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The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa

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
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HDP Study Key Findings

1. The HDP Nexus is not a rigid instrument that can be implemented, but rather an **approach that needs to be applied in a contextualised way**. The application of the HDP Nexus already offers valuable experiences and lessons to be learned, especially regarding institutional opportunities and shortcomings, funding pathways, and common outcome processes.
2. In its institutional functionality, the HDP Nexus **cannot function in a top-down way**. The Nexus requires the engagement of a wide range of actors, especially in-country and by national counterparts. The HDP 'branding' provides opportunities, but is not a prerequisite, for fostering collaboration and coherent modalities of working in a nexus-spirit. For this to happen, the demand side of collaboration (operational goals) should take priority over the supply side (collaboration forums and structures). Respondents point towards the importance of a **pragmatic application of the HDP Nexus that works 'with the grain' of already established collaboration mechanisms** in-country. In turn, operational staff should be granted the flexibility to pursue such collaboration where useful.
3. Cooperation, coordination, and coherence are necessary, but procedural modalities cannot dominate the process. Each actor needs to be able to focus on delivering the results for which they are best suited. Dedicating not more than 5% of dedicated to coordination is seen as ideal. Nexus initiatives tend to face challenges when people feel over-coordinated and tend to work when the **collaboration offers additional flexibilities** (e.g., in terms of funding) and is **institutionally rewarded** (e.g., through joint outcome goals).
4. **National government counterparts play a critical role**, especially as critical partners in development compacts, and in most efforts of humanitarianism and peacebuilding. While national governments are a critical stakeholder in joint outcome processes, their role is often ambivalent, especially when they are actively involved in an ongoing armed conflict or have a questionable track record in complying with international legal norms and standards.
5. Financing is a crucial implementation tool for the HDP Nexus. Two main challenges tend to arise: first, the **flexibility of funding**, which sometimes contradicts the earmarking required by specific donor priorities, and the **different funding cycles** between humanitarianism (ad hoc funding), development (three-to-five-year cycles), and peacebuilding (ideally structured as long-term engagement). **Funding instruments need to bridge these different priorities and working modalities** while enabling joined-up analysis, planning and risk taking (de-linking funding streams from very specific outcome targets). Funding sources ideally are diversified and do not rest entirely on ODA funds, but on other public or private funding sources as well. Ideally, the Nexus approach serves as a catalyst for multi-stakeholder projects that rely on a variety of funding instruments.
6. **Collective Outcome processes are an effective way for developing joint portfolios and financing mechanisms** across the three HDP sectors (humanitarianism, development, peacebuilding). They also enable a better collaboration between peacekeeping missions, the UN country teams, and other public and private actors. Collective outcomes, however, cannot be enforced. They have to evolve at different levels: internationally, regionally, nationally, at sub-national levels, but also across and within organisations. Institutionally, information-sharing (for instance, within UN country teams or within large private civil society organisations that work in two or three of the HDP sectors) is still a considerable weakness that needs to be addressed more systematically.

7. The HDP Nexus has contributed to **understanding the UN peacekeeping mandates in a holistic way**. Although the Nexus language is not commonly used within peacekeeping operations, the approach has taken firm hold through institutionalised structures, such as humanitarian hubs. The Nexus has also enabled a better collaboration between peacekeeping missions, the UN country team, and other development and humanitarian actors, especially because the **HDP Nexus motivates those other actors to proactively engage with the peacekeeping missions**.
8. The **specific mandate of humanitarian actors**, as stipulated in the humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law, **is not necessarily a major obstacle** to the application of the HDP Nexus. A number of leading humanitarian organisations, such as WFP, ICRC, Oxfam, and World Vision, have taken proactive steps to engage with the Nexus within their organisations. However, protecting the space for humanitarian action needs to remain a priority for on the ground implementation, central to all decisions taken along the HDP Nexus. Great care must be given to **prevent undermining the perception of humanitarian actors' neutrality**, particularly in escalated conflict contexts.
9. **Conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity capacities are still perceived as one of the major weaknesses** in Nexus-related work, especially in-country. This is both due to an often-perceived shortage of coordination and exchange between existing conflict analysis facilities within organisations, and a lack of conflict analysis capacities among technical staff. However, several organisations not initially engaged with the realm of conflict transformation and peacebuilding have increased their conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity capacities. Larger organisations, due to their large staff numbers, have a considerable advantage in applying these methodologies. Peacebuilding-oriented NGOs furthermore are often engaged in these contexts and have capacities which could be further leveraged.
10. **HDP experts can play a catalytic role** when working in-country to facilitate HDP Nexus processes, especially in the initial stages, when there is not a broad familiarity with the Nexus in a particular context. Still, as said, the pragmatic, demand-driven uptake of the Nexus has to be given priority.
11. The prevention aspect of the HDP Nexus overlaps with resilience-based approaches and tends to be widely accepted. In general, however, **prevention remains a big challenge because it remains difficult to define and measure**. Enhanced analytical capabilities due to the increased utilisation of new technologies and big data analysis, which increasingly is becoming commonly used by humanitarian organisations, may provide a potential pathway to strengthening prevention capacities.



Introduction

The expansion of peacekeeping operation mandates, as well as the mandates of many public and civil society organisations engaged in humanitarian relief, development, and peacebuilding, are a constant challenge for policy and the work in the field. Particularly in fragile contexts where large-scale peacekeeping missions are present, a multitude of actors work in overlapping, but still distinct, sectors on mitigating and transitioning from complex crises. The Humanitarian-Peace-Development (HDP) Nexus, which emerged following the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, suggests one pathway for bridging the gaps between these three traditionally distinct areas of crisis intervention.

The general argument in favour of enhanced collaboration in order to attain the common goal of enabling the transition from conflict and crisis is well accepted. However, the application of the HDP Nexus remains a challenge. Following up on an emerging, although still limited number of evaluations, this study investigates the implications of the Nexus for on-the-groundwork in countries with ongoing peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. While not focusing on peacekeeping in particular, the study embarks with the assumption that the HDP Nexus needs to become instrumental for peacekeeping operations as well, in order for the approach to be successful. Based on this analysis, it provides guidance for international training programmes that can assist peacekeepers, humanitarians, and development and peacebuilding practitioners to collaborate in the spirit of the HDP Nexus according to their respective areas of priority and expertise.


The study therefore aims to improve the institutional practices in implementing the HDP Nexus in the context of peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, three interrelated research questions are discussed and answered. First, it identifies prevalent understandings and common practices towards the HDP Nexus by looking at institutional approaches in order to identify patterns of cooperation either related to context or to institutional type (humanitarian, development, and both peacekeeping and peacebuilding). Second, a comparison across institutions and contexts should enable the study to reveal

strengths and challenges in the work with the Nexus and additional practical implications, such as on financing mechanisms and organisational mandating. Thirdly, the study translates these insights into recommendations for a draft training curriculum which can be implemented at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

The study has been conducted by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution within the framework of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)'s cooperation with and support to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), based in Accra, Ghana. GIZ has been cooperating with the KAIPTC since its inception in 2004, and supports, inter alia, the centre's training programmes and cooperation with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The centre's systemic knowledge and skills in training for complex peace and security challenges, as well as in relation to the conceptual and implementational aspects of the HDP Nexus approach, offers an opportunity for translating research findings into a demand-driven and practice-relevant training curriculum.

The HDP Nexus approach promises to offer a pathway towards greater coherence and joint approaches to addressing humanitarian and development needs alongside peacebuilding. However, much remains to be done to translate the concept into practice and to link the parallel transitional efforts ongoing in the humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding fields. A more comprehensive understanding of the state of the HDP Nexus and the challenges faced will allow for the development of practice-oriented training courses or modules, to take the HDP Nexus to the next level of practical implementation.

The KAIPTC, as a centre of excellence for training in humanitarian assistance, multidimensional peace operations and civilian-military co-ordination, will be able to implement HDP Nexus training courses or training modules as part of its ongoing courses, thereby contributing to HDP Nexus implementation in the framework of the APSA.



Methodological Approach

The study applies an empirical approach primarily focused on content analysis of documents and interviews. Over 120 written accounts, conceptual documents, policy and programme papers, reports, evaluations, and academic analyses on the HDP Nexus were collected and structurally coded (using Dedoose content analysis software). A list of these documents is provided in the appendix, under Reviewed Documents and Bibliography.

Furthermore, the authors conducted remote interviews with 20 HDP experts and practitioners from UN missions and agencies, political organisations, INGOs, and humanitarian networks and civil society peacebuilders. The interviewees were selected based on a wide spread of organisational types (international, regional, national, and civil society organisations) with a particular focus on countries

in Sub-Saharan Africa with ongoing peacekeeping missions. Initially, it was foreseen to conduct a major part of these interviews in a face-to-face format. In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, however, these needed to be shifted online and were done remotely (mainly via Zoom and Skype). Interviewees were guaranteed personal and organisational anonymity in quotes and opinions in the report (only the type of organisation is mentioned). Interviews were documented in interview notes produced during/immediately after the interviews and included in the full list of reviewed documents. A full list of interviewees is provided in Annex II of the report.

For assessing the impact of the HDP Nexus on peace negotiations, quantitative data on peace agreements from the PA-X peace agreements database (peaceagreements.org) was used.

Evolvement of the HDP Nexus – Yet Another Policy Concept?

Since 2016, the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus has emerged as a widely recognised approach for addressing the needs of people and societies in protracted and complex crises. It is neither a revolution, nor simply ‘old wine in a new bottle’. Rather, at its best, it represents the culmination of an evolutionary process of thirty years within the fields of humanitarian assistance, development, and peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It is driven by the reality that “the volume, cost and length of humanitarian assistance over the past 10 years has grown dramatically, mainly due to the protracted nature of the crises and scarce development action in many contexts where vulnerability is the highest” (OCHA 2017, 3).

This is particularly relevant for the challenges facing many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. As one interviewee from an international organisation noted,

“If you look at the development context today, across Africa, what you find is a constellation of crisis. So, you have a conflict, you also have a humanitarian crisis, and you also have these intractable development challenges. I have not seen in the African Development context where you wouldn’t see a variation of these three different challenges being manifested in any particular context.”

At the core of the HDP Nexus approach is the insight that the needs of communities in complex crises cannot

be addressed by uncoordinated actors operating within the strict confines of humanitarian relief, development assistance, and peacebuilding. The request for an integrated approach has been a persistent companion in these working fields over the past three decades, and its implementation is far from simple. An interplay of the emergence of highly violent civil wars in places like Syria, South Sudan, or Yemen, and geopolitical shifts that made the formation of a more or less unitary ‘international community’ for resolving – or at least freezing – such conflicts unlikely, has put mounting pressure on formulating comprehensive answers to the work on complex crises in recent years.

The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was a watershed moment in affirming a renewed determination to address the challenge of fulfilling the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It deliberately set the agenda for overcoming the gaps between humanitarian aid and other ongoing work in armed conflict settings. Therefore, the WHS had to implicitly problematise the traditional self-understanding of humanitarian actors, who – according to their core mandate embodied in the Humanitarian Principles – were reluctant to engage in activities that could be seen as political, or even in conflict mitigation.

This particular humanitarian ethos is designed to safeguard the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian actors, especially in highly contested situations of ongoing armed conflict. While the humanitarian

mandate is, in theory, widely accepted, it has shown an increasing number of shortcomings that became more and more obvious in contemporary protracted conflict settings. First, humanitarian aid, while not being delivered along political lines, still has considerable political implications and was, as a consequence, never entirely non-political. Second, historically initiated by the split in the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and the foundation of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans frontières (MSF), the humanitarian sector became increasingly discontented with the short-term nature of their work. This was the beginning of discussions about sustainability and long-term effects of humanitarian relief that co-emerged with broader development and transition mandates in the UN development doctrine.

Considerable efforts to bridge the humanitarian-development divide emerged over the three decades. An early approach was Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development (LRRD). A concept which first emerged in the 1990s, addressing the need to find a better way to transition from humanitarian responses to long-term development. The ‘resilience agenda’, and the ‘whole-of-government’ approach followed and have sought to establish links to state building and peacebuilding in fragile states. More recently, the need to establish a better way of linking humanitarian relief and development assistance has been recognised in the Grand Bargain, launched during the WHS 2016, the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.

On the donor and funding side, the Grand Bargain was launched in the run-up to the WHS held in Istanbul in May 2016, as an agreement between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organisations, “who have committed to get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action”. Initially conceived as an agreement among the five biggest donors and the six largest UN Agencies, the Grand Bargain now includes 61 Signatories (24 states, 11 UN Agencies, 5 inter-governmental organisations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movements, and 21 NGOs) and represents 73% of all humanitarian contributions donated in 2018 and 70% of aid received by agencies. The Grand Bargain currently has nine work streams, as the tenth – “Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors” – has become a cross-cutting theme of all work streams. However, it was reported that the workstream saw “limited strategic progress following the closure of the workstream as a coordination body” (Metcalf-Hough et al. 2020, 19).

