

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 15359

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**Kaiwen Leong**

*Nanyang Technological University*

**Huailu Li**

*Fudan University and IZA*

**Nicola Pavanini**

*Tilburg University and CEPR*

**Christoph Walsh**

*Tilburg University and CEPR*

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## ABSTRACT

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# The Welfare Effects of Law Enforcement in the Illegal Money Lending Market\*

We estimate a structural model of borrowing and lending in the illegal money lending market using a unique panel survey of 1,090 borrowers taking out 11,032 loans from loan sharks. We use the model to evaluate the welfare effects of alternative law enforcement strategies. We find that a large enforcement crackdown that occurred during our sample period raised interest rates, lowered the volume of loans, increased the lenders' unit cost of harassment, decreased lender profits, and decreased borrower welfare. We compare this strategy to targeting borrowers and find that targeting medium-performing borrowers is the most effective at lowering lender profits.

**JEL Classification:** illegal money lending, loan sharks, law enforcement, crime

**Keywords:** K42, G51

**Corresponding author:**

Huailu Li  
Division of Economics  
Fudan University  
220 Handan Lu  
Yangpu, Shanghai  
China  
E-mail: huailuli@fudan.edu.cn

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# 1 Introduction

Illegal money lending (IML), often also referred to as usury or loansharking, is the practice of lending money at rates higher than the legally prescribed limit, using illegal harassment methods for loan recollection, and attempting to lock borrowers into never ending debt traps (Kaplan and Matteis, 1968). This is a large scale phenomenon that has existed for a very long time,<sup>1</sup> and is widespread across various countries.<sup>2</sup> This market generates severe negative externalities, because lenders are part of criminal organizations that use IML to launder money and conceal profits from other criminal activities, and because borrowers, rejected by any legal creditor, mostly invest IML loans into addictive activities such as gambling, drugs and alcohol (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017; Marinaro, 2017).

On the one hand, due to its detrimental effects on society, law enforcement has exerted considerable effort to eradicate such phenomenon (Savona and Riccardi, 2015). Interventions range from resources to the police force to arrest lenders and other members of the criminal organizations they belong to (Home Office, 2018; DFAT, 2019), to support programs for borrowers via rehabilitation strategies, formal-market alternatives, or financial education.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the presence of IML is enhanced by the widespread worldwide adoption of interest rate caps (Maimbo and Henriquez, 2014), which limit access to legal credit for risky borrowers (Temin and Voth, 2008), fostering demand for illegal lending.

Despite the importance of IML historically and worldwide, in the literature there

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<sup>1</sup>Laws banning individuals from charging excessive interest rates have existed at least as early as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi from 1800 BC, and were present also in the Old Testament and in the Roman Law (Blitz and Long, 1965).

<sup>2</sup>In 2004 around 1% of households in the UK were in debt to an illegal lender (Payne et al., 2020), while in Germany and France the incidence of illegal lending is respectively 2.5 and 3 times higher than in the UK (Ellison et al., 2006). In 2009 in Italy loansharking raised to the organized crime profits of €15bn, 1% of GDP (Schneider, 2013). In 1990 in the US proceeds from loansharking were estimated to be around \$14bn, 0.2% of GDP (Levi and Reuter, 2006). Public reports on IML can also be found for various East Asian countries, including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.

<sup>3</sup>Several governmental and non-governmental organizations provide these kinds of services to borrowers victims of loan sharks, both in Singapore (Credit Counseling Singapore - <https://ccs.org.sg/>) and in other countries (Stop Loan Sharks in the UK - <https://www.stoploansharks.co.uk/>).

is neither a quantification of the welfare effects and effectiveness of such interventions in this market, nor a clear understanding of the main incentives that drive borrowers and lenders. The reason is that reliable and large scale transaction-level data on the IML market do not exist, because lenders are part of organized criminal groups that operate under the radar of law enforcement, and because borrowers are vulnerable individuals who fear both the consequences of reporting their loan sharks and the stigma of admitting their financial troubles.

In this paper we are the first to overcome these challenges with novel and unique data, that allows us to estimate a structural model of the IML market in Singapore,<sup>4</sup> and to use the model to simulate the effect of law enforcement counterfactuals on borrower welfare and lender profits. We do this using a survey of 11,032 loans granted by loan sharks to 1,090 borrowers, representing the largest dataset of this kind to the best of our knowledge. Our counterfactuals evaluate the welfare effects of two kinds of policy interventions. First, we document that a crackdown on lenders that occurred during our sample period was highly successful at lowering the volume of disbursed loans and the profits of lenders. Second, we show that removing borrowers from this market, either through offering formal market alternatives by relaxing interest rate caps, or via rehabilitation and education programs, also hurts lenders, particularly if they focus on medium-performing borrowers in terms of loan repayment time.

Our model and findings also highlight the unique features that make IML different from other formal and informal credit markets with predatory lending practices, such as payday loans, pawnbroking, subprime lending, and informal lending. First, as several other illegal markets, IML is organized as a non-competitive cartel run by transnational criminal syndicates, which implies that policymakers cannot regulate

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<sup>4</sup>According to the Singapore Police Force's 2010 Annual Crime Brief, more than half of the crimes committed in Singapore are related to the IML market. This is because IML is run by transnational criminal organizations involved in various illegal activities and Singapore is an important hub for their operations in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2003). Furthermore, the transnational crime syndicates operating in Singapore also operate across Southeast Asia and China using the same IML operating model. Therefore Singapore is an interesting context to study the IML market, because it has a similar market structure to other countries Southeast Asian countries, with a combined population of over 2 billion. In Section A.14 in the Online Appendix we discuss the external validity of our results in greater detail.

it and aim instead to eradicate it. In Singapore, the dominant criminal syndicates set the loan contract terms (interest rate, maturity, frequency of repayment installments) equivalently for all lenders, allowing them only to adjust the loan size within limits.<sup>5</sup> Second, being unregulated, lenders in IML engage in severe and illegal harassment methods to recollect payments. Third, loansharking features a particular loan structure with loan reset in case of missed payments, explicitly aimed at debt trapping borrowers. Last, borrowers have very poor creditworthiness, as they are rejected by all sources of formal credit.

Our structural framework incorporates these specific features of the IML market, as well as aspects that are common in formal credit markets. In our model, borrowers decide how much to borrow and which lender to borrow from. When approached by a borrower, the lender decides whether to give them the loan or not, or to give a smaller loan, and how harsh to be in response to missed payments. They choose this based on their estimate of the borrower's ability to repay, which depends on the borrower's characteristics and past loan performance. The harshness level chosen by the lender can also impact the borrower's ability to repay through the threat of harassment. Lenders thus face a trade off that larger loans provide larger interest payments but are more difficult for borrowers to repay, while higher harshness levels increase repayment ability but are more costly. Borrowers then choose the lender to maximize their expected discounted payoffs. Borrowers exhibit quasi-hyperbolic discounting and low degrees of risk aversion, and obtain disutility from harassment. Borrower payoffs depend on the expected size of the loan, expected harshness level, the expected number of missed payments, and the associated penalties and harassment from those missed payments. We structurally estimate the model using the observed loan outcomes in our data to evaluate the welfare effects of various market interventions.

Our data detail many loan characteristics, such as requested and granted loan amount, interest rate, the number of missed payments, and types of harassment used by the lender. We also surveyed the characteristics of the borrowers, such as their demographics and addictions. Our borrower panel survey was conducted

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<sup>5</sup>These syndicates also set loan terms this way in the other countries where it operates, such as Malaysia and China.

over 2009-2016. In 2014, the authorities increased the resources targeting the IML market.<sup>6</sup> This crackdown was successful at causing a large number of lenders to exit the market, often through arrest. This caused the market interest rate to increase from 20% over a six-week period to 35%.<sup>7</sup> We use our estimated model to compute the welfare effects of this crackdown by simulating what would have happened had it not occurred. We find that the crackdown caused the volume of loans to fall by 45.9%, lender profits by 47.9% and borrower surplus by 14.4%.

We compare this crackdown to an alternative policy that involves targeting the borrowers instead. We group borrowers into ten groups of equal loan demand based on their repayment ability and consider removing each group one at a time. Borrowers could be removed in practice through rehabilitation strategies or education programs that deter them from borrowing, as the majority of loans in our data are taken out for gambling reasons,<sup>8</sup> but also offering them a formal-market alternative by relaxing the interest rate cap. We find that removing the middle-performing borrowers lowers the profits of lenders the most. Borrowers with the highest repayment ability have smaller expected harassment costs, yet earn lenders little in missed payment penalties. Borrowers with the smallest repayment ability earn lenders the most in missed payment penalties, but lenders need to conduct more harassment to recover the loan. Due to these higher costs, lenders only give smaller loans to these borrowers. Borrowers in the middle of the distribution are the most profitable borrowers for lenders, and targeting these would be the most effective strategy at lowering lenders' profits.

**Related Literature** Our paper contributes to three main strands of the literature. The first is the growing field on the economics of illegal markets. This branch of the literature has notable contribution both in terms of theory (Becker et al., 2006; Galenianos et al., 2012) and empirics (Adda et al., 2014; Jacobi and Sovinsky,

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<sup>6</sup>In Section A.14 in the Online Appendix, we document that other countries across Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand, have also implemented similar crackdowns on the IML market.

<sup>7</sup>With the loan structure in this market, the implied annual percentage rate (APR) increased from 261% to 562%. We show how this is calculated in Section A.1 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>8</sup>Gambling is legal and widespread across the general population in Singapore, as well as in other Asian countries. We document the prevalence of gambling across different countries in Section A.2 in the Online Appendix.

2016; Galenianos and Gavazza, 2017; Leong et al., forthcoming), but is almost exclusively focused on drug markets. A few recent papers have tried to connect financing frictions with illegal activities, such as terrorism (Limodio, 2022), but none of these have direct access to illegal loan contracts.<sup>9</sup> Together with Lang et al. (2022), we are the first to provide an empirical quantification of the market of illegal lending, leveraging unique and extensive survey data on a large fraction of illegal loan contracts in Singapore.<sup>10</sup>

The second contribution we make is to the literature on predatory lending practices. Among formal markets such as pawnbroking (Caskey, 1991) and subprime lending (Adams et al., 2009), the closest lending context to ours is that of payday loans (Stegman, 2007; Morse, 2011). Both IML and payday loans feature small loans with very high interest rates and short maturities, granted to vulnerable borrowers with potential cognitive biases (Bertrand and Morse, 2011). While Melzer (2011) shows that the availability of payday loans in some US states does not alleviate borrowers' economic hardship, we provide a complementary angle, as the lack of payday loans may be compensated by the presence of IML. The literature has also shown that regulating formal predatory lending can increase welfare by limiting repeated borrowing (Allcott et al., 2021) or by prohibiting large penalties for deferred payments (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2010). These targeted interventions are however not feasible in IML, due to its unregulated and criminal nature.

A related literature is also that of microfinance (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011, 2012; de Quidt et al., 2018) and informal lending (Aleem, 1990), but these markets present at least three significant differences to IML. First, microcredit has the objective of fighting poverty and offering borrowers, mostly in rural areas in developing

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<sup>9</sup>To our knowledge, Soudijn and Zhang (2013) is the only other study with access to any data on illegal loans (see Section A.3 in the Online Appendix). They describe the ledger of a single lender that was seized from a Dutch casino. The features they observe in their data have many similarities with ours. We discuss these in Section A.4 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>10</sup>Our paper uses the same dataset as Lang et al. (2022) supplemented by additional survey data we collected from borrowers and ex-lenders in the market. The contributions of Lang et al. (2022) include describing how they collected data on this financially vulnerable population, developing descriptive facts about this understudied market, and summarizing the effects of the enforcement crackdown on loan-related outcomes in reduced form. In this paper we estimate a structural model of the IML market to compute the welfare effects on borrowers and lenders of the crackdown and other enforcement counterfactuals.

countries, a more viable financial channel compared to alternative credit means. IML is instead an extortionary practice that aims to exploit vulnerable borrowers, and is mainly widespread in urban areas in developed economies. Second, microfinance programs are mostly promoted by governments, NGOs, and non-profit organizations, while IML is dominated by large criminal organizations. Last, one of the main objectives of microcredit is to stimulate investment by households and small businesses (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011), while IML finances individuals' consumption and addictions, such as gambling. To sum up, microcredit represents a recent best practice to provide financial inclusion in developing countries, while IML is a criminal, old and global phenomenon that authorities strive to eradicate.<sup>11</sup>

Last, our paper also contributes to the growing area of structural models quantifying the welfare effects of market frictions and of policy interventions in financial markets. In recent years several papers have developed equilibrium frameworks of this kind, ranging from business loans (Crawford et al., 2018), mortgages (Allen et al., 2019; Benetton, 2021), consumer credit (Einav et al., 2012), credit cards (Nelson, 2020), deposits (Egan et al., 2017), insurance (Kojien and Yogo, 2016), and others. We provide the first model of a unique, relevant, and understudied lending market, that of loan sharking. Our modeling approach brings several novel features to this literature, specific of illegal money lending. First, lenders can harass borrowers to enforce repayment, and borrowers have a disutility from harassment. Second, lenders coordinate on several loan features, are not cash constrained, and ultimately decide on the loan size to give. Third, borrowers are present-biased, often miss payments (but never strategically), and almost always end up repaying the loan. Moreover, we provide a new perspective in the debate on the welfare effects of interest rate caps (Cuesta and Sepúlveda, 2021), quantifying how a relaxation of usury rates can hurt criminal organizations active in IML.

Despite these differences, our model and findings also shed light on three key unexplored features of formal credit markets. First, while most datasets only report the granted loan amount, we can instead observe and model borrowers' desired loan amount and what lenders eventually decide to grant. This allows us to sepa-

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<sup>11</sup>In Section A.5 in the Online Appendix we provide an extended discussion outlining the core differences between IML and related credit markets.

rately quantify how a policy intervention affects demanded and supplied quantity of credit. Second, while monitoring plays a crucial role in theoretical models of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984), its empirical importance has not been tested for high risk consumer credit, and just recently only for large commercial loans (Gustafson et al., 2021). We provide novel evidence with detailed information on lenders’ use of a variety of harassment methods, akin to monitoring in formal loans, which are likely to play a key role in high credit risk sectors such as payday loans. Not only we are able to model lenders’ optimal choice of harshness in harassment, but can also recover harassment cost and how it incentivizes borrowers’ effort in repayment, all features so far unexplored by the literature on formal credit. Third, our second counterfactual quantifies an important trade-off also present in legal credit markets. We show that for lenders the most profitable borrowers are those that do miss some repayments, as this delivers lenders revenues from financial penalties, but that do not miss too many of them, which instead requires lenders to incur substantial monitoring and recollection costs.

## 2 Background and Data

### 2.1 Data Collection

We obtained our data by interviewing borrowers about their previous transactions with unlicensed lenders. Our loan-level dataset is the same data used in Lang et al. (2022) but we supplement these data with additional survey data we collected from borrowers and ex-lenders in the market. We provide an overview of our data collection process here, but we refer the reader to Sections A.7 and A.8 in the Online Appendix for further details.

Similar to the strategy used by Blattman et al. (2017), we hired 48 survey enumerators who were previously involved in the unlicensed lending market, as they had a good understanding of the institutional details of our setting. These enumerators initially went to locations where borrowers frequented and asked about the lenders they borrowed from. We estimate that we obtained information on the loca-

tions and operating hours of approximately 90% of all lenders active at that time.<sup>12</sup> From this list of lenders and operating times, we chose a set of random times and locations for the enumerators to visit to approach borrowers who had visited a lender, to see if they would be willing to participate in a survey about the market. From this list of borrowers, we asked the enumerators to conduct interviews with a random 40% of the borrowers.<sup>13</sup> Out of the list of 1,232 borrowers, the enumerators successfully completed interviews with 1,123 respondents over 2011-2013.<sup>14</sup> Respondents were interviewed at least once per year about their latest loan transactions.<sup>15</sup> Interviews were 1-2 hours long and were held in a café chosen by the respondent.<sup>16</sup> Over this period, 57.4% of borrowers reported nine loans and 97.2% reported at least six loans.<sup>17</sup>

After the increase in enforcement in the market which began in 2014, we held follow-up interviews with each respondent over 2015-2016. 1,090 of the original 1,123 were successfully reinterviewed and 95.2% of borrowers reported on two loans over this period. We constrain our sample to the 1,090 borrowers who we successfully interviewed in both time periods.<sup>18</sup>

## 2.2 Loan Shark Syndicates

We also carried out interviews with previous loan sharks from Singapore (4), Malaysia (2) and China (13) to understand how the transnational loan shark syndicates oper-

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<sup>12</sup>The approximate total number of lenders was known because the syndicates kept track of their lenders and made this number known to market participants.

<sup>13</sup>We did not interview the full list of borrowers for financial reasons, as borrowers received S\$20-40 for participating, where in 2009 US\$1 was approximately S\$1.38-1.45.

<sup>14</sup>The 109 incomplete surveys included borrowers that did not want to participate in any survey and those that participated in only one interview.

<sup>15</sup>We gave a financial incentive to borrowers to provide evidence of their transactions to ensure low recall error in our sample. We provide details in Section A.9 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>16</sup>We provide more information on the interviews in Section A.7 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>17</sup>In Section A.10 in the Online Appendix we provide evidence that once-off borrowers are rare in this market.

<sup>18</sup>The main reason for why the remaining 33 borrowers could not be reinterviewed was because we were unable to make contact with them. We believe the high initial take-up rate of 91.1% rules out any concerns for sample selection. We also randomized our survey over several dimensions: the times and locations we asked enumerators to locate borrowers, as well as the time the borrowers were interviewed.

ate across Southeast Asia and China. Based on these interviews, there were on average 10 active transnational syndicates over our sample period that were all headquartered in China. These syndicates have branches in each country of operation across the region, which has a combined population of over 2 billion people.

They told us the syndicates employ the same operating model in each country of operation.<sup>19</sup> The syndicates recruit lenders via a formal interview process and vetting procedure. The syndicate provides the lender with a start-up loan of approximately S\$50,000 (US\$36,500) which they can use to lend out to borrowers. They also provide lenders with a database of potential borrowers that they can lend to.<sup>20</sup>

There is evidence from our data that these syndicates operated in a cartel-like nature for loan terms. As we will see, all loans in our data with lenders from different syndicates have the same structure, and the vast majority have the same interest rate at any given time.<sup>21</sup> Therefore there is some evidence that syndicates coordinated. Two ex-offending lenders we have spoken to also confirmed that the syndicates coordinated on certain dimensions.<sup>22</sup>

### 2.3 Standard Loan Structure

All loans issued by the loan sharks in our sample follow the same payment structure. We explain this structure using a S\$1,000 principal as an example. In the early part of our sample, the nominal interest rate charged by almost all lenders was 20%. This means that for a S\$1,000 loan, the borrower makes repayments of S\$200 per week for six weeks. In this market the lender always takes the first payment from the borrower the moment the loan is issued. In effect, the borrower receives only

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<sup>19</sup>We discuss this operating model in greater detail in Section A.14 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>20</sup>Based on the interviews we have carried out with ex-lenders, there are very low barriers to entry for potential lenders. Prior affiliation with the syndicate is not required to become a lender. There are also very low barriers to exit, provided they pay off their start-up loan, hand over their existing customers, and do not divulge any information.

<sup>21</sup>Each syndicate also has their own turf in the market. Lenders with one syndicate must pay fees to operate on the turf of another. The lenders we have interviewed reported that violence between lenders when competing for borrowers is very uncommon. All lenders have a lucrative business and have little incentive to physically attack other lenders for business.

<sup>22</sup>In other work, [Lang et al. \(2021\)](#) also find that drug-selling gangs in Singapore have an external relations unit that talks to other gangs to work out differences and work together where possible.

S\$800 when taking out the loan, and the loan has a 25% interest rate over a 5-week period.

If a borrower misses a repayment, the lender punishes the borrower in two ways: with harassment and a financial penalty. Harassment can involve anything from threatening text messages, to public shaming and to destruction of personal property. The way in which the lender imposes the financial penalty is by returning all previous payments made by the borrower back to them except one, and restarting the loan. This remaining payment kept by the lender is the financial penalty. In the context of the S\$1,000 loan example, if the borrower had made three payments totaling S\$600 but missed the fourth week's payment, the lender would return S\$400 back to the borrower and keep the remaining \$200 as a financial penalty. The lender would then reset the loan and the borrower would be required to make six payments each week starting in the following week. Thus when a loan resets, it takes at least six weeks to repay, compared to five weeks when the loan is first issued. The borrower cannot repay early, and thus cannot use the cash returned to them to immediately make some of these repayments. To get out of the loan, the borrower must make their payment six weeks in a row. In rare cases where the loan lasts up to six months, the lender will make the borrower work for them to pay off the remaining balance.

