Corporate Unit Evaluation Central Project Evaluation

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Central project evaluation

Socio-economic Dialogue in Libya

Project number: 2017.2142.2

Evaluation Report

On behalf of GIZ by Torge Hamkens (FAKT Consult GmbH) and Dr. Haider El Saeh (FAKT Consult GmbH)
Date of evaluation report: 21 October 2021
Published: February 2023

giz Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

Publication details

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH is a federal enterprise and supports the German Federal Government in achieving its objectives in the fields of international education and international cooperation for sustainable development.

GIZ's Evaluation Unit reports directly to the Management Board. It is separate from GIZ's operational business. This organisational structure strengthens its independence. The unit is mandated to generate evidence-based results and recommendations for decision-making, to provide plausible verification of results and to increase the transparency of findings.

The Evaluation Unit commissioned external independent evaluators to conduct the evaluation. This evaluation report was written by these external evaluators. All opinions and assessments expressed in the report are those of the authors.

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Published by:
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Design/layout:
DITHO Design GmbH, Cologne

Distribution:
GIZ, Bonn

Bonn 2023.

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Abbreviations

BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CPE	Central Project Evaluation
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
EU	European Union
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
GNA	Government of National Accord
IZR	International Cooperation with regions für sustainable development (Internationale Zusammenarbeit mit Regionen für Nachhaltige Entwicklung)
MoP	Ministry of Planning of Libya
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA	Peace and conflict analysis
RoM	Results-oriented monitoring
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SED	Socio-Economic Dialogue project
SMART	Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound
TC	Technical cooperation
ToC	Theory of change
UN	United Nations
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya

The project at a glance

Libya: Socio-economic dialogue (PN: 2017.2142.2)

Project number	2017.2142.2
Creditor reporting system code(s)	15150 (Democratic participation and civil society): 30% 15220 (Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution): 20% 15110 (Politics and administration in the public sector): 50%
Project objective	Options for a sustainable economic, state and social model flow into relevant political processes for Libya's transformation
Project term	December 2017 - February 2021
Project value	EUR 4,000,000
Commissioning party	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Lead executing agency	Ministry of Planning of Libya
Implementing organisations (in the partner country)	
Other development organisations involved	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)
Target group(s)	Direct target group: Participants of the socio-economic dialogue processes such as leaders and representatives of a broad range of society groups in Libya (from politics, business, trade unions, science, civil society including women and youth groups, etc.) as well as representatives of the country's local communities, non-governmental organisations, private sector and academia. Additionally, Libyan government officials in charge of the political process (if they have not been involved in the dialogue processes organised by the project). The entire population of Libya is the indirect target group (final beneficiaries)

1 Evaluation objectives and questions

This chapter aims to describe the purpose of the evaluation, the standard evaluation criteria, and additional stakeholders' knowledge interests and evaluation questions.

1.1 Evaluation objectives

Central project evaluations of projects commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) fulfil three basic functions: they support evidence-based decisions, promote transparency and accountability, and foster organisational learning within the scope of contributing to effective knowledge management. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH structures the planning, implementation and use of evaluations so that the contribution the evaluation process and the evaluation findings make to these basic functions is optimised (GIZ, 2018).

GIZ's Evaluation Unit has commissioned the independent consultancy FAKT Consult GmbH to evaluate the GIZ Socio-Economic Dialogue (SED) project in Libya (see section 2.1), as part of GIZ's centrally steered central project evaluations. This project, which ended on 28 February 2021, has been randomly selected in line with GIZ's guidelines on central project evaluations, which state that a 40% random sample should be selected annually, and structured regionally and proportionally.

1.2 Evaluation questions

The project is assessed on the basis of standardised evaluation criteria and questions to ensure comparability by GIZ. This is based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria (updated 2020) for international cooperation and the evaluation criteria for German bilateral cooperation (in German): **relevance, coherence, efficiency**, **effectiveness**, **impact** and **sustainability**.

Specific assessment dimensions and analytical questions have been derived from this framework. These form the basis for all central project evaluations in GIZ and can be found in the **evaluation matrix** (Annex). In addition, contributions to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its principles are taken into account as well as cross-cutting issues such as gender, the environment, conflict sensitivity and human rights. Also, aspects regarding the quality of implementation are included in all OECD/DAC criteria.

Table 1: Knowledge interests by main evaluation stakeholder groups

Evaluation stakeholder group	Knowledge interests in evaluation/additional evaluation questions	Relevant section in this report
BMZ	Practical relevance of the project's results, relationship of results and recommendations from the dialogue processes to Libya's reality, usability of results and products from the dialogues, appropriateness of the dialogues' timing, potential of the dialogues to revitalise the Libya 2030 vision process, lessons learned for other dialogue processes.	Relevance (4.2), Effectiveness (4.4) Impact (4.5), Conclusions and recommendations (5)
Ministry of Planning of Libya	'Buy-in' from national institutions, usefulness for national planning processes.	Relevance (4.2), Impact (4.5), Sustainability (4.7)
GIZ staff in charge of project design and strategy	Role of research in fostering dialogue processes, conditions for making outcomes of dialogue process relevant for political practice (science to policy), appropriateness of timing for conducting dialogue processes.	Relevance (4.2), Impact (4.5), Sustainability (4.7)

Evaluation stakeholder group	Knowledge interests in evaluation/additional evaluation questions	Relevant section in this report
Project team	• Potential of dialogue processes as an instrument for learning • Reality check of the project's initial idea and planning • Relationship of the project's resources to its ambitions considering also its fragile context • Potential to adapt the project to reality • Specificities of working with a multilateral organisation such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) • Legitimacy of the developed vision/results • Potential for Libyan policy makers to use the project's results • Scope of representation required to produce legitimacy of dialogue processes and other conditions required to make such dialogue processes inclusive • Non-involvement of Libyan stakeholders in the project's planning • Potential of holding a dialogue process in a highly fragmented society and an environment that is so dynamic and fragile as in Libya • General potential of building peace through dialogues and lessons learned for developing a methodology of national dialogues. It is assumed that GIZ's Network International Cooperation in Conflicts and Disasters will be interested in answers regarding these issues.	Relevance (4.2), Coherence (4.3), Effectiveness (4.4), Impact (4.5), Efficiency (4.6), Sustainability (4.7)

2 Object of the evaluation

This chapter aims to define the evaluation object, including the theory of change, and results hypotheses.

2.1 Definition of the evaluation object

The **object of this evaluation** is the technical cooperation (TC) project, Socio-economic Dialogue in Libya (project number: 2017.2142.2) henceforth called the 'project'. The project's objective was that 'Options for a sustainable economic, state and social model flow into relevant political processes for Libya's transformation'. The project originally encompassed the period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2020 before it was extended at no extra cost for another three months to 28 February 2021. The project's total value amounted to EUR 4,000,000. Furthermore, there was no predecessor TC project and has not received any co-funding. In terms of geographical delineation, the evaluation takes into consideration the project's interventions at the national level and subnational levels (although there was only one subnational intervention in the municipality of Derj in Western Libya).

The project's **political and sectoral context** is highly fragile, volatile and complex (description of the context is based on the project's proposal, but has been updated): Libya, Africa's fourth largest country, but with no more than 6.7 million inhabitants, has not succeeded in returning to a stable political and economic development path since the 2011 revolution. Gaddafi's fall was followed by an armed conflict in 2014. In 2015, the international community and the United Nations Support Assistance Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) succeeded in reaching an agreement between the parties to the conflict and forming a Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the GNA was weak, political and tribal fragmentation was ongoing, and there was no improvement in security policy by unifying various armed factions into a national army. Even worse, a second civil war broke out. This escalating situation has highly limited the GNA's influence as it

only controlled parts of the country. The division of the country was perpetuated during most of the project's term by the existence of two governments – the internationally-supported GNA, the Libyan Parliament (House of Representatives) and the associated government in the east of the country (Tobruk, Al-Baida). Not until 23 October 2020 was a permanent ceasefire signed to end the civil war. The formation of an interim unity government was announced on 5 February 2021, and national elections were scheduled for 24 December 2021 (Volk, 2021).

Figure 1: Map of project region, © Geographic Guide

From an economic standpoint, the country continues to be shaped by the former centralist and state-socialist structures. Libya's economy, which has so far been centrally managed, is still almost exclusively dependent on the oil sector (> 70% of gross national product; > 90% of state revenues; > 95% of exports). The private sector had been systematically 'destroyed' by the Gaddafi regime and because of this plays a marginal role only (its contribution was estimated at just 4–15% of the country's income). This has led to a bloated public sector where oil was used to keep the people 'happy and quiet'. (In fact, most Libyans still feel that oil gives them a life-long payment.) In consequence, the labour market consists mainly of public sector employment utilising about 80% of the workforce (OECD, 2016). Social security also depends on employment in the public sector. Around 80% of all Libyan employees – more than one person per household – received a salary and related social benefits from the state to secure their families. However, in view of the state, economic and budget crises (e.g. due to the decline in oil production) and the associated cuts, the public sector absorbs fewer and fewer young people who enter the labour market. At the same time, in addition to 350,000 internally displaced persons, there are about 700,000 to 1 million migrants in Libya, whereby Libya is both a transit and a destination country. The GNA was therefore unable to address the country's most pressing problems through effective governance. The development of medium- and long-term policy approaches to solve these problems was almost non-existent. The consequences of low state capacities are a lack of work and prospects, increased risk of conflict and lawlessness (Doc 3).

The central problem at the project's inception was therefore that options for a sustainable state and social model for a future Libya, which would flow into the political processes for the transformation of the country, had not been developed.

The project's official partner was the Libyan Ministry of Planning (MoP). According to its design, the project pursued a **multi-level approach**. At macro level, the project supported strategy development for national policy-making processes. At meso level, the project promoted networks between national and decentralised stakeholders from academia, politics, private sector and civil society. Finally, at micro-level, it encouraged participation of citizens in the dialogue process. Furthermore, citizen participation and public relations work was supposed to support an awareness for the necessity of a transformation at policy level.

According to the project proposal, one of the project's direct **target groups** were the participants of the socio-economic dialogue processes such as leaders and representatives of a broad range of society groups in Libya (from politics, business, trade unions, science, civil society including women and youth groups, etc.) as well as representatives of the country's local communities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private sector and academia. An additional target group was Libyan government officials in charge of the political process. To a limited degree, this target group was involved in the national dialogue process. The entire population of Libya was considered an indirect target group (final beneficiaries) of the project which was also represented in the project's dialogue processes at national and subnational levels.

According to the project's proposal, the **capacity-development strategy** was planned to reach out to different levels. At the individual level, it was supposed to focus on awareness raising, information sharing and capacity development for Libyan Government representatives in charge of the political process, whereas at society level, stakeholders from academia, politics, business and civil society were supposed to be supported in testing collaboration, dialogue and cooperation through moderating conferences, working and expert groups as well as the advisory board of the project (Doc 1). However, the project did not work out any overall strategy for capacity development. Its strategic approach in this context was limited to defining a capacity-development strategy for training dialogue facilitators (Doc 28).

The project received the following markers: participatory development and good governance: PD/GG-2, gender equality: GG-1, peace and security: FS-1, public-private partnership: PPP-0, programme-based approach: PBA-0.

Regarding **cross-cutting issues**, the project was designed to contribute to creating framework conditions for peaceful development and stability, but also to respecting and guaranteeing human rights by promoting participation and good governance, especially by introducing dialogue processes. In terms of gender, the project aimed to ensure that women can participate appropriately at both national and local levels and that their situation, needs and role are considered in Libya's future economic, state and social model (Doc 1).

2.2 Results model including hypotheses

A theory-based approach was applied when evaluating the project, specifically using a contribution analysis. The main challenge of this type of analysis is to plausibly substantiate the contribution the project measures have made to the observed results. Therefore, a project's theory of change (ToC) is key to a contribution analysis in order to make credible causal statements about interventions and their observable results. At GIZ, ToCs are expressed in results models and complemented by a narrative including corresponding hypotheses. A results model is a graphical representation of the project, describing the logical connection and interrelationship of results and how they contribute to the module objective and impact. A results model defines: the possible results; change hypotheses, including multi-dimensional causalities; system boundary positive assumptions about risks; and other external factors. A key advantage of basing the evaluation on a results model is the enhanced visibility of causalities, going beyond linear and mono-dimensional relationships between different results at different result levels.

At the inception workshop, the evaluation and the project teams jointly reconstructed the project's results model presented in Figure 2 and also prepared the corresponding narrative (contribution story):

Figure 2: Current results model, reconstructed during evaluation



The project was composed of three components: (i) National Dialogue of experts from academia, politics, business and civil society to develop options for socio-economic transformation (based on and to be achieved by the instrument of a grant agreement with ESCWA); (ii) Strengthening the capacity of the stakeholders involved to shape socio-economic transformation strategies; and (iii) Participation of the population at community level in the development of options. While ESCWA was responsible for the dialogue process within the framework of a grant agreement, the project also contributed to implementing dialogue processes. The project logic aimed at supporting the development of options for a viable economic, state and social model for Libya and their inclusion in relevant political processes (module/project objective). The focus was on socio-economic development in order to also off-set discussions and assessments on potentially fundamental questions such as power and politics, as these have hindered identifying a sustainable economic, state and social model for Libya. In the dialogues, issues concerning the role of the state and the state administration were discussed within the framework of the future socio-economic development models for the country. At the impact level, this process was supposed to contribute towards promoting greater social cohesion, confidence-building in government institutions, economic stabilisation and the development of prospects for the younger Libyan generation. The three interrelated components of the project were designed as follows.

Component 1 aimed at supporting a national dialogue between experts from academia, politics, business and civil society in Libya on the development of options for socio-economic transformation (Output A: 'Experts from science, politics, business and civil society work together to develop reform strategies and implementation plans for priority policy areas'). To support a national dialogue on the development of options for Libya's socio-economic transformation, ESCWA was expected to acquire additional project funds from other donors (R27) and conclude a financing agreement with GIZ (R7). On this basis, project staff were hired by ESCWA (R5). As a first step, three interrelated (socio-economic interrelationship) baseline studies on Libya's government institutions, economy and society were prepared with the help of Libyan and international experts (R1). The studies were supported by statistically based analyses by experts from ministries and research regarding 10 policy fields (R3). Both the baseline studies and the statistically based analyses were published for the wider public (R15). From these results, ESCWA moderated a series of national dialogues among respected Libyans (men, women and youth) from academia, business, civil society and politics to develop options and future models for Libya's institutions, economy and society (R2). The dialogue process was expected to eventually lead to the development of strategic options for five policy fields by representatives from research, policy consulting and civil society (R4). This, in turn, would contribute to making available strategy documents and one road map for each of five socio-economic policy areas in the context of the Libyan 'Vision 2030' process (outcome 1: 'In the context of the Libyan "Vision 2030" process, strategy documents and one road map are available for each of five socio-economic policy areas'). Finally, it should be noted that almost all output-level results anticipated under component 1 lie half inside and half outside the project's system boundary (sphere of responsibility) except for the setting up and strengthening of the advisory board (R6).

At outcome and impact level, it is assumed that holding the dialogue sessions with digital tools has promoted their use (R20) and that the concept of dialogue as a means for involvement across a broad level of participation has been introduced in Libya (R19). In addition, it is assumed that GIZ has learned from using digital platforms for dialogues (R24) and that there has been a knowledge transfer from GIZ to ESCWA (R23).

Component 2 aimed at strengthening the capacity of range of Libyan stakeholders (especially from the government, but also beyond – including, for example, experts in an advisory role to the government or civil society organisation (CSO) representatives) who are responsible for the political process (Output B: 'The capacities of the stakeholders involved in shaping socio-economic transformation strategies have been strengthened'). For strengthening the stakeholders' capacity, it was first necessary to set up and strengthen the advisory board to steer project implementation (R6). Furthermore, national dialogue facilitators were trained as a result of a direct request from the Libyan project partner (R12). The request was based on the assessment that the concept of dialoguing was systematically hindered during the Gadhafi regime and that holding dialogues was fundamental for promoting a peaceful development of the country. In turn, these trained national

dialogue facilitators were supposed to train local level facilitators in Arabic (R11) with the aim of creating a pool of national and local dialogue facilitators, composed of representatives from municipalities, NGOs and the private sector (R10). For sustaining the concept of dialogue facilitation, the facilitators established a national association of dialogue facilitators (R8). As part of their capacity development, to promote the use of dialogue and to provide a platform to discuss selected socio-economic issues at the local level, the national and local dialogue facilitators organised (up to 6-8) socio-economic dialogues (R9). An important product of the capacity building was the publication of a 'Dialogue Facilitation Handbook' (in Arabic and English) which is available for the association as well as for other institutions and organisations (R17). In addition, a training film has been produced on soft skills for Covid-19 hotline operators providing advice during the pandemic (R22). Also, study trips to countries that have similar socio-economic conditions as Libya, but are more advanced in their political, institutional and administrative structures, standards and procedures (e.g. South Africa, Mongolia, Norway) were supposed to be carried out to ensure exposure for the stakeholders involved in the project (R13). The capacity building was continuously strengthened through a range of expert support (international short-term consultants and a researcher from German Development Institute) who provided advice, training and coaching to the major stakeholders throughout the capacity building and project implementation process. This included technical content as well as modern methods and instruments of planning and foresight (R27). The experience sharing by the international experts and the case studies that they introduced during their interventions further provided policy-makers with new inputs allowing them to refer to international experiences or already-developed policy options as part of their work in developing policy options, influencing the design of policy documents in Libya (outcome 3: '50% of the 100 policy-makers who have participated in international study trips or exchange formats in the socio-economic dialogue process refer to international experiences or already-developed policy options in their policy documents').

At impact level, results under component 2 would contribute to introducing the concept of dialogue as a means for peaceful involvement of Libyans from all walks of life across a broad level of participation (R19), the promotion of Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven processes with participation all over Libya (R25) and the active participation of women and youth (R26). Finally, the project achieved additional outcomes by training National Centre for Disease Control doctors and hotline operators delivered by national dialogue facilitators (R21) as a contribution to manage the Covid-19 pandemic.

Component 3 aimed at the broader involvement of the Libyan population in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country (output C: 'The population of selected Libyan municipalities has been involved in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country'). The key aim of and also the link between component 3 and component 1 was that the socio-economic options developed as part of output 1 would be presented, discussed, adjusted and then fed back into the national dialogue process. For this purpose, dialogue events with the population to shape the future economic and social model were conducted by national and international experts in cooperation with Libyan universities and NGOs (R14). These dialogue events were interlinked with the national dialogues (R2). In addition, baseline studies and five options for reform strategies and implementation plans for the wider public in Libya were published (R15); and advice to local administrations, media, NGOs and universities on the implementation of participatory measures at municipal level to engage the population was provided (R16). This would lead to the involvement of 20 CSOs in 20 exchange formats on socio-economic policy areas of a future economic, state and social model, of which 20% represented women and 20% represented young people (outcome 2: '20 civil society organisations took part in 20 public dialogue events on socio-economic policy areas of a future economic, state and social model (e.g. the role of the oil and private sectors, decentralisation, social security'), of which 20% represented women and 20% represented young people'). An expected key outcome under component 3 was to introduce concepts (for example socio-economic development) which are considered by the national and local Libyan government authorities (R18).

The following **risks for achieving the intended results** have been identified at the project's inception (Doc 1):

- The main risks are related to the lacking foreseeability of how the political situation in Libya will evolve. If the government does not stabilise, differences between competing fractions could become even more acute. This might lead to a limitation of stakeholders' willingness to advocate an inclusive and sustainable economic, state and social model for Libya.
- Another risk is that ESCWA has not been mandated by the official Libyan Government, the GNA, to moderate this inclusive process of developing strategies and concepts for a future economic, state and social model. For these reasons, stakeholders may refuse to participate. Yet another risk is that ESCWA cannot acquire the USD 4,000,000 it has calculated as the total amount needed to implement the national dialogue process (component 1). The contribution envisaged by the financing agreement with GIZ will allow ESCWA to carry out basic work set out in component 1, but not take any additional measures such as preparing the implementation of strategies and road maps (outcome 1). In addition, there is the risk of ESCWA staff not being fully available throughout the project period, especially if the necessary funds cannot be acquired in a timely manner and salary payments cannot be guaranteed for the whole project duration. ESCWA was assuming to acquire additional funds to pay for the staff for the entire project period. If this negatively impacts the project's perception as not reliable and neutral, it may lead to a loss of credibility and support for the project by Libyan stakeholders. There is also a risk that although GIZ concludes the grant agreement with ESCWA and is responsible for implementation of component 1, its influence on ESCWA in terms of implementing the national dialogue process is de facto limited. Eventually, interrupted or delayed implementation of measures by ESCWA under component 1 (e.g. due to insufficient project funds), may cause delays in the implementation of components 2 and 3.
- Another issue potentially giving rise to implementation risks is that Libyan political leaders could be too absorbed with fundamental questions of power politics and for that reason will not get involved in shaping potential solutions. Finally, the selection of participants for the dialogue process and study trips is considered a sensitive issue. Conflicts among selected and non-selected candidates could arise. Participants could also abuse the dialogue processes for individual public messages.

According to its design, the project has made these **considerations for risk mitigation**:

- For political risks, the project's influence on stabilisation of the political situation was estimated to be limited, apart from its contribution to the dialogue process.
- Regarding the cooperation with ESCWA, the potential to influence the national dialogue's topics and process was assessed as 'medium' – mainly due to ESCWA's impartial mandate as a United Nations organisation and the diplomatic approach in the selection of stakeholders. Hence, it was clear from the outset that the project would not be able to ensure the national dialogue is implemented as planned and that conceptual, technical and qualitative standards are sufficiently observed. Accordingly, it was expected that the project will have limited influence on the achievement of objectives. Should there be delays in implementing the dialogue process under component 1, it will still be possible, to a limited extent, to independently implement measures in the areas of capacity building for policy makers and individual citizen participation under components 2 and 3.
- Concerning other issues, the process of selecting the participants should be specified after carrying out the in-depth conflict analysis. The intention is to structure the selection qualitatively and to allow both openness for extended participation formats and application possibilities. A jointly developed code of conduct and confidence-building among the participants will reduce the risk of instrumentalisation.

3 Evaluability and evaluation process

This chapter aims to clarify the availability and quality of data and the process of the evaluation.

3.1 Evaluability: data availability and quality

This section covers the following aspects:

- availability of essential documents,
- monitoring and baseline data including partner data, and
- secondary data.

Availability of essential documents: Most essential documents for the evaluation were made available to be assessed during the evaluation and are listed in the reference section at the end of the report. However, there are exceptions: the draft final products of the national dialogue process organised by ESCWA under component 1 were made available in Arabic only in May 2021 (the English translation was not finished until June 2021). This particularly relates to the vision and the policy papers, which are the key outputs for outlining options for a sustainable economic, state and social model of Libya. Also, due to delayed finalisation of the deliverables by ESCWA, they could not be considered in the evaluation interviews. Monitoring data with a results-based focus was available. Finally, a capacity development and overall strategy was not available; the project merely prepared a capacity-development strategy for the training of dialogue facilitators.