The WHS not only brought a new approach to funding, but it also launched a new approach for implementation, the so-called New Way of Working (NWoW). It was initially thought of as a means removing ‘unnecessary barriers’ which undermine or prevent collaboration between humanitarian and

development actors. NWoW is distinguished through its **localisation**, the definition of **Collective Outcomes**, operating on a **multi-year timeframe**, (usually three to five years), based on **comparative advantages** of a **wide range of public and private actors**, and addressing **risks, vulnerabilities and the root causes** to crises, to reduce **the needs of the most vulnerable** (WHS 2017, 17).

At this earlier point, there was resistance to expanding the NWoW to include peace(building) activities, out of concerns from actors in traditional parts of the humanitarian sphere that doing so would undermine the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, a concern that remains at least in part to this day. However, as this study will show at a later stage, these concerns have meanwhile turned into a minority position within the humanitarian sector and cannot be considered as a major collaboration obstacle anymore, although the details of implementation still matter greatly.

The move toward the HDP (Triple) Nexus, which brings in that additional element of supporting peace, grew out of the strong push for supporting peace efforts from the incoming Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in late 2016. In his remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office, and in the context of one of the largest increases in violent conflict in the world in 30 years, the Secretary General called for bringing

“the humanitarian and development spheres closer together from the very beginning of a crisis to support affected communities, address structural and economic impacts and help prevent a new spiral of fragility and instability. Humanitarian response, sustainable development and sustaining peace are three sides of the same triangle” (2016)

These goals fall very much in line with the 2030 Agenda, where the UN and Member States made a commitment “that no one will be left behind”, and to “reach the furthest behind first” (UN 2015, 4–5).

In the aftermath of the WHS, in October and November 2016, the UN Working Group on Transitions invited the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), especially through the IASC Task Team on Strengthening the Humanitarian/Development Nexus, to work on progressing from the dual Humanitarian-Development Nexus towards the inclusion of peace actors. These committees jointly developed a “Plan of Action for Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus” in a roadmap form, inviting UN country teams and missions to engage in joint analysis and “context-specific agreed collective outcomes for the short-, medium- and long-term”. This was effectively the birth of the HDP Nexus as it is known today.

In UN peacekeeping, the 2000s saw an increasing trend towards multidimensional ‘integrated missions’, peace operations under the Capstone Doctrine as formalised in the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines. Integrated missions not only work with an increased mandate that incorporates a wide range of tasks such as the protection of civilians. It also demands for a closer integration with the UN country teams to increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the UN intervention in fragile states and conflict-affected environments. The specific target was a bundling of the common strategic and operational means, incorporating military, civilian, and police actors in the pursuit of complex security and development goals.

The NWoW, and subsequently the HDP Nexus approach, have taken the further step of going well beyond the UN system. It is therefore not a multilateral approach, but crucially a multi-stakeholder approach, bringing in a much wider set of actors, including international NGOs, local NGOs, donor countries, host countries, and a wide range of international organisations outside of the UN system, such as the OECD or regional organisations. The HDP Nexus effort takes on the important task of addressing the known shortcomings of the integrated mission approach while being under pressure to avoid common mistakes such as bureaucratisation, over-coordination, and over-ambitious goal setting.

When considering the history of the HDP Nexus, two factors are striking. First, the Nexus appears at a critical juncture of the international system. The traditional way of working towards comprehensive conflict transitions, as it has been practiced until the mid-2010s,

albeit with mixed success, seems to have reached a deadlock, also because the protracted and complex nature of contemporary crises. This deadlock has begun to reflect back on the international institutional cornerstones of working in complex crises, leading to calls for more sustainable and, in parallel, more effective action.

Second, the Nexus does not appear alone, but coincides with ‘resilience’, another concept that aims for a contextualised, multifaceted, and bottom-up engagement in such situations. These two factors suggest that the HDP Nexus is not just another policy concept.

Three commitments guide the NWoW and consequently the HDP Nexus, namely

“(1) joint multi-year SDG-based programming with a clear roadmap to contribute to the long-term resilience and development of affected communities; (2) tangible collective results in reducing needs, vulnerability and risks; and (3) collaboration based on comparative advantages in the different areas of intervention” (UNDP DRC Office 2018, 40).

Whatever the concrete name given – and there are considerable overlaps between the HDP Nexus, resilience, and other efforts of working more effectively, collaboratively, and sustainably towards common goals – the traditional division of labour that existed between actors working in and on complex crises and armed conflicts in particular does not appear to be sufficient anymore. In this context, the HDP Nexus can be seen as a specific tool to enhance this collaboration and to more proactively engage with the interrelated challenges complex crises provide.

Efforts towards HDP Nexus Institutionalisation

Due to its origins as a United Nations framework, it is hardly surprising that the first initiatives to operationalise the HDP Nexus emerged within the UN system. One of the first attempts to implement the HDP Nexus is the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative (HDPI), a joint effort by the United Nations and the World Bank Group to work together in new ways across the HDP Nexus in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence. It was launched in 2017, specifically to carry out country level pilots on operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.

Under the HDPI, the UN and the World Bank identify Collective Outcomes and deliver comprehensive and integrated responses to countries at risk, in protracted crisis and post-crisis situations. This includes sharing data, joint analysis, and assessment of needs, as well as aligned multi-year planning across peace,

humanitarian and development operations, which are critical to enable collaboration in these countries. The plan foresees to include seven countries in the initiative, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, and Yemen, with support coming from the UN-WBG Fragility and Conflict Partnership Trust Fund.

In 2017, the UN also formally established the Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (JSC) as a mechanism to promote greater coherence of humanitarian and development action in crises and transitions to long-term sustainable development. The JSC aims at reducing vulnerabilities to build resilience, bringing together UN agencies and the World Bank. It is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General with the Principals of OCHA and UNDP as vice-chairs. Additionally, the JSC

includes participation on a principle level of the FAO, IOM, OHCHR, PBSO, DPA, DPKO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNFPA, WFP, WHO, as well as the World Bank. JSC also works in defined priority countries, which are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is a forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the main UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. As already shown, the IASC Task Team on Strengthening the HDP Nexus was one of the leading forums for developing and implementing the Nexus, completing its task in 2019. Since then, the IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Collaboration has continued to build on this work. Its current work streams include guidance on working towards Collective Outcomes (a joint UN JSC and IASC product, targeting senior management across the humanitarian, development, and peace community at country level, but also the wider 'HDP Community').

Also involved in the development of the HDP Nexus is the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) secretariat, which organises formal consultation with OECD DAC donors to “(1) ensure coherence between the IASC/UN vision and the OECD vision; (2) consolidate lessons learned and identify good practices in selected fragile contexts; (3) key messages on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus and links to peace; (4) maintain a community of practice network in support of field practitioners; and (5) provide support to country operations through a system of pooling capacities” (UNDP 2020).

As a result of the JSC and IASC Task Team efforts, there has been extensive efforts by UN agencies in implementing NWoW and the HDP Nexus, and identifying not only how to bridge the gap between the humanitarian and development sectors, but also how they can contribute to peace.

UN humanitarian agencies have also moved into the HDP realm. The World Food Programme's (WFP) report on its contribution to peace in the context of the HDP Nexus gives a comprehensive look into how the WFP has linked its humanitarian and development activities to improving the prospects for peace and ensuring its operations do no harm in the communities and societies assisted through its programmes and country activities. It explains why and how WFP “contributes to the international community's peace-building objectives; provides evidence of the ways in which WFP's programmes have advanced the prospects for peace including evidence from four country case studies; and highlights WFP's plans for moving forward, including actions to embed conflict sensitivity and peace-building objectives into its activities and related knowledge management and evidence- collection systems” (WFP 2019).


At the inter-organisational level, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has been a highly influential setting outside of the UN system for building a broad consensus for developing and implementing the HDP Nexus. It hosts the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which brings together its member states, which are key donors, and multi-lateral institutions that have a critical role to play to ensure the success of the HDP approach. Several UN agencies participate (covering all three HDP sectors), namely the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO). It also includes the participation of multilateral development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), European Investment Bank (EIB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The “DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus” was adopted by the DAC at its Senior Level Meeting on 22 February 2019 and is a 'soft' legal instrument to which 29 OECD member states have now adhered. The European Union and the UNDP were the first non-country adherents to the DAC Recommendations, recently joined by UNICEF and the WFP (OECD 2020). The recommendations carry significant weight, even if they are not legally binding, coming out of a multi-year process with the DAC and the INCAF network.

The JSC is the only one of the three high level HDP Nexus-related policy-oriented settings to include the DPKO. There are few references to peacekeeping specifically across most reports and working documents generated around the topic of the HDP Nexus. Several reasons may exist for this. The NWoW, out of which HDP Nexus processes have developed, was originally focused on the Humanitarian and Development sectors, with peace coming in later as the 'third side' of the HDP Nexus triangle. Another reason may be that UN missions operate on a completely separate funding mechanism than traditional bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and development assistance and come with their own integrated mission approach.

The IASC's Task Team on the Humanitarian Development Nexus produced progress snapshots, which were made available in 2018. The snapshots give some indications that UN Missions are also active in a number of HDP Nexus contexts. The Central African Republic (CAR) IASC HDPN Progress Snapshot notes that there are “regular joint meetings between HCT, UNCT, the SRSG and senior leadership within the peacekeeping mission” and that the “multidimensional integrated stabilization mission has also facilitated the development of a collective sense of needs and conflict drivers” (2018c).

The HDP Nexus: Overview of Pillars and Key Components



The UNDP DRC team offered further details in a published article, noting that the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG), Resident Coordinator (RC), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), and UNDP Resident Representative (UNDP RR) in the DRC coordinate a committee composed of UNDP, OCHA, UNICEF, the World Bank, the office of DSRSG and Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) of MONUSCO, in order to operationalise the Nexus in the DRC. A meeting on the HDP Nexus implementation in the Grand Kasai region of the DRC in August 2019 presented the approach in order gain broader adherence to it, and included the Deputy SRSG, several MONUSCO representatives, as well as international humanitarian and development NGOs, EU, and donor country representatives.

As in other contexts with UN integrated peacekeeping missions, the issue of integrating peacekeeping missions in the HDP Nexus approach is the subject of ongoing debate, particularly “if it involves direct joint programming”, due to concerns raised by humanitarian organisations. Therefore, one option under consideration is focusing on coordination and strategic alignment, rather than direct programmatic cooperation (IASC 2019, 6).

The Mali IASC Snapshot, for instance, highlights a pilot project to bring together HDP actors from the three sectors, initiated between the UNDP, OCHA and the Stabilization and Recovery Section of the UN Mission in Mali, MINUSMA. “The objective of this initiative is to work on the early recovery in areas/locations where the overall security situation allows” (IASC 2018g). The Snapshot further notes that, in Mali, “the



Construction of a high school in Lontou, Mali / ©Association la Voûte Nubienne

UNDAF currently [...] involves MINUSMA”. The UN Country programme document for Mali (2020-2024) calls on mitigating security risks by “strengthening collaboration with MINUSMA, other United Nations agencies and development partners; establishing innovative implementation arrangements with civil society and non-governmental organization [...] and improving community-centric approaches and the peace-humanitarian-development nexus” (United Nations 2019, 7).

These reports of efforts on the ground show how there is engagement with UN Missions on implementing the HDP Nexus approach.

Perhaps because the HDP Nexus’ origins, meaning a predominantly donor-backed (through the Grand Bargain and INCAF) and UN-backed approach (WHS and NWoW), regional, and sub-regional international organizations have not been as much part of the discussions and implementation efforts as other relevant HDP actors. None of the main HDP Nexus high-level policy and working group formats include regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD in Sub-Saharan Africa, or elsewhere, such as the OSCE in Eurasia.

This should not be taken to mean that regional organisations have not begun their own HDP-relevant processes, or that they have not at all engaged in HDP Processes. Several regional NWoW workshops have been organised in Dakar, Senegal and Entebbe, Uganda in 2017, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders, helped to bring to fore examples and good practices, which can help learning from a regional perspective, and a further large workshop

was held in Dakar, Senegal in 2018. This included the participation of regional organizations, including ECOWAS, as well as from across civil society, local and international NGOs, UN agencies, and UN missions (OCHA / UNDP 2018).

The African Union and the United Nations have well-established ties and forms of cooperation on a wide range of issues across the HDP spectrum, if not specifically on the HDP Nexus approach itself, and often with a peace and security focus. The “Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security” and the “Framework for a Renewed UN-AU Partnership on Africa’s Integration and Development Agenda 2017-2027” (PAIDA) are specific formats for enhancing cooperation, especially in the dimension of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (ACCORD 2017). The support to the African Union also includes integrating development approaches into the AU’s peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities and training programs.

It is clear that the application of the HDP Nexus approach in Africa requires continued and strengthened cooperation between the UN, World Bank and Nexus-oriented actors with the African Union and the RECs, such as ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC. Their monitoring mechanisms and analysis capacities, as well as their ongoing peace support and peacekeeping experience make them natural partners in any HDP Nexus initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The HDP Nexus Operationalisation and Practice

The HDP Nexus is intended to enable collaboration, wherever context permits, towards Collective Outcomes, over multi-year timeframes, based on comparative advantages, with the aim to contribute to longer term gains, for instance, in terms of reducing need, protecting the vulnerable, sustainable development, and sustainable peace (IASC HDN Toolkit n.d.). Implementation, however, is a work in progress.