## 2.4 Enforcement Crackdown

Starting in 2014, there was an increase in enforcement efforts targeting the loan shark market.<sup>23</sup> The police force was expanded with additional funding and law enforcement devoted more efforts to combat the loansharking market. According to the Singapore Police Force Annual reports, the expenditure on manpower increased by 27.3% from 2012-2013 to 2014-2015 while the number of IML-related crimes fell by 37.7% over the same period.<sup>24</sup>

In Singapore, unlicensed lending and harassment methods such as intimidation,

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<sup>23</sup>Prior to this, there was an “exceedingly low ratio” of police officers to population compared to other large cities (Lang et al., 2021).

<sup>24</sup>Their 2014 report states: “Despite facing the challenge of evolving tactics by [IML] syndicates, we continue to collaborate with other [police] units to relentlessly clamp down on these syndicates.”

vandalism and stalking are illegal, whereas the act of borrowing itself is not illegal. Thus this crackdown was targeted at lenders and runners who conduct harassment for lenders. From our interviews with ex-lenders, many lenders exited the market as a result of this crackdown. This includes lenders who were arrested, as well as those who chose to exit for fear of arrest. Market insiders claim that the total number of active lenders in Singapore fell from approximately 1,100 to between 500-1,000 during 2014-2016. In our own sample, we observe 710 unique lenders before the crackdown, and 401 lenders afterwards.

As we will see, the enforcement crackdown affected typical loan contracts in a number of ways. Most notably, lenders began to charge higher interest rates. They did this for two reasons. First, because several lenders were arrested and exited the market, the remaining lenders could profit more from borrowers' demand. Second, the rates increased to price the increased risk of arrest and the higher cost of harassment. Lenders also disbursed smaller loans to reduce the chance of missed payments and harassment they need to conduct, as it had become more costly.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.5 Features of the Loan Sharking Market

We now describe a number of features of the market that we observe in our data and that we have learned from our interviews. We use these features as a foundation of the assumptions we make for our structural model.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, we provide evidence of external validity of our setting in Section A.14, showing that the features of the IML market in Singapore are representative of loan sharking markets across Asia.

### 2.5.1 Borrower Features

*Borrower Feature 1: Borrowers frequently miss payments but almost always eventually repay.* In our data, only 14.6% of loans are paid on time within 6 weeks, but

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<sup>25</sup>We present event study plots of loan outcomes in Section A.11 in the Online Appendix to show that the pre-crackdown environment was relatively stable. We also rule out several alternative explanations for these effects of the crackdown in Section A.12 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>26</sup>We combine these features and the loan structure summarized above in the description of the modal loan in our data, presented in Section A.13 in the Online Appendix.

97.5% are eventually repaid. The median and modal loan is repaid after 12 weeks. Borrowers who do not finish repaying after a certain number of weeks repay the loan by working for the lender.

*Borrower Feature 2: Borrowers often return to the same lenders they borrowed from in the past. When looking for a new lender, they settle for the first lender they find.* Before the crackdown, 88% of loans were taken from lenders borrowers had previously borrowed from before. After the crackdown, this dropped to 75.5%, as several lenders were arrested.<sup>27</sup> When borrowers look for a new lender, they usually are referred to one by their contacts. They typically will settle for the first lender they find as they want the cash as soon as possible. All the borrowers in our dataset stated that they considered at most one new lender for all transactions.

In our model, we assume borrowers choose between lenders when they want to take out a loan. We assume they only consider lenders they have previously borrowed from and one additional new lender, instead of choosing between all possible lenders. We use the observed network of borrowers and lenders to choose this additional lender for each borrower, so they are likely lenders to be referred to them.

*Borrower Feature 3: Borrowers do not have access to loans from the formal sector.* Loan sharks are lenders of last resort, and borrowers in our sample stated that they would not be borrowing from them if they had access to formal sector loans. In our model we do not include the formal sector in the borrower's consideration set, and instead allow borrowers to have an outside option of not borrowing at all.

*Borrower Feature 4: Borrowers exert effort to make repayments, and do not miss payments if they can afford to repay.* Because of the threat of harassment, together with the fact that lenders almost always get the loans repaid eventually, borrowers exert effort to make repayments and almost always make a repayment when they can afford to. Borrowers we have interviewed have also told us that if a lender ever discovered that a borrower chose not to pay when they could afford to (for example, because they had a good gambling win), then the lender would use extra harassment methods to punish the borrower.<sup>28</sup> Our model estimates show

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<sup>27</sup>In our sample, there were 711 active lenders before the crackdown, whereas there were only 401 active lenders after the crackdown. There was also very little entry of lenders after the crackdown. We only observe 43 lenders active in 2015-2016 that we observe no loans from in earlier years.

<sup>28</sup>Lenders often have contacts stationed in different areas where people gamble and would know

that the median borrower would need to be compensated with at least S\$5,187 to accept lenders' harassment. Even with our sample's average harassment probability of 16%, and ignoring that the loan will reset, the median borrower is still better off making the weekly repayment of S\$200 at the median loan size. Therefore, in our model we assume that borrowers will always make a loan repayment when they have enough cash available to do so.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, we allow borrowers to increase the amount of cash they can generate for repayments through costly effort.

*Borrower Feature 5: Borrowers are present-biased and have high discount rates.* We elicit the borrowers' discount factors and present bias in our surveys.<sup>30</sup> In our model, we assume borrowers discount the payoffs in future weeks with quasi-hyperbolic discounting using these factors elicited from the survey. The median borrower has a weekly discount factor of 0.954, corresponding to an annual factor of approximately 0.09. 99% of the borrowers exhibit present bias, with the median  $\beta_i$  with  $\beta_i \delta_i$  discounting term equal to 0.752. Due to this large fraction of present biased borrowers, we refrain from modeling any dynamic consideration of borrowers beyond their current loan. This implies that borrowers, when repaying a loan, do not consider the larger loan they could get in the future from the same lender, if they were to perform well on the current loan.

*Borrower Feature 6: Borrowers have a low degree of risk aversion.* We asked borrowers to choose between a gamble and a certain alternative in three different scenarios, and converted the responses into a coefficient of relative risk aversion for each borrower that we use in our model. The median value was 0.382.<sup>31</sup>

*Borrower Feature 7: The most common use for loans is gambling.* In our survey, we asked borrowers what they spend their loans on, where borrowers could give multiple responses per loan. 56.9% of loans were taken out for gambling-related reasons,<sup>32</sup> and 47.9% of loans were for drug or alcohol consumption. 55.3% of

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if their borrowers had a good gambling win.

<sup>29</sup>The borrowers we have interviewed also stated that borrowers do not report lenders to the authorities when they cannot repay. This is because lenders would seek revenge on the borrower which would be much more severe than the harassment from a missed payment. Reporting a lender would also exclude the borrower from future loans, as this information would be shared between lenders.

<sup>30</sup>Details of these calculations are shown in Section A.17 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>31</sup>Details of these calculations are shown in Section A.18 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>32</sup>A table of these reasons is shown in Table A.6 in the Online Appendix.

borrowers stated they regularly treat friends for drinks and food, while 42.6% stated they occasionally do.<sup>33</sup> Other reasons for taking out loans, such as paying rent or medical emergencies, were much less common. In our model, we assume borrowers receive demand shocks for loans, and decide how much to borrow based on the prevailing interest rate.

*Borrower Feature 8: Borrowers mainly use their own income to repay loans.* Borrowers stated that their own income was the main source of funds to repay 83.6% of loans. In 5.5% of loans, borrowers borrowed from either friends or family. In contrast, borrowers said their main source of cash to repay was from another loan shark in only 1.6% of loans.<sup>34</sup> Lenders may share information on borrowers to improve their joint profitability. If a borrower wanted to take out a loan from one lender to repay another, the new lender may already have the information on the borrower's debt and reject their loan request. Therefore, as the borrower's own income is the main source of funds for repayment, we do not model borrowers deciding to take out additional loans to repay outstanding loans.

*Borrower Feature 9: Most borrowers spend frequently and do not have savings.* All borrowers in our sample have zero savings that they can withdraw. They all stated that if they had savings, they would not borrow from loan sharks. Only 54 of the 1,090 borrowers stated they would save some of their money from windfall income. Therefore in our modeling, we assume that borrowers do not save the money lenders return to them when they miss a payment and the loan resets.

## 2.5.2 Lender Features

*Lender Feature 1: Lenders are not cash constrained.* Actively-trading lenders make large profits as there is very little default, high interest rates, and high revenue from missed payment penalties. From our interviews, we learned that lenders are always

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<sup>33</sup>In many Asian countries, including Singapore, it is common for one person to pay for all the drinks and food for everyone at a table. To a certain extent, whose turn it is to pay for the food and drinks in these settings rotates and there is a certain degree of randomness in when this occurs and the size of the bill. This can lead borrowers to unexpectedly require additional cash which they need to borrow.

<sup>34</sup>Column 2 of Table A.6 in the Online Appendix shows the primary reasons borrowers took out loans. Borrowers took out a loan to repay a lender only 9.1% of the time.

searching for new borrowers to lend to. The average lender will typically start with S\$50,000 in cash from the syndicate to lend out for a day. If they lend out all of the cash before the end of the day, they can obtain additional cash within thirty minutes. Therefore in our modeling we do not model the lenders choosing which borrowers to lend to, but rather whether or not to lend to a borrower when approached.<sup>35</sup>

*Lender Feature 2: Competition among lenders is very limited, as they all coordinate on offering the same loan features such as the interest rate, maturity structure, and no collateral requirement.* This market features very limited competition between lenders, which explains why we do not explicitly incorporate it into our model. There are three main reasons that support this modeling strategy. First, as described in Section 2.2, the syndicates that control the market and hire the lenders coordinate on several margins, imposing to all lenders the same interest rate and loan structure, including the maturity, financial penalties for missed payments, similar harassment methods, and no collateral requirement. This implies that lenders have little margin left to compete between each other. This form of cartel-like agreements is a typical feature of illicit market products.<sup>36</sup> Second, as discussed in Section 2.5.1, borrowers often return to the same lenders they borrowed from in the past, which implies that poaching borrowers from each other is not common practice among lenders. Third, lenders are not cash constrained and their harassment methods ensure that borrowers always repay, so they have little incentive to reject borrowers that approach them. This also limits borrowers' search among lenders and the extent of competition.

The cartel of loan shark syndicates advised lenders on the interest rate they should charge at any given time. Lenders do not engage in price discrimination. In our data, 88% of loans had a nominal rate of 20% before the crackdown in

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<sup>35</sup>While there are very few loans for less than S\$300 in our sample, lenders are still willing to give out small loans. There are a small number of S\$100 loans in our sample, and we also tried to take out a loan for S\$150 ourselves and were able to do so. This is evidence that lenders do not have an economically significant fixed cost per loan. In our model, therefore, we do not include a fixed cost in the lender's payoff function. Lenders may still have fixed operating costs, but we consider these to be sunk when they make borrower-by-borrower lending decisions.

<sup>36</sup>Allard (2019) writes that "the crime network is also less prone to uncontrolled outbreaks of internecine violence . . . The money is so big that long-standing, blood-soaked rivalries among Asian crime groups have been set aside in a united pursuit of gargantuan profits."

2014. After 2015, 89.6% of loans had a nominal rate of 35%. Because almost all lenders charge the same interest rate at any given time, we assume lenders take the prevailing interest rate as given in our model.<sup>37</sup>

*Lender Feature 3: Lenders give a loan size smaller than initially sought by the borrower, but give larger loans to borrowers they have a previous history with and who performed better on their last loan.* In our data, we observe the loan size borrowers initially desired and the loan size they ended up receiving from the lender. Lenders tend to give only a fraction of what borrowers ask, fearing that borrowers won't be able to repay a large loan. Before the crackdown, 59.6% of borrowers got the loan size they initially asked for (median S\$1,500), while borrowers obtaining smaller loans on average received 61% of what they initially asked for. After the crackdown, only 15.1% got the loan size they initially asked for (median S\$1,000), and the remaining got on average 48% of their initial desired amount.<sup>38</sup> When loan sizes are less than the desired loan size, they are often round fractions of the desired amount, such as one half or two thirds of the desired loan size. In our model, we assume borrowers initially ask for their desired loan size. The lender then chooses whether to give out the loan at that size, a smaller size, or to give out no loan at all.<sup>39</sup>

If a borrower performs well on a loan, lenders are more likely to give larger loan sizes to them in subsequent loans. We observe in our data that if a borrower missed more than five payments in the previous loan, the average loan size drops from 83.9% to 59.1% of the desired loan size. If a borrower has developed a relationship with a lender with previous loans, the lender on average gives larger loan sizes. In our sample the average loan size, as proportion of the borrower's desired loan,

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<sup>37</sup>In Section A.33 in the Online Appendix we discuss optimal interest rate determination from the cartel's perspective.

<sup>38</sup>According to the borrowers we have interviewed, borrowers typically asked lenders for the amount that they desired. They stated they had little incentive to ask for a larger amount, mainly for two reasons. First, lenders ultimately decide whether to lend at each loan size and asking for a larger amount won't alter their decision. Second, if the lender gave them an amount larger than what they desired, they would have greater difficulty repaying it. They also had little incentive to initially ask for a smaller amount, because lenders almost never give out larger loans than borrowers ask for.

<sup>39</sup>Despite this feature, in our interviews borrowers stated that they have little incentive to ask for a larger loan than they actually want. Asking for a larger loan will not affect the lender's optimal choice of loan size.

grows from 63.5% with no prior relationship to 83.4% when borrowers had two or more prior loans with the lender. Therefore, in our model we incorporate the past performance and relationship history of a borrower in the lender's estimate of the borrower's ability to repay.

*Lender Feature 4: Lenders use harassment methods, with different degrees of harshness, to ensure borrowers repay.* When a borrower misses a payment, the lender will conduct some form of harassment to pressure the borrower to repay. Harassment types can vary from making a phone call or sending a text message, to more severe forms, such as shaming and destruction of property. Lenders shame borrowers by threatening them in their neighborhood or workplace, or threatening their friends or family.<sup>40</sup>

In our model, we differentiate between threatening phone calls and text messages to more severe kinds of harassment. Reminder calls and text messages happen in most loans when a borrower misses a payment. We consider these to be a standard part of all loans and do not incorporate it in our model. This implicitly assumes that these calls and text messages are costless for the lender to send and give no disutility to the borrower.<sup>41</sup> The more severe forms, however, are costly for the lender in terms of the cost of hiring runners to conduct harassment, and the risk of arrest from doing so.<sup>42</sup> The severe forms also give the borrowers disutility.

In our modeling, we assume lenders harass borrowers with a certain probability after a borrower misses a payment. Lenders will commit to a specific harshness level when the loan is issued, to maintain their reputation and to ensure borrowers exert effort to make repayments. The only exception to this is when borrowers miss two payments in a row. According to our survey respondents, lenders will always conduct more severe forms of harassment when a borrower misses two payments in a row. This is because the lender does not have any payments made by the borrower to punish them financially. This is standard practice and common knowledge in the

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<sup>40</sup>In Table A.5 in the Online Appendix, we show all the harassment methods and the proportion of loans in our data where each form of harassment method was used.

<sup>41</sup>We make this normalization because we cannot separately identify the expected cost of severe harassment and these reminder calls and text messages.

<sup>42</sup>Based on interviews with two ex-runners, splashing paint on someone's house costed between S\$350-S\$500 the post-crackdown period. Locking a debtor's door or gate costed between S\$120-S\$150, and setting their house on fire costed between S\$1,000-S\$1,800.

market. In our model, we therefore assume that if a borrower misses two payments in a row, they are harassed with a severe type of harassment with probability one.

*Lender Feature 5: In rare cases, the lender requires the borrower to work for them to finish repaying the loan.* The borrower works for the lender to finish repaying the loan in 8.7% of loans. This occurs when the loan is still unpaid after several months. In our model, we specify this terminal period to be 24 weeks after the initial loan is disbursed. In our data, 89.7% of loans are repaid within this timeframe, closely matching the rate at which borrowers are made work for the lender.

*Lender Feature 6: Lenders do not accept partial repayments or early prepayments.* No borrower in our data ever experienced a lender that allowed partial or repayments or early prepayments. Therefore in our model we assume borrowers can only make a payment if they have enough cash available for the entire amount due in a week, and cannot prepay the loan.

*Lender Feature 7: Lenders have imperfect information about a borrower's ability to repay.* The lender will ask new borrowers to view their government-issued ID (Singpass). The lender can then check the borrower's name against a large database of borrowers they have purchased from the black market or have received from the syndicate. Market insiders have told us this database contains information on 350,000 borrowers. This allows lenders to observe borrowers' formal sector income and basic sociodemographic information, such as age and education. If the borrower is not in their database, they will require the borrower to give them access to obtain this information. The lender also has information on the borrower's ability to repay from the borrower's performance on past loans. However, the lender is unable to observe the borrower's gambling, drug and alcohol addictions, gang member status or prior convictions.<sup>43</sup>

In our modeling, we assume the lender estimates the borrower's ability to repay using only information that is available to them. Because lenders are experienced in the market, we assume that on average their estimates are correct and they are not over-optimistic or pessimistic about new borrowers.

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<sup>43</sup>The exception to this is when a borrower asks for a loan while under the influence of alcohol, which occurred in 34% of loans in our data.

## 3 Model

### 3.1 Overview

We now describe our model which captures the features of this market described above, starting with an informal overview before describing it formally.

When approached by a borrower asking for a particular loan size, the lender chooses whether to disburse the loan, or to give a smaller loan size. The lender also chooses how harsh to be with the borrower, which corresponds to a probability of conducting severe harassment after a missed payment. This harassment is costly to the lender, but can increase a borrower's loan repayment efforts because harassment gives them disutility. Lenders use available information they have from past loans and other sources to estimate the borrower's repayment ability, and choose the loan size and harshness level to maximize their expected payoffs, taking into account the loan resetting property and harassment after missed payments.

When a borrower wants to take out a loan, they decide both how much to borrow and which lender to borrow from. While all lenders charge the same interest rate at any given time, lenders are differentiated from the borrower's perspective because of differing past loan history with each lender. Depending on the past loan history, certain lenders are more likely to give larger loans or be harsher with the borrower. In each week of the loan, borrowers generate cash to make repayments and can increase the amount they have available with costly effort. Borrowers obtain utility from consumption, which is the amount they have left after any loan repayments. Borrowers also obtain disutility from harassment when it occurs after a missed payment. Based on the borrower's expectations over possible repayment paths and the loan size and harshness level chosen by the lender, the borrower chooses the lender that gives the highest expected present discounted value of payoffs.

### 3.2 Setup

#### 3.2.1 Borrower Loan Demand and Consideration Set

In the market there are  $I$  borrowers and  $L$  lenders. At each time period  $t$ , the nominal interest rate  $r_t$  is chosen by the network of syndicates and all borrowers and lenders

take it as given. At time  $t$ , borrower  $i$  receives a need to borrow an amount of money. The size of the loan that the borrower desires is given by the following demand function:

$$L_{it}^* = e^{-\alpha_i r_t} \zeta_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $\alpha_i$  measures borrower  $i$ 's sensitivity of loan demand with respect to the interest rate, and  $\zeta_{it}$  is a demand shock where  $\log(\zeta_{it})$  is normally distributed with mean  $\mu_i^\zeta$  and standard deviation  $\sigma_i^\zeta$ , which can vary over borrowers.

Borrower  $i$  at time  $t$  chooses between a subset of all the lenders active in the market, defined by  $\mathcal{L}_{it} \subset \{1, \dots, L\}$ , or to not borrow at all.  $\mathcal{L}_{it}$  includes lenders the borrower has borrowed from before who are still active, as well as a new lender they have no history with.

