I Z A Institute of Labor Economics

Initiated by Deutsche Post Foundation

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 15752

The Impact of ICT and Robots on Labour Market Outcomes of Demographic Groups in Europe

Maciej Albinowski
Piotr Lewandowski

NOVEMBER 2022

I Z A Institute
of Labor Economics

Initiated by Deutsche Post Foundation

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 15752

The Impact of ICT and Robots on Labour Market Outcomes of Demographic Groups in Europe

Maciej Albinowski
IBS

Piotr Lewandowski
IBS and IZA

NOVEMBER 2022

ISSN: 2365-9793

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9
53113 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0
Email: publications@iza.org

www.iza.org

ABSTRACT

The Impact of ICT and Robots on Labour Market Outcomes of Demographic Groups in Europe*

We study the age- and gender-specific labour market effects of two key modern technologies, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and robots, in 14 European countries between 2010 and 2018. To identify the causal effects of technology adoption, we utilise the variation in technology adoption between industries and apply the instrumental variables strategy proposed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020). We find that the exposure to ICT and robots increased the shares of young and prime-aged women in employment and the wage bills of particular sectors, but reduced the shares of older women and prime-aged men. The adverse effects were particularly pronounced for older women in cognitive occupations, who had relatively low ICT-related skills; and for young men in routine manual occupations, who experienced substitutions by robots. Between 2010 and 2018, the growth in ICT capital played a much larger role than robot adoption in the changes in the labour market outcomes of demographic groups.

JEL Classification: J24, O33, J23

Keywords: technological change, automation, ICT, robots, employment, wages, Europe

Corresponding author:
Piotr Lewandowski
Institute for Structural Research (IBS)
Wiśniowa 40B/8
02-520 Warsaw
Poland
E-mail: piotr.lewandowski@ibs.org.pl

* We thank Robert Stehrer, and the participants of the BIBB/IAB/ZEW Tasks VI conference in Nuremberg, the UNTANGLED workshop in Vienna, and the WIEM conference in Warsaw for their helpful comments. This paper uses Eurostat data. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results or the conclusions, which are those of the authors. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme (project "UNTANGLED") under grant agreement No. 1001004776.

1. Introduction

The increased use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and robots in workplaces has been changing the world of work. Between 2000 and 2019, the real value of ICT capital per worker in Europe increased by 91%. The robot exposure, measured by the number of industrial robots per 1,000 workers, increased by 140%. These labour-saving technologies can have aggregate and compositional impacts on labour markets. They can directly reduce employment as machines replace humans in performing certain tasks, resulting in a labour-saving effect. However, the scale effect – i.e., an increase in activity thanks to a productivity-enhancing technology – and the demand spillover effect – i.e., demand for other sectors' output resulting from growth in the technology-adopting sector – can increase employment. Gregory et al. (2021) showed that the latter two effects have been dominant in Europe, leading to an overall positive employment effect of routine-replacing technologies. At the same time, these technologies have reduced the role of routine tasks and increased the role of non-routine tasks, both within and across occupations (Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006), leading to job and wage polarisation (Goos et al., 2014). While a lot of attention has been paid to who are the winners and losers of technological progress with regard to education (Firpo et al., 2011; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010; Taniguchi and Yamada, 2022), the age and gender dimensions have been less comprehensively studied.

In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by evaluating the age- and gender-specific labour market effects of two key routine-replacing technologies – ICT and robots – in a large group of European countries. There are two main reasons why the impact of technology adoption on workers can differ depending on whether they are younger or older. First, technological change can compress returns to old skills – i.e., those related to technology that becomes obsolete – and increase returns to new skills – i.e., those related to emerging technology (Barth et al., 2022; Fillmore and Hall, 2021). As older workers tend to have skills that complement older technologies, and their expected returns from an investment in new skills are lower than those of younger workers, older workers can be more affected by technological change than younger workers. Indeed, older people (aged 55-64) in the OECD countries tend to have lower ICT and analytical skill levels, and are less likely to use information-processing skills at work than younger individuals.[1] Second, older workers are more likely to benefit from insider power. As such, they may be more protected from changes than younger workers, who are often outsiders or labour market entrants. Indeed, there is evidence that the shift from routine to non-routine work in Europe has affected younger workers more than older workers (Lewandowski et al., 2020), and that industrial robots in Germany have reduced the labour market prospects of younger workers (Dauth et al., 2021).

The gender dimension is also relevant. On the one hand, as routine-replacing technologies increase returns to social skills, which tend to be higher among women than among men (Deming, 2017), women may benefit from ICT adoption more than men (Jerbashian, 2019). On the other hand, smaller shares of women than of men have skills that complement new technologies. Women are less likely than men to participate in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) college programmes (Delaney and Devereux, 2019), and they exhibit lower numeracy skills than their male counterparts (Rebollo-Sanz and De la Rica, 2020).

Our first contribution is to disentangle both the gender- and the age-specific dimension of the impact of new technologies on the labour market. We distinguish between the following demographic groups: men and

[1] Based on the data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies – PIAAC.

women aged 20-29, 30-49, 50-59, and 60 or older, and focus on three vital outcomes: share in employment, average wage, and share in the total wage bill.

Our second contribution is to distinguish between the effects of two key routine-replacing technologies: ICT and robots.[2] We measure ICT capital using Eurostat data, and robots using International Federation of Robotics (IFR, 2017) data, both at a finely disaggregated sector level. We merged these data with the worker-level data of the EU Structure of Earnings Survey (EU-SES), which allows us to calculate the labour market outcomes of demographic groups. For reasons of data availability, our sample covers 14 European countries between 2010 and 2018.[3] To obtain causal effects, we make two methodological choices. First, we estimate models of demographic groups' outcomes within sectors, and thus focus on the direct effects of technology on labour market outcomes.[4] Second, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) methodology. We use the average exposure to ICT or robots in comparable countries as an instrument. This method has been previously applied to measure the effects of robots by, e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), Dauth et al. (2021), and Bachmann et al. (2022). We also control for globalisation, in line with the literature that identifies technological progress as a critical driver of labour market developments and trade as a mediating factor (Gregory et al., 2021).

We find that, between 2010 and 2018, the impact of technology adoption varied across demographic groups. Increased exposure to ICT capital was beneficial for the labour market outcomes of young and prime-aged workers but detrimental for older workers. These effects were more pronounced for women than for men. The positive impacts were concentrated among workers in occupations intensive in non-routine manual tasks, which suggests that some basic level of ICT-related skills may be required even in jobs that generally require less advanced skills. However, among workers aged 60 or older, the adoption of ICT capital deteriorated the labour market outcomes of women in cognitive occupations, in line with Fillmore and Hall (2021) argument that older workers may lack the skills to benefit from emerging technologies. Meanwhile, exposure to robots mainly affected men. It harmed the labour market outcomes of men aged 20-49, particularly those in occupations intensive in routine manual tasks. In contrast, men aged 50 or older were not affected, in line with arguments that older workers have stronger insider power that may protect them from shocks.

Overall, we find that, between 2010 and 2018, the increase in ICT capital played a much larger role than robot adoption in driving changes in European labour market outcomes. Both types of technology affected the employment shares of demographic groups rather than their relative earnings. We confirm the robustness of our findings by performing placebo tests, extending the long-change period, and showing that no particular country drives our results.

[2] The previous literature has focused mainly on robots and their impact on productivity and wages (Graetz and Michaels, 2018), employment (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Adachi et al., 2022; Dauth et al., 2021; de Vries et al., 2020), wage disparities (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022; Aksoy et al., 2021), labour market flows (Bachmann et al., 2022), or multidimensional firm-level adjustments (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Bessen et al., 2020; Domini et al., 2020; Koch et al., 2021). Studies of ICT often tackled job polarization (Jerbashian, 2019; Michaels et al., 2014). Some studies used broader concepts of routine-replacing technologies and assessed their employment effects (Downey, 2021; Gregory et al., 2021).

[3] Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

[4] Focusing on sectors to assess the causal effects of technology is common. We follow Graetz and Michaels (2018), who used sector regressions to show that robot adoption has increased GDP, labour productivity, and wages; and Jerbashian (2019), who studied the within-sector effects of IT technology adoption, and found that it had a negative impact on the share of middle-waged occupations.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our data and presents descriptive evidence on the relationship between technology adoption and labour market outcomes for different demographic groups. In Section 3, we describe our identification strategy and the methodology of our post-estimation analyses to assess the economic significance of the results. In Section 4, we report our results, quantify the impact of technology adoption on the historical changes in the labour market outcomes of demographic groups, and present the robustness checks. Section 5 discusses the policy options for mitigating the adverse effects of technology adoption on the most vulnerable groups. In section 6, we present our conclusions.

2. Data and Descriptive Statistics

2.1 Data and Definitions

To measure labour market outcomes, we use worker-level data from the EU Structure of Earnings Survey (EU-SES), which is the most reliable source of cross-country data on wages in the EU, as firms report these data. Another advantage of using the SES is that the sectoral structure – needed to assign data on technology - is at the 2-digit NACE level, which is more detailed than in other EU microdata, such as Labour Force Survey data. An important limitation of the EU-SES is that it does not cover firms with fewer than 10 workers. However, we are studying the effects on workers of automation and ICT capital, and thus of technologies adopted less often by micro firms than by firms with at least 10 workers. The EU-SES data have previously been used to study the labour market effects of automation, for instance, by Aksoy et al. (2021). The EU-SES data are collected every four years.

