

KNOWING WHAT WORKS



Central Project Evaluation

Supporting the ECOWAS Commission through
strategic managerial and technical advice

PN 2013.2271.8

Evaluation Report

On behalf of GIZ by Olga Almqvist (Syspons GmbH) and Leonard Ugbajah

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
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List of abbreviations

| | |
|----------|---|
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| AU | African Union |
| BMZ | German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| CET | Common External Tariff |
| CSF | Common Strategic Framework |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECPF | ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework |
| EPA | EU Economic Partnership Agreement |
| ESF | ECOWAS Standby Force |
| ETLS | ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH |
| HR | Human Resources |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MSA | Policy marker that involves macro- or sectoral-level measures |
| OECD/DAC | Organisation for International Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee |
| PAPS | Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security |
| PN | Project Number |
| RECs | Regional Economic Communities |
| RSP | Regional Strategic Plan |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SEDIN | Pro-poor Growth and Employment Promotion in Nigeria (bilateral GIZ project) |
| SMART | Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound |
| SPM | Special Protection Measures |
| UN | United Nations |
| WAEMU | West Africa Economic and Monetary Union |
| WATIP | Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme |



| | |
|---|--|
| Project number | 2013.2271.8 |
| CRS-Purpose Code | 33120 – Trade facilitation |
| Project objectives | The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy |
| Project term | 01.03.2014 – 31.02.2019 |
| Project volume | EUR 28,193,902, including EUR 18,193,902 BMZ funding and EUR 10,000,000 EU funding |
| Commissioning party | German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, (BMZ, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) |
| Lead executing agency | German Development Agency (GIZ, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) |
| Implementing organisations (in the partner country) | Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) |
| Other participating development organisations | European Union (EU) as cofinancing agency not involved in implementation |

Note: The intervention subject to evaluation is known as the 'Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission' to its partners. In the following, it is however referred to as the 'project', because this corresponds to GIZ headquarters terminology.

1 Summary

Background

The GIZ evaluation unit has commissioned the independent consultancy Syspons to evaluate the GIZ project 'Supporting the ECOWAS Commission through strategic managerial and technical advice', also known as the 'Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission'.¹ The **purpose of the evaluation** is to contribute to learning, to facilitate decision-making, and to provide accountability.

The **project** runs from 03/2014 until 02/2019 and builds on several predecessor projects. The current project has a budget of EUR 28,193,902, of which EUR 10,000,000 is cofinanced by the European Union (EU) under an Indirect Management Delegation Agreement. The objective (intended outcome) of the project is 'The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy'. This is to translate into better steering, implementation and monitoring of decisions of the regional organisation at the level of ECOWAS member states (intended impact). To achieve these results, the project provides support in three areas: organisational development (unit one), trade and customs (unit two) as well as peace and security (unit three). The EU co-funding goes towards support in the field of trade and customs.

The project was evaluated using a **theory-based evaluation design** that relied on the project's theory of change as a basis for analysis. Specifically, the evaluation team implemented a contribution analysis, which was complemented by process tracing for some elements of the theory of change. A contribution analysis consists of an analysis of the contribution of a project and analyses the extent to which observed (positive or negative) results can be related to the project. In light of the complexity of the project (three sectors, several levels of implementation, a very broad stakeholder landscape, highly political environment, etc.) and the resources available for the evaluation, it was decided at the time of the evaluation's inception phase to focus the contribution analysis on three processes supported by the project, one for each unit. These were:

- the contribution of the project to the community strategic framework (in unit one),
- the contribution of the project to the common external tariff (in unit two),
- the contribution of the project to early warning support (in unit three).

The evaluation was carried out by a team of two consultants and relied on three main data sources: internal documentation provided by the project team, secondary data identified by the evaluation team, and first-hand interviews conducted by the evaluation team. The interviews were conducted with GIZ project staff, other GIZ staff, partners from the ECOWAS Commission, other development partners, as well as sector experts in the field of regional economic integration in West Africa. Most interviews were conducted during a two-week field mission in Abuja between 16 October and 8 November 2017. Preliminary findings of the evaluation were presented to and discussed with the project team and interested partners at the end of the field mission.

Key findings

The evaluation identified some key characteristics related to the planning, monitoring and documentation of the project that are significant for the overall assessment of the project:

¹ The intervention subject to evaluation is known as the 'Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission' to its partners. In the following, it is, however, referred to as 'project', because this corresponds to GIZ headquarters terminology.

- First, the project's proposal and reporting does not adequately reflect the **complexity** of the project. On the one hand, this is important to take into account regarding the basis for evaluation, as it means that effectiveness, impact and production efficiency cannot solely be assessed based on indicator achievement. On the other hand, it affects the implementation of the project, as the project's complexity can potentially make it difficult to plan, steer and monitor.
- Second, many of the intended results at outcome level and partly at output level are outside of the project's **sphere of influence**. This is because the project works with a regional organisation, yet ultimately aims to achieve results in the member states. From the evaluation team's perspective, this underscores a challenge inherent in the planning of GIZ projects supporting the capacity development of regional organisations. In results-oriented development cooperation, a project is considered successful if its outputs are used by the partner and this brings about changes at the level of the final beneficiaries. Results-oriented planning should reflect this ambition. If the partner is a regional organisation, however, whether policies are implemented only partly depends on capacities and ownership for policies at the level of the immediate counterpart of the project (in this case, the ECOWAS Commission). Implementation of policies is highly dependent on the **political will of the member states** of the regional organisation. Against this background, there are two options for planning a project: (1) formulating an objective (intended outcome) that is within the sphere of the project's influence, but which does not correspond to the outcome level as it does not take into account whether policies developed are implemented; or (2) formulating an objective that corresponds to the outcome level, but that is partly outside of the project's sphere of influence. This project has opted for the latter, which needs to be taken into account in the assessment of results.
- Third, there is a substantial gap between advisory services at the level of the Commission, and the **target group** as defined in the project proposal: the whole population of ECOWAS member states. This has to be taken into account in the assessment of the impact criterion.
- Fourth, there is continuity between support provided in the predecessor project and the current project. However, there is room for improvement regarding **lessons learned** on support to key processes over several projects.
- Fifth, **weak absorption capacities** at the level of the Commission are an important context factor affecting results. Currently, the personnel situation of the partners is particularly strained because of a hiring freeze.

Taking these factors into consideration, the evaluation team comes to the following assessment of the OECD/DAC criteria:

In terms of **relevance**, the project is rated very successful (95 out of 100 points). The project is in line with the partner's key framework documents such as the ECOWAS Treaty and the ECOWAS Vision 2020. In these documents, regional integration in the fields of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy is set out as a goal. Since the project's objective aims for strengthening the Commission in steering, monitoring and implementation in these areas, it is highly relevant to the partner's mandate. The support is also in line with the German frameworks for development cooperation. Most notably, it adheres to the 'New Africa Policy of BMZ', which commits to strengthening African initiatives both at the level of the African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities (RECs) for continental and regional cooperation. Finally, the project also contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, through its support on regional economic integration it contributes to SDG 8, 'decent work and economic growth'. In addition, the project's support to peace and security contributes to SDG 16, 'peace, justice and strong institutions'. In addition, by the project's own accounts, the project also contributes to SDG 10, 'reduce inequality within and among countries', and SDG 17, 'Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development'. No important strategic frameworks were left out in the project concept. With regard to the relevance of the project concept, the evaluation team observes that while the project concept is highly relevant, it is partly outside of the project's sphere of influence.

The relevance within each of the three project units is also rated very high. Unit one, organisational development, has a key role to leverage the support in the thematic fields. For example, the Community Strategic Framework (CSF) supported by unit one is an important framework document for planning, monitoring and implementation for the whole ECOWAS Community. The support of unit one to improve human resource (HR) processes is also crucial, as the technical capacities of the whole organisation depend on the quality of hiring and promotion processes. Looking at the relevance of unit two, key processes supported in the field of economic and trade policy, such as the Common External Tariff (CET) and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), are directly contributing to the objectives formulated in the ECOWAS Treaty. The relevance of unit three is equally high, as the work being done in the field of peace and security is aligned not only with the partners' priorities, but also with continental norms defined under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Finally, the project shows a high relevance in its ability to flexibly adapt to changes in line with the partners' evolving needs. This applies to all three units.

In terms of **effectiveness**, the project is rated successful (84 of 100 points). Out of five outcome indicators, two are achieved and three are partly achieved. Since the project is still ongoing, some of the indicators that are not yet achieved may still be achieved by the end. However, the evaluation team found that the five outcome indicators do not adequately reflect the work of the whole project, which is so complex it could easily constitute three projects. To provide a more differentiated analysis of the contribution of each of the three units of the project to the intended outcome, the evaluation carried out a contribution analysis for one core process supported within each unit. In addition, the evaluation team undertook an overall assessment of progress towards the project's objective.

- In unit one, the elaboration of the CSF involved a comprehensive stakeholder consultation process in the ECOWAS Community over a time span of 2.5 years. The document was adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2015. The evaluation team found that at the level of the Commission, knowledge of and ownership for the CSF varies. The framework has the potential to play an important role for the achievement of the project's objective. To what extent it will live up to its potential will however depend on future dissemination efforts and buy-in from the ECOWAS Commission's next management team.
- In unit two, important progress on the application of the Common External Tariff has been made in recent years. Currently, 14 out of 15 member states are applying CET. However, since there is no political will of ECOWAS member states for a formal monitoring mechanism, it is hard to assess whether the level of actual compliance at the borders is in line with official declarations. Sector experts interviewed for the evaluation clearly see progress on CET implementation, but also see a need for further trainings of customs authorities because of the complexity of the subject matter and turnover of border agents.
- In unit three, early warning processes within the Commission have been strengthened through the elaboration of the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response System Strategic and Action Plans 2016-2020. The project's work with the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) on teambuilding, cohesion and communication has also contributed to improved conditions for steering and implementation in the field of early warning. Finally, the project is contributing to the ongoing establishment of National Early Warning Centres through supporting capacity building measures for national centre staff as well as through the identification of civil society organisations (CSOs), which will support the process of mobilising local capacities for early response across the five pilot member states. The CSOs will also support the evaluation of the functionality of the National Early Warning Response Mechanisms.

Looking at overall progress towards the project's objective, the evaluation team distinguishes between steering, monitoring and implementation capacities at the level of the whole Commission, and those at the level of the thematic directorates supported by units two and three. For monitoring, an additional level has to be taken into account: the capacity to monitor compliance of member states with ECOWAS decisions (protocol monitoring). Regarding capacities to steer, monitor and implement at the level of the whole organisation, the project has made valued contributions through the Community Strategic Framework and work on results-based monitoring.

However, since the counterparts for strategic planning and monitoring at the level of the Commission are highly understaffed, capacities remain limited. In comparison, steering and implementation capacities in the areas of regional economic integration and peace and security have made more progress. This has partly been made possible because in the field of trade and customs, the project employs embedded advisors working in the offices of the Commission to bridge capacity gaps. In addition, the counterparts of unit two and three have made progress in terms of monitoring their own work plans. However, monitoring the extent to which member states comply with ECOWAS decisions in the field of economic and trade policy and peace and security remains difficult for the partners. This is largely due to a lack of political will from the member states, and mostly outside of the project's sphere of influence.

In terms of **impact**, the project is rated rather successful (76 of 100 points). In addition to progress against the programme objective and the impact indicators from the project proposal, this rating takes into account unintended positive and negative impacts. With regard to progress towards the overarching development results, the evaluation team observes a considerable attribution gap between advisory services at the level of the Commission, and the application of ECOWAS decisions in the member states. This notwithstanding, interviews conducted during the evaluation mission with the partners indicated that the project has made a substantial contribution to advancing key ECOWAS processes in the field of trade and customs and peace and security. This includes, among others, progress on the CET, and contribution to conflict prevention through the financing of long-term election observers and the sensitisation of media and political parties on hate speech and identity politics.

Regarding unintended positive and negative impacts, the evaluation team comes to a mixed assessment. In the field of peace and security, the evaluation team did not identify any unintended negative results. Successful mediation and conflict prevention missions conducted by the ECOWAS can be viewed as significant unintended positive results for the population of ECOWAS member states. Examples include the prevention and management of election-related crises in Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin. In the field of economic and trade policy, the literature analysis conducted by the evaluation team finds that the CET is expected to have mixed impacts and is characterised by asymmetric benefits, with larger and more export-oriented ECOWAS member states being structurally favoured. The evaluation team considers that given the classification of the project as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (BMZ policy marker MSA), a differentiated analysis of the impacts of the Common External Tariff on poorer member states and segments of society would have been called for in the project proposal. The fact that Cape Verde is not implementing the CET out of concern for adverse effects on consumer prices underscores the need for a differentiated analysis of the CET impacts that goes beyond government revenue. The evaluation team acknowledges the project team's recognition of the need to find solutions for Cape Verde's situation.

