jahre einbezogen wurden. Siehe z. B. die Sache M.10534 – Traton/Aktiebolaget Volvo/Daimler Truck/JV (Erwägungsgründe 106-109 und 118-120), in der die Kommission die Gründung eines Gemeinschaftsunternehmens auf dem neu entstehenden Markt für öffentliche Ladelösungen für batteriebetriebene schwere Lastkraftwagen und Reisebusse geprüft und die voraussichtlichen Marktanteile für mehrere in der Zukunft liegende Jahre beurteilt hat.

⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ ABl. C 372 vom 9.12.1997, S. 5.



C/2024/1646

22.2.2024

Vorherige Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses
(Sache M.11483 — MSD HOSPITALITY / ARC CAPITAL / AUBERGE RESORTS) Für das vereinfachte
Verfahren infrage kommender Fall

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

(C/2024/1646)

1. Am 13. Februar 2024 ist die Anmeldung eines geplanten Zusammenschlusses nach Artikel 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates ⁽¹⁾ bei der Kommission eingegangen.

Diese Anmeldung betrifft folgende Unternehmen:

- MSD Hospitality Partners, L.P. („MSD HP“, USA), kontrolliert von BDT & MSD Holdings (USA),
- ARC Capital Holdings LLC („ARC Capital“, USA), eine Tochtergesellschaft der Friedkin Capital Partners L.L.C. („FCP“, USA),
- Auberge Resorts LLC („Auberge Resorts“, USA), derzeit unter der alleinigen Kontrolle von FCP.

MSD HP und ARC Capital werden im Sinne des Artikels 3 Absatz 1 Buchstabe b und Absatz 4 der Fusionskontrollverordnung die gemeinsame Kontrolle über Auberge Resorts erwerben.

Der Zusammenschluss erfolgt durch Erwerb von Anteilen.

2. Die beteiligten Unternehmen sind in folgenden Geschäftsbereichen tätig:

- MSD HP ist ein Immobilienfonds mit Fokus auf Investitionen in hochwertige Luxusimmobilien im Gastgewerbe und in verbundenen Branchen.
- ARC Capital ist eine Tochtergesellschaft von FCP, die direkte und indirekte Beteiligungen im Gastgewerbe hält.

3. Das Unternehmen Auberge Resorts ist in folgenden Geschäftsbereichen tätig: Auberge Resorts ist ein im Gastgewerbe tätiges Unternehmen, das Hotels, Resorts und Luxusdomizile in Nord- und Zentralamerika, Frankreich und Griechenland sowie ein Hotel in Italien, das 2024 den Gästebetrieb aufnehmen soll, betreibt.

4. Die Kommission hat nach vorläufiger Prüfung festgestellt, dass das angemeldete Rechtsgeschäft unter die Fusionskontrollverordnung fallen könnte. Die endgültige Entscheidung zu diesem Punkt behält sie sich vor.

Dieser Fall kommt für das vereinfachte Verfahren im Sinne der Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die vereinfachte Behandlung bestimmter Zusammenschlüsse gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates über die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen ⁽²⁾ infrage.

5. Alle betroffenen Dritten können bei der Kommission zu diesem Vorhaben Stellung nehmen.

Die Stellungnahmen müssen bei der Kommission spätestens 10 Tage nach dieser Veröffentlichung eingehen. Dabei ist stets folgendes Aktenzeichen anzugeben:

M.11483 — MSD HOSPITALITY / ARC CAPITAL / AUBERGE RESORTS

Die Stellungnahmen können der Kommission per E-Mail oder Post übermittelt werden, wobei folgende Kontaktangaben zu verwenden sind:

E-Mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

⁽¹⁾ ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1 („Fusionskontrollverordnung“).

⁽²⁾ ABl. C 160 vom 5.5.2023, S. 1.

Postanschrift:

Europäische Kommission
Generaldirektion Wettbewerb
Registratur Fusionskontrolle
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË



C/2024/1716

22.2.2024

**Vorherige Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses
(Sache M.11463 – MABANAFT / WESTFA)
Für das vereinfachte Verfahren infrage kommender Fall**

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

(C/2024/1716)

1. Am 15. Februar 2024 ist die Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses nach Artikel 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates ⁽¹⁾ bei der Kommission eingegangen.