We account for the labour market effects of two types of technologies: ICT and industrial robots. Data on both are available at the country x sector level. The data on ICT capital come from Eurostat. We add net stocks of three types of capital: computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, and computer software and databases. We use data expressed in chain-linked volumes to account for the systematic price decline of ICT capital. We use all countries for which sectoral distribution of the ICT capital is available. For Germany and Spain, we use data from the EU-KLEMS 2019 release.[5]

The data on robots come from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR, 2017), which provides annual information on the current stock of industrial robots across countries, broken down by industries[6]. The data are based on consolidated information provided by nearly all industrial robot suppliers. The IFR ensures that the data are reliable and internationally comparable. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO 8373:201) defines an industrial robot as an "automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator, programmable in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications". We use Eurostat aggregate employment data to calculate robot exposure and ICT capital exposure.

For reasons of data availability, our study period is 2010-2018. The NACE Rev. 2 classification used by Eurostat in the EU-SES data from 2010 allows for a fine matching of technology variables. In contrast, the earlier waves of EU-SES used the NACE Rev. 1 classification, which can only be mapped into the NACE Rev. 2 classification at the broad sector level, which does not capture important differences in technology use

[5] KLEMS data end in 2017 for Germany and in 2016 for Spain. We impute values for 2018 using aggregate growth of ICT capital from Eurostat.

[6] In the IFR data, some robots are not attributed to specific industries. We assign them to industries based on the observable country-specific structures of robot stocks as provided by the IFR.

between finely defined sectors. In particular, major business services sectors that are present in the NACE Rev. 2 classification cannot be retrieved from NACE Rev. 1.[7]

Furthermore, to control for globalisation, we use the OECD Trade in Value Added data to construct a measure of the sectors' participation in global value chains. We compute this measure as foreign value added in exports divided by total sectoral output.

Our sample of countries for which all these data are available consists of 14 European countries: Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The average number of sectors per country is 22, with some differences arising due to the aggregation schemes in the SES. In the baseline specification, the unit of analysis is a demographic group, which is defined based on age – we distinguish between four age groups (20-29, 30-49, 50-59, 60+) – and gender, in a given sector and country. In total, we have 936 country x sector observations for each demographic group. We have dropped groups with fewer than 15 observations. The remaining number of worker-level observations in our sample is 21.2 million. On average, a demographic group contains 2934 observations.

We also estimate regressions separately for four occupation types: non-routine cognitive, routine cognitive, routine manual, and non-routine manual. We use the classification developed by Lewandowski et al. (2020), who adapted the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) based on the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) data, to European data. We use the 2-digit or the 3-digit level of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), depending on the availability of the information in the EU-SES data. The allocation of occupations to types is shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.

2.2 Descriptive evidence

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Typically, more than half of the workers employed at the sector level were aged 30-49. The descriptive statistics also tend to confirm that there was a substantial gender wage gap in all age groups. ICT exposure varied significantly across the whole sample, while robots were concentrated in selected sectors only (mostly manufacturing).

The demographic groups differed substantially in their occupation structure (Table 2), and thus in their exposure to task displacement. Men were much more likely than woman to be employed in manual jobs, while women were more likely than men to be performing routine cognitive tasks. For both women and men, the share of routine cognitive occupations decreased with age. While the share of manual occupations increased with age among women, the share of non-routine cognitive occupations increased with age among men. Importantly, there were stark differences in the kinds of non-routine manual occupations held by men and women. For women, these were mostly associated with personal services and cleaning jobs, while the majority of men in this group worked as industrial workers or drivers.

Next, we report correlations between the four-year changes in the stocks of ICT capital (Figure 1) or robots (Figure 2) and the four-year changes in the demographic groups' shares of the sectors' total wage bill. In Appendix B, we also report the correlations for other outcome variables. We find that the labour market outcomes of prime-aged men were negatively correlated to both types of technology. In addition, we observe that the adoption of ICT technology was negatively correlated with the outcomes for older women and

[7] For example, NACE rev. 1 category "70 to 73" contains major parts of the four NACE rev. 2 sections: L – Real Estate Activities; N – Administrative and Support Service Activities; J – Information and Communication; and M – Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities.

positively correlated with the outcomes for young and prime-aged women. However, as these findings do not account for various types of endogeneity, they cannot be interpreted in causal terms.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90
Employment share, women 20-29	8.1	2.1	4.2	7.6	11.4	14.3
Employment share, women 30-49	25.1	10.3	17.5	26.0	32.8	38.1
Employment share, women 50-59	11.5	4.0	6.6	9.9	15.8	21.6
Employment share, women 60+	3.9	0.8	1.5	2.7	5.5	8.7
Employment share, men 20-29	8.9	3.0	5.1	8.6	11.8	15.1
Employment share, men 30-49	27.2	10.0	19.7	26.7	35.0	44.3
Employment share, men 50-59	11.6	4.9	7.1	10.5	16.3	20.4
Employment share, men 60+	4.0	1.4	2.2	3.5	5.3	7.4
Relative wages, women 20-29	78.8	65.3	71.6	78.8	85.7	91.4
Relative wages, women 30-49	95.2	88.1	91.4	95.3	98.7	102.0
Relative wages, women 50-59	96.4	83.1	90.3	97.3	102.2	107.3
Relative wages, women 60+	94.9	77.5	85.1	94.5	102.4	112.5
Relative wages, men 20-29	83.5	68.8	75.6	82.2	90.8	100.1
Relative wages, men 30-49	95.2	88.1	91.4	95.3	98.7	102.0
Relative wages, men 50-59	96.4	83.1	90.3	97.3	102.2	107.3
Relative wages, men 60+	121.3	94.9	106.0	117.6	132.3	152.6
ICT capital per worker (thousand EUR)	5.1	0.7	1.2	2.4	4.9	9.4
Robots per thousand employees	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3.2
GVC participation	4.5	0.0	0.2	1.8	5.3	13.8

Note: Employment shares of all demographic groups sum up to 100 in each country-sector-year cell. Relative wage is the mean hourly wage of a demographic group in a given sector as a % of the mean sectoral hourly wage.

Table 2. Occupation structures of demographic groups, %, 2010

	Non-routine cognitive	Routine cognitive	Routine manual	Non-routine manual	Structure of non-routine manual jobs			
					Services workers	Craft and related trades workers	Drivers and mobile plant operators	Elementary occupations
Women 20-29	27	47	4	21	69	3	1	26
Women 30-49	38	36	5	21	55	3	2	39
Women 50-59	37	30	6	27	48	3	2	48
Women 60+	38	29	4	30	42	1	1	55
Men 20-29	21	27	15	37	18	35	16	30
Men 30-49	35	20	13	31	18	31	28	22
Men 50-59	36	17	13	34	16	31	31	20
Men 60+	42	16	10	33	17	27	30	24

Note: Employment shares as of 2010 are based on the EU-SES data for countries included in the sample, with each country given equal weight.

Figure 1. ICT capital growth and changes in the shares of the wage bill



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and Eurostat

Figure 2. Growth in robot exposure and changes in the shares of the wage bill



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and IFR

3. Econometric methodology

Here, we outline our estimation framework, our instrumental variable approach to the identification of causal effects, and the methodology of the post-estimation analyses we perform to quantify the economic significance of these effects.

3.1 Estimation framework and instruments

We focus on three key labour market outcomes of demographic groups: share in employment (based on the number of employees), wages relative to the average wage, and share in the wage bill. The third outcome is the consequence of the former two, and sums up the impact. We study the impact of two technological shocks: exposure to industrial robots and to ICT capital. Our identification strategy relies on the variation of technological capital growth across sectors and countries.

Following Graetz and Michaels (2018) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), we calculate robot exposure as the number of robots per thousand workers at the sector level, ($\mathrm{R_{c,s,t}}$). Analogously, we compute exposure to ICT capital, ($\mathrm{I_{c,s,t}}$), as the net stock of ICT capital and software expressed in real terms (in 2015 euros) per worker. We use the 2010 employment (the first year of our sample) as a numerator. This ensures that variation in the explanatory variables over time reflects the acquisition of selected assets, and is independent of changes in employment (which could be endogenous to capital growth).

First, we estimate the following OLS regressions for each demographic group *d*:

$$\Delta y_{c,s,d,t} = \beta_1 \Delta I_{c,s,t} + \beta_2 \Delta R_{c,s,t} + \beta_3 \Delta GVC_{c,s,t} + \beta_4 Edu_{c,s,d,t-1} + \rho_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,s,d,t} \quad (1)$$

where y stands for the share of a demographic group in the total wage bill, its share in employment, or its relative wages; $GVC_{c,s,t}$ is the foreign value added in exports divided by total sectoral output; $Edu_{c,s,d,t-1}$ is the lagged share of tertiary educated persons in a demographic group relative to the sectoral average; $\rho_{c,t}$ denotes country-year fixed effects; t takes two levels: 2014 and 2018, with 2010 serving as the initial reference period.

By including country-year fixed effects, we control for all aggregate changes in the labour supply of the demographic groups, as well as for institutional developments that may affect the labour market outcomes. We also control for sector-specific participation in global value chains, which increased substantially in the analysed period. Some variation in the labour market outcomes of the demographic groups may be explained by their initial average educational attainment. We express it in relative terms, as the average percentage of tertiary educated people is sector-specific. We use standardised weights (based on 2010 employment structures) that give every country in the sample an equal weight.