In terms of **efficiency**, the project is rated rather successful (73 of 100 points). The evaluation team comes to a mixed assessment of the project's production efficiency, and to a positive assessment of allocation efficiency. In this regard, the data available only allowed for a qualitative assessment of both efficiency dimensions. For production efficiency, the transformation of inputs to outputs, the data available did not allow for a follow-the-money approach at output level.

The evaluation team's qualitative assessment of production efficiency identified both strengths and weaknesses. One weakness lies in the fact that the project has defined several output indicators which lie outside of its sphere of influence. This means GIZ has partly committed to deliver on results it is not in a position to bring about. At the same time, the project is making significant contributions towards the outputs which are not reflected in the output indicators. A further weakness lies in the fact that the project is committing significant resources to processes that do not contribute to any of the outputs agreed upon with BMZ. Conversely, strengths regarding production efficiency include efficient modes of delivery, the training-of-trainers approach and a sensible stance on per diems for workshops and trainings with ECOWAS.

With regard to allocation efficiency, it is not possible to monetise the added value of the project's outcome. The evaluation team therefore provides a qualitative assessment that focuses on how the project maximises results with the available resources through synergies, cost sharing, scaling-up and cofinancing agreements. In this regard, the evaluation team found the project is successful in achieving synergies with other GIZ projects in the field of trade and customs and peace in security. In addition, the project was also successful in creating synergies with other development partners. Lastly, several initiatives of the project have been scaled up by other development partners, and current and future co-funding from the EU leverage the resources the BMZ has invested in the project.

In terms of **sustainability**, the project is rated rather successful (77 of 100 points). The results are well anchored in the partner structures at policy level, yet only partly anchored at operational level. One aspect that contributes to sustainability is that many of the processes supported directly emanate from the ECOWAS Treaty or the African Peace and Security Architecture, and others directly emanate from partner requests. However, weak absorption capacities of the partners are a threat to sustainability. In unit two, embedded advisors bridge weak absorption capacities, and in all units, the project staff works hand in hand with the partners, thereby contributing to develop capacities. At the same time, the potential for transferring know-how and responsibilities is limited if partners remain understaffed. In unit one, the personnel situation of key counterparts is a challenge to the long-term success of the Community Strategic Framework and results-based monitoring at the level of the whole organisation. In all three units, the project liaises with external stakeholders and other development partners to ensure that project-supported processes are aligned with both international standards as well as with other processes at the level of the Commission. The cooperation principles of the project thereby contribute to anchor results in the partner structures to the extent possible given the weak absorption capacities.

The evaluation team assesses the prospects for results in the field of economic policy and peace and security to outlast the project as rather good. In the field of economic policy, the momentum on key processes such as the Common External Tariff makes results difficult to reverse, except if protectionist tendencies regain strength. In the field of peace and security, the ownership of the Commission for certain processes is not always up to expectations of development partners (donors and technical cooperation agencies). However, the prospects for results in this area to last are positively influenced by a comparatively strong political will of ECOWAS member states to engage in early warning and mediation, and by an interest of other development partners to provide support in these areas. Since the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides a substantial support package in the field of early warning, the project's own support in this area should however be reassessed. In the field of organisational development, the adoption of the Community Strategic Framework by the Council of Ministers and the Authority of Heads of State and Government has anchored a key result at policy level. Whether this framework will be used by the Commission will in part depend on the new management team, which will take over in the first half of 2018.

The evaluation team comes to a mixed assessment of the economic and social sustainability of the project. This is because the Common External Tariff, while bearing potential for increasing overall trade in the ECOWAS region, structurally favours larger, export-oriented ECOWAS member states. An analysis of ecological sustainability was not relevant in the context of this project.

The overall score for all criteria adds up to $408 / 5 = 81.6$, which amounts to the rating 'successful'.

1.1 Key recommendations

Strategic recommendations for the planning of the next project

Recommendations concerning the whole project – addressed to the whole project team and members

of the planning mission

Recommendation one: Support to organisational development, trade and customs as well and peace and security should be maintained, but split into three projects.

Recommendation two: Joint planning and coordination between support to organisational development, trade and customs and peace and security should be maintained.

Recommendation three: The definition of the target group should be reassessed.

Recommendation four: The modes of delivery should be reassessed once the reorganisation process of the Commission is being implemented.

Recommendation concerning unit two– addressed to the team of unit two, the project leader and the members of the planning mission for the follow-up-project

Recommendation five: Support in the field of trade and customs should take into account the Leave-No-One-Behind principle.

Recommendation concerning unit three – addressed to the team of unit three, the project leader and the members of the planning mission for the follow-up-project

Recommendation six: The perspective for future GIZ support to early warning should be discussed with the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) and other development partners.

Operational recommendations for the implementation of the next project

Recommendations concerning the whole project – addressed to the whole project team

Recommendation seven: Documentation of lessons learned should be strengthened.

Recommendations concerning unit one – addressed to the team of unit one and the project leader

Recommendation eight: The organisational development team should proactively seek out the support of the other two teams for mainstreaming of the Community Strategic Framework and other organisation-wide processes.

Recommendation nine: Mainstreaming of the Community Strategic Framework through dialogue with other development partners and service providers contracted by the Commission should be continued.

Recommendations concerning unit two – addressed to the team of unit two and the project leader

Recommendation ten: The findings of studies on the impact of regional economic integration should be more widely disseminated, including to actors of civil society.

| Criterion | Score | Rating |
|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Relevance | 95 of 100 points | Very successful |
| Effectiveness | 84 of 100 points | Successful |
| Impact | 78 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Efficiency | 73 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Sustainability | 77 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Overall score and rating for all criteria | $408 / 5 = 81.6$ | Successful |

| 100-point-scale | 6-level-scale (rating) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| 92-100 | Level 1 = very successful |
| 81-91 | Level 2 = successful |
| 67-80 | Level 3 = rather successful |
| 50-66 | Level 4 = rather unsatisfactory |
| 30-49 | Level 5 = unsatisfactory |
| 0-29 | Level 6 = very unsatisfactory |

2 Evaluation objective and questions

2.1 Objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation of the GIZ project 'Supporting the ECOWAS Commission through strategic managerial and technical advice' was the first central project evaluation to be implemented after GIZ's fundamental reform of its project evaluation system in 2016. The evaluation system reform was carried out against the backdrop of increasing requirements for accountability arising from, among others, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Joint Procedural Reform in commissioning procedures with BMZ. With the reform of its evaluation system, GIZ endeavours to improve evidence of effectiveness, to enhance credibility of evaluation findings, and to gear project evaluations to new challenges.

The objective of all central project evaluations is to contribute to learning, to facilitate decision-making, and to provide accountability. Some projects, subject to central project evaluations, are selected on the basis of a regionally stratified sample, while others are selected in accordance with specific information requirements (GIZ 2017b). The ECOWAS project was selected through sampling (preparatory discussion with GIZ evaluation unit). The project is currently in its third of five years, which makes this an interim evaluation. However, since the cofinancing for the trade and customs component comes to an end in 2018, and new cofinancing agreements are currently being discussed with the EU both in the field of trade and customs and in the field of peace and security, the evaluation team has been asked to provide first pointers for the planning process for the follow-up project. The mission for planning the follow-up project is expected to take place in the first quarter of 2018 (interview 1).

2.2 Evaluation questions

Each project is assessed on the basis of standardised evaluation criteria and questions to ensure comparability. More specifically, each evaluation is based on the OECD/DAC criteria for the evaluation of development cooperation, or the criteria for evaluating German bilateral development cooperation: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The evaluation dimensions and analysis questions derived from these criteria were specified by the GIZ. Limitations to the indicators used as the basis for this evaluation are reflected where appropriate in Section 5.2 on effectiveness. In addition to these evaluation criteria, the contributions to the Agenda 2030 and its principles (universality, integrative approach, Leave-No-One-Behind, multi-stakeholder partnerships) were also taken into account. The evaluation questions also relate to cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights where applicable. The evaluation questions can be found in annex 3.

Preparatory discussions were conducted between the evaluation team and project leader as well as representatives from the project's three units to find out, among others, whether the project has specific evaluation questions to add. The project team was particularly interested in what it could learn from this evaluation for the follow-up project, and wanted to know which key findings should be taken into account for further programme planning. In addition, the project team was interested in an analysis of the contribution to impacts at the level of the population of ECOWAS member states (interview 1).² These questions are therefore also addressed in the evaluation (see Section 7 on recommendations and Section 5.3 on impact).

² The numbers of the interviews do not reflect the chronological order in which the interviews were carried out, as interview sources are anonymous except in this instance where context is needed.

3 Object of the evaluation

3.1 Definition of the evaluation object

The evaluation object (PN 2013.2271.8) is a regional project running from 03/2014 to 02/2019 with a budget of 28.193.902 EUR, including EUR 10,000,000 cofinancing from the EU under an Indirect Management Delegation Agreement. The intervention subject to evaluation is known as the 'Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission' to its partners. However, in the following, it is referred to as the 'project', because this corresponds to the GIZ headquarters terminology. The project builds on predecessor projects that were taken into consideration in the evaluation where it was relevant. In addition to examining the current project, the evaluation sought to examine long-term results of the previous project regarding impact and sustainability. Findings in this regard are however limited due to two factors. First, the project is highly complex and the project reporting does not provide a complete picture of this complexity (interview 1). Second, there has been a turnover of personnel at the project and partner levels, which limited the possibility to triangulate data from the project documentation of the predecessor projects through interviews. The connection between the previous and current projects was examined taking into account these limitations.

The table below gives an overview of the duration and budget of each of the different projects.

| Module | Duration | Budget overall | Budget breakdown |
|----------------|-------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| PN 2013.2271.8 | 11.03.2014 – 28.02.2019 | €28,193,902 | BMZ €18,193,902 EU €10 million |
| PN 2010.2250.8 | 01.2011 – 12.2013 | €11,236,666 (including €90,000 unused funds from PN 2007.2177.9) | BMZ €11,236,666 |
| PN 2007.2177.9 | 01.2008 – 31.12.2010 | €6,214,000 (including €1,714,000 unused funds from PN 2005.2162.5) | BMZ €6,214,000 |
| PN 2005.2162.5 | 31.10.2005 – 05.11.2008 | €2,500,000 | Unknown |

According to the proposal to the BMZ, the objective of the current project is: 'The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the area of economic and trade policy as well as peace and security policy.' The project is based in Abuja, Nigeria, where its partner, the ECOWAS Commission, is located. It operates in a highly political and complex environment. The project is divided into three units that work with specific divisions and directorates of the partner: organisational development (unit 1), trade and customs (unit 2), and peace and security (unit 3). The office of the Vice President of the Commission is the overall entry point for the project.

The project partner is the ECOWAS Commission, the most important executive body of the Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS has existed since 1975 and has 15 member states³ with substantial political and economic heterogeneity. Its mandate incorporates promoting regional and economic integration as well as peace and security. At political level, to date, ECOWAS has achieved visa-free travel and right of domicile within the region; the activation of mediation mechanisms for conflict situations; the ratification of regional standards for democracy and governance; and an internationally recognised role in electoral observation. Regarding economic integration, a Common External Tariff has recently been introduced, and an

³ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU has been negotiated and signed by most member states (GIZ 2017a). A sub-group of ECOWAS member states, the eight countries forming the West African and Economic Union⁴ (WAEMU), had already introduced a CET between them in 2000. Regarding peace and security, the first ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was adopted in 1999. This mechanism, together with the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as well as the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, forms the foundations of the ECOWAS peace and security agenda. ECOWAS was pioneering in terms of formalising collective conflict prevention and management – even preceding the African Union Peace and Security Protocol. The ECOWAS mechanism outlines three foundational pillars: early warning, mediation, and peacekeeping through the standby force (ISS 2016).

ECOWAS is considered one of the most performing regional bodies on the continent. According to its own estimates, it is financed to 80% by its member states. However, member states are lagging behind with their financial contributions. Payments from Nigeria make up 50% of the ECOWAS budget and have been substantially delayed (GIZ 2017a). The Commission thus experiences budget constraints that weaken its capacities to deliver. In addition, there is a hiring freeze, and the Commission is understaffed. This is exacerbated by frequent travel undertaken by Commission staff (GIZ 2016a).