There is a well-established consensus that the NWoW and the implementation of the HDP Nexus cannot be done in a top-down manner, nor dictated by the United Nations agencies or other major actors. Fundamentally, NWoW, and the HDP Nexus are collaborative multi-stakeholder approaches, and one of the basic axioms is utilising the comparative advantages of a diverse set of actors. This means that there needs to be some kind of way to ensure that these diverse actors involved in the humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts are not working at odds with each other, and that the most urgent and essential human needs are being addressed.

Collective Outcomes. The concept of ‘Collective Outcomes’ has therefore been developed as a central component of the NWoW and HDP Nexus, and as a key driver for all following planning, programming and financing processes. Collective Outcomes have been defined in a few different ways. The definition developed by the IASC, in cooperation with the JSC, and based on commissioned research has developed a clear and practical definition:

“A collective outcome (CO) is a jointly envisioned result with the aim of addressing and reducing needs, risks and vulnerabilities, requiring the combined effort of humanitarian, development and peace communities and other actors as appropriate. To be effective, the CO should be context specific, engage the comparative advantage of all actors and draw on multi-year timeframes. They should be developed through joint (or joined-up) analysis, complementary planning and programming, effective leadership/coordination, refined financing beyond project-based funding and sequencing in formulation and implementation.” (IASC 2020a)

Collective Outcomes make it possible for humanitarian, development, and other actors to align efforts around clear and jointly shaped goals, helping to ensure collaboration in protracted crises is effective and delivers results for the most vulnerable. It is the shared vision to which all actors, whether INGOs or multi-lateral, national or international, aim to

contribute to, and should be developed through a broad stakeholder consultation process. The Collective Outcomes enable these diverse actors to overcome their different orientations within the HDP Nexus by placing the emphasis on agreeing on the landing point, with the actors asking themselves “What do we want to achieve collectively over 3 to 5 years as instalments towards the 2030 Agenda?” (OCHA 2018). This allows for the full range of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding and peacekeeping actors to engage in a context based on their comparative advantages and guided by their own humanitarian or other values and imperatives.


The Collective Outcomes are part of a set of processes needed for the implementation of the Nexus. Suggestions on the process are explored in greater operational detail in the IASC’s “Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes” (IASC 2020b). A first step is determining what the best entry points for Nexus planning and Collective Outcomes are. The entry is either initiated by the UN RC / HC (or triple-hatted DSRSG) or generated among the HDP Community in-country. In this process, the government’s positive or negative role in the protracted crisis can be considered, in order to determine to what extent the government needs to be part of the process. In practice, this may be difficult to do in an impartial way, without push-back from governments if they are left out or marginalized (an issue discussed below under the heading of humanitarian concerns). A next step is bringing together the diverse range of relevant stakeholders, ensuring that the process is inclusive and that no one who should be included is left out.

Joint analysis. Joint analysis is the preferred approach for identifying and understanding the drivers and root causes of protracted crises, risks and vulnerabilities, their humanitarian consequences, conflict drivers, fault lines, and stakeholders. This process should include agreeing on a conceptual framework for the joint analysis, mobilising capacity for joint analysis, determining the scope of the local, national, and regional context, and preparing a plan for data collection and analysis. Based on the analysis, programming for Collective Outcomes entails developing SMART Collective Outcomes that can be implemented over a three to five-year time frame by actors demonstrating appropriate comparative advantage working in each of the three pillars.

In practice, however, there are no clear standards yet for what a Collective Outcome should look like. As noted in the “Collective Outcomes Progress Mapping” working document of the IASC HDN Task Team, “implementation, understanding, and even expectations for what and how collective outcomes should be

HDP Nexus Implementation Steps

Based on IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes, May 2020



varies widely in their interpretation and has resulted in COs that are pitched at different levels of specificity, granularity (national/sub-national), and timeframes’ (2019).

Implementing Collective Outcomes includes the strengthening of coordination and information management at national and sub-national levels, between but also within agencies, and with national counterparts. These coordination mechanisms can evolve in a formal or informal, more ad-hoc way. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. While a needs-based, pragmatic perspective would prefer informal mechanisms that are actor-driven, high staff turnover and a quickly changing structural environment suggest formal mechanisms that are easier to institutionalise. Existing coordination mechanisms for achieving Collective Outcomes, hence, may require adjusting existing mechanisms or the creation of new ones.

Monitoring progress and evaluating results ensures that progress is being made towards achieving the Collective Outcomes, and to adapt when needed. M&E frameworks and mechanisms from existing programmes for collective outcomes should be used to the extent possible. The IASC Light Guidance document furthermore suggests that leaders in the HDP Community should use the joint analysis as a clear baseline from which performance will be measured.

The specific task of disseminating M&E findings and monitoring the adjustments that the HDP Community make to their programming should be coordinated by a ‘duty bearer’. At the UN level, the RCO is suggested as a likely candidate for this, although a more critical scrutiny might insist that this can create a conflict of interest for the RCO, and that a neutral monitoring process by third-party is required. An independent monitoring and evaluation process would allow for critical feedback not encumbered by political concerns.

Financing. Besides Collective Outcomes, financing has developed into the second pivotal pillar of HDP operationalisation. The two key issues that financing has to address is (1) to be aligned with Collective Outcome processes – hence it has to attract implementing agencies from different sectors, ideally in joint collaborative efforts – and (2) flexibility. Such flexibility especially concerns the different funding patterns between the three HDP sectors – short-term humanitarian funding, mid-term project cycles in development, ideally long-term peace-building financing – and the general long-term character of the engagement in complex crises and transition processes.

Country-level pool funding has been identified as one of the main instruments to support these aims (NYU 2019) and link them to collective outcome processes as well as to the localisation agenda. Interview respondents also confirmed the helpful role of pool funding for



Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa Training of Trainers course at the KAIPTC / © ASPR

catalysing collaborative efforts, for instance between UN missions and the UN country teams, or even within large civil society organisations with both humanitarian and development programmes.

Furthermore, the HDP Nexus can be used as “an opportunity to further use development aid to attract private sector investment” (Oxfam 2019), whereby the concrete evidence for the success of this assumption is still lacking. The UN’s pooled funds increased by nearly 25% from 2018 to 2019 and have more than doubled since 2013 (Thomas and Urquhart 2020). Overall, however, pooled funding still covers less than 10% of current ODA funding mechanisms.

One persistent funding-related issue is the practice of donors earmarking funds. This is often because there is a specific policy priority of the donor, whatever it may be. This goes counter to the call for greater flexibility of funding needed to implement the Nexus approach. One of the interviewees from an international organization pointed to a way out being earmarking to results rather than to activities. An interviewee from an international organization noted,

“There is still a lot of earmarking today, more and more now. In part, it is a need for governments to justify spending to their domestic public. What would be fantastic is to earmark to results and not to earmark to activities. For example, the earmark could be for- reducing malnutrition by 10%. This funding can then be used for whatever would best contribute to that result, whether a feeding centre, policy change initiatives, road for produce to be transported on, ensuring adequate cash in the environment, or water quality, etc. The key is that the earmarking should be to results – never to activities.”

Humanitarian Sector Concerns

The question of how to bridge immediate humanitarian responses with long-term development and peace needs, while respecting the humanitarian principles has been an enduring challenge. Humanitarian assistance addresses immediate needs, for example food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical care, but the needs may endure for a long time because of the broader context. Until that broader context is addressed, the need remains. The proposition offered by the HDP Nexus, and underlying the rationale of the Grand Bargain, is that the duration of the humanitarian crisis can be reduced through development and peacebuilding efforts, and thereby increasing the efficiency of resources used.

In recent years, humanitarian agencies themselves have increasingly shifted to operationalising the HDP agenda within their own organisations, partly by expanding their mandates towards long-term relief, which can be understood as de-facto development, often driven by practical challenges such as refugee or IDP camp management. At the same time, a number of humanitarian agencies are getting increasingly engaged in practices such as humanitarian negotiation and mediation, which significantly overlap with peacebuilding. Organisational initiatives, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, or the more recent Frontline Negotiations initiative, are an outcome of this shift. Nowadays, most of the large humanitarian organisations now employ conflict analysts and are engaged in ceasefire negotiations, in places as varied as Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan.

These practices, in turn, have resulted in a more pragmatic interpretation of the humanitarian mandate. While conceptual differences remain – a ceasefire is not negotiated predominantly as a precursor for a peace process (even though it might work as one), but as a precondition for humanitarian aid delivery – the restrictions towards neutrality and impartiality, for most organisations, are interpreted more flexibly. Examples such as Syria show that mediating in one context might exclude an organisation from working in another context, which implies the need for political decision-making.

As already discussed, the humanitarian principles – especially neutrality and impartiality – have historically been a significant concern for enhanced collaboration by humanitarian agencies with development and especially peacekeeping/peacebuilding actors. In recent years, these relationships have eased. One of the main practical reasons for the more pragmatic approach taken by humanitarian organisations is their ever-increasing collaboration with peacekeeping missions in countries where such missions are present. Interviews with UN missions confirm that

especially the protection of civilians (PoC) agenda has facilitated this collaboration. The establishment of huge PoC sites – de-facto IDP camps of displaced from locations in the closer surroundings – and related humanitarian hubs, for instance in South Sudan, have fostered collaboration, as have now practices such as, as a last resort in highly volatile contexts, the armed protection of humanitarian aid convoys by UN missions.

Key concerns and criticisms from the humanitarian sector's perspective require further discussion, however. Taking these concerns and potentially serious issues into account as part of the HDP Nexus approach can go a long way to alleviating the concerns and strengthen the Nexus approach. Back in 2016, MSF pulled out of the World Humanitarian Summit, and published an open letter criticising the focus on the “incorporation of humanitarian assistance into a broader development and resilience agenda” and that this “threatens to dissolve humanitarian assistance into wider development, peace-building and political agendas” (MSF 2016). Since then, MSF has engaged with Nexus discussions, such as those facilitated by the IASC and the OECD DAC/INCAF, but it has maintained its concerns with the approach, and does not engage with HDP implementation efforts on a field level.

One concern raised in humanitarian circles is that the HDP Nexus remains a top-down approach, driven by discussions in capitals of donor countries, rather than coming out of a field-level identified need. At the same time, it is seen as too controlled and centralized in its current iterations. An interviewee from an INGO working in the humanitarian sector stated,

“No one in humanitarian crisis was saying what we need to do. It is very much about being more ‘efficient’. Also, you see the genesis of this idea, viewed from the perspective of a financial crisis, or perceived crisis, the idea that we can reduce the financial burden by ending the crises, but not based on any sort of analysis of what are driving the crises themselves.”

Otherwise, the Nexus approach may “lead to the impression among donor and host governments that good practice dictates humanitarian actors to prioritize their actions according to national development or foreign policy objectives, even where this does not align with the most urgent needs of the affected population”. (MSF Korea 2019, a view echoed by an interviewee from a Humanitarian INGO).

In principle, the HDP Nexus is conceived to be context specific on the issue of cooperation with governments.

The IASC's Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes addresses this.

“The IASC’s initial analysis of typologies of engagement [...] outlines five basic scenarios characterizing positive to negative roles governments may play in protracted crises. The HDP Community should use the typologies and dialogue with government officials to choose whether and when to seek government leadership or participation” (2020, 5,18).

However, in practice this can prove to be difficult, in particular for the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), who is often at the centre of HDP Nexus implementation and increasingly ‘double-hatted’ as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or even ‘triple-hatted’ as DSRSG, given that they need to ensure good working relations with the government and its various ministries as part of the core functioning of the RCO. Explaining that aid will bypass government structures due to low capacity and not being considered as a ‘responsible’ government will certainly elicit a strong response from any government. The exact case cited positively in the IASC Light Guidance document, the routing of assistance through the Ethiopian government to address the 2017 drought response in the country, is also that cited by an interviewee from an INGO as being a case in which aid did not reach those who needed it most, in particular in the Somali region where humanitarian access was reportedly restricted and lives were lost due to an inadequate humanitarian response.

The shifting of funds away from humanitarian responses that address immediate needs of vulnerable populations in favour of development for a more sustainable infrastructure to address those same needs has been pointed out as something which poses a risk for humanitarian assistance.

“There is no moral democratic or principled mandate to take away from people life-saving assistance that they need right now, with some notion that you are going to stabilise the situation in the future. When it comes to Sphere standards, they are minimum standards for a reason. Minimum for sustaining life for a population.” - Interviewee from a humanitarian INGO

An example given by this interviewee took place in a refugee camp in Uganda. Water provisions required expensive trucking of water to the camp. Ideally, a more sustainable method of water delivery would be preferable. However, the funding for this water infrastructure development activity was at least in part taken from the funding for the ongoing water provision by truck. This resulted in a reduction in the

target for water provisioning for those in the camps to a level below that set by the Sphere standards.