Diese Anmeldung betrifft folgende Unternehmen:

- Mabanaft GmbH & Co. KG („Mabanaft“, Deutschland), kontrolliert von Marquard & Bahls AG („Marquard & Bahls“, Deutschland),
- WESTFA Energy GmbH („WESTFA“, Deutschland), kontrolliert von Adeleon Familienholding GmbH („Adeleon“, Deutschland).

Mabanaft wird im Sinne des Artikels 3 Absatz 1 Buchstabe b der Fusionskontrollverordnung die alleinige Kontrolle über die Gesamtheit von WESTFA übernehmen.

Der Zusammenschluss erfolgt durch Erwerb von Anteilen.

2. Die beteiligten Unternehmen sind in folgenden Geschäftsbereichen tätig:

- Mabanaft ist ein integriertes Energieunternehmen, das Energielösungen in den Bereichen Transport, Heizung und Industrie anbietet. Mabanaft ist Teil der Marquard & Bahls Group, die in der Versorgung, dem Handel und der Logistik in den Bereichen Energie, Mineralölprodukte und Chemikalien tätig ist.
- WESTFA ist im Handel und Vertrieb von Flüssiggas (LPG) tätig.

3. Die Kommission hat nach vorläufiger Prüfung festgestellt, dass das angemeldete Rechtsgeschäft unter die Fusionskontrollverordnung fallen könnte. Die endgültige Entscheidung zu diesem Punkt behält sie sich vor.

Dieser Fall kommt für das vereinfachte Verfahren im Sinne der Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die vereinfachte Behandlung bestimmter Zusammenschlüsse gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates über die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen ⁽²⁾ infrage.

4. Alle betroffenen Dritten können bei der Kommission zu diesem Vorhaben Stellung nehmen.

Die Stellungnahmen müssen bei der Kommission spätestens 10 Tage nach dieser Veröffentlichung eingehen. Dabei ist stets folgendes Aktenzeichen anzugeben:

M.11463 – MABANAFT / WESTFA

Die Stellungnahmen können der Kommission per E-Mail oder Post übermittelt werden, wobei folgende Kontaktangaben zu verwenden sind:

E-Mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Postanschrift:

Europäische Kommission
Generaldirektion Wettbewerb
Registratur Fusionskontrolle
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË

⁽¹⁾ ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1 („Fusionskontrollverordnung“).

⁽²⁾ ABl. C 160 vom 5.5.2023, S. 1.



C/2024/1717

22.2.2024

Vorherige Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses
(Sache M. — 11411 BPIFRANCE / MERIDIAM / EXOES)
Für das vereinfachte Verfahren infrage kommender Fall

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

(C/2024/1717)

1. Am 13. Februar 2024 ist aufgrund einer Verweisung nach Artikel 4 Absatz 5 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates ⁽¹⁾ die Anmeldung eines geplanten Zusammenschlusses nach Artikel 4 bei der Kommission eingegangen.

Diese Anmeldung betrifft folgende Unternehmen:

- Bpifrance Investissement (Frankreich), kontrolliert von Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (Frankreich),
- Meridiam SAS („Meridiam“) (Frankreich), kontrolliert von Meridiam Infrastructure Partners S.A.S. (Frankreich),
- Groupe Exoès („JV“) (Frankreich).

Bpifrance Investissement und Meridiam werden im Sinne des Artikels 3 Absatz 1 Buchstabe b und Absatz 4 der Fusionskontrollverordnung die gemeinsame Kontrolle über das JV erwerben.

Der Zusammenschluss erfolgt durch Erwerb von Anteilen.

2. Die beteiligten Unternehmen sind in folgenden Geschäftsbereichen tätig:

- Bpifrance Investissement ist eine von der französischen Autorité des Marchés Financiers zugelassene und unter deren Aufsicht stehende Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft.
- Meridiam ist eine weltweit tätige Investment- und Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft, die auf nachhaltige Vermögensverwaltung und, insbesondere, auf die Entwicklung und Verwaltung von Unternehmensprojekten zur Förderung des ökologischen Wandels spezialisiert ist.
- Das JV ist auf thermische Systeme für elektrische Batterien, Elektromotoren, Leistungselektronik und Wärmepumpen spezialisiert. Das Unternehmen bietet Beratungs- und Ingenieurdienstleistungen im Bereich Batteriekühlsysteme für Elektrofahrzeuge an. Ferner plant das JV ab 2026 die Herstellung und Vermarktung von elektrischen Batterien.

3. Die Kommission hat nach vorläufiger Prüfung festgestellt, dass das angemeldete Rechtsgeschäft unter die Fusionskontrollverordnung fallen könnte. Die endgültige Entscheidung zu diesem Punkt behält sie sich vor.