### 3.2.2 Lender Choice Problem: Loan Size and Harshness Level

If borrower  $i$  chooses lender  $\ell \in \mathcal{L}_{it}$  and asks for a loan of size  $L_{it}^*$ , lender  $\ell$  decides on both the size of the loan to give and how harsh to be in the loan. Lenders can choose between the following fixed fractions of the loan size the borrower asks for. The set of possible loan sizes is given by:

$$\mathcal{L}_{it} = \left\{ \rho L_{it}^* : \rho \in \left\{ 0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}, 1 \right\} \right\} \quad (2)$$

The harshness level,  $h_{i\ell t}$ , corresponds to a probability of harassing the borrower after a missed payment, denoted by  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ . The lender can choose between three harshness levels:  $\mathcal{H} = \{Low, Medium, High\}$ . The harassment probability  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  can depend on the loan size and borrower characteristics, but the harshness level  $h_{i\ell t}$  can shift this probability up or down. We assume that the lender communicates its choice to the borrower and commits to it. This probability is the probability the lender harasses the borrower every time a borrower misses a payment, except in the instance where the borrower has missed two payments in a row. According to standard practice in the market, we assume that the lender conducts

severe harassment with probability one in this case.<sup>44</sup>

### 3.2.3 Borrower Income Process and Moral Hazard

An important component of the expected payoffs in a loan for both borrowers and lenders is the probability that the borrower makes the weekly payments, which determines how often a loan is reset and how much harassment will take place.

Borrowers generate  $m_{i0t}$  cash each week  $w$ , which they can use for consumption and loan repayments. We assume this is generated according to a truncated normal distribution:

$$m_{i0tw} = \max \{0, m_{i0t} + v_{itw}\} \quad \text{where } v_{itw} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2) \quad (3)$$

Borrowers generate a fixed amount  $m_{i0t}$  plus a stochastic component  $v_{itw}$  whose variance can vary by borrower (for example, because they gamble more frequently).<sup>45</sup>

Borrowers can increase the amount they have available for loan repayments each week through costly effort, for example by working or reducing discretionary consumption. This moral hazard component in borrower repayment may be affected by the lender's harshness choice, the past loan history with the lender, or the market interest rate. We model moral hazard in a similar way to [Einav et al. \(2013\)](#) and allow the fixed amount the borrower generates each week to be a function of these variables. More specifically, if borrower  $i$  has a loan with lender  $\ell$  using a harshness level  $h_{i\ell t}$ , they increase the fixed component generated each week from  $m_{i0t}$  to  $m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t})$ , resulting in a total amount generated each week of:

$$m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) = \max \{0, m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) + v_{itw}\} \quad \text{where } v_{itw} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2) \quad (4)$$

The unit cost of effort for borrowers is assumed to be  $\Psi$ , resulting in a total disutility of  $\Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t})$  from increasing  $m_{i0t}$  to  $m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t})$ .

<sup>44</sup>For example, if a borrower misses their payments in weeks 3, 4 and 6, the harassment probability is  $p_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  in weeks 3 and 6 but 1 in week 4.

<sup>45</sup>This cash on hand is assumed to be stochastic because borrowers may have fluctuations in their expenses each week. Furthermore, many borrowers in our data are either self-employed or work for small businesses and can also experience fluctuations in income.

With a loan of size  $L_{ilt}$ , the borrower must make weekly repayments of  $r_t L_{ilt}$  throughout the course of the loan. The borrower can only make a payment if  $m_{iltw}(h_{ilt}) \geq r_t L_{ilt}$ , as lenders do not accept partial payments. Although we assume borrowers exhibit moral hazard in their effort of generating cash for repayments, in line with our evidence we assume borrowers never strategically default on a payment. Thus, they will always make a payment if they can afford to. The probability that the borrower can make a payment in any week is therefore given by:

$$p_{ilt}^m(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) = \Phi\left(\frac{m_{ilt}(h_{ilt}) - r_t L_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}\right) \quad (5)$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution.

### 3.3 Lender's Optimal Choice of Loan Size and Harshness

We assume that borrowers are better informed than lenders over their repayment probability. Lenders have imperfect information about the process for  $m_{iltw}(h_{ilt})$  as they do not observe all borrower characteristics. We assume that the lender believes the borrower earns  $\tilde{m}_{iltw}(h_{ilt})$  each week, where

$$\tilde{m}_{iltw} = \max\{0, \tilde{m}_{ilt}(h_{ilt}) + \tilde{v}_{itw}\} \quad \text{where } \tilde{v}_{itw} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tilde{\sigma}_i^2) \quad (6)$$

Given this, the lender's belief that a borrower can make a payment in any week is given by:

$$p_{ilt}^{\tilde{m}}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) = \Phi\left(\frac{\tilde{m}_{ilt}(h_{ilt}) - r_t L_{ilt}}{\tilde{\sigma}_i}\right) \quad (7)$$

We now describe the lenders' expected payoffs from a loan of a given size and harshness level, and then discuss their optimal choice. If the lender originates a loan of size  $L_{ilt}$  with harshness level  $h_{ilt}$  to the borrower, in week 1 their payoff from the loan is the cash outflow from disbursing the loan:

$$\tilde{u}_{ilt1}(L_{ilt}) = -(1 - r_t)L_{ilt} \quad (8)$$

The reason the lender only disburses  $(1 - r_t)L_{ilt}$  instead of  $L_{ilt}$  is because the lender keeps the first payment at the moment of disbursing the loan.

In the second week, the lender believes the borrower will make the payment with probability  $p_{ilt}^{\tilde{m}}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$ . If the borrower makes the payment, the lender receives a cash inflow of  $r_t L_{ilt}$ , but if they miss the payment, the lender conducts harassment with probability  $p_{ilt}^{\eta}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  at an expected cost  $\kappa_t$ .<sup>46</sup> Together, the expected payoff in week 2 is given by:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_{ilt2}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})] = p_{ilt}^{\tilde{m}}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) r_t L_{ilt} - \left[1 - p_{ilt}^{\tilde{m}}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})\right] p_{ilt}^{\eta}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) \kappa_t \quad (9)$$

In the following weeks the lender's payoff depends on the number of consecutive payments the borrower has made up to that point. To define the lender's payoff in each possible case, we define the payment counter  $n_{iltw}$  as the number of consecutive payments made before week  $w$ . When a borrower misses a payment in week  $w$ ,  $n_{iltw+1}$  resets to zero. Using this, we can define the lender's expected payoff in each possible case for weeks  $w \in \{2, \dots, W - 1\}$  before the terminal week  $W$  as:

$$\tilde{u}_{iltw}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) = \begin{cases} r_t L_{ilt} & \text{if } n_{iltw} < 6 \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{iltw}(h_{ilt}) \geq r_t L_{ilt} \\ -\kappa_t & \text{if } n_{iltw} = 0 \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{iltw}(h_{ilt}) < r_t L_{ilt} \\ -(n_{iltw} - 1) r_t L_{ilt} - p_{ilt}^{\eta}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) \kappa_t & \text{if } n_{iltw} \in \{1, \dots, 5\} \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{iltw}(h_{ilt}) < r_t L_{ilt} \\ 0 & \text{if } n_{iltw} = 6 \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

In the first case, the loan is not fully repaid ( $n_{iltw} < 6$ ), the borrower makes the payment and the lender receives  $r_t L_{ilt}$ . In the second case, the borrower has missed two payments in a row and the lender harasses the borrower with probability one. In the third case, the borrower misses a payment and the lender must return  $(n_{iltw} - 1) r_t L_{ilt}$  back to the borrower. They inflict harassment with probability  $p_{ilt}^{\eta}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  at an expected cost  $\kappa_t$ . In the final case, the loan is already fully repaid ( $n_{iltw} = 6$ ) and there are no more cashflows between the borrower and lender. In the case where the loan is still unpaid by the terminal week  $W$ , the lender is still able to recover the remaining balance of the loan by making the borrower do work for them. We de-

<sup>46</sup>This expected cost can be interpreted as the cost of paying runners to conduct harassment plus the lender's risk of arrest from harassing.

scribe the exact specification for the lender's payoff for this special case in Section A.19.1 in the Online Appendix .

The lender discounts future weeks with a weekly discount factor of  $\tilde{\delta}$ . The expected present discounted value of disbursing a loan of size  $L_{i\ell t}$  with harshness level  $h_{i\ell t}$  is then:

$$\tilde{V}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) = -(1 - r_t)L_{i\ell t} + \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{w=2}^W \tilde{\delta}^{w-1} \tilde{u}_{i\ell tw}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right] + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \quad (11)$$

where  $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  is a lender payoff shock specific to the loan size and harshness level that is private information to the lender. We assume a nested logit structure for the lender's choice problem, where the upper nest is the loan size and the lower nests are the harshness levels. We denote by  $p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  the nested logit probabilities that the lender chooses loan size  $L_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{L}_{it}$  and harshness level  $h_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}$  before the realizations of the payoff shocks  $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ . This full expression for this probability is shown in Section A.20 in the Online Appendix.

### 3.4 Borrower's Optimal Choice of Lender

We now describe the expected payoffs for borrower  $i$  from a loan of size  $L_{i\ell t}$  and harshness level  $h_{i\ell t}$  with lender  $\ell$  at time  $t$ . We then discuss the borrower's optimal choice of lender.

In the first week, the borrower consumes their available cash  $m_{i0t1}$  and the disbursed loan  $(1 - r_t)L_{i\ell t}$ . The borrower does not put in extra effort to raise cash in the first week because the first payment is already taken out of the initial loan size by the lender. We assume the borrower takes out the loan before the weekly cash shock  $v_{itw}$  is realized. We further assume borrowers have constant relative risk aversion utility over consumption each week, where borrower  $i$ 's coefficient of relative risk aversion is  $\gamma_i$ . The borrower's expected utility in week 1 is then:

$$\mathbb{E}[u_{i\ell t1}(L_{i\ell t})] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{i0t1} + (1 - r_t)L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right] \quad (12)$$

In week 2, the borrower is able to make the repayment with probability  $p_{i\ell t}^m(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ . If the borrower misses the payment, the borrower will be harassed by the lender

with probability  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ , which gives the borrower disutility  $\chi$ . The expected payoff in week 2 from the loan is then:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[u_{i\ell t 2}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})] &= -\Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) \\ &+ [p_{i\ell t}^m(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i\ell t 2}(h_{i\ell t}) - r_t L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i} \middle| m_{i\ell t 2}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t}\right] \\ &+ [1 - p_{i\ell t}^m(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})] \left( \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i\ell t 2}(h_{i\ell t})]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i} \middle| m_{i\ell t 2}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t}\right] - p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi \right) \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

In the following weeks, the payoff depends on the number of consecutive payments made before week  $w$ ,  $n_{i\ell tw}$ . We can define the borrower's expected payoff in each possible case for all weeks  $w \in \{2, \dots, W-1\}$  as:

$$\mathbb{E}[u_{i\ell tw}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})] = \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) - r_t L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i} \middle| m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t}\right] \\ \quad - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell tw} < 6 \text{ and } m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t})]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i} \middle| m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t}\right] \\ \quad - \chi - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell tw} = 0 \text{ and } m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) + (n_{i\ell tw} - 1)r_t L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i} \middle| m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t}\right] \\ \quad - p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell tw} \in \{1, \dots, 5\} \text{ and } m_{i\ell tw}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{[m_{i0tw}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1-\gamma_i}\right] & \text{if } n_{i\ell tw} = 6 \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

In the first case, the borrower is able to make the payment and consumes their remaining income. In the second case, the borrower has missed two payments in a row and is harassed with probability one. In the third case, the borrower misses a payment and the lender returns  $(n_{i\ell tw} - 1)r_t L_{i\ell t}$  to them and resets the loan. We assume the borrower consumes this extra cash immediately and does not save it for payments in following weeks.<sup>47</sup> The borrower also is harassed with probability  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ . In the final case, the loan is already fully repaid and the borrower consumes their entire available cash,  $m_{i0tw}$ , from that week. If the loan is still unpaid by the terminal week  $W$ , the borrower must work for the lender to repay the loan.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup>This is based on the low savings rate observed by the borrowers in our data (also after windfall income shocks) and from interviews we have carried out.

<sup>48</sup>We specify the exact payoffs in this case in Section A.19.2 in the Online Appendix.

Borrowers discount payoffs in future weeks with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Borrower  $i$  discounts expected payoffs  $w$  weeks in the future with a discount factor  $\beta_i \delta_i^w$ . The expected present discounted value of a loan of size  $L_{ilt}$  and harshness level  $h_{ilt}$  from lender  $\ell$  is then:

$$v_{ilt}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) = \mathbb{E} \left[ u_{ilt1}(L_{ilt}) + \sum_{w=2}^W \beta_i \delta_i^{w-1} u_{iltw}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) \right] \quad (15)$$

The borrower does not observe the value of the lender's payoff shocks,  $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{ilt}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$ . Therefore, when a borrower is choosing a lender, they are uncertain about the loan size they will receive and the harshness level that the lender will choose. However, borrowers know the probabilities  $p_{ilt}^{Lh}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  of the lender choosing each combination. The expected present discounted payoff of choosing lender  $\ell$  is then:

$$V_{ilt} = \sum_{L_{ilt} \in \mathcal{L}_i} \sum_{h_{ilt} \in \mathcal{H}} p_{ilt}^{Lh}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) v_{ilt}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) + \varepsilon_{ilt} \quad (16)$$

where  $\varepsilon_{ilt}$  is a Type I extreme value borrower-lender-time-specific match value shock. If the borrower chooses the outside option of not taking out a loan, they consume their weekly available cash,  $m_{i0tw}$ , each week. The expected present discounted value of payoffs from this option is then:

$$V_{i0t} = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{m_{i0t1}^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} + \sum_{w=2}^W \beta_i \delta_i^{w-1} \frac{m_{i0tw}^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right] + \varepsilon_{i0t} \quad (17)$$

where  $\varepsilon_{i0t}$  is a Type I extreme value shock to the match value of the outside option.

The borrower chooses the lender or outside option which maximizes their payoff. Let  $\bar{V}_{ilt}$  and  $\bar{V}_{i0t}$  be the expected present discounted value of choosing lender  $\ell$  and the outside option respectively excluding the match value shocks,  $\varepsilon_{ilt}$  and  $\varepsilon_{i0t}$ . Before the realization of the match value shock, the probability of choosing lender  $\ell$  is then given by:

$$\Pr \left( V_{ilt} > \max_{\ell' \in \{0\} \cup \mathcal{L}_i \setminus \{\ell\}} V_{i\ell't} \right) = \frac{\exp(\bar{V}_{ilt})}{\sum_{\ell' \in \{0\} \cup \mathcal{L}_i} \exp(\bar{V}_{i\ell't})} \quad (18)$$

Our modeling of the borrower’s choice of lender is a complex dynamic problem. We use this formulation which takes into account the specific loan structure in our setting for the following reasons. First, the borrowers in our sample are very experienced and understand the structure of loans. In our surveys we asked borrowers mathematical questions about the loan structure and only 2 of the 1,090 borrowers answered questions incorrectly. This is evidence that the borrowers are not cognitively impaired. Also, 93% of the borrowers in our sample stated that they have talked to others to obtain advice about borrowing. Therefore we argue that on average borrowers are able to compute the expected payoffs from a lender. The match-value shock  $\varepsilon_{ilt}$  can also be interpreted as the borrower’s measurement error when forming these expectations. Second, although we model the choice of lender as a rational problem, the extremely low discount factors and high degree of present bias in most borrowers lead borrowers to weight the initial utility of receiving the loan much higher than the following repayments and harassment. Thus our framework is able to rationalize decisions that are not dynamically consistent. Third, in order to analyze the welfare effects of law enforcement interventions, we want to be able to decompose how changes in interest payments and harassment contribute to welfare changes within the structure of loans in the market.

## 4 Estimation

### 4.1 Parameterization

We model the harassment probability  $p_{ilt}^\eta(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  as a function of harshness level dummies, the loan size, and a host of borrower characteristics and past loan history variables. We also allow the harshness level dummies to change after the crack-down. We apply the normal cdf to a linear function of these variables and denote the parameter vector by  $\theta^\eta$ .

We parameterize the constant part of the cash a borrower generates each week,  $m_{ilt}$ , as a function of the harassment probability, the interest rate, the past relationship history with the lender, and a host of borrower characteristics, including addictions. We denote these parameters by  $\theta^m$ . We model the standard deviation

of the cash shocks  $v_{itw}$  as  $\sigma_i(\theta^\sigma) = 1 + \theta^{\sigma, Gambler} Gambler_i$ , where  $Gambler_i = 1$  if the borrower gambles. We normalize  $\sigma_i = 1$  for non-gamblers. We parameterize the lender's estimate of the borrower's cash generation process in a similar way, except that we exclude variables such as addictions that the lender cannot observe. We denote these parameters by  $\theta^{\tilde{m}}$  and  $\theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}$ .

We parameterize the unit cost of harassment as  $\kappa_t(\theta^\kappa) = \theta^\kappa + \theta^{\kappa, post} Post_t$ , where  $Post_t = 1$  after the 2014 crackdown. The borrower harassment disutility,  $\chi$ , and effort cost,  $\Psi$ , are also parameters to be estimated. We denote these by  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  respectively.

For the borrower loan demand function, we parameterize the borrower's price sensitivity,  $\alpha_i$ , to be a function of borrower characteristics. To do this, we interact the interest rate with these characteristics. For the means of the borrower demand shocks,  $\mu_i^\zeta$ , we use borrower fixed effects. We denote these parameters by  $\theta^\alpha$  and  $\theta^\zeta$  respectively. The full vector of parameters is then given by:

$$\theta = \left( \theta^\eta, \theta^{\tilde{m}}, \theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}, \theta^\kappa, \theta^\alpha, \theta^\zeta, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, \theta^\chi, \theta^\Psi \right) \quad (19)$$

## 4.2 Estimation of Lender Parameters

We jointly estimate the parameters relating to the harassment probabilities,  $\theta^\eta$ , the lenders' estimates of the borrowers' repayment abilities,  $\theta^{\tilde{m}}$  and  $\theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}$ , and the harassment costs,  $\theta^\kappa$  via simulated maximum likelihood. We first discuss the variation in the data that identify these parameters.

To identify the harassment probabilities, we use observed harassment events in our data. We denote by  $h_{ilt} \in \{0, 1\}$  whether severe harassment was used in a loan. In our data, we observe if harassment was used at the loan level, but we do not observe the exact number of times harassment was used. For example, for a loan with three missed payments, we may observe if the lender splashed paint on the borrower's home and harassed a family member. However, we do not observe if these were used for different missed payments, or if they were both used at the same time in response to a single missed payment. We also do not observe how many times a single form of harassment was used in a loan. Therefore we only use if harassment was used at least once to identify  $\theta^\eta$ .

To identify the repayment probability parameters from the lender's perspective,  $\theta^{\tilde{m}}$  and  $\theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}$ , we use the observed total number of weeks to repay,  $w_{i\ell t}$ , the total number of missed payments,  $f_{i\ell t}$ , and whether the borrower reached the terminal week,  $d_{i\ell t} \in \{0, 1\}$ . This is because we do not observe the specific weeks in which missed payments occurred.

Finally, to identify the lender harassment cost parameters,  $\theta^{\kappa}$ , we use variation in the observed loan sizes in the data. A higher harassment cost leads lenders to be more likely to choose smaller loans for a given repayment ability and harshness level, as they will need to harass borrowers more often to ensure they repay.

We now discuss the likelihood function that we use to estimate the subset of lender parameters  $\theta^{Lender} = (\theta^{\eta}, \theta^{\tilde{m}}, \theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}, \theta^{\kappa})$ . We do not observe the harshness level,  $h_{i\ell t}$ , chosen by the lender. Therefore we need to integrate it out of our likelihood. In Section A.21 in the Online Appendix, we show that the contribution of loan  $(i, \ell, t)$  to the likelihood can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(h_{i\ell t}, w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t}, L_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}) &= \sum_{h_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}} \Pr(h_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}, w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t}) \\ &\quad \times \Pr(w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \\ &\quad \times \Pr(L_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, h_{i\ell t}) \Pr(h_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}) \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

The first component  $\Pr(h_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}, w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t})$  is the likelihood of whether harassment was used at least once or not given the harassment probability (which depends on the loan size and harshness level), the time to repay and number of missed payments. The functional form of this component is shown in Section A.22 in the Online Appendix.

The second component  $\Pr(w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  is the probability of the observed total number of weeks to repay and the total number of missed payments given the loan size and harshness level. The functional form for this component is shown in Section A.23 in the Online Appendix.