Another factor that influences the implementation of the project are shifting political priorities within the Commission. This can be attributed to the highly political and complex environment in which it is operating. In addition, personnel changes at management level affect priorities within the Commission. While the President, the Vice President and the Commissioners usually serve a four-year term, the President, Vice President and Commissioners sitting at the time of the evaluation who were appointed in early 2016 only served a two-year term. This decision was taken by the ECOWAS member heads of state in view of the ongoing organisational reform, in light of which all members of the Commission were to end their terms in 2018, when the Commission was to adopt a new structure (GIZ 2016a).

3.2 Target group analysis

According to the project's proposal, the target group is the entire population of the ECOWAS member states (GIZ 2013a). The rationale behind this is that regional economic integration will ultimately lead to increased trade, increased investments and creation of jobs. The last progress report further explains that measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoiding and reducing conflict in the region and to secure peace, which ultimately favours the framework conditions for increasing the population's living standards (GIZ 2016a).

While this reasoning seems plausible, the evaluation team considers that given that the project is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (BMZ policy marker MSA), the analysis of the target group calls for further differentiation, especially relating to regional economic integration. One of the criteria to attribute the policy marker MSA to a project financed by BMZ is that poor people in the region/country benefit to a significant degree from the indirect project results. While the section on the target group in the project proposal specifies that owners and staff of export-oriented companies and their suppliers and regions close to borders are expected to benefit most, there is no specific analysis of how poor people in the region will benefit. However, the problem analysis from the project proposal acknowledges the risk that the interests of disadvantaged and poor people may not adequately be identified and taken into account in the regional economic integration process. In light of this risk, the evaluation team finds that a more differentiated analysis of how the regional economic integration process supported by the project affects different segments of society would have been appropriate. In addition, this would also be in line with the Leave-No-One-Behind principle, which emphasises that the UN Sustainable Development Goals be met for all nations and people for all

⁴ Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau.

segments of society (UN 2016). However, since the Leave-No-One-Behind principle was only introduced after the project proposal was formulated, this latter aspect does not factor into the evaluation team's assessment of the appropriateness of the target group analysis.

The evaluation team further draws attention to the fact that there are very long causal chains between the measures carried out by the project at the level of the ECOWAS Commission and potential effects on the whole population of ECOWAS member states. This is also reflected by none of the impact indicators measuring changes at the population level (see Section 5.3 on impact). In practice, the project team distinguishes between the direct target group of the project (ECOWAS Commission and, to a lesser extent, customs officials and export-oriented companies participating in trainings) and the final beneficiaries (whole population of ECOWAS member states). Due to the long causal chains before final beneficiaries may be expected to experience changes, primary data collection for this evaluation could only be carried out at the level of the immediate target group. An analysis of potential impacts on the final beneficiaries has been carried out by means of literature analysis. A reflection of plausible contribution of the programme to potential impacts at the final beneficiary level has been carried out on the basis of the interviews conducted in the evaluation.

4 Evaluability and evaluation design – data sources, data quality and evaluation methods used

4.1 Data sources, data quality

The evaluation relied on three main data sources: internal documentation provided by the project team, secondary data identified by the evaluation team, and first-hand interviews conducted by the evaluation team. The internal documentation included the proposals and annual reports from the predecessor project and the current project as well as the predecessor project's reports of internal project progress reviews. In addition, it included a range of internal documents, such as stakeholder maps and results models. For the current project, the evaluation team also consulted the draft report of the external evaluation of the EU cofinancing, the reports of the evaluation of the trainings on the Common External Tariff commissioned by the project, and several reports produced by consulting missions financed by the project. Finally, internal cost data was consulted for the analysis of efficiency. The full list of these documents can be found in annex 6.

The secondary data identified by the project team centred on the (projected) CET impact studies, but also included some general literature on the ECOWAS integration process and the African Peace and Security Architecture. A full overview of these documents can be found in the bibliography in annex 4. The interviews were conducted with project staff, other GIZ staff, partners from the ECOWAS Commission, other development partners, as well as sector experts in the field of regional economic integration in West Africa. Interview partners were selected on the basis of their ability to provide relevant information about the project and the sectors in which it is operating. To come to this selection, the evaluation team first established a list of internal and external stakeholders with whom the project is cooperating on the basis of the project documentation (project proposal, progress reports, and stakeholder maps). The evaluation team then asked the project team to comment and complement this list. Because of the high number of stakeholders identified, the evaluation team decided to conduct some of the interviews with partners as group interviews in order to take into account all relevant perspectives in the given time frame. In addition, to ensure that the selection of interviewees did not leave out important perspectives, the local consultant vetted the selection of sector experts in the field of trade policy. Finally, some interviews conducted during the evaluation mission led to the identification of additional interview partners on a specific subject matter. The evaluation team thus added some interviews to the schedule on the spot during the evaluation mission in Abuja. The full list of interviews conducted can be found in annex 7.

Overall, the evaluation team considers that the data on which this evaluation is based is of good quality, in the sense that ample documentation on processes supported by the evaluation was available. At the same time, given the complexity of the evaluation, the time allotted for analysis was limited. Even though the project provided ample documentation, much of it could only be properly put in context by the evaluation team through the kick-off meeting with the project team in Abuja. The project is highly complex and could, according to the project team's own accounts, easily constitute three separate projects (interview 2). The project's proposal and the reporting to BMZ do not fully capture this complexity due to page restrictions (interview 2). There is no internal document that provides a comprehensive overview beyond the proposal and reporting to BMZ. The project team, however, delivered a presentation on each of the units during the kick-off in Abuja, which proved very helpful for the evaluation team to comprehend the project. Regarding the interviews, the evaluation team managed to talk to almost all relevant interview partners in spite of the high number of partners with whom the project works in different directorates and units, and the busy agenda of the ECOWAS Commission. The only interview that could not take place as planned was the interview with the Private Sector Commissioner. The evaluation team considers that the availability of many high-level interview partners in a short time frame is in

itself testimony to the high standing of the project within the ECOWAS Commission.

The evaluation team used the project's monitoring data, which tracks progress against the indicators from the project proposal. The project has recently started working with the GIZ 'results monitor' online tool for this. Previously, this data was tracked in an Excel sheet. Looking at the quality of the project's monitoring, the evaluation team found that the indicators are mostly SMART and include a baseline (annex 2 includes an assessment of indicators against the SMART quality criteria). The evaluation team also found the information from the project's monitoring, including the baseline data, to be reliable, as it is in line with information provided by partners and external stakeholders during the interviews conducted in the evaluation mission. However, the indicators formulated in the project proposal do not fully do justice to the changes to which the project aims to contribute. To address this, the evaluation team's assessment of effectiveness and impact not only takes into account progress against these indicators, but also a qualitative assessment of the project's contribution to the intended outcomes and overarching development results. This is explained in more detail in the respective sections on results. The evaluation team did not use partner data for monitoring, as the partner's results-oriented monitoring is still work in progress and does not measure the changes intended by the project.

4.2 Evaluation design and methods used

Evaluation design

In line with the Terms of Reference, the evaluation team adopted a theory-based approach that relied on the project's theory of change as a basis for analysis. Specifically, it implemented a contribution analysis related to the OECD/DAC criteria effectiveness and impact. A contribution analysis consists in an analysis of the contribution of a project and analyses the extent to which observed (positive or negative) results can be related to it (Mayne 2001). Contribution analysis differs from other forms of theory-based evaluation in so far as it both analyses the hypotheses of the theory of change and seeks to identify alternative explanations that may explain observed impacts. Contribution analysis does not seek to prove that one factor 'caused' the intended impact, but analyses the extent to which the project has contributed to the observed impacts. Data from various sources is collected to analyse the causal hypotheses between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts formulated in the theory of change. Contribution analysis thus seeks to construct a credible 'performance story' to show whether the programme was a relevant factor, possibly together with other factors, to lead to change (ibid.). Context factors that play a role in achieving (or not achieving) the project's objective are explicitly taken into account in contribution analysis.

Contribution analysis falls into the category of the **generative/mechanisms approach** to causal inference. This approach relies on identifying the 'causal mechanisms' that generate the desirable effects. In order to use this approach, the existence of one case with good quality data sources is sufficient. The approach is based on an existing theory for the project in question which allows the evaluator to understand the factors that cause the observed effect. As a result this approach permits an in-depth understanding of the case and its context, proving a detailed explanation of both of them (Stern et al. 2012). The evaluation team chose this over other approaches to causal inference, such as the experiment/counterfactual approach, the regulatory approach or the multiple causation approach. An experiment/counterfactual approach was not deemed feasible because the project targets the whole ECOWAS Commission, for which it would hardly be feasible to identify a unit of comparison. A regulatory approach was deemed largely unsuitable because for most of the causal hypotheses of the theory of change, the number of direct beneficiaries (e.g. staff members of specific directorates of the ECOWAS Commission) is limited. It would thus hardly have been possible to draw conclusions on cause-effect relationships on the basis of a high number of observed cases for these causal hypotheses.⁵ Lastly, a multiple

⁵ At first sight, trainings on CET in unit 2 (trade and customs) and possibly trainings in unit 3 (peace and security) could have had potential for a regulatory approach to causal inference, as they involved a larger number of participants. However, on the basis of exploratory interviews with the project team and on the basis of a preliminary document review, the evaluation team came to the conclusion that the feasibility of a regulatory approach seemed limited also in this case. The method of data collection of choice to reach a large number of training participants that are located in different countries would have been an online survey. However, in unit 2, an online survey had already been

causation approach to causal inference was not deemed feasible due to the complexity of the project.

In light of the complexity of the project (3 sectors, several levels of implementation, a very broad stakeholder landscape, highly political environment, etc.) and the resources available for the evaluation, it was decided in the inception phase of the evaluation to focus the contribution analysis on three processes supported by the project, one for each unit. These were:

- the contribution of the project to the community strategic framework (in unit 1),
- the contribution of the project to the common external tariff (in unit 2),
- the contribution of the project to early warning support (in unit 3).

Furthermore, to strengthen the generative/mechanisms approach to causal inference, the evaluation team combined the contribution analysis with process tracing for certain elements of the theory of change. The main objective of process tracing is to identify all possible underlying causal mechanisms of a theory of change and to test their validity using different forms of probability tests (e.g., hoop tests, smoking-gun tests, straw-in-the-wind test or doubly decisive tests). The difference with regard to contribution analysis is that in process tracing, alternative causal hypotheses to those formulated in the theory of change are formulated before data collection, so that they can be explicitly tested. During the inception phase, alternative impact hypotheses were formulated regarding the Community Strategic Framework and the Common External Tariff. The full list of alternative hypotheses is documented in the inception report. Where these alternative hypotheses proved relevant, they are elaborated upon in the sections on effectiveness and impact in this report.

Methods used

The methods used in the evaluation included an analysis of internal documentation, of secondary data and interviews conducted by the evaluation team. A systematic approach was used for document analysis. In the inception phase, the project proposal and the results models were used to understand what the project intends to achieve and how. The progress reports were used to understand progress towards the project's objective as well as context factors that affect progress. In addition, stakeholder maps were also consulted to understand the role of different actors involved. Since the stakeholder maps were not accompanied by a narrative, they could however only be fully comprehended when they were explained by the project team during the evaluation mission. The evaluation team further reviewed the capacity development strategy which consists of a SWOT⁶ analysis of the partner system. This proved useful to better understand the context in which the project is operating. The internal documentation was continuously revisited during the evaluation mission and in the analysis phase to triangulate and complement it with information from other sources. This was especially important because the project's proposal and reporting do not fully capture the its complexity.

The strength of the internal documentation lies in the fact that it provides information that can be directly related to the project's results model and the quality of the implementation process. Internal documentation, however, comes with a potential bias, since most of the internal documentation is prepared for the commissioning party (BMZ), and there may be an incentive to focus on successes rather than weaknesses. This bias was compensated for by also consulting external evaluations and secondary data such as studies by external parties on the potential impact of the Common External Tariff. In the context of this evaluation, the strength of interviews was that they provided detailed qualitative information on the quality of processes as well as on political context factors that are highly relevant for achieving results. Depending on the type of stakeholders, some interview partners may also have a certain bias against addressing weaknesses in the project. The evaluation team found the project team itself rather open in talking about both strengths and weaknesses, although some of the partners were rather prone to focus on strengths only. Taking into account the perception

carried out recently for training participants. The response rate was limited (interview 2). In addition, on the basis of a review of the report on the survey findings, the evaluation team considered that the insights provided by this survey can contribute to understand strengths and weaknesses of the trainings, but do not allow for a structured analysis of causal hypothesis of the BMZ results model for unit 2. In unit 3, no online survey of training participants has yet been conducted. However, since no consolidated participant list with contact details is available for training participants in unit 3, an online survey was not deemed feasible in the time frame given for this evaluation.

⁶ Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

of other development partners and external actors was useful in this regard to get a balanced perspective.