Monitoring and baseline data including partner data: A project-level monitoring system was in place. The project used the impact monitor (*Wirkungsmonitor*) to measure changes in key indicators. This GIZ internal web-based software monitors data and indicator progress for projects and programmes. All categories needed for a results-based management system are included: baseline values, yearly status update, sources for verification, time and frequency of data collection, and person in charge. The project's monitoring and evaluation manages and updates the data (some indicators twice a year, other indicators more frequently). For this purpose, progress reports on each component were produced. In addition, the project used a self-developed Excel based tool to monitor the project's risks at cluster level (staff safety and security, general context or situation specific risks, internal/institutional risks, risks related to the implementation of the project or programme, Covid-19). In addition, the evaluation used a self-developed risk monitoring tool which compiled the data of all projects in the Libya cluster. The cluster the project belonged to has a risk management team that was partly working from Tunisia and partly from Libya and constantly monitored the security situation. The risk management team regularly provided the project with reports on the security situation in Libya. However, this approach barely met the requirements of context and conflict-sensitive monitoring as it necessitates monitoring potential negative effects and do-no-harm aspects (due to the interaction of the project with the conflict context and vice versa). Ideally, escalating and deescalating factors/connector and dividers are supposed to be monitored as well.

The project did not apply the qualitative survey procedure (KOMPASS) to explore the different perspectives of key stakeholder groups. In addition, the project was unable to use the partners' monitoring and evaluation systems, but there was a continuous exchange and meetings between ESCWA and GIZ to share reports and information. However, there is no clear methodology for using this information in a continuous manner. The project also maintained a work plan that was revised annually as well as on an *ad hoc* basis (e.g. during steering/coordination meetings GIZ-ESCWA or GIZ-ESCWA-MoP), and which reflected updates of activity schedules including forecasts until the end of the project. The work plan was jointly developed between GIZ and ESCWA (early 2018) and regularly updated.

Regarding implementation of component 1, ESCWA had its own monitoring system in place, which included:

- Developing and continuously updating the work plan for the project activities, taking into consideration any political and health developments in Libya and the region,
- Following up on the developed work plans to make sure that the project's commitments are efficiently met,
- Drafting quarterly updates and highlighting the achievements made and featuring a projection of the planned activities for the following quarters/6 months,
- Developing a risk assessment matrix which was added to quarterly updates and the annual progress report of 2019,
- Conducting team meetings on a regular basis, to monitor and assess the progress made at the implementation level,
- Conducting coordination meetings with GIZ team and the Advisory Board members on a regular basis,
- Developing budget projection tables and updating the figures on a regular basis,
- Taking part of ESCWA's evaluation and monitoring exercise.

There was no collection of baseline information on the main indicators before the project led, or contributed, to changes. However, within component 1, the project was assigned with preparing three interrelated (socio-economic interrelationship) baseline studies on Libya's government institutions, economy and society with the help of Libyan and international experts. Preparation of these studies was the responsibility of ESCWA. Finalisation of these baseline studies has been very delayed as they were published in the second half of 2020 (Int_6, 24, Doc 9). Also, these baseline studies do not specifically relate to the project's results matrix, but to the general situation of Libya's government institutions, economy and society. For the evaluation, this meant that some baseline data could be extracted from the baseline studies, but partly had to be reconstructed. The main means for reconstructing baseline data have been interviews with key informants. They provided information relevant to the conditions existing before the start of the project.

Secondary data: The evaluation primarily relies on primary (survey) data as well as the project's monitoring data. National and international statistics have not been available to allow any triangulation.

3.2 Evaluation process

This section covers the following aspects:

- milestones of the evaluation process,
- involvement of stakeholders,
- selection of interviewees,
- data analysis process,
- roles of international and local evaluators,
- (semi-)remote evaluation (if applicable), and
- context and conflict sensitivity within the evaluation process (if applicable).

Figure 3: Milestones of the evaluation process



Involvement of stakeholders: The evaluation followed a participatory approach that fostered ownership for evaluation results and provided the basis for learning that can be used in future interventions in corresponding sectors. The participatory approach entails that the evaluation team described the purpose of the evaluation to the interview partners, was transparent about the methodology, considered the questions of the stakeholders and gave opportunities to provide feedback on findings. The approach has been implemented in the evaluation's inception phase, especially at the workshop, meetings and discussions held with the project team and key stakeholders. In this context, all these stakeholders have been invited to articulate specific knowledge interests in the evaluation (see section 1.2). A wide range of stakeholders has been involved in the evaluation. Overall, 25 interviews and two surveys (among advisory board members and another among participants of the national dialogue) were conducted during the evaluation. Due to its participatory approach, all interview partners, including external actors, were informed about the evaluation objective when first contacted for an appointment, and they received guiding questions in advance of the interview. As for the process of data collection, it should be noted that the response rate on interview requests and the surveys was low (roughly 50% on interview requests and about 25% on the surveys), partly also due to Ramadan. Especially, it was not possible to conduct a comprehensive interview with the project's focal point at the MoP during the evaluation mission, but very few government representatives were available for interviews. For this reason, data triangulation was not always possible and evidence strength was partially limited.

Selection of interviewees: Table 2 includes all interviewees and survey participants, which were included in the evaluation. The selection of interviewees has been agreed with GIZ project staff and was subject to prioritisation, weighing the importance for the project (degree of involvement and knowledge of the project) and availability.

Table 2: List of evaluation stakeholders and selected participants

Organisation/company/ target group	Overall number of persons involved in evaluation (including gender disaggregation)	No. of interview participants	No. of focus group participants	No. of workshop participants	No. of survey participants
Donors	2 (2m)	2			
BMZ, World Bank					
GIZ	8 (5m, 3f)	8			
GIZ project team, GIZ headquarters Germany and other GIZ projects: GIZ project 'Support for municipalities in Libya', GIZ project 'Promoting decentralisation to contribute to stability in Libya'.					
Partner organisations (direct target group)	6 (4m, 2f)	6			
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Ministry of Planning of Libya					
Other stakeholders (e.g. public actors, other development projects)	5 (4m, 1f)	5			
Member of the SED project's advisory board, municipality of Derj					
Civil society and private sector actors	3 (3m)	3			
Barqa Organisation					

Organisation/company/ target group	Overall number of persons involved in evaluation (including gender disaggregation)	No. of interview participants	No. of focus group participants	No. of workshop participants	No. of survey participants
Universities and think tanks	3 (2m, 1f)	3			
Libyan academic experts assigned with elaborating the 3 baseline studies for the project					
Final beneficiaries/ indirect target groups (sum)	48				
Participants of the national dialogue process (Libyans in and outside Libya from academia, politics, business and civil society including women and youth groups) with a broad range of regional backgrounds (see section 4.5 for specification).					48
Note: f = female; m = male					

Data analysis process: Qualitative interviews were documented using interview protocols. The results of the interviews and other forms of data collection (document analysis, monitoring data) were subsequently documented as per the evaluation questions in the evaluation matrix. Additionally, the evaluation team was allowed to use the results of an online survey among the 200 participants of the national dialogue process. The survey was carried out by another evaluation team commissioned by ESCWA parallel to this evaluation to evaluate the results of GIZ's grant for the dialogue process. In the context of their evaluation, the team asked participants about (i) their background and (ii) assessment of the dialogue process (response rate was about 25%). Primary quantitative survey data collected as part of the evaluation was handled in accordance with the highest standards of data collection, storage and analysis ensuring protection of data and sources. A combination of different empirical methods served to counterbalance their individual limitations. Qualitative interviews offered the strength of analysing causal relationships and their explanations in great depth and helped to interpret the quantitative survey results. Quantitative surveys as well as the various forms of triangulation therefore counterbalanced the risk of biases of qualitative data collection. Researcher, data and method triangulation took place at various points during data collection and data analysis. Among others, the evaluation team ensured researcher triangulation by reflecting the interview results on a regular basis.

Roles of international and local evaluators: The evaluation team comprised an international and a local evaluator. The evaluators built up a strong team rapport and established an effective and fruitful working relationship. Whenever possible, both evaluators took shared roles in central tasks throughout the evaluation process. Research was coordinated through common interpretation and analysis of the available data. The tasks were divided according to the evaluators' specific knowledge: the international evaluator assumed overall responsibility for the evaluation as team leader and was responsible for the quality and consideration of methodological requirements for evaluation design, the drafting of evaluation questions, data analysis and writing the evaluation report. The local evaluator was mostly responsible for drafting interview transcripts and provided data analysis and input for the evaluation report.

Remote evaluation: The evaluation was planned to be conducted remotely (international evaluator in Germany, local evaluator in Egypt) from the outset due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing conflict in Libya which made trips to Libya impossible. Hence, the workshops with the project team as well as interviews

and surveys were conducted using online communication tools or over the phone. Most stakeholders were accessible virtually, also because major parts of the project were implemented virtually.

Context and conflict sensitivity within the evaluation process: The evaluation as such was an intervention in a fragile environment. Due to the conflict sensitivity guided by the do-no-harm principle and to avoid unintended and/or indirect negative results, the political, security, cultural and religious aspects were considered carefully for the evaluation process. The approach and methods used in the evaluation have been used in such way that they do not lead to any sensitive situations implying negative impact on the evaluation process, on the partners and/or the beneficiaries. Because of this, focus group discussions were not carried out in the evaluation as they might have triggered conflicts among participants. Moreover, every effort was made to capture opinions of stakeholders from a broad range in terms of regional, political and tribal backgrounds.

4 Assessment according to OECD/DAC criteria

4.1 Impact and sustainability of predecessor projects

The 'Socio-economic Dialogue in Libya' project was a stand-alone TC measure newly initiated at the beginning of the period under evaluation. Therefore, this section of the report does not apply to the evaluation.

4.2 Relevance

This section analyses and assesses the relevance of the project.

Summarising assessment and rating of relevance

Table 3: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: relevance

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Relevance	Alignment with policies and priorities	30 out of 30 points
	Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	25 out of 30 points
	Appropriateness of the design*	5 out of 20 points
	Adaptability – response to change	15 out of 20 points
Relevance total score and rating		Score: **75 out of 100 points** Rating: **Level 3: moderately successful**

The project contributed to several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and was relevant to the overall national policies and priorities for Libya's future development despite a lack of overarching strategies in this regard. It was well aligned with the sectoral policies and strategies of BMZ. The project also addressed the needs and capacities of its beneficiaries and stakeholders. However, the buy-in of government institutions in the dialogue process was low, mainly because of ESCWA's 'apolitical' approach in keeping the GNA and representatives of competing government institutions in Libya out of the process for reasons of neutrality. The project design had shortcomings, because it was partly inappropriate and unrealistic for achieving the intended

objectives. These deficiencies were due to the strong dependency of those components of the project which GIZ was supposed to be implementing as opposed to those that ESCWA was taking care of. Another facet of the project's suboptimal design was its reliance on the GNA's MoP as the project's political partner. This was incongruent with ESCWA's approach to not recognise the MoP as an official implementing partner of the national dialogue for reasons of neutrality. Additionally, some of the planned results have proved too ambitious and not realistic, considering the fragile and dynamic conditions, the project's short term, its limited budget and the existing risks. In terms of adaptability, the project navigated well through its extremely volatile environment by updating the implementation strategy, but it was hesitant in addressing strategy changes by a subsequent modification of the results matrix.

In total, the relevance of the project is rated as Level 3: moderately successful, with 75 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of relevance

The relevance criterion analyses the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are in line with national, international and BMZ strategies and consistent with stakeholders' needs and capacities and the extent to which the concept is appropriately designed to meet them. Additionally, the criterion assesses the project's adaptability to change. All dimensions and their respective designs are detailed in table 6. Assessments were made based on global, national as well as BMZ-related policies and strategies, interviews and the online surveys conducted during the inception and evaluation mission.

Relevance dimension 1: Alignment with policies and priorities

On the **global level**, the project contributes to the SDGs of the Agenda 2030. More specifically, the project contributed to SDG 16 which aims 'to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. SDG 16 recognises that conflict, insecurity, weak institutions and limited access to justice remain a great threat to sustainable development. The more specific targets of SDG 16 are to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere (16.1); to develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels (16.6); to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels (16.7); and to strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime (16A). The project touched on all these targets in its efforts to set up and facilitate inclusive and participatory dialogue processes at the national and subnational levels and building capacities of governmental institutions, but also other stakeholders involved such as CSOs. Due to its special focus on disadvantaged groups, for example women and youth, the project also contributed to SDG 5 on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls – especially its target 5.5 to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.

The project's approach was adapted to the objectives of the GNA such as the Libyan 'Vision 2030' process. This process was launched in 2013 by the MoP for the renaissance of the country and improving economic conditions. Therefore, it can be assumed that the project was also relevant to overall **national policies and priorities** of Libya. However, assessing this question faced challenges. First, there were no up-to-date and approved national strategies on which the evaluation could rely. As Libya was in dire need for a new vision and strategy, it was the project's main objective to develop such orientation through the means of socio-economic dialogue. In the past, there had been many attempts to develop and adopt a national strategy for Libya, but they all more or less failed. In 2007, the Benghazi Center for Studies was commissioned to prepare a national strategy covering economic, political and social aspects, but the strategy was suspended due to the 2011 revolution. In 2012, the National Planning Council commissioned Libyan experts to prepare Libya's 2025 Vision under the supervision of the Economic Development Board. Libya's 2040 Vision was presented as an

extension of the vision by Benghazi Center for Studies and Research in 2007. However, none of the Libyan Governments adopted these visions. In 2013, the interim government appointed a committee of 50 multidisciplinary Libyan experts to develop Libya's 2030 Vision. This Vision was outlined in a presentation but not submitted in writing (Doc 21, Int_1), nor was the presentation accessible for the project and the evaluation team. Despite these shortcomings, the project relied on the 2030 Vision in the design of its project objective indicator 1 (outcome 1). Furthermore, in accepting to become the project's direct counterpart and supporting its implementation, the MoP implicitly stated the project as such is in its interest and thus also relevant in terms of the GNA's national policies and priorities. However, due to limited availability of representatives from the (new) Libyan Government (especially the project's focal point at the MoP) for interviews in the context of the evaluation as well as the delayed finalisation of the Policy Papers and the Vision, it was hard to assess whether the key outputs of the national dialogue process could sufficiently respond to national policies and priorities. However, several interviewees with strong links to the Libyan Government confirmed that the strategic approaches and products developed by the project are in line with the national priorities and policies (Int_6, 9, 18, 22).

Regarding the alignment of the project to **policies and strategies related to BMZ and/or the German Federal Government as a whole**, one should note that BMZ has not yet prepared a country strategy for Libya. However, the project aligned well with a couple of sectoral policies and strategies applicable to the project. First, the German Federal Government's 'Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace' dated of 2017 explicitly promote national dialogues as a suitable approach and instrument for societies, including marginalised populations, to renegotiate the basics of their coexistence during a post-conflict phase. The purpose of these national dialogues is to help develop, consolidate or restore the basic consensus necessary for a functioning political system. The guidelines also underline that the German Federal Government is committed to supporting such dialogue processes, for example by providing advice and financial resources. In promoting national dialogue for post-conflict resolution, the guidelines explicitly mention additional options that have been followed by the project such as (i) identification of the agents of change in civil society and enhancing their contribution to constructive conflict resolution; (ii) supporting the institutionalisation of participation processes and strengthening the capacity of government authorities to engage with civil society involvement; and (iii) strengthening subnational governmental and administrative structures, among others to bolster confidence in state structures and to peacefully resolve socio-political conflicts (German Federal Government, 2017). Second, several BMZ strategy and concept papers support the project's approach: BMZ's strategy paper 'Development for peace and security' also promotes dialogue as an instrument to overcome conflict (BMZ, 2013). BMZ's 'Strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 development policy' aims to foster dialogue between civil society, business and the academic and research community with a view to finding common, inclusive and value-oriented approaches to development that make full use of the comparative advantages offered by each of the various actors (BMZ, 2014a). Finally, third, the project's approach to focus on strengthening the rights and participation of women was in line with BMZ's strategies as articulated in BMZ's strategy paper 'Gender equality in German development policy' (BMZ, 2014b).

One should also note that the project contributed to implementing the strategic framework of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) for the period 2018/19 as a **regional strategy of an international organisation**. As such, the United Nations General Assembly's programme planning mentions the project as 'a platform for Libyans to formulate, discuss, evaluate and advocate a future socio-economic vision to achieve stability and development in Libya' (UN, 2019).

As the project was implemented in a fragile context, it is also important to assess how the project addressed the **conflict context** in which it was implemented. In this regard, document analysis demonstrates that the conflict and fragility context was adequately analysed and integrated into the project design through a comprehensive peace and conflict analysis (PCA) (Doc 3). Furthermore, the project proposal adequately analysed the context and weighed associated risks by addressing all relevant dimensions of fragility (Doc 1).

This also holds true for ESCWA's initial proposal for the national dialogue process: 'Libya Socio-economic Dialogue Project: Alternative paths to sustainable and inclusive development' (Doc 19). In the project's implementation, the conflict context has been addressed by defining selection criteria for participants of the national dialogue process. Among others, the criteria required that participants are 'able to prove not being directly or indirectly involved in any armed groups, networks, conflict or criminal groups, militias, or named on either the EU or UN sanctions list' and 'committed to engaging in constructive dialogue with a diverse range of stakeholders with possibly opposing views and finding areas of consensus and space for constructive compromises' (Doc 24). A variety of interviewees could confirm that these selection criteria have been observed (Int_7, 11, 13) and that the national dialogue process was a deescalating factor regarding the ongoing conflict as such (Int_9, 14).

Relevance dimension 1 – Alignment with policies and priorities – scores **30 out of 30 points.**

Relevance dimension 2: Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

The second evaluation dimension deals with the suitability of the project design to match the specific needs of its different target groups. According to its proposal, the project's direct target group are the **participants of the socio-economic dialogue processes** such as leaders and representatives of a broad range of society groups in Libya (from politics, business, trade unions, academia, civil society including women and youth groups, etc.). An additional direct target group were **Libyan Government stakeholders in charge of the political process** – their strategic and implementation capacities were supposed to be strengthened through international exchange. Finally, due to the project's additional involvement subnationally, **representatives of the country's local communities** are considered another direct target group. Ultimately, it was hoped that the **entire Libyan population** would benefit from implementation of an inclusive economic, state and social model in Libya. Hence, it can be considered as indirect target group (final beneficiaries).

According to an advisory board member, the ESCWA-implemented **national dialogue process** as a whole was extremely important. This was because it was a Libyan–Libyan dialogue that took place in an appropriate scientific and knowledge environment, without restrictions or limitations. There were also the serious and effective participation of experts and advisors, which encouraged a progressive exchange of views and information circulation that influenced the dialogue and concluded with positive results (survey among members of the advisory board). This perspective was largely shared by other project stakeholders (Int_7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18). In an online survey among participants of the national dialogue, 29.2% out of a total of 48 respondents confirmed that the dialogue was 'very relevant' to the priorities and needs of the Libyan people, whereas 64.6% assessed it as 'relevant', 6.2% as 'a little relevant' and 0% as 'not relevant.'

For ensuring that the topics covered by the dialogue process meet the priorities, needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders, ESCWA held a couple of physical preparatory meetings in 2019 in Tunis. The first meeting hosted 19 Libyan experts and members of the advisory board, representatives from GIZ, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the MoP. It was aimed to advise ESCWA on the building blocks of three baseline studies. During the meeting, it was agreed that the first baseline study covers the economy, the second is related to social issues and the third will deal with governance, institutional structures and capacities. The outline of the three baseline studies was presented and discussed at the second meeting, which also hosted a number of Libyan and international experts and members of the advisory board, representatives from GIZ and the MoP. The meeting included an exchange on feedback and directions to prepare the final version of the baseline studies and integrate them in one cohesive and thorough study on present-day Libya. In addition, the second meeting featured several sessions of an in-depth discussion by the Libyan participants to formulate the criteria and select approximately 14–15 priority topics. These topics, which pertain to state-building, peacebuilding and socio-economic development in Libya, were finally discussed with major stakeholders involved at the third and last meeting. Additionally, the third meeting was used to finalise

the three baseline studies incorporating the viewpoints of experts who only recently joined the preparatory process. In sum, the thorough preparation for the dialogue process did in fact ensure that priorities, needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders were optimally met (Doc 6, 8, Int_11, 24).

When assessing the project's alignment with the needs and capacities of Libyan Government stakeholders in charge of the political process, one should take into account that the project's focal point at the MoP was closely involved in the above-mentioned preparatory process for the dialogue process. Despite this, implementation of the dialogue proved that the buy-in of government institutions in this process was not at all strong (Int_9, 18). It is not clear why that was the case. One reason might have been that Libyan government officials have no practice in attending any virtual meetings, especially the government leadership. Therefore, the dialogue, which had to be carried out virtually due to the Covid-19 pandemic, might not have been convincing to them. Face-to-face meetings would have attracted more attention (Int_9). Another potential reason is that ESCWA followed an 'apolitical' approach by keeping the GNA, as well as representatives of competing government institutions in Libya, out of the dialogue process for reasons of neutrality. In fact, ESCWA did not want government institutions (as such) to be involved; instead, government representatives were invited to participate in their individual capacity (Int_22, see also relevance dimension 3 below). By the same token, the relationship between the MoP and ESCWA was not smooth (Int_9), also because the MoP insisted on having government institutions on board. Due to these incompatible points of view, the MoP did not make great efforts in involving government representatives. However, low participation of government officials in the dialogue process does not per se allow specific conclusions on deficiencies in alignment with the needs and capacities of Libyan Government stakeholders, but it indicates something went wrong in attracting and involving this important direct target group. Unfortunately, the specific reasons could not be clarified in the evaluation by questioning government representatives as they were not available for interviews. Meanwhile, a positive example for the project's alignment with the Libyan Governments needs and capacities was that it committed to train a pool of Libyan dialogue facilitators, because it happened at the explicit request of the MoP (Doc 14, Int_3).

As regards the project's alignment with the needs and capacities of **local communities' representatives**, the assessment basis is just one subnational dialogue conducted by the project. Interviews with dialogue stakeholders, however, could confirm that there was a strong need for implementing such dialogue at the municipal level and that the outcome was highly positive (Int_8, 15).

Finally, it is hard to assess whether the project was able to align with the needs and capacities of the **entire population of Libya** as an indirect target group. However, the evaluation team assumes that Libya's entire population was well represented in the national dialogue process which involved a total of 190 stakeholders from all walks of life (Doc 12). Furthermore, the dialogue sessions were shared on social media and received feedback from that source (Doc 9, Int_22).

Conflict sensitivity in the project design

Beyond the direct needs and capacities of the target groups, the project considered **deescalating factors and connectors** as well as **escalating factors and dividers** both in the project's design and its implementation. The most important factors here are state and societal dissolution due to intra-regional conflict, as well as social and economic exclusion of marginalised groups. Tables 5 and 6 provide an overview of escalating factors (dividers)[1] and deescalating factors (connectors)[2] identified in the project context, according to the PCA provided by the project (Doc 3). Additionally, these tables indicate which of these factors have been considered in the project design. In this regard, it can be highlighted that the project made great effort to strike a balance regarding stakeholders involved (Int_7, 11, 22, 24). This holds true for the members of the advisory board, the

[1] Escalating factors: e.g. destructive institutions, structures, norms and behaviour. For more details, see: GIZ (2007).