As the explanatory variables of interest might be endogenous to the labour market outcomes,[8] we apply the instrumental variable method to obtain the causal effects of technology. We instrument exposure to both robots and ICT capital. In each case, we follow Bachmann et al. (2022), and generalise the "technology frontier" instrument previously applied by (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020) and Dauth et al. (2021). We instrument the robot (ICT) exposure in sector s, country c, and year t with the average robot (ICT) exposure in other European countries. For example, instrument for robot adoption, $R^{iv}_{c,s,t}$, is given by:

[8] In particular, firms' decisions to invest in technology may depend on the availability of workers, labour costs, etc.

$$R^{iv}_{c,s,t} = \sum_{k,k \neq c}^{K} \frac{ROB_{k,s,t}}{EMP_{k,s,t_0}} \tag{2}$$

where $ROB_{k,s,t}$ is the stock of industrial robots in country k, sector s, and year t, and EMP_{k,s,t_0} is employment level in thousands in country k, and sector s in 2010. We re-estimate equation (1) using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The relevance of instruments is confirmed by the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments.[9]

Furthermore, we explore the mechanisms behind the results obtained at the level of demographic groups. To this end, we split each demographic group into four subgroups by occupation type, classified according to the prevalent task: non-routine cognitive, routine cognitive, routine manual, or non-routine manual. We re-estimate our regressions for these sector / demographic group / occupation type cells. This allows us to assess which occupation types drive the overall results found for a given demographic group. For this analysis, we drop outcome variables for cells with fewer than 10 observations. The size of the sample prevents us from using more detailed occupation groups.

3.2 Counterfactual analysis

To assess the economic impact of technology adoption on relative labour market outcomes, we conduct a counterfactual historical analysis. We focus on the shares in employment and in the wage bill. We do not conduct a counterfactual analysis for relative wages, as it would be based on statistically insignificant estimates. In the counterfactual scenario, we keep the ICT and robot exposures in each country and sector constant after 2010.

In the first step, we use coefficients from the 2SLS estimation (equation 1) and actual values of all variables entering the second stage of the estimation to calculate the predicted changes in the employment / wage bill shares of the demographic groups. In the second step, we predict for each demographic group two counterfactual employment / wage bill shares, one assuming no changes in the exposure to ICT capital, and the other assuming no changes in the exposure to robots. For that purpose, we use the same coefficients as in the first step. In the third step, we express the effects of each technology as the percentage point difference in the employment / wage bill shares between the model-predicted and the counterfactual employment. As in the regression analysis, each country is given equal weight.

4. Results

In this section, we present our econometric results, followed by the results of a counterfactual analysis used to assess the economic significance of the estimated effects of technology on the labour market outcomes of demographic groups.

4.1 The impact of technology adoption on labour market outcomes

First, we report the effects of technology adoption on the demographic groups' employment shares, focusing on the 2SLS results (Table 3). We find that the adoption of both types of technology had positive effects on the employment share of young women and negative effects on the employment share of women

[9] We use the ivreg2 Stata module developed by Baum et al. (2010).

aged 60 or older. Growth in ICT capital of one thousand EUR per worker[10] increased the employment share of young women by 0.13 pp (*p-value* = 0.051), and reduced the employment share of older women by 0.21 pp. Each additional robot per one thousand workers[11] increased the employment share of young women by 0.28 pp and decreased the employment share of older women by 0.17 pp. We also find positive effects of growth in ICT capital for prime-aged women. For prime-aged men, one additional robot per thousand workers reduced the employment share of men aged 30-49 by 0.31 pp (*p-value* = 0.062). In contrast, for men aged 50-59, robots had a positive (but less precisely estimated) employment effect.

Table 3. The effects of technological change on the employment shares of demographic groups

	Women, OLS	Women, 2SLS	Men, OLS	Men, 2SLS
A: Age 20-29				
Δ ICT capital	0.065***	0.132*	0.010	0.002
	(0.022)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.077)
Δ Robots	0.091***	0.275***	0.003	-0.111
	(0.027)	(0.091)	(0.035)	(0.081)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		10.6
No. of Observations	584	584	608	608
B: Age 30-49				
Δ ICT capital	0.047*	0.202*	0.003	-0.127
	(0.028)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.120)
Δ Robots	0.055	0.086	-0.134*	-0.309*
	(0.036)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.166)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.9		12.0
No. of Observations	616	616	622	622
C: Age 50-59				
Δ ICT capital	-0.019	-0.006	-0.063	-0.099
	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.045)	(0.089)
Δ Robots	-0.018	-0.031	0.002	0.146
	(0.022)	(0.057)	(0.039)	(0.099)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		11.3
No. of Observations	606	606	618	618
D: Age 60+				
Δ ICT capital	-0.047***	-0.213***	-0.003	0.078*
	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.009)	(0.046)
Δ Robots	-0.059**	-0.175**	0.015	0.031
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.015)	(0.044)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		9.4		11.2
No. of Observations	520	520	586	586

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's share (in %) in total sector employment. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. For 2SLS, Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

We do not find any statistically significant (at a 5% level) causal effects of technology adoption on the average, wages of demographic groups (relative to the sectoral averages, columns with 2SLS results in

[10] In our sample, a weighted average four-year change in the ICT capital per worker amounted to EUR 315.
[11] Among sectors that invested in robots, a weighted average four-year increase in the number of robots per one thousand workers amounted to 1.09.

Table 4). The only effect close to statistical significance (*p-value* = 0.052) is the positive impact on the wages of prime-aged men. An additional robot per one thousand workers increases their relative wages by 0.39 pp.

Table 4. The effects of technological change on the relative wages of demographic groups

	Women, OLS	Women, 2SLS	Men, OLS	Men, 2SLS
A: Age 20-29				
Δ ICT capital	0.042 (0.069)	0.173 (0.260)	0.021 (0.053)	-0.082 (0.187)
Δ Robots	0.046 (0.078)	0.202 (0.235)	-0.095 (0.080)	0.001 (0.225)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		10.6
No. of Observations	584	584	608	608
B: Age 30-49				
Δ ICT capital	0.006 (0.045)	0.192 (0.198)	0.006 (0.036)	-0.216 (0.191)
Δ Robots	0.156** (0.067)	0.054 (0.201)	0.165** (0.070)	0.388* (0.199)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.9		12.0
No. of Observations	616	616	622	622
C: Age 50-59				
Δ ICT capital	0.298*** (0.104)	0.234 (0.162)	0.192 (0.171)	-0.286 (0.250)
Δ Robots	0.041 (0.090)	-0.037 (0.213)	0.009 (0.116)	-0.216 (0.268)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		11.3
No. of Observations	606	606	618	618
D: Age 60+				
Δ ICT capital	0.239 (0.166)	0.417 (0.410)	0.169 (0.211)	0.316 (0.396)
Δ Robots	0.209 (0.246)	0.338 (0.557)	-0.195 (0.255)	0.373 (0.516)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		9.4		11.2
No. of Observations	520	520	586	586

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's average hourly wage as % of the sector's average. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. For 2SLS, Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Now, we turn to the effects of technology on the demographic groups' shares in the wage bill (Table 5). This outcome variable is a result of the two previously discussed ones, but it also accounts for changes in the average hours worked by the different demographic groups. However, as is reported in Appendix C, the impact of technology on the hours worked was negligible, with some small positive effects detected only for prime-aged men (Table C1).

Table 5. The effects of technological change on the shares of demographic groups in the wage bill

	Women, OLS	Women, 2SLS	Men, OLS	Men, 2SLS
A: Age 20-29				
Δ ICT capital	0.046***	0.117**	0.001	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.063)
Δ Robots	0.056***	0.182***	-0.020	-0.128
	(0.021)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.079)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		10.6
No. of Observations	584	584	608	608
B: Age 30-49				
Δ ICT capital	0.048*	0.217**	-0.006	-0.158
	(0.026)	(0.106)	(0.054)	(0.142)
Δ Robots	0.066**	0.09	-0.102	-0.217
	(0.032)	(0.096)	(0.071)	(0.177)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.9		12.0
No. of Observations	616	616	622	622
C: Age 50-59				
Δ ICT capital	0.000	0.029	-0.049	-0.116
	(0.022)	(0.065)	(0.044)	(0.109)
Δ Robots	-0.016	-0.04	0.011	0.118
	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.103)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		11.3
No. of Observations	606	606	618	618
D: Age 60+				
Δ ICT capital	-0.041***	-0.185***	0.000	0.100**
	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.011)	(0.051)
Δ Robots	-0.055***	-0.161**	0.011	0.043
	(0.021)	(0.081)	(0.019)	(0.051)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		9.4		11.2
No. of Observations	520	520	586	586

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's share (in %) in total sector wages. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Country-year fixed are effects included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. For 2SLS, Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

As in the case of employment effects, both ICT capital and robots had a positive impact on the labour market outcomes of young women and a negative impact on the labour market outcomes of women aged 60 or older (Table 5). However, we also find that the overall effect of ICT capital was significantly positive for prime-aged women and for men aged 60 or older. Growth in the ICT capital of one thousand EUR per worker increased the wage bill share of young and prime-aged women by 0.12 pp and 0.22 pp, respectively; while it decreased the wage bill share of older women by 0.19 pp. Another important result is that robot adoption had a negative (though insignificant) effect on the share in the total wage bill of prime-aged men. Thus, for this group, the positive effects on average hourly wages (Table 4) did not compensate for the negative employment effects of robot adoption (Table 3).