To come to valid and reliable information, whenever possible, the evaluation team aimed for systematic data triangulation (taking into account the perspectives of different stakeholders on the same aspect) and/or method triangulation (using various methods of data collection to collect information on the same aspect). It was not always possible to do both for every aspect. Possibilities for data triangulation were limited for some evaluation aspects because only the project team and the respective partner with whom the project is cooperating in a given area knew specifics about the project. For this reason, external actors (other GIZ projects, sector experts, other cooperation agencies or donors) could only triangulate part of the evaluation aspects, such as general developments in a sector, the quality of coordination between different development partners, or an overall impression of the project's contribution to changes in a given area. Possibilities for method triangulation were limited for some evaluation criteria because not all aspects of the project are covered in internal documentation, and secondary data does not cover project specifics. However, either method or data triangulation proved possible for most aspects analysed by the evaluation team. The evaluation matrix in annex 3 and Section 4.2, which presents the evaluation findings, give the sources and methods of data collection for each finding to illuminate how the evaluation team came to its conclusions.

In addition to data and method triangulation, the evaluation team carried out researcher triangulation. The local and international evaluators regularly exchanged on their analysis of evaluation results during the evaluation mission. The analysis of evaluation results was systematically carried out along the evaluation matrix in annex 3. This matrix was developed at the evaluation inception phase and details evaluation dimensions, analysis questions and indicators for each evaluation criterion. During the evaluation mission, the evaluation team documented results in interview minutes. At the end of the mission, the international evaluator elaborated the presentation for the debriefing of the mission, which was commented on by the local evaluator and revised accordingly before the debriefing. A triangulation of results with involved stakeholders was carried out by means of an internal debriefing session with the project team and an external debriefing session with interested partners. The comments made by participants in the debriefing sessions were taken into account in the elaboration of the final report, which was drafted by the international evaluator. The local evaluator reviewed the draft report before it was finalised, which further consolidated the researcher triangulation.

4.3 Evaluation process

The evaluation included an inception phase, a data collection phase and an analysis and reporting phase. The inception phase lasted from September to October 2017 and included the clarification of roles in the evaluation team, informational interviews with the GIZ evaluation unit and the project team, a desk study and the elaboration of the inception report. The data collection phase mainly revolved around the field mission in Abuja, which was carried out from 27 October until 8 November 2017. A few interviews with stakeholders outside of Nigeria were conducted by phone shortly prior to the field mission. The analysis and reporting phase started at the end of the field mission. The final report was submitted to GIZ in the first week of January 2018.

Overall, the evaluation team considers that the evaluation process went smoothly. As described in the previous chapters, relevant documentation was available for analysis, and the evaluation team managed to talk to almost all relevant interview partners. The evaluation process was however characterised by some minor challenges that are described in the following:

- The evaluation could not live up to the initial aspirations of GIZ to involve the partners in the inception phase. The project team decided against sharing the inception report with the partners, as it was deemed too technical. The evaluation team shares this view. The format for the inception report requires the evaluation team to address a number of technical aspects, ranging from an assessment of a project's

adherence to GIZ internal standards, to the discussion of different evaluation theories. This makes the inception report potentially difficult to digest for a lay audience. In the case of this project, a further aspect that made it difficult to share the inception report is that no one at the level of the partners is aware of the full complexity of the project. The project works with numerous partners at the level of the Commission, and each partner is typically only aware of the parts of the project that concern him or her. Partners are also not aware of the results model and the indicators associated with it.⁷ This has been a very deliberate choice by the project, since the Commission is already highly solicited by planning processes with various development partners. The project wishes to contribute to the consolidation of the Commission's own strategic planning (namely, the Community Strategic Framework) rather than to strain its already sparse resources with absorbing the GIZ logic (interview 3). The evaluation team deems this approach sensible in the given context, but it does make a participatory approach to evaluation all the more difficult. The high level of solicitation of partners was also reflected in sparse attendance of partners in the external debriefing session, which fell into a period with many high-level meetings taking place at the Commission.

- Moreover, full participation of the local consultant in the inception phase of the evaluation was difficult because most of the internal documentation was only available in German. The local consultant could thus not participate in the elaboration of the inception report. The evaluation team however found that the inception report still provided added value to a shared understanding between the international and national consultant regarding the evaluation process.
- Furthermore, no participation of the final beneficiaries was foreseen in the evaluation, as the gap between advisory services at the level of the ECOWAS Commission and results at the level of the whole population of ECOWAS member states is substantial.
- In addition, the assessment of production efficiency was rendered difficult because the project had many more outputs than foreseen by GIZ norms, and because several of the output indicators measure changes outside of the project's sphere of influence.
- Finally, with regard to the evaluation process, the rescheduling of the mission in Abuja was not ideal. Due to a change in the project's planning, the mission had to be rescheduled, and the only possible time frame was a slightly reduced time frame with regard to the initial planning. As a result, there was no other possibility but to schedule meetings with the project team on a weekend to leave enough time for all interviews to take place in the reduced time frame. The evaluation team would like to thank the project team for the flexibility in this regard. At the same time, we would like to point out that the rescheduling of the mission led to a very tight time frame for the interviews. While the evaluation team is satisfied with access to relevant interview partners (see chapter 4.1), time for analysis between interviews was curtailed due to the tight schedule. This was not ideal especially given the complexity of the project and the fact that the evaluation team could only fully apprehend the project after the presentations delivered during the kick-off session in Abuja.


4.4 Results model including hypotheses

The evaluation was carried out on the basis of the project's results model (theory of change), which is outlined in the following. The project has developed an overall results model and a separate results model for each of the three units of the project (see annex 1). The results models have been updated in April 2017. They build upon the results matrix from the project's proposal (GIZ 2013a). The project's overall results model provides an understanding of the interplay between the outputs⁸ of the three units to achieve the projects' objective and the programme objective. The respective results models for each of the three units provide details on how the outputs are to be achieved. In the following, the overall results model and the separate results models for each of the three units are first described and then discussed. This description is intended to give the reader a

⁷ The results matrix and the indicators of the EU-cofinanced part of component 2, the WATIP programme, are an exception, as there is a joint steering committee for WATIP in which the partners are represented.

⁸ Outputs are called 'results' in the graphic representations of the results models elaborated by the project.

general understanding of how the project aims to achieve its objective. During the inception phase and the field mission, it became clear that the graphic representation of the results models do not fully do justice to the project team's understanding of the theory of change. They provide a good overview of the fields in which the project is active and convey that there are interlinkages between progress made in terms of organisational development and bringing about change in the fields of trade and customs as well as peace and security. However, the discussions with the project team revealed that in some cases, the arrows in the graphic representation of the results models implied causal linkages between outputs that were not accurate according to the project team. On the other hand, the discussion brought to light some causal linkages between outputs that were not always fully represented in the graphic depiction of the results model. For reasons of clarity, the following section describes only causal linkages that were confirmed in the discussion with the evaluation team. Inconsistencies with the graphic representation (see below, for an A4 version see annex 1) are documented in footnotes.



In the project's **overall results model**, the outputs of all three units jointly contribute towards the project's objective: 'The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the area of economic and trade policy as well as peace and security policy'.⁹ The overall results model includes a total of 11 outputs in three units. Since the project is quite complex, we provide an overview of the units and their outputs before describing selected hypotheses regarding the interplay between the different units.

Unit 1, organisational development, has a strong focus on the planning and monitoring capacities of the Commission, and also works on strengthening internal and external communication and coordination. It intends to deliver three outputs (in the centre in green in the graphic representation):

- Organisational and Capacity Development of the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened (R1 – Output A¹⁰)
- ECOWAS Commission has made proposals to Council of Ministers regarding strategic priorities received from the M+E system (R2 – Output B)
- The ECOWAS Commission implements a CSF and an action plan that set particular priorities (R3 – Output C).

⁹ The peace and security aspect does not appear as part of the model objective in the graphic representation of the overall results model, but it is included in the project's objective formulated in the project's proposal.

¹⁰ The numbers correspond to the numbers given to the outputs in the results model for each of unit, the units. Each unit has its individual „R (result) 1“. The letters relate to the overall results framework, with outputs A – H corresponding to the way the outputs are numbered in the projects' proposal.

Unit 2, trade and customs, intends to deliver four outputs¹¹ (on the left in blue in the graphic representation):

- ECOWAS Commission harmonises and dismantles tariff trade barriers (R1 – Output D)
- The ECOWAS Commission makes a greater contribution to dismantling non-tariff barriers to trade (R2 – Output E)
- The harmonisation of indirect tax rates is improved (R3.1 – Output F.1)
- The harmonisation of customs procedures is improved (R3.2 – Outputs F.2)

Key processes supported in this regard include the implementation of the ECOWAS CET, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), support to the fiscal transition programme of ECOWAS and support to the liberalisation of trade in services in ECOWAS.

Unit 3, Peace and Security, intends to deliver four outputs¹² (on the right in yellow in the graphic representation):

- The approach and programming of PAPS directorates is aligned with African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) concepts and strategies (R1)
- Internal synergy and cohesion is enhanced within PAPS through improved inter-directorate planning and implementation (R2 – Output G)
- PAPS capacities to identify, deploy and manage civilian experts for conflict prevention, management and resolution are enhanced (R3 – Output H)
- National capacities especially CSOs have effectively contributed to Early Warning and Early Response efforts of ECOWAS (R4).

In the overall results model, unit one, organisational development, is deliberately placed in the centre, its outputs contributing to the outputs of unit two, trade and customs, and unit three, peace and security. While the specific linkages suggested in the graphic representation by arrows from outputs in unit one to outputs in unit two and three were sometimes refuted by the project team,¹³ discussions with the project team still confirmed that the work being done in the field of organisational development is to contribute to progress in the other two units. An example for this, which is not explicitly included in the graphic representation of the results model, is that 'if the overall monitoring and evaluation capacities of the ECOWAS Commission are strengthened, this will strengthen the Commission's capacities to deliver on its mandate in the fields of trade and customs and peace and security'. A further important linkage between organisational development and thematic support lies in the advisory services to human resources recently taken up by the project at the request of the Commission. This support is not explicitly depicted in the results model. However, a key hypothesis formulated by the project team during the field mission is that 'if the human resources of the ECOWAS Commission are strengthened, then the capacities of the Commission to deliver results in the fields of trade and customs as well as peace and security will be strengthened'.

The programme objective mirrors the contents of the project's objective, but at the level of the member states of ECOWAS instead of at the level of the Commission.¹⁴ The program's objective is 'The steering, implementation and monitoring of decisions taken by ECOWAS in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security are improved' (impact). The rationale behind this is that while the Commission is the executive organ of the ECOWAS, the results of its work can only come to fruition if the member states implement decisions taken by the organisation.¹⁵

¹¹ Three in the project's proposal, output F from the project's proposal has been split into two in the results model elaborated subsequently.

¹² Two in the project's proposal, R1 and R4 have been added in the results model elaborated subsequently.

¹³ For example, the following hypotheses were refuted by the project team, in spite of a direct arrow linking the corresponding outputs in the overall results model:

- 'If the ECOWAS commission implements a Community Strategic Framework and an action plan that set particular priorities (R3 – Output C from unit 1), this contributes to the approach and programming of PAPS directorates being aligned with APSA concepts and strategies (R1 of unit 3)';
- 'If the ECOWAS Commission has made proposals to the Council of Ministers regarding strategic priorities received from the M+E system (R2 – Output B of unit 1), this contributes to the Commission making a greater contribution to dismantling non-trade and tariff trade barriers (R2 – Output E and R1- Output D of unit 2).'

¹⁴ In the results model there is no hypothesis (arrow) linking the module objective to the program objective. According to the project team, this is simply an omission, and there should be a connection.

¹⁵ According to the results model, achieving the project's objective at the level of the Commission is perceived to be (partly) within the project's sphere of influence (system barrier). This differs from the framework of reference for the GIZ results model, in which a project's objective is seen as within the sphere of responsibility of a project (GIZ, n.d.). According to the overall results model of the project subject to project, achieving the program objective at the level of the member states is perceived to be outside the project's sphere of influence (system barrier). This is in line with the framework of reference for the GIZ results model.