[2] Deescalating factors: e.g. peace-promoting actors and institutions, structural changes, peace-promoting norms and behaviour. For more details, see: GIZ (2007).

experts involved in elaborating baseline studies and policy papers and the participants of the national dialogue process. Finally, ESCWA followed a so-called apolitical approach for implementing the dialogue. On the one hand, this implied that political and security topics were excluded from the discussions. On the other, it meant that ESCWA also kept distance to specific stakeholders such as the GNA, but also to international organisations such as UNSMIL and the World Bank, due to the fact that Libyan stakeholders perceived them as being parties to or part of the conflict (Int_22). In sum, deescalating factors and connectors as well as escalating factors and dividers have been sufficiently considered both in the project design and its implementation.

Table 4: Dividers/escalating factors in the project context

Which dividers/escalating factors were identified in the project context?	Addressed by the project? (yes/no)	If addressed, how is it considered by the project design?
Civil war and intra-state escalation of violence	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Exclusion of political and security topics from national dialogue. • Support actors calling for reconciliation and compromise. • Exclusion of violent actors from the national dialogue. • Inclusion of marginalised groups (leave no one behind). • Adaptive and flexible steering of project, establishment of an advisory board comprising Libyan stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds.
Fragility and state disintegration	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups. • Adaptive and flexible steering of project, establishment of an advisory board comprising Libyan stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds.
Economic instability and financial crisis	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Preparation of Baseline study 1 on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan economy, coverage of respective topics in dialogue process. • Support the development of state institutions at the services of the Libyan people. • Support the development of strategies, policies and processes for inclusive and sustainable management and redistribution of country's wealth. • Support the development of a diversified economy and labour market.
Governance deficits and political crisis	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups. • Preparation of Baseline study 3 on the status, challenges and prospects of governance and institutions in Libya, coverage of respective topics in dialogue process. • Support the development of state institutions at the services of the Libyan people and respective capacity building.
Societal exclusion and social tensions	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups.

Which dividers/escalating factors were identified in the project context?	Addressed by the project? (yes/no)	If addressed, how is it considered by the project design?
		• Preparation of Baseline study 2 on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan society, coverage of respective topics in dialogue process. • Inclusion of marginalised groups (leave no one behind) with targeted measures for reaching women and youth. • Use of digital tools to decrease exclusion.
Human rights violations, legal insecurity, and discrimination of specific groups	Yes	• Integrate human rights and rule of law into dialogue processes; advocate for the implementation of international law in the framework of project measures.
Covid-19 pandemic	Yes	• Shift to web-based dialogue and event formats.

Table 5: Connectors/deescalating factors in the project context

Which deescalating factors/connectors were identified in the project context?	Addressed by the project? (yes/no)	If addressed, how is it considered by the project design?
Peace and reconciliation	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Exclusion of political and security topics from national dialogue. • Support actors calling for reconciliation and compromise. • Exclusion of violent actors from the national dialogue. • Inclusion of marginalised groups (leave no one behind). • Adaptive and flexible steering of project, establishment of an advisory board comprising Libyan stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds.
Stability and state consolidation	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups. • Adaptive and flexible steering of project, establishment of an advisory board comprising Libyan stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds.
Economic stability and social equality	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Preparation of Baseline study 1 on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan economy, coverage of respective topics in dialogue process. • Support the development of state institutions at the services of the Libyan people. • Support the development of strategies, policies and processes for inclusive and sustainable management and redistribution of the country's wealth. • Support the development of a diversified economy and labour market.
Strengthening of state institutions and good governance	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, State and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups. • Preparation of Baseline study 3 on the status, challenges and prospects of governance and institutions in Libya, coverage of respective topics in the dialogue process.

Which deescalating factors/connectors were identified in the project context?	Addressed by the project? (yes/no)	If addressed, how is it considered by the project design?
		• Support the development of state institutions at the services of the Libyan people and respective capacity building.
Societal integration and participation	Yes	• Support a national dialogue on a common vision for the Libyan economy, state and society. • Support inclusive capacities for governmental services to benefit all groups. • Preparation of Baseline study 2 on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan society, coverage of respective topics in the dialogue process. • Inclusion of marginalised groups (leave no one behind) with targeted measures for reaching women and youth. • Use of digital tools to decrease exclusion.
Securing human rights and equal treatment of all groups under the law	No	• Integrate human rights and rule of law into dialogue processes; advocate for the implementation of international law in the framework of project measures.

Relevance dimension 2 – Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders – scores **25 out of 30 points.**

Relevance dimension 3: Appropriateness of the design

This dimension assesses the appropriateness of the project's objective and results model, with its outputs, activities, instruments and results hypotheses, as well as its implementation strategy. Overall, the project design had shortcomings, because it was partly inappropriate and unrealistic to achieve its intended objectives. For assessing this dimension, the results model and underlying hypotheses, as described in section 2.2, serve as a central basis for the evaluation.

As mentioned before, the results model was reconstructed during the evaluation's inception phase. It reflects the three components of the project (colours are used to visualise which component the results belong to) and there is a logical relationship between most of the project's results, outputs and the outcomes. Generally, the results as well as their underlying assumptions appear to be plausible and are also addressed at target group level. However, one of the key underlying assumptions for the entire project was that a window of opportunity exists for conducting a socio-economic dialogue process in Libya. This question of whether the project's timing was right has been raised by some stakeholders in the inception phase (see section 1.1). The answers given by interviewees have been diverse. Some complained about the fact that the project was delayed and that it did not take the advantage of the right momentum (Int_9); others pointed out that from a retrospective point of view the timing was just right, because the project's key results were available after the conflict has come to an end, there is a new interim government in place in Libya, and general elections are planned for December 2021 (Int_22). Probably, an answer to this question is somewhere in between both positions: on the one hand, the end of the civil war and a new unified government present a window of opportunity. On the other hand, however, peace in Libya has proved to be quite fragile in the recent past, and it is unclear if the new interim government will have any interest in the vision and the policy papers produced by the project.

The results model's system boundaries are clearly defined and plausible. As mentioned in the contribution story, almost all output-level results under component 1 lie halfway within and outside the project's system boundary (sphere of responsibility), except for setting up and strengthening the advisory board (R6). For output A and outcome 1, this implies that the project's direct influence on their achievement is significantly limited. In addition, the results model shows that many results within the project's system boundaries are linked with and/or dependent on results (partly) outside the system boundary and vice versa (e.g. R27/R5, R1/R15,

R2/R14 on output level). The strong dependency of those components of the project which GIZ was supposed to implement as opposed to those ESCWA was taking care of has proved a major shortcoming of the project's design. First, it was unrealistic that GIZ would be able to steer ESCWA's implementation of the dialogue process. Although ESCWA was a subcontractor to GIZ formally, it was unrealistic that a regional UN organisation would behave like a service provider in implementation (Int_21). In fact, it was clear from the project's outset that ESCWA had its own (political) agenda bearing in mind that the initial proposal for a socio-economic dialogue process in Libya came from ESCWA (Doc 19). Accordingly, the project proposal considered the risk that ESCWA carries the responsibility for implementing the national dialogue process, whereas GIZ, in turn, had little influence on the implementation of measures under component 1 or the achievement of the indicator 1 and of output A. However, no appropriate mitigation measures were put in place. On the contrary, in the project proposal's logic, interventions at such as surveys and subnational dialogues, were planned to follow the national dialogues in terms of time and content, as outcomes at national level were supposed to be shared with and validated by the local population (see section 4.4). These interlinkages and interdependencies have caused fundamental problems when implementation of the national dialogue became more and more delayed. In fact, they made it hard or partly even impossible to implement components 2 and 3 according to their underlying logic.

Another facet of the project's suboptimal design was its reliance on the GNA. Accordingly, the GNA's MoP was designated the project's political partner, and activities under components 2 were designed for strengthening capacities of policy makers within the MoP. This reliance on the GNA was incongruent with ESCWA's approach to collaborate with the MoP 'behind the scenes' as best possible, but to not recognise the MoP as an official implementing partner of the national dialogue. As mentioned below (see relevance dimension 2), such an approach was necessary for keeping distance to all stakeholders directly involved in the ongoing conflict – and the GNA was de facto a party in the civil war even though it was the UN-recognised government of Libya. Otherwise, the neutrality of those actors facilitating the dialogue would not have been given. ESCWA underlined that the incongruency in the approach was pointed out repeatedly at the project's inception (Int_22). In fact, this approach caused much discussion among the implementing partners (GIZ, ESCWA and the GNA) during implementation and could not be solved to the satisfaction of all parties. One of the consequences was that the GNA's interest and ownership in the dialogue decreased more and more (Int_23). Additionally, the project was not positioned to incentivise the interest of GNA officials in the project, for example by organising study trips to foreign countries. This was partly due to the project's limited financial resources, but of course also due to the ongoing conflict and the pandemic (Group_Int_1). Overall, the project's design was much too broad, covering a wide range of intervention areas which was too demanding relative to the limited financial resources available. The project therefore had no other choice than to limit its scope and ambition.

Furthermore, some of the planned results have proved being too ambitious and not realistic, considering the fragile and dynamic conditions, the project's short term, its limited budget and the existing risks. One example was the project's stated objective at impact level, according to the proposal, to 'contribute to social cohesion, confidence-building in government institutions, economic stabilisation and the development of prospects for the younger generation in Libya'. This was not at all realistic given the GNA only controlled parts of the country and its highly limited influence became even worse during the project duration. Another too ambitious and thus not realistically planned result was to organise study trips to countries with similar problems in Europe, other Middle East and North African countries or other regions (e.g. Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Norway). This was not possible due to budget constraints.

However, at least risks identified in the project proposal accurately represented the situation the project actually faced during implementation (except for the pandemic risk which was, of course, not identified at the project's inception) – unfortunately, most of these risks became reality. Eventually, the design of specific indicators had some shortcomings. Project objective indicator 1 (outcome 1) mentions, and is based on, the Libya 2030 process: 'In the context of the Libyan "Vision 2030" process, strategy documents and one road map are

available for each of five socio-economic policy areas.' However, the project did not get hold of any document describing the process and it was also not clear what the cornerstones of the process are.

Relevance dimension 3 – Appropriateness of the design – scores **5 out of 20 points.**

Relevance dimension 4: Adaptability – response to change

This dimension analyses whether changes in the general conditions, e.g. the political, security and regulatory context, took place and to what extent these changes have been taken up by the project. In accordance with the assessment of the other dimensions of the relevance criterion, the evaluation further examines whether the adaptations reflect relevant and appropriate adjustments to the changing conditions under which the project operates.

The project was implemented in an extremely fragile and volatile environment. This was particularly true for the security context. Whereas travel to Libya was possible in principle at the project's inception, the escalating conflict did not allow any travel to Libya during most of the project's term (Group_Int_1). The worsening security situation due to the civil war had significant implications on the political situation as the GNA, especially when Tripoli was under siege in 2019, temporarily became a government with extremely limited power over the country's territory.

The project's design and strategy have been modified during project implementation. These modifications were necessary due to a change in the external conditions for implementing the project. Apparently, the project was forced to change its strategy of implementation due to the escalating conflict in Libya and the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Among others, the socio-economic dialogue process had to be conducted online as opposed to the initially planned physical format (Doc 9). Another major shift in the project's strategy was the training of dialogue facilitators in 2019, which was initiated upon request of the MoP although it was not planned according to the project's design. However, it was included to ensure that the project's results can be sustained (Doc 6). With this newly integrated capacity-development approach, the project built the capacity of local dialogue facilitators by training 15 national dialogue moderators who afterwards qualified an additional 25 dialogue moderators to work at the subnational level (Doc 14). From the evaluators' point of view, the inclusion of the approach was an excellent move by the project, also in terms of sustainability.

In addition, there have been specific developments in its environment on which the project did not react with any change in strategy. One of these is the fact that the grant agreement with ESCWA, concluded after the project had been commissioned by BMZ, did not reflect the project's results matrix. Instead of 'strategy documents and one road map … for each of five socio-economic policy areas' as planned by project objective/ module indicator 1, the grant agreement required ESCWA to develop a future vision for Libyan and policy options for realising the future vision, but no road maps (see section 4.4 below). By this, it was apparent at an early stage that the project would face problems in achieving objective indicator 1. However, there was no written communication with BMZ on this discrepancy. Another issue was the growing delay in the national dialogue's implementation. This problem also became tangible early in the project's term as already reported in the 2018 progress report (Doc 5). For the project management, it was clear that the constantly growing delay would have significant negative implications for implementing the planned subnational-level activities on validating the results of the national dialogue process. Finally, the project management decided that it would not be possible to organise any study trips to foreign countries due to the project's limited financial resources (compared to the significant cost of such trips), security constraints and the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic (Group_Int_1).

The project was hesitant in addressing any of these changes in its environment by a subsequent modification of the results matrix agreed with BMZ. Nor have the consequences of the changes in its environment been spelled out to BMZ in project progress reporting. Reasons given by the project for such avoidance of

adaptation, especially towards any modification of the results matrix, were an overly complex planning processes; the fact that the project had been planned before the BMZ/GIZ Joint Procedural Reform; and a constantly changing situation which would have meant a new project proposal being drafted too often, etc. Accordingly, major changes in the project's strategy have not been explicitly communicated to and approved by BMZ, although BMZ has been notified about some of them in project progress reports.

Certainly, the necessity for some of these adaptations might have been avoided by a more suitable project design from the outset. The project management would have been better advised to adapt the project's results matrix at an early stage and to communicate more clearly to BMZ on developments in its environment, which impeded smooth project implementation as planned. However, the project showed a lot of flexibility in its approach when it agreed to train dialogue facilitators at the request of its political partner and the move to virtual meetings in the dialogue process.

Relevance dimension 4 – Adaptability – response to change – scores **15 out of 20 points.**

Methodology for assessing relevance

Table 6: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: relevance

Relevance: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Alignment with policies and priorities	Relevance in this dimension is achieved if the project's design is aligned with key strategic frameworks such as: • BMZ's concept paper on support for good governance in development cooperation, 2009. • BMZ's strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 development policy. 2014. • BMZ's strategy paper on development for peace and security, 2013. • BMZ's strategy paper on gender equality in German development policy, 2014. • BMZ's 2030 reform strategy, 2020. • The German Federal Government's Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace, 2017.	Evaluation design: The evaluation design followed the questions from the evaluation matrix. No specific evaluation design was applied. **Empirical methods:** • Document analysis (project proposal, strategic frameworks), • Semi-structured interviews with project staff, partners and key stakeholders.	• Key documents for assessing relevance were available. • Representatives of the Libyan Government could not be interviewed during the evaluation mission. • Overall, response rate for interviews was low. • For this reason, data triangulation was not always possible. • Evidence strength is therefore limited. • Finally, access to direct and indirect target groups also proved difficult due to conflict/fragile context.
Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	Relevance in this dimension is achieved if the project's design is aligned with the needs of its target groups. **Direct target groups:**	Evaluation design: By way of a needs assessment, the evaluation team differentiated between needs of all identified	See above.

	• Participants of the socio-economic dialogue processes such as leaders and representatives of a broad range of society groups in Libya. • Libyan government officials in charge of the political process. • Representatives of Libya's local communities. **Indirect target groups:** • Entire population of Libya (represented by participants of socio-economic dialogue).	target groups. **Empirical methods:** • Document analysis (project proposal and reconstructed results model). • Semi-structured interviews with project staff, partners as well as other stakeholders. • Survey among members of the advisory board.	
Appropriateness of design*	Relevance in this dimension is achieved if the project's results model and project offer adequately address the baseline conditions identified at the outset of the project.	Evaluation design: To assess the plausibility of hypotheses, objectives and other elements of the results model, the evaluation team assessed the project offer. Further, it followed the questions of the evaluation matrix. **Empirical methods:** Document review Semi-structured interviews with project staff, partners as well as other stakeholders.	See above
Adaptability – response to change	Relevance in this dimension is achieved if the project's results model and other steering instruments have been adapted to changing contextual factors over the course of the project.	Evaluation design: To assess the adaptability to change, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the project adapted to changed conditions. **Empirical methods:** Document review. Semi-structured interviews with project staff, partners as well as other stakeholders.	See above

* The project design encompasses the project's objective and theory of change (GIZ results model, graphic illustration and narrative results hypotheses) with outputs, activities, instruments and results hypotheses as well as the implementation strategy (e.g. methodological approach, capacity-development strategy, results hypotheses).

4.3 Coherence

This section analyses and assesses the coherence of the project. It is structured according to the assessment dimensions in the GIZ project **evaluation matrix** (see Annex).

Summarising assessment and rating of coherence

Table 7: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: coherence

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Coherence	Internal coherence	36 out of 50 points
	External coherence	45 out of 50 points
Overall score and rating		Score: **81 out of 100 points** Rating: **Level 2: successful**

Overall, the evaluation results show that internal coherence has mostly been achieved. The project fitted well into GIZ's overall Libya portfolio, and the project management sought close and fruitful cooperation and exchange with other GIZ projects in Libya and made efforts to create linkages as well as possible. However, the evaluation team had the impression that potential collaboration with other projects could have been better exploited. Although the project achieved external coherence by its efforts in attracting additional funding from other donors, exchange and cooperation with other international organisations involved in Libya was limited on purpose. This was because the national dialogue participants perceived these organisations as being involved in the ongoing conflict; and to ensure a Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven dialogue process.

In total, the coherence of the project is rated as Level 2: successful, with 81 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of coherence

Coherence dimension 1: Internal coherence

The coherence criterion analyses the extent to which a development intervention is compatible with other interventions in the country, sector and institution. Dimension 1 (internal coherence) thereby investigates synergies, trade-offs and links with other GIZ projects, as well as the consistency of the project's implementation with GIZ's governing principles and standards. The evaluation assessed the project's internal coherence on the basis of interviews with GIZ project staff and other relevant GIZ staff of other projects implemented in Libya. These were: (1) the GIZ project on 'Support for municipalities in Libya' (SML); (2) the GIZ project 'Promoting decentralisation to contribute to stability in Libya'; and (3) the GIZ project 'Promoting youth for peaceful development in Libya'.

When looking at the coherence of the project with these other GIZ projects in Libya, it is apparent that they were complementary although the others were oriented more towards technical support (while the project was a highly political project). Furthermore, GIZ has a cluster structure in place in Libya for strengthening the internal coherence of the GIZ projects. According to interviews, the project has some overlap with these projects as they also focus on capacity development and support for subnational development, especially on the Support for municipalities in Libya project (objective: 'Municipal capacity has increased, and local authorities are able to provide efficient public services') and the project for promoting political participation of young people (objective: 'Youth multipliers and local administrations increasingly have the capacity to promote social and political participation'). Basically, all these build on the SML project as the starting point of GIZ's engagement in Libya, and interviewees stated that the project fitted well into GIZ's overall Libya project

portfolio (Int_21). There was close and fruitful cooperation and exchange with other GIZ projects in Libya and efforts were made to ensure as good a collaboration as possible (Int_21). A good example was the inclusion of other projects' staff in the training for dialogue facilitators (Int_17). Nevertheless, the evaluation team had the impression that potential synergies with other projects could have been even better exploited. For example, the SML project supported a number of municipal dialogue processes for preparing local economic development plans and provided support on participatory planning to improve basic public services, which also necessitated dialogue processes (Int_17). In particular, the project's training of dialogue facilitators was an opportunity to involve them in the dialogue processes carried out by other projects in terms of optimising collaboration, but apparently this potential was only minimally exploited (Int_16, 17). The main reason for this was that the timing did not match. This limitation of the project's reaching out to municipalities was a pity as there proved to be great need and interest for conducting participatory dialogues in municipalities (Int_15).

Coherence dimension 1 – Internal coherence – scores **36 out of 50 points**.

Coherence dimension 2: External coherence

This dimension deals with the project's complementarity with interventions from the partner country and other bilateral and multilateral donors. It therefore addresses the project's harmonisation and coordination efforts with these interventions and to what extent the project provides an added value while avoiding a duplication of efforts.

For the GNA, no similar or comparable interventions in terms of dialogue facilitation (particularly of the MoP) could be identified. There were a few attempts to establish a strategic orientation for the country but they all failed (see also section 4.1).

Initially, it was planned that ESCWA would bring more donors on board for the project (see section 2.2) such as the EU and the Governments of Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. The idea was to initiate a dialogue project with multiple donors and not just one funding country. The Norwegian Government had previously funded a similar dialogue process organised by ESCWA in Syria, which indicated they would also be interested in funding the Libya project. In fact, ESCWA staff have been on a couple of missions in Tunis to hold meetings with multiple donors and governments, but in the end these endeavours were unsuccessful (Int_20). The evaluation team could not talk to any of the donors approached by ESCWA at the start of the project's and could not identify any specific reasons for the failure in convincing any of these donors to take on additional financial commitments.

At the beginning of the project's term, there was a lot of exchange and cooperation with UNSMIL and the World Bank on behalf of ESCWA (Int_20). The situation changed, however, when ESCWA's project management staff was replaced. Additionally, ESCWA became increasingly reluctant to coordinate with UNSMIL and the World Bank when the Libyan conflict continued to escalate in 2019, because national dialogue participants perceived even these international organisations as being involved in the conflict (Int_22). Yet other donors confirmed that GIZ made efforts to coordinate with them at the beginning of the project (Int_19).
There was a major criticism that the project duplicated many interventions of other donors (Int_19). For example, the EU, the UN and the World Bank jointly prepared a recovery and peacebuilding assessment at the request of the GNA in August 2018 (European Union, United Nations, World Bank Group 2020). Within this context, they undertook a mapping exercise to assess the existing body of analysis and data on the situation in Libya, thereby providing a major contribution to the collective understanding of Libya's challenges and needs. The assessment covers a total of 26 sectors and thematic areas; all of these have also been covered by project's baseline studies. The evaluation team could not find any robust indications for exchange among the Libyan experts preparing the baseline studies and those international experts engaged in carrying out the assessment. The evaluation team has therefore concluded that the project's efforts in harmonisation and coordination have not been particularly strong. Nevertheless, complementarity was given, at least to a certain

degree. It was part of the project's logic that the baseline studies were prepared by Libyan experts (instead of international experts) for attaining the goal of a Libyan-driven and Libyan-owned process. This meant that the project's logic did not allow use of studies prepared by other donors. It was also a political issue as 'external' studies were perceived as not being impartial or Libyan-owned. Shortcomings on external coherence resulting from the approach are therefore justified.