The third component  $\Pr(L_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, h_{i\ell t})$  is the probability of the observed loan size given the harshness level. This is given by:

$$\Pr(L_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender}, h_{i\ell t}) = \frac{p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender})}{\Pr(h_{i\ell t} | \theta^{Lender})} \quad (21)$$

where

$$\Pr\left(h_{ilt} \mid \theta^{Lender}\right) = \sum_{L_{ilt} \in \mathcal{L}_{it}} p_{ilt}^{Lh}\left(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \mid \theta^{Lender}\right) \quad (22)$$

We compute  $p_{ilt}^{Lh}\left(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \mid \theta^{Lender}\right)$  via simulation. Given a guess of parameters  $\theta^{Lender}$ , we compute  $v_{ilt}\left(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right)$  for each possible loan size and harshness level by simulating  $ns = 10,000$  repayment paths using the repayment probability  $p_{ilt}^{\tilde{m}}\left(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right)$  and the harassment probability  $p_{ilt}^{\eta}\left(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right)$ .<sup>49</sup> To do this, we assume the lender's weekly discount factor is  $\tilde{\delta} = 0.999$ , corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.95.<sup>50</sup>

### 4.3 Estimation of Borrower Parameters

#### 4.3.1 Borrower Loan Demand

We estimate the parameters relating to the borrowers in three steps. In the first step we estimate the borrower loan demand parameters,  $\theta^{\alpha}$  and  $\theta^{\zeta}$ , using a linear regression with borrower fixed effects, interacting the interest rate with borrower characteristics,  $x_i^{\alpha}$ . Taking logs of the borrower loan demand function and using our parameterization:

$$\begin{aligned} \log L_{it}^* &= -\alpha_i r_t + \log(\zeta_{it}) \\ &= -(\theta^{\alpha} \cdot x_i^{\alpha}) r_t + \mu_{\zeta, i} + v_{it}^{\zeta} \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

where  $v_{it}^{\zeta}$  is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation  $\sigma_i^{\zeta}$ . The  $\mu_i^{\zeta}$  are borrower fixed effects in this regression. Because the change in the interest rates were due to the crackdown's effect on the cost of harassment and not due to changes in demand, the variation in the interest rate over time identifies  $\theta^{\alpha}$ .

<sup>49</sup>If the fraction of the actual loan size to the desired loan size is not one of the fractions  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{3}$ , or 1, we replace the  $\rho$  in  $\mathcal{L}_{it}$  closest to that in the data with the actual fraction in the data.

<sup>50</sup>This is a common annual discount factor used in empirical settings, such as in [Holmes \(2011\)](#) and [Collard-Wexler \(2013\)](#). We have also elicited the discount factor from two ex-lenders and found them to be consistent with this assumption.

### 4.3.2 Borrower Repayment Parameters

To estimate the borrower repayment parameters,  $\theta^m$  and  $\theta^\sigma$ , we use variation in the observed total weeks to repay and the number of missed payments, similar to the second component of the lender likelihood. As the repayment probability depends on the harshness level, which is unobserved, we integrate it out using the estimated lender parameters. The contribution of a loan to this likelihood is given by:<sup>51</sup>

$$\Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid L_{ilt}, \widehat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma\right) = \sum_{h_{ilt} \in \mathcal{H}} \Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid \widehat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right) \times \Pr\left(h_{ilt} \mid \widehat{\theta}^{Lender}\right) \quad (24)$$

### 4.3.3 Borrower Harassment Disutility and Effort Cost

We estimate  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  using the observed choices of lenders by borrowers. Because borrowers have different loan histories with different lenders, lenders differ in how likely they are to choose certain harshness levels and loan sizes. We identify  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  through the borrower's trade offs between the loan size they expect to receive, and the expected penalties and harassment from missing payments from the lender.

We assume borrowers do not choose between all available lenders, and construct consideration sets for each loan by assuming that borrowers choose between lenders they have borrowed from in the past, and a new lender they have never borrowed from before. We use the observed network of borrowing and lending to choose likely new lenders for each borrower.<sup>52</sup>

For each trial value of  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  and using the estimated values of  $\theta^{Lender}$ ,  $\theta^m$  and  $\theta^\sigma$  as given, we compute the borrower's expected payoff for a lender according to equation (16). We do this for every lender in their consideration set to obtain the choice probabilities according to equation (18). Similar to the lender's case, we use simulation methods to compute these expected payoffs. We provide further details of estimating  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  in Section A.26 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>51</sup>The functional form for this likelihood is shown in Section A.24 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>52</sup>We provide additional details to this procedure in Section A.26.1 in the Online Appendix.

## 5 Estimation Results

Table 1 shows our parameter estimates. The upper part of the table shows the estimates of the borrower repayment probability parameters. Column (1) shows those from the lender's perspective, while column (2) shows that from the borrower. The difference between these columns is that the lender does not observe certain borrower characteristics, such as their addictions, prior convictions, or gang member status. Based on our modeling approach, these coefficients can be interpreted in S\$ terms when multiplied by 1,000. The estimates show that borrowers increase the cash they have available when faced with a higher harassment probability, showing the effectiveness of higher harshness for lenders. When the interest rate increased after the crackdown, borrowers put in less effort into repayment. Borrowers borrowing from a lender for the first time have a lower repayment probability, partially explained by those borrowers not having any relationship capital to lose with that lender. Borrowers with some relationship capital are better able to repay, but those with many previous loans are worse. This is because borrowers who borrow very often are worse at repaying. Borrowers who asked for the loan under the influence of alcohol, have previously been in prison, use sex workers and who treat friends regularly have lower repayment ability. Borrowers involved in a gang have higher repayment ability, because they may have access to more money-making opportunities. We also estimate that gamblers have a higher variance in income, compared to non-gamblers.

The harassment probability parameter estimates show that the constant terms for each harshness level differ, indicating heterogeneity across harshness levels, but this heterogeneity decreased after the crackdown. The average harassment probabilities for each harshness level are 0.2%, 1.5% and 48.9% before the crackdown and 0.4%, 2.9% and 11.9% after the crackdown. The harassment probability also increases with the loan size, as lenders have a greater incentive to make borrowers repay.

The harassment cost is estimated to be S\$385 before the crackdown and increasing to S\$1,094 afterwards. The harassment disutility and effort costs do not have a direct dollar interpretation, but a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the median borrower would need to be compensated at least S\$5,187 to be willing to

TABLE 1: Parameter Estimation Results.

	Lender		Borrower	
<i>Cash available for repayments: mean</i>	$\theta^m$		$\theta^m$	
Harassment probability	0.294	(0.169)	0.192	(0.033)
Interest rate	-1.398	(0.197)	-2.419	(0.181)
No lending history	-0.553	(0.036)	-0.771	(0.045)
Number of previous loans	0.001	(0.001)	0.022	(0.007)
Number of previous loans squared	-0.001	(0.000)	-0.003	(0.001)
Number of missed payments in last loan	-0.051	(0.006)	-0.087	(0.004)
Asked for loan under the influence of alcohol	-0.012	(0.013)	-0.029	(0.015)
Current gang member			0.076	(0.035)
Previously gang member			0.039	(0.027)
Number of previous convictions			-0.024	(0.011)
Drinks alcohol			-0.079	(0.048)
Uses drugs			-0.014	(0.029)
Frequents sex workers			-0.066	(0.028)
Frequently treats friends			-0.142	(0.037)
Borrower sociodemographics	Yes		Yes	
<i>Cash available for repayments: std. deviation</i>	$\theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}$		$\theta^{\sigma}$	
Constant	1.000		1.000	
Gambler			0.504	(0.041)
<i>Harassment probabilities</i>	$\theta^{\eta}$			
Pre-crackdown low harshness level	-3.384	(0.986)		
Pre-crackdown medium harshness level	-2.338	(0.920)		
Pre-crackdown high harshness level	0.386	(0.194)		
Post-crackdown low harshness level	-2.288	(1.592)		
Post-crackdown medium harshness level	-1.388	(0.335)		
Post-crackdown high harshness level	-0.579	(0.432)		
Loan size	0.591	(0.118)		
Past Loan History	Yes			
Borrower sociodemographics	Yes			
<i>Harassment costs</i>	$\theta^{\kappa}$			
Constant	0.385	(0.072)		
Post crackdown	0.709	(0.073)		
<i>Borrower disutility</i>			$\theta^{\chi}, \theta^{\psi}$	
Harassment disutility			3.584	(0.073)
Effort costs			1.597	(0.023)

Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the borrower level. Borrower sociodemographics includes age, education, gender, marital status, children nationality, and ethnicity. Loan history variables include the number of passed loans and number of missed payments in last loan. The constant terms in  $\theta^{\tilde{\sigma}}$  and  $\theta^{\sigma}$  are normalized to 1.

accept certain harassment in a period.

Table A.9 in the Online Appendix shows the estimates of the borrower loan demand parameters  $\theta^{\alpha}$ . These estimates show that borrower loan demand is decreasing in the interest rate, but gamblers have a lower price sensitivity. In Table A.11 in the Online Appendix we show how well our model is able to match our data. The

expected loan outcomes at the estimated parameters match the average number of weeks, number of missed payments, harassment levels and loan sizes reasonably well on aggregate.

## **6 The Welfare Effects of Law Enforcement**

### **6.1 Crackdown on Lenders**

We use our model estimates to compute the effects of the crackdown on borrower and lender welfare and on the total value of disbursed loans. Our sample period spans 2009-2016 and the crackdown occurred in 2014. We run a counterfactual simulation where we assume the crackdown did not occur and compare payoffs and loan sizes in the 2014-2016 period to the baseline scenario where the crackdown does occur.

To implement this counterfactual, we assume that the lender harassment costs remained at their pre-crackdown level. We also assume that the constant terms in the harassment probability function, which form the lender's set of possible harassment probabilities, remain at their pre-crackdown levels. Because the crackdown caused the cartel of syndicates to raise the interest rates from 20% to 35%, we assume that in the absence of the crackdown the interest rate remains at 20%. We use the borrower loan demand function to compute the adjusted loan demand to this interest rate. Finally, the crackdown caused a number of lenders to exit (either voluntarily or due to arrest) in the 2014-2016 period, which meant these lenders were removed from the borrowers' consideration sets. In the no-crackdown counterfactual we add these lenders back into the borrower consideration sets.

The results of this counterfactual experiment are summarized in Table 2. The crackdown caused a large decrease in total lender profits, from S\$2.58m to S\$1.35m. This was accompanied by a large decrease in the volume of disbursed loans of 45.9%. Although the interest rate increased after the crackdown, the reduction in loan sizes meant that total interest revenue was mostly unchanged. The decrease in profits therefore is mostly driven by the increase in harassment costs. This increase is mainly due to the increase in the unit cost of harassment, but lenders also

TABLE 2: The welfare effects of the crackdown.

	No Crackdown	Crackdown (Baseline)	% Difference
Total lender profits (in S\$m)	2.58	1.35	-47.87%
Total loan volume (in S\$m)	2.67	1.45	-45.93%
Average harassment probability chosen	0.17	0.07	-58.31%
Total interest revenue (in S\$m)	6.43	6.24	-2.89%
Total harassment costs (in S\$m)	1.17	3.45	+194.45%
Average borrower surplus (in S\$000)	0.46	0.40	-14.37%
Average number of missed payments	4.35	5.55	+27.72%
Average number of times harassed	1.80	2.21	+22.77%

conducted harassment more frequently because borrowers missed more payments, despite choosing lower harshness levels on average.

Borrowers were also negatively affected by the crackdown, where we find a 14.4% decrease in surplus. To compute borrower welfare under each scenario, we first convert borrower surplus to dollar values by calculating a certainty equivalent amount for each borrower. We do this by calculating the amount of money a borrower would need to receive each week over the  $W$  weeks to be indifferent between it and the option value of borrowing from lenders. We follow the standard in the literature (e.g. [Heidhues and Kőszegi \(2010\)](#)) and measure borrower welfare using week-zero preferences at their stated discount factors. If we instead assume a 0.95 annual discount factor with no quasi-hyperbolic discounting, borrower surplus decreases by only 5.8%. Borrower surplus decreases because borrowers receive smaller loans, while the weekly interest payments remain similar to the pre-crackdown amounts because of the interest rate increase. Borrowers end up missing more payments which means the loans last longer and borrowers are harassed more frequently.<sup>53</sup> In [Table A.12](#) in the Online Appendix, we show that gamblers, drinkers and drug-users were especially affected by the crackdown, but gang members were less affected.<sup>54</sup>

Overall, the crackdown was successful at lowering the volume of loans, reducing the incentives for borrowers to borrow from this market, and hurting the profits

<sup>53</sup>We note that because borrower welfare is estimated using the borrowers' choice probabilities, these welfare estimates do not capture any negative externalities on borrowers' friends or families.

<sup>54</sup>In [Section A.31](#) in the Online Appendix, we decompose the effects of the crackdown by removing changes caused by the crackdown one by one.

lenders.

## 6.2 Targeting Borrowers

As an alternative market intervention, we consider the effect of removing different types of borrowers on lender profits. We sort borrowers by their average loan repayment probability and group them into ten groups, such that the sum of the desired loan size within each group is approximately equal. Thus each group, or “decile”, has a similar size in terms of loan demand but differs in their repayment ability. We consider the effect of removing each of these groups in turn on lender profits. These borrowers could be removed in practice by either offering them formal-market alternatives, providing rehabilitation for their gambling, drug or alcohol use, or educating them on the perils of borrowing from loan sharks. We implicitly assume that removing only 10% of borrowers has no effect on the market interest rate or harassment schedule of lenders.

The results of this counterfactual experiment are shown in Figure 1.<sup>55</sup> We find that removing the worst borrowers (decile 1) is the least effective at lowering lender welfare. This is because these borrowers are more costly for lenders to serve as they miss many payments, leading to high harassment costs. Lenders often reject loans that these borrowers request and only give them smaller loan sizes such that they are better able to repay them. Removing borrowers from the middle of the distribution, especially decile 7, hurts lenders the most. These borrowers are the most profitable for the lender because they still miss several payments, leading to greater payment penalty revenue for the lender, while at the same time they do not miss too many payments such that they need to be harassed very frequently. Removing the borrowers with the highest repayment ability (decile 10) lowers the volume of loans the most, but does not impact the lenders’ profits as much as those in the middle of the distribution. This is because these borrowers do not miss many payments and earn the lenders less in interest payment revenue, although they are also less costly to serve. Therefore targeting borrowers in the center of the repayment ability distribution is the most effective at hurting lender profits.

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<sup>55</sup>We show the results for other outcomes in Figure A.3 in the Online Appendix.




FIGURE 1: Effects of targeting borrowers on lender profits.

The characteristics of borrowers that represent the best and worst borrowers can be seen in the parameter estimates in Table A.10 in the Online Appendix. In general, targeting borrowers with a higher ability to repay is the most effective strategy to affect lenders. Those with a gang affiliation, who are often selling drugs, have a higher repayment ability. Therefore enforcement efforts targeting drug pushers also can have a large knock-on effect on the lenders in the loan shark market.

## 7 Conclusion

Illegal money lending is prevalent across the world, yet due to a lack of high-quality data, empirical studies of this illegal market are scarce. We use highly detailed survey data from over one thousand borrowers to estimate a structural model of the illegal money lending market in Singapore. We use this model to evaluate the welfare effects of a large enforcement crackdown that occurred in this market during our sample period, and to evaluate alternative policy interventions. We find that the crackdown was highly successful at lowering the payoffs of lenders and borrowers in the market, as well as lowering the total volume of loans disbursed. Removing borrowers from the market, either through offering formal market alternatives, rehabilitation or education programs, also hurts lenders, particularly if they focus on medium-performing borrowers in terms of loan repayment time.

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*Online Appendix to:*  
**The Welfare Effects of Law Enforcement in the Illegal  
Money Lending Market**

*by Kaiwen Leong, Huailu Li, Nicola Pavanini and Christoph Walsh*

**A.1 Calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR)**

Before the enforcement crackdown in 2014, the standard loan involved making six payments of 20% of the principal over six weeks. For example, with a \$1,000 loan, the borrower made 6 payments of \$200 per week. This is also exactly the loan structure noted by Seidl (1970) for urban areas in the US, who notes that “20% for six weeks means that a \$200 loan costs \$240 and is repaid in six weekly installments of \$40 each.”

However, because the lender takes the first payment immediately before disbursing the loan, the effective interest rate is higher than this. With a \$1,000 loan, the borrower effectively receives \$800 and makes five repayments of \$200 over the next five weeks, i.e. 25% of the principal.<sup>56</sup> More generally, with a quoted interest rate  $r_t$  at time  $t$ , the effective five-week interest rate,  $r_t^e$ , is:

$$r_t^e = \frac{r_t}{1 - r_t} \quad (25)$$

This implies that before the crackdown, the annual percentage rate (APR) was:

$$25\% \times \frac{365}{35} = 208.57\%$$

After the enforcement crackdown, the quoted interest rate increased to 35%. The effective interest rate over five weeks is then 53.85%. This implies an APR of:

$$53.85\% \times \frac{365}{35} = 561.54\%$$

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<sup>56</sup>This feature, however, is in contrast to Seidl (1970), who states that the “borrower receives full use of the total principal for only one week.”

By law in Singapore, licensed money lenders cannot charge more than 4% per month on loans. This means the maximum APR on legal loans is 48%. This is significantly lower than the interest charged by the loan sharks in our setting.

## A.2 Gambling in Singapore and other Countries

Gambling is legal in Singapore and over 50% of Singaporeans do some form of gambling ([National Council on Problem Gambling, 2018](#)). The two largest resorts in Singapore generate 80% of their revenue from gambling, and these resorts contribute to 1.5-2% of GDP ([Naidu-Ghelani, 2013](#)). Gambling is also common in many Asian countries. Table A.1 shows the approximate percentage of gamblers across several countries and regions. The percentage of gamblers varies between 42-80%, which makes Singapore comparable to these countries in this respect.

TABLE A.1: Approximate percentage of the population who do any form of gambling across countries.

Country/Region	Approx. % who gamble	Source
India	80%	<a href="#">Taxscan (2020)</a>
Hong Kong SER of PRC	78%	<a href="#">Wong and So (2003)</a>
Macau SER of PRC	68%	<a href="#">Fong and Ozorio (2005)</a>
Chinese Taipei	65%	<a href="#">Chang (2009)</a>
Vietnam	64%	<a href="#">Hays (2015)</a>
Thailand	57%	<a href="#">Boonbandit (2019)</a>
Singapore	50%	<a href="#">National Council on Problem Gambling (2018)</a>
South Korea	42%	<a href="#">Williams et al. (2013)</a>

## A.3 Previous Literature on Illegal Money Lending

To the best of our knowledge, the only other study with a dataset of IML transactions is [Soudijn and Zhang \(2013\)](#), who provide a descriptive account of seized accounting records from a Chinese loan shark operating in the Netherlands. Their data include 497 loans with a single lender, whereas our data include 11,032 loans

taken by 1,090 borrowers and 773 unique lenders.<sup>57</sup> Thus the only other papers using transactional IML data are [Soudijn and Zhang \(2013\)](#) and our companion paper [Lang et al. \(2022\)](#).

To confirm this, we searched for “loansharking”, “loan sharks”, “illegal lending” and “illegal moneylending” on the EconLit database and only obtained five search results when excluding our own and companion papers.<sup>58</sup> None of the search results used transaction data from illegal loans. [Vause \(2017\)](#) studies usury trials in 19<sup>th</sup>-century France, [Wood \(2008\)](#) provides a biblical perspective of usury using excerpts from the Old and New Testaments, and [Dalla Pellegrina \(2008\)](#) studies the effect of formal-market interest rates and credit supply on usury crimes in Italy using data on reported usury crimes. In a Harvard Business Review article, [Seidl \(1970\)](#) discusses features of the loansharking market in the US and [Geisst \(2017\)](#) is a book studying the history of usury in the US, but neither use transactional IML data.

#### **A.4 Comparison to Setting in Soudijn and Zhang (2013)**

In this section we briefly describe the main similarities and differences with our data and the data described by [Soudijn and Zhang \(2013\)](#). Their dataset is an accounting ledger of a single loan shark that was seized in a police raid on a Dutch casino in 1997, whereas our dataset comes from a survey of 1,090 borrowers borrowing from loan sharks in Singapore over 2009 to 2016. They observe 497 distinct loans whereas we observe 11,032.