While potential risks are not depicted in the graphic representation of the results models, they can be derived from the project's proposal. A first risk lies in a diminishing political will of the ECOWAS member states to support further regional integration. The motivation for further regional integration could be diminished if certain member states have the impression to stand to lose from regional integration processes. ECOWAS has, along with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the most diverse membership structure among African regional economic communities. Melo and Tsikata (2014) argue that this heterogeneity lays down a dilemma: on the one hand, the gains from deep integration are the greatest. On the other, the interests are the furthest apart. For example, the extensive delays in the ECOWAS consensus regarding the Common External Tariff and the Economic Partnership Agreement can partly be attributed to Nigeria's arguments to protect its competitiveness (De Melo and Laski 2014). A further risk lies in a lack of or limited availability of members of the ECOWAS Commission and of ECOWAS member states for advisory services provided by the project. An additional risk for the ECOWAS Commission's capacity lies in the fact that some member states do not respect their financial commitments to ECOWAS. One of the member states that delayed its payments in 2016 was Nigeria, which is responsible for roughly half of the ECOWAS budget. This has led to substantial cuts for units and departments of the Commission in the 2016 ECOWAS budget, which has led to adaptations regarding the projects activities (GIZ 2016a).

Regarding the **quality of the overall results model**, the evaluation team acknowledges that it constitutes a challenge to elaborate a graphic representation that fully captures the complexity of the project with all its interlinkages.¹⁶ A written narrative explaining the project team's understanding of the results model would however be beneficial to fully leverage the potential of the results model for steering, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It would certainly have facilitated the inception phase of this evaluation.

The **respective results models for the different units** of the project are elaborate and clear. For each unit, a graphic representation of the theory of change of the whole unit including a depiction of the interplay between the different outputs and sub-results of the unit is available. In addition, a separate graphic representation of how each individual output is to be achieved is available. The results models of each individual unit include three levels: the project's objective, outputs (results) and sub-results. The sub-results correspond to changes at the level of the ECOWAS Commission that result from specific activities and uptake of the products of these activities, whereas the outputs describe mid-term results that are the sum of the sub-results. In terms of evaluability, it would have been helpful for the results models to explicitly formulate results hypotheses and to also include activities. This would have facilitated the contribution analysis. Given the fact that the sub-results constitute the lowest level of change in the results models, some of the sub-results that refer to the use of systems or frameworks developed within the project are quite ambitious (e.g. sub-results R1c in unit 1, 'ECOWAS uses a results-based performance system'). In the experience of the evaluation team, uptake of systems or frameworks developed within a project is often not totally in the sphere of control of the project, but favourable conditions for ownership and uptake can be created by involving the partner every step along the elaboration of these systems or frameworks. The project team itself also finds that some of the outputs in the results model are clearly outside of its scope of influence. This is the case for example for output B and output C of unit one, since decisions by the Council of Ministers are not only influenced by technical inputs, but mainly by political interests (GIZ 2017c). For reasons of brevity, the results models of the three units are not presented in detail here. They are included in annex 1.

For unit two, trade and customs, an additional results model has been elaborated for the part cofinanced by the European Union. The impacts, outcomes and outputs formulated therein are different than in the results model for unit two elaborated on the basis of the BMZ results matrix. The EU results model was not the focus of the evaluation, as it has been subject to a recent mid-term evaluation for which a report is available. However, as measures carried out in unit two under EU financing and measures carried out under BMZ financing are closely

¹⁶ Cross-cutting issues and the policy marker or the level of the final beneficiaries (whole population of the ECOWAS member states) are also not reflected in the overall results model. The evaluation team could however find information on these aspects in the project's proposal and reporting.

intertwined, the EU part was looked into to the extent to which this helped understand progress towards achieving the BMZ objective.

5 Assessment of the project's results (OECD/DAC criteria)

5.1 Relevance

The criterion relevance analyses the extent to which the objectives of a development project are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, regional needs, global priorities and partner' and donors' policies. The underlying question is whether the project sets the right priorities, both in how it was planned initially, and in how it is implemented in practice. To answer this question, this chapter first identifies the frameworks and strategies relevant for the project. Subsequently, an analysis of the alignment of the project's objective and scope with the frameworks of the partner, the frameworks of German development cooperation as well as with the SDGs is presented. The chapter then examines the project's relevance for the final beneficiaries, and to what extent the design of the project is suited to contribute to changes at their level. This is followed by an assessment of the relevance of the specific areas of support in the three units of the project from the perspective of the partners.

The extent to which the project is in line with frameworks of the partner, strategies of German development cooperation, and frameworks of the international development community is an important aspect of the project's relevance. At the level of the partner, the founding treaty of the ECOWAS Community and the ECOWAS Vision 2020 are the most important overarching framework documents relevant for the project. In addition, the Agenda 2063 is the main reference framework at the level of the African Continent. At the level of the BMZ, the Ministry's policies on cooperation with Africa, namely the 'New Africa policy of BMZ' and the German Marshall Plan for Africa are the most important framework documents. Finally, at international level, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals constitute the main reference framework for development.

In this regard, the project's objective is strongly in line with the priorities of the partner, the ECOWAS Commission. This is reflected by the fact that key processes supported to improve steering, implementation and monitoring in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy correspond to ECOWAS objectives formulated in reference documents of the organisation. The liberalisation of trade among member states and the establishment of a common external tariff, supported by unit 2 of the project, were already formulated as objectives of the Community in the first ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and the revised Treaty of 1993. The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 expanded the mandate of the organisation on peace and security as well as democratic governance, and formally introduced the peace and security observation system and election observers, both of which are supported by unit 3 of the project. The support of GIZ is also in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2020, encapsulated in the vision statement pledging 'to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation.' Lastly, at continental level, the intervention is also in line with the Agenda 2063, which, among others, calls for a prosperous, peaceful and secure Africa.

By supporting a regional economic community, the project is also in line with frameworks of the German Ministry for Economic and Development Cooperation. In the 'New Africa policy of BMZ', the Ministry underlines its commitment to strengthening African initiatives both at the level of the African Union and the RECs for continental and regional cooperation (BMZ 2014). Furthermore, the project is also in line with the pillars of the German Marshall Plan for Africa, which include, among others, trade as well as peace and security (BMZ 2017). In annual reports to the Ministry, the relevance of the project is linked to the SDGs. By the project's own accounts, measures in the field of organisational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ('Strengthen the

means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development'). Trade facilitation and harmonisation of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ('Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all') and 17 ('Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development'). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ('Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'). The project also links the project to SDG 1 ('End poverty in all its forms everywhere') and SDG 10 ('Reduce inequality within and among countries') (GIZ 2016a), because the support to the ECOWAS Commission is ultimately intended to benefit the whole population of ECOWAS member states.

The final beneficiaries of the project are, according to the project's proposal, 'the whole population of ECOWAS member states'. While it is plausible that the positive long-term developments to which the project aspires are relevant for the population, the evaluation team observes that the final beneficiaries are quite far away from the level at which the project operates in its day-to-day cooperation with the ECOWAS Commission. Unlike a bilateral GIZ project whose partner typically is the Ministry of one partner country, the partner of this project is a regional organisation whose members are sovereign states. This means that for capacity development at the level of the partner organisation to translate into changes at the level of the population, many factors outside of the project's sphere of influence come into play. These include, among others, political will in the ECOWAS member states to implement policies developed at the level of the ECOWAS Commission.

Since the project does not directly work with the final beneficiaries, the evaluation did not conduct primary data collection at the level of the population of ECOWAS member states. The assessment of the relevance to final beneficiaries is therefore done on the basis of the project's proposal and reporting, as well as on the basis of interviews with the project team, partners and external actors. In this regard, interview partners concurred that the project's work in the field of peace and security is highly relevant to the population of ECOWAS member states (interview 3, 4, 5, 6). With regard to the project's work in the field of trade and customs, interview partners agreed that the region will overall benefit from regional economic integration, but some interview partners pointed out that not all member countries may benefit to the same extent (interview 3, 7, 8). In this regard, no analysis of the impacts of regional economic integration differentiated by ECOWAS member states was carried out in the planning stages of the project (interview 3).

Looking at the relevance of the individual units of the project for the ECOWAS Commission, the relevance of support in the field of organisational development (unit one) was assessed positively in the interviews conducted. Support to improve planning and monitoring and to enhance communication and HR processes are viewed as crucial to unlock the potential of work being done by the Commission in thematic areas. Efforts on improving unambiguousness, transparency, fairness and accountability of processes related to human resources were cited as particularly relevant (interview 9). The rationale for this is that the Commission can only do its work well if hiring and promotions occur on the basis of qualifications. Currently, there is a hiring freeze at the Commission due to concerns over past hiring practices (interview 10, 9, 4, 11). The efforts at improving the staff regulations are pursued in anticipation of a lift of the hiring freeze.

While the overall relevance of unit one is assessed positively, one specific field of support does not seem in line with partners' priorities. This concerns protocol monitoring, the monitoring of the implementation of decisions adopted by the ECOWAS heads of states. The Commission understands the rationale for protocol monitoring, but according to several interview partners, it does not have a mandate to formally track compliance of member states to ECOWAS decisions. The Legal Directorate can take stock of domestication of regional protocols/regulations, but not of implementation (interview 11, 12).

The relevance of the project in the field of trade and customs (unit two) was rated highly by interview partners, as the processes supported directly emanate from the ECOWAS Treaty. The dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, the harmonisation of customs procedures and the harmonisation of fiscal policies are complementary processes which have already been on the ECOWAS agenda for decades, but on which progress had long stalled. Specifically, the ETLS addresses intra-regional trade, whereas the CET and the Customs Code that accompanies it address trade with third parties. According to several interview partners, these processes had stalled in the past partly due to lack of capacities to move them forward at the technical level, and partly due to uncertainty at political level regarding the gains (or losses) that may accrue from full implementation (interview 7, 8). The studies, advisory services, trainings and sensitisation measures of unit two are thus deemed important by interview partners because they improve knowledge, technical capacities and awareness. Thereby, they contribute to momentum for moving the integration process forward (interview 7, 8, 13, 14).

The relevance of the project in the field of peace and security (unit three) was also rated highly by the partners. First, measures on team building and cohesion strengthen the capacity to deliver of the Directorate of PAPS. Second, the thematic support provided by unit three is aligned with continental priorities, norms and conventions around the APSA (interview 6, 15). APSA outlines the systems (roles, instruments and procedures) by which the African Union (AU), the RECs and the Regional Mechanisms are meant to realise their conflict prevention, management and resolution (Nathan 2016). There are five APSA instruments of the AU, which are mirrored at the level of the ECOWAS. The project provides support on three of these instruments: the Early Warning System, the Council of the Wise, and the African Standby Force.¹⁷ Since these ECOWAS instruments are part of the APSA, the support of the project is aligned with regional frameworks. At the same time, the project also contributes to strengthen PAPS' alignment to APSA. ECOWAS partners do not always have the capacities to absorb agreements and decisions made at the level of the AU. Through its advisory services, the project staff supports its partners in internalising AU frameworks and bearing in mind alignment (interview 6).

For all three units, partners attest that a high flexibility towards evolving needs of the Commission contributes to the project's relevance (interview 16, 13, 15, 17). The project team itself views a certain degree of flexibility in day-to-day cooperation as a necessity, because of the highly political environment in which it operates, which is characterised by changing priorities (interview 11). To the extent possible, emerging requests of the partners are taken into account even if this involves activities that were not initially planned, as long as they contribute to the project's objective (interview 11, 15). Examples for current areas of support that were not part of the initial results matrix include support in the field of human resources by unit one, and support in the field of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework by unit three¹⁸ (interview 3, 11). Attentiveness to evolving needs of the partners is mainly ensured through informal coordination in day-to-day work between the units and their respective counterparts at the level of the ECOWAS Commission.¹⁹ The only unit which has a formal steering committee with the partners is the trade and customs unit. In unit two, exchange with the partners is facilitated by the fact that the project has embedded advisors with offices located directly in the Commission. In addition, the project supports the annual retreats of some of the directorates and is invited to attend these, thereby gaining a good understanding of the partners' priorities in a more structured setting (interview 11, 18). Finally, relevance is also achieved because the modes of delivery are suited to the context. The modes of delivery include advisory services by the project team and by external consultants, and the project draws upon West African expertise where possible (interview 16, 13, 15, 17). With regard to the support to the Community Strategic Framework, the partner would however have preferred longer-term support by external consultancies

¹⁷ The other two APSA instruments are the Peace and Security Council and the Peace Fund.

¹⁸ The unit's three areas of support (Early Warning, Conflict Prevention, and the ECOWAS Standby Force) are components of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework ECPF. The unit's support to the ECPF has been provided to support and enable the Secretariat to coordinate and create linkages and synergies across these areas.

¹⁹ For unit one, organizational development, the counterparts are: the Vice President of the Commission, the ECOWAS Monitoring and evaluation unit, the Director of External Relations, the Legal Advisor in the Office of the President, the Director of Legal Affairs, and the Commissioner Human Resources and his team. For unit two, trade and customs, the counterparts are: the Commissioner Trade, Customs and Free Movement and team, the Commissioner Macroeconomic policy and research and team, the Commissioner Private Sector and Industry and team. For unit three, peace and security, the counterparts are the Commissioner Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Directorate Political Affairs, the Directorate Peacekeeping and Regional Security, and the Directorate Early Warning.