Coherence dimension 2 – External Coherence – scores **45 out of 50 points.**

Methodology for assessing coherence

Table 8: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: coherence

Coherence: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Internal coherence	Internal coherence is understood to have been achieved if the project does not duplicate efforts of and seeks synergies with other GIZ projects or German development interventions. Internal coherence is further achieved if the project operates according to GIZ's governing standards. **Other GIZ projects:** • Project on 'Support for municipalities in Libya' • Project 'Promoting decentralisation to contribute to stability in Libya' • Project 'Promoting youth for peaceful development in Libya' • 'Employment promotion and economic development'.	**Evaluation design:** To assess this dimension, the evaluation team mapped other projects' objectives with a view to analysing potential synergies, overlaps and trade-offs. Further, the evaluation team assessed the project's objective and implementation regarding GIZ's governing principles and standards. This second step was implemented as a cross-cutting theme across all evaluation criteria. **Empirical methods:** Review of documents from other projects Semi-structured interviews with other GIZ project's staff.	• Key documents for assessing coherence were available. • Representatives of the Libyan Government could not be interviewed during the evaluation mission. • Overall, response rate for interviews was low. • For this reason, data triangulation was not always possible. • Evidence strength is therefore limited. • Finally, access to direct and indirect target groups also proved difficult due to conflict/fragile context.
External coherence	External coherence is understood to have been achieved if the project does not duplicate efforts of other actors' interventions and if potential synergies are realised. **Interventions of other actors in similar sectors:** EU, UN, World Bank: Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya. A Compilation of Existing Analysis on Challenges and Needs.	**Evaluation design:** To assess this dimension, the evaluation team mapped the objectives of other interventions, with a view to analysing potential synergies or overlaps. **Empirical methods:** • Review of documents from other interventions. • Semi-structured interviews with project staff and programme managers of other interventions.	See above

4.4 Effectiveness

This section analyses and assesses the effectiveness of the project. It is structured according to the assessment dimensions in the GIZ project evaluation matrix (see Annex 1).

Summarising assessment and rating of effectiveness

Table 9: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: effectiveness

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Effectiveness	Achievement of the (intended) objectives	24 out of 30 points
	Contribution to achievement of objectives	30 out of 30 points
	Quality of implementation	15 out of 20 points
	Unintended results	18 out of 20 points
Overall score and rating		Score: **87 out of 100 points** Rating: **Level 2: successful**

The project has largely achieved its intended project objective (outcome). Overall, most of the project's outcome and output indicators were fulfilled. Therefore, the project implementation can be considered effective. The project managed to achieve all its outcome indicators with an average of 79,17%. At the output level, the project was partly successful. Indicators for output A were achieved in full, whereas outputs B and C were achieved partially. Furthermore, the project's contribution to the achievement of its objectives seems plausible as the three hypotheses linking the project's outputs and activities to its module objective were assessed as fulfilled. (1) It was confirmed that the provision of guidance by experts for the dialogue process and elaboration of socio-economic options was successful; (2) the training of dialogue facilitators enabled them to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes; and (3) trained dialogue facilitators have been able to apply their knowledge at the local level. Looking at the way the project was able to achieve its objectives, the assessment of the project's implementation quality revealed a mixed picture. GIZ and ESCWA were able to develop a very good, respectful, effective and constructive working relationship and the advisory board's support proved to be highly successful. However, GIZ and ESCWA could not always reach a common understanding about the project's approach and there was no joint overall strategy for project implementation on which both organisations could rely. Additionally, the collaboration between ESCWA and the MoP was not smooth, mainly due to the project's inappropriate design. As a result, MoP grew increasingly frustrated with the project's implementation, which led to the feeling that the project does not really care for its partner's specific interests and ownership. Finally, the project experienced positive, unplanned results during its implementation. One additional positive result was generated by the Covid-19 pandemic requiring the dialogue process shift to online communication media. As consequence, the process became more inclusive due to more participants involved and less expensive with less travel involved.

In total, the effectiveness of the project is rated Level 2: successful, with 87 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of effectiveness

The assessment of the project's effectiveness is structured along four evaluation dimensions, as shown in table 12. The assessment of this dimension rests on the project's module objective and outcome indicators and the contribution analysis, which forms the core of the effectiveness assessment. The assessment is derived from qualitative interviews, monitoring data and analysis of relevant project documents. All assessment dimensions, their basis, respective evaluation designs and methods, as well as issues concerning data quality and other limitations are detailed in table 12. The evaluation matrix (see Annex) contains specific evaluation questions for assessing the effectiveness.

Effectiveness dimension 1: Achievement of the (intended) objectives

This evaluation dimension assesses the extent to which the project has achieved the objective on time and in accordance with the project objective (outcome) indicators agreed in the proposal. A necessary precondition for using these indicators as the basis for assessment is that they fulfil the specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound (SMART) quality criteria. For this reason, two of the indicators required adaptations, as stated below.

Table 10: Assessed and adapted objective indicators for specific modules (outcome level)

Project's objective indicator according to the (last change) offer	Assessment according to SMART* criteria	Specified objective indicator (only if necessary for measurement or understanding)
Outcome 1: In the context of the Libyan 'Vision 2030' process, strategy documents and one road map are available for each of five socio-economic policy areas. Baseline value (01/18): 0 Target value (02/21): 5 strategy documents plus 5 road maps Current value (04/21): 8 strategy documents Achievement in % (04/21): 80 Source: Review of the minutes of the meetings held in the socio-economic dialogue process; review of strategy documents and implementation concepts (road map).	The indicator is SMART. During the inception mission, it was discussed if the indicator is sufficiently specific as regards the deliverables to be produced. Although it was intended to elaborate 5 road maps at the project's inception, it became clear during project implementation that instead of the '5 road maps' it was more adequate to develop a 'vision'. The evaluation team decided, however, not to adapt the indicator so that it reflects these changes. Reasons. There was no written communication with BMZ on revising the indicator. Additionally, replacing the '5 road maps' by a 'vision' would decrease the indicator's ambitiousness. This is mainly due to the assumption that – logically – the elaboration of guiding documents starts with creating a vision, then moves on to strategies and based on these results road maps are being produced. These steps are becoming more and more specific and thus also more ambitious	
Outcome 2: 20 civil society organisations (CSOs) took part in 20 public dialogue events on socio-economic policy areas of a future economic, state and social model (e.g. the role of the oil and private sectors, decentralisation, social security), of which 20% represented women and 20% represented young people. Baseline value (01/18): 0	The indicator is measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. However, during the inception workshop it was decided to revise the indicator slightly for making it more specific. This was done by specifying the scope of applicable public dialogue events and including 'national and subnational dialogues, expert forums' in brackets. Besides, it was clarified in the indicator's adaptation	**Outcome 2:** 20 CSOs took part in 20 public dialogue events (national and subnational dialogues, expert forums) on socio-economic policy areas of a future economic, state and social model (e.g. the role of the oil and private sectors, decentralisation, social security), of which on average 20% represented women and 20% represented young people.

Target value (02/21): 20 Current value (04/21): 22 CSOs took part in 19 public dialogues (3 women and 3 youth organisations) Achievement in % (04/21): 67,5 Source: Qualitative analysis of reporting on the events in government publications; qualitative content analyses of the press and social media; evaluation of the documentation of the participating organisations.	that the required representation of women and youth is, on average, related to the events. With this revision, the indicator is now also specific.	Baseline value (01/18): 0 Target value (02/21): 20 Current value (04/21): 22 CSOs took part in 12 public dialogues (3 woman and 3 youth organisations) Achievement in % (04/21): 67,5 Source: Qualitative analysis of reporting on the events in government publications; qualitative content analyses of the press and social media; evaluation of the documentation of the participating organisations.
Outcome 3: 50% of the 100 policy makers who have participated in international study trips or exchange formats in the socio-economic dialogue process refer to international experiences or already-developed policy options in their policy documents. Baseline value (01/18): 0 Target value (02/21): 50% of 100 (60 dialogue participants,45 study tours, 10 AG members, 20 co-facilitators, 10 experts) Current value (04/21): 45 out of 60 policy and decision-makers Achievement in % (04/21): 90 (45 out of 50) Source: Qualitative content analysis of policy documents; survey of participants in study trips and exchange formats in the dialogue process.	The indicator is not measurable, because the indicator relies on the reference of Libyan policy-makers to 'international experiences or already-developed policy options in their policy documents'. However, as access to such documents would be denied to the project counting of the required referrals was not possible. Besides, the indicator's adaptation seems justified considering that written communication to BMZ about such adaptation exists in the 2019 progress report (although it has not been agreed explicitly).	**Outcome 3:** 50% of the 100 policy makers who have participated in international study trips or exchange formats in the socio-economic dialogue process confirm that they can make use of the international experiences in their work. Baseline value (01/18): 0 Target value (02/21): 50% of 100 (60 Dialogue participants,45 study tours, 10 AG members, 20 co-facilitators, 10 experts) Current value (04/21): 45 out of 60 policy and decision-makers Achievement in % (04/21): 90 (45 out of 50) Source: Qualitative content analysis of policy documents; survey of participants in study trips and exchange formats in the dialogue process.
* SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound		

The majority of the project's outcome and output indicators were partly fulfilled, some fully achieved and others not at all. Therefore, the **project implementation can be considered partly effective**.

Project objective indicator 1 (outcome 1) required making available strategy documents and one road map for each of five socio-economic policy areas. The indicator relates to the national dialogue process organised by ESCWA (component 1). The indicator's overall fulfilment rate is assessed to be 80%.

Although far beyond time schedule, ESCWA has delivered eight strategy documents ('policy options reports') for socio-economic policy areas (the final draft version in Arabic was made available on 4 May 2021, but the English translation was still being prepared in June 2021). The documents cover the topics: mechanisms for economic reform and recovery; an inclusive national identity under a state of justice; a social protection system; human capital; empowerment of women and youth and integration of militants; the role of the state in sustainable economic development and the strategic positioning of Libya in the global economy; strengthening state authority and rule of law; building an institutional state and restoring trust and reconciliation. There are eight strategy documents (three more than required by indicator 1). This part of indicator 1 was therefore overachieved.

Regarding the individual road maps for each of the five socio-economic policy areas, none was made available. Instead, ESCWA developed a socio-economic future vision for Libya and made the Arabic version available on 4 May 2021 (English translation is still under preparation). This was in accordance with the project's grant

agreement with ESCWA for implementing component 1. However, a vision is a product with a completely different approach and quality compared to road maps for socio-economic policy areas which aim to outline specific ways and means of implementation. The evaluation team has not overlooked that (retrospectively) it was a reasonable approach to elaborate a vision and affiliated policy papers first and then move to the more operational level by defining specific road maps. For assessing this evaluation dimension, however, indicator achievement is what counts, as agreed with BMZ. In this context, the vision cannot replace the road maps although it might be an important and meaningful output (accordingly, it will be considered when assessing other evaluation dimensions). Therefore, the vision cannot be considered for assessing fulfilment of project objective indicator 1. In sum, the evaluation draws the conclusion that indicator 1 was fulfilled to 80%. The calculation was footed on the assumption that policy documents preparation accounts for 60% of indicator achievement, because this requires more effort compared to the preparation of road maps (conversely, those account for 40% of indicator achievement). However, the evaluation's assessment took into account the overachievement regarding the number of policy papers to be prepared as well as the vision being considered a useful product from the dialogue process. Due to those reasons, a supplement of 20% was given.

Project objective indicator 2 (outcome 2) required 20 CSOs to take part in 20 public dialogue events (national and subnational dialogues, expert forums) on socio-economic policy areas of a future economic, state and social model (e.g. the role of the oil and private sectors, decentralisation, social security), of which on average 20% represented women and 20% represented young people. For the purpose of this evaluation, indicator 2 was revised by specifying and extending the scope of the aforementioned public dialogue events. In addition, it was clarified in the indicator's adaptation that the required representation of women and youth relates to the events as an average.

In the project's logic, indicator 2 refers to component 3 which aimed to involve the population of selected Libyan municipalities in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country. According to the project design, interventions such as subnational-level surveys and dialogues, were expected to follow the national dialogues in terms of time and content. In line with this logic, outputs of the national dialogues were supposed to be shared with and validated by the local population. The project proposal stated: 'In coordination with ESCWA, the project supports the research work under component 1 by networking research at the local level in Libya. In cooperation with the TC projects on municipal development, young people, women and university professors will be integrated into data collection, analysis and strategy development work.' Hence, the project proposal envisioned a shared responsibility of both GIZ and ESCWA for reaching out to the subnational level. Accordingly, the grant agreement with ESCWA stipulated involvement of Libyan citizens in structured dialogue on the future socio-economic development of the country for validating the vision (expected accomplishment/outcome 3, see grant agreement's logical framework in the Annex). For this purpose, the agreement required ESCWA to organise three regional consultations in three different regions of Libya (activity 3.1.1), six municipal consultations in selected Libyan municipalities (activity 3.1.2) and with youth and women organisations (activity 3.1.3). However, none of these validation events was organised by ESCWA either at subnational level or particularly involving women and youth. This was because the (draft) products of the national dialogue on which such validation was supposed to be based only became available at the very end of the project due to the delays in the national dialogue's implementation. On account of these challenges, GIZ proposed to BMZ in the 2019 progress report to consider **all** exchange and dialogue formats implemented by the project under indicator 2 (and subsequently under output indicator C2); also, the security situation made it difficult to work at the local level. This proposal was not rejected. Therefore, the indicator's adaptation is justified.

In sum, a total of 20 exchange and dialogue formats were organised by the project. In the context of the national dialogue process, ESCWA conducted eight dialogue sessions in the third quarter of 2020. GIZ organised one subnational dialogue on economic development in the municipality of Derj south-west of Tripoli (December 2019). Additionally, dialogues were organised on youth and sustainable development (September 2020), sustainable development (January 2020), renewable energies (February 2021) and potential investment

opportunities (December 2020). Finally, three expert forums (presentation and thematic discussions of the draft for the baseline studies, involving GIZ, ESCWA and selected experts in February, September and November 2019), two meetings on the macroeconomic model (presentation and discussion of topics related to the macroeconomic model, October/December 2020) and two validation meetings (validation of the Vision of Libya, January 2021) were held. According to the project's monitoring data, a total of 22 CSOs participated in 12 of these events. three were representing women and three young people. This means that the first part of indicator 2 (number of CSOs) was achieved by 60%, whereas the indicators second part (representation of women and youth) was achieved by 75% (15% of the CSOs represented women and another 15% youth). In sum, this means project objective indicator 2 was achieved by an average of 67,5%.

Project objective indicator 3 (outcome 3) required that 50% of the 100 policy makers who have participated in international study trips or exchange formats in the socio-economic dialogue process confirm that they can make use of the international experiences in their work. This indicator was therefore adapted for the evaluation. In its previous version, indicator 3 relied on the mentioning of 'international experiences or already-developed policy options in their policy documents' of Libyan government officials. As access to such documents would be denied, the indicator was not measurable. However, the indicator's adaptation seems justified considering that written communication (Doc 6) to BMZ about such adaptation exists (although it has not been agreed explicitly).

Project monitoring data states a total of 60 policy makers have been reached through exchange formats in the socio-economic dialogue process (however, the indicator required 100). According to project surveys, 45 of them confirmed that they can make use of the international experiences in their work. Thus, indicator 3 has been achieved to 90%.

On average, the project objective indicators have thus been partially achieved by 79,17% (indicator 1: 80%, indicator 2: 67,5%, indicator 3: 90%).

The project's output **indicator achievement** was also partly successful. Based on the information from the interviews as well as the project's monitoring data (Doc 12), indicators related to output A were achieved in full, whereas outputs B and C were achieved partially.

Output A is differentiated into three output indicators. Output indicator A1 (preparation of three baseline studies) as well as output indicator A2 (presentation of statistically based analyses for 10 policy fields by experts from ministries and research) were 100% achieved (Doc 12, 9). However, the respective logic in the project's design was weak. In fact, preparation of baseline studies requires use of statistical analyses. Therefore, access to these statistical analyses could not follow preparation of the studies but was a necessary precondition for their preparation. The three baseline studies actually cover a lot more than 10 policy fields (among others, public finances, shadow economy and war economy, human resources, education, employment and unemployment, financial sector, business sector, investments and public-private partnerships, economic inclusion and migration issues, state-formation conflict and the impact of conflict on social fabric cohesion and reintegration, role of cultural and religious norms and values, violence, radicalisation and violent extremism, governance, institution building and political divisions). All three baseline studies were based on statistical analyses. This particularly holds true for the first baseline study on the 'Status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan economy' (Doc 21). Finally, output indicator A3 aimed at the development of strategic options for five policy fields on the basis of the baseline studies and analyses by representatives from ministries, research, business associations, policy consulting and civil society. This indicator was overachieved by 160% as ESCWA delivered eight instead of five strategic policy papers for the respective policy fields (see above).

Looking at the indicators for output B, it can be shown from the project's monitoring data that the indicators were partly achieved (Doc 12). Output indicator B1 required 60 out of 100 participants from politics, business,

media and civil society to confirm in interviews that their perspective on Libya's future economic, state and social model has broadened. According to the project's monitoring data, a total of 119 participants of diverse exchange and dialogue formats organised by SED were interviewed by the project. 83 of them confirmed that their perspective on Libya's future economic, state and social model has broadened (Doc 12). Indicator B1 can thus be conceived as fully achieved. Output indicator B2, however, achieved 0%. To fulfil the indicator, 50 decision-makers from Libyan ministries, government institutions and political parties were supposed to confirm they use examples of policy design and implementation learned on study trips to countries with similar problems (raw material-based economies, diversification and economic development, development of ministries and administration). Primarily due to the project's limited budget, which did not allow costly study trips to foreign countries, but also due to Libya's increasingly fragile security situation and the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, the project was not in the position to organise any study trips to foreign countries.

For output B, however, note that upon its political partner's request, the project built significant additional capacity by training 15 national dialogue moderators who, in turn, trained around 25 subnational dialogue moderators (Doc 6). These moderators are available to the Libyan Government, to donors or other stakeholders to design and implement socio-economic dialogues on various socio-economic issues and at different levels. To ensure sustainability, the moderators set up a foundation of national dialogue facilitators (Int_8, 17). Capacity building has also taken place thanks to a series of missions of experts who provided training, coaching and advice to the different stakeholder groups. However, this special endeavour was not reflected by any reformulation of the indicator B2 under output B although it was communicated to BMZ in progress reports. In the context of this evaluation, these additional endeavours by the project are considered in evaluating the impact dimension (see section 4.5 below).

Similar to output B, the project could only partially achieve the indicators allocated to output C. Output C addressed the population of selected Libyan municipalities to be involved in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country. As mentioned, according to the project's logic, interventions such as surveys and subnational dialogues were supposed to follow the national dialogue in terms of time and content for validating their results. Such validation, however, was not possible because the national dialogue's results only became available at the very end of the project. However, the delay in making these results available was only relevant for output indicator C2. This indicator required 20 dialogue events to be conducted by national and international experts in cooperation with Libyan universities and NGOs with the population to shape the future economic and social model. As explained above, the scope of project objective indicator 2 was specified and also extended to **all** exchange and dialogue formats implemented by the project ('national and subnational dialogues, expert forums'). Hence, output indicator C2 needs to be interpreted accordingly. In total, 20 exchange and dialogue formats were organised by the project (see above). This results in a fulfilment rate of 100% for output indicator C2. When it comes to output indicator C1, the idea was to feed results of surveys among local population into the national dialogue process (results of five local surveys among the population to shape the future economic, state and social model were presented to the stakeholders of the Libya socio-economic dialogue). GIZ did not make any effort to conduct surveys among the local population, possibly due to the tense security situation. This indicator was therefore fulfilled to 0%. Eventually, output indicator C3 required the project making available three basic studies and five options for reform strategies, and implementation plans have been made available to a wider public in Libya. From the evaluators' perspective, this indicator's meaning is somewhat limited because it (partially) replicates output indicator A1 as well as project objective indicator 1. However, its fulfilment rate can be assessed at 80% considering there were three basic studies, eight, instead of five, policy documents ('options'), although no implementation plans were made available (see also assessment above).

In sum, the evaluation team concludes that the three project objective indicators were partially achieved with an average of 79,17% by the end of the project's term.

Effectiveness dimension 1 – Achievement of the (intended) objectives – scores **26 out of 30 points.**

Effectiveness dimension 2: Contribution to achievement of objectives

In this effectiveness dimension, the evaluation analyses how project activities and outputs contributed to the attainment of the module objective (outcome). As outlined in table 12 below, a contribution analysis is used to assess this dimension. For this purpose, **three hypotheses** were selected to assess the plausibility of the output's contribution to the module objective. For closer examination, the output/outcome-level hypotheses were selected together with the GIZ project team and are detailed in table 11 below. They concern the provision of guidance by experts for the dialogue process and preparation of socio-economic options (hypothesis 1 on component 1), the training of dialogue facilitators to design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes successfully (hypothesis 2 on component 2), and the knowledge application of trained dialogue facilitators at the local level (hypothesis 3 on component 3).

Hypothesis 1 required an examination of how a group of experts has guided the project (GIZ and ESCWA) on the whole dialogue process and the subsequent development of socio-economic options. The expert guidance was designed to assist in setting up and strengthening the advisory board for the national dialogues, but also for achieving Outputs A (experts from science, politics, business and civil society work together to develop reform strategies and implementation plans for priority policy areas) and B (capacities of the stakeholders involved in shaping socio-economic transformation strategies have been strengthened). This hypothesis was selected to provide some interesting insights into the counterfactual question (what would have happened without the guidance?). In fact, the evaluation found a lot of evidence for the confirmation of this hypothesis: one member of the project's advisory board reported that the guidance provided by international experts was 'excellent and very impressive' (Int_9). Other interviewees stated that the experts' contributions have indeed played a crucial role in setting up and strengthening the advisory board for the national dialogues (R6) and led towards the promotion of Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven processes with countrywide participation (R25). Thus, the guidance was successful and provided added value, especially by helping to address important topics when it comes to improving the conditions for an inclusive dialogue process and ensuring relevance of options emanating from it. (Int_9, 18). Among others, a major success factor has been the excellent and sufficiently balanced selection of those who were invited to join the project's advisory board (Int_9, 14, 18). Hypothesis 1 was therefore confirmed.

Hypothesis 2 was foreseen to examine the extent to which the training of dialogue facilitators has enabled them to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes (R12). This result was supposed to contribute to creating a pool of national and local dialogue facilitators (R10) and the training of local dialogue facilitators by national facilitators (R11). The hypothesis was chosen because the training of national and local dialogue facilitators was implemented due to a change in the project's strategy. Although the data basis for the assessment is not strong (unfortunately, it was not possible to interview participants of the training for Arabic speaking dialogue facilitators or supported National Centre for Disease Control doctors and hotline operators), the evaluation found sufficient evidence that the training of dialogue facilitators, carried out in 2019, has enabled them to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes (Int_25). Two participants of the dialogue facilitators training explained that it was of high quality and excellent in terms of methodology, instruments and tools introduced although very practical issues, such as a favourable arrangement of the tables for a dialogue session, could have been dealt with as well (Int_8, 17). Interviewees could confirm that they feel sufficiently equipped to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogues processes on their own after finishing the training and that they use what they have learned in their professional life (Int_8, 17). In fact, all participants of the training have organised and moderated a socio-economic dialogue at the end of their training as their 'masterpiece', one example being the subnational dialogue which was carried out in the municipality of Derj (Int_8). It was confirmed that this meeting was a great success (Int_15). Therefore, the hypothesis was confirmed.