There are a number of features in their setting which are similar to ours. The lender in their dataset charges all borrowers the exact same interest rate, regardless if they are a new customer or differ in repayment ability. This is exactly the same as in our setting, albeit with a different interest rate. They also do not have any interest rate compounding. They report very low default rates, where only 4 loans defaulted and 5 loans were reported missing. Thus their default rate is approximately 2%,

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<sup>57</sup>In Section A.4 we describe in detail how all the market features observed by [Soudijn and Zhang \(2013\)](#) relate to ours.

<sup>58</sup>In contrast, EconLit revealed 76 results for “payday lending”, 80 results for “informal lending”, and 869 results for “microcredit”.

similar to our setting. They also note that a small number of loans were cleared by paying via other means, which they interpret as doing jobs for the lender. This also occurs in our setting for borrowers that struggle to repay. The borrowers in their sample are also borrowing for gambling reasons, which is also the most common reason in our setting.

From their ledger it is unclear what types of harassment methods were used by the lender, but they do note that some fees were paid to individuals for debt collection. This corresponds to the runners in our setting. They also know that several lenders operated in the casino where the ledger was seized, and speculate that the lenders cooperated. This corresponds to our setting in that lenders used the same interest rate and loan terms at any given time, which were set by the transnational syndicates operating in the country.

There are also some features in their setting that differ from ours. The basic loan structure differs in that interest is charged at 10% per week on the original principal and the principal plus interest must be paid to close the loan in the last payment. In our case, borrowers in the pre-crackdown period pay 20% of the original principal per week for six weeks, but do not have to pay the original principal back at the end to close the loan. This is incorporated in the repayment schedule. The APR in their setting is 521%, whereas in our setting it is 261% before the crackdown and 562% afterwards. In their setting, early repayment is possible but in our setting borrowers cannot repay earlier. In fact, in their setting borrowers receive a discount when repaying earlier: if they repay the loan principal on the same day it is issued, they are only charged 5% interest. Missing a payment in their setting does not result in a reset loan, unlike ours. Instead, the loan continues until the principal plus interest is repaid. Finally, borrowers repay much faster in their setting compared to ours. The median time to repay was 1 week and the longest time to repay was 17 weeks. In our setting, the median time to repay was 12 weeks. This shorter time to repay is likely because early repayment in our setting is not possible.

## A.5 IML Compared to Other Credit Markets

In this section we outline the similarities the IML market shares with related credit markets and highlight some core differences that differentiate it from them.

### A.5.1 Core Characteristics of IML

To do this, we begin by outlining four core characteristics of IML. First, because loans fall outside the scope of financial regulators, loans have very high interest rates that exceed the legal maximum. Second, its customers are low-ability borrowers who do not have access to credit from the formal sector and often use the money for gambling, drugs and alcohol. Third, lenders operate with or under organized criminal groups and use severe forms of harassment to encourage repayment that are not possible in legal credit markets. Fourth, it is a phenomenon primarily found in urban areas of developed countries.<sup>59</sup>

### A.5.2 IML in the Spectrum of Credit Markets

Although very little research has been done on the IML market itself, there are other legal credit markets that share some of these features that have been studied extensively. In Figure A.1 we position IML relative to some of these markets, where we split markets based on whether the region is developed versus developing and position them on a spectrum of varying borrower repayment ability. From this we see that the closest legal alternative to IML in developed areas is payday lending, together with related other fringe market loans such as pawnbroking (Caskey, 1991). In terms of developing world credit markets, IML shares some similarities with informal lending and microfinance. However, there remain a large number of

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<sup>59</sup>Seidl (1970) defines IML similarly. He defines loansharking by the following characteristics. “[First,] cash is lent at very high interest rates – generally 20 to 100 times higher than rates charged by legitimate lending institutions. [Second,] the borrower-lender agreement rests on the borrower’s willingness to pledge the physical well-being of him and his family as collateral against a loan. The corollary of the borrower’s willingness is the lender’s willingness to accept such collateral, with its obvious implications for what he *may* have to do to collect. [Third,] the borrower believes the lender has connections with ruthless criminal organizations. That fact and his expected need for future loans induce him to repay.”




FIGURE A.1: Illegal Money Lending (IML) versus other credit markets.

differences between IML and these markets.<sup>60</sup> We outline a number of these below.

### A.5.3 Market Structure: Collusion versus Competition

The loan sharks in our setting operate under a cartel of transnational crime syndicates that set common loan terms such as the interest rate and loan duration. In contrast, the payday lending, microfinance and informal lending markets are typically competitive. [Allcott et al. \(2021\)](#) states that “payday lending has the hallmarks of a competitive market”, as entry barriers and profit margins are low. Using a data from a survey of 14 moneylenders in rural Pakistan, [Aleem \(1990\)](#) describes the informal lending market as monopolistically competitive, driven by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Finally, [McIntosh et al. \(2005\)](#) finds competitive effects of entrants on an incumbent lender in the Ugandan microfinance market.

### A.5.4 Loan Structure

Loan sharks, payday lenders, microfinance institutions and informal moneylenders all typically charge high interest rates. These loans also often have short maturities. Unlike payday lending, however, interest rates often exceed the legal maximum in IML. [Allcott et al. \(2021\)](#) find that all loans issued by a large payday lender in Indiana had interest rates at the legal maximum. In our setting, lenders charge interest rates at least four times the legal maximum. The resetting structure of loans

<sup>60</sup>In Section A.6 we also discuss qualitative evidence we have collected from lenders, borrowers, government officers and charities working with borrowers from both China and India to obtain further evidence of the differences between IML and microfinance and informal lending in these countries.

in our setting has the purpose of debt trapping borrowers. In contrast, [Karlan et al. \(2019\)](#) finds no evidence that moneylenders in India and the Philippines debt-trap borrowers.

#### **A.5.5 Penalties for Default**

The main difference between IML and other fringe markets is arguably the manner in which lenders respond to missed payments. Lenders in IML often use severe harassment methods in response to missed payments such as damaging a borrower's property or harassing their friends or family members. These methods are outside the scope of legal lenders. [Dobbie and Skiba \(2013\)](#) states that payday loans "have the unique feature that delinquencies are not reported to traditional credit rating agencies, and default comes with few penalties outside of calls from debt collection agencies." The primary penalty for default in other markets is not being able to borrow again from a lender. This was adopted by some lenders in [Kaboski and Townsend \(2011\)](#) as well as by the Nigerian digital lender in [Björkegren et al. \(2022\)](#).

In our setting, lenders will also make borrowers do work for them to finish paying off loans that they cannot repay, virtually guaranteeing that all loans will be repaid.

#### **A.5.6 Borrower Characteristics and Loan Uses**

The borrowers in our setting have very low creditworthiness. None of the borrowers in our survey had access to loans in the formal sector. Thus they represent a different sector of the population compared to payday lending or the credit card markets. They also represent a large portion of the population, as the black market database of IML borrowers in Singapore includes information on approximately 350,000 individuals.<sup>61</sup> Payday loans are also often used to pay rent or bills ([Morgan et al.](#),

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<sup>61</sup>During our sample period, the population of Singapore was approximately 5 million. Although the size of this database is likely a lower bound on the number of borrowers, this indicates that they make up approximately 5-10% of the population. The size of the illicit drugs market can also be used to gauge the size of the IML market, as loansharking is used as a means to launder drug money and make it more difficult to trace ([Jorgic, 2020](#); [UNODC, 2018](#)). Over 100 metric tons of methamphetamine were seized in Southeast Asia in 2018, compared to only 68 tons in the US

2012), whereas we find that IML loans are mostly taken out for gambling, drugs or alcohol. This also differs from typically loans from microfinance institutions, which are often for agricultural uses or household investment reasons (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011).

## **A.6 Interviews with Those Active in Microcredit and Informal Lending**

We acknowledge that it is a large claim to state that the IML market is very different from the microcredit and informal lending market. To ensure that the IML market is indeed different from these markets in practice, we spoke to market participants which included lenders, borrowers, government officers and charities working with borrowers in two of the world's largest developing economies – China and India – to obtain their views and to provide some suggestive evidence about the differences between IML and these markets.

We asked market participants in both countries the following questions: (1) Who are these professional moneylenders and are they part of organized crime syndicates? (2) What is the definition of professional moneylenders? (3) Can you describe the marketplace in which professional moneylenders operate? (4) Do professional moneylenders behave in similar ways in different areas within a country?

We first discuss our findings in India and then discuss our findings for China.

### **A.6.1 India**

We collected information from approximately 20 street vendors. These correspond to the types of borrowers from professional moneylenders in Karlan et al. (2019). We also interviewed a senior management officer of one of India's largest microcredit firms and one ex-government officer.<sup>62</sup> The answers to all the above questions

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(NETI, 2019; UNODC, 2020). Singapore is also an important transit point for illegal drugs that is used by many transnational gangs in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2003). Therefore the size of the drug market and amount of cash needed to be laundered is likely very large.

<sup>62</sup>We have obtained permission from the relevant parties to be able to provide photographs of these meetings with mosaiced faces. These are available upon request.

are similar across all respondents. Borrowers claim that professional moneylenders are normal individuals and business owners who are not part of any organized crime group. The government of India views microcredit firms and these individual lenders and business that charge high interest rates as “professional moneylenders”. These lenders are an important group of people that will help India achieve its financial inclusion program goals, i.e. to help the poor gain access to credit. As such, even though some of these businesses are unlicensed, they are tolerated and are not the target of enforcement activities.<sup>63</sup>

The professional moneylending market is heterogeneous even within a particular area in India. The loan structures used by microcredit firms in India are heterogeneous, but only within the ranges of the directive by the Reserve Bank of India. For individuals and small unlicensed businesses, they are heterogeneous as they follow their own defined rules around interest charges, penal charges, repayment methodology, and other terms. The professional moneylender market is also competitive. They compete with one another in interest rates and other dimensions. There are also some market frictions. For example, in some of the areas in India that respondents were from, the government will require some larger microcredit firms to set lower interest rates so that everyone else will follow suit.

## **A.6.2 China**

We asked individuals from a religious organization that helps provide credit counseling to borrowers in 35 rural villages in different parts of China to collect information from 20 borrowers of professional moneylenders from 10 different villages (2 borrowers per village).<sup>64</sup> From these interviews we learned that professional moneylenders are usually people that they know. For example, people who have made their fortune in the cities and have moved back home and started a lending business. None of these lenders are part of an organized criminal syndicate. Informal lending

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<sup>63</sup>Market insiders did tell us, however, that in the run-up to elections, there are sometimes politically motivated small-scale enforcement activities carried out against some professional moneylenders that are harsh with borrowers during debt collection. They believed that political candidates want to demonstrate their concern for the electorate with these acts.

<sup>64</sup>We have been asked by the organization not to provide their information in any public forum. We are able to provide more information upon request subject to non-disclosure agreements.

is also heterogeneous across villages. In some villages, borrowers are required to continuously give gifts in kind to the lender to establish trust with the lender before they will give them a loan. This process could take a number of months and it was not possible to bypass this requirement. In other places, it is possible to obtain a loan via a referral that both the lender and borrower knows. There is no standard structure to the loans and depends on the lender and borrower. In some villages, you can choose to keep paying fixed interest rates in perpetuity on the loan until you decide to pay off the loan in full. In other places, you will have to pay the interest and principal back by a fixed time period.

We also interviewed one ex-prison officer and an ex-police officer in China. They are not aware of any enforcement activities that are carried out against the lenders mentioned in this subsection, i.e. professional moneylenders in villages. To the best of their knowledge, they said that the government is only actively targeting organized criminal lending syndicates nationwide.<sup>65</sup>

## **A.7 Additional Details on Data Collection**

In this section we provide some additional details of the data collection process. We provide the essential details here, but a more extensive description is provided in [Lang et al. \(2022\)](#).

### **A.7.1 Background**

Before pursuing an academic career in Economics, Leong had initially dropped out of high school. After dropping out, he spent a lot of time hanging out with people from poor families, many of whom were or had become victims of loan sharks. Later, Leong became a social worker for one year where he dealt with individuals involved in the illegal money lending market. During this time he spoke with borrowers, ex-offenders, social service agencies, politicians, grassroots agencies and ex-law enforcement officers which allowed him to gain an understanding of the

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<sup>65</sup>We also spoke to a smaller number of market participants in the professional moneylending market in Malaysia and Indonesia. According to them, the professional moneylending market is similar to China in the sense that it is relatively heterogeneous across different parts within the same country.

market. Since then, Leong has spent over a decade volunteering at organizations and agencies that aim to rehabilitate ex-offenders, many of whom have been involved in the IML market in the past. His social work has been documented by the media (Palansamy, 2012; Singh, 2013) and he has been invited by neighboring countries to help devise programs to rehabilitate ex-offenders.

### **A.7.2 Enumerators**

To collect the survey data, we recruited 48 enumerators who had previously been borrowers from loan sharks. This had two primary advantages. First, they were familiar with the institutional details of the market and were better able to ask questions and understand the respondents in the qualitative component of the interviews. Second, by sharing their own experiences from borrowing from loan sharks with respondents, the respondents themselves became more comfortable sharing their own experiences.

The enumerators we used were trained using ethics and legal materials and then tested by us to ensure they understood the rules given to us by the IRB and the authorities when helping us to collect the survey. Each year when new interviews were being carried out, we gave refreshers and tested them again. This was to ensure that interviews were held in a consistent way over the years and across all of the enumerators. Leong also attended random interviews at a distance to ensure there was no strategic misreporting by enumerators and that they followed the correct protocols.

### **A.7.3 Interviews**

In each interview, respondents were first told their rights as they related to the study and asked for informed consent. Respondents were told that they could withdraw from the study at any time without forfeiting their payment. They were then asked if they had any questions or concerns. Standard answers to certain questions were provided to the enumerators. Next, the enumerators shared some of their own personal experiences from borrowing from loan sharks and the different ways they dealt with the stress it caused. Then, the enumerators explained the penalties that

the researchers would incur and the possible legal actions that respondents could take if the information they provided were ever leaked. The NTU IRB approved a waiver of the signature acknowledging informed consent. This waiver was essential to the interview process because almost all borrowers Leong spoke to before conducting the study were averse to signing any documents for fear of being identified. Thus, we obtained only verbal consent before beginning the interviews.

To design our survey and minimize risk to respondents, we consulted with experts who were familiar with the market. These included lawyers, ex-law enforcement officers, religious volunteers who worked with borrowers, ex-lenders, grass-roots organizations, borrowers, and ex-runners (individuals previously imprisoned for helping lenders conduct harassment). To protect the respondents' identities, we did not collect copies of any documents such as government IDs that could identify them. We assigned a unique nickname to each respondent.

We also did not ask respondents to report on any illegal activity. Drug use and gambling are illegal but not in all circumstances. Our enumerators were taught to ask about these practices in a way that did not reveal whether the borrower was engaged in illegal activity. Furthermore, the act of borrowing itself is not illegal. The act of borrowing has not been criminalized because of the small number of borrowers with a genuine need that are unable to borrow from legal lenders or make use of standard safety nets. The Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs in 2010 stated that “[n]ow, as many [members of parliament] have highlighted . . . there are borrowers out there who would have a genuine financial need and some of them turn to loansharks” ([Singapore High Court, 2012](#)).

After data collection was complete, the data were anonymized to ensure that no respondent could be traced. The IRB requires the data to be stored in a locked drawer in NTU except when in use. Individuals who want to access the data for replication purposes should write to Leong, who will submit their request to the IRB. All written requests must state that no data will be revealed or used against any respondent. After approval, the researcher would have to be physically present in a room approved by the IRB to conduct the analysis without removing any data

#### **A.7.4 Additional Data**

Although our loan-level data are the same as in [Lang et al. \(2022\)](#), we use additional data collected by the enumerators that [Lang et al. \(2022\)](#) do not use. These data are from the qualitative components of the interviews with borrowers as well as some interviews with ex-lenders. We use these data to form the foundations of our structural model so that it closely approximates how the market works in practice. Some examples of this are as follows. First, we use information from the interviews to learn how borrowers form their consideration sets of lenders and how many new lenders they consider when taking out loans. Second, we use borrower responses for how they rank the severity of different harassment methods and the disutility of working for the lender relative to being harassed. Third, we use the information on the cognitive ability of borrowers and how well they understand how loans are structured in the market. Fourth, we measured the discount factors of a small number of ex-lenders. Finally, we asked ex-lenders which borrower of the characteristics were observable to them when assessing a borrower's ability to repay.

#### **A.8 Survey Summary Statistics**

Table [A.2](#) shows the summary statistics of the borrower-level characteristics, Table [A.3](#) shows the summary statistics for the loan-level variables, and Table [A.4](#) shows the means of the loan-level variables by year. In estimation, we only use loans where we have complete observations for all variables that we require. We also omit some outlier observations, such as those with very large loan sizes. This leaves us with data on 1,061 borrowers and 8,866 loans. These tables show the summary statistics on this subsample.

#### **A.9 Low Recall Error in Survey**

Our survey requires borrowers to recall their past loans to the enumerator conducting the survey. We believe the recall error associated with these responses is small. We offered respondents an additional S\$10 if they provided physical evidence

TABLE A.2: Summary statistics of borrower characteristics.

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
Age	1061	37.60	7.64	20	38	63
Post-secondary education	1061	0.19	0.39	0	0	1
Female	1061	0.10	0.30	0	0	1
Married	1061	0.49	0.50	0	0	1
Divorced	1061	0.16	0.37	0	0	1
Has children	1061	0.62	0.49	0	1	1
Malaysian	1061	0.14	0.35	0	0	1
Indian	1061	0.11	0.31	0	0	1
Current gang member	1061	0.14	0.35	0	0	1
Previously gang member	1061	0.30	0.46	0	0	1
Number of previous convictions	1061	0.49	1.10	0	0	6
Gambles	1061	0.90	0.29	0	1	1
Drinks alcohol	1061	0.96	0.19	0	1	1
Uses drugs	1061	0.31	0.46	0	0	1
Frequents sex workers	1061	0.31	0.46	0	0	1
Frequently treats friends	1061	0.09	0.29	0	0	1

The statistics shown are for subsample of data used in estimation.

TABLE A.3: Summary statistics of loan-level variables.

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
Loan size (in S\$)	8866	1286.34	982.57	300	1000	5000
Desired loan size (in S\$)	8866	1597.85	1018.15	300	1000	5000
Interest rate (in %)	8866	22.28	6.48	2	20	50
Number of weeks to repay	8866	13.37	5.84	6	12	24
Number of missed payments	8866	3.85	3.91	0	2	23
Number of past loans with lender	8866	4.09	3.43	0	3	19
Asked for loan under influence of alcohol	8866	0.35	0.48	0	0	1
Worked for lender to repay	8576	0.06	0.23	0	0	1
Harassed at least once in loan	8866	0.54	0.50	0	1	1

The statistics shown are for subsample of data used in estimation.

TABLE A.4: Means of loan-level variables by year.

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Loan size (in S\$)	1487.16	1399.25	1456.67	1531.58	1506.85	972.14	425.25	480.43
Desired loan size (in S\$)	1699.27	1659.28	1741.90	1831.90	1847.72	1378.89	909.40	966.67
Interest rate (in %)	19.33	19.43	19.44	19.48	19.48	30.33	35.31	38.33
Number of weeks to repay	11.93	12.10	12.06	11.98	13.11	15.81	19.19	19.68
Number of missed payments	2.68	3.00	3.18	3.29	4.15	5.34	7.08	6.85
Number of past loans with lender	4.27	3.57	3.51	3.61	3.19	2.18	7.44	4.75
Asked for loan under influence of alcohol	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.35	0.37	0.31	0.44	0.44
Worked for lender to repay	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.12
Harassed at least once in loan	0.50	0.46	0.45	0.43	0.48	0.81	0.89	0.88

The statistics shown are for subsample of data used in estimation.

of their past loans. These were in the form of diaries, repayment schedule notes,

text messages from lenders, and bank account statements.<sup>66</sup> Borrowers kept good details of their outstanding loans with lenders because they did not want to accidentally miss a payment. This is because the financial penalties and harassment are very severe when borrowers miss payments. Because borrowing from loan sharks is not illegal, borrowers did not take any legal risks by keeping such records. 59% of borrowers were able to provide proof of the details of their past loans.<sup>67</sup> Of the remaining 41% of borrowers, 78% offered to show physical evidence in return for higher compensation. Due to financial constraints, we could not meet all of these demands but randomly selected twelve borrowers to compare their evidence with their previous answers. The responses for these respondents were accurate for almost all questions except that 5 had somewhat inflated their salaries. We have obtained the relevant permissions to provide redacted photographs of examples of these types of records upon request.