(interview 19).

Overall assessment of relevance

The evaluation team comes to the conclusion that the project fits into the relevant strategic frameworks, and awards it 40 of 40 points in this dimension. As outlined in this chapter, the project is in line with the ECOWAS Treaty, the African Peace and Security Structure, the SDGs as well as the German Ministry for Development Cooperation's commitment towards strengthening regional organisations in Africa.

Regarding the suitability of the strategy to match core problems of the target group, the assessment needs to differentiate between the immediate target group (the ECOWAS Commission) and the final beneficiaries (the whole population of ECOWAS member countries). As described above, the pathway between advisory services to the Commission and changes at the level of the whole population is quite long. From the evaluation team's perspective, this underscores a challenge inherent in the planning of GIZ projects supporting the capacity development of regional organisations. In results-oriented development cooperation, a project is considered successful if its outputs are used by the partners and this leads to changes at the level of the final beneficiaries. Results-oriented planning shall reflect this ambition. If the partner is a regional organisation, however, whether policies are implemented only partly depends on capacities and ownership for policies at the level of the immediate counterpart of the project (in this case, the ECOWAS Commission). Implementation of policies is highly dependent on political will of the member states of the regional organisation. Against this background, there are two alternatives for designing a project: 1.) formulating an objective that is within the sphere of influence of the project, but which does not correspond to the outcome level because it does not take into account whether policies developed are implemented 2.) Formulating an outcome that is partly outside of the project's sphere of influence. The project has opted for the latter. Still, from the perspective of the evaluation team, the hypothesis that changes at the level of the ECOWAS Commission contribute to changes at the level of the whole population of ECOWAS member states is plausible. First, it is plausible that measures in the field of peace and security contribute to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region. Second, it is plausible that trade facilitation and harmonisation processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in some ECOWAS member states and for some segments of society (see also chapter on impact). However, as laid out in the target group analysis (see chapter on target analysis), the project proposal does not adequately reflect how poor and disadvantaged members of society will be affected by regional economic integration. The evaluation team comes to the assessment that the strategy of the project matches core problems of the final beneficiaries, but that there is room for improvement regarding the analysis of impacts of regional economic integration on poorer segments of society (see also chapter on impact). Regarding the extent to which the strategy matches the needs of the immediate target group, partners have expressed high satisfaction with the modes of delivery and flexibility of the project. There is minor room for improvement regarding modes of delivery for support to the Community Strategic Framework process, where the partner would have preferred longer-term consultancies. Overall, the evaluation team awards 27 out of 30 points for the suitability of the strategy because the project addresses core needs of the immediate target group and it is plausible that it contributes to changes at the level of the final beneficiaries.

The evaluation team comes to the conclusion that the design of the project is adequately adapted to the chosen goal, and awards 18 of 20 points in this dimension.²⁰ The combination of thematic advisory services on trade and customs (unit 2) and peace and security (unit 3), and an organisational development approach both within the thematic units (unit 2 and 3) and towards service departments that serve the whole ECOWAS Commission (unit 3) creates synergies in strengthening the partner's capacity to deliver. The full score is not awarded because with protocol monitoring, the design of the project includes support in a field for which the partner does not have a mandate.

²⁰ The fact that several of the output indicators are outside of the project's sphere of influence is assessed under efficiency.

Finally, the evaluation team considers the conceptual design of the project was adapted to changes in line with requirements and re-adapted where applicable, and awards 10 of 10 points in this dimension. Concrete examples for adaptations taken up at the request of the partner are the support to the revision of staff regulations in unit one, and the support to the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in unit three. Albeit not foreseen in the initial planning, these processes contribute to the project's objective and the changes are thus relevant.

The overall score for the assessment criterion relevance adds up to 95 out of 100 points: very successful.

| Criterion | Assessment dimension | Score |
|--------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| Relevance | The project fits into the relevant strategic reference frameworks | <i>40 of 40 points</i> |
| | Suitability of the conception to match core problems/needs of the target groups | <i>27 of 30 points</i> |
| | The design of the project is adequately adapted to the chosen goal | <i>18 of 20 points</i> |
| | The conceptual design of the project was adapted to changes in line with requirements and re-adapted where applicable | <i>10 of 10 points</i> |
| Overall rating relevance | | <i>95 of 100 points</i> |

5.2 Effectiveness

The criterion effectiveness measures progress against the project's objective. This includes an analysis of the degree to which the outcome indicators are achieved, as well as an analysis of the extent to which the project successfully contributes to the achievement of the objective (contribution analysis). In addition, the occurrence of additional, not formally agreed results is examined under effectiveness. For reasons of clarity, this chapter is divided into an analysis of findings for each of the project's units, and an analysis of findings that apply to the whole project. Before presenting the findings by unit as well as the overall analysis, an overview of all outcome indicators is presented in the following, and the focus of the contribution analysis in the three chapters is briefly presented.

Evaluation basis for assessing effectiveness

A necessary condition for using indicators as a basis for assessment is that they fulfil the SMART quality criteria. Of the five outcome indicators formulated in the project's proposal, three were considered fully SMART by the evaluation team, and two partly SMART. To adjust for the indicators that the evaluation team considered only partly SMART, new indicators were formulated in the inception phase of the evaluation. The following

indicators were agreed upon for the assessment of effectiveness during the inception phase of the evaluation:

- Adapted indicator 1.1: 75% of Commission staff interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security
- Adapted indicator 1.2: 60% of other donors interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security over the last three years (current project started March 2014)²¹

Source: closed question in interviews with answers on a five-point scale, 'good' being the second best option.

The adapted indicators 1.1 and 1.2 replaced indicator 1 from the project proposal, which is formulated as follows '75% of the ECOWAS Focal Points in the member states rate the contribution made by the ECOWAS Commission to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy as either 'good' or 'very good'.' This indicator was replaced because it had not been measurable in the past. According to the project's last progress report, the information could not be collected via an online survey due to political sensitivity.

- Adapted indicator 2: In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the hypothesis related to the connection between the project's measures to support the CET process and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed.²²

Source: closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale.

The adapted indicator 2 replaced indicator 1 from the project proposal, which is formulated as follows '90% of training course participants prove in the final test that they are capable of applying the Common External Tariff correctly'. This indicator was replaced because it was is deemed only partly relevant and only partly specific by the evaluation team. Regarding relevance, the evaluation team considered that the indicator describes a change at output level rather than at outcome level. The evaluation team further observed that the indicator could be formulated more specifically by describing who exactly is being trained (type of stakeholders and numbers of stakeholders).

- **Indicator 3 from project proposal:** For each of the following three core processes for compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade, either a new regional agreement has been adopted or a new instrument introduced which improves the implementation of an existing agreement: a.) programme of tax and customs duties reform, b.) value added tax and c.) excise duties.
- **Indicator 4 from project proposal:** ECOWAS instruments and conceptual approaches for fulfilling its mandate in the area of peace and security, e.g. developing the civilian components of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), meet the AU requirements for the APSA.
- **Indicator 5 from project proposal:** Four trade or fiscal policy recommendations aimed at improving female participation in regional economic processes are discussed in the relevant ECOWAS decision-making bodies.

²¹ During the evaluation, interviewees were asked to provide the same assessment regarding the last 10 years. This assessment was taken into account for the analysis of sustainability of the predecessor project.

²² The initial formulation for this indicator in the Inception Report was: 'In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the hypothesis related to the connection between training on CET and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed. Source: closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale.' However, the project team asked for the analysis to be extended to all measures supporting CET, which is why the analysis was expanded.

Indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are discussed in the subchapter that presents findings that apply to the whole project, indicators 2, 3 and 5 are discussed in the subchapter that presents findings for unit two, and indicator 4 is discussed under the subchapter that presents findings on unit three. Since none of the outcome indicators from the project proposal is exclusively relevant for unit one, no findings on indicator achievement are presented in the subchapter for unit one. The fact that the indicators only very partially reflect the work of the project is analysed in the overall assessment on effectiveness.

The work done in the three units goes way beyond what is captured in the indicators. In light of the complexity of the project, it was decided in the inception phase to centre the contribution analysis on one core process supported by each of the three units:

- the Community Strategic Framework (CSF) for unit one,
- the Common External Tariff (CET) for unit two,
- the support to early warning in unit three.

Effectiveness of unit one – organisational development

Since none of the **outcome indicators** from the project proposal refers exclusively to unit one, no findings on the outcome indicators are presented in this subchapter.

The **contribution analysis** in unit one focuses on the support to the CSF. The Community Strategic Framework is a planning document not only for the ECOWAS Commission, but for all ECOWAS institutions and agencies. It is accompanied by a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) results framework, and by a document that contains implementation and communication agreements.

In the project's overall **results model**, support to the CSF corresponds to R3 – Output C 'The ECOWAS Commission implements a Community Strategic Framework and an action plan that set particular priorities'. As explained in chapter 4.4, neither the overall results model nor the separate results models specific each of the three units provide information at activity level. Moreover, no results hypotheses have been formulated in writing to accompany the graphic representations of the results models. The following description of how the project is to achieve the output related to the CSF, and how this is to contribute to the project objective is therefore based on discussions of the results model of unit one with the project team at the outset of the evaluation.

In the results model, the Community Strategic Framework has a central role to play for the achievement of the project's objective. The underlying hypothesis is that if the objectives and priorities of the ECOWAS Community are defined in a shared strategic framework, then the Commission can use this strategic framework as a basis for steering, monitoring and implementation of ECOWAS decisions. The corresponding output 'The ECOWAS Commission implements a Community Strategic Framework and an action plan that set particular priorities' is thereby ambitious, because it not only describes the existence of the framework, but also its use. If the Commission uses this framework, this will enhance the quality of steering, monitoring and implementation (hypothesis linking R3 Output C to the project objective). Use of the CSF would mark a qualitative improvement because it is the first officially endorsed results-oriented framework for the ECOWAS Community²³ (interview 11). In this regard, it has to be taken into account that the CSF itself is accompanied by an M&E results framework, and by a document that contains implementation and communication arrangements. To achieve effective use of the CSF, the activities of unit one include the elaboration of the framework and its accompanying documents, as well as dissemination activities within the Commission and other ECOWAS institutions and agencies. Moreover, activities also included support to trainings on results-based management.

²³ A first strategic plan was developed with support from GTZ many years ago, but never adopted due to lack of ownership for the process within the Commission (interview 11).

The project supported the elaboration and adoption of the CSF and associated documents over a time span of several years. The basis for the work on this process was a request from the ECOWAS Commission to GIZ to support the evaluation of its first strategic plan, the 2011 – 2015 Regional Strategic Plan (RSP). The project supported the evaluation of the RSP through an independent institute. On the basis of the results of this evaluation, the CSF was drafted by consultancies financed by the project on the basis of an extensive stakeholder consultation process. Member states, specialised agencies of ECOWAS, civil society, the national planning offices of member states, as well as the Council of Ministers and the Heads of State were consulted. From the partner side, this process was led by the former Vice President of the Commission and the Directorate of Strategic Planning. Due to the high number of stakeholders from whom buy-in had to be generated, the finalisation of the document took 2.5 years. The CSF was ultimately adopted by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in December 2015. Since then, trainings on the CSF and its tools were conducted with support from the project.

However, two years into its adoption by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, the CSF is not yet fully used by the Commission. The evaluation identified two main reasons for this. First, the key stakeholders responsible for planning and monitoring at the level of the Commission are highly understaffed (interview 11, 19, 20, 10), and thus lack the capacities to drive the process. The strategic planning directorate and the monitoring unit both have one staff each, for an organisation that is estimated to have more than 700 employees.²⁴ According to several observers, the fact that they are not within the same organisational unit is also not ideal in terms of coordination (interview 11, 10). The second aspect that affects effective use of the CSF is that knowledge of and ownership for the CSF varies widely within the Commission. Some of the interview partners consulted in the evaluation align their work plans on it, while others were unclear about what the CSF is, or did not see it as relevant for their work. One interview partner explained that there is currently only limited momentum for the CSF, because a change of the management team of the Commission is coming up, and staff is waiting to see whether the new management team will commit to the CSF (interview 10).

Strengths and weaknesses regarding the quality of the process of the elaboration of the CSF affect ownership within the Commission. The members of the project's unit one assessed the Commission's participation very positively, pointing out that the former Vice President went through every page of the subsequent drafts in detail to provide feedback (interview 11). At the same time, interviews with various Commission officials revealed room for improvement concerning the elaboration of the CSF. One interview partner closely involved in the elaboration of the document observed that while the project's support was much appreciated, the process would have benefitted from longer, more continuous consultancy missions. Another interview partner expressed that not enough input was sought from technical staff of the Commission in the elaboration of the document. This was viewed as a weakness not only in terms of ownership, but also in terms of the relevance of the CSF's content. For example, resource mobilisation was cited as key issue to the organisation not taken into account in the CSF (interview 21).