Hypothesis 3 examined whether trained dialogue facilitators have been able to apply their knowledge at the local level. The hypothesis was assessed using the example of the aforementioned socio-economic dialogue

that was organised by a national dialogue facilitator in Derj (R9) and to what extent this dialogue as well as the national dialogue have contributed to the promotion of Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven processes with countrywide participation (R25), introducing the concept of dialogue (R19) and the creation of a pool of national and local dialogue facilitators (R10). Again, this hypothesis was chosen because the training of national and dialogue facilitators was implemented due to a change in the project's strategy. Interviews confirmed that application of knowledge provided in the training was useful, demand-oriented and applicable (see above). Some trainees could confirm that they applied their knowledge locally, for example by carrying out the subnational dialogue in Derj (Int_8, 15). Another participant could confirm that there is significant need for the Ministry of Local Governance to conduct dialogue processes at local level, for example to prepare action or implementation plans involving stakeholders with different and partly conflicting interests (Int_17). To sum up, hypothesis 3 could be verified to a large extent.

Table 11: Selected results hypotheses for effectiveness

Hypothesis 1 (activity – output – outcome component 1)	Experts have successfully provided guidance for the dialogue process and preparation of socio-economic options.
Main assumptions	Expert guidance was taken on board and has successfully supported the dialogue process and the preparation of socio-economic options.
Risks/unintended results	Members of the advisory board or participants of the dialogue process do not accept expert guidance provided, for example due to lack of context and conflict sensitivity or deficiencies in enabling a Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven process.
Alternative explanation	The dialogue process did not need any expert guidance, because it could be organised by GIZ, ESCWA, Libyan Government institutions and the advisory board on their own.
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Confirmed.
Hypothesis 2 (activity – output – outcome component 2)	Dialogue facilitators have been trained to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes.
Main assumptions	The training was comprehensive and geared to the needs and practice.
Risks/unintended results	Dialogue facilitators do not have interest in or any opportunity to design and implement socio-economic dialogue processes after training.
Alternative explanation	Dialogue facilitators did not require the training, because they already knew how to successfully design and implement socio-economic dialogues.
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 (activity – output – outcome component 3)	Trained dialogue facilitators apply their knowledge at the local level.
Main assumptions	There is a need and request for dialogue facilitation at local level.
Risks/unintended results	There is no interest in dialogue facilitation at local level.
Alternative explanation	At local level, sufficient other dialogue facilitators are available that have not been trained by the project.
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Confirmed.

Effectiveness dimension 2 – Contribution to achievement of objectives – scores **30 out of 30 points.**

Effectiveness dimension 3: Quality of implementation

This dimension addresses the appropriateness of the project's chosen strategies, processes, cooperation approaches, and steering structure for realising its outputs. As explained in table 12, this dimension was assessed as a cross-cutting theme during the evaluation.

The assessment of the project's implementation quality reveals a mixed picture: on the one hand, the interviews highlighted that the quality of implementation developed positively during the project as GIZ and ESCWA developed a very good, respectful, effective and constructive working relationship (Int_7). At the beginning of the project's implementation though, the quality of implementation was affected by delays in ESCWA making project staff available. The first project manager left 8 months after its inception. ESCWA then faced difficulties in hiring a new project manager, causing in turn significant delays in implementation (Int_3, 20), but fluctuation in the project management also hampered implementation by GIZ. Moreover, GIZ and ESCWA did not always reach a common understanding about the approach of the project (Int_3, 22). There was no joint overall strategy for project implementation which both organisations could rely on. Additionally, the cooperation between ESCWA and the MoP was not smooth mainly because of the project's inappropriate design (see section 4.2). As a result, the project's political partner grew increasingly frustrated with the project's implementation, which led to their feeling that the project did not really care for its partner's specific interests and ownership (Int_2).

On the positive side in terms of implementation quality, however, was the project's advisory board. According to the advisory board's selection criteria and terms of reference, its members were expected to be Libyan experts with socio-economic, technical expertise and experience. In general terms, the advisory board was responsible for (i) monitoring, evaluation, adaptation, learning, quality control, and improving the process as it moves along; (ii) reviewing the substantive inputs and outputs developed during the dialogue process, including the baseline studies, prioritisation of issue areas, and similar. In addition, its members were expected to participate in each of the dialogue sessions, so that they could ensure that connections were made across all pillars/research areas. For that purpose, its members required the capacity to draft and review detailed policy papers, and thus needed training in public policy, social science, engineering and similar disciplines. Furthermore, the advisory board was expected to comprise a highly balanced mix in terms of age, gender, disciplines, and of regional, ethnic and racial backgrounds (Doc 25). An online survey carried out by the project among 11 advisory board members (number of survey participants: 2) revealed that the board's support to the project was rated 'effective' to 'very effective' (scale 1–5: 1 = 'very effective', 2 = 'effective', 3 = 'partly effective, partly ineffective', 4 = 'rather ineffective', 5 = 'entirely ineffective'). In the same survey, the function of the advisory board was rated 'appropriate' on achieving the mandate of developing a socio-economic vision for Libya (scale 1–5: 1 = 'very appropriate', 2 = 'appropriate', 3 = 'more or less appropriate', 4 = 'insufficient', 5 = 'very insufficient'). Finally, the advisory board's composition was rated 'good' (scale 1–5: 1 = 'ideal', 2 = 'good', 3 = 'partly good, partly improvable', 4 = 'bad', 5 = 'very bad'). These results were confirmed in a couple of interviews (Int_7, 8, 18). It was pointed out that the advisory board's role was essential; for the strategic papers, inputs were good; and it was supportive, because its members had substantial and a wide range of relevant experience (Int_18). Interviews confirmed that women and young people were represented well on the board (Int_7). In sum, the advisory board had a positive effect in continuously addressing conflict-related issues. Thus, the project ensured that escalating factors/dividers have not been strengthened (indirectly) and that there was no unintentional (indirectly) support for any violent or 'destructive' actors, also due to systematic and continual monitoring of risks in the context of conflict, fragility and violence (context and conflict-sensitive monitoring). The project's advisory board also had a steering committee reporting to them, which functioned successfully.

The quality of the results-based monitoring was assessed to be medium as it was mainly activity based. This made it hard for the project to track the overall ongoing progress of all outcome and output indicators. In this regard, risks, assumptions, results hypotheses and conflict/context dimensions were not systematically

monitored. As mentioned before, the project's monitoring approach only partially met the requirements of context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring (see section 3.1).

Effectiveness dimension 3 – Quality of implementation – scores **15 out of 20 points.**

Effectiveness dimension 4: Unintended results

This dimension assesses whether the project has produced any positive or negative unintended results at the outcome or output level and if so, why.

As regards **positive not originally planned results**, interviews showed that the Covid-19 pandemic generated a boost of innovations when it comes to conducting online instead of face-to-face dialogue formats. Another positive side effect of switching the national dialogue process to online communication media was that it became more inclusive as there were more participants involved. Finally, the associated costs decreased significantly, because there were no travel expenses and accommodation costs. As a consequence, ESCWA was able to save about EUR 400,000 in grant implementation.

Additionally, ESCWA has produced a study on 'Economic cost of the Libyan conflict' which can be considered a positive not originally planned result (Doc 26) – beyond that the study can be considered as an additional output contributing to the project outcome and possibly even impact. The study was part of another project examining the effects of peace and reconstruction in Libya on neighbouring countries and on regional cooperation. That project measures the direct effects of the war economy on Libya and estimates the opportunities generated by the peace process and reconstruction in Libya on neighbouring countries and on regional cooperation. An interview indicated that the study received significant attention within the international donor community seeking to bring Libya on a stable path of development (Int_19). A complementary study on 'Peace in Libya and the future of regional cooperation' is planned for soon.

Finally, the project achieved additional outputs by training National Centre for Disease Control doctors and hotline operators delivered by national dialogue facilitators (R21) as a contribution to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. This measure can be considered another positive not originally planned result.

No **negative unintended results** could be observed.

Effectiveness dimension 3 – Unintended results – scores **18 out of 20 points.**

Photo 1: Women's power in the group of Libyan dialogue moderators, © GIZ/Firas Ben Khelifa

Methodology for assessing effectiveness

Table 12: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: effectiveness

Effectiveness: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Achievement of the (intended) objectives	Status quo on each of the outcome indicators of the results matrix forms the basis of assessment. While SMART criteria are partially met at the indicator level, the evaluation will assess the extent to which underlying definitions are relevant, specific, and measurable.	**Evaluation design:** The analysis follows the analytical questions from the evaluation matrix. **Empirical methods:** • Online surveys among members of the advisory board (2 participants) and the national dialogue (48 participants). • Monitoring data. • Interviews (implementation partners).	• Incomplete (monitoring) data (see section 3.1). • Additional data collected may be incomplete and suffer from survivor bias. • Available monitoring data for some indicators ('success stories') may exhibit selection bias.
Contribution to achievement of objectives	Hypotheses selected for examination (output level) (see table 11).	**Evaluation design:**	• Incomplete (monitoring) data (see section 3.1).

Effectiveness: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
		A contribution analysis is used to analyse the extent to which observed (positive or negative) impacts can be related to the intervention (Mayne 2011). Given the project's long causal chain (see section 1.1), this offers the additional benefit of seeking to identify alternative explanations that may explain observed results. It analyses the extent to which the intervention has contributed to the observed results. **Empirical methods:** A review of project monitoring data, complemented with data from interviews and two surveys among advisory board members and participants of the national dialogue is used to examine causal hypotheses between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts in the results model and to construct a 'contribution story' to show whether the intervention was a relevant factor, possibly together with other (context) factors, for change.	
Quality of implementation	Quality of implementation is understood to have been achieved if the project's steering decisions and employment of instruments align with the project's objectives and results have been monitored constantly according to requirements of context and conflict-sensitive monitoring.	**Evaluation design:** Quality of implementation will be assessed as a cross-cutting theme throughout the evaluation and will be discussed as part of the contribution analysis. As such, the evaluation team will assess the appropriateness of the project's chosen strategy, deployed instruments, cooperation approach, and steering structure for the realisation of its outputs. **Empirical methods:** • Document analysis. • Analysis of monitoring data, capacity-development approach, choice of instruments. • Interviews with project, other GIZ projects, implementation partners.	• Low quality of the results-based monitoring system. • Lack of overall/capacity-development strategy.

Effectiveness: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Unintended results	The assessment of this dimension is based on unintended results identified over the course of the evaluation. The project is understood to have operated effectively in this regard if positive unintended results were seized upon and negative unintended results were mitigated by the project.	**Evaluation design:** Unintended results were assessed throughout the evaluation process, especially in interviews. Specifically, the analysis will rely on findings across the impact and sustainability dimensions to assess whether additional unintended results occurred. Potential trade-offs among the intervention's dimensions (e.g. economic, social, ecological) will also be considered. **Empirical methods:** • Document analysis (contextual documents). • Interviews with key stakeholders. • Qualitative assessment of project practices for monitoring risks, unintended consequences.	
* SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound			

4.5 Impact

This section analyses and assesses the impact of the project. It is structured according to the assessment dimensions in the GIZ project evaluation matrix (see Annex 1).

Summarising assessment and rating of impact

Table 13: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: impact

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Impact	Higher-level (intended) development changes/results	15 out of 30 points
	Contribution to higher-level (intended) development results/changes	27 out of 40 points
	Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development results/changes	30 out of 30 points
Impact score and rating		Score: **72 out of 100 points** Rating: **Level 3: moderately successful**

At impact level, it was observed that the dialogue process contributed to better social cohesion, at least among those who participated in the process as it proved that dialogue is possible even in times of ongoing civil war. The project's contribution to confidence-building towards Libya's government institutions was rather low, partly because there were few government officials participating in the dialogue. For creating more impact, the key written products (baseline studies, policy papers and vision) need to be operationalised including the drafting

and approval of road maps which have not yet been developed. Thus, a couple of interim steps will be necessary until key written products can be adopted in practical government policy but there was no evidence for government ownership of the key products. Furthermore, the project did not manage to contribute much in terms of introducing and conducting dialogue processes at subnational level; only one subnational dialogue was implemented. However, the national and subnational dialogue facilitator training was seen as a positive. Although the evaluation could not find much evidence of regular engagement in dialogue facilitation, the situation might change after the pandemic restrictions are lifted. The foundation of a national association of dialogue facilitators will be an indication for potential future impact. The hypotheses on contributions to higher-level development results and changes were assessed as partially plausible. It was confirmed that dialogues conducted by the project were Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven with countrywide participation including active participation of women and youth. It was also confirmed that the project was successful in introducing the concept of dialogue with involvement across a broad level of participation. However, it could not be verified that concepts introduced by the project are adopted or even considered by Libyan national and local government authorities.

In total, the impact of the project is rated Level 3: moderately successful, with 72 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of impact

The analysis and assessment of impact is structured along three evaluation dimensions and considers the (foreseeable) achievement of overarching development results, the contribution of the project to these results, and the triggering of positive or negative unintended impacts. Due to the project's short timeline and the big delays in conducting the national dialogue, it was difficult to collect robust evidence on impact and assess whether overarching results have been achieved or are likely to be achieved. Consequently, the assessment of the impact hypotheses is at least partly based on a plausibility analysis that also results from the assumptions regarding the effectiveness of the project.

Impact dimension 1: Higher-level (intended) development changes/results

As the project was a stand-alone measure, it was not part of a more comprehensive GIZ programme. Thus, there was no programme proposal and objective that could be used as a reference document for the selection of intended impacts or for the selection of outcome-impact hypotheses. However, the guidance on intended impacts could be derived from the project proposal. It states that the project will 'contribute to social cohesion, confidence-building in government institutions, economic stabilisation and the development of prospects for the younger generation in Libya' (Doc 1). As previously mentioned, this overarching goal was generally quite ambitious (although it just required to "contribute") when taking into account that GNA only controlled parts of the country, and its highly limited influence became even worse during the project duration. Besides, the buy-in of government stakeholders in the dialogue process was relatively low (see section 4.2). For now, it can be stated that the dialogue process has in fact contributed to better social cohesion, at least among those who participated in the process, as it proved that dialogue is possible even in times of ongoing civil war (Int_9, 22). The 'apolitical' approach taken by the project as well as the balanced selection of dialogue participants have contributed to this result (see section 4.2). The project's contribution to confidence-building in Libyan Government institutions, however, is assessed rather low as there were few government officials participating in the dialogue. Furthermore, the project might lead to economic stabilisation should recommendations from its key products (as previously stated, baseline studies, policy papers and vision) will be taken on board by the new interim government currently in power or a newly elected government in December 2021. As explained above, the evaluation was unable to find any evidence for government ownership of the key products. Any likelihood of their application by the current or future Libyan Governments can therefore not be assessed, nor make plausibility assumptions. Finally, when it comes to the development of prospects for the younger generation in Libya, it can be said that representatives of the young generation have been involved in the dialogue. This is an initial good step in the right direction for developing prospects for the younger generation,

especially considering that the key products did not focus on specific topics relevant for the younger generation (Int_9, 14, 22).

For higher-level development changes regarding specific direct target groups, the evaluators assess that an inclusive as well as Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven dialogue process is possible for participants of the socio-economic dialogue process, even in times of ongoing civil war, and may pave the ground for respective future government policy (Int_14, 18, 22, 24). This result was confirmed by the surveys among advisory board members and also the dialogue participants. Among others, 52.1% of 48 dialogue participants stated that the dialogue on the future of Libya among experts and other stakeholders was enhanced 'to a large extent' (whereas 37.5% confirmed 'to some extent').

Although Libyan Government stakeholders in charge of the political process have not been strongly involved in the dialogue process, they have benefited to a certain extent from exchange formats enrolled by the project. However, the impact on this target group is assessed rather low, as the project did not have a dedicated and specified capacity-development strategy for government officials in charge of the political process, capacity-development activities were not linked to the dialogue process and no study trips could be organised. In addition, the project was limited in its contribution to strengthening the target groups' strategic and implementation capacities through international exchange. Finally, the project only managed to implement just one subnational dialogue process. According to the evaluation team's perception, the potential impact of dialogues involving local communities could have been vast (Int_8, 15, 17), but it was not fulfilled.

On the positive side, however, was the training for national and subnational dialogue facilitators (the latter included a group of female facilitators). Although the evaluation team could not find much evidence that those trained are regularly engaged in dialogue facilitation, this situation might change after the pandemic restrictions have been lifted. An indication for potential future impact is the foundation of a national association of dialogue facilitators (Int_8). However, its potential impact will, of course, greatly depend on whether the Libyan Government or the international donor community will engage experts for dialogue facilitation at different levels. Unfortunately, it was not possible to assess if and how the Libyan Government is inclined to make future use of the trained dialogue facilitators to a lack of available data.

Finally, the project's overarching development results, especially the dialogue process as such, but also the key outputs, have plausibly contributed to achieving SDG 16 in promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies in order to overcome conflict, insecurity, weak institutions and limited access to justice – also to SDG 5 on gender equality and empowering all women and girls. More specifically, this holds true for target 16.7 aiming to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; and target 5.5 to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life. Accordingly, plausible contributions have been made regarding BMZ markers towards which the project was oriented, especially participatory development and good governance (PD/GG-2), gender equality (GG-1) and peace and security (FS-1).

Impact dimension 1 – Higher-level (intended) development changes/results – scores **15 out of 30 points.**

Impact dimension 2: Contribution to higher-level (intended) development results/changes

To evaluate impact dimension 2, the evaluation conducted an assessment of three outcome-impact hypotheses using a plausibility analysis. Their plausibility also builds on the plausibility of the output-outcome hypothesis assessed in the effectiveness section (see section 4.4). Since the hypotheses on contributions to higher-level development results/changes were assessed as partially plausible, the project is considered to have contributed to a Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven dialogue process with countrywide participation, which includes the active participation of women and youth, as well as introducing the concept of dialogue as involvement across a broad level of participation. Although the project could not (yet) contribute to

consideration of any of its concepts and policy approaches introduced by the national and local Libyan government authorities, a majority of those who participated in the national dialogues stated that the policy options of the vision will be relevant in post-conflict Libya (64.6% out of 48 participants who participated in the survey confirmed that this is true 'to a large extent', 31.3% opted for 'to some extent' and 4,1% answered 'not at all').

Hypothesis 4 examined to what extent dialogues conducted by the project have been Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven with participation all over Libya and including active participation of women and youth (R25/26), thus contributing the overarching goal of enabling a process as inclusive as possible (however, due to the dialogues 'apolitical' approach government institutions as such were excluded from the process, see section 4.2). The hypothesis was chosen because reaching all stakeholders in the dialogue process is considered one of the project's key challenges. The hypothesis was confirmed. Indeed, the dialogue process was highly inclusive. The selection criteria for dialogue participants aimed at a balanced participant mix in terms of age ('ideally would be 50% under 40 years old, but a minimum of 30% under 40 years old'), gender ('ideally would be a 50:50 ratio of women to men, but a minimum 30:70'), disciplines ('ideally mix of natural, social, political, and engineering sciences, at least including economists and sociologists') and regional, ethnic and racial backgrounds. First, the inclusiveness of dialogue participants was enhanced by the fact that it went virtual (Int_7). Certainly, project monitoring data proved that the actual mix of participants mostly conformed with the pre-defined selection criteria, especially regarding regional representation (Doc 12). Moreover, the survey among dialogue participants revealed that the dialogue targeted a wide range of stakeholders involving women, youth, CSOs, the private sector and various geographical locations of Libya, that is from Libya's west, east and south (47.9% out of 48 participants could confirm this statement 'to a large extent', 47.9% 'to some extent' and 4.2% 'not at all'). Interviewees also confirmed a good balance in the selection of participants and that the dialogue was indeed Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven (Int_6, 8, 11, 14, 18, 22, 24). One interviewee even remarked that the whole socio-economic dialogue was more than 95% owned and driven by Libyans (Int_11). Finally, it was confirmed that there was active participation of women and youth in the dialogue although few CSOs were representing their interests in Libya (Int_6, 9, 11, 14, 18, 22).

Hypothesis 5 required an examination of whether the project was successful in introducing the concept of dialogue as involvement across a broad level of participation (R19), thus contributing to the overarching goal of developing the basic consensus necessary for a functioning political system. This hypothesis was chosen because introducing the concept of dialogue was one of the project strategy's key aims, which is also reflected by the decision to train national and local dialogue facilitators. Here as well, the hypothesis was confirmed. First, the project successfully introduced the concept of dialogue as involvement across a broad level of participation by successfully implementing the national dialogue process involving about 190 participants. (Although the project has been less successful in implementing dialogues at subnational level.) Through this process, participants have experienced that it is possible to build a basic consensus to be fed into the political system at a later stage (Int_14, 18, 22, 24). The result was confirmed by the surveys among advisory board members and the dialogue participants. Second, the project has laid a basis for scaling up the use of dialogues as an instrument for peaceful conflict solution and consensus identification by training dialogue facilitators at different levels, conducting a comprehensive dialogue at national level and thus introducing a culture of dialogue to Libya which did not exist before. To this end, the establishment of the national association of dialogue facilitators is a tangible impact (see above).

Eventually, **hypothesis 6** examined to what extent national and local Libyan government authorities consider concepts such as socio-economic development and social market economy, which were introduced by the project, as opposed to purely economic and a purely social concepts (R18), thus contributing to the overarching goal of establishing effective governance in Libya for managing the country's transformation. This hypothesis was chosen because the project's deliverables (plans and vision) are supposed to flow into the country's political transformation. The hypothesis could not be verified, due to a lack of data as it was not possible to interview either the project's focal point at the MoP or other government officials during the

evaluation mission; and, as previously stated, the buy-in of government stakeholders in the dialogue was low (Int_9, 18). In addition, the delay in the finalisation of key products resulting from the dialogue process did not allow for national and local Libyan government authorities to consideration any of these products.

Table 14: Selected results hypotheses for impact

Results hypothesis 4 (outcome – impact)	Dialogues conducted by the project have been Libyan-owned and Libyan-driven with countrywide participation, and also including active participation of women and youth.
Main assumption	Organisers of the dialogues succeeded in striking a good balance in composition of dialogue participants and dialogue facilitation enabled sufficient ownership of Libyans in steering the process and defining the results.
Risks	Dialogue does not involve a balanced mix of participants and has contributed to escalation of the ongoing conflict and failed in defining a basic consensus.
Alternative explanation	
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Confirmed.
Results hypothesis 5 (outcome – impact)	The concept of dialogue as involvement across a broad level of participation has been introduced.
Main assumptions	The national dialogue process was successful, contributed to social cohesion and succeeded in carving out a consensus on the results.
Risks/unintended results	Dialogue facilitation failed in keeping out participants directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict from the dialogue or to forge a consensus on the results.
Alternative explanation	It was not necessary to introduce the concept of dialogue as involvement across a broad level of participation, because participants and relevant target groups were familiar with the concept from before.
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Confirmed.
Results hypothesis 6 (outcome – impact)	Concepts (for example on socio-economic development) introduced by the project are considered by the national and local Libyan government authorities.
Main assumptions	Concepts introduced by the project are relevant, up-to-date, practice-oriented and framed in an appropriate manner.
Risks/unintended results	Finalisation of the concepts is delayed.
Alternative explanation	Similar or equivalent concepts have been introduced by other donors and are considered by the Libyan government authorities on national and local level.
Confirmed/partly confirmed/not confirmed	Not confirmed.