4.2 The effects of technology adoption within occupation types

In this subsection, we explore the potential mechanisms behind the differences in the effects of technology adoption between the demographic groups. We report the effects of technology adoption while focusing on four major occupation types: non-routine cognitive, routine cognitive, routine manual, and non-routine manual. On the one hand, the difference between demographic groups in the overall effects of technology exposure could reflect differences in the shares of occupation types that vary in vulnerability to such exposure. If this was the case, we would expect to find the coefficient signs for a given occupation type to be the same for different demographic groups. On the other hand, the impact of technology on a given occupation type might be age-or gender-specific; e.g., due to skill profiles or institutional features that benefit certain demographic groups. In that case, the coefficient signs for a given occupation tye would vary between the demographic groups. In Appendix E, we also report the effects of technology on the aggregate labour market outcomes of the occupation types, without considering the demographic dimension.

Overall, we find important differences between demographic groups within particular occupation types. This suggests that the age- and gender-specific effects of technology adoption drove the different impacts of robot and ICT exposure on younger and older workers and on men and women, rather than the occupational composition of the jobs held by various demographic groups.

First, our results show that robot exposure had substantial and significant negative effects on the employment shares of young (aged 20-29) and prime-aged (30-49) men in routine manual occupations (Table 6). By contrast, robotisation had much weaker effects on workers in non-routine manual occupations (either men or women, Table 6), and no significant wage effects (Table 7). Therefore, we attribute the negative effects of robot exposure on employment shares of young and prime-aged men (Table 3) primarily to significant adverse effects on men in routine manual occupations. These findings are consistent with theories that stress that automation technologies can substitute human labour mainly in structured and repetitive tasks. We also find that robotisation positively affected the employment shares of men aged 50 or older in routine manual occupations (Table 6). However, the effect is small, and it does not necessarily mean that older workers benefited from robot exposure. It instead reflects strong adverse effects on young and prime-aged workers, as we focus on shares in sector-level employment, and we find no effect on older men in general (Table 3). Our estimates for women in routine manual jobs are less reliable due to small sample sizes and resulting weak instruments.

Second, we find that robotisation had indirect effects on workers performing cognitive tasks (Table 6). This result suggests complementarities between adopting automation technologies and cognitive skills. Notably, the age dimension was again relevant, as these effects were large and positive for younger workers, and especially for women (in terms of both employment shares, Table 6, and wage bill shares, Table 8), but were harmful for women aged 50 or older. Moreover, we also find significant adverse effects of ICT capital adoption on the employment shares of older women (Table 6). These differential effects align with the hypothesis that technological change can benefit labour market entrants while making the skills of some of the older incumbents obsolete (Fillmore and Hall 2021). Adult skill surveys confirm that ICT and analytical skills decrease with age (OECD, 2013). Nearly 50% of adults aged 25-34 were among the best performers (Level 2 or 3) in PIAAC tests of problem-solving in a technology-rich environment, compared with 24% of adults aged 45-54 and only 12% for the age group 55-65.

Third, the effects of ICT adoption concentrate on young and prime-aged workers in non-routine manual occupations. They also differ between men and women. These effects were positive for young and prime-aged women but negative for men aged 30-59. Our findings are in line with arguments that ICT adoption increases returns to social skills, and that women tend to have a comparative advantage in these skills (Deming, 2017).[12] Moreover, we find further evidence that modern technologies benefited younger workers more than older workers, as these effects were positive among young workers, but negative among older workers, especially among women (Table 6).

Table 6. The effects of technological change on the employment shares by occupational task groups

	Women				Men			
	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual
A: Age 20-29								
Δ ICT capital	0.047	0.027	-0.030	0.177**	-0.013	0.011	0.035	0.027
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.123)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.090)	(0.038)
Δ Robots	0.057	0.176***	-0.032	0.064	0.028	0.074**	-0.339***	0.095**
	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.073)	(0.041)
K-P F statistic	11.6	10.6	1.6	6.0	10.9	8.8	5.0	9.9
Observations	542	544	256	396	566	498	390	520
B: Age 30-49								
Δ ICT capital	0.178	-0.030	-0.050	0.116**	0.138	-0.047	-0.118	-0.178*
	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.093)	(0.050)	(0.141)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.092)
Δ Robots	0.083	0.048	-0.093*	0.093	0.101	-0.047	-0.405***	0.051
	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.128)	(0.046)	(0.152)	(0.086)
K-P F statistic	11.2	11.8	4.3	8.6	11.7	11.2	10.6	11.1
Observations	606	606	378	522	618	558	478	594
C: Age 50-59								
Δ ICT capital	0.092	-0.071	-0.164*	-0.012	0.141	-0.079	-0.034	-0.119***
	(0.074)	(0.051)	(0.084)	(0.042)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.091)	(0.043)
Δ Robots	0.020	-0.069**	0.072*	0.002	0.088	-0.008	0.064	0.034
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.043)
K-P F statistic	10.9	11.5	3.9	6.6	11.2	9.4	6.8	10.8
Observations	558	574	326	478	610	496	434	570
D: Age 60+								
Δ ICT capital	-0.102**	-0.066***	-0.249	-0.068	0.093***	-0.007	0.037	0.028
	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.182)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.044)	(0.039)
Δ Robots	-0.120**	-0.070**	0.139	-0.052	0.018	-0.019*	0.107***	-0.113***
	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.089)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.041)
K-P F statistic	6.7	6.8	2.1	2.8	11.7	7.2	5.0	7.5
Observations	402	442	190	358	542	384	306	484

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the group's share (in %) in total sector employment. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the group relative to the sector's average. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

[12] This difference is partly reflected in the different occupational structures among men and women employed in non-routine manual jobs, with women being more heavily represented in occupations that require social skills, like service occupations (Table 2).

Table 7. The effects of technological change on the relative wages by occupational task groups

	Women				Men			
	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual
A: Age 20-29								
Δ ICT capital	-0.063	-0.062	2.901	-0.182	-0.732	0.059	0.214	-0.375
	(0.362)	(0.183)	(2.070)	(0.627)	(0.453)	(0.236)	(0.588)	(0.364)
Δ Robots	-0.013	0.244	-0.712	0.966	-0.034	-0.073	-0.357	0.347
	(0.552)	(0.304)	(0.999)	(0.806)	(0.529)	(0.346)	(0.364)	(0.340)
K-P F statistic	11.6	10.6	1.6	6.0	10.9	8.8	5.0	9.9
Observations	542	544	256	396	566	498	390	520
B: Age 30-49								
Δ ICT capital	-0.197	-0.078	-0.105	-0.108	-0.205	-0.259	0.213	-0.425
	(0.348)	(0.196)	(0.898)	(0.396)	(0.449)	(0.275)	(0.396)	(0.387)
Δ Robots	-0.662	0.228	-0.385	0.689	0.246	-0.118	0.552	-0.293
	(0.434)	(0.268)	(0.661)	(0.426)	(0.422)	(0.319)	(0.376)	(0.287)
K-P F statistic	11.2	11.8	4.3	8.6	11.7	11.2	10.6	11.1
Observations	606	606	378	522	618	558	478	594
C: Age 50-59								
Δ ICT capital	-0.363	-0.255	-0.281	-1.138*	-1.363	0.727*	-0.187	-0.209
	(0.485)	(0.201)	(0.785)	(0.585)	(0.833)	(0.419)	(0.478)	(0.561)
Δ Robots	-0.999	0.212	0.348	-0.136	-0.098	-0.213	0.141	-0.523
	(0.702)	(0.353)	(0.393)	(0.448)	(0.868)	(0.482)	(0.371)	(0.342)
K-P F statistic	10.9	11.5	3.9	6.6	11.2	9.4	6.8	10.8
Observations	558	574	326	478	610	496	434	570
D: Age 60+								
Δ ICT capital	-1.179	0.240	1.569	0.175	0.325	0.389	1.130	0.462
	(0.745)	(0.499)	(1.420)	(0.776)	(0.745)	(0.680)	(0.884)	(0.405)
Δ Robots	0.436	0.666	-0.004	0.358	2.271	0.013	-0.553	0.006
	(0.946)	(0.686)	(0.677)	(0.393)	(1.453)	(0.920)	(0.567)	(0.552)
K-P F statistic	6.7	6.8	2.1	2.8	11.7	7.2	5.0	7.5
Observations	402	442	190	358	542	384	306	484

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the group's average hourly wage as % of the sector's average. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the group relative to the sector's average. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Table 8. The effects of technological change on the wage bill shares by task groups