Outside of knowledge and ownership for the CSF document itself, the effective use of the CSF depends on the development of a results-oriented mind-set within the Commission, and on clear processes for M&E. Various interview partners expressed the opinion that this is still work in progress (interview 3, 11, 22). So far, the project has already conducted one round of general trainings on results-based management for M&E focal points. However, several interview partners expressed that results orientation has not yet taken root throughout the organisation. To address this, the project has planned an additional round of trainings on results-based management which shall go beyond general concepts and introduce clear processes linked to the CSF. This round of trainings will be conducted for a wider participant group, since the M&E focal points depend on inputs from their colleagues to consolidate monitoring data (interview 11, 3). The evaluation mission found that another development partner, Transtec, also plans to provide support on results-oriented planning and monitoring (interview 22, 19) and encouraged unit one and Transtec to exchange on this matter to avoid

²⁴ Estimation of one interview partner (interview 11), no official numbers available

duplication.

To further anchor results orientation around the CSF in the Commission's processes, the project is currently liaising with the consultancy responsible for the introduction of SAP at ECOWAS. Specifically, the project aims to achieve that the future IT solution for submitting budgets prompts users to connect budget lines to the objectives of the CSF (interview 11, 10, 19, 17).

In sum, the evaluation team comes to the assessment that the CSF is an important framework document with a substantial role to play for the achievement of the project's objective. To what extent it will live up to this potential will depend on further dissemination efforts, especially towards the technical staff of the Commission, but also on the outcome of the reorganisation process and buy-in from the future management team. The issue of involvement of the technical levels of the ECOWAS Commission in the elaboration and dissemination of the CSF was discussed with the team of unit one during the debriefing. While the team of unit one acknowledges that there is still room for improvement in terms of ownership of CSF, it pointed out that the invitations to dissemination sessions had always been open to the technical staff of the Commission, but that information about this may not always have been shared by supervisors because communication in the organisation does not always circulate well. On the one hand, this reiterates the relevance of the project's work (all three units) on cohesion and communication within the different units and departments with whom they cooperate. On the other hand, given that weaknesses in communication are known to unit one, particular attention should have been paid to ensure that information on the CSF reached all relevant parties.

In addition to the support to the CSF process, unit one also contributes to the project's objective through support in several other areas. The most important other areas of support have arisen from ad hoc support requests from the Commission and thereby lead to **unintended results** not formally part of the project proposal, but still contributing to the intended outcome. These are briefly described and analysed in the following.

First, unit one provides support to the revision of ECOWAS' staff regulations. The rationale behind this is that clear regulations are one condition for competency-based hiring and promotions and fair allowances. This is however a highly politicised issue. The project takes on the role of a neutral mediator to reconcile the interests of various stakeholders (interview 11, 16). Results of this support are only to be expected once the hiring freeze is lifted (interview 11). Whether the support brings about the desired results will depend on compliance with the revised staff regulations. This is however outside of the project's sphere of influence (interview 9, 23).

The project's organisational development team furthermore supports ECOWAS on the cohesion and service quality of the HR department. The rationale behind this is that high quality HR services are key to staff morale. The project's support to the HR department is relatively recent, but improvements in internal communication and service-orientation can already be discerned (interview 11, 16).

Lastly, unit one provides support to strengthen the Commission's External Communications department in its capacity to coordinate development partners: Specific measures include the financing of the annual development partners' coordination meeting, and a consultancy which elaborates an inventory of all of the Commission's MoUs with its different partners. This is necessary, as currently the perception of development partners is that the Commission is not very proactive regarding donor coordination. The measures supported by the project are perceived as useful to strengthen the organisational capacity of ECOWAS by the interviewed external stakeholders (interview 23, 4).

Effectiveness of unit two – trade and customs

For unit two, three of the **outcome indicators** are relevant. Since they are rather technical and may be difficult to follow for a reader not familiar with the context of regional economic integration of the ECOWAS, findings

related to these indicators are presented in narrative form in this chapter. Outcome indicator 2 measures the contribution of the project's support to the introduction and implementation of the CET through process tracing.²⁵ A narrative presentation of findings in this regard is part of the contribution analysis which follows hereunder. A narrative presentation of findings on outcome indicator 3 (related to core processes for compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade) and outcome indicator 5 (related to recommendations aimed at improving female participation in regional economic processes) can be found in the section on other intended results at the end of this subchapter. To better locate this information, the respective indicators are highlighted in bold in the text. An overview of progress against all outcome indicators in table form can be found in the subchapter 'overall assessment of effectiveness' at the very end of the effectiveness chapter.

The **contribution analysis** in unit two focuses on the support to the introduction and implementation of the ECOWAS CET.

In the project's overall **results model**, support to the CET is one of the main aspects behind R1 – Output D "The ECOWAS Commission harmonises and dismantles tariff trade barriers". As explained in chapter 4.4, neither the overall results model nor the separate results models specific each of the three units provide information at activity level. Moreover, no results hypotheses have been formulated in writing to accompany the graphic representations of the results models. The following description of how the project is to achieve the output related to the CET, and how this is to contribute to the project objective is therefore based on discussions of the results model of unit two with the project team at the outset of the evaluation.

In the results model, support to the CET has a central role to play for the achievement of the project's objective. As described in the chapter on relevance, the dismantling of tariff trade barriers (R1 – Output D), including the introduction and implementation of the CET, is a central goal of the ECOWAS Treaty. Since the objective of the project is to strengthen the Commission in its capacities to steer, implement and monitor ECOWAS decisions, and the dismantling of tariff trade barriers is an ECOWAS decision, support to the CET process directly contributes to the project's objective. The underlying hypothesis is therefore that if tariff trade barriers are harmonised and dismantled, among others via the introduction and implementation of the CET, then the ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the area of economic and trade policy (hypothesis linking R1 – Output D to the project objective). The activities carried out by the project to move the CET process forward and therefore achieve R1 – Output D include sensitisation measures and the facilitation of a dialogue between key stakeholders affected by the CET. Further activities include technical training of customs authorities of ECOWAS member states on the CET, as well as support to monitoring of progress on the implementation of the CET. In addition, the project supports the drafting of the Customs Code, which accompanies the CET. This code harmonises customs measures and procedures in member states to streamline the implementation of the CET and applies to both intra-regional trade and trade with third parties.

The project's support to the CET process already goes back to the predecessor project, during which the negotiation of the CET was facilitated and studies were conducted, e.g. on the potential impact of the CET on government revenue in the region, and on options for monitoring the implementation of the CET (interview 18). The predecessor project thereby contributed to the finalisation of a version of CET on which the member states agree. In this regard, it is however important to mention that the elaboration of the CET was a complex negotiation process involving all 15 member states and spanning over a period of 10 years. In the current project, the support focusses on the introduction and implementation of the CET. In terms of fostering understanding and generating goodwill towards the CET at the political level and within society, sensitisation includes different formats for stakeholders ranging from parliamentarians, civil society, the private sector and

²⁵ The initial formulation for this indicator in the Inception Report was: 'In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the hypothesis related to the connection between training on CET and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed. Source: closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale.' However, the project team asked for the analysis to be extended to all measures supporting CET, which is why the analysis was expanded.

the media. In terms of facilitating the coordination between key stakeholders at technical level, the project initiated meetings of all the Directors General of customs in the region. It also provides support to the CET management committee regarding logistics and in framing discussions for meetings (interview 18). To build the capacities for the application of the CET, so far, trainings were conducted for more than 2000 customs officials and freight forwarders in the 15 member states (Results monitor, consulted 22.09.2017). This was done by means of a training-of-trainers approach in which the customs agencies were capacitated to train their own staff (interview 18). Monitoring on the implementation of the CET is carried out by consultants who visit the different member states, conduct interviews about the state of implementation of the CET with Ministries and subordinate agencies, and report back to the Commission.

In terms of modes of delivery, services are provided by the project's own staff as well as via consultancies. Unit two has four advisors embedded in the Commission's customs directorate working on CET and related processes, such as the Customs Code. A substantial part of the project's support to CET is financed via the EU co-funding. Under the EU cofinancing agreement, the project also provides support to trade statistics. This support indirectly strengthens the CET. The underlying hypothesis – which is not included in the BMZ results model – is that if the capacities of the Commission in the field of trade statistics are strengthened, then this contributes to improved steering, implementation and monitoring of trade related policy decisions, including CET.²⁶

Currently, in theory, all ECOWAS member states except Cape Verde are applying CET (interview 18, 24). However, the actual degree of implementation at the borders is difficult to assess, as there is little political will in the member states to monitor this (interview 17, 18). The monitoring missions financed by the project constitute an ad hoc solution to gather information in the absence of a formal monitoring mechanism. The missions were conducted in summer 2014, 2015 and 2016 and provide information on the situation at that point in time. This information was useful to raise awareness among member states regarding the situation on the ground and provided a basis for decision-making on steps to be taken to make further progress (interview 18). The reports of these missions can however not be used to assess the current state of implementation, as back then only eight countries applied CET (Zannou and Baba 2016, Gangnon and Camara 2016, Author unknown 2016a&b). Sector experts who provided their assessment on the current situation to the evaluation team estimated that full implementation is not yet achieved at the borders in the 14 member states that have started applying the tariff. The current state of progress towards full implementation was however considered adequate by these interview partners, given the fact that the CET is still in a five year transition period (interview 7, 8).

Challenges to the application of the CET at the borders are partly explained by lack of awareness of the private sector, and by a lack of knowledge of customs officials (interview 7, 8). In this regard, interview partners recognised that trainings and sensitisation carried out by the project have substantially contributed to develop knowledge. This is in line with findings from the independent study on the quality of CET trainings implemented by the project, which showed that 100% of trainers and 86% of trainee respondents are able to correctly apply the CET (Saana Consulting 2017). However, interview partners reasoned that because of the complexity of the subject matter and due to staff turnover at the level of customs officials, the knowledge base still needs to be consolidated (interview 7, 8).

Adapted **outcome indicator 2** measured interview partners' assessment of the relevance of the project's measures to support the CET process for the dismantlement of trade barriers through process tracing.²⁷ In the inception report, it had been foreseen to ask interview partners to rate the plausibility of several alternative hypotheses which might explain progress (or lack thereof) on the dismantlement of trade barriers on a five-point scale. During the evaluation, it became clear that the five-point scale did not do justice to the complexity

²⁶ This support is not included in the BMZ results matrix or BMZ results model, but in the results model for the EU-cofinancing.

²⁷ The initial formulation for this indicator in the Inception Report was: 'In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the hypothesis related to the connection between training on CET and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed. Source: closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale.' However, the project team asked for the analysis to be extended to all measures supporting CET, which is why the analysis was expanded.

of the subject matter. Respondents were not comfortable with it and preferred to provide a narrative assessment, which is summarised here.

Overall, interview partners deemed the projects' measures to support the CET process played a significant role in the Commission's contribution to dismantling trade barriers. In this regard, technical support to the Commission, sensitisation of different stakeholders and trainings for customs authorities were all deemed important (interview 7, 17, 8, 13, 24). The evaluation team thus considers the adapted outcome indicator 2 achieved. Interviews however also reinforced a notion inherent in unit two's results model: that correct application of CET is to a certain degree outside of the project's sphere of influence (system boundary).

In this regard, several external factors influencing progress on the CET were identified through interviews and an external literature review:

- For one, member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonisation (interview 17, 7, 18, 24, De Melo and Laski 2014b).²⁸ In some countries, the prospect of the Economic Partnership Agreement, a free trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET (interview 7, De Melo and Laski 2014). In Nigeria however there have been protectionist tendencies (De Melo and Laski 2014b). Since Nigeria is by far the biggest market in the region, its stance on regional economic integration has implications for the whole ECOWAS (interview 25).
- In addition, several interview partners argued that a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector/country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past (interview 17, 13). The project team contested the lack of studies during the debriefing session, and subsequently provided several studies carried out by the World Bank Group (MacLeod, Von Uexkull, Erik and Lulu 2015, Marchat, Von Uexkull, Erik 2016, Von Uexkull, Erik, and Lulu Shui 2014), UNECA (UNECA 2017) and an individual consultant (Adjovi 2013). The evaluation team reviewed these studies and still finds it plausible that a lack of studies on the potential impact of the CET may have adversely affected political will towards the CET in the past. Of the studies provided, only the studies carried out by the World Bank Group are in the public domain, and they only cover Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal. The existence of these studies therefore does not put all ECOWAS member states in a position to assess the impact of CET on their economy. The other studies were only disseminated in limited circles, including the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions and the joint management committee of the ECOWAS CET, a committee comprised of experts from the member states ministries of trade, finance and customs administrations (personal communication 15.11.2017). In addition, the 2013 study by Adjovi only covered impacts on government revenue, and did therefore not put governments in a position to assess other impacts, such as price effects for consumers. The UNECA study was only finalised in 2017, and therefore cannot have influenced political will in the member states before.
- An unrelated external factor which affected political priorities in the region and temporarily slowed down the CET process was the Ebola crisis (WATIP 2015, De Melo and Laski 2014b).
- Lastly, an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials (interview 25, 26).