A matter of grave concern, since it affects the ability of humanitarian actors to provide services and protects the lives of humanitarian workers, is ensuring that they are still perceived as neutral. When integrated peacekeeping missions engage in humanitarian-like activities, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), there is a certain chance that all humanitarian workers will be considered as part of the peacekeeping force. In extreme cases, humanitarian actors are at risk to being perceived as political actors taking clear sides. In this case, access is lost, as is largely the case in Borno, Nigeria, with a population of over a million people, where humanitarian agencies are seen by armed actors as agents of the national government. IS/ISIS-affiliated groups, as well, have called on attacks against humanitarian workers precisely on the basis that they are now seen being partial, using Borno as an example to prove their case.

Recognising the potentially negative impact of humanitarian (and development) aid is meanwhile well-established. This recognition is at the core of conflict sensitivity and the Do No Harm approach that are being used since the 1990s. What is a possible added value of the Nexus approach is having a more coordinated approach based on Collective Outcomes, to which the three components of the Nexus contribute, while ensuring that humanitarian actors continue to live by, and be protected by, the humanitarian principles which have served well until now.

If resources are channelled through government structures in order to address a crisis, there needs to be some kind of assurance, some contemporaneous monitoring mechanism that is mandated as a precondition, in order to ensure that this aid leads to the provision of humanitarian relief services on the ground, and not lost along the way. These mechanisms are, at times, pioneered by regional development banks. One example is the support of the African Development Bank (AfDB) for the South Sudanese customs service, which included a number of externally monitored benchmarking procedures, including the request for a foreign head of agency. Such initiatives may provide valuable lessons for monitoring and evaluating HDP Nexus implementation in general as well.

Peace in the HDP Nexus

The HDP Nexus emerged as an HD Nexus with Peace added later. IASC working documents often refer to the “Humanitarian-Development Nexus and its Links to Peace”. This historical trajectory is still felt in a conceivable gap between the clearly mandated fields of humanitarian aid and development, on the one hand, and the more loosely organised field of peacebuilding, including but by far not limited to peace support operations, on the other. The discussion of how peace should be incorporated into the Nexus have not adequately addressed how ‘peace’ should be interpreted and understood. Is it the peace of civil society organization, community activism, dialogue activities, the ‘soft’ peace? Or is it the ‘peace’ of peacekeeping, the ‘hard’ edge of peace, referring to the military forces which make up a considerable part of UN Peacekeeping missions?

There are two answers to these questions. On the one hand, the definitions of peace are handled in a pragmatic way that supports the interests of the organisations involved: “when discussing the nexus, different actors interpret ‘peace’ differently, seemingly often according to their respective interests and agendas” (Oxfam 2019, 12). Such a pragmatic approach is not necessarily a problem, since, arguably, the focus should be put on defining concrete and tangible outcomes without getting entrenched in often fruitless principled debates about the character of ‘peace’.

Nevertheless, deliberately linking peace with humanitarian relief and development unavoidably favours a broad concept of peace that goes beyond elements of ‘negative peace’ in the sense of conflict management.

In doing so, the HDP Nexus progresses on a path that UN peacekeeping has started with the ‘integrated mission’ approach, which evolved out of the claim that ‘hard’ peacekeeping alone is too limited to work in situations of complex crises that lack a clear line of separation that could be ‘kept’. Drawing on ‘positive peace’-thinking, the 2030 Agenda process, especially via SDG16, added peace as a core component to the sustainable development effort. Peace, in turn, became more developmental and refocused from the work on conflict settlements and with conflict parties into a long-term effort focused on root causes which, among HDP actors, have become increasingly defined in socio-economic terms. Such an interpretation of peace is certainly a challenge for peacekeeping which, through their mandates, is still predominantly concerned with a more limited vision of peace, and this certainly provides a challenge to the integration of peacekeeping missions into the HDP Nexus.

As a consequence of the broadened and deliberately positive interpretation of peace inherent in the Nexus, our empirical investigation confirms that many organisations can imagine greater cooperation in the field with the ‘soft’ peace actors, especially when engaging at the community level. There is a far more cautious and deeper reluctance to be seen to have anything to do with armed peace and security actors. Even within the ongoing UN processes around the HDP Nexus, the debate around security elements within the Nexus has not yet been deeply engaged with, according to one interviewee with a UN background, although it is starting to happen.

The HDP Nexus in Peace Negotiations

From a peacemaking standpoint, the inclusion of humanitarian and development issues into peace negotiations and subsequent agreements is a major benchmark that can provide pathways for better coordination in post-conflict transition processes. The history of such inclusion is mixed, as confirmed by interviewees involved in international peace mediation and comparative peace agreement data provided by the PA-X database.

Particularly in African conflict settings, the issues are addressed, although rarely in a systematic way. While development and humanitarian actors are partially involved in negotiations, there is a considerable gap between international pledging efforts and compacts, and the concrete work on the ground. The Collective Outcomes-dimension of the HDP Nexus could

provide useful guidance here, but often falls short of addressing mid- to longer-term challenges that frequently remain hidden behind the often-short-term focus of peace process implementation.

Historically, a comparison of all peace agreements signed since 1990 shows a remarkable continuity of humanitarian and development issues addressed in peace agreements. Because of the large number of agreements negotiated and signed in the post-Yugoslav wars in South-Eastern Europe, the 1990s still dominate in absolute numbers. However, two interesting trends that affect HDP Nexus-related work have emerged since the mid-2000s. First, the number of references to socio-economic development decline significantly, especially when comparing them to the total number of agreements (see graph 1).

Humanitarian Aid and Development in Peace Agreements

1990-2019 (total numbers)




Graph 1: Total number of stipulations referring to humanitarian aid and development in peace agreements from 1990-2019

This trend reflects a wider issue in peace negotiations that also concerns the current state of peacekeeping and peacebuilding: the number of comprehensive peace processes declines, mainly because of global structural shifts that render an alignment of international powers behind a certain peacemaking effort increasingly unlikely. Instead, armed conflicts, once again, tend to regionalise and internationalise by taking on a proxy component: conflict settings such as Libya, Yemen, or Syria are unfortunate examples of this development.

In a second, closely related trend, the number of agreement provisions enabling or referring to humanitarian aid increases – in absolute (see graph 1, whereby the numbers for 2019 are tentative and not yet complete) as well as in relative numbers. Especially protracted, highly violent conflicts produce peculiar agreements, often local, short-term ceasefires, that predominantly enable the delivery of relief and humanitarian access (for example, to recover wounded combatants or evacuate the civilian population).

Humanitarian Aid and Development in Peace Agreements

1990-2019 (in percentages)



Graph 2: Percentage of agreements containing stipulations referring to humanitarian aid and development from 1990-2019

Inclusion of Humanitarian and Development Issues in Peace Processes

	Agree-ments	HD Mentions	Soc-Econ Dev	Hum Aid	Infr. Dev & Rec
Darfur-Sudan peace process	25	80	36	64	28
Afghanistan: 2000s Post-intervention process	22	77.27	68.18	9.09	36.36
Myanmar ceasefires process w/ ethnic armed groups	35	71.43	68.57	14.29	8.57
Sudanese (North-South) peace process	31	70.97	54.84	19.35	45.16
South Sudan ARCSS process	26	69.23	23.08	57.69	30.77
Mali Local Processes	13	69.23	7.69	46.15	23.08
Kordofan - Blue Nile - Abyei process	18	66.67	55.56	22.22	33.33
Sri Lanka LTTE 2002 onward process	23	65.22	43.48	43.48	34.78
Indonesia-Aceh peace process	19	63.16	15.79	52.63	15.79
South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements	19	63.16	52.63	21.05	36.84
Syrian peace process	18	61.11	5.56	55.56	11.11
Israel-Palestine peace process	33	54.55	48.48	0	15.15
DRC: Eastern DRC processes	11	54.55	36.36	9.09	27.27
Other selected processes:					
CAR: coups and rebellions process	15	53.33	40	20	13.33
North - South Sudan secession process	18	50	44.44	0	5.56
Kenya peace process	12	50	50	8.33	0
Bosnia peace process	124	47.58	9.68	37.9	10.48
Yemen peace process	28	46.43	17.86	28.57	17.86
South Africa peace process	11	45.45	36.36	9.09	18.18
Somalia Peace Process	42	45.24	45.24	0	0
Burundi: Arusha and related peace process	22	40.91	40.91	0	18.18
DRC: Second Congo war process	15	40	40	6.67	6.67
Philippines - Mindanao process	124	38.71	38.71	0	0
Liberia peace process	30	30	13.33	23.33	6.67
Libyan peace process	12	16.67	8.33	8.33	16.67
Morocco-Western Sahara peace process	11	0	0	0	0

Table 1: Inclusion of humanitarian and development issues in peace processes ¹

¹ HD Mentions – references to humanitarian and development issues; Soc-Econ Dev – references to socio-economic development; Hum Aid – references to humanitarian aid in concrete terms, references to funding and pledging are excluded; Infr Dev & Rec – references to infrastructure development and recovery. The numbers represent percentage points of peace agreements total in the respective process. The colour codes represent the prevalence: blue: very high percentage, to grey: very low percentage.

A look at specific peace processes confirms this assessment. Comprehensive peace processes with strong international involvement tend to substantially include both humanitarian and development issues, such as in Darfur, South Sudan, or Sri Lanka. Some processes are designed around the issue of development, which is often used in negotiations as a lever to address the so-called 'root causes' and, de facto, to provide an economic incentive for non-state armed groups to join the process – see, for instance, Afghanistan, Myanmar, or Palestine. More recent protracted conflicts, in turn, have hardly reached the stage of negotiating development issues and remain at the stage of humanitarian efforts, see for instance Mali, Syria, and, to an extent, Yemen.

The form of negotiations is still predominantly contextual and reflects peacemaking dynamics. Somalia, Burundi, and the second phase of the DRC

negotiations, for instance, focus fully on development concerns and do not touch issues of humanitarian relief.

While these patterns, of course, do not translate into cooperation structures among actors on the ground, they still show the structural challenges the HDP Nexus has to face. There needs to be a joint problematisation and mobilisation of all actors – and especially the parties to a peace process – behind issues of humanitarian relief and development when negotiating conflict transitions that goes beyond the simple acknowledgement that more money and effort is needed. Especially peace negotiations can provide a critical juncture for discussing and formulating Collective Outcomes, since these are topics touched upon anyway in the course of most negotiations. However, a systematic lens on the interrelations appears to be still lacking.

Institutional Approaches to the HDP Nexus

The institutional approaches towards the HDP Nexus differ, depending on the size of the organisation, its type (international, national, local), and its mandate and concrete emphasis. Generally, larger organisations appear to have become proactively engaged in HDP Nexus uptake, especially because the silo-thinking within their structures has already been identified as an organisational problem even before the Nexus had been formally established.

Multilateral approaches. The most significant driver of the HDP Nexus has been the United Nations, in particular the UNDP, the WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, IOM, and the PBSO. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has been a strong advocate for promoting a sustaining peace and conflict prevention agenda alongside humanitarian and development assistance for which he has brought together senior UN officials, including special representatives. There is therefore a strong and active commitment by these UN agencies for implementing the HDP Nexus.

If the impetus for the HDP Nexus has come out of the UN system, it should not be perceived as an UN-centric approach. The NWoW and the HDP Nexus have included significant buy-in and engagement by other multi-lateral institutions early on – especially through the OECD-DAC and by the World Bank. This has been a significant factor in establishing the HDP Nexus broadly enough across the wide range of actors needed for its implementation.

High-level coordination on the HDP Nexus occurs through the UN's JSC, consisting of UN Agencies plus the World Bank, the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) of the OECD's Development

Assistance Committee, bringing together donor countries (the OECD member states), and multilateral development banks.

The DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus calls for the provision of appropriate resourcing to empower leadership and strengthen coordination across the Nexus, including by supporting local and national authorities, and legitimate nonstate authorities, wherever possible and appropriate and in accordance with international law. It urges donors to undertake joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict, and identify Collective Outcomes incorporating humanitarian, development, and peace actions. It also stresses the importance of incentivising international actors to invest in local capacities (OECD 2019, sec. III.).

The 29 OECD states which adhere to the DAC Recommendations show that there is significant institutional buy-in by the majority of key donor countries. This, in turn, should be translated into the bilateral assistance from these countries, although to various degrees. Some countries, such as the UK, Denmark, Sweden have helped lead the way. However, not all INCAF participants have integrated the HDP Nexus in their development programming. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has not been at the forefront of the approach. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that there is often a considerable gap between the institutional policy commitments of the large donor organisations and their activities on the ground, especially in cases where the staff is not fully on board with the policy messaging that may often be perceived as being too distant from the practical realities of working on the ground.

Peacekeeping missions. The consequences the HDP Nexus has for UN peacekeeping are indirect but still considerable. Due to their separate funding stream, UN peacekeeping missions are not entitled to use Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) instruments. However, Nexus-induced financing and reasoning has had its impact on the missions. On the one hand, recent years have seen a sharp increase in non-military tasks and agencies UN peacekeeping missions are undertaking – offices such as civil affairs, political affairs, human rights or rule of law represent this trend which is very much part of the ‘integrated missions’ agenda. On the other hand, UN missions are increasingly approached as integral partners by consortiums of UN agencies and other implementing partners that work in Nexus-related projects and seek the specific expertise and assistance of the missions. This process has, in turn, led to a further bolstering of the civilian components and to better coordination within missions.