	Women				Men			
	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual	Non-Routine Cognitive	Routine Cognitive	Routine Manual	Non-Routine Manual
A: Age 20-29								
Δ ICT capital	0.048	0.029	0.028	0.092*	-0.018	0.018	0.044	0.012
	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.077)	(0.031)
Δ Robots	0.046	0.111**	-0.037	0.054	0.015	0.038*	-0.275***	0.075**
	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.065)	(0.037)
K-P F statistic	11.6	10.6	1.6	6.0	10.9	8.8	5.0	9.9
Observations	542	544	256	396	566	498	390	520
B: Age 30-49								
Δ ICT capital	0.173	0.006	-0.009	0.077**	0.113	-0.077	-0.108	-0.164*
	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.165)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.094)
Δ Robots	0.048	0.056	-0.075*	0.078*	0.065	-0.020	-0.334**	0.090
	(0.077)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.151)	(0.046)	(0.148)	(0.085)
K-P F statistic	11.2	11.8	4.3	8.6	11.7	11.2	10.6	11.1
Observations	606	606	378	522	618	558	478	594
C: Age 50-59								
Δ ICT capital	0.100	-0.057	-0.125**	-0.017	0.172	-0.091	-0.028	-0.122***
	(0.079)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.113)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.044)
Δ Robots	0.005	-0.059**	0.058*	0.001	0.113	-0.010	0.047	0.016
	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.080)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.042)
K-P F statistic	10.9	11.5	3.9	6.6	11.2	9.4	6.8	10.8
Observations	558	574	326	478	610	496	434	570
D: Age 60+								
Δ ICT capital	-0.144**	-0.051***	-0.158	-0.043	0.112**	-0.002	0.044	0.018
	(0.060)	(0.017)	(0.119)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Δ Robots	-0.140*	-0.054**	0.092	-0.030	0.048	-0.021*	0.091***	-0.104***
	(0.074)	(0.024)	(0.059)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.036)
K-P F statistic	6.7	6.8	2.1	2.8	11.7	7.2	5.0	7.5
Observations	402	442	190	358	542	384	306	484

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the group's share (in %) in total sector wages. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the group relative to the sector's average. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

4.3 Counterfactual analysis of the labour market outcomes

In this subsection, we show the economic significance of our findings. In the period covered in our analysis, there were significant increases in the employment shares of people aged 50 or older, representing a continuation of an earlier trend. Other factors that may have contributed to these increases, such as changes in the population structure or retirement system reforms, are controlled for in our regressions with the country-year fixed effects.

For older women, technology adoption acted in opposition to the overall trend. On average, the employment shares of older women in 2018 were 0.43 pp lower than in the counterfactual scenario of no technology adoption in 2010-2018 (Figure 3). We attribute the dominant part of this outcome (-0.32 pp) to the adoption of ICT capital. The economic significance of this effect is noticeable, as the average employment share of older women in 2018 in our data was 4.9%. In contrast, for men aged 60 or older, technology adoption positively contributed to the overall rising trend, as their employment shares were 0.14 pp higher in 2018 than they would be in the counterfactual scenario.

Figure 3. The effects of technology adoption on employment shares, pp



Note: The differences in the employment shares of demographic groups in the historical and counterfactual scenarios of no increase in ICT and robot exposure in the 2010-2018 period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

For younger women, the relative effects were also substantial. On average, their employment shares were 0.39 pp higher in 2018 than in the counterfactual scenario, while the actual employment share of this group decreased from 8.8% in 2010 to 7.3% in 2018 (Figure 3). In contrast, the effects for young men were minor (-0.07 pp). For prime-aged women and prime-aged men, the impact of technology adoption was relatively small (0.37 pp and -0.41 pp, respectively) compared to their overall employment shares in 2018 (24.3% and 26.7%, respectively). Lastly, the overall effects were negligible for people aged 50-59.

Figure 4. The effects of technology adoption on shares in the wage bill, pp



Note: The differences in the wage bill shares of demographic groups in the historical and counterfactual scenarios of no increase in ICT and robot exposure in the 2010-2018 period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

The effects on the share in total wages differed only slightly from the employment effects, with the largest difference observed for young women. Due to technology adoption, the share in the wage bill increased by 0.30 pp for young women, by 0.40 pp for prime-aged women (Figure 4), and by 0.19 pp for older men. If not for technology adoption, the share in the wage bill would have been 0.40 pp larger for prime-aged men and 0.37 pp larger for older women. We can attribute most changes in the labour market outcomes in 2010-2018 to ICT capital growth, with robot adoption having a smaller impact.

In the appendix, we report the results of counterfactual analyses conducted for each country separately (the employment effects in Appendix F, and the wage bill effects in Appendix G). The variation in the results across countries stems from two factors: i) the country-specific average growth in ICT and robot exposures (captured in the first stage regressions by country-year fixed effects), and ii) the differences in the sectoral structures of the economies. Czechia and Germany were the most affected by robot adoption; in France, Finland, and Norway, almost all technology adoption's effects on the demographic groups were due to increased exposure to ICT capital. The sizes of the effects also varied substantially across countries.

4.4 Robustness analysis

As an initial robustness check, we conduct placebo tests, replacing ICT capital and robots with other types of capital. Here, we use transport equipment and a broad category of machinery, excluding transport equipment and ICT capital. Thus, we verify whether ICT capital and robots play a unique role in shaping the labour market outcomes of demographic groups or whether we can detect similar effects for other types of capital. However, the "technology frontier" instrument is not valid for the assets considered in this placebo test.[13] In consequence, we report only the OLS results. Notably, in our baseline results, the OLS results align with the key 2SLS findings about the significant employment effects of ICT capital and robots (Table 3).

The employment shares of demographic groups were not related to the changes in the other types of capital (Table 9). The negative association between machinery capital (which also includes robots) and the employment shares of older women was insignificant (*p-value* = 0.092). These results starkly contrast with the significant effects of ICT capital and robots. The placebo tests for relative wages and shares in the wage bill also yield no significant results (reported in Appendix D).

Table 9. Placebo tests results for the employment shares of demographic groups

	Age 20-29	Age 30-49	Age 50-59	Age 60+
A: Women				
Δ Transport equipment	-0.009 (0.020)	0.006 (0.026)	0.000 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.015)
Δ Machinery capital	0.002 (0.005)	0.000 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.003* (0.002)
No. of Observations	582	614	604	518
B: Men				
Δ Transport equipment	-0.014 (0.023)	0.032 (0.027)	0.000 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.015)
Δ Machinery capital	0.003 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.003)
No. of Observations	606	620	616	584

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's share (in %) in total sector employment. Δ Transport equipment is the four-year change in the transport equipment stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Machinery capital is the four-year change in the other machinery capital stock (code "N11ON", in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Country-year fixed are effects included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

[13] The instrumental variables constructed according to equation (2) are not statistically significant in the first-stage regressions explaining actual changes in transport equipment or other machinery capital.

Next, we conduct a range of robustness checks to ensure that our results are not sensitive to the model specification, and are not driven by outliers. First, we verify that our findings do not hinge on the choice of control variables. In Table 10, we report the results from a specification that does not include controls for GVC participation or the average educational attainment. This modification has a minor impact on the interpretation of the results. Without these control variables, we would detect a slightly smaller impact of ICT capital on the employment of women aged 20-49. Some other coefficients of interest would be statistically more significant (the employment effects of robot adoption among people aged 50-59, and the employment effects of growth in ICT capital among older men).

Second, we verify the sensitivity of the results to the adjustment dynamics assumed in the specification (1). Here we use one 8-year difference instead of the baseline approach of two 4-year differences per country-sector cell. The qualitative interpretation of the results remains mostly the same, except for the much-reduced impact of ICT capital on the employment of young women.

Table 10. Robustness analysis of the estimated employment effects

	Women			Men		
	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.
A: Age 20-29						
Δ ICT capital	0.132*	0.118*	0.032	0.002	0.063	-0.07
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.067)
Δ Robots	0.275***	0.349***	0.220***	-0.111	-0.078	0.065
	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.090)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.6	11.2	10.6	11.7	10.6
Observations	584	584	292	608	608	304
B: Age 30-49						
Δ ICT capital	0.202*	0.177*	0.322***	-0.127	-0.122	-0.118
	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.101)
Δ Robots	0.086	0.078	0.041	-0.309*	-0.328**	-0.348**
	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.177)
K-P F statistic	11.9	12.2	11.6	12.0	12.2	11.7
Observations	616	616	308	622	622	311
C: Age 50-59						
Δ ICT capital	-0.006	-0.019	-0.010	-0.099	-0.080	-0.131
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.049)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Δ Robots	-0.031	-0.089	-0.073	0.146	0.173*	0.106
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.121)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.7	11.3	11.3	11.7	11.4
Observations	606	606	303	618	618	309
D: Age 60+						
Δ ICT capital	-0.213***	-0.192***	-0.205***	0.078*	0.101**	0.088*
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Δ Robots	-0.175**	-0.165**	-0.162	0.031	0.039	0.091
	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.061)
K-P F statistic	9.4	10.0	8.7	11.2	12.0	10.8
Observations	520	520	260	586	586	293

*Note: The table presents the robustness analysis of the baseline 2SLS employment regressions reported in Table 3. We provide the baseline results for each demographic group in the first column. In the second column, we report the results of regressions that do not control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers. The regression results using 8-year differences are presented in the third column. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Finally, we test if any particular countries drive our results. To this end, we re-estimate our baseline 2SLS regressions while excluding one country from the sample each time. In Figures 5-6, we report the results for the employment effects of ICT capital and robot adoption, respectively. The results confirm that developments in single countries do not drive our findings. Excluding individual countries had only a minor impact on the estimated coefficients. We observe some quantitative variation in the estimated effects of robot adoption for prime-aged men. In particular, after excluding Czechia or Estonia from the sample, the negative effect increased from 0.31 pp to 0.48 pp or 0.44 pp. During the analysed period, these Eastern European countries experienced rapid growth in the value added in manufacturing, which limited the potential for the adverse employment effects of robot adoption.

In Appendix D, we report analogous robustness checks for the effects on the relative wages and the shares in the wage bill. They also show the stability of our results.