Impact dimension 2 – Contribution to higher-level (intended) development results/changes – scores **27 out of 40 points**.

Photo 2: © GIZ/Firas Ben Khelifa

Impact dimension 3: Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development results/changes

This evaluation dimension assesses the extent to which positive or negative unintended results at impact level have occurred. During the whole evaluation, no (unintended) positive or negative development results/changes could be observed.

Looking at the different **dimensions of sustainability**, the project mainly took into account the social and economic dimension (socio-economic), but it also touched upon the environmental dimension in organising a dialogue session on renewable energies. In this regard, no relevant trade-offs could be observed during the evaluation. Regarding the economic and social aspects of sustainability, the project successfully supported the preparation of policy papers covering, among others, topics such as mechanisms for economic reform and recovery, a social protection system, human capital, empowerment of women and youth and integration of militants, the role of the state in sustainable economic development and the strategic positioning of Libya in the global economy.

Impact dimension 3 – Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development results/changes – scores **30 out of 30 points**.

Methodology for assessing impact

Table 15: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: impact

Impact: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Higher-level (intended) development changes/results	**Main impact areas** derived from project proposal and updated results model: • Foster social cohesion, confidence-building in government institutions, economic stabilisation and the development of prospects for the younger generation in Libya. • SDG 5 (gender equality). • SDG 16 (peaceful, just and inclusive societies). **BMZ markers**: • Participatory development and good governance (PD/GG-2). • Gender equality (GG-1). • Peace and security (FS-1).	**Evaluation design:** To assess this dimension, the evaluation team will focus on the impacts according to the updated results model (see section 2.2). In this regard, the evaluation team will establish the state of higher-level (intended) development changes and results pertaining to the main impact areas. **Empirical methods:** • Qualitative interviews. • Online survey among participants of the national dialogues (48 participants).	As the object of evaluation is a stand-alone measure, neither a programme objective nor programme objective indicators were included in the impact matrix, which could otherwise be used as a basis for the evaluation of this dimension.
Contribution to higher-level (intended) development results/changes	Hypotheses selected for examination (outcome-impact level) (see table 14).	**Evaluation design:** The evaluation of this dimension will mainly draw on the results from the contribution analysis to show whether the intervention was a relevant factor, possibly together with other factors, to lead to change on impact level. Table 12 in section 4.4. includes a more detailed description of this approach. **Empirical methods:** Qualitative interviews and workshops with project staff, implementation partners, external experts, other donors. • Analysis of secondary literature.	
Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development results/changes	The assessment of this dimension is based on unintended results identified over the course of the evaluation. Assessment rests on the extent to which positive unintended results were seized upon and negative unintended results were mitigated by the project.	**Evaluation design:** Unintended results will be assessed iteratively throughout the evaluation process. Specifically, the analysis will rely on findings across other impact dimensions and the sustainability criterion to assess whether additional unintended results occurred. • Qualitative interviews and workshops with project staff, implementation partners, external experts, other donors.	

4.6 Efficiency

This section analyses and assesses the efficiency of the project. It is structured according to the assessment dimensions in the GIZ project evaluation matrix (see Annex 1).

Summarising assessment and rating of efficiency

Table 16: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: efficiency

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Efficiency	Production efficiency (resources/outputs)	61 out of 70 points
	Allocation efficiency (resources/outcome)	20 out of 30 points
Efficiency score and rating		Score: **81 out of 100 points** Rating: **Level 2: successful**

The project is assessed as successful in its production and allocation efficiency. For production efficiency, the share of overarching costs was comparably low bearing in mind that the project operated in a conflict context, which generally causes higher security costs. Overall, the project's production efficiency is underscored by the fact that it was able to achieve most of its output and outcome-level indicators. The allocation of costs between the outputs was assessed as appropriate considering their final achievement levels. In terms of the project's cooperation management, the financing agreement with limited influence from GIZ made it difficult to demand agreed objectives and milestones from the implementing partner, although GIZ had no other (or better) instrument available for establishing a cooperation basis. However, it would have been beneficial for the project to develop a joint implementation strategy between GIZ and ESCWA and to negotiate the key elements of the grant agreement before BMZ commissioned the project. Regarding the project's allocation efficiency, the multi-level approach was found to be highly appropriate considering there was strong need and interest in dialogue facilitation at subnational level. However, the project was very limited in exploiting the potential of the multi-level approach. Finally, the project made efforts to include additional funding sources, although they were not successful.

In total, the efficiency of the project is rated Level 2: successful, with 81 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of efficiency

The efficiency criterion measures the cost-effectiveness in achieving the interventions' objectives. The key question in assessing efficiency is whether the project is managed economically. An intervention is thus efficient when a maximum of results is achieved with the available financial resources. GIZ takes a maximisation approach, asking whether output or outcome-level results have been maximised with the resources available. Efficiency is therefore understood to mean transformation efficiency, with inputs transformed into results and effects. The relationship of inputs to results and effects indicates how efficient the measure is. A distinction is made between two types of efficiency: production efficiency (efficiency dimension 1) and allocation efficiency (efficiency dimension 2). While the first evaluates the transformation of inputs to outputs, the second evaluates the transformation of inputs to results at outcome and impact level. In analysing the project's production efficiency, both the principle of yield maximisation and yield minimisation are applied. The former analyses the extent to which (even) more results could be achieved with the same financial means. The objective is thus not to reduce the intervention's budget, but to maximise results with the resources available. The latter principle analyses the extent to which costs were minimised, while achieving the same level of results.

Following GIZ's guidelines on assessing efficiency, the evaluation team applied the follow-the-money approach by using the GIZ Efficiency Tool, in which all intervention's expenses were identified and assigned to specific outputs. This allowed an assessment of the efficiency regarding the use of funds in the different output areas of the project. The strength of this approach lies in the fact that all project costs can be systematically tracked, and costs that cannot be assigned to outputs can be easily identified. Outputs that may make little or no contribution to the module objective can also be identified.

Efficiency dimension 1: Production efficiency

Overall, the shares of the project budget allocated to its different outputs as well as the share of overarching costs are considered as plausible given the high operating costs resulting from the conflict-affected context. Table 17 below shows the costs and commitments of the project as well as the allocation of costs to the different outputs (A–C) and the overall costs of the project. The costs of the outputs accumulated to around 89%. Hence, overarching costs had a share of 11% of the total project expenditure. This share is comparably low considering the conflict context which generally causes higher security costs. In fact, some of the overarching costs were allocated to security personnel and general operating costs in Libya to secure the project's ability to work in the conflict-affected context. Therefore, the share of the project's budget for overarching costs seems reasonable given the need to secure project staff and the implementation of activities.

On a more general level, the project's cooperation management needs to be considered under this evaluation dimension. In this case, the following questions have to be asked: 'Was it a good idea to cooperate with ESCWA (considering also delay of results)? And was it the best choice to cooperate with ESCWA based on a grant agreement with limited influence from GIZ?' The answers are pragmatic: It was not GIZ's choice to enter into cooperation with ESCWA, because ESCWA has approached BMZ for supporting the dialogue project in Libya, and BMZ asked GIZ to design a project for enabling respective support (Int_4). Moreover, GIZ had no other (or better) instrument available beyond concluding a grant agreement with ESCWA for establishing a cooperation basis. However, there are a few recommendations on how things might have evolved in a better way. Overall, it would have been beneficial for the project to develop a joint implementation strategy of GIZ and ESCWA and to negotiate the key elements of the grant agreement before BMZ commissioned the project. Such an approach would have stimulated better synchronisation of GIZ and ESCWA contributions. Additionally, GIZ would have been better advised to keep the MoP out and instead select a different partner institution that is more neutral in the ongoing conflict.

Focusing on the proportion of the total project expenditure that was spent on outputs, 67% was allocated to output A, 18% to output B and 4% to output C. Output A focused on the whole national socio-economic dialogue process (Doc 29). This mainly included the project's financing agreement with ESCWA, but also related GIZ costs. The 18% of the project expenditure allocated to output B was spent on strengthening capacities of the stakeholders involved in shaping socio-economic transformation strategies, more specifically on the training for dialogue facilitators and dialogue formats for the presentation, discussion and evaluation of best practice examples from other countries. This output also used expert assignments to finance the respective activities. Finally, output C addressed the population of selected Libyan municipalities to be involved in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country. Just 4% of the project's budget was allocated to this output.

As described before, the project managed to fulfil outcome objectives rather successfully (average achievement rate: 79,17%), whereas overall output-level achievements were weaker (see section 4.4). Output indicators A1 and A2 regarding preparation of three basic studies and the presentation of statistically based analyses for 10 policy fields by experts from ministries and research were fully achieved; and output indicator A3 on development of strategic options for five policy fields was overachieved by 160%. Output indicator B1 – on capacity development for stakeholders from politics, business, media and civil society for broadening their perspective on Libya's future economic, state and social model has broadened – was also fully achieved.

However, output indicator B2, requiring the project to present, discuss and evaluate best practice examples from other countries involving decision-makers from Libyan ministries, government institutions and political parties, was not achieved as the project was not in the position to organise any study trips to foreign countries, mainly due to its limited budget, but also due to Libya's increasingly fragile security situation and the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. The decision not to carry out study trips can be considered as having positively contributed to the production efficiency, but at the same time limited the project in its impact on those target groups, thus limiting its allocation efficiency (see efficiency dimension 2). In terms of results, this decision was counterbalanced by the project's decision to train dialogue facilitators which was not reflected in its results matrix (see section 5.1). Finally, there was no achievement on output indicator C1 regarding surveys among local population, but there was a 100% achievement rate on output indicator C2 for national and subnational dialogues and expert forums. Eventually, output indicator C3 regarding the three basic studies and five options for reform strategies and implementation plans was 80% achieved. These shortcomings can be explained by the worsening security situation, but also by the delays in implementing the national dialogue process as these outputs partly depended on the process. Despite the hindering factor, the project achieved most of its output and outcome-level targets, which underscores the project's production efficiency. Overall, the allocation of costs between the outputs is assessed to be appropriate taking into account their final achievement levels.

Furthermore, the project's efficiency was demonstrated during the pandemic, in which it proved its resilience and was able to still implement its main activities, especially by shifting from face-to-face to virtual sessions in the national dialogue process. This highlighted the project's ability to sustain its effectiveness in a changing context, which contributed to the efficiency as well. In addition, the project increased the overall participation rate in comparison to face-to-face formats. Also, the virtual formats enabled ESCWA to save the substantial sum of EUR 400,000 in the grant's implementation, which will be returned to BMZ. Finally, the number of project staff was rather low (one project manager, one junior staff, both co-financed by another project within the Libya cluster, and one national staff) which is assessed to be an appropriate composition.

Table 17: Efficiency tool

	Output A	**Output B**	**Output C**
Outputs	Financing agreement with ESCWA: Experts from science, politics, business and civil society work together to develop reform strategies and implementation plans for priority policy areas	The capacities of the stakeholders involved in shaping socio-economic transformation strategies have been strengthened	The population of selected Libyan municipalities has been involved in the development of options for shaping the future economic, state and social model of the country
Costs incl. commitment	EUR 2,244,647.92	EUR 610,147.38	EUR 146,793.62
Co-financing	€0.00	€0.00	€0.00
Partner inputs	€0.00	€0.00	€0.00
Total costs	**EUR 2,244,647.92**	**EUR 610,147.38**	**EUR 146,793.62**
Total costs in %	**67%**	**18%**	**4%**
BMZ total costs in % without co-financing	**67%**	**18%**	**4%**

Efficiency dimension 1 – Production efficiency – scores **61 out of 70 points**.

Efficiency dimension 2: Allocation efficiency

As opposed to production efficiency, allocation efficiency describes the transformation of inputs to outcomes and impact. At outcome level, the average indicator achievement rate of 79,17% is partially successful (see section 4.4) However, the situation looks different when it comes to transforming inputs to impact. Although two of the three impact hypotheses could be confirmed, the project was not particularly strong in achieving (foreseeable) overarching development results (see section 4.5). Yet, for assessing allocation efficiency, the extremely challenging conditions for the project's implementation, the major shortcomings in its design and strategy (see section 4.2) and the generally weak capacities of the Libyan Government must also be taken into consideration.

The multi-level approach which the project has taken was found in principle very to be appropriate considering there was strong need and interest in dialogue facilitation at subnational level. However, the project minimally exploited the potential of the multi-level approach. This was for various reasons such as delay of the deliveries from the national dialogue process, shortcomings in internal coherence, the lack of a comprehensive capacity-development strategy and, of course, external factors such as the security situation and the pandemic. A stronger project engagement at local level might have stimulated Libyan Government's interest and ownership, considering also that the training of dialogue facilitators was implemented at the request of the MoP. In the end, the multi-level approach had the potential to bring stakeholders from different levels together and initiate discussions among them.

Allocation efficiency also takes into consideration if and how the project has included additional funding sources. Although ESCWA has made significant efforts in acquiring co-funding for the project at its inception, these efforts have not been successful (see section 4.3 above), but there are ongoing efforts to raise additional funding for implementing the project's phase 2 (Int_22). The project was successful in building synergies between GIZ and ESCWA. However, synergies with other GIZ projects and other donors and organisations such as the World Bank and UNSMIL have only been partially achieved although they followed comparable approaches and strategies in supporting the Libyan Government (Int_17, 19, 22). Again, this limited the maximisation of impact.

Efficiency dimension 2 – Allocation efficiency – **scores 20 out of 30 points**.

Methodology for assessing efficiency

Table 18: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: efficiency

Efficiency: assessment dimensions	Basis for Assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Production efficiency (Resources/outputs)	The project is understood to have operated efficiently if results were maximised with the given means (yield maximisation), and if results were achieved employing only the resources requires (yield minimisation).	**Evaluation design:** The evaluation will apply a 'follow-the-money' approach. Thereby, all expenses are identified and assigned to specific outputs of the intervention. With this mapping of costs concluded, the evaluation team assesses the appropriateness of costs per output. **Empirical methods:** • Analysis of cost data (GIZ efficiency tool) and instruments employed (progress	

Efficiency: assessment dimensions	Basis for Assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
		reports, steering structure). • Interviews with project staff, implementation partners.	
Allocation efficiency (Resources/outcome)	The project is understood to have allocated its resources efficiently if cooperation potentials within the GIZ structure and implementation partners were identified and realised.	**Evaluation design:** The design for assessing allocation efficiency focuses on the project's transformation of inputs to outcome and impact, its multi-level approach, the cooperation with other GIZ projects and those of other donors and the acquisition of additional funding. **Empirical methods:** • Analysis of cost data (GIZ efficiency tool) and instruments employed (progress reports). • Interviews with project staff, other GIZ projects and other donors.	

4.7 Sustainability

This section analyses and assesses the sustainability of the project. It is structured according to the assessment dimensions in the GIZ project evaluation matrix (see Annex 1).

Summarising assessment and rating of sustainability

Table 19: Rating of OECD/DAC criterion: sustainability

Criterion	Assessment dimension	Score and rating
Sustainability	Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	8 out of 20 points
	Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities	15 out of 30 points
	Durability of results over time	45 out of 50 points
Sustainability score and rating		Score: **68 out of 100 points** Rating: Level 3: moderately successful

Overall, the project was moderately successful in terms of sustainability. However, the basis for assessing the project's sustainability was poor as key outputs from the national dialogue had not been finalised at the time of the evaluation. In terms of capacity building, the project's major focus was on strengthening the capacity of Libyan stakeholders responsible for and involved in political processes. The project had limited reach to this important direct target group, mainly because of its low budget and poor ownership on behalf of the Libyan Government. Regarding activities at subnational level, the project conducted one successful dialogue within a municipality. Apart from this, it was successful in creating ownership among participants involved in the

dialogue process including the advisory board. Due to the low ownership of the project by the Ministry of Planning (MoP), the anchoring of results in government partner structures was weak although the project followed a strongly participatory approach. However, the project was more successful in anchoring results such as introducing the concept of dialogue with other direct target groups, namely participants of the socio-economic dialogue and the trained dialogue facilitators. These results may have a positive effect on future social cohesion. Presumably, durability of the project's results will also be ensured by ESCWA's plans to continue the project in a second phase.

In total, the sustainability of the project is rated Level 3: moderately successful, with 68 out of 100 points.

Analysis and assessment of sustainability

The sustainability criterion examines the extent to which positive results of the project can be expected to continue once the project has ended. However, the basis for assessing the project's sustainability is extremely poor, because the key outputs from the national dialogue (policy papers and the vision) were not finalised at the time of this evaluation. Therefore, the beneficiaries and stakeholders could not be interviewed regarding the potential utilisation of these products. Also, key stakeholders of the project's political partner (MoP), whose views were crucial in assessing sustainability, were not available for interview during the evaluation mission. For these reasons, the assessment of sustainability is preliminary and rests on not much more than vague plausibility assumptions. However, a major factor in terms of the project's sustainability will be that ESCWA is preparing for a second phase, although the current GIZ project has come to an end (Doc 27).

Sustainability dimension 1: Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

This dimension examines the extent to which capacities relevant to the project objective are utilised by direct and indirect target groups. Given the project's short timeline, utilisation of capacities by the target groups is taken as an indication of their sustainability.

The project's major focus was on strengthening the capacity of Libyan stakeholders responsible for and involved in political processes (component 2). The project had limited reach to this important direct target group, mainly due to its low budget and other constraints (not allowing activities such as the organisation of study tours) and the poor ownership on behalf of the Libyan Government (mainly due to the project's inappropriate design). Furthermore, the buy-in of government officials in the dialogue was low. However, mostly towards the end of its term, the project organised a couple of exchange and dialogue formats to substitute study trips and to offer a platform for the presentation, discussion and evaluation of best practice examples from other countries. These formats also involved government representatives, but it could not be assessed if and to what extent the events contributed to increased capacities of and their use by government stakeholders. Improved capacities to develop and implement policies and strategies at different levels appears crucial for the needs of this key target group, but the project did little to address this issue. Accordingly, ESCWA's proposal for the project's phase 2 prominently addresses the need for such capacity building of Libyan civil servants from national and local agencies (Doc 27). To a limited degree, however, the involvement of Libyan consultants as part of a multidisciplinary panel of experts (expert working groups) to support in the preparation of the policy papers and vision can be assumed to have contributed to the capacity building of relevant stakeholders in the government sphere, because they also advise government institutions (Int_6).

As regards subnational-level project activities, the evaluation has also found little evidence of capacities being utilised by beneficiaries. Although the subnational dialogue conducted in Derj was perceived as highly successful, there was no follow-up for sustaining its results. Interviewees mentioned, however, that the Derj dialogue has opened doors for improved cooperation among various municipal stakeholders including CSOs (Int_15). The evaluators noted that the project, owing to its involvement in the national dialogue, strengthened

the role and participation of marginalised groups, especially women and youth, as relevant actors in policy-making processes in the long run.

Moreover, the project has made great effort in training national and subnational dialogue facilitators, including female facilitators, at the request of the MoP although the activities were not planned in the project's design (Doc 6). As explained before, the training was perceived as very successful, but the evaluation could not find much evidence of utilisation regarding the gained capacities of dialogue facilitators owing to a limited request for dialogue facilitation (see section 4.5). However, the foundation of the Libyan National Association of Dialogue Facilitators is a clear sign of willingness to use the knowledge gained in the training sessions to the benefit of the Libyan people (Int_8).

Finally, ESCWA has not succeeded in diversifying the project's funding sources as initially planned and thus did not contribute to the project's financial sustainability. However, ESCWA has started new endeavours in identifying funding partners for its planned phase 2 of the project (Int_22).

Overall, it can be stated that the project was successful in creating ownership among participants involved in the dialogue process including the advisory board, but it had comparatively poor results in creating ownership on behalf of Libyan Government institutions and policy-makers regarding the developed options for a sustainable economic, state and social model. Thus, the potential of these options to flow into relevant political processes for Libya's transformation is undetermined for now.

Sustainability dimension 1 – Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders – scores **8 out of 20 points.**

Sustainability dimension 2: Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

This dimension assesses the extent to which the project facilitated the anchoring of results in (partner) structures. To this end, the dimension analyses whether the project chose appropriate approaches, methods, policies and strategies in cooperating with its direct target groups. The evaluation team therefore analysed how far the ownership of partner institutions was strengthened by means of a participatory approach and a shared vision; but it also scrutinised how successful the anchoring of results was for target groups.

As mentioned before, the project was not particularly successful in creating sufficient ownership of its political partner, the MoP, for the national dialogues and their outputs, mostly due to specific reasons in the project design (see section 4.2 and 4.5). Presumably, another reason for low ownership of government institutions was that the project did not have a specific capacity-development strategy for addressing Libyan stakeholders responsible for and involved in political processes. The anchoring of results in government partner structures was therefore generally weak although the project followed a strongly participatory approach towards the MoP, for example by involving the Ministry's focal point for the project in the project's steering and advisory board structures.

However, the project was more successful in anchoring results for other direct target groups, namely the socio-economic dialogue participants and the trained dialogue facilitators. First, the project produced the key outputs that the national dialogue process was aimed at, such as the baseline studies, the policy papers and the vision (although these products were not 100% in line with the project's objective indicator 1, see section 4.4). The finalisation of outputs indicates the project made use of appropriate approaches, methods and strategies for reaching these results. In addition, the vision was considered to have realistic potential to be anchored in Libya's state structures, for example by adoption of the Libyan Planning Council, which is an associated body of the Libyan Parliament (Int_18). Second, the project was successful in training dialogue facilitators. The training resulted in founding of Libya's National Association of Dialogue Facilitators. This also indicates the anchoring of results in structures that will keep existing beyond the project's term. However, it was not possible to find out how the Libyan Government intends to make use of the trained dialogue facilitators because of gaps

in data collection. Finally, the project contributed to sustaining the results of the training for dialogue facilitators by making available a manual on the design, preparation and facilitation of socio-economic dialogues (see below).

Sustainability dimension 2 – Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities – scores **15 out of 30 points**.

Sustainability dimension 3: Durability of results over time

This dimension of sustainability relates to a forecast of durability. Here, the evaluation team examines to what extent the results of the project are permanent, stable and long-term resilient, and whether trade-offs between sustainability dimensions (e.g. economic, social, environmental) ought to be considered or expected.

Presumably, durability of the project's results will be ensured by **ESCWA's plans and preparation to continue the project in a second phase**. For this purpose, ESCWA has elaborated a proposal on phase 2 and held initial talks with funding partners. (BMZ, however, decided not to contribute additional funding for phase 2.) ESCWA declares it can implement the second phase, regardless of any additional funding being made available, based on its own financial resources (Int_22). The planned phase 2 will focus on access for Libyan stakeholders to a tailored strategic framework. This will translate the national vision into concrete policies at the sectoral and local levels, and improve capacities of Libyan civil servants (from national and local agencies) to develop and implement policies and strategies at different levels by 2024 (Doc 27). This approach certainly offers a realistic perspective in making project results to date permanent, stable and long-term resilient. However, the success of these ambitions will largely depend on the Libyan Government's ownership, as has been the case during the first phase. In this regard, and contrary to its attitude during phase 1, ESCWA stated that they will seek close cooperation with the new Government of National Unity, especially for involving government stakeholders in operationalising the vision and the policy papers emanating from phase 1 (Int_22). For now, it is unclear if such close cooperation will actually materialise.