Peacebuilding agencies. The implications of the HDP Nexus on the peacebuilding realm largely depend on the institutional situatedness of the respective organisations. Within the UN, peacekeeping and peacebuilding have a mainstream status. UN missions usually have their own stream of project budgeting, and are therefore less concerned about collaborations than, for instance, the civil society sector. Often, there is still the perception, even within the UN system, that UN missions tend to side-line the UN country team or vice-versa, a long-standing challenge that has become once more problematised in the context of operationalising the HDP Nexus.

However, peacebuilding within bilateral and civil society organisations has a different stance. Largely funded by development money, peacebuilding here has more the role of a side-stream that accompanies the mainstream of economic development, either by accompanying projects or by efforts of conflict sensitivity mainstreaming. Consequently, in this sector the language of the HDP Nexus has seen a proactive uptake and the push towards the mainstream sectors to acknowledge the imperative role of peacebuilding for sustainable transitional work. However, the challenge is again financing. Attracting prevention funding for activities in complex crises remains an ongoing challenge. Even in post-conflict transitions, a major part of funding is channelled towards socio-economic recovery rather than towards specific peacebuilding activities. Earmarking remains one important element in tackling this challenge, however this earmarking needs to provide for flexibility. The initiative by the UK government to designate 50% of their ODA funding for fragile states is one best practice example that responds to this challenge.

Implementing development agencies and INGOs. It is true that humanitarian and development work have different mandates, differences in funding mechanisms and in their ways of working (Dūdaitė 2018, 35). This is one of the reasons for the HDP Nexus, to break down the barriers between these silos of activities. The two sectors not only have different ways of working and different funding mechanisms, but also different mandates. This is also true of peacebuilding-related work. However, international NGOs and bilateral development agencies are not

>> Developing Common Definitions <<

The OECD-DAC “Recommendations on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus” include a number of definitions which can serve as a basis for a common understanding of the HDP Nexus.

Nexus refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development, and peace actions.

Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence, and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.

Collective outcome refers to a commonly agreed measurable result or impact enhanced by the combined effort of different actors, within their respective mandates, to address and reduce people’s unmet needs, risks and vulnerabilities, increasing their resilience and addressing the root causes of conflict.

Comparative advantage refers to the demonstrated capacity and expertise (not limited solely to a mandate) of one individual, group or institution to meet needs.

Joined-up refers to the coherent and complementary coordination, programming and financing of humanitarian, development and peace actions that are based on shared risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis; while ensuring that humanitarian action always remains needs-based and principled.

(OECD 2019)

new to simultaneously navigating humanitarian and development, and even peace support, activities within a particular context.


The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) has developed a planning and management tool for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). All GIZ projects must apply the PCIA tool if there is a heightened conflict context, and all GIZ projects in conflict contexts, whether humanitarian or development oriented, must contribute in some way to addressing the Peacebuilding Needs that have been identified in that context by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and GIZ.

Other development agencies also have developed their own conflict sensitive approaches and engage in activities which fit under the three components of the HDP Nexus. It is also common for International NGOs to engage in both humanitarian and development work and engage in peacebuilding-related activities. However not all NGOs approve of the HDP Nexus approach, especially those which are strongly oriented towards humanitarian action.

There is in part a wariness that the HDP Nexus becomes ‘too much jargon’ based on a global policy idea rather than in terms of what it means for a specific problem, such as displacement, and in a particular context. It is the needs on the ground which then should determine what kind of joined-up planning and cooperation is needed to address specific needs. An interviewee from an INGO noted,

“Where there are advances on Nexus, for instance in Somalia on the durable solutions work that has happened, it has been because there is an operational requirement for it. And a real collaboration around a new way of working that is grounded in the needs on the ground. So you have different actors coming together and bringing their different competencies together and finding funding instruments that would work for that instance. There is a need to get away from the terminology of the Nexus which I think is just too broad and to think just what it means for a specific thematic area, and how to find more holistic solution to that particular problem. I don’t think it is helpful to think of it globally as different actors coming together on an international level.”

A further concern is that the HDP Nexus becomes imposed in a top-down way, and that humanitarian actors will be directed to provide humanitarian aid in a particular way to serve interests other than those specified by the humanitarian principles. If the HDP Nexus becomes a rationale for directing humanitarian actors to support peace processes or stabilisation in a conflict setting, then there would indeed be a real risk that principled humanitarian action will no longer be possible and that humanitarian actors will be denied access or become targets (Thomas 2019, 32–33). The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) is currently working on a document addressing concerns around humanitarian issues.



Training participants taking part in a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) course at the KAIPTC.
© GIZ / Michael Tsegaye

Best Practices and Biggest Gaps in HDP Nexus Uptake and Implementation

Efforts to implement the HDP Nexus are still relatively new, with the first efforts being initiated in 2017, such as the UN-World Bank joint Humanitarian Development Peace Initiative and the JSC priority countries. There are also efforts by UN agencies, donor countries, and international NGOs to develop the HDP Nexus approach. The implementation of the HDP Nexus varies widely across these different initiatives and contexts. Based on these experiences of the past several years, lessons have already been learned and still-existing gaps in implementation have been identified.

The various settings allowing for different types of HDP Nexus stakeholders (UN, other multilateral organisations, donors, INGOs, various development agencies) to interact, discuss, and jointly develop policy and implementation recommendations have shown a lot of success. As a result, there is a much broader and more defined understanding of what the HDP Nexus is and how to shape policy to enable its implementation.

INCAF is sharing best practice amongst members and through its on-going support for its flagship 'States of Fragility' report and, in particular, to ensure that the evidence of what works in fragile contexts is more effectively translated from policy into practice (INCAF 2018). The IASC Task Team on the HDP Nexus (until 2019) and the IASC Working Group 4 documentation are a valuable source of information, including key messages and "HDPN Progress Snapshots" from efforts in Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Mauritania, which provide insights into the implementation of the HDP Nexus in those different contexts. JSC priority countries have also been a source of significant experience and lessons on implementation.

Some examples show a successful operationalisation of the Nexus in concrete initiatives. In Bangladesh, for instance, where refugees cooking with firewood is a major environmental issue and also a source of conflict with the host population, a joint humanitarian and development intervention has converted one million people from firewood to gas and begun a reforestation project. This has reduced pollution and deforestation, created jobs, and decreased tensions between refugees and host populations (Redvers and Parker 2019).

The WFP uses a community-based participatory approach to identify and implement food security activities to minimise risks of inequitable allocation resources and strengthen the resilience of communities, described in its report, "Triple Nexus: WFP's Contributions to Peace".

"In Mali, for example, an interagency pilot project with WFP as the lead agency was initiated in 2018 to address ongoing violence between pastoralists and farmers in the commune of Diankabou, in the Mopti region. Based on a participatory community-wide planning process, land for a communal garden was identified, a water management committee was established along with village credit and savings groups. In addition, a community-based conflict mediation process was established, and 500 households were targeted to receive training to become 'peers for peace'. SIPRI reported that these efforts substantially reduced tensions and fostered economic linkages between different previously divided villagers, thereby helping to decrease violence." (WFP, 2019a)

Relevant lessons for implementing the HDP Nexus can be drawn not only from the past several years, but on the entire set of experiences made over the past decades in bridging humanitarian, development, and peace efforts. The overall goal is to promote stability, social cohesion and state-citizen trust by supporting people's livelihoods and access to services such as health, education and employment, and increasing their resilience to shocks. WFP responded in 2013 by adopting a policy "WFP's Role in Peace-building in Transition Settings", which outlines principles and programming approaches for supporting wider efforts to help countries restore peace. The policy highlights the importance of 'do no harm' by unintentionally adding to existing tensions, and of supporting actions at both local and national levels. Subsequently, WFP signed up in 2016 to the 'Peace Promise', a set of commitments by 30 international and non-governmental organisations to address the basic causes of conflict by, inter alia, aligning their assistance and using conflict-sensitive approaches (WFP 2019a, 5).

Joint analyses, which bring together international and local organisations from different HDP fields amalgamate different expertise and approaches. Data sharing has served in a number of instances as an enabling first step towards meaningful cooperation, although certain humanitarian actors have concerns about sharing sensitive data. Specific outcomes on (gender) equality help to focus on women's or marginalised group's equal access and rights but they also bear the risk of being tokenised. Meanwhile, it is commonly accepted that all outcomes must be gender and conflict sensitive, and the financing must be clearly linked to the respective (gender) markers.

Flexibility in the process of participating in comprehensive collaborative efforts is seen, especially by humanitarian actors, as essential for greater participation and engagement in the HDP Nexus process. This means that the Nexus cannot be a package deal, requiring those who participate to commit to all aspects of analysis, Collective Outcome determination, financing, programming, and monitoring. Individual actors, from across the HDP range of actors, on all levels, should be able to contribute to those aspects of the Nexus which they are able and willing to contribute to. Therefore, an organisation may choose to participate in joint analysis, but not subscribe to the Collective Outcomes if they find them not to be in line with their own mandates or values. Or they may come in after the Collective Outcomes have been determined and find a way to contribute to those.

The analysis and development of Collective Outcomes should be as pluralistic as possible. Based on experiences made by the UNDP among others, there are some options for what the process can look like. Although the HDP Nexus approach should be conceived as a decentralised approach, not imposed from the top-down, each context will need someone to help keep the space and ensure the HDP Nexus processes are facilitated. Often, this may be the UN Resident Coordinator Office (RCO), but could be a donor country, or some other well regarded and well-informed institution or organization. Joint analysis can be started by desk research and gathering available materials and reports. These are followed by a two-three-day workshop.

These workshops have taken various forms. One of the interviewees who has an international organization background and has participated in several such workshops, gave an outline of how these can take place. Workshops should be diverse and include 60-70 participants, with usually one person, at most two, per participating organization or agency. They can

come from the local or national level, including NGOs, CSOs, chamber of commerce, government ministries and agencies, as well as the INGOs, international and multilateral organizations, donors, development banks. The diversity of expertise, knowledge, and background, whether local knowledge or thematic expertise, helps set the implementation of a Nexus approach on a solid foundation. For these processes, external expertise on the HDP Nexus approach and on implementation is still needed to facilitate the process effectively.

Based on feedback from a range of interviewees, one promising approach may be the establishment of a pool of HDP Nexus experts who can support the establishment of the Nexus in a particular context. Such an approach would also push the standardisation of the tools and methods used, bringing in lessons learned from other processes, while ensuring that these lessons are adapted to the specific needs in the given context. The argument made in favour of this approach is that HDP-relevant actors are themselves focused on their primary activities, and do not have much time for developing HDP Nexus expertise. External experts can therefore contribute by facilitating the implementation of HDP Nexus processes, such as Collective Outcome workshops, and bring in their experience, so that best practices can be established from the start.

Interviewees from different types of organisations have raised the lack of conflict analysis capacity as the most serious shortcoming of the Nexus operationalisation to date. While large organisations have started to install conflict advisors and these conflict advisors also tend to set up and institutionalise forms of mutual collaboration, the overall capacity is still assessed as being very low. This shortcoming concerns intra-institutional gaps between different sectors and engagement streams, as well as the general role of aligning ongoing activities with the overarching goal of a post-conflict transition out of complex crises.

Financing the HDP Nexus Approach

The predominant funding streams in countries characterised by complex crises still run along the traditional sectors. Recent assessments have, thereby, confirmed the concern raised by the peacebuilding community that peacebuilding is chronically underfunded. Recent data OECD data (see graph 3 below) shows that development financing is by far dominating. A strong increase of humanitarian funding over the last five years has not been matched by a comparative investment in peacebuilding.


Nexus-related financing models can be distinguished by the types of donors involved (e.g. multi donor funds and development banks, bilateral funding,

foundations), by sectors (e.g. humanitarian funding, development funding), or by thematic approaches (e.g. development actors often engage at the national level on strengthening systems and policy reform, while humanitarians more often engage at individual, community and local-systems level (NRC 2019, 16), or by type of financing (e.g. funding, direct budget support as loans and grants, guarantees).

The cluster approach as well as the coordinating role played by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) make coordination easier for the humanitarian sector. Actors want their projects to be visible in the annual Humanitarian

ODA to Fragile Contexts by Donor - HDP Nexus

in billion USD



Graph 3: Funding in the three elements of the HDP Nexus (OECD States of Fragility data)


Response Plan (HRP) for a protracted or sudden onset emergency that requires international humanitarian assistance as this enhances their chance to be funded through country-based pooled funds and by bilateral donors. Participation in coordination also has a financial incentive.