Figure 5. Robustness of the estimated employment effects of ICT capital



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Figure 6. Robustness of the estimated employment effects of robot adoption



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

5. Discussion of policy options to mitigate the age- and gender-specific effects of automation and ICT

Our findings indicate that technology adoption in Europe affects women aged 60 or older most negatively. Shortages of skills complementing new technologies are likely behind this pattern. Indeed, surveys of adult skills have shown that, compared to men with similar observable characteristics or younger people, women aged 45-64 are much less likely to have high problem-solving skills in a technology-rich environment (OECD 2013).

Public policy can help to bridge the gap between the needs of the market and the skills of older women and other groups left behind by technological progress by increasing private returns to lifelong learning. First, governments may subsidise adult education by channelling targeted funds to either employers or individuals. In some cases, public employment services may organise training on their own, such as training for unemployed individuals. Second, the social security system should promote the extension of working life – the longer people work after training, the higher the return on investment in education (Ben-Porath, 1967). Early retirement options interact with the impact of technology adoption by decreasing the expected return on investment in the new skills that complement modern technologies. Generous unemployment benefits reduce the employment rates of older workers exposed to digital technologies (Yashiro et al., 2022). Indeed, across the EU countries, there is a positive correlation between participation in adult education and the average effective age of labour market exit (Figure 7). The correlation is much stronger among women (0.46) than among men (0.22). While we cannot make claims regarding the direction of causality, we can state that a higher incidence of lifelong learning is empirically consistent with longer working lives.

In the countries covered by our study, participation in adult education increased between 2010 and 2018. Still, the propensity to participate in learning decreased sharply with age. In 2018, the share of women who participated in formal or non-formal education within the last four weeks was 17.1% for those aged 35-44, and only 10.2% for those aged 55-64.[14] Moreover, non-formal education rarely aims to improve skills related to new technologies. Among people aged 55-64, only 0.6% participated in training within ICT or engineering.

Figure 7. Effective age of labour market exit vs participation in adult education in European countries, 2018



Note: Circles represent 22 EU countries. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Malta, and Romania are omitted due to missing data.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the OECD (2019) and Eurostat data.

[14] Based on the EU-LFS data. We report unweighted averages for 14 countries included in our sample.

The majority of evaluation studies in Western European countries have found that adult education has positive employment effects (Card et al., 2018; Picchio and van Ours, 2013; Dauth and Toomet, 2016; Doerr, 2022; Fouarge et al., 2013; Hällsten, 2012; Midtsundstad and Nielsen, 2019). However, voucher-financed education (governments subsidise courses chosen by individuals) appears to be an exception. Evaluations of such programmes have generally found no positive employment effects, at least in the short term (Görlitz and Tamm, 2016; Hidalgo et al., 2014; Schwerdt et al., 2012). From a policy-making perspective, the overall cost-benefit balance must be favourable to justify an intervention. Even with significantly positive employment effects, the measurable benefits may not outweigh the costs of public interventions (Dauth 2020). Therefore, pilot projects should precede the introduction of full-scale programmes subsidising lifelong learning.

In the 1990s, early retirement schemes were widely promoted to reduce unemployment. But in the 21st century, European governments reversed their priorities and focused on extending working life (Ogg and Rašticová, 2020). The remaining objective of early retirement is to insure older workers against the risk of poor labour outcomes, which may occur due to changes in labour demand or individual factors such as health problems. In this context, early retirement benefits should be understood broadly as all social transfers that can serve as a long-term source of income for people of pre-retirement age. Various forms of early retirement exist in the 14 countries covered by our study. In 2010, only 25.8% of women aged 61-65 were employed, while 57.0% were jobless and received social transfers such as unemployment, old-age, survivor, or disability benefits.[15] By 2018, the employment rate among this demographic group increased to 41.1%, while the share of jobless benefit recipients decreased to 43.7%. In the period of our study, European countries continued to implement reforms of their social safety nets aimed at incentivising longer employment. In particular, 10 of 14 analysed countries raised the statutory retirement age. Still, in seven EU countries, the statutory retirement age remains lower for women than for men, which may discourage them from investing in skills. This could contribute to the adverse effects of technology adoption on the labour market outcomes of older women. Efforts to prolong working lives should be combined with policies to increase access and funding for life-long learning and ensure access to safety nets for older workers.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we studied the impact of the exposure to two key modern technologies – ICT and robots – on the labour market outcomes of different demographic groups – men and women of different ages. We focused on the within-sector outcomes – employment shares, average hourly wages, and shares in total wages. We used the between-sector variance in technology adoption and the instrumental variable approach to identify causal effects. Our sample covered 14 European countries in the 2010-2018 period.

We found that across the various demographic groups, the effects of technology adoption on employment shares were noticeable, while the effects on relative wages were minor. Technology adoption improved the labour market outcomes of young and prime-aged women but deteriorated the outcomes of older women and prime-aged men. These effects could be only partly attributed to the different occupational exposures of the demographic groups to task displacement by technology, as we found gender- and age-specific effects within particular occupation types. In particular, our results show that the adverse effects of robot adoption are concentrated among young and prime-aged men in routine manual occupations. For ICT, we found positive effects on employment for young and prime-aged women in non-routine manual occupations, and negative effects on employment for older women in cognitive occupations. This suggests that

[15] Based on the EU-SILC data. We report unweighted averages for 14 countries included in our sample.

intergenerational differences in ICT-related skills and interpersonal skills may have contributed to the age divide in the effects of technology. We also found that in the 2010s, ICT capital was a more critical driver of labour market outcomes than robots.

Our study has limitations. We identify the causal effects of technology adoption on labour market outcomes within sectors. The overall effects of technology may also involve between sector-effect, i.e. the changes in the relative size of sectors. As studying the impact of ICT and robot adoption on the economy's structure is not feasible within our framework, we do not attempt to analyse this issue in the present investigation.

Our results help to shed light on the future of demographic-specific challenges, such as extending working life, preventing youth unemployment, and minimising the gender wage gap. As technology adoption continues, we may expect to observe trends similar to those we reported in our study over the near term. Our findings support arguments that the role of lifelong learning should increase and the retirement age should be the same for men and women.

References

Acemoglu, D., Autor, D.H., 2011. Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings. In: Card, D., Ashenfelter, O. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier, pp. 1043–1171.

Acemoglu, D., Lelarge, C., Restrepo, P., 2020. Competing with Robots: Firm-Level Evidence from France. AEA Papers and Proceedings 110, 383–388.

Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2020. Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets. Journal of Political Economy 128, 2188–2244.

Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2022. Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality. Econometrica 90, 1973–2016.

Adachi, D., Kawaguchi, D., Saito, Y.U., 2022. Robots and Employment: Evidence from Japan, 1978-2017. Journal of Labor Economics.

Aksoy, C.G., Özcan, B., Philipp, J., 2021. Robots and the Gender Pay Gap in Europe. European Economic Review 134, 103693.

Autor, D.H., Levy, F., Murnane, R.J., 2003. The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. Q J Econ 118, 1279–1333.

Bachmann, R., Gonschor, M., Lewandowski, P., Madoń, K., 2022. The impact of robots on labour market transitions in Europe (IBS Working Paper No. 01/2022). Instytut Badań Strukturalnych.

Barth, E., Davis, J.C., Freeman, R.B., McElheran, K., 2022. Twisting the demand curve: Digitalization and the older workforce. Journal of Econometrics.

Baum, C., Schaffer, M., Stillman, S., 2010. ivreg2: Stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression.

Ben-Porath, Y., 1967. The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings. Journal of Political Economy 75, 352–365.

Bessen, J., Goos, M., Salomons, A., van den Berge, W., 2020. Firm-Level Automation: Evidence from the Netherlands. AEA Papers and Proceedings 110, 389–393.

Card, D., Kluve, J., Weber, A., 2018. What Works? A Meta Analysis of Recent Active Labor Market Program Evaluations. Journal of the European Economic Association 16, 894–931.

Dauth, C., 2020. Regional discontinuities and the effectiveness of further training subsidies for low-skilled employees. ILR review 73, 1147–1184.

Dauth, C., Toomet, O., 2016. On government-subsidized training programs for older workers. Labour 30, 371–392.

Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., Suedekum, J., Woessner, N., 2021. The Adjustment of Labor Markets to Robots. Journal of the European Economic Association.

de Vries, G.J., Gentile, E., Miroudot, S., Wacker, K.M., 2020. The rise of robots and the fall of routine jobs. Labour Economics 66, 101885.

Delaney, J.M., Devereux, P.J., 2019. Understanding gender differences in STEM: Evidence from college applications. Economics of Education Review 72, 219–238.

Deming, D.J., 2017. The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market. Q J Econ 132, 1593–1640.

Doerr, A., 2022. Vocational training for female job returners - Effects on employment, earnings and job quality. Labour Economics 75, 102139.

Domini, G., Grazzi, M., Moschella, D., Treibich, T., 2020. Threats and opportunities in the digital era: Automation spikes and employment dynamics. Research Policy 50, 104137.

Downey, M., 2021. Partial automation and the technology-enabled deskilling of routine jobs. Labour Economics 69, 101973.

Fillmore, I., Hall, J.D., 2021. Technological Change and Obsolete Skills: Evidence from Men's Professional Tennis. Labour Economics 73, 102051.