Dieser Fall kommt für das vereinfachte Verfahren im Sinne der Bekanntmachung der Kommission über die vereinfachte Behandlung bestimmter Zusammenschlüsse gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates über die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen ⁽²⁾ infrage.

4. Alle betroffenen Dritten können bei der Kommission zu diesem Vorhaben Stellung nehmen.

Die Stellungnahmen müssen bei der Kommission spätestens 10 Tage nach dieser Veröffentlichung eingehen. Dabei ist stets folgendes Aktenzeichen anzugeben:

M. 11411 — BPIFRANCE / MERIDIAM / EXOES

Die Stellungnahmen können der Kommission per E-Mail oder Post übermittelt werden, wobei folgende Kontaktangaben zu verwenden sind:

E-Mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

⁽¹⁾ ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1 („Fusionskontrollverordnung“).

⁽²⁾ ABl. C 160 vom 5.5.2023, S. 1.

Postanschrift:

Europäische Kommission
Generaldirektion Wettbewerb
Registratur Fusionskontrolle
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË



C/2024/90010

22.2.2024

Berichtigung der Amtsblattmitteilung in der Rechtssache T-1098/23

(Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union, ABl. C, C/2024/1102, 5. Februar 2024)

(C/2024/90010)

Die Mitteilung im Amtsblatt in der Rechtssache T-1098/23, Khudaynatov/Rat, lautet richtig wie folgt:

Klage, eingereicht am 23. November 2023 — Khudaynatov/Rat

(Rechtssache T-1098/23)

(C/2024/1102)

Verfahrenssprache: Französisch

Parteien

Kläger: Eduard Yurevich Khudaynatov (Moskau, Russland) (vertreten durch Rechtsanwälte T. Bontinck, D. Rovetta und M. Moretto)

Beklagter: Rat der Europäischen Union

Anträge

Der Kläger beantragt,

- den Beschluss (GASP) 2023/1767 des Rates vom 13. September 2023 für nichtig zu erklären, soweit er den Beschluss 2014/145/GASP des Rates vom 17. März 2014 in der durch den Beschluss (GASP) 2022/883 vom 3. Juni 2022 geänderten Fassung, mit dem der Name des Klägers in den Anhang des Beschlusses 2014/145 aufgenommen wurde, bis zum 15. März 2024 für anwendbar erklärt;
- die Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2023/1765 des Rates vom 13. September 2023 für nichtig zu erklären, soweit damit der Name des Klägers auf der Liste in Anhang I der Verordnung (EU) 269/2014 vom 17. März 2014 belassen wird;
- hilfsweise, das in Art. 1 Abs. 1 Buchst. e und Art. 2 Abs. 1 Buchst. g des Beschlusses 2014/145/GASP und in Art. 3 Abs. 1 Buchst. g der Verordnung (EU) 2014/269 in der durch den Beschluss (GASP) 2023/1094 des Rates vom 5. Juni 2023 zur Änderung des Beschlusses 2014/145/GASP über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts von Handlungen, die die territoriale Unversehrtheit, Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine untergraben oder bedrohen, bzw. durch die Verordnung (EU) 2023/1089 des Rates vom 5. Juni 2023 zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 269/2014 über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts von Handlungen, die die territoriale Unversehrtheit, Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine untergraben oder bedrohen, geänderten Fassung vorgesehene Aufnahmekriterium für rechtswidrig zu erklären, soweit es in Russland tätige führende Geschäftsleute oder Geschäftsleute, juristische Personen, Organisationen oder Einrichtungen betrifft, die in Bereichen der Wirtschaft tätig sind, die der Regierung der Russischen Föderation, die für die Annexion der Krim und die Destabilisierung der Ukraine verantwortlich ist, als wichtige Einnahmequelle dienen.

Klagegründe und wesentliche Argumente

Die Klage wird auf folgende vier Gründe gestützt:

1. Verstoß gegen die Begründungspflicht und das Recht auf effektiven gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz.
2. Offensichtlicher Beurteilungsfehler hinsichtlich der vom Rat angeführten Gründe, insbesondere hinsichtlich der auf den Kläger angewandten Benennungskriterien und des Wesens der erlassenen Maßnahmen.
3. Verstoß gegen den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit und die Grundrechte des Klägers.
4. Verletzung des Anspruchs auf rechtliches Gehör.