“Development actors, in contrast, face disincentives to coordinate. Coordination on the whole is not funded and significant antipathy was expressed toward the added burden of coordinating, and scepticism was expressed about the return on investment. National authorities tend to lead the coordination of development work, which means that if governance is weak so is coordination.” (NRC 2019, 20)

Collaboration based on the HDP Nexus is particularly a challenge for the humanitarian sector, with predominantly multilateral funding, and the development sector, which has a higher proportion of bilateral donor funding. Development funding is predominantly bilateral. In 2018, DAC countries disbursed 73% of total ODA bilaterally, of which 20% was channelled through multilateral organisations (earmarked contributions). Core multilateral contributions represented 27% of total ODA. The highest share of multilateral contributions went to United Nations organisations, followed by EU institutions, and the World Bank Group. Direct budget support – both loans and grants – has expanded significantly, particularly with the engagement of the IMF and the increased engagement of the World Bank and regional institutions such as the African Development Bank (NYU CIC 2019).

Bilateral ODA by Allocations

DAC countries and other official providers
gross disbursements, million USD, 2018 constant prices



Graph 4: DAC countries and other official providers - Bilateral ODA by extremely fragile, other fragile and non-fragile context. (OECD-iLibrary 2019)

While humanitarian pooled funds are often constrained in their ability to support non-lifesaving activities, development-oriented funding sources are often too slow to link up with humanitarian activities. In terms of high-impact development funding, country-level pooled funds, as provided by Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Canada, are promising mechanisms for improving coordination and financing Collective Outcomes for the HDP Nexus. They incentivize coherence, also by empowering UN RCs/HCs to ensure that plans and programs support shared objectives.

In emergency relief and humanitarian work, pooled funds amounted to 6 percent of all reported humanitarian funding in 2018 (NYU CIC 2019, 50). This is a significant amount, given the large sums (especially for direct costs) that are disbursed in the sector. The focus of the majority of humanitarian funding remains short-term. Since the establishment of the Grand Bargain commitments in 2015, multi-year humanitarian funding has

increased, however. For instance, ECHO now provides 18-month programming in Cameroon and Chad, and it has adopted global guidelines that allow for two-year programming as of 2019 (NRC 2019).

There are new financing instruments that provide increased flexibility and responsiveness to programme funds as the International Development Association (IDA)'s Refugee and Host Population sub-window, or financing through its Crisis Response Window (CRW), which includes responses to disaster and climate change-related shocks for low-income countries (NYU CIC 2019). For example, the Mutual Reliance Initiative (MRI) is a successful mechanism, initially developed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), and the (German) Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), allows for donors to shift fund between their respective agencies (e.g. in the Central African Republic).

>> Examples of Multi-Donor Funds / Pooled Funds <<

UN-World Bank Fragility and Conflict Partnership Trust Fund: Multi-country fund to support partnership activities between the UN and the World Bank (WB). Funding is currently provided by Switzerland and Norway. Applications proposals are jointly developed by UN and World Bank teams and submitted on a rolling basis. Core objectives are improved regional, country-specific and institutional collaboration at strategic and operational levels. The UN-WBG Fragility and Conflict Partnership Trust Fund also supports the joint UN-World Bank HDP Initiative in its seven pilot countries.

▶ **Examples of Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Grants**

- Mali: Joint UN-World Bank Project on Jobs for Youth (US\$1,000,000)
- Lake Chad Region: Cross-border Collaboration (US\$450,000)
- Libya: Developing a Framework for Recovery and Peacebuilding in Libya (US\$750,000)

World Bank Group State and Peacebuilding Trust Fund (SPF): finances innovative approaches to state and peacebuilding in regions affected by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). Funding is currently provided by IBRD, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Activities must be aligned with the relevant country programme framework and should support the prevention approach and/or be highly innovative or experimental and/or respond to a need linked to active conflict, violence, disaster, or other urgent condition and/or respond to a rare window of opportunity created by a significant transformative moment; commitments by partners, governments, or other counterparts; and/or other extraordinary developments in the country or region.

EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF): funds for longer-term programming for displaced and host populations. It is a primary focus of cooperation between the EU's Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), ECHO and AFD (French Development Cooperation).

UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF): "CERF's Rapid Response window allows country teams to kick-start relief efforts immediately in a coordinated and prioritized response when a new crisis emerges. CERF's window for Underfunded Emergencies helps scale-up and sustain protracted relief operations to avoid critical gaps when no other funding is available".

UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF): The Fund works across pillars and supports integrated UN responses to fill critical gaps; respond quickly and with flexibility to peacebuilding opportunities; and catalyse processes and resources in a risk-tolerant fashion.

Examples from the Field: Mechanisms and Instruments for Collaboration

Over the past years, a number of mechanisms have been established that fit within the HDP Nexus and New Way of Working approach, although they do not necessarily directly refer to those approaches. These mechanisms take the broader approach of the HDP Nexus and NWoW to address the specific needs of the

country context for which they were established. There are no cases where the entire approach in a particular context is entirely centred on the HDP Nexus, but rather implementation has been partial, and heavily influenced by the particular context and the work which has been done in the past.

South Sudan

In South Sudan, the Partnership for Recovery and Resilience Framework (PfRR) brings the UN's 'New Way of Working' together with the support of multiple donors and non-governmental partners in a commitment that shifts the focus from "meeting needs" to "reducing needs, risks, and vulnerability". The conclusions reached at the March 22, 2018 meeting in Juba of donors, UN entities, and NGOs is one which will be familiar to discourse on the HDP Nexus.

"There is consensus that there is no recourse but for individual UN entities, donors, NGOs, and technical organizations to act together to reverse the trends of growing vulnerability. There is no silver bullet to solving the problem of declining coping capacity. We need to bring to bear all of the tools available to tackle the challenge, including conflict resolution, basic health, education, and WASH services; agriculture and livelihood support; infrastructure; reconciliation, social cohesion, and peace building efforts." (PfRR 2018)

The pillar objectives of the PfRR are somewhat analogous to a broad set of Collective Outcomes, and consist of four issues: (1) Rebuild Trust in people and institutions; (2) (Re)Establish Access to Basic Services; (3) Restore & Build Productive Capacities

and Economic Opportunities; (4) Nurture Effective Partnership. PfRR partners include South Sudan, the African Development Bank, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, NGO Forum, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the United States, and the World Bank. Funding is flexible in that the partners can fund or receive funding bilaterally or multilaterally, as long as this funding is reported. This means that there is not one centralized funding mechanism, but the PfRR serves as a framework for funding the pillar activities.

The PfRR is substantiated by a number of funding pots that can be approached, The main instrument is the UN-managed South Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilization, Resilience (RSRTF, approved budget 12.7 million USD), which is mainly targeting HDP Nexus-relevant activities, and is accompanied by specific funding pots for the three work areas: the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (approved budget 786.3 million USD), the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF, approved budget 50.8 million USD) and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF, approved budget 36.4 million USD, currently in the process of re-application). Projects funded by RSRTF and PBF, in particular, are encouraged to have a catalytic impact to attract additional funding for Collective Outcomes.

Somalia

Somalia is characterised by the presence of numerous international humanitarian, development, and peace actors, some of which have been there for decades, since the time of the civil war. For a long time, Somalia was seen in terms of being in a perpetual humanitarian emergency. The last years have seen a paradigm shift. The international community and regional actors increasingly focus on the challenge as one of building up the fragile state and supporting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). This has resulted in a shift towards resilience-building, longer-term development programming and, most of all, towards ensuring territorial control and developing a state apparatus that could eventually take full responsibility for the

security and development needs of Somalia and its people (Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron 2019). Somalia is one of the Nexus-pilot countries for the UN JSC on Humanitarian Development Collaboration.

The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was established as a mechanism for pulling finances to match the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia, a follow up to the New Deal Compact for Somalia. It brings together government, UN and bilateral partners in nine thematic pillars. Respective working groups are coordinating the implementation of the Somali National Development Plan (NDP). The SDRF is both a coordinating mechanism and a financing architecture (Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron

2019). It pulls together three multi-partner funding windows, administered by the UN, the World Bank and the AfDB, with the central aim of providing the FGS with funds for both urgent needs and long-term institutional development (UNDP 2017).

These include the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), which is a flexible instrument for funding any of the NDP pillars. It is executed by government institutions, NGOs, academia and even the private sector as implementing partners of UN agencies. The MPTF supports core state functions, with some funds also allocated for World Bank-financed small-scale activities. The AfDB Somali Infrastructure Fund (SIF) is earmarked for long-term development, infrastructure, and institutional capacity- building projects. These can be implemented either by the government or by NGOs, private-sector organisations and UN agencies acting with the government's consent (Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron 2019). Additionally, the UN Peacebuilding Fund has enabled the UN to do more joined up programming linking recovery, stabilization, local governance

Mali

Since the military coup in 2012, Mali has faced instability and conflict, and the occupation of the northern regions by armed groups. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over from French military forces to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks, including securing the northern border. The third largest active UN peacekeeping mission, its number over 15,00, including over 12,000 military personnel and 1,700 police. The challenging interplay between an integrated UN peacekeeping mission and the HDP Nexus's joined-up integrated approach can be seen in Mali. As an interviewee noted,

“MINUSMA is doing election support, aid support, support in terms of gender issues, ... although there are UN agencies doing the same things. If possible, they should be doing it rather than duplicate the efforts from the mission side. This duplication is not just an issue of lack of efficiency in terms of resources and coordination it creates also tensions and becomes counterproductive”.

Implementing a Nexus approach in this context it clearly a challenge, and there have been a lot of tensions between the actors across the Nexus fields. Mali lacks a comprehensive HDP framework, although there are some cross-HDP platforms. They include the Senior Leadership Forum (MINUSMA and UNCT including humanitarian UN agencies, but no NGOs) and the Commission de Réhabilitation des Zones Post-conflit (CRZPC) that includes donor, agencies from the UN Country Team, some HCT members, and NGOs (IASC

and peacebuilding. In practice, however, only a small portion of the development aid to Somalia (~ 21% in 2018) is channelled through the SDRF (MoPIED 2020).

Although the HDP Nexus approach is arguably not fully implemented in Somalia, in January 2018, the humanitarian and development communities in Somalia agreed on four Collective Outcomes to ensure alignment and complementarity between the Humanitarian Response Plan and the Recovery and National Resilience Framework (RRF). The RRF takes a Humanitarian-Development Nexus approach to promote a sustainable recovery while addressing the underlying drivers of drought vulnerability (Federal Government of Somalia 2018). The Collective Outcomes identified, relate to a decrease in acute food insecurity, durable solutions for displaced households, increasing those receiving basic social services, and reducing the proportion of the population affected by climate-induced hazards (UN NWoW Progress update Somalia 2018).

2018). The Nexus can be therefore found within certain programs, but not on the national level.

An ad hoc Nexus task force is coordinated by a committee which includes UN agencies, the Government, and donors, and in which the WFP has taken a lead role, having seconded a Nexus advisor to the task force (Perret 2019; WFP 2018). As in the other cases mentioned, there is no fully-fledged HDPN strategy with Collective Outcomes backed up by an operational framework. However, Mali has both an HRP and a UNDAF. The two are seen as being complementary, which is considered conducive to the operationalization of the HDP Nexus (Perret 2019, 5, 26). The HRP now includes references to Collective Outcomes (réalisations collectives) and specifically establishing a consultation framework on the Nexus and facilitate its operationalization in three key regions (OCHA 2020).

The inclusion of the third side of the HDP Nexus triangle – peace – is particularly challenging in the Mali context. Participants in the Nexus task force disagree not only on the issue of including the ‘hard peace’ security forces (MINUSMA), but even the ‘soft elements’ of peace as well. MINUSMA’s implementation of Quick Impact Projects has been seen as blurring the lines too much between security/peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, participation in the task force has been evaluated as being somewhat limited, not inclusive enough and too much centred on the capital region (Perret 2019). As a result, efforts to implement the Nexus are more piecemeal and limited.

Based on the Mali experience and in other places, it would be important to stress once more the need to ensure that even as there is increased coordination

and cooperation, especially between security actors and humanitarian actors, that this does not negatively impact the humanitarian sector actors. On the ground, security actors should entirely refrain from appearing to deliver any kind of humanitarian assistance, taking great care to not blur the lines between the sectors on the ground.

Pooled funding mechanisms particularly relevant to the Nexus approach include the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF), which invested 35.7 million USD between 2014 and 2018. The Malian MFA chaired the fund's steering committee, which also included the UN, and funds were given to 13 UN agencies, funds and programmes, but only three civil society organizations, for 20 projects (Nimaga, Keita, and Petrie 2019).

The Sahel Alliance was established by the EU, France, Germany, UNDP, the African Development Bank and the World Bank in 2017, to assist with regional stabilization and the accelerated development of the G5 Sahel countries, which includes Mali. In February 2018, the Sahel Alliance announced the implementation of over 500 projects by 2022, with global funding of € 7.5 billion (Perret 2019). The initiative projects target six priority areas: education and youth employment; agriculture, rural development and food security; energy and climate; governance; decentralization and basic services; and internal security, with particular attention to vulnerable and fragile zones, and makes reference to the HDP Nexus, however it is not primarily implemented on the basis of the HDP Nexus approach.