Firpo, S., Fortin, N.M., Lemieux, T., 2011. Occupational Tasks and Changes in the Wage Structure (No. 5542), IZA Discussion Papers. Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

Fouarge, D., Schils, T., de Grip, A., 2013. Why do low-educated workers invest less in further training? Applied Economics 45, 2587–2601.

Gathmann, C., Schönberg, U., 2010. How General Is Human Capital? A Task-Based Approach. Journal of Labor Economics 28, 1–49.

Goos, M., Manning, A., Salomons, A., 2014. Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring. American Economic Review 104, 2509–2526.

Görlitz, K., Tamm, M., 2016. The returns to voucher-financed training on wages, employment and job tasks. Economics of Education Review 52, 51–62.

Graetz, G., Michaels, G., 2018. Robots at Work. The Review of Economics and Statistics 100, 753–768.

Gregory, T., Salomons, A., Zierahn, U., 2021. Racing with or Against the Machine? Evidence on the Role of Trade in Europe. Journal of the European Economic Association.

Hällsten, M., 2012. Is it ever too late to study? The economic returns on late tertiary degrees in Sweden. Economics of Education Review 31, 179–194.

Hidalgo, D., Oosterbeek, H., Webbink, D., 2014. The impact of training vouchers on low-skilled workers. Labour Economics 31, 117–128.

International Federation of Robotics (IFR), 2017. World Robotics Industrial Robots 2017. International Federation of Robotics (IFR), Frankfurt am Main.

Jerbashian, V., 2019. Automation and Job Polarization: On the Decline of Middling Occupations in Europe. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, 1095–1116.

Koch, M., Manuylov, I., Smolka, M., 2021. Robots and Firms. The Economic Journal 131, 2553–2584.

Lewandowski, P., Keister, R., Hardy, W., Górka, S., 2020. Ageing of routine jobs in Europe. Economic Systems 44, 100816.

Michaels, G., Natraj, A., Van Reenen, J., 2014. Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand? Evidence from Eleven Countries over Twenty-Five Years. The Review of Economics and Statistics 96, 60–77.

Midtsundstad, T., Nielsen, R.A., 2019. Lifelong learning and the continued participation of older Norwegian adults in employment. European Journal of Education 54, 48–59.

OECD, 2013. OECD Skills Outlook 2013. Paris.

OECD, 2019. Pensions at a Glance 2019.

Ogg, J., Rašticová, M., 2020. Introduction: Key Issues and Policies for Extending Working Life. In: Ní Léime, Á., Ogg, J., Rašticová, M., Street, D., Krekula, C., Bédiová, M., Madero-Cabib, I. (Eds.), Extended Working Life Policies: International Gender and Health Perspectives. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 3–27.

Picchio, M., van Ours, J.C., 2013. Retaining through training even for older workers. Economics of Education Review 32, 29–48.

Rebollo-Sanz, Y.F., De la Rica, S., 2020. Gender gaps in skills and labor market outcomes: evidence from the PIAAC. Rev Econ Household.

Schwerdt, G., Messer, D., Woessmann, L., Wolter, S.C., 2012. The impact of an adult education voucher program: Evidence from a randomized field experiment. Journal of Public Economics 96, 569–583.

Spitz-Oener, A., 2006. Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational Demands: Looking outside the Wage Structure. Journal of Labor Economics 24, 235–270.

Stock, J., Yogo, M., 2005. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. In: Identification and Inference for Econometric Models. Cambridge University Press, pp. 80–105.

Taniguchi, H., Yamada, K., 2022. ICT capital–skill complementarity and wage inequality: Evidence from OECD countries. Labour Economics 76, 102151.

Yashiro, N., Kyyrä, T., Hwang, H., Tuomala, J., 2022. Technology, labour market institutions and early retirement. Economic Policy.

Appendices

Appendix A. Classification of Occupations

In Table A1, we report the allocation of occupations to task groups used for the econometric analysis reported in Section 4.3.

Table A1. The allocation of occupations to task groups in the ISCO-08 classification

Task group	ISCO-08 code	Occupation
Non-routine cognitive	11	Chief Executives, Senior Officials, and Legislators
	12	Administrative and Commercial Managers
	13	Production and Specialised Services Managers
	14	Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers
	21	Science and Engineering Professionals
	22	Health Professionals
	23	Teaching Professionals
	24	Business and Administration Professionals
	25	Information and Communications Technology Professionals
	26	Legal, Social, and Cultural Professionals
	31	Science and Engineering Associate Professionals
	32	Health Associate Professionals
	35	Information and Communications Technicians
Routine cognitive	33	Business and Administration Associate Professionals
	34	Legal, Social, Cultural, and Related Associate Professionals
	41	General and Keyboard Clerks
	42	Customer Services Clerks
	43	Numerical and Material Recording Clerks
	44	Other Clerical Support Workers
	52	Sales Workers
Routine manual	72	Metal, Machinery, and Related Trades Workers
	73	Handicraft and Printing Workers
	75	Food Processing, Woodworking, Garment, and Other Craft and Related Trades Workers
	81	Stationary Plant and Machine Operators
	82	Assemblers
	94	Food Preparation Assistants
Non-routine manual	51	Personal Services Workers
	53	Personal Care Workers
	54	Protective Services Workers
	61	Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural Workers
	62	Market-oriented Skilled Forestry, Fishery, and Hunting Workers
	63	Subsistence Farmers, Fishers, Hunters, and Gatherers
	71	Building and Related Trades Workers (excluding Electricians)
	74	Electrical and Electronic Trades Workers
	83	Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators
	91	Cleaners and Helpers
	92	Agricultural, Forestry, and Fishery Labourers
	93	Labourers in Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Transport
	95	Street and Related Sales and Services Workers
	96	Refuse Workers and Other Elementary Workers

*Source: Authors' elaboration based on Lewandowski et al. (2020), O*NET, and EU-LFS data.*

Appendix B. Descriptive evidence

Figure B1. ICT capital growth and changes in the employment shares



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and Eurostat.

Figure B2. Growth in robot exposure and changes in the employment shares



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and Eurostat.

Figure B3. ICT capital growth and changes in the relative wages



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and Eurostat.

Figure B4. Growth in robot exposure and changes in the relative wages



Source: Own elaboration based on EU-SES and Eurostat.

Appendix C. Estimation Results for Hours Worked

Variation in average hours worked may contribute to changes in the demographic groups' shares in the total wage bill, which is one of our outcome variables. In Table C1, we report the effects of technology on relative hours; that is, the group's average hours worked expressed as a % of the sector's average working hours. The only significant coefficients are found for prime-aged men, and their economic significance is rather limited. For example, an additional robot per one thousand workers increased the average hours by 0.29% of the sector's average; that is, by 27 minutes per month.

Table C1. The effects of technological change on hours worked by demographic groups

	Women, OLS	Women, 2SLS	Men, OLS	Men, 2SLS
A: Age 20-29				
Δ ICT capital	-0.004	-0.018	-0.043	0.059
	(0.036)	(0.107)	(0.032)	(0.088)
Δ Robots	0.049	-0.037	-0.088*	-0.069
	(0.067)	(0.164)	(0.046)	(0.110)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		10.6
No. of Observations	584	584	608	608
B: Age 30-49				
Δ ICT capital	0.030*	-0.002	0.022	0.176***
	(0.018)	(0.055)	(0.020)	(0.067)
Δ Robots	-0.041	-0.066	0.079**	0.292***
	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.039)	(0.104)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.9		12.0
No. of Observations	616	616	622	622
C: Age 50-59				
Δ ICT capital	0.003	-0.040	-0.006	0.045
	(0.030)	(0.084)	(0.027)	(0.093)
Δ Robots	0.011	0.055	0.087*	0.089
	(0.055)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.095)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		11.3		11.3
No. of Observations	606	606	618	618
D: Age 60+				
Δ ICT capital	-0.015	0.235	-0.004	-0.053
	(0.077)	(0.229)	(0.063)	(0.179)
Δ Robots	0.040	0.043	0.106	0.156
	(0.177)	(0.256)	(0.091)	(0.205)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		9.4		11.2
No. of Observations	520	520	586	586

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's average working hours as a % of the sector's average. Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Country-year fixed effects included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. For 2SLS, Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Appendix D. Robustness checks for relative wages and shares in the wage bill

Table D1 Placebo tests results for the relative wages of demographic groups

	Age 20-29	Age 30-49	Age 50-59	Age 60+
A: Women				
Δ Transport equipment	0.148	0.068	0.089	-0.017
	(0.117)	(0.046)	(0.063)	(0.137)
Δ Machinery capital	-0.024*	-0.011	0.015	0.044
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.034)
No. of Observations	582	614	604	518
B: Men				
Δ Transport equipment	0.022	-0.041	0.008	-0.415*
	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.117)	(0.247)
Δ Machinery capital	0.004	0.000	0.015	0.044
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.040)
No. of Observations	606	620	616	584

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's average hourly wage as % of the sector's average. Δ Transport equipment is the four-year change in the transport equipment stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Machinery capital is the four-year change in the other machinery capital stock (code "N11ON", in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Country-year fixed are effects included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Table D2. Placebo tests results for the wage bill shares of demographic groups

	Age 20-29	Age 30-49	Age 50-59	Age 60+
A: Women				
Δ Transport equipment	0.001	0.016	0.004	-0.010
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.013)
Δ Machinery capital	0.000	-0.002	0.006	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.002)
No. of Observations	582	614	604	518
B: Men				
Δ Transport equipment	-0.015	0.020	0.008	-0.031
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Δ Machinery capital	0.003	-0.010	0.003	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.003)
No. of Observations	606	620	616	584