For ensuring long-term resilience of its contribution to **building the capacities of Libyan dialogue facilitators**, GIZ made available a very comprehensive manual on the design, preparation and facilitation of socio-economic dialogues, which rely on methods of foresight and scenario-based strategic planning called 'Building Capacity of Dialogue Facilitators' in English and Arabic (Doc 28). The evaluation values the manual as a major step in strengthening the important role of dialogue facilitation in Libya's reconstruction, peacebuilding and development process, and ensuring durability of project results over time. However, to further enhance long-term resilience of its contribution to building the capacities of Libyan dialogue facilitators, there could have been more systematic efforts in involving trained dialogue facilitators in the implementation of other GIZ projects in Libya, in particular at the municipal level (see section 4.3)

Sustainability dimension 3 – Durability of results over time – scores **45 out of 50 points**.

Photo 3: Planning a dialogue moderation, © GIZ/Firas Ben Khelifa

Methodology for assessing sustainability

Sustainability: assessment dimensions	Basis for assessment	Evaluation design and empirical methods	Data quality and limitations
Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	Sustainability in this dimension is understood to have been achieved if capacities relevant to the project are utilised by the target groups.	**Evaluation design:** To assess this dimension, the evaluation will analyse capacities of target groups along the areas of the project's capacity-development approach. **Empirical methods:** • Interviews with implementation partners, project team.	• Lack of overall/capacity-development strategy. • Due to the project's short term, gaps in data collection and delays in finalisation of key products, the availability of robust evidence on sustainability is limited.
Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities	Sustainability in this dimension is understood to have been achieved if results have been anchored in (partner) structures and instruments were employed appropriately to this end.	**Evaluation design:** Based on the contribution analysis, and in particular findings from the effectiveness and impact assessments, the evaluation team will analyse the project's contribution to supporting sustainable capacities along dimensions of the capacity works framework. The evaluation will differentiate contributions at the level of direct target groups. This further allows for the identification of factors impacting sustainability internal and external to the project. **Empirical methods:** • Interviews with implementation partners, project team.	See above.
Durability of results over time	Sustainability in this dimension is understood to have been achieved if results can be forecasted to be permanent, stable, and long-term resilient.	**Evaluation design:** This evaluation dimension relates to a prognosis of durability. Given the limitations (see right column), the assessment will rest on a plausibility analysis of the durability of results at the level of target groups, the analysis will take into account potential risks and other influencing contextual factors, as well as the projects mitigation strategies, also with a view to potential trade-offs. **Empirical methods:** • Interviews with implementation partners, project team.	See above.

Table 20: Methodology for assessing OECD/DAC criterion: sustainability

4.8 Key results and overall rating

In sum, the project has been rated overall as ‘moderately successful’. Although implemented in a highly fragile and conflict-driven environment, it has succeeded in conducting a holistic and participatory socio-economic dialogue process to carve out three baseline studies, eight policy papers and a vision for Libya’s future development. The project has also succeeded in conducting a truly Libyan-driven and Libyan-owned process for elaborating these deliverables and thereby introduced a culture of dialogue in a country that had no experience of such in its past. Bringing Libyans to the table for discussing the country’s future was a big step in an environment struck by armed conflict. For sustaining a dialogue culture in Libya, the project has trained dialogue facilitators who are in a position to contribute to establishing participatory approaches and mediate among conflicting interests and fractions in the future – at both national and subnational levels. However, the project was less successful on relevance, impact and sustainability. This was mainly due to shortcomings in the project’s design and its strategy, resulting in decreasing ownership of its partner, the Government of National Accord, but also due to limited consensus between the two implementing partners GIZ and ESCWA on an overall implementation strategy, insufficient funding by GIZ, difficulties and hesitance in reaching out to the subnational level, and the lack of a capacity-building strategy for Libyan stakeholders responsible for and involved in political processes. However, at least some of these deficiencies might be overcome by a successful implementation of the project’s second phase planned by ESCWA.

Table 21: Rating and score scales

100-point scale (score)	**6-level scale (rating)**
92–100	Level 1: highly successful
81–91	Level 2: successful
67–80	Level 3: moderately successful
50–66	Level 4: moderately unsuccessful
30–49	Level 5: unsuccessful
0–29	Level 6: highly unsuccessful
Overall rating: The criteria of effectiveness, impact and sustainability are knock-out criteria: If one of the criteria is rated at level 4 or lower, the overall rating cannot go beyond level 4 although the mean score may be higher.	

Table 22: Overall rating of OECD/DAC criteria and assessment dimensions

Evaluation criteria	Dimension	Max	Score	Total (max.100)	Rating
Relevance	Alignment with policies and priorities	30	30	**75**	Level 3: moderately successful
	Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	30	25		
	Appropriateness of the design	20	5		
	Adaptability – response to change	20	15		
Coherence	Internal coherence	50	36	**81**	Level 2: successful
	External coherence	50	45		
Effectiveness	Achievement of the (intended) objectives	30	26	**87**	Level 2: successful
	Contribution to achievement of objectives	30	30		
	Quality of implementation	20	15		
	Unintended results	20	18		
Impact	Higher-level (intended) development changes/results	30	15	**72**	Level 3: moderately successful
	Contribution to higher-level (intended) development results/changes	40	27		
	Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development results/changes	30	30		
Efficiency	Production efficiency	70	61	**81**	Level 2: successful
	Allocation efficiency	30	20		
Sustainability	Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	20	8	**68**	Level 3: moderately successful
	Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities	30	15		
	Durability of results over time	50	45		
Mean score and overall rating		100	**77.33**		**Level 3: moderately successful ***

5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Key findings and factors of success/failure

- The Sproject was implemented in a highly challenging context. Major external factors challenging successful project implementation have been the escalation of conflict in Libya, the Covid-19 pandemic and the project's limited funding in relation to its ambitions. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the collaboration between GIZ and ESCWA was not a partnership of choice but was initiated at the request of the commissioning party, BMZ.
- One of the factors of success has been the inclusiveness of the national dialogue process enabling a dialogue which was perceived as truly Libyan-driven and Libyan-owned by its participants. The good composition of the advisory board has especially contributed to this success. Another key success factor was the project's shift towards training dialogue facilitators at the request of its political partner. These trained dialogue facilitators might pave the way for further introducing and sustaining a dialogue culture in the future. Finally, another factor of potential future success is that ESCWA will continue working on the project's key outputs in the project's planned phase 2 even though the GIZ project has already come to an end. This continuation might ensure more successful project results in future, especially on relevance, impact and sustainability.
- Among the factors of failure have been significant shortcomings in the project design, the decreasing ownership of the project's main partner, the weak buy-in of government stakeholders in the dialogue process, the lack of a joint implementation strategy for GIZ and ESCWA, the differences in how GNA's role is perceived, the significant delays in implementing the national dialogue process by ESCWA and GIZ's hesitance in adapting the overall project strategy including revision of indicators, initiating additional dialogue processes at the subnational level and seeking closer cooperation with other GIZ projects on subnational dialogues.

Findings regarding 2030 Agenda

Universality, shared responsibility and accountability

- The project specifically contributed to SDG 16 (promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies) and SDG 5 (gender equality), especially by facilitating responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative dialogue processes and decision-making at national and subnational levels, and by ensuring women's participation in this context. Furthermore, the project was designed to build on the existing structures of ESCWA as its main implementation partner and the organisation's experience in facilitating comparable socio-economic dialogues in other contexts, such as Syria. Although synergies could be exploited to only a limited degree, the project was designed to build on existing structures of its bilateral partner, the GNA – particularly the MoP. Synergies with other donors and international organisations were also integrated to some extent.

Interplay of economic, environmental and social development

- As the project had a distinct scope and focused on facilitating socio-economic dialogue processes in Libya, its emphasis was on social and economic issues regarding Libya's future development, but it did not address the environmental dimension of sustainable development (although, as mentioned above, it did touch upon the environmental dimension in organising a dialogue session on renewable energies). Overall, the project followed a sustainable approach to enhance the social and economic situation of Libya by combining these two dimensions in socio-economic dialogues. Such an approach is highly suitable to include policies promoting sustainable growth and development as the term socio-economic, by definition, relates to or is concerned with the interaction of social and economic factors. In terms of the social dimension of sustainable development, the project also fostered inter-regional collaboration among the

participants of the national dialogue, members of the advisory board and the group of experts involved for preparing the policy options and the vision. At the impact level, no unintended results or trade-offs could be observed between the dimensions.

Inclusiveness/leave no one behind

- The principle of 'Leave no one behind' was considered in the project's approach through the inclusion of women and youth as marginalised groups in today's Libyan society. Both groups were addressed during the project implementation by setting specific goals for their participation and representation in the national dialogue process and the advisory board (see sections 4.4 and 4.5). Additionally, a dedicated project objective indicator (outcome 2) was focused on strengthening CSOs of which 20% represented women and 20% represented young people. Although only a few CSOs representing these groups can be found in Libya and their involvement was therefore challenging, the project largely managed to meet the goals for inclusion of women and youth representatives in the national dialogue process and achieved the respective indicator. Finally, the project implemented a training dedicated exclusively for female dialogue facilitators (Doc 6, 12). With these activities, the project has indeed contributed to supporting disadvantaged and vulnerable groups although the impact was not very tangible, or at least difficult to assess, due to non-availability of interviewees representing these groups.

5.2 Recommendations to GIZ and ESCWA

As there is no follow-on project involving GIZ, the scope of this final section is mainly limited to some retrospective conclusions and recommendations for reflecting on past experience. The following recommendations are based on the analysis and conclusions in the previous sections and addressed to GIZ, specifically staff involved with designing and managing projects.

- When setting up a cooperation project with a (regional) UN organisation, it is better that such organisations have their own (regional) agenda and will not behave like an ordinary subcontractor for implementing a grant. Accordingly, it will be challenging for GIZ to steer the UN partner organisation. This holds particularly true when the respective UN organisation has developed an initial proposal for the project's implementation before the GIZ project is commissioned, as was the case with this project. It is crucial that both GIZ and the UN partner organisation develop and agree on a joint strategy for the joint implementation of the project. The lack of a joint implementation strategy might result in different and possibly conflicting approaches of both organisations that will perpetuate during the project's lifetime with negative implications for the outcome and impact level (see section 4.2). Moreover, it would have been beneficial for the project to develop a joint implementation strategy of GIZ and ESCWA and to negotiate the key elements of the grant agreement before BMZ commissioned the project. Such approach would have enabled or stimulated a much better synchronisation of GIZ and ESCWA contributions (see section 4.6).
- If GIZ actually has no more than limited control regarding implementation of a project's component (as was the case with the national dialogue process), the project's logic should be designed in a way that all components can be implemented independently from each other. Otherwise, such interlinkages and interdependencies may cause fundamental problems, for example due to implementation delays (see section 4.2). In addition, it is not recommendable to conclude a grant agreement on the assumption that the grant recipient will acquire the additional funding necessary for implementation.
- For a project to be successful overall, it needs to adapt its strategy according to developments in its environment as necessary. And by the same token it should revise its results matrix in agreement with BMZ if outcome or output-level indicators prove to be unrealistic, especially if this happens at an early stage of project implementation (see section 4.2). Otherwise, the project risks shortcomings on dimensions such as relevance, effectiveness and impact.

- A dialogue project in an environment severely struck by ongoing conflict is certainly difficult to implement if the project's main partner is representing a party involved in ongoing conflict (even if the partner represents the UN-recognised government). The dialogue facilitation needs to be organised so that it is perceived as neutral and not linked to any conflicting party. For this reason, GIZ would have been better advised to keep the MoP out and instead select a different partner institution that is more neutral in the ongoing conflict (see sections 4.2 and 4.6).
- If a project has a strong capacity-development component, an overall capacity-development strategy needs to be elaborated to define and guide the capacity-development approach (see section 4.2).
- When continuing to implement the project in its planned phase 2, ESCWA is strongly advised to seek close cooperation with the new Libyan Government for establishing sufficient ownership.

List of references

GIZ standard project documents

- Document 1: Project proposal (2017)
- Document 2: Libya context analysis (2016)
- Document 3: Peace and conflict assessment matrix (PCA) (2018)
- Document 4: Gender analysis (2018)
- Document 5: GIZ progress report (2018)
- Document 6: GIZ progress report (2019)
- Document 7: ESCWA progress report (2018)
- Document 8: ESCWA progress report (2019)
- Document 9: ESCWA progress report (2020)
- Document 10: Results matrix (2017)
- Document 11: Reconstructed results model (2020)
- Document 12: Data from the results-based monitoring system
- Document 13: Map of actors
- Document 14: Concept of building capacity for dialogue facilitation
- Document 15: Steering structure
- Document 16: Plan of operations
- Document 17: Cost data (2021)
- Document 18: Excel sheet assigning working-months of staff to outputs (2021)

Other GIZ and ESCWA project documents

- Document 19: ESCWA project proposal ‘Libya socio-economic dialogue project: Alternative paths to sustainable and inclusive development’
- Document 20: Grant agreement GIZ-ESCWA (2018)
- Document 21: Baseline study 1: An introductory study on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan economy
- Document 22: Baseline study 2: An introductory study on the status, challenges and prospects of the Libyan society
- Document 23: Baseline study 3: An introductory study on the status, challenges and prospects of governance and institutions in Libya
- Document 24: ESCWA selection criteria for participants of the national dialogue
- Document 25: Advisory board: Criteria of membership and terms of reference
- Document 26: ESCWA study ‘Economic cost of the Libyan conflict’
- Document 27: ESCWA proposal for phase 2 of the Libya socio-economic dialogue project
- Document 28: GIZ manual ‘Building capacity of dialogue facilitators’ (2020)
- Document 29: Efficiency Tool (2021)

Other GIZ documents

GIZ (2007): *Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Maßnahmen,* Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

GIZ (2017): *Guide for Central Project Evaluations,* Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

GIZ (2018): *GIZ's Evaluation System – Central Project Evaluations for BMZ Business,* Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH [online] GIZ_EVAL_EN_ZPE_BMZ business.pdf [14.08.2019].

Further references

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Annex: Evaluation matrix

OECD-DAC Criterion Relevance - Is the intervention doing the right things? (max. 100 points)
The 'relevance' criterion focuses on the intervention's design. It refers to the extent to which the objectives and design of a development intervention are consistent with the (global, country and institution-specific) requirements, needs, priorities and policies of beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups, organisations and development partners). It also identifies the ability of the intervention's design to adapt to a change in circumstances. 'Relevance' is assessed in relation to 1) the **time of the intervention design**[1] and 2) from **today's perspective**[2].

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - project type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for assessment / evaluation indicators** *(e.g. module objective/programme indicators, selected hypotheses, or more generally a definition of the aspects to be used for evaluation)*	**Evaluation design and empirical methods** *(Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)*	**Data sources** *(e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)*	**Data quality and limitations** *(Description of limitations, assessment of data quality: poor, moderate, good, strong)*	**Data quality assessment** (weak, moderate, good, strong)
Alignment with policies and priorities	Standard	1) To what extent are the intervention's objectives aligned with the (global, regional and country specific) policies and priorities of the BMZ and of the beneficiaries and stakeholders and other (development) partners? To what extent do they take account of the relevant political and institutional environment?	• Orientation at BMZ country strategies and BMZ sector concepts • Strategic reference framework for the project, e.g. national strategies including the national implementation strategy for Agenda 2030, regional and international strategies, sectoral and cross-sectoral change strategies, in bilateral projects especially partner strategies, internal analytical framework e.g. safeguards and gender[4] • Orientation of the project design at the (national) objectives of Agenda 2030 • Project contribution to certain Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) • Explanation of a hierarchy of the different policies, priorities (especially in case of contradictions)	Description, interview partners refer to strategic reference framework, alignment is reflected in core documents, project documents refer to SDGs	Document analysis, interviews	Project documents, interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good	good
	and Fragility	2) To what extent was the (conflict) context of the project adequately analysed and considered for the project concept?	• Key documents: (Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment (I)PCA, Safeguard Conflict and Context Sensitivity documents	Monitoring system exists, PCA matrix was elaborated and regularly updated		Project documents, interviews with project team	good	good
	and SV/GV	To what extent does the project complement bilateral or regional projects? To what extent does it complement other global projects?	• Please use CPE factsheet on SV / GV / IZR					
	and SV/GV	To what extent is the project geared towards solving a global challenge that cannot only be effectively addressed bilaterally/ regionally?	• Please use CPE factsheet on SV / GV / IZR					
Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries	Standard	To what extent are the intervention's objectives aligned with the development needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders involved	• Also: consideration of stakeholders such as civil society and private sector in the design of the measure	Detailed description of beneficiaries and stakeholders involved exists, their needs and capacities are clearly identified, indicators reflect	Document analysis, interviews	Project documents, interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries	good	good

and stakeholders		(individuals, groups and organisations)?		target groups sufficiently, proof of do-no-harm approach				
	and Fragility	How were deescalating factors/ connectors[5] as well as escalating factors/ dividers[6] in the project context identified and considered for the project concept (please list the factors)?[7]	• e.g. see column I and II of the (Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment	PCA matrix was elaborated and regularly updated		Project documents, interviews with project team	good	good
	and Fragility	To what extent were potential (security) risks for (GIZ) staff, partners, target groups/final beneficiaries identified and considered?		Risks in PCA matrix identified, RoM system in place as well as conflict-sensitive monitoring		Project documents, interviews with project team and RoM	good	good
	Standard	To what extent are the intervention's objectives geared to the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups and organisations)? With respect to groups, a differentiation can be made by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.?	• Reaching particularly disadvantaged groups (in terms of Leave No One Behind, LNOB) • Consideration of potential for human rights and gender aspects • Consideration of identified risks	Disadvantaged groups and the most vulnerable were taken into concern		Project documents, interviews with partners, private and civil society actors and target group, focus group discussions	good	good
Appropriateness of the design[3]	Standard	1) To what extent is the intervention's design appropriate and realistic (in terms of technical, organisational and financial aspects)?	• Realistic project goal from today's perspective and in view of the available resources (time, finances, partner capacities) • Consideration of potential changes in the framework conditions • Dealing with the complexity of framework conditions and strategic reference frameworks and with possible overloading • Strategic focusing	Dialogue process has been inclusive, developed policy options are relevant and applied, project goals have been achieved, changes in framework conditions have been taken into account, project strategy has been adjusted accordingly	Operational planning, project progress reports, results matrix and monitoring data, interviews	Project documents, interviews with project team, partners, beneficiaries and research institutions	good	good

	Standard	2) To what extent is the intervention's design sufficiently precise and plausible (in terms of the verifiability und traceability of the system of objectives and the underlying assumptions)?	Assessment of the (current) results model and results hypotheses (theory of change, ToC) of the actual project logic: • Adequacy of activities, instruments and outputs in relation to the project objective to be achieved • Plausibility of the underlying results hypotheses • Clear definition and plausibility of the selected system boundary (sphere of responsibility) • Appropriate consideration of potential influences of other donors/ organisations outside the project's sphere of responsibility • completeness and plausibility of assumptions and risks for the project results • How well is co-financing (if any) integrated into the overall concept of the project and what added value could be generated for the ToC/project design?	Results model exists, is logical and updated, objective is realistic, activities, instruments and outputs are adequate to reach the objective, system boundaries are clear and plausible, assumptions and risks are complete and plausible		Project documents, interviews with partners, etc. (focus on effectiveness related questions)	good	good
	Standard	3) To what extent is the intervention's design based on a holistic approach to sustainable development (interaction of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainability)?	• Presentation of the interactions (synergies/trade-offs) of the intervention with other sectors in the project design - also with regard to the sustainability dimensions in terms of Agenda 2030 (economic, ecological and social development)	Trade-offs between sustainability dimensions have been reflected		Workshop with project team, interviews with GIZ staff in charge of project design and project documents	good	good
Adaptability – response to change	Standard	To what extent has the intervention responded to changes in the environment over time (risks and potentials)?	• Reaction to changes during project including change offers (e.g. local, national, international, sectoral changes, including state-of-the-art sectoral know-how)	Adaptation is demonstrated in documents, examples that demonstrate the reaction of the project to changes in the course of the implementation can be given	Workshop, interviews and documents	Workshop with project team, interviews with Project Manager and staff in charge of components and project documents	good	strong

(1) The 'time of the intervention design' is the point in time when the offer/most recent modification offer was approved.

(2) In relation to the current standards, knowledge and framework conditions.

(3) The design of an intervention is usually assessed by evaluating its intervention logic. The intervention logic depicts the system of objectives used by an intervention. It maps out the systematic relationships between the individual results levels. At the time an intervention is designed, the intervention logic, in the form of a logical model, is described in the offer for the intervention both as a narrative and generally also on the basis of a results framework. The model is reviewed at the start of an evaluation and adjusted to reflect current knowledge. Comprehensive (re)constructed intervention logics are also known as 'theories of change'. In GIZ the 'project design' encompasses project objective (outcome) and the respective theory of change (ToC) with outputs, activities, TC instruments and especially the results hypotheses as well as the implementation strategy (e.g. methodological approach, Capacity Development strategy). In GIZ the Theory of Change is described by the GIZ results model as graphic illustration and the narrative results hypotheses.

(4) In the GIZ Safeguards and Gender system risks are assessed before project start regarding following aspects: gender, conflict, human rights, environment and climate. For the topics gender and human rights not only risks but also potentials are assessed. Before introducing the new safeguard system in 2016 GIZ used to examine these aspects in separate checks.

(5) Deescalating factors/ connectors: e.g. peace-promoting actors and institutions, structural changes, peace-promoting norms and behaviour. For more details on 'connectors' see: GIZ (2007): 'Peace and Conflict Assessment' (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Maßnahmen', p. 55/135.

(6) Escalating factors/ dividers: e.g. destructive institutions, structures, norms and behaviour. For more details on 'dividers' see: GIZ (2007): 'Peace and Conflict Assessment' (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Maßnahmen', p. 135.

(7) All projects in fragile contexts, projects with FS1 or FS2 markers and all transitional aid projects have to weaken escalating factors/dividers and have to mitigate risks in the context of conflict, fragility and violence. Projects with FS1 or FS2 markers should also consider how to strengthen deescalating factors/ connectors and how to address peace needs in its project objective/sub-objective.

OECD-DAC Criterion Coherence - How well does the intervention fit? (max. 100 points)

This criterion refers to the intervention's compatibility with other interventions in a country, sector or institution as well as with international norms and standards. **Internal coherence** addresses the synergies and division of tasks between the intervention and other interventions of German development cooperation and also the intervention's consistency with the relevant international norms and standards to which German development cooperation adheres. **External coherence** considers the intervention's complementarity, harmonisation and coordination with the interventions of other partners, donors and international organisations. The 'coherence' criterion relates both to the intervention's design as well as to the results it achieves.