## **A.10 Low Proportion of Once-Off Borrowers in the Market**

Our final sample does not contain any once-off borrowers. However, based on our data collection process and information we have collected, these borrowers make up a very small fraction of all borrowers. First, market participants we have interviewed also told us once-off borrowers were very rare in this market. Second, of the 8.9% of borrowers that did not complete initial rounds of interviews over 2011-2013, only 3% of those participated in only one interview and did not continue with the survey. Of this, some were once-off borrowers but others did not have time to continue. All the remaining borrowers we interviewed reported multiple loans. With the 91.1% initial take-up rate in our survey, this provides evidence that our sample is representative and once-off borrowers are rare in this market.<sup>68</sup> Third, as

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<sup>66</sup>We note that payments to lenders were always done in cash, but borrowers often took cash out of an ATM on the day a loan repayment was due. These withdrawals were able to confirm the amount they needed to make repayments.

<sup>67</sup>Many of the documents, such as the bank account statements, contained identifying information of respondents. As per IRB protocol we were not able to keep this information and were required to erase these records.

<sup>68</sup>As further evidence that our sample is representative, it was stated in the Singaporean Parliament in 2010 that the number of borrowers with a “genuine financial need” is “not very large”, corresponding to our own findings in Section A.16 (Singapore High Court, 2012).

a developed country, Singapore offers many safety nets for individuals who have once-off medical emergencies or experience sudden unemployment. Such individuals can make use of these without having to resort to illegal money lenders. In contrast, the majority of loans taken out in our context are for gambling, drugs or alcohol. These addictive habits are prone to repeat borrowing. Therefore, the proportion of once-off borrowers in this market is likely to be very low.

### **A.11 Crackdown Event Study**

In Figure A.2, we show the estimates of the year fixed effects in regressions of loan outcome variables on year fixed effects (with 2013 as the base year), borrower-lender fixed effects, the number of past loans, and the number of missed payments in their previous loan. We cluster standard errors at the borrower level. The graphs show that the pre-crackdown period of 2009-2013 was relatively stable in these loan outcomes.<sup>69</sup> Starting in 2014, there was a large increase in the interest rate, which decreased the desired loan size and actual loan sizes. Borrowers took longer to repay and missed more payments, which ultimately meant that severe harassment was used more often in loans.


### **A.12 Alternative Explanations for Crackdown Effects**

We now provide evidence that rule out possible alternative explanations for the changes we observe in the market in 2014-2016.

First, the changes are unlikely to be due to changing macroeconomic conditions. There was no recession during our sample period and GDP growth remained stable over the entire period of 2012-2016. We also tested for a structural break in 2014 using a simple trend regression and did not find any evidence for a structural break. Therefore, it is unlikely that the increase in the interest rate charged by lenders is due to a higher cost of capital. Furthermore, it is unlikely that borrowers faced major changes in income that would require them to change their borrowing habits

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<sup>69</sup>Only the number of missed payments in a loan shows a significant difference between 2009-2012 and 2013. However this difference is very small when compared to the large increase after 2014.



Estimates of the year fixed effects in regressions of loan outcome variables on year fixed effects (with 2013 as the base year), borrower-lender fixed effects, the number of past loans, and the number of missed payments in their previous loan. Severe harassment used is an indicator for if any harassment method (excluding reminder phone calls or messages) were used throughout the course of the loan. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

FIGURE A.2: Event study graphs of the crackdown.

during this time.<sup>70</sup>

Second, it is unlikely that the transnational syndicates that fund the lenders reduced funding due to changes in capital controls. Singapore dismantled its capital controls in the 1970s. Furthermore, the majority of lending operations in Singapore did not require funds from abroad as lenders were highly profitable as there is very little borrower default.

Third, it is unlikely that the borrowers' bad habits intensified in 2014, which increased risk for lenders, causing them to charge higher interest rates. This is because we do not observe any decrease in eventual repayment after the crack-

<sup>70</sup>We also note that although GDP growth in Singapore fell briefly following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, annual GDP growth was never negative during this period. Because our sample period begins after GDP growth had recovered, our estimates are unlikely to be impacted by this financial crisis.

down. Furthermore, the net gambling revenue at the Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa, the two largest gambling locations in Singapore, did not increase after 2014. In fact, the average gambling revenue over 2011-2013 was approximately 4 billion USD per year, and fell to on average 3.5 billion USD per year from 2014-2016 (Noble, 2018). There was also a small drop in the national gambling participation rate from 47% in 2011 to 44% in 2014 (National Council on Problem Gambling, 2017). This, combined with the fact that over 95% of the borrowers in our sample continued to borrow after the crackdown means it is also unlikely that adverse selection in the market worsened after the crackdown.

Fourth, it is also unlikely that the crackdown saw the beginning of (or an increase in) protection money paid to corrupt police officers. It is challenging to obtain direct evidence on corrupt activities related to IML. However, Transparency International (2020) reports that Singapore was always consistently ranked one of the least corrupt countries in the world in the past decade. The Gallup (2020) report has ranked Singapore first for law and order from 2014 to 2020. According to Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (2017), for the whole of government, there were only 20 public corruption cases in 2014, 15 in 2015, and 18 in 2016 that were investigated by it. Because the police force is a small subset of the whole of government and only part of the police force focuses on IML, the number of corruption cases related to IML that had been investigated in these years should be even smaller. Although the actual number of cases could be more than the cases that had been investigated, given Singapore's standing as it pertains to law and order, it is unlikely that fees paid to corrupt police officers had caused loan prices to increase.

### **A.13 The Modal Loan**

We provide further clarity on the structure of this market and how a typical loan proceeds in reality by describing how the modal loan in our data proceeds in practice.

A borrower is gambling at the casino and runs out of money. The borrower

needs a loan to continue gambling.<sup>71</sup> The borrower decides between different lenders to ask for a loan and decides on one they borrowed from in the past.<sup>72</sup> The borrower leaves the casino to go to the café where this lender operates.<sup>73</sup> The borrower asks for S\$1,000 from the lender. The lender asks to see the borrower's ID card to check their own records, both the past loan history and information from the borrower's Singpass that the lender purchased from the black market. The lender deems the loan profitable and returns the ID card to the borrower.<sup>74</sup> The lender hands S\$800 in cash to the borrower, keeping the remaining S\$200 as the first payment.<sup>75</sup> The borrower then returns to the casino and continues gambling.

One week later, the borrower gives the lender the second payment of S\$200 according to the repayment schedule. In week 3 when the next payment is due, the borrower had just had some bad gambling losses and cannot make the payment. The lender calls the borrower and threatens them but does not resort to any severe harassment methods. The borrower must visit the lender where the lender returns S\$200 to the borrower, keeps the remaining S\$200 the borrower had paid as a financial penalty and resets the loan. In weeks 4 and 5 the borrower succeeds in making a payment, but fails to make the payment in week 6. This time the lender conducts a more severe form of harassment and sends a runner to visit them at their home to threaten them.<sup>76</sup> The borrower must then visit the lender where the lender returns S\$200 back to the borrower, keeping the remaining S\$200 they have paid as a financial penalty and resets the loan a second time. The borrower then makes six consecutive payments each week in weeks 7 to 12 and finishes paying off the loan.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>56.9% of loans were taken out for gambling-related reasons.

<sup>72</sup>86% of loans are taken with a lender they have previously borrowed from.

<sup>73</sup>Lenders do not normally have an office but typically have a fixed timing schedule in public places such as coffee shops or hawker centers (food court) that is known by borrowers.

<sup>74</sup>The modal desired loan size and actual loan size is S\$1,000.

<sup>75</sup>The modal interest rate and prevailing pre-crackdown rate is 20%.

<sup>76</sup>Severe harassment methods are used in 50.6% of loans. Visiting the borrower's home is the most common severe form, present in 42.9% of loans.

<sup>77</sup>The modal loan has two missed payments and takes 12 weeks to repay.

## A.14 External Validity

We used the interviews we carried out with ex-lenders who were active in Singapore (4), Malaysia (2) and China (13) to investigate if the features of the market that we observe in Singapore are similar in other Asian countries. All of these lenders told us that the markets in China and Southeast Asia were dominated by the same transnational syndicates that are headquartered in China.<sup>78</sup> As we discuss below, they applied the same operating model in all these countries. We also found news reports of loan sharks from Chinese syndicates being arrested in Singapore (Chong, 2015), Vietnam (Thang, 2020), Thailand (CTN News, 2021b,a) and Indonesia (Tencent News, 2021), confirming their activity in these countries. Because these syndicates apply the same practices across these countries, the results that we find in this paper would arguably be similar across these countries, which have a combined population of over two billion people. Moreover, Curtis et al. (2002) report a large rise in Chinese criminal groups operating throughout the world since the 1990s, including countries in Europe, North and South America and Southeast Asia. They report loansharking to be among the criminal activities that these transnational groups engage in. Thus the validity of our results may also extend beyond Asia to markets where these syndicates are active.

We now discuss some features of the operating model that the syndicates used across the countries they were active in. The syndicates set up branches in the wealthier, urban parts of these countries, rather than the poorer, rural areas. Lenders face low barriers to entry and after an interview process they receive start-up capital from the syndicate. Syndicates finance lenders in a similar way to venture capital, where successful lenders receive additional funding at later stages. Lenders can also transfer to operate to another country where the syndicate they work operates. Lenders share a common database of potential borrowers and receive similar advice from the syndicates. They are advised on the traits of the most profitable borrowers. Borrowers in each setting were those who were unable to obtain loans from the formal sector. They stated that it was very common for borrowers to have at least

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<sup>78</sup>Southeast Asia includes all the Asian countries south of China and east of Bangladesh as far as Indonesia. The population of the region is larger than 650 million. It includes countries such as the Philippines (107m), Vietnam (95m), Thailand (69m), Myanmar (53m) and Malaysia (31m).

one addiction or bad habit. Like in Singapore, it is also not illegal to borrow from a loan shark in China. They said lenders tend to locate in or near places where gambling takes place, such as casinos. We also asked these ex-lenders to contact 32 borrowers in some cities in Guangdong, China and 16 borrowers in Johor, Malaysia and these confirmed that the loan structure that we observe in our setting is identical. Furthermore, two of the lenders that we interviewed were active in both Singapore and China in the past, and were able to confirm from first-hand experience that the markets operated in a similar way in both countries. Based on this information, therefore, many of the market features that we observe in our setting are likely to hold in these other markets. Therefore we believe that our results have external validity to these countries.

Finally, other countries in Southeast Asia have implemented crackdowns on the IML market similar to the 2014 crackdown that we study. In a report about Malaysia, the [DFAT \(2019\)](#) state that “[in] October 2019, media reported that the [Royal Malaysia Police] planned to embark on a ‘major war’ against loan sharks, following reports that Ah Long syndicates are becoming more aggressive”. Vietnam have also implemented a similar crackdown, where the [Home Office \(2018\)](#) state that “police in southern Bình Thuận Province have set up a special police unit to crack down on illegal loan sharks, which have reportedly been increasing their activities with many sophisticated tricks that ensnare locals in never-ending debt traps.” In September 2021, the Thai prime minister also announced a nationwide crackdown on loan sharks. Therefore, because the same loan shark syndicates operate in these countries with the same operating model, our results for the effects of the crackdown may also be externally valid for these crackdowns.

## **A.15 Harassment Methods**

Table [A.5](#) shows the proportion of loans involving different harassment methods used by loan sharks in our data. Multiple harassment methods were possible for each loan and hence the sum of proportions can exceed one.

We note that none of the borrowers in our sample reported any use of body attacks or torture. When discussing the loansharking market, [Seidl \(1970\)](#) notes that

“actual violence is minimized” and “fear and anxiety about it are used instead to motivate delinquent borrowers.” He also notes that violence may be counterproductive as it may bring increased scrutiny by law enforcement and make repayment more difficult for borrowers.

TABLE A.5: Harassment methods used by loan sharks.

Harassment Method Type	Proportion of Loans
Phone harassment or reminder call	0.511
Verbal threat	0.429
Send letter, note or threatening message	0.269
Knock borrower’s door or gate	0.173
Scribble on borrower’s property	0.066
Splash paint or kerosene in borrower’s building	0.059
Graffiti on borrower’s property	0.030
Harass neighbors	0.023
Harass borrower’s family members or friends	0.021
Use or threat to use ID(s) in lender’s hand for crime	0.018
Visiting borrower’s workplace	0.018
Visiting borrower’s home	0.011
Throw flowerpot at borrower	0.007
Block borrower’s door (e.g. putting superglue in key holes)	0.003
Harass borrower in his/her workplace	0.003
Stalk borrower in a public venue and shout at him/her	0.001
Others	0.000
Scratch & splash paint on borrower’s car	0.000
Body attack or torture	0.000

## A.16 Uses for and Primary Reasons for Taking out Loans

Table A.6 shows how loans were used and what the primary reason was for taking out the loan. Because borrowers could give multiple reasons for how the loan was used, the sum of proportions exceeds one.

TABLE A.6: Uses for loans and primary reasons for taking out loans.

	Uses for loan (Proportion) (1)	Primary reason for loan (Proportion) (2)
Gambling or buying lottery tickets	0.551	0.264
Buying alcohol or drugs	0.479	0.381
Paying lender	0.343	0.091
Paying bills	0.213	0.052
Treating friends	0.144	0.006
Paying gambling debt	0.132	0.035
Sex worker, girlfriend, or KTV	0.130	0.009
Business needs	0.049	0.038
Paying credit card debt	0.047	0.013
Paying rent	0.046	0.039
Paying company creditor	0.034	0.012
Children's education	0.029	0.020
Holidays or special celebrations	0.021	0.004
Paying other debt	0.019	0.006
Paying hospital fees	0.012	0.009
Bank loan installment	0.012	0.004
Loan sharing with friends in need	0.008	0.004
Others	0.006	0.003
Child medical fee	0.005	0.001
Supporting family	0.004	0.003
Guarantor for others	0.004	0.001
Pay debts for others	0.004	0.002
Vehicle	0.002	0.001
Marriage	0.001	0.001
Renovations	0.001	0.001
Lawyer fees	0.001	0.000
Helping Friend to Borrow	0.000	0.000

Column 1 shows the proportion of loans that were used for each category. Because multiple responses were possible for each loan, the sum of proportions can exceed one. Column 2 shows the primary reason for taking out the loan.

## A.17 Borrower Weekly Discount Rates and Present Bias

In our model we assume borrowers discount payoffs in future weeks with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Borrower  $i$  discounts a payoff  $w$  weeks into the future with  $\beta_i \delta_i^w$ . In our surveys we asked borrowers two question to elicit their discount factors and present bias. We use these responses to calculate each borrower's  $\beta_i$  and  $\delta_i$  as follows.

In the first question, we asked borrowers what they would need to receive in ten months to be equivalent to receiving S\$800 in nine months. The median borrower said S\$980. Let  $X_i^\delta$  be the amount stated by borrower  $i$  for this question.

We assume that this the  $X_i^\delta$  that solves:

$$\beta_i \delta_i^{\left(\frac{9}{12} \times \frac{365.25}{7}\right)} 800 = \beta_i \delta_i^{\left(\frac{10}{12} \times \frac{365.25}{7}\right)} X_i^\delta \quad (26)$$

Thus the  $\delta_i$  for borrower  $i$  is:

$$\delta_i = \left( \frac{800}{X_i^\delta} \right)^{12 \times \frac{7}{365.25}} \quad (27)$$

In the second question, we asked borrowers what they would need to receive in one month to be equivalent to receiving S\$500 now. The median borrower said S\$700. Let  $X_i^\beta$  be the amount stated by borrower  $i$  for this question. We assume that this the  $X_i^\beta$  that solves:

$$\beta_i \delta_i^{\left(\frac{1}{12} \times \frac{365.25}{7}\right)} X_i^\beta = 500 \quad (28)$$

Using the  $\delta_i$  from equation (27) and solving for  $\beta_i$  yields:

$$\beta_i = \left( \frac{500}{X_i^\beta} \right) \frac{1}{\delta_i^{\left(\frac{1}{12} \times \frac{365.25}{7}\right)}} = \left( \frac{500}{X_i^\beta} \right) \left( \frac{800}{X_i^\delta} \right) \quad (29)$$

The average borrower in our sample is slightly more impatient compared to the average borrower in [Meier and Sprenger \(2010\)](#) who surveyed individuals at tax assistance sites in Boston, MA during the 2006 tax season. In their survey they elicit the monthly discount factor between months 0 and 1 and between months

6 and 7 for each respondent. When they average these two discount factors and average these over respondents, they find an average monthly discount factor of 0.84. If we compute a similar average with our data (using months 9 and 10 instead of months 6 and 7), we find an average monthly discount factor of 0.77. In contrast to [Meier and Sprenger \(2010\)](#), however, the borrowers in our sample are much more likely to be present biased, with 99% in our sample and only 36% in theirs.

### A.18 Borrowers' Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion

In our survey, we asked borrowers to choose between a gamble and a certain amount in three different scenarios. In each scenario there was a gamble which was to win S\$1,000 with 50% probability and S\$0 otherwise. The alternative in each scenario was a varying certain amount. These were S\$300, S\$350, and S\$400. With S\$300 as the certain amount, 80.3% chose the gamble. With S\$350, 46.5% chose the gamble, and with S\$400, only 7.6% chose the gamble. We also asked what their certainty equivalent amount was for a gamble with S\$800 with 50% probability. The median borrower said S\$500.

We use these responses to calculate each borrower's coefficient of relative risk aversion as follows. The borrower's utility function is  $u_i(c) = (c^{1-\gamma_i} - 1) / (1 - \gamma_i)$ , where  $\gamma_i$  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We assume a baseline wealth of zero, which for the borrowers in our sample is a close approximation. Let  $\bar{c} \in \{0.3, 0.35, 0.4\}$  be the certain amount in S\$1,000s. A borrower indifferent between the certain amount  $\bar{c}$  and the gamble which wins S\$1,000 with probability 0.5 and S\$0 otherwise has a coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $\gamma_{\bar{c}}$ , that satisfies:

$$\frac{\bar{c}^{1-\gamma_{\bar{c}}} - 1}{1 - \gamma_{\bar{c}}} = 0.5 \times \frac{1^{1-\gamma_{\bar{c}}} - 1}{1 - \gamma_{\bar{c}}} + \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{0^{1-\gamma_{\bar{c}}} - 1}{1 - \gamma_{\bar{c}}} \quad (30)$$

Canceling terms and solving for  $\gamma_{\bar{c}}$  yields:

$$\gamma_{\bar{c}} = 1 + \frac{\log(2)}{\log(\bar{c})} \quad (31)$$

These indifference points are  $\gamma_{\bar{c}} \in \{0.424, 0.340, 0.244\}$  for  $\bar{c} \in \{0.3, 0.35, 0.4\}$ .

TABLE A.7: Number of borrowers with each possible coefficient of relative risk aversion.

Coefficient	Number of Borrowers
0.195	83
0.292	417
0.382	374
0.806	216

Based on the survey responses, we assign borrowers a coefficient of relative risk aversion as follows. If borrower  $i$  would take the gamble with  $\bar{c} = 0.3$  but the certain amount at  $\bar{c} = 0.35$ , we assume  $\gamma_i = \frac{\gamma_{0.3} + \gamma_{0.35}}{2}$ . Similarly, if borrower  $i$  would take the gamble with  $\bar{c} = 0.35$  but the certain amount at  $\bar{c} = 0.4$ , we assume  $\gamma_i = \frac{\gamma_{0.35} + \gamma_{0.4}}{2}$ . If borrower  $i$  would always take the gamble, we assume  $\gamma_i = \gamma_{0.4} - \frac{\gamma_{0.35} - \gamma_{0.4}}{2}$ . If borrower  $i$  would always take the certain amount, we assume  $\gamma_i = \gamma_{0.3} + \frac{\gamma_{0.3} - \gamma_{0.35}}{2}$ . Thus we assume an upper and lower bound on their level of risk aversion. However, borrowers at the extremes are a minority. A table of the number of borrowers with each value is shown in Table A.7. The majority of borrowers would take the gamble over the certain S\$300, but would take the certain S\$400 over the gamble. The range of risk aversion estimates are in line with those found by Chetty (2006), who finds a mean value of 0.71 with values ranging from 0.15 to 1.78. We also find that gamblers are significantly less risk averse compared to non-gamblers, with an 18.2% lower average  $\gamma_i$  coefficient compared to non-gamblers.<sup>79</sup>

## A.19 Terminal Week Payoffs

### A.19.1 Lender

If the borrower reaches the terminal week  $W$ , the borrower is made to work for the lender to finish paying off the loan. This gives the lender an immediate payoff of the outstanding amount plus a mean-zero shock  $\xi_{ilt}$ . This shock captures that sometimes the lender does not have a suitable job for the borrower and earns less

<sup>79</sup>The fact that gamblers can be measured to be risk averse (although with a low coefficient of risk aversion) can be rationalized by the utility from gambling itself (Conlisk, 1993).

than the amount outstanding, whereas other times the lender has a very lucrative and valuable task that is worth more than the amount outstanding.