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable is a four-year change in the demographic group's share (in %) in total sector wages. Δ Transport equipment is the four-year change in the transport equipment stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Machinery capital is the four-year change in the other machinery capital stock (code "N11ON", in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Country-year fixed are effects included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the demographic group relative to the sector's average. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Table D3. Robustness analysis of the estimated wage effects

	Women			Men		
	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.
A: Age 20-29						
Δ ICT capital	0.173	0.177	-0.120	-0.082	-0.159	-0.233
	(0.260)	(0.251)	(0.200)	(0.187)	(0.179)	(0.166)
Δ Robots	0.202	0.151	-0.452	0.001	0.238	-0.204
	(0.235)	(0.168)	(0.388)	(0.225)	(0.214)	(0.296)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.6	11.2	10.6	11.7	10.6
Observations	584	584	292	608	608	304
B: Age 30-49						
Δ ICT capital	0.192	0.213	0.133	-0.216	-0.244	-0.278
	(0.198)	(0.194)	(0.174)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.184)
Δ Robots	0.054	0.161	-0.086	0.388*	0.316*	0.187
	(0.201)	(0.168)	(0.277)	(0.199)	(0.167)	(0.172)
K-P F statistic	11.9	12.2	11.6	12.0	12.2	11.7
Observations	616	616	308	622	622	311
C: Age 50-59						
Δ ICT capital	0.234	0.300*	0.221	-0.286	-0.108	0.231
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.250)	(0.239)	(0.247)
Δ Robots	-0.037	0.056	0.195	-0.216	0.144	0.521
	(0.213)	(0.200)	(0.251)	(0.268)	(0.234)	(0.320)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.7	11.3	11.3	11.7	11.4
Observations	606	606	303	618	618	309
D: Age 60+						
Δ ICT capital	0.417	0.259	0.106	0.316	0.855**	0.253
	(0.410)	(0.381)	(0.534)	(0.396)	(0.419)	(0.413)
Δ Robots	0.338	0.015	0.876	0.373	0.207	0.728
	(0.557)	(0.432)	(0.702)	(0.516)	(0.421)	(0.705)
K-P F statistic	9.4	10.0	8.7	11.2	12.0	10.8
Observations	520	520	260	586	586	293

*Note: The table presents the robustness analysis of the baseline 2SLS wage regressions reported in Table 4. For each demographic group, we provide the baseline results in the first column. In the second column, we report the results of regressions that do not control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers. The results of the regression using 8-year differences are presented in the third column. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Figure D1. Robustness of the estimated wage effects of ICT capital



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Figure D2. Robustness of the estimated wage effects of robot adoption



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Table D4. Robustness analysis of the estimated effects on the wage bill shares

	Women			Men		
	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.	Baseline	No controls	8-year diff.
A: Age 20-29						
Δ ICT capital	0.117**	0.108*	0.038	0.017	0.061	-0.054
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.053)
Δ Robots	0.182***	0.248***	0.124**	-0.128	-0.069	0.026
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.086)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.6	11.2	10.6	11.7	10.6
Observations	584	584	292	608	608	304
B: Age 30-49						
Δ ICT capital	0.217**	0.197*	0.305***	-0.158	-0.165	-0.173
	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.123)
Δ Robots	0.09	0.081	0.004	-0.217	-0.275*	-0.317
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.177)	(0.161)	(0.196)
K-P F statistic	11.9	12.2	11.6	12.0	12.2	11.7
Observations	616	616	308	622	622	311
C: Age 50-59						
Δ ICT capital	0.029	0.021	0.017	-0.116	-0.082	-0.098
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Δ Robots	-0.04	-0.087	-0.055	0.118	0.179*	0.159
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.138)
K-P F statistic	11.3	11.7	11.3	11.3	11.7	11.4
Observations	606	606	303	618	618	309
D: Age 60+						
Δ ICT capital	-0.185***	-0.169***	-0.182***	0.100**	0.126**	0.113**
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Δ Robots	-0.161**	-0.155**	-0.143	0.043	0.049	0.116*
	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.066)
K-P F statistic	9.4	10.0	8.7	11.2	12.0	10.8
Observations	520	520	260	586	586	293

*Note: The table presents the robustness analysis of the baseline 2SLS wage bill share regressions reported in Table 5. For each demographic group, we provide the baseline results in the first column. In the second column, we report the results of regressions that do not control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers. The results of the regression using 8-year differences are presented in the third column. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Figure D3. Robustness of the estimated ICT capital effects on the wage bill shares



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Figure D4. Robustness of the estimated robot adoption effects on the wage bill shares



Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Appendix E. Estimation Results for Occupation Groups

Here, we report the effects of technology adoption on the labour market outcomes of occupation groups. Consistent with our intuition, we find a statistically significant negative effect of robotisation on the employment share of routine manual workers, and – less precisely estimated – a negative effect on this group's share in total wages. Adoption of ICT technology had significantly negative effects on the relative wages of non-routine manual workers. While the overall effects of ICT capital seemed to be positive for non-routine cognitive employees, they were not statistically significant.

Table E1. The effect of technological change on the labour market outcomes of occupation groups

	Non-routine cognitive workers	Routine cognitive workers	Routine manual workers	Non-routine manual workers
A: Employment shares				
Δ ICT capital	0.560 (0.368)	-0.263 (0.359)	-0.155 (0.163)	-0.166 (0.139)
Δ Robots	0.311 (0.255)	0.146 (0.131)	-0.531** (0.215)	0.129 (0.138)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	11.8	11.7	12.3	11.5
No. of Observations	620	616	538	614
B: Relative wages				
Δ ICT capital	-0.265 (0.297)	-0.109 (0.148)	-0.324 (0.273)	-0.747** (0.336)
Δ Robots	-0.228 (0.273)	0.029 (0.202)	0.154 (0.267)	0.01 (0.265)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	11.8	11.7	12.3	11.5
No. of Observations	620	616	538	614
C: Shares in the wage bill				
Δ ICT capital	0.574 (0.356)	-0.245 (0.329)	-0.102 (0.144)	-0.233 (0.156)
Δ Robots	0.238 (0.263)	0.087 (0.120)	-0.416** (0.209)	0.137 (0.138)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	11.8	11.7	12.3	11.5
No. of Observations	620	616	538	614

*Note: The table presents the estimated coefficients of the 2SLS regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country-sector level. The dependent variable varies by panels. It is a four-year change in the occupation group's: share (in %) in total sector employment (panel A), average wage as a % of the sector's average (panel B), or share (in %) in total sector wages (panel C). Δ ICT capital is the four-year change in the ICT and software capital stock (in thousand EUR, constant prices) divided by employment as of 2010. Δ Robots is the four-year change in the number of industrial robots per 1000 workers, where employment is fixed in 2010. Country-year fixed effects are included. We also control for the change in the GVC participation and for the lagged share of tertiary-educated workers in the occupation group relative to the sector's average. Δ Robots and Δ ICT capital are instrumented using the growth of these types of capital in other European countries. According to the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments, maximal size distortions of a Wald statistic are below 10% when the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above 7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.*

Appendix F. The employment effects of technology adoption by country, pp

Belgium, women



Belgium, men



Czechia, women



Czechia, men



Germany, women



Germany, men




Estonia, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Women, 20-29 Women, 30-49 Women, 50-59 Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Estonia, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Men, 20-29 Men, 30-49 Men, 50-59 Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Greece, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Women, 20-29 Women, 30-49 Women, 50-59 Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Greece, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Men, 20-29 Men, 30-49 Men, 50-59 Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Spain, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Women, 20-29 Women, 30-49 Women, 50-59 Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Spain, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
Men, 20-29 Men, 30-49 Men, 50-59 Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Finland, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Finland, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


France, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.5
0
.5
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


France, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.2
0
.2
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Italy, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Italy, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Lithuania, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Lithuania, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.2
-.1
0
.1
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Latvia, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Latvia, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.1
-.05
0
.05
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


the Netherlands, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-1
-.5
0
.5
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


the Netherlands, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect



Note: The differences in the employment shares of demographic groups in the historical scenario and in the counterfactual scenario of no increase in ICT and robot exposure in the 2010–2018 period. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.

Appendix G. The effects of technology adoption on shares in wage bill by country, pp

Belgium, women



Belgium, men



Czechia, women



Czechia, men



Germany, women



Germany, men




Estonia, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect
Estonia, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect
Greece, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect
Greece, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.1
0
.1
.2
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect
Spain, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.5
0
.5
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect
Spain, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect

Finland, women



Finland, men

France, women



France, men



Italy, women



Italy, men




Lithuania, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Lithuania, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Latvia, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


Latvia, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.1
-.05
0
.05
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


the Netherlands, women
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.5
0
.5
1
Women, 20-29
Women, 30-49
Women, 50-59
Women, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect


the Netherlands, men
Difference vs counterfactual scenario, pp
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Men, 20-29
Men, 30-49
Men, 50-59
Men, 60+
robot adoption effect
ICT capital effect



Note: The differences in the wage bill shares of demographic groups in the historical scenario and in the counterfactual scenario of no increase in ICT and robot exposure in the 2010–2018 period. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU-SES, Eurostat, IFR, OECD TiVA, and EU-KLEMS data.