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - project type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for assessment / evaluation indicators** (*e.g. Modulziel-/Programmindikatoren, ausgewählte Hypothesen, oder allgemeiner eine Definition der Aspekte, die zur Bewertung herangezogen werden)*	**Evaluation design and empirical methods** (Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)	**Data sources** (e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)	**Data quality and limitations** (Description of limitations, assessment of data quality: poor, moderate, good, strong)	**Data quality assessment** (weak, moderate, good, strong)
Internal coherence	Standard	1) Within German development cooperation, to what extent is the intervention designed and implemented (in a sector, country, region or globally) in a complementary manner, based on the division of tasks?	• Also analysis of whether the project takes the necessary steps to fully realise synergies within German development cooperation	Coordination with other GIZ projects, also in order to leverage synergies	Interviews and Workshop	Interviews and workshop with project team, interviews with management of other relevant projects	good	good
	Standard	2) To what extent are the instruments of German development cooperation (Technical and Financial Cooperation) meaningfully interlinked within the intervention (in terms of both design and implementation)? Are synergies leveraged?	• if applicable, also take into account projects of different German ministries	Coordination with other GIZ projects funded by the German Federal Foreign Office.			good	good
	Standard	3) To what extent is the intervention consistent with international and national norms and standards to which German development cooperation is committed (e.g. human rights)?		Consideration of relevant sectoral documents such as BMZ's concept paper on support for good governance in development cooperation, BMZ's strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 development policy, BMZ's strategy paper on development for peace and security, BMZ's strategy paper on gender equality in German development policy, BMZ's 2030 reform strategy, German Federal Government's Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace		Interviews and workshop with project team, interviews with management of other relevant projects	good	good
External coherence	Standard	To what extent does the intervention complement and support the partner's own efforts (principle of subsidiarity)?		Consideration of relevant national strategies if existent	Documents, interviews, monitoring system	Project documents, interviews with project team, partners and other donors	good	good
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention's design and implementation been coordinated with other donors' activities?	• Also: To what extent could synergies be achieved through co-financing (where available) with other bilateral and multilateral donors and organisations and how did co-financing contribute to improved donor coordination?	Coordination with other donors took place on regular basis			good	good

	Standard	To what extent has the intervention's design been designed to use existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) for implementing its activities? To what extent are these systems and structures used?	• Also: analysis of whether the project is taking the necessary steps to fully realise synergies with interventions of other donors at the impact level	Existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) have been considered and used if possible			good	good
	Standard	To what extent are common systems (together with partners/other donors/international organisations) used for M&E, learning and accountability?		Use of common systems (together with partners/other donors/international organisations) for M&E, learning and accountability			good	good

OECD-DAC Criterion Effectiveness - Is the intervention achieving its objectives? (max. 100 points)

'Effectiveness' refers to the extent to which the intervention has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives (at outcome level), including any differential results across beneficiary and stakeholder groups. It examines the achievement of objectives in terms of the direct, short-term and medium term results.

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - Project Type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for ssessment / evaluation indicators** (*e.g. Modulziel-/Programmindikatoren, ausgewählte Hypothesen, oder allgemeiner eine Definition der Aspekte, die zur Bewertung herangezogen werden)*	**Evaluation design and empirical methods** (Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)	**Data sources** (e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)	**Data quality and limitations** (Description of limitations, assessment of data quality: poor, moderate, good, strong)
Achievement of the (intended) objectives[1]	Standard	To what extent has the intervention achieved, or is the intervention expected to achieve, the (intended) objectives as originally planned (or as modified to cater for changes in the environment)?	• Assessment based on the project objective indicators (agreed with BMZ) • Check whether more specific or additional indicators are needed to adequately reflect the project objective	Outcome indicators are achieved; need for more specific or additional indicators	Monitoring system, documents, interviews, workshop, surveys	Monitoring data and project progress reports	good
	and Fragility	For projects with FS1 or FS2 markers: To what extent was the project able to strengthen deescalating factors/ connectors?[2, 4]		Project has FS1 marker, influence of dialogues as a deescalating factor/connector		Interviews with participants of the dialogues and other policy-makers	good
Contribution to achievement of objectives	Standard	*To what extent have the intervention's outputs been delivered as originally planned (or as modified to cater for changes in the environment)?*		Outputs have been delivered as originally planned	Monitoring system, documents, interviews, workshop, surveys	Projects progress reports, workshop with project team.	good
	Standard	To what extent have the delivered outputs and increased capacities been used and equal access (e.g. in terms of physical, non-discriminatory and affordable access) guaranteed?		Use of delivered outputs and increased capacities and guarantee of equal access		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries, surveys among stakeholders of dialogues processes	
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to the achievement of objectives?	• Assessment based on the activities, TC instruments and outputs of the project (contribution analysis as focus of this assessment dimension and minimum standard, see annotated	Objectives have been achieved		Interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries	

			reports) • What would have happened without the project? (usually qualitative reflection)					
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to the achievement of objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?		Dialogue process has been inclusive and results flow into policy decisions for Libya's transformation		Interviews with stakeholders of the dialogue process and other beneficiaries		
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to the achievement of objectives at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups of beneficiaries and stakeholders? (These may be broken down by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)?		Particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups of beneficiaries and stakeholder have been considered in project implementation		Interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries		
	Standard	*Which internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for achievement/non-achievement of the intervention's intended objectives?*	• Internal factors = within the project's sphere of responsibility/ system boundary. The project is implemented jointly by GIZ and the official partner(s).	Interviewees name internal factors of success or failure for the achievement of intended objective		Interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries		
	Standard	*Which external factors were decisive for achievement/non-achievement of the intervention's intended objectives (taking into account the anticipated risks)?*	• External factors = outside the project's sphere of responsibility/ system boundary. The project is implemented jointly by GIZ and the official partner(s).	Interviewees name external factors of success or failure for the achievement of intended objective		Interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries		
Quality of implementation	Standard	What assessment can be made of the quality of steering and implementation of the intervention in terms of the achievement of objectives? What assessment can be made of the quality of steering and implementation of, and participation in, the intervention by the partner/executing agency?	Capacity Works considerations: - **Results-oriented monitoring (RoM / WoM)** is established and used, e.g. for evidence-based decisions, risk management. Data are disaggregated by gender and marginalised groups. unintended positive and negative results are monitored. Conflict-sensitive monitoring and explicit risk-safety monitoring are particularly important for projects in fragile contexts. - A bindingly communicated **strategy** agreed with the partners is pursued - Involvement and **cooperation** of all relevant actors (including partners, civil society, private sector) - **Steering**: decisions influencing the project's results are made in time and evidence-informed. Decision processes are transparent. - **Processes**: Relevant change processes are anchored in the cooperation system; project-internal processes are established and regularly reflected and optimised. - **Learning and innovation**: There is a learning and innovation-friendly work culture that promotes the exchange of experience; learning processes are established; context-specific adjustments are possible	Project steering and implementation has made use of Capacity WORKS considerations and has also been inclusive regarding the partners and the executing agency	Interviews, documents	Interviews with project team and members of the steering group, project documents related to steering group (minutes of meetings, etc.)	good	

Unintended results	Standard	To what extent can unintended positive/negative direct results (social, economic, environmental and among vulnerable beneficiary groups) be observed/anticipated?	• The focus is on the outcome level, but for the analysis the unintended effects can also be included on the output level	Risks and unintended positive/negative results were recorded as observation fields by the monitoring system	Monitoring systems, documents, workshop, interviews	Monitoring systems and project progress reports, workshop with project team and interviews with partners	good
	and Fragility	To what extent was the project able to ensure that escalating factors/ dividers[3] have not been strengthened (indirectly) by the project[4]? Has the project unintentionally (indirectly) supported violent or 'dividing' actors?		Risks and measures to mitigate these risks have been monitored			good
	Standard	What potential benefits/risks arise from the positive/negative unintended results? What assessment can be made of them?	• also check whether the risks were already mentioned and monitored in the design phase	Description and assessment			good
	and Fragility	To what extent have risks and unintended negative results in the context of conflict, fragility and violence[5] been monitored (context/conflict-sensitive monitoring) in a systematic way?		Project systematically monitored risks and unintended negative results in this context			good
	Standard	How has the intervention responded to the potential benefits/risks of the positive/negative unintended results?	• Check if positive results at the outcome level have been monitored and set in value	Project reflected about potential benefits/risks of the unintended results, described them and developed mitigation strategies or exploited positive unintended results			good

(1) The first and second assessment dimensions are interrelated: If the project's contribution to achieving the objective is small (2nd assessment dimension), this must also be taken into account when evaluating the first assessment dimension.

(2) Deescalating factors/ connectors: e.g. peace-promoting actors and institutions, structural changes, peace-promoting norms and behaviour. For more details on 'connectors' see: GIZ (2007): 'Peace and Conflict Assessment' (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Maßnahmen', p. 55/135.

(3) Escalating factors/ dividers: e.g. destructive institutions, structures, norms and behaviour. For more details on 'dividers' see: GIZ (2007): 'Peace and Conflict Assessment' (PCA). Ein methodischer Rahmen zur konflikt- und friedensbezogenen Ausrichtung von EZ-Maßnahmen', p. 135.

(4) All projects in fragile contexts, projects with FS1 or FS2 markers and all transitional aid projects have to weaken escalating factors/dividers and have to mitigate risks in the context of conflict, fragility and violence. Projects with FS1 or FS2 markers should also consider how to strengthen deescalating factors/ connectors and how to address peace needs in its project objective/sub-objective?

(5) Risks in the context of conflict, fragility and violence: e.g. contextual (e.g. political instability, violence, economic crises, migration/refugee flows, drought, etc.), institutional (e.g. weak partner capacity, fiduciary risks, corruption, staff turnover, investment risks) and personnel (murder, robbery, kidnapping, medical care, etc.). For more details see: GIZ (2014): 'Context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring system'. Supplement to: The 'Guidelines on designing and using a results-based monitoring system', pp. 27 & 28.

OECD-DAC Criterion Impact (higher-level development results) - What difference does the intervention make? (max. 100 points)

Based on recognisable higher-level development changes (at impact level), the criterion of 'higher-level development results (at impact level)' relates to the extent to which the intervention has already produced significant positive or negative, intended or unintended results at the overarching level (contributions to the observed changes), or is expected to do so in the future. This includes any differential results across different stakeholders and beneficiaries. This criterion refers to the results of the development intervention.

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - Project Type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for assessment / evaluation indicators (e.g. Modulziel-/Programmindikatoren, ausgewählte Hypothesen, oder allgemeiner eine Definition der Aspekte, die zur Bewertung herangezogen werden)**	**Evaluation design and empirical methods** (Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)	**Data sources** (e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)
Higher-level (intended) development changes[1]	Standard	To what extent can the higher-level development changes (social, economic and environmental dimensions and the interactions between them) to which the intervention will/is designed to contribute be identified/foreseen)? (Specify time frame where possible.)	Description	Documents, interviews, surveys	Project documents such as the project proposal and project progress reports, interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries, surveys among beneficiaries	good
	IZR	To what extent have the IZR criteria contributed to strengthening overarching development results?				
	Standard	To what extent can the higher-level development changes (social, economic, environmental dimensions and the interactions between them) be identified/foreseen at the level of the intended beneficiaries? (Specify time frame where possible.)	Description			
	Standard	To what extent can higher-level development changes to which the intervention will/is designed to contribute be identified/foreseen at the level of particularly disadvantaged/vulnerable groups of beneficiaries and stakeholders? (These may be broken down by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.) (Specify time frame where possible.)	Description			
Contribution to higher-level (intended) development changes	Standard	To what extent has the intervention actually contributed to the identified and/or foreseeable higher-level development changes (social, economic, environmental dimensions and their interactions, taking into account political stability) that it was designed to bring about?	Description	Monitoring system, documents, workshop, interviews	Project documents such as the project proposal and project progress reports, interviews with project team, partners and beneficiaries, surveys among beneficiaries	good
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention achieved its intended (original and, where applicable, revised) development objectives?	Description			
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention achieved its (original and, where applicable, revised) development objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?	Description			
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to higher-level development changes/changes in the lives of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups of beneficiaries and stakeholders that it was designed to bring about? (These may be broken down by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.).	Description			

		Standard	Which internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for achievement/non-achievement of the intervention's intended development objectives?	Description, internal factors can be identified			
		Standard	Which external factors were decisive for the achievement/non-achievement of the intervention's intended development objectives?	Description, external factors can be identified			
		Standard	To what extent has the intervention achieved structural or institutional changes (e.g. for organisations, systems and regulations)?	Description			
		Standard	To what extent did the intervention serve as a model and/or achieve broad-based impact?	Description			
		IZR	To what extent has the project made an innovative contribution (or a contribution to innovation)? Which innovations have been tested in different regional contexts? How are the innovations evaluated by which partners?				
		Standard	How would the situation have developed without the intervention?	Description			
	Contribution to higher-level (unintended) development changes	Standard	To what extent can higher-level, unintended development changes (social, economic and environmental dimensions and their interactions, taking into account political stability) be identified/foreseen? (Specify time frame where possible.)	There are no negative results or trade-offs, positive results and synergies between the three dimensions can be described	Workshop, interviews, surveys	Workshop with project team, interviews with partners, focus group discussions with and surveys among beneficiaries	good
		and Fragility	To what extent did the project have (unintended) negative or escalating effects on the conflict or the context of fragility (e.g. conflict dynamics, violence, legitimacy of state and non-state actors/institutions)? To what extent did the project have positive or deescalating effects on the conflict or the context of fragility (e.g. conflict dynamics, violence, legitimacy of state and non-state actors/institutions)?	Description	Workshop, interviews, surveys		
		Standard	To what extent has the intervention brought about foreseeable/identifiable unintended (positive and/or negative) higher-level development results?	Description	Workshop, interviews, surveys		
		Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to foreseeable/identifiable unintended (positive and/or negative) higher-level development results at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups of beneficiaries and stakeholders? (These may be broken down by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)	Description	Workshop, interviews, focus group discussions, surveys		

(1) The first and second assessment dimensions are interrelated: If the project's contribution to achieving the objective is small (2nd assessment dimension), this must also be taken into account when evaluating the first assessment dimension.

(2) See GIZ 2016 'Guidelines on scaling up for programme managers (AV) and planning officers'

(3) Risks, negative effects and trade-offs are separate aspects that should be discussed individually at this point.

OECD-DAC Criterion Efficiency - How well are resources being used? (max. 100 points)

This criterion describes the extent to which the intervention delivers results in an economic and timely way (relationship between input and output, outcome and impact level). The evaluation dimension '**production efficiency**' refers to the appropriateness of the relationship between inputs and outputs. The evaluation dimension '**allocation efficiency**' refers to the appropriateness of the relationship between the inputs and the results achieved (project/development objective; outcome/impact level) by the intervention. The 'efficiency' criterion relates both to the intervention's design and implementation and to the results it achieves.

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - project type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for assessment / evaluation indicators** (*e.g. Modulziel-/Programmindikatoren, ausgewählte Hypothesen, oder allgemeiner eine Definition der Aspekte, die zur Bewertung herangezogen werden)*	**Evaluation design and empirical methods** (Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)	**Data sources** (e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)	**Data quality and limitations** (Description of limitations, assessment of data quality: poor, moderate, good, strong)
Production efficiency	Standard	How are the intervention's inputs (financial, human and material resources) distributed (e.g. by instruments, sectors, sub-interventions, taking into account the cost contributions of partners/executing agencies/other beneficiaries and stakeholders etc.)?	• Description of the data: Costs per output, type of costs, agreed and provided partner contributions • Description of the deviations between original planned costs and actual costs (with comprehensible justification, changes are certainly desirable for increased efficiency)	Description	Documents, interviews	Documents such as cost commitment report, operational plans and interview with project management	good
	Standard	To what extent have the intervention's inputs (financial, human and material resources) been used economically in relation to the outputs delivered (products, investment goods and services)? If possible, refer to data from other evaluations in a region or sector, for instance.	• Use of 'Efficiency tool' including instructions and use of the follow-the-money approach as evaluation design (may be combined with other high-quality approaches) • Output level: Analysis of approaches and activities as well as TC instruments (personnel instruments, financing, materials and equipment)[1] compared to possible alternatives with a focus on the minimum principle (use of comparative data if available) • The project is oriented on internal or external benchmarks in order to achieve its effects economically • Regular reflection of the resources used by the project with focus on economically use of resources and cost risks • The overarching costs of the project are in an appropriate proportion to the costs of the outputs	Description			
	Standard	To what extent could the intervention's outputs (products, investment goods and services) have been increased through the alternative use of inputs (financial, human and material resources)? If possible, refer to data from other evaluations of a region or sector, for instance. (If applicable, this question adds a complementary perspective*) * This case is always applicable in the technical cooperation (TC), please answer the question bindingly	• Use of 'Efficiency tool' including instructions and use of the follow-the-money approach as evaluation design (may be combined with other high-quality approaches) • Output level: Analysis of approaches and activities as well as TC instruments (personnel instruments, financing, materials and equipment)[1] compared to possible alternatives with focus on output maximisation (use of comparative data if available) • Analysis of alternative options for allocating resources and shifts between outputs for output maximisation • saved resources can and should be used to maximise outputs • Reflection of the resources during the design phase and regularly during the implementation of the project with focus on output maximisation (with comprehensible justification, changes are certainly desirable for increased efficiency) • 'maximising outputs' means with the same resources, under the same conditions and with the same or better quality	Description			

	Standard	Were the outputs (products, investment goods and services) produced on time and within the planned time frame?		Description			
Allocation efficiency	Standard	By what other means and at what cost could the results achieved (higher-level project objective) have been attained?		Description	Documents, interviews	Documents such as cost commitment report, operational plans and interview with project management	good
	Standard	To what extent – compared with alternative designs for the intervention – could the results have been attained more cost-effectively?	• Outcome level: Analysis of approaches and activities as well as TC instruments in comparison to possible alternatives with focus on minimum principle (use of comparative data if available) • Regular reflection in the project of the input-outcome relation and alternatives as well as cost risks • The partner contributions are proportionate to the costs for the outcome of the project	Description			
	Standard	To what extent – compared with alternative designs for the intervention – could the positive results have been increased using the existing resources? (If applicable, this question adds a complementary perspective*) * This case is always applicable in the technical cooperation (TC), please answer the question bindingly	• Outcome level: Analysis of applied approaches and activities as well as TC instruments compared to possible alternatives with focus on maximising the outcome (real comparison if available) • The project manages its resources between the outputs in such a way that the maximum effects in terms of the module objective are achieved • Regular reflection in the project of the input-outcome relation and alternatives • Reflection and realisation of possibilities for scaling up • If additional funds (e.g. co-financing) have been raised: Effects on input-outcome ratio (e.g. via economies of scale) and the ratio of administrative costs to total costs • Losses in efficiency due to insufficient coordination and complementarity within German DC are sufficiently avoided	Description			

(1) see GIZ 2015: 'Integration of TC Instruments – Key Elements', based on BMZ 2014: Handbuch der bilateralen TZ Verfahrensinformation Nr. VI0362014 'Eckpunkte zur Instrumentenintegration'

OECD-DAC Criterion Sustainability - Will the benefits last? (max. 100 points)

The 'sustainability' criterion relates to continued long-term benefits (at the outcome and impact level) or the probability of continued long-term benefits – taking into account observed or foreseeable risks – over time, particularly after assistance has ended.

Assessment dimensions	**Filter - Project Type**	**Evaluation questions**	**Clarifications**	**Basis for Assessment / Evaluation indicators** (*e.g. Modulziel-/Programmindikatoren, ausgewählte Hypothesen, oder allgemeiner eine Definition der Aspekte, die zur Bewertung herangezogen werden)*	**Evaluation Design and empirical methods** (Design: e.g. Contribution analysis, Follow-the-Money Approach) (Methods: e.g. interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis, project/partner monitoring system, workshop, online survey, etc.)	**Data sources** (e.g. list of relevant documents, interviews with stakeholder category XY, specific data, specific monitoring data, specific workshop(s), etc.)	**Data Quality and limitations** (Description of limitations, assessment of data quality: poor, moderate, good, strong)
Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders	Standard	To what extent do the beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups and organisations, partners and executing agencies) have the institutional, human and financial resources as well as the willingness (ownership) required to sustain the positive results of the intervention over time (once assistance has drawn to a close)?	• Transitional Development Assistance (TDA) projects primarily address final beneficiaries, whose resilience to crises and recurring shocks is to be strengthened. The focus for TDA projects is thus often on the resilience of final beneficiaries and/or at least the continuity of the measure (see explanation in dimension 3) (clarification in the inception phase of the evaluation).	Beneficiaries and stakeholders confirm they have the institutional, human and financial resources as well as the willingness (ownership) required to sustain the positive results of the intervention over time	Interviews	Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
	Standard	To what extent do the beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups and organisations, partners and executing agencies) have the resilience to overcome future risks that could jeopardise the intervention's results?		Beneficiaries and stakeholders confirm to have the resilience to overcome future risks that could jeopardise the intervention's results		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to the beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups and organisations, partners and executing agencies) having the institutional, human and financial resources as well as the willingness (ownership) required to sustain the intervention's positive results over time and to limit the impact of any negative results?	• Analysis of the preparation and documentation of learning experiences • Description of the anchoring of contents, approaches, methods and concepts in the partner system • Reference to exit strategy of the project • If there is a follow-on project, check to what extent the results of the evaluated project are taken up; the anchoring of the effects in the partner's organisation should be pursued independently of a follow-on project, since sustainability should be achieved even without donor funds • Transitional Development Assistance (TDA) projects primarily address final beneficiaries, whose resilience to crises and recurring shocks is to be strengthened. The focus for TDA projects is thus often on the resilience of final beneficiaries and/or at least the continuity of the measure (see explanation in dimension 3) (clarification in the inception phase of the evaluation).	Description of the project's contributions in this regard	Interviews	Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to strengthening the resilience of the beneficiaries and stakeholders (individuals, groups and organisations,		Description of the project's contributions in this regard		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good

		partners and executing agencies)?					
	Standard	To what extent has the intervention contributed to strengthening the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups? (These may be broken down by age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)		Description of the project's contributions in this regard		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
Durability of results over time	Standard	How stable is the context in which the intervention operates?		Description	Interviews	Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
	Standard	To what extent is the durability of the intervention's positive results influenced by the context?	• Consideration of risks and potentials for the long-term stability of the results and description of the reaction of the project to these.	Description		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good
	Standard	To what extent can the positive (and any negative) results of the intervention be deemed durable?	• Consideration of the extent to which continued use of the results by partners and beneficiaries can be foreseen • Reference to conditions and their influence on the durability, longevity and resilience of the effects (outcome and impact) • In the case of projects in the field of Transitional Development Assistance (TDA), at least the continuity of the measure must be examined: To what extent will services or results be continued in future projects (of GIZ or other donors/organisations) or their sustainability ensured? (Clarification in the inception phase).	Description		Interviews with partners and beneficiaries	good

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