The expected payoff to the lender in the terminal week in each possible case is given by:

$$\tilde{u}_{i\ell t W}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) = \begin{cases} r_t L_{i\ell t} & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 5 \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ 6r_t L_{i\ell t} - \kappa_t & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 0 \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ (6 - n_{i\ell t W}) r_t L_{i\ell t} - p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \kappa_t & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} \in \{1, \dots, 5\} \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ (5 - n_{i\ell t W}) r_t L_{i\ell t} & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \text{ and } \tilde{m}_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ 0 & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 6 \end{cases} \quad (32)$$

In the first case, the borrower manages to make the final payment in the terminal week and doesn't have to work for the lender. In the second case, the borrower has not made any payments towards the loan and must work to repay the loan in full. Because of two missed payments in a row, the lender inflicts harassment with probability 1. In the third case, the loan is partially repaid. The borrower misses a payment and must work to repay the remaining  $(6 - n_{i\ell t W}) r_t L_{i\ell t}$  outstanding on the loan. Because of the missed payment, the lender additionally harasses the borrower with probability  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ . In the fourth case, the borrower makes a payment in week  $W$  and only has to work to repay the remaining  $(5 - n_{i\ell t W}) r_t L_{i\ell t}$  on the loan. In the final case, the loan is already fully paid by week  $W$ .

### A.19.2 Borrower

If the loan is unpaid upon reaching the terminal week, the borrower must work for the lender. This gives the borrower disutility because the lender requires them to complete undesirable tasks. The expected level of disutility from this depends on the amount outstanding on the loan. Borrowers we have interviewed stated the expected disutility from this is between 8-10 times the expected disutility from missing a payment. Based on this information, we assume the expected disutility

from working for the lender is:<sup>80</sup>

$$\left[ 8 + 2 \left( \frac{5 - \mathbb{1} \{m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t}\} - n_{i\ell t W}}{5} \right) \right] p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi \quad (33)$$

If the borrower has not made any payments towards the loan, the expected disutility is  $10p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi$ . If they only have one outstanding payment, the disutility is  $8p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi$ .

The expected payoff to the borrower in the terminal week in each possible case is given by:

$$u_{i\ell t W}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) - r_t L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} \mid m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \right] \\ - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 5 \text{ and } m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t})]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} \mid m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \right] \\ - (10p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) + 1) \chi \\ - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 0 \text{ and } m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t})]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} \mid m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \right] \\ - \left( 9 + 2 \left( \frac{5 - n_{i\ell t W}}{5} \right) \right) p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi \\ - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} \in \{1, \dots, 5\} \text{ and } m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) < r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) - r_t L_{i\ell t}]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} \mid m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \right] \\ - \left( 8 + 2 \left( \frac{4 - n_{i\ell t W}}{5} \right) \right) p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi \\ - \Psi(m_{i\ell t}(h_{i\ell t}) - m_{i0t}) & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \text{ and } m_{i\ell t W}(h_{i\ell t}) \geq r_t L_{i\ell t} \\ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{m_{i0t W}^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} \right] & \text{if } n_{i\ell t W} = 6 \end{cases} \quad (34)$$

In the first case, the borrower manages to make the final payment at the terminal week and avoids having to work for the lender. In the second case, the borrower reaches the terminal week with no part of the loan paid and receives the largest possible disutility: an expected harassment cost of  $\chi$  from two missed payments in a row and an expected disutility of  $10p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \chi$  from working for the lender to recover the full value of the loan. In the third case, the borrower does not make a

<sup>80</sup>We note that because the majority of borrowers discount the future very heavily, the specification of the terminal week payoffs does not have a large impact on the borrowers' expected present discounted payoffs from loans.

payment in the final week an receives the expected disutility from a missed payment of  $p_{i\ell t}^\eta(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})\chi$  and must work for the lender to repay the loan. The fourth case is similar except the borrower makes a payment in the terminal week and avoids the missed payment disutility. Finally, if the loan is fully repaid by week  $W$ , the borrower simply consumes her cash from that week.

## A.20 Lender Choice Probabilities

When approached by borrower  $i$  at time  $t$ , lender  $\ell$  chooses the loan size  $L_{i\ell t} \in \mathfrak{L}_{it}$  and harshness level  $h_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}$ . We assume that the choice-specific shocks to the lender's payoffs are such that the lender's problem has a nested logit structure, where the upper nest involves choosing the loan size and the lower nests the harshness level. If the lender chooses a loan size of zero, there is no lower nest. For the sake of notation, we assume the lender uses the "Low" harshness level in this case. For positive loan sizes, the probability that the lender chooses the combination  $(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$  is given by

$$p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) = \frac{\exp(\tilde{v}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})/\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})})}{\sum_{h'_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}} \exp(\tilde{v}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h'_{i\ell t})/\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})})} \times \frac{\exp\left(\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})} \log\left(\sum_{h'_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}} \exp(\tilde{v}_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t}, h'_{i\ell t})/\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})})\right)\right)}{1 + \sum_{L'_{i\ell t} \in \mathfrak{L}_{it} \setminus \{0\}} \exp\left(\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L'_{i\ell t})} \log\left(\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp(\tilde{v}_{i\ell t}(L'_{i\ell t}, h'_{i\ell t})/\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L'_{i\ell t})})\right)\right)} \quad (35)$$

where the function  $k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})$  indexes the elements of  $\mathfrak{L}_{it} \setminus \{0\}$ . For example,  $k_{i\ell t}(\frac{1}{3}L_{it}^*) = 1$  and  $k_{i\ell t}(L_{it}^*) = 4$ . The  $\lambda_{k_{i\ell t}(L_{i\ell t})}$  terms are parameters to be estimated. The probability that the lender chooses to give no loan is then:

$$p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(0, Low) = 1 - \sum_{L_{i\ell t} \in \mathfrak{L}_{it} \setminus \{0\}} \sum_{h_{i\ell t} \in \mathcal{H}} p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \quad (36)$$

where we note that  $p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(0, Medium) = p_{i\ell t}^{Lh}(0, High) = 0$ .

## A.21 Integrating the Harshness Level out of the Likelihood

In this section we show how we can integrate the harshness level out of the likelihood and write it as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}\right) &= \sum_{h_{ilt} \in \mathcal{H}} \Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}\right) \\
&\quad \times \Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right) \\
&\quad \times \Pr\left(L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right) \Pr\left(h_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

We first write the likelihood as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}\right) &= \sum_{h_{ilt} \in \mathcal{H}} \Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right) \\
&\quad \times \Pr\left(h_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

The  $\Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right)$  term can be split into:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right) &= \\
&\quad \Pr\left(\mathfrak{h}_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right) \times \Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

Finally, the  $\Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right)$  term can be split into:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}, L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right) &= \\
&\quad \Pr\left(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}\right) \times \Pr\left(L_{ilt} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^{Lender}, h_{ilt}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{40}$$

Putting the results from equations (38) to (40) together yields the expression in equation (37).

## A.22 Likelihood of Harassment

In our model, if a borrower misses one payment, the lender will harass the borrower with probability  $p_{ilt}^\eta(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$ . If the borrower misses two payments in a row, the lender will harass the borrower with probability one after the second missed payment.<sup>81</sup> However, we do not observe in our data if a borrower missing multiple payments ever missed two payments in a row. Instead, we use the number of missed payments combined with the number of possible ways a loan can have two missed payments in a row given the time taken to repay to estimate the harassment probability. We denote by  $h_{ilt} \in \{0, 1\}$  whether or not harassment was used at least once in a loan and we denote by  $\Pr(h_{ilt} = 1 | \theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt})$  the probability of harassment occurring at least once given  $w_{ilt}$ ,  $f_{ilt}$ ,  $d_{ilt}$ ,  $L_{ilt}$  and  $h_{ilt}$ . This is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(h_{ilt} = 1 | \theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}) = & \\ & (1 - d_{ilt}) \left( \frac{\widehat{C}_{f_{ilt}}^{w_{ilt}} + \left( C_{f_{ilt}}^{w_{ilt}} - \widehat{C}_{f_{ilt}}^{w_{ilt}} \right) \left( 1 - [1 - p_{ilt}^\eta(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})]^{f_{ilt}} \right)}{C_{f_{ilt}}^{w_{ilt}}} \right) \\ & + d_{ilt} \left( \frac{\widehat{C}_{f_{ilt}}^d + \left( C_{f_{ilt}}^d - \widehat{C}_{f_{ilt}}^d \right) \left( 1 - [1 - p_{ilt}^\eta(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})]^{f_{ilt}} \right)}{C_{f_{ilt}}^d} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

The terms  $C_f^w$ ,  $\widehat{C}_f^w$ ,  $C_f^d$  and  $\widehat{C}_f^d$  are defined as follows. First,  $C_f^w$  is the number of ways a loan can finish in  $w$  weeks with  $f$  missed payments. Some examples of this term are shown in Section A.25. Second,  $\widehat{C}_f^w$  is the number of ways a loan can have

<sup>81</sup>We note that this does not imply that any loan with two missed payments has harassment with probability 1. This only occurs if both missed payments occur in consecutive weeks. For example, a loan with missed payments in weeks 2 and 3 has harassment in week 2 with probability  $p_{ilt}^\eta(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  and in week 3 with probability 1. On the contrary, a loan with missed payments in weeks 2 and 4 has harassment with probability  $p_{ilt}^\eta(\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  in both weeks.

two missed payments in a row when finishing in  $w$  weeks with  $f$  missed payments. Third,  $C_f^d$  is the number of ways a loan can reach the terminal week with  $f$  missed payments. Finally,  $\widehat{C}_f^d$  is the number of ways a loan can have two missed payments in a row when reaching the terminal week with  $f$  missed payments.

For some examples of how this formula works, suppose a borrower finishes a loan with no missed payments ( $f_{ilt} = 0$ ). Then the harassment probability is zero. This is because  $\widehat{C}_0^w = 0$ : there are no possible ways for two missed payments in a row if the borrower does not miss a payment. If the borrower finishes a loan with only one missed payment, the harassment probability is  $p_{ilt}^\eta (\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$ . This is because  $\widehat{C}_1^w = 0$  as there are no possible ways to finish a loan with two missed payments in a row when there is only one missed payment. If the borrower finishes a loan in 9 weeks with 2 missed payments, the harassment probability is 1. This is because there is only 1 way to finish a loan with 9 weeks with 2 missed payments: to miss in both weeks 2 and 3. Thus the only way a loan can finish in 9 weeks with 2 missed payments is with two missed payments in a row, so  $\widehat{C}_1^9 = C_2^9 = 1$ . Finally, if the borrower finishes a loan in 10 weeks with 2 missed payments, the harassment probability is:

$$\frac{\left(1 + \left(1 - \left[1 - p_{ilt}^\eta (\theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})\right]^2\right)\right)}{2}$$

This is because a loan that finishes in 10 weeks either had a missed payment in weeks 2 and 4 or weeks 3 and 4. So  $C_2^{10} = 2$  and  $\widehat{C}_2^{10} = 1$ . Therefore either there were two separate missed payments or two missed payments in a row, with both equally likely according to the model.

The likelihood of observing the harassment observed in the data is then:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr\left(h_{ilt} \mid \theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}\right) = \\ h_{ilt} \Pr\left(h_{ilt} = 1 \mid \theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}\right) \\ + (1 - h_{ilt}) \left[1 - \Pr\left(h_{ilt} = 0 \mid \theta^{Lender}, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}, w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt}\right)\right] \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

### A.23 Lender Likelihood of Repayment Time and Number of Missed Payments

If the probability of making a payment in any given week is  $p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t})$ , then the probability that the borrower completes the loan in  $w$  weeks with  $f$  missed payments according to our model is:

$$C_f^w \left[ p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^{w-f-1} \left[ 1 - p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^f \quad (43)$$

where  $C_f^w$  is the number of possible ways a borrower can miss  $f$  payments in  $w$  weeks under the structure of the loan.<sup>82</sup>

The probability that the loan reaches the terminal period unpaid is:

$$1 - \sum_{w=1}^W \sum_{f=0}^w C_f^w \left[ p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^{w-f-1} \left[ 1 - p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^f$$

The probability of observing  $(w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t})$  according to the model is then:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(w_{i\ell t}, f_{i\ell t}, d_{i\ell t} \mid \theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) = & \\ & (1 - d_{i\ell t}) C_{f_{i\ell t}}^{w_{i\ell t}} \left[ p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^{w_{i\ell t} - f_{i\ell t} - 1} \left[ 1 - p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^{f_{i\ell t}} \\ & + d_{i\ell t} \left( 1 - \sum_{w=1}^W \sum_{f=0}^w C_f^w \left[ p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^{w-f-1} \left[ 1 - p_{i\ell t}^{\tilde{m}}(\theta^{Lender}, L_{i\ell t}, h_{i\ell t}) \right]^f \right) \end{aligned} \quad (44)$$

where  $w_{i\ell t}$  is the observed number of weeks to repay,  $f_{i\ell t}$  is the observed number of missed payments and  $d_{i\ell t} \in \{0, 1\}$  denotes whether the borrower failed to complete the loan by the terminal week  $W$ .

<sup>82</sup>We provide further details on  $C_f^w$  and the derivation of this probability in Section A.25.

## A.24 Borrower Likelihood of Repayment Time and Number of Missed Payments

The expression for  $\Pr(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})$  is analogous to equation (44) where we use the estimated lender parameters for the harassment probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(w_{ilt}, f_{ilt}, d_{ilt} \mid \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt}) = & \\ (1 - d_{ilt}) C_{f_{ilt}}^{w_{ilt}} \left[ p_{ilt}^m \left( \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \right) \right]^{w_{ilt} - f_{ilt} - 1} & \left[ 1 - p_{ilt}^m \left( \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \right) \right]^{f_{ilt}} \\ + d_{ilt} \left( 1 - \sum_{w=1}^W \sum_{f=0}^w C_f^w \left[ p_{ilt}^m \left( \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \right) \right]^{w-f-1} \right. & \left. \left[ 1 - p_{ilt}^m \left( \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \theta^m, \theta^\sigma, L_{ilt}, h_{ilt} \right) \right]^f \right) \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

## A.25 Loan Path Combinations

In this section we provide further explanation of the likelihoods for repayment time and number of missed payments in equations (44) and (45), and the term  $C_f^w$  in these likelihoods.

If the loan is finished in week  $w \geq 8$ , we know that six consecutive payments were made following one missed payment. The probability of this part of the path is  $(p_{ilt}^m)^6 (1 - p_{ilt}^m)$ , where we omit the arguments of  $p_{ilt}^m$  for ease of notation. We only need to consider the probability of the events preceding this final missed payment. For this part we need the probability of missing  $f - 1$  payments in the preceding  $w - 8$  weeks. In general this would be given by the binomial probability  $\frac{(w-8)!}{(f-1)!(w-7)!} (p_{ilt}^m)^{w-f-7} (1 - p_{ilt}^m)^{f-1}$ . To get the probability of the entire path, we take the product of the two probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned} & (p_{ilt}^m)^6 (1 - p_{ilt}^m) \frac{(w-8)!}{(f-1)!(w-7)!} (p_{ilt}^m)^{w-f-7} (1 - p_{ilt}^m)^{f-1} \\ & = \frac{(w-8)!}{(f-1)!(w-7)!} (p_{ilt}^m)^{w-f-1} (1 - p_{ilt}^m)^f \end{aligned}$$

However, it is possible that the binomial coefficient contains paths that include 6 consecutive payments before week  $w$ , the end date of the loan. This is not possible as otherwise the loan would finish before week  $w$ . Therefore we compute an ad-

TABLE A.8: Example values of  $C_f^w$  for different values of  $w$  and  $f$ .

Weeks	Missed payments												
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	1	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	1	4	6	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	5	10	10	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	5	15	20	15	6	1	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	4	20	35	35	21	7	1	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	3	23	55	70	56	28	8	1	0	0	0
17	0	0	2	24	77	125	126	84	36	9	1	0	0
18	0	0	1	23	98	201	251	210	120	45	10	1	0
19	0	0	0	20	115	295	451	461	330	165	55	11	1
20	0	0	0	15	125	400	741	911	791	495	220	66	12

justed coefficient that removes these combinations. Table A.8 shows values of  $C_f^w$  for a range of values of  $w$  and  $f$ . We can see that starting in week 8 the combinations are part of Pascal's triangle, but combinations are removed when the number of missed payments is small relative to the number of weeks. With this adjustment, the probability of repaying a loan in  $w$  weeks with  $f$  missed payments is:

$$C_f^w (p_{ilt}^m)^{w-f-1} (1 - p_{ilt}^m)^f$$

This probability also includes the final case of repaying a loan in 6 weeks with no missed payments, which is  $p_{ilt}^5$ .

## A.26 Borrower Harassment Disutility and Effort Cost Estimation

In this section we provide further details on our estimation procedure to estimate the borrower harassment disutility parameter,  $\theta^\chi$ , and the borrower effort cost,  $\theta^\Psi$ . These are identified through the borrowers' choices of lenders, who differ by past loan performance and number of previous loans. In order to calculate a borrower's choice probabilities for each lender, we also need to specify their consideration sets of lenders and potential loan instances. We discuss each of these in turn before discussing the calculation of the choice probabilities.

### A.26.1 Borrower Consideration Sets

For each borrower in the data we observe the lender they actually chose to borrow from, but we do not observe all the lenders they compare the payoffs of borrowing from for each loan. For the borrower's consideration set at each point in time  $\mathcal{L}_{it}$ , we assume that they choose between five options: the lender they actually chose, the last two lenders they borrowed from, a new lender they never borrowed from before, and the outside option of not taking out a loan. We assume this because all the borrowers in our dataset stated that they considered less than or equal to one new lender for all transactions. If the borrower does not have history with other lenders, we add additional new lenders so that all borrowers have exactly five options in their consideration sets.<sup>83</sup> Because borrowers do not have access to formal sector loans, these types of loans are not part of their consideration set.

For the new lenders in the borrower's consideration set, we do not draw lender's randomly but instead use the lending network to choose a lender close to the borrower's own lenders. The idea behind this approach is if  $i$ 's lenders also frequently lend to borrower  $i'$ , then  $i$ 's additional lender should be one of  $i'$ 's lenders that  $i$  has not borrowed from before.

To do this, we construct a yearly network matrix where element  $(\ell, \ell')$  is the number of different borrowers lenders  $\ell$  and  $\ell'$  both lent to in that year. We do this

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<sup>83</sup>For the first two lenders a borrower borrowed from, we take the first three lenders they actually borrowed from, the outside option and an additional new lender.

year-by-year to account for the fact that lenders enter and exit, as some are arrested. We will use a simple example of five lenders and three borrowers to explain how we use this matrix. Suppose borrower 1 borrowed from lenders *A*, *B* and *C*, borrower 2 borrowed from lenders *B*, *C*, and *D*, and borrower 3 borrowed from lenders *C*, *D* and *E*. The network matrix would be:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \\ 1 & 2 & 2 & \mathbf{1} & \mathbf{0} \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & \mathbf{2} & \mathbf{1} \\ 0 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

For borrower 1, we look at the lenders that are close to borrower 1's lenders that borrower 1 did not borrow from. We do this by looking at the submatrix of rows of the lenders that borrower 1 did borrow from and the columns of lenders that borrower 1 did not borrow from. This is shown in bold. We then take the lender with the maximum value in this submatrix, which is lender *D* in this case.

More generally, to find the additional lender for borrower *i*, we take the submatrix of rows corresponding to borrower *i*'s lenders and the columns corresponding to all other lenders. The additional lender is then the lender associated with the maximum value of this submatrix. In the event of ties, we draw a lender randomly from the largest values. In the event that we need to draw more than one new lender for a borrower (because they borrowed from fewer than three lenders in the data), we take the largest values from the submatrix until we have the desired number of lenders (again drawing randomly in the event of ties).