Nexus Change Agents and their Challenges

As has already been highlighted, larger INGOs are on the forefront of HDP Nexus implementation efforts outside of the UN system. Several of them, for instance, Oxfam, have internal ongoing processes for strengthening the cross-sector collaboration and enhancing the conflict analysis capacity. As one interviewee highlighted, INGOs seem to have less issues with the HDP Nexus as many of them already have a double or triple mandate across the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors. However, cooperation across departments and financial streams may still be a problem. One respondent even highlighted that there were instances where different teams within one organisation applied for the same funding pot without even knowing of the other application.

Becoming more efficient and successful, also in attracting funding, is also one of the major motivations for organisations to operationalise HDP Nexus practices. Due to the often-significant part of guaranteed funding for International Organisations, civil society organisations appear to be often more flexible and open to uptake change and institutionalise new practices in response to changing funding streams. This once more highlights the critical role of flexible funding instruments that are oriented towards common outcomes.

It is also unsurprising that the chronically underfunded realm of peacebuilders and conflict advisors are often the most proactive change agents when it comes to the uptake and operationalisation of the HDP Nexus approach. Yet, especially the peacebuilding realm poses significant challenges as well, for instance the definition of the category of peace (Barakat et al 2020, 6), how it is related to 'hard' practices such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and how it is related to long-term socio-economic development.

Another issue is the question of coordination. The HDP Nexus is indeed one of a number of frameworks that want to facilitate coordination and collaboration, but it can also make things more complicated because it is not fully aligned with other elements such as the SDG framework (Howe 2019, 10), which is even broader and focuses on outcomes at different scales and levels. Furthermore, many actors on the ground have the feeling of being already 'over-coordinated'. Indeed, as interviewees confirmed, there is already a well-established culture of coordination between agencies when there is demand for it. Turning collaboration into a mere technical requirement would, in turn, risk to lose already existing buy-in and to generate fatigue among the practitioners working in programme and project implementation. Not all things and sectors need to be coordinated and to collaborate.

However, there are significant gaps in cross-sectoral cooperation, often between the rather single-mandated humanitarian and peacebuilding practitioners on the one hand and the mounting sectoral specialists in development, which range from economy over education to health and agriculture. As one humanitarian account highlights, "development actors have been missing from many of the insecure and unstable contexts since at least early 2000s" (Stoianova 2018). It is especially the multi-faceted character of development efforts that makes an inclusion of the actors challenging. This is less a problem of mindsets of willingness but of practical challenges. Even within development, the coordination between the wide range of sectors is challenging and often, due to organisational constraints, elusive. Obviously, this challenge translates to HDP Nexus-related collaboration: when development practitioners or specialists are to be included in collective outcome processes, the first obvious question often is, which ones – answering this question in a practically feasible way often requires the investment of considerable transactional costs.

Implications for Professional Training

Capacity development on the HDP Nexus needs to be tailored to the specific needs of different target audiences. The thematic focus of the trainings can be directly derived from the main challenges and drivers stated in this study. One recurrent key point is that all stakeholders need a better understanding of the functioning (e.g., planning cycles), mandates (e.g., legal frameworks for humanitarian actors) and lexicon of the other HDP Nexus components. An interviewee from the military pointed out:

“We need to make sure that all three pillars have a good understanding of the other pillars in terms of how they operate, how they work on the ground, how they plan. We do things differently and to find common ground we must understand the differences. That is a prerequisite for the mutual respect that is needed. From the military point of

view, what I would like other pillars to understand, is the chain of command, how we delegate, how we plan.”

While civilians can profit from enhanced, first-hand insights into military settings, mid-level military staff could build their capacity by a better awareness of humanitarian, development and civilian peacebuilding sectors, and battalions must be informed on how CIMIC/CMCoord procedures operate. Humanitarians, development, and peacebuilding professionals are used to different programme cycles and intervention logics. All actors should be trained towards a joint understanding of humanitarian principles and the do-no-harm approach, principles that are prerequisites for the mutual understanding that underpins the HDP Nexus approach. They also should be trained to do joint conflict analysis.

Target Groups

Based on the findings of this study, the following priority target groups could be identified:

- Decision makers: representatives from regional institutions, mission commanders, HQ staff, national representatives from government, ministries, state and local level governments, donor community/financing partners;
- Planning and field staff: CIMIC/CMCoord officers, humanitarian workers, peacebuilders, development workers, peacekeepers/military personnel, police forces, public officials e.g. in civil protection organisations, disaster management institutions or health services.

Policy makers in the different institutions generally already have a good theoretical knowledge of the

HDP Nexus but might need structured networking opportunities with other stakeholders across different organisations and hierarchical levels to broaden their view and understand practical issues with the implementation.

“We have to address this vertically, meaning along the hierarchy, but also horizontally meaning along the different sectors” - Interviewee from a regional African institution.

State authorities have an important role to play by facilitating a whole-of-government approach for development measures, peacebuilding and emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and equitable service delivery (cf. CIC 2019).

Training Approaches

When it comes to capacity development for the HDP Nexus three approaches are conceivable:

- offering standalone training course on HDP Nexus implementation with a strong emphasis on coordination and CIMIC/CMCoord, communication and cultures, gender and conflict sensitivity/analysis, protection with a particular emphasis on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda, and financing/planning/M&E. The theoretical input could be complemented by scenario exercises.
- integrating HDP Nexus modules within existing training courses (e.g. PoC, PolAd, CIMIC, HAWA) on key aspects for the implementation.
- integrating the HDP Nexus thematically as a cross-cutting topic in existing training courses for

military, humanitarian and development workers, and peacebuilders to enable ‘Nexus thinking’. A training of Trainers (ToT) could be useful.

All three concepts come with different advantages and disadvantages. The standalone training allows for in-depth capacity development but might not be prioritised within the training needs of specific staff. Integrated modules allow to tailor HDP Nexus topics to the respective focus area of the courses but will lack a broader view. Establishing ‘Nexus thinking’ as cross-cutting issue helps to link the HDP Nexus with all aspects of the respective intervention/course topic and advance the mind set of actors especially when the HDP Nexus is not explicitly incorporated in the mandate of a respective mission or organisation. Nevertheless, usually many cross-cutting issues need

to be addressed simultaneously and the HDP Nexus might fall short in the course process. Additionally, this would require training the trainers on the foundations of the concept. For attracting a wider range of actors, all three approaches should be envisaged.

Studies have shown that one-off training without systemic changes to processes, structures, norms, policies, and culture do not generate lasting change and often have the opposite effect of entrenching biases and increasing defensiveness. An additional option, beyond training, would be to facilitate organisational development processes, in cooperation with dedicated leadership, to achieve the systemic change needed to overcome obstacles for cooperation within the HDP Nexus approach. Since such organisational development processes are beyond the scope of KAIPTC training, networking and cooperation with other institutions which offer this type of counselling could be used for mutual quality assurance and further development of the courses.

An INGO representative offered a recommendation for all trainings:

“Stop over-intellectualising the Nexus! Quickly brush the concept in a simple manner and then take it down to a very participatory approach with

local actors. Make people reflect on what they do already and demystify this super-complex concept that we have created and help them to embrace it with humility, in a simple way, and as a main outcome, give them the confidence back that actually we are already doing a great deal but we can do better.”

Training for the policy level would focus more on general questions of functionality and reasonableness, as well as scope and limits of the HDP Nexus. The training should facilitate debate, offer different points of view, and encourage participants to develop a position for programming and funding of their own or for their organisation. Training for field practitioners could deal with functional topics as shared conflict analysis, joint assessment, and engaging with others. As a respondent from a development agency emphasises,

“the answer to the question of how to implement the Nexus in certain contexts is on the one hand, highly contextual, but on the other hand, I think you still need a toolbox like ideas, options, how to deal with that, and what different approaches could look like”.



Opening of the first HDP Nexus pilot training course at the KAIPTC / © GIZ KAIPTC

Main Topics for Training Courses

Coordination and Cooperation

Coordination appears to be one of the most challenging topics when it comes to the implementation of the HDP Nexus on the field level. Some stakeholders need a better understanding of existing coordination efforts (CIMIC/CMCoord) and must learn to cooperate outside their sector. On the other hand, personnel on a field level oftentimes state that there is already a lot of collaboration and exchange going on, without it necessarily being under the heading of the ‘HDP Nexus’. The already highlighted emphasis on pragmatism and a demand-driven approach when working on cooperation in-country should also be reflected in training efforts. Diverse good practice examples from missions can encourage participants to develop their own strategies to enable cooperation in their respective fields of work.

While all interviewees placed great emphasis on the need for coordination, some pointed out that coordination and cooperation can only work with clear accountability and must not entail an unreasonable additional workload. To overcome challenges related to coordination, training courses should foster the understanding of different mandates, planning approaches, and institutional cultures. A thorough knowledge of CIMIC/CMCoord is another element.

“However, the question is what is peacekeeping, in a more general sense? What is the exercise that we are engaged in? ... There should be more training on how collaborations are approached on the ground – it would be important to have civilians together with mid-level commanders, they should know what they are doing, and vice versa. This might be the most important training need. It is about the political design of the mission, the strategic perspective., and what peacekeeping is ought to do, also in collaboration with others.” - Interviewee from a UN mission

Analysis and Planning for Collective Outcomes

The NWoW demands joined-up planning and programming on the basis of shared data and joint analysis on risk, resilience, and inclusion, as well as qualitative and quantitative outcome-level indicators, and where possible, joint monitoring and evaluation to measure progress on the HDP Nexus. Coherence between actors from different sectors can contribute directly to the prevention of conflict and to sustaining peace (cf. IGAD/Global Health Cluster 2019, Development Initiatives 2019, UN NWoW Progress update Somalia 2018, IASC TT/UN SDG 2019, UN OCHA 2018a).

Collective Outcomes are often seen as the core transformational aspect that distinguishes the HDP Nexus from previous concepts (cf. Moriniere Vaughan-Lee 2018). Yet, as there are no established standards, the understanding of how Collective Outcomes should be formulated in terms of specificity, granularity (national/sub-national), and timeframes, varies a lot among institutions and in different contexts. The UN IASC (May 2020) Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes provides a key training resource.

Other challenges are the development of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and ensuring short to long-term financing.

Training should consider different existing recommendations for the development of COs, joint analysis and M&E and encourage participants to develop specific tools for their respective context. It is important to note that this should not only be based on the UN context but strongly include regional references (like the ECOWAS 2050 vision, the ECOWAS humanitarian policy and plan of action/handbook, or the DRR plan of action). Furthermore, guiding documents from the AU should be included (e.g. APSA and CEWS strategies, the Communiqué adopted by the AU PSC at its 899th meeting, held on 5 December 2019, “National Reconciliation, Restoration of Peace, Security and Rebuilding of Cohesion in Africa). A representative from a UN agency suggested staff officers’ courses or peacekeeping planning courses as a strategic interface where participants from different communities could learn from direct interaction for how to improve the synchronisation between their organisations/sectors. Several interviewees advocated for training on joint analysis and planning, as well as critical assessment and gender competency in the HDP Nexus approach.

The training approaches mentioned can correspond to several emerging interpretations as to how to operationalise the HDP Nexus, namely

- A conventional Humanitarian-Development Nexus approach, relabelling already existing elements such as the peace element;
- A more flexible Humanitarian-Development Nexus approach, incorporating regular shocks, adding conflict sensitivity, and risk analysis components;
- A formal HDP Nexus approach, including peace elements based on a broad peace definition, which includes social cohesion, education or livelihood development and further elements of peacebuilding and conflict transformation;
- A formal Triple Nexus approach, including some peacebuilding/conflict transformation modules;
- Peacebuilding as the core element of aid programmes (CHA 2020, 4)

Peace

While including peacebuilding as a pillar of the HDP Nexus is a clear opportunity, it is at the same time the most ambiguous sector. The lack of a common definition of what peace means and the blurring of concepts between peacebuilding, security, and stabilisation are major challenges facing the Nexus (cf. CHA 2020, Medinilla 2019, Oxfam 2019).

INGOs tend to comprehend peacebuilding as demonstrating better conflict sensitivity and facilitating bottom-up processes, e.g. through supporting community-level reconciliation and social cohesion. The EU subsumes a wide range from conflict prevention and early warning, through mediation and conflict response, to security and stabilisation under the label 'peace'. States or donors might include security, counterterrorism, and stabilisation. Different actors interpret peace differently according to their respective interests and agendas (cf. Oxfam 2019, cf. CHA 2020).

One interviewee pointed out: "Many civil society or humanitarian NGOs are now going into peacebuilding strategies, so there is a shift. Peacekeeping / peacebuilding – for them it is still not clear what this implies and what is their role; Peacebuilding however is everywhere – everybody does it, in different circumstances;" and recommends that trainings include reflexion on what peacebuilding can mean for the HDP Nexus; as well as on questions such as how can we contribute, what are the others contributing, and, how do we interact, between institutions, and with communities.

Furthermore, concrete examples, such as from the Somalia experience, may serve as entry-point for discussions on what peace/peacebuilding in the framework of the HDP Nexus might mean.