We have also tested the sensitivity of our estimates to changing the size of the borrowers' consideration sets. We did this by increasing the number of lenders in each borrower's consideration set from four to five and reestimating our parameters. Only the borrower harassment disutility and effort cost are affected by the size of the consideration set. These parameters only change by a small amount in magnitude (less than 10%) when compared to our baseline model.

### A.26.2 Borrower Potential Loans

In our data we observe the loans the borrowers actually took out, but we do not observe instances where borrowers chose the outside option, i.e. instances where they considered taking out a loan but chose not to. Motivated by the literature in the estimation of dynamic entry models (Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013), we introduce potential loan instances for each borrower. We construct these based on the median time interval between loans for each borrower, over the time they were active taking out loans. We do this separately before and after the crackdown, as their loan frequency may change after the crackdown. For a simple example of this approach, suppose we observe a borrower taking out loans in July 2009, January 2010, July 2010, and July 2011. The time intervals are 6, 6, and 12 months. The median number of months is therefore 6 months. For this borrower, we would assume that loan instances arrive every 6 months and they chose the outside option in January 2011. This procedure leads to the outside option being chosen 5,894 times, which means it is chosen approximately 39.9% of the time.

We have also tested the sensitivity of our estimates to changing the number of potential loans. We did this by increasing the number of potential loans by 10% and reestimating our parameters. Only the borrower harassment disutility and effort cost are affected by this change. These increase slightly in magnitude compared to our baseline model but are not statistically different.

### A.26.3 Outside Option Payoff

When choosing the outside option, borrowers receive  $m_{i0rw} = \max\{0, m_{i0r} + v_{itw}\}$  each week, where  $v_{itw} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2)$ . This is the weekly cash they would have if they put zero effort into repayment. In estimation, we use the weekly cash that a borrower would generate with a first-time lender that used a zero harassment probability with the lower rate of 20% nominal interest.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>We use the lower rate of 20% instead of 0% to avoid avoid extrapolating outside the range of our data.

#### A.26.4 Computing the Expected Payoff from a Lender

Given a guess of  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  and estimates  $\hat{\theta}^{Lender}$ ,  $\hat{\theta}^m$ ,  $\hat{\theta}^\sigma$ , we can calculate the expected payoff of each lender,  $\bar{V}_{ilt}(\theta^\chi, \theta^\Psi, \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \hat{\theta}^m, \hat{\theta}^\sigma)$ , and the outside option for each borrower. This involves calculating the expected payoff from a loan for each possible loan size and each possible harshness level for each lender in the borrower's consideration set. We also calculate the value of the outside option for each borrower.

Due to the large number of possible paths, combined with a large number of different lenders, harshness levels and loan sizes, we compute these expected payoffs via simulation. We use 10,000 paths to calculate these expected payoffs. We first calculate the expected payoff  $\mathbb{E}[u_{iltw}(L_{ilt}, h_{ilt})]$  in each possible state for each week. We numerically evaluate the conditional and unconditional expectations in these expressions using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 200 nodes. We provide further details of this numerical integration procedure in Section A.27. We then simulate 10,000 repayment paths for each possible loan using the borrower's repayment probabilities.

#### A.26.5 Likelihood

The contribution of a loan to the likelihood is then:

$$\frac{\exp\left(\bar{V}_{ilt}\left(\theta^\chi, \theta^\Psi, \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \hat{\theta}^m, \hat{\theta}^\sigma\right)\right)}{\sum_{\ell' \in \{0\} \cup \mathcal{L}_i} \exp\left(\bar{V}_{i\ell't}\left(\theta^\chi, \theta^\Psi, \hat{\theta}^{Lender}, \hat{\theta}^m, \hat{\theta}^\sigma\right)\right)}$$

We estimate  $\theta^\chi$  and  $\theta^\Psi$  via simulated maximum likelihood.

### A.27 Expected Weekly Payoff Calculations

We use Gauss-Hermite quadrature with  $H = 200$  weights  $w_h$  and nodes  $z_h$  to numerically evaluate the conditional and unconditional expectations in the borrower's payoff functions. For ease of notation, we omit the  $h_{ilt}$  argument in  $m_{ilt}(h_{ilt})$  in this subsection and write it simply as  $m_{ilt}$  (and similarly for  $m_{iltw}$ ).

### A.27.1 Expected Payoff in the First Week

The expected payoff in week 1 before the realization of  $v_{it1}$  is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{(m_{i0t1} + (1 - r_t) L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right] \\ &= \Phi \left( -\frac{m_{i0t}}{\sigma_i} \right) \frac{[(1 - r_t) L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} + \\ & \int_{-m_{i0t}/\sigma_i}^{\infty} \frac{(m_{i0t} + \sigma_i v_{it1} + (1 - r_t) L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \frac{e^{-v_{it1}^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} dv_{it1} \end{aligned}$$

We approximate this using:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{(m_{i0t1} + (1 - r_t) L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right] \\ & \approx \Phi \left( -\frac{m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right) \frac{[(1 - r_t) L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} + \\ & \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{w_h}{\sqrt{\pi}} \mathbb{1} \left\{ m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2} \sigma_i z_h > 0 \right\} \frac{[m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2} \sigma_i z_h + (1 - r_t) L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \end{aligned}$$

### A.27.2 Expected Payoff from Making a Payment

The borrower can make a payment only if  $m_{iltw} \geq r_t L_{ilt}$  which can also be written as  $v_{itw} \geq (r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}) / \sigma_i$ . The expected payoff from making a payment conditional on being able to make the payment is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{(m_{iltw} - r_t L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \middle| m_{iltw} \geq r_t L_{ilt} \right] - \Psi(m_{ilt} - m_{i0t}) \\ &= \left[ \Phi \left( \frac{m_{ilt} - r_t L_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right) \right]^{-1} \int_{\frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}}^{\infty} \frac{(m_{ilt} + \sigma_i v_{itw} - r_t L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \frac{e^{-v_{itw}^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} dv_{itw} \\ & \quad - \Psi(m_{ilt} - m_{i0t}) \end{aligned}$$

We approximate the expectation using:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{(m_{iltw} - r_t L_{ilt})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \middle| m_{iltw} \geq r_t L_{ilt} \right] &\approx \left[ \Phi \left( \frac{m_{ilt} - r_t L_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right) \right]^{-1} \\ &\times \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{w_h}{\sqrt{\pi}} \mathbb{1} \left\{ m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2} \sigma_i z_h \geq r_t L_{ilt} \right\} \\ &\times \frac{\left[ m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2} \sigma_i z_h - r_t L_{ilt} \right]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \end{aligned}$$

### A.27.3 Expected Payoff from Not Making a Payment

The borrower is unable to make the payment when  $m_{iltw} < r_t L_{ilt}$ . This can also be written as  $v_{itw} < (r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}) / \sigma_i$ . The expected payoff conditional on not being able to make the payment is:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{iltw} + (n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \middle| m_{iltw} < r_t L_{ilt} \right] \\ &- \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} > 0\} p_{ilt}^\eta \chi - \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} = 0\} \chi - \Psi(m_{ilt} - m_{i0t}) \end{aligned}$$

The term inside the expectation is can be written in two parts: when  $m_{iltw} = 0$  and when  $m_{iltw} \in (0, r_t L_{ilt})$ . The probability that  $m_{iltw} = 0$  conditional on  $m_{iltw} < r_t L_{ilt}$  is  $\frac{\Phi(-m_{ilt}/\sigma_i)}{\Phi((r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt})/\sigma_i)}$ . Given this, the term inside the expectation is:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{iltw} + (n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \middle| m_{iltw} < r_t L_{ilt} \right] = \\ &\frac{\Phi \left( \frac{-m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right)}{\Phi \left( \frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right)} \frac{[(n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} + \\ &\frac{1}{\Phi \left( \frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i} \right)} \int_{-\frac{m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}}^{\frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}} \frac{[m_{ilt} + \sigma_i v_{itw} + (n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1} \{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \\ &\times \frac{e^{-v_{itw}^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} dv_{itw} \end{aligned}$$

We approximate this by:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{[m_{iltw} + (n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1}\{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \middle| m_{iltw} < r_t L_{ilt} \right] \approx \\ \frac{\Phi\left(\frac{-m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}\right) [(n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1}\{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{\Phi\left(\frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}\right) (1 - \gamma_i)} + \\ \left[ \Phi\left(\frac{r_t L_{ilt} - m_{ilt}}{\sigma_i}\right) \right]^{-1} \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{w_h}{\sqrt{\pi}} \mathbb{1}\{m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i z_h > 0\} \mathbb{1}\{m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i z_h < r_t L_{ilt}\} \times \\ \frac{[m_{ilt} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i z_h + (n_{iltw} - 1) \mathbb{1}\{n_{iltw} > 0\} r_t L_{ilt}]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \end{aligned}$$

#### A.27.4 Expected Payoff from a Completed Loan

The expected payoff when the loan is complete is the unconditional expectation

$\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{m_{i0tw}^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right]$ . We approximate this using:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{m_{i0tw}^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \right] &= \int_{-m_{i0t}/\sigma_i}^{\infty} \frac{(m_{i0t} + \sigma_i v_{itw})^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \frac{e^{-v_{itw}^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} dv_{itw} \\ &\approx \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{w_h}{\sqrt{\pi}} \mathbb{1}\{m_{i0t} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i z_h > 0\} \frac{[m_{i0t} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i z_h]^{1-\gamma_i} - 1}{1 - \gamma_i} \end{aligned}$$

#### A.28 Full Set of Parameter Estimates

Table A.9 shows the borrower demand estimates and Table A.10 shows the remaining parameter estimates parameter estimates.

TABLE A.9: Borrower Demand Estimates

	Log Loan Asked	
Interest Rate	-5.675	(0.916)
Interest rate $\times$ Age	-0.038	(0.015)
Interest rate $\times$ Post-secondary education	0.072	(0.242)
Interest rate $\times$ Female	2.137	(0.322)
Interest rate $\times$ Married (rel. to single)	0.166	(0.424)
Interest rate $\times$ Divorced (rel. to single)	0.111	(0.446)
Interest rate $\times$ Has children	-0.257	(0.427)
Interest rate $\times$ Malaysian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	0.761	(0.284)
Interest rate $\times$ Indian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	0.735	(0.321)
Interest rate $\times$ Drinks alcohol	0.598	(0.493)
Interest rate $\times$ Uses drugs	0.331	(0.212)
Interest rate $\times$ Frequents sex workers	-0.069	(0.234)
Interest rate $\times$ Gambles	2.886	(0.380)
Borrower fixed effects	Yes	
Number of observations	10306	

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the borrower level.

TABLE A.10: All parameter estimates

	Lender		Borrower	
<i>Cash available for repayments: mean</i>	$\theta^m$		$\theta^m$	
Harassment probability	0.294	(0.169)	0.192	(0.033)
Interest rate	-1.398	(0.197)	-2.419	(0.181)
No lending history	-0.553	(0.036)	-0.771	(0.045)
Number of previous loans	0.001	(0.001)	0.022	(0.007)
Number of previous loans squared	-0.001	(0.000)	-0.003	(0.001)
Number of missed payments in last loan	-0.051	(0.006)	-0.087	(0.004)
Asked for loan under the influence of alcohol	-0.012	(0.013)	-0.029	(0.015)
Age	0.003	(0.001)	0.006	(0.002)
Post-secondary education	-0.123	(0.046)	-0.077	(0.029)
Female	0.118	(0.054)	0.114	(0.039)
Married (rel. to single)	0.045	(0.017)	0.004	(0.041)
Divorced (rel. to single)	0.068	(0.029)	0.041	(0.043)
Has children	-0.101	(0.025)	-0.061	(0.041)
Malaysian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	0.100	(0.024)	0.070	(0.032)
Indian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	0.072	(0.064)	0.003	(0.039)
Current gang member			0.076	(0.035)
Previously gang member			0.039	(0.027)
Number of previous convictions			-0.024	(0.011)
Drinks alcohol			-0.079	(0.048)
Uses drugs			-0.014	(0.029)
Frequents sex workers			-0.066	(0.028)
Frequently treats friends			-0.142	(0.037)
<i>Cash available for repayments: std. deviation</i>	$\theta^{\bar{\sigma}}$		$\theta^{\sigma}$	
Constant	1.000		1.000	
Gambler			0.504	(0.041)
<i>Harassment probabilities</i>	$\theta^{\eta}$			
Pre-crackdown low harshness level	-3.384	(0.986)		
Pre-crackdown medium harshness level	-2.338	(0.920)		
Pre-crackdown high harshness level	0.386	(0.194)		
Post-crackdown low harshness level	-2.288	(1.592)		
Post-crackdown medium harshness level	-1.388	(0.335)		
Post-crackdown high harshness level	-0.579	(0.432)		
Loan size	0.591	(0.118)		
No lending history	-0.590	(0.486)		
Number of previous loans	0.062	(0.054)		
Number of previous loans squared	-0.004	(0.002)		
Number of missed payments in last loan	-0.161	(0.097)		
Asked for loan under the influence of alcohol	0.031	(0.025)		
Age	-0.011	(0.007)		
Post-secondary education	-0.216	(0.252)		
Female	-0.228	(0.245)		
Married (rel. to single)	0.188	(0.042)		
Divorced (rel. to single)	0.064	(0.100)		
Has children	-0.447	(0.775)		
Malaysian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	0.284	(0.228)		
Indian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	-0.576	(0.517)		
<i>Harassment costs</i>	$\theta^{\kappa}$			
Constant	0.385	(0.072)		
Post crackdown	0.709	(0.073)		
<i>Borrower disutility</i>			$\theta^{\lambda}, \theta^{\psi}$	
Harassment disutility			3.584	(0.073)
Effort costs			1.597	(0.023)

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the borrower level.

## A.29 Model Fit

Table A.11 shows how expected loan outcomes at the estimated parameters compare with the observed outcomes in the data. The model slightly overpredicts the average time to repay, but matches the average number of missed payments, the proportion of loans with harassment, and the average loan size reasonably well on aggregate.

TABLE A.11: Expected outcomes at parameter estimates versus observed outcomes in the data.

	Data	Model
Average number of weeks	13.37	15.39
Average number of missed payments	3.85	4.25
Proportion of loans with harassment	0.54	0.55
Average loan size	1.29	1.28

## A.30 Heterogeneous Effects of the Enforcement Crackdown

In Table A.12 we regress borrower surplus in a loan on a post-crackdown dummy, borrower dummies and the interaction of the post-crackdown dummy with a series of borrower characteristics. Borrower surplus is measured in thousands of Singaporean dollars, using the certainty equivalent amount method described in the main text. Gamblers, drinkers and drug users are more affected by the crackdown, but gang members are less affected.

TABLE A.12: Heterogeneous effects of the crackdown.

	Borrower Surplus	
Post-crackdown $\times$ Age	-0.001	(0.001)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Post-secondary education	0.017	(0.025)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Female	-0.020	(0.030)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Married (rel. to single)	-0.033	(0.037)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Divorced (rel. to single)	-0.038	(0.037)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Has children	0.050	(0.036)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Malaysian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	-0.026	(0.029)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Indian (rel. to Singaporean Chinese)	-0.015	(0.026)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Current gang member	0.066	(0.031)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Previously gang member	0.023	(0.022)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Number of previous convictions	-0.001	(0.009)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Drinks alcohol	-0.140	(0.044)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Uses drugs	-0.038	(0.022)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Frequents sex workers	-0.034	(0.021)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Gambles	-0.053	(0.027)
Post-crackdown $\times$ Frequently treats friends	-0.010	(0.031)
Borrower fixed effects	Yes	
Period fixed effects	Yes	

Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the borrower level. The dependent variable is borrower surplus of the loan measured in S\$000.

### A.31 Decomposition of the Enforcement Crackdown

In Table A.13, we decompose the effects of the crackdown. Column (1) shows the baseline effects of the crackdown and is identical to Table 2 in the main text. In column (2) we consider the effect of raising the interest rate from 20% to 35% but maintaining the pre-crackdown harassment cost and adding lenders that exited or were arrested back into borrower consideration sets. In this case lender profits actually increase by 31%, indicating that the cartel could have raised its joint profitability by increasing its interest rate.<sup>85</sup> Borrower surplus decreases even further because lenders use harassment more frequently compared to when it is more

<sup>85</sup>In Section A.33 we use our model to find the interest rate that would have maximized joint profitability before and after the crackdown. Before the crackdown, an interest rate of 35% would have maximized joint lender profits. We discuss the possible reasons for why the cartel instead charged 20% during this period in Section A.33.

TABLE A.13: Decomposing the effects of the crackdown.

	Crackdown (1)	Only Interest Rate Increases (2)	Only Harassment Costs Increase (3)	Only Lenders Exit/are Arrested (4)
Total lender profits (in S\$m)	-47.87%	+30.96%	-87.31%	+0.21%
Total loan volume (in S\$m)	-45.93%	-47.75%	-1.25%	-0.07%
Average harassment probability chosen	-58.31%	-10.80%	-48.31%	-0.62%
Total interest revenue (in S\$m)	-2.89%	-7.46%	+1.34%	+0.38%
Total harassment costs (in S\$m)	+194.45%	-0.21%	+202.58%	+1.82%
Average borrower surplus (in S\$000)	-14.37%	-21.34%	+10.69%	-0.04%
Average number of missed payments	+27.72%	+25.14%	+7.74%	+1.76%
Average number of times harassed	+22.77%	+33.04%	-2.85%	+2.29%

Column (1) shows the baseline (total) effects of the crackdown. Column (2) shows the effects of the crackdown if only the interest rate increased from 20% to 35%. Column (3) shows the effects of only the harassment cost changing. Column (4) shows the effects of the lenders exiting.

costly. In column (3) we consider the effect of the lender harassment cost increasing but maintaining the same interest rate of 20% and keeping the same lenders in the borrowers' consideration sets. Lender profitability falls further in this scenario as lenders are not compensated for the increase in costs. Borrowers, on the other hand, are better off because lenders use harassment less frequently when they miss payments. Finally, in column (4) we show the effect of lender exit. This has only a very small effect on each outcome because borrowers can easily switch to other lenders. The small changes that do occur do so because lenders may give different loan sizes or use different harshness levels depending on the past loan history, and borrowers may also change their effort levels in response.

## A.32 Decomposition of the Borrower Targeting Counterfactual




FIGURE A.3: Effects of targeting borrowers on lender outcomes.

## A.33 Optimal Cartel Interest Rate

In Figure A.4 we show the results of a counterfactual experiment where we simulate loan outcomes at alternative interest rates set by the cartel and compute the relative changes in joint profitability for lenders. In the pre-crackdown period of 2009-2013, the modal interest rate charged by lenders was 20%. We compute the expected total profits for all lenders if the cartel had instead set the interest rate differently. We do this for all interest rates between 5% and 50% at 5 percentage point intervals. We adjust loan demand, borrower effort and the endogenously chosen loan sizes and harshness levels accordingly for each interest rate.

At 20%, the percentage change relative to the baseline is zero because 20% is the baseline rate observed during this time period. We find that if the cartel lowered the interest rate to below 20% that the total lender profits would have fallen. However, the lenders as a whole would have benefited from a higher interest rate. An interest rate of 35% would have maximized lender profits before the crackdown. Above 35%, lender profits begin to fall because at this higher rate, loan demand is smaller and borrower effort is reduced.




FIGURE A.4: Percentage change in total lender profits at alternative interest rates before and after the crackdown.

There are several reasons why we did not observe the cartel advising lenders to use the profit-maximizing rate of 35% in our data. First, because of the number of different syndicates operating in the market, they may not have been able to sustain the higher rate of 35%. At 35%, the incentive for one syndicate to deviate to a lower rate would have been too large. Second, if the syndicates made such large profits, it would encourage other entrants into the market. The syndicates may have kept the interest rate lower to deter further entry into the market. Third, if the syndicates were making even larger profits the authorities may have cracked down on the market sooner.

After the crackdown, the baseline interest rate was 35%. We omit 2014 from this analysis because this period involved some transitions from 20% different intervals before stabilizing at 35%. Over the 2015-2016 period, our model predicts that 35% was close to the optimal rate with only slight gains to be made by reducing the rate to 30%. Because of the increase in costs and reduced profitability, it became easier for the cartel to sustain the optimal rate. Furthermore, with reduced profitability, the cartel also had less incentive to deter future entrants.

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