"Peacebuilding' may well be the weakest leg in the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus in Somalia. While security and stabilisation are necessary conditions and are viewed as priorities in Somalia, peacebuilding, as a socially oriented, bottom-up and relational praxis, features much less prominently. ... Bottom-up peacebuilding practitioners point out how peacebuilding is increasingly conflated with security in Somalia and how donors' attachment to the statebuilding agenda tends to overlook local clan-based resource conflicts (over land and water, for example)." (Medinilla 2019, 26)

Briefly addressing the different understanding of peace by different actors must be part of the introduction of functioning, mandates, and 'language'.

Conflict Sensitivity and Do No Harm

Several interview partners from the humanitarian and development sectors acknowledged that the peacebuilding branch brings in a stronger focus on conflict sensitivity and do no harm and encouraged to close this training gap, including the development of specific training materials, to provide a more systematic integration of those concepts. A representative of an UN agency pointed out that "compliance sign-off is an issue, so training needs to make this practically relevant, not a tick-box exercise". For such a training session, concepts from DRR, early warning and early-action interventions, and the analysis of drivers of fragility and conflict may be explored and further developed (cf. Oxfam 2019).

Humanitarian Principles

There has been a lot of debate on whether the humanitarian principles are in contradiction with the HDP Nexus, and whether the humanitarian principles are jeopardised by an growing politicisation, "and the fact that [humanitarians] engaging with state actors and development actors who work through state can hamper the principles" (Dûdaité 2019, 26). In line with the Paris Declaration and the 2030 Agenda, development principles emphasise working through governments, strengthening their capacities and supporting their aims which can be difficult to reconcile with humanitarian principles, focusing on humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence, especially when the government is a party to a conflict (cf. Howe 2019). Humanitarian actors are furthermore not only bound by their principles, but also International Humanitarian Law.

This study has shown that the opposition provided by a hard-line humanitarian standpoint has not been a major obstacle to the development of HDP Nexus processes. Instead, it was especially humanitarian agencies that got increasingly engaged in conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity trainings, and efforts of mediation and negotiation. However, viewpoints are mixed, which needs to be reflected in training programmes.

Discussions on the understanding of humanitarian principles, the boundaries and the margins for different actors, will hence be crucial for any training on the HDP Nexus. This debate also directly affects the understanding of inclusion, localisation, and gender equality. A couple of years ago, interventions towards gender equality were considered against the humanitarian principles. (cf. Fal-Dutra Santos 2019) In this connection, training on the HDP Nexus can help to identify common grounds (UN conventions and resolutions, good practice, etc.) between the different stakeholders from the humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping realm.

Gender and Inequalities

“Organisations that have worked on Women, Peace, Security feel that the HDP Nexus is not something new. We have understood already 20 years ago with the UN/S/Res 1325 that in a conflict setting where we have to respond to immediate needs, we can’t address the roots of conflicts by just doing that. We need to work on women’s participation – that’s not a typical humanitarian approach – we need to hear the voice of women, look at their needs, their participation, their leadership, that takes generations to make it happen. It is about culture and mindset change. The WPS Agenda is very important for the Nexus!” - INGO Interviewee

The UN DPPA Women, Peace, Security policy is complementary to the 2018 DPO policy on Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping. Both apply across the Department’s divisions, offices, and special political missions (SPM) and should be implemented in close cooperation with relevant UN partners, in particular UN Women and the Development Coordination Office (DCO).

The policy identifies principles and parameters for the implementation of the WPS agenda and gender mainstreaming and connects them to a range of international policy documents. It relates to regional policies as the Dakar Declaration on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the regional plan of action for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which outlines the four key pillars participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery. It further relates to the EU Gender Action Plan II (GAP II) which provides the mandatory framework for the European External Action Services and the EU Member States in their approach to gender equality through external action. INGOs and Civil Society Organisations usually have internal gender equality policies and action plans.

Although the organisational methods range from women’s empowerment work to gender transformative approaches, intersectionality and inclusion, the general commitment to gender equality (usually using gender mainstreaming) could be a linchpin for coalition building, cooperation, and complementary action across the sectors. Even so, it is important to note that the implementation of the policies is lagging.

“A lot of the failure is attributed to the culture because all these institutions that we are trying to influence on WPS are very dominated by men, have very patriarchal structures and thinking,” says an INGO interviewee.

Foreign donors give little priority to longer-term structural aspects of conflict prevention such as

the women, peace and security component of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) where WPS was ranked 14th out of 15 in terms of priority (cf. Udoka Ndidiamaka Owie 2019). An interviewee from a UN peacekeeping mission points to the respective opportunities the HDP Nexus provides. It “is a window of opportunity to reenergise the topic and put it to the core, but we don’t need more advisors who produce a lot of documents, because we all know that this is important. What we need is that the leadership embraces the topic, leaders who take ownership and are responsible and accountable. It goes back to the mainstreaming”.

Pre-existing (gender) inequalities can put vulnerable persons at disproportionate risk and discriminatory (gender) norms can drive fragility and conflict. Climate- and conflict-related risks often overlap or exacerbate each other, resulting in complex needs. Responses must consider the differing needs and requirements of marginalised groups and individuals with specific needs. Programmes need to be designed and adapted accordingly based on thorough analysis of the context including topics such as gender, protection, and conflict-sensitivity (cf. IASC 2018, OXFAM discussion paper 2019).

While the majority of interview partners agreed on the importance of the WPS agenda and were in favour of joint data collection and a living analysis of the context that includes cross-cutting gender, protection and conflict-sensitivity issues, it was also pointed out that this has to be done pragmatically. Training efforts need to consider existing tools and policies according to the needs of the participants.

UN agencies and governmental institutions struggle more with the necessary coordination for HDP Nexus implementation and meaningful realisation of measures towards gender equality than NGOs, which have progressed much further. The 2020 Civil Society Roadmap on Women, Peace and Security of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) is supported by 18 international NGOs in the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding spectrum and promotes country-specific policy recommendations that positively impact the lives of women affected by conflict to Member States and United Nations leadership.

Financing

The broadly shared view that donors themselves need training on the HDP Nexus was one of the insights from the interviews. This view appears plausible due to the wide spectrum of efforts development cooperation has to deal with. From a conventional development policy standpoint, peacebuilding is just one – often rather minor – topic and is rarely perceived as a priority agenda. The already mentioned initiative by the UK to

earmark 50% of their ODA funding for fragile contexts is a powerful signal countering such habits. However, as one interviewee from an INGO highlights, “donors are the biggest promoters of the concept, but they haven’t made their internal changes and don’t enable us to implement what they want us to implement.” (INGO interviewee).

For operationalising the HDP Nexus, donors need to develop their peace and security approaches and must define the limits of the Nexus concerning humanitarian responses. Experiences from connecting humanitarian and development approaches through resilience can be used to adapt financing and programming to peace demands (cf. Development Initiatives 2019). For training, this means to raise donor’s awareness for practical implementation obstacles. They need to have a thorough understanding of Collective Outcomes and need to mitigate the negative effects of competition within and across sectors.

“Donors have a major responsibility of creating the right incentives through their allocations of Official Development Assistance. Lack of flexible funding can reinforce existing silos, but donors can also be major enablers of transformation by placing their resources behind the commitments they made at the World Humanitarian Summit to ‘invest in humanity.’” (UN OCHA 2018a)

Apart from donors, interview partners stated that there is a training need for country programme staff to increase their level of ‘financial literacy’. Far too often, staff has significant shortcomings about bilateral or multilateral financing mechanisms, incentives, and financing flows, how to work with them and how to use them to achieve organisational and operational goals. It is not always a lack of the right, flexible funding instruments that is the most prevalent obstacle, often it is the ability of in-country staff, international as well as national, to attract and utilise the available funding streams.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The investigation has shown that the HDP Nexus has developed into an important tool for fostering the collaboration between the three sectors (humanitarian, development, peace) over the last several years. The enhancement of collaboration has increased between organisations and also within organisations. The UN has dominated the conceptual development of the HDP Nexus approach, however, there has meanwhile been considerable uptake among civil society organisations, especially within the large humanitarian ones.

The HDP Nexus is not always the predominant ‘brand’ for collaboration, it might be resilience, it might be the working towards compacts, or the 2030 development agenda. It might be the view of searching for and fostering collaborations beyond the own institutional confines. The outcomes are similar. This is particularly true for UN peacekeeping operations, where the approach is known but not in frequent use. However, it has enabled an atmosphere of collaboration and has, in turn, motivated partners from the humanitarian and development sector to actively seek cooperation. While there is a common fatigue among practitioners towards ever new conceptual developments, the goal of working towards Collective Outcomes in complex crises is widely accepted and hardly ever put in question. In answering the questions for this study, three elements need to be highlighted.

First, the investigation has shown that the HDP Nexus rationale, the enhanced coordination and collaboration for Collective Outcomes in complex crises and

post-conflict transitions, is widely recognised and accepted. However, there is the risk of ‘coordination fatigue’ triggered by a top-down enforcement of respective mechanisms. A significant number of coordination and collaboration efforts in-country are ongoing, some of them labelled as Nexus-related, some of them not. The precondition of their functionality – which, inter alia, means that senior staff engages in the efforts and guarantees the implementation of the outcomes – is that they are demand-driven. These insights point towards the need for a pragmatic, bottom-up implementation of the HDP Nexus.

Second, as one interviewee half-seriously remarked, “it is all about the money”. As already identified at the start of the Nexus endeavour, flexible financing is indeed key for establishing joint practices that emerge around Collective Outcomes. Flexibility requires instruments that are (1) able to bridge the operational silos and the related divergent funding patterns, (2) to bridge the gap between national and international, public and civil society actors, and (3) to develop genuine efforts of collaboration that are able and willing to take risks without having to fulfil short-term, and thus often short-sighted, performance and output benchmarks.

However, funding for mid- and long-term solutions should not come out of the already underfunded humanitarian sector, but rather humanitarian activities should be supplemented with additional resources from development and peace funding sources in order to create the necessary structures and infrastructures


which can sustainably reduce the unmet needs relieved by humanitarian actors. Only once that is achieved should humanitarian assistance be reduced based on an actual reduction of needs, rather than a future expected reduction of needs.

Third, conflict analysis capacities need to be strengthened, for two reasons in particular: Collective Outcome processes need a specific window of opportunity, which is often related to critical junctures in peace processes or post-conflict transitions. Effective outcome processes cannot be enforced but need to be carefully prepared to get to the fore when these critical junctures arise. Analytical capacities would enable actors on the ground to sense these critical junctures and they should already have identified the main levers of change when these junctures arise.

Furthermore, HDP Nexus processes are highly contextualised and need to reflect the peculiarities of the conflict settings, such as the need for humanitarian relief and aid delivery, and their stage of socio-economic development. No ready-made blueprint solutions are available. Conflict analysis is not only

a matter of conflict sensitivity approaches – each of the pillars of the Nexus needs to respond to the challenges of the transitional process as a whole, and most commonly this transitional process entails a complex process of post-conflict political resettlement that often includes additional challenges like a regime change. Humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts need to go hand and hand in the sense of a viable transitional support.

To this end, the HDP Nexus approach offers important leverage. It motivates actors to streamline their portfolios internally and to proactively establish networks that reach beyond their mandate. The HDP Nexus also serves as a tool for policy development in multi-mandated international organisations – this has been its origin within the UN system, and it is in the process to spawn to regional organisations as well. Notwithstanding all institutional, financial, and practical challenges, establishing and upholding this perspective is the perhaps most important contribution the HDP Nexus is able to provide.




List of Acronyms

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
AU	African Union
CCHN	Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation
CCRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination. UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) officers are military officers responsible for the military part of interactions among civilian, police, and military components of an integrated UN field mission in a peace operations environment
CMCoord	UN-CMCoord is the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concept that refers to humanitarian civil-military coordination.
CMCS	UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section
CRZPC	Commission de Réhabilitation des Zones Post-conflit (Mali)
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DG ECHO	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (United Nations)
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African State
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EU	European Union
EU GAP II	European Union Gender Action Plan II
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator (UN Country Team)
HDP Nexus	Humanitarian, Development, and Peace Nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDA	International Development Association
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
INCAF	OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)

MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Funds
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NWoW	New Way of Working
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
OSAA	UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
PA-X	PA-X Peace Agreements Database, University of Edinburgh (www.peaceagreements.org)
PDSB	UN OCHA Policy Development and Study Branch
PfRR	Partnership for Recovery and Resilience Framework
RC	UN Resident Coordinator (UN Country Team)
RCO	UN Resident Coordinator Office
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SIF	Somali Infrastructure Fund (AfDB)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPM	Special Political Missions
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN DCO	United Nations Development Coordination Office
UN DPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
UN DPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
WBG	World Bank Group: IBRD, IFC, IDA, ICSID, MIGA
WPS Agenda	Women, Peace, Security Agenda following up on UNSCR 1325

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15. UNDP, Crisis Bureau, Senior policy and partnerships advisor, Rachel Scott, on 24.08.2020
16. UNMISS, Chief of Political Affairs Division, Guy Bennett, on 21.07.2020
17. WFP, Global Network Against Food Crises, Hugh Macleman; Chief and Humanitarian Crises and Transitions Unit, ebecca Richards, on 21.07.2020
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