Moreover, the project has monitored **unintended results** of the CET on ECOWAS member states. An unintended positive result was that the reduction in government revenue which had been expected for Nigeria did not occur. Since for Nigeria the introduction of CET meant a reduction in tariffs, it had been expected that government revenue would go down. However, as tariffs were reduced, smuggling went down. Smuggling was also reduced because the tariffs applied between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries were the same on several products, thus creating a disincentive to import goods through these neighbouring countries (personal

²⁸ This is corroborated by external literature, further elaborated upon in the chapter on impact.

communication 18.01.2018). The decline in smuggling balanced out the effect of tariff reduction on government revenue. (GIZ 2017 d, interview 18). However, an unintended negative result was observed regarding the implementation of CET, which is currently being addressed by unit two. Specifically, the pharma sector is adversely affected by evolving tariff rates (GIZ 2017 d, interview 18, 7). The tariff rates on drugs and essential medicines have been reduced under CET, whereas the rate applicable on input products has been increased, which creates a disincentive for local production of drugs. A regulation has been elaborated to address this unintended negative result, and the ECOWAS Commission and the project are assisting the pharmaceutical sector to make use of this regulation (personal communication 18.01.2018)..

In addition to the support to the CET process, unit two also contributes to the project's objective through support in several other areas. The most important other areas of support (intended results) are briefly described and analysed in the following.

- First, the project provides support to the ETLS, which addresses issues related to intra-regional trade. Like the CET, the ETLS directly emanates from the ECOWAS Treaty. Measures to support the ETLS process include sensitisation, trainings, studies, and the establishment of a high-level task force to monitor progress in the absence of a formal monitoring mechanism. The output indicator which measures a reduction of time needed to register industrial goods under ETLS is on track (Results monitor, consulted 22.09.2017, Full details of progress against indicators are included in table format in annex 9).
- Second, as mentioned above, the project also provided support on the elaboration of the Customs Code, which is relevant for the application of both the Common External Tariff and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme. The Customs Code has been adopted by the summit of Heads of States in December 2017 (personal communication 18.01.2018). Its elaboration was largely driven by one of the embedded advisors of unit two in close liaison with the World Customs Organisation (interview 18).
- Third, the project supports market integration through the harmonisation of taxes and duties within ECOWAS. Specifically, it provided support to the elaboration of draft directives on a programme of tax and customs duties reform, on value added tax, and on excise duties. The outcome indicator which measures the introduction and adoption of instruments in this area (**outcome indicator 3²⁹**) is achieved, draft directives in all three fields have been adopted by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in December 2017 (personal communication 18.01.2018).
- Finally, the project strives to mainstream gender aspects into trade and fiscal policy. The outcome indicator that measures the discussion of improvements of female participation in regional economic processes in the relevant ECOWAS decision bodies is on track (**outcome indicator 5³⁰**). A gender study has been completed and recommendations have been discussed, and at least one recommendation has been validated (Results monitor, consulted 22.09.2017 Full details of progress against indicators are included in table format in annex 9) However, the project team acknowledges that gender aspects do not gain much traction at the level of the partners (interview 18).

Effectiveness of unit three – peace and security

For unit three, only of the **outcome indicators**, indicator 4, is relevant. It relates to the development and application of instruments in the area of mediation, early warning and the ECOWAS Standby Force in line with requirements of the APSA. To first provide the reader with some context on the project's measures in the field of peace and security, findings on this indicator are presented after the contribution analysis (which follows hereafter) and in narrative form in the section on other intended results at the end of this subchapter. To better locate this information, the indicator is highlighted in bold in the text. An overview of progress against all outcome indicators in table form can be found in the subchapter 'overall assessment of effectiveness' at the very end of the effectiveness chapter.

²⁹ The full wording of the indicator is 'For each of the following three core processes for compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade, either a new regional agreement has been adopted or a new instrument introduced which improves the implementation of an existing agreement: a.) programme of tax and customs duties reform, b.) value added tax and c.) excise duties.'. For full details on baseline, target value, current value and sources of information, see annex 9.

³⁰ The full wording of the indicator is 'Four trade or fiscal policy recommendations aimed at improving female participation in regional economic processes are discussed in the relevant ECOWAS decision-making bodies.' For full details on baseline, target value, current value and sources of information, see annex 9.

The **contribution analysis** in unit three focuses on the project's support to early warning. As explained in the chapter on relevance, early warning is one of the instruments of the APSA and of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. It is a regional peace and security observation system which is intended to help policy makers avert or resolve situations of conflict or instability.

In the project's overall **results model**, support to early warning corresponds output R4, 'National capacities especially CSOs have effectively contributed to Early Warning and Early Response efforts of ECOWAS'. As explained in chapter 4.4, neither the overall results model nor the separate results models specific each of the three units provide information at activity level. Moreover, no results hypotheses have been formulated in writing to accompany the graphic representations of the results models. The following description of how the project is to achieve the output related to early warning, and how this is to contribute to the project objective is therefore based on discussions of the results model of unit three with the project team at the outset of the evaluation.

In the results model, early warning has a central role to play for the achievement of the project's objective. Since the objective of the project is to strengthen the Commission in its capacities to steer, implement and monitor ECOWAS decisions, and early warning emanates from an ECOWAS framework, support in this area directly contributes to the project's objective. The underlying hypothesis is that if Early Warning and Early Response efforts of ECOWAS are strengthened via improved national capacities, especially of CSOs (output R4), then the ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the area of peace and security (hypothesis linking output R4 to the project objective). The activities carried out by the project to improve national capacities, especially those of CSOs, in the area of early warning revolve around two main axes. First, the project contributes to the establishment of National Early Warning Centres through the identification of CSOs which can monitor the peace and security situation in the member states (subresult R4A). It also provides capacity building for staff at the National Centres. Second, the project strengthens capacity to support conflict prevention strategies at the national level (subresult R4B) through trainings and sensitisation of media, political parties and other actors on conflict prevention strategies. In addition to this direct support to the early warning instrument, the project's work to improve the internal synergy and cohesion within the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. (R2 – Output G) contributes to more effective utilisation of early warning products.

The project's support to early warning already started during the predecessor project, in which an evaluation of the early warning processes at ECOWAS was conducted. The findings and recommendations of this evaluation were validated by member states in 2014. They informed the choice of measures supported in the current project. One finding was that the products of the Early Warning Directorate were not adequately used by the other directorates within the Department of PAPS. Additionally, the evaluation recommended to elaborate a strategic plan linking early warning to early response. A further recommendation was the establishment of National Early Warning Centres. The idea behind the decentralisation of early warning is that subsidiarity in terms of monitoring of the peace and security situation will render this process more efficient (interview 6, 15).

The project contributes to bringing the concept of the National Early Warning Centres to life. To lay the groundwork for the establishment of these Centres, unit three has started a pilot phase of identification of CSOs in the field of peace and security for five countries. These feed into a database on which the future Centres will be able to draw for monitoring developments in the respective countries. One hundred CSOs with networks on the ground have so far been invited to submit information about their areas of expertise in terms of peace and security, with the objective of eventually identifying 50 relevant CSOs per member state. Albeit instigated by the project, this process has been channelled through the ECOWAS Commission, so as to strengthen the Commission's profile with regard to coordination of early warning (interview 6, 15). While the National Early Warning Centres were not yet operational at the time of the evaluation, there were concrete prospects for the establishment of the five first National Early Warning Centres, as USAID/the US Department

of State had committed to provide equipment, technical advice, staffing, training and capacity building (interview 18, interview 27). The fact that an initiative started by the project is scaled up by other donors constitutes an **unintended result**. There is however still a need for funding the remaining ten National Early Warning Centres (interview 27).

At the level of the Commission, the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response System Strategic and Action plans (2016 – 2020) developed with support from the project contributed to improve clarity on processes, roles and responsibilities (interview 6, 15). In addition, the project's work with PAPS on team building, cohesion and communication has contributed to improved conditions for steering and implementation in the field of early warning (interview 15, 22). Finally, the project instigated a survey on the usefulness of products and services of the Early Warning Directorate for key stakeholders at the Commission. On the basis of the results, a reflection process was conducted to improve early warning products and services (interview 6, 15).

Overall, external actors view the Early Warning Directorate as comparatively effective, and recognise that the project has left a legacy in terms of conflict prevention. In this regard, interview partners explained that processes of the Early Warning Directorate are mapped out rather clearly, which enables coherent and swift reactions to security situations (interview 22). The project's good working relationship with the Department of PAPS is also recognised by other development partners (interview 22, 4). This is one of the reasons why the EU sees GIZ as suitable partner to implement co-funding in the field of peace and security in the next project (interview 4).

In addition to the support to early warning, unit three also contributes to the project's objective through support in several other areas. The most important other areas of support are briefly described and analysed in the following.

- First, the project has introduced planning retreats and/or review meetings at the level of the PAPS Department, thereby strengthening team cohesion and the quality of planning (interview 4). These fora have attracted the attention of other development partners, who have recently expressed interest in attending these meetings. In addition, the project provided advisory and logistic support to meetings within the field of peace and security, including ECONEC (ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions) meetings and steering group meetings for the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. It also supported different divisions in participating in meetings with stakeholders and counterparts in other regions, at the AU, at the UN and member state levels (personal communication 08.12.2017). Through this operational support, coordination and knowledge exchange in the sector is strengthened.
- Second, the project works on alignment of processes of the Department of PAPS on the APSA The initial **outcome indicator 4** measuring progress in this regard has been replaced by a more concrete proxy indicator by unit 3.³¹ It is on track and shows that so far, eight instruments/concepts/guidelines in the area of mediation, early warning and the ESF have been developed and/or are applied in line with APSA requirements (the target value is ten).
- Third, the project has provided support to the introduction and operation of the civilian component of the ESF through various measures. In the predecessor project, the salary of the head of the civilian component was financed. In the current project, supported the development of a framework, trainings and guidelines and a rostering approach to identify, deploy and manage civilian experts for conflict prevention, management and resolution and paid for long-term election observers in several missions (interview 6, 15) was developed. However, regarding the rostering of civilian experts, partners are not very active in filling the database (interview 3, 6). This could constitute a challenge for deployment of civilians in future missions of the ESF. In spite of this challenge, several interview partners confirmed that the civilian component is now established within the ESF (interview 28, 3). This is exemplified by the role of the

³¹ The initial indicator from the project's proposal is 'ECOWAS instruments and conceptual approaches for fulfilling its mandate in the area of peace and security, e.g. developing the civilian components of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), meet the African Union (AU) requirements for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)'. To make this indicator measurable, the project has measured the following proxy indicator: "10 instruments/concepts/guidelines in the area of Mediation, Early Warning and the ESF have been developed and/or applied in alignment with APSA requirements".

Programme Officer Strategic Assessment and Doctrine employed in the Department of PAPS, who acts as Head of Civilian component (interview 6, ECOWAS 2017 e). The position is currently being funded under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) (interview 3).

- Finally, the project's measures to strengthen conflict prevention strategies in the member states include trainings and sensitisation of political parties and the media on identity politics and avoiding hate speech (interview 6, 15). The evaluation team observes that it is per se difficult to measure the results of support in the field of conflict prevention, since it is not known how a given situation would have turned out in the absence of these measures. Interview partners consulted however stated that the project's sensitisation on hate speech and identity politics made a valuable contribution to avert situations of conflict or instability (interview 15).

Moreover, unit three also contributes to the project's objective through support in several areas not part of the results model, thereby leading to **unintended results**. These are briefly described and analysed in the following.

- First, the project strengthens the ESF in its capability to deploy forces through support to the organisation of a command post exercise, a multidimensional and integrated training exercise that will simulate a deployment scenario (interview 3, 28). So far, the project has supported the evaluation of an evaluation training exercise leading up to the command post exercise which is scheduled for 2018 (ECOWAS 2017d). In addition, the project provides advisory services and supported a number of trainings and planning events as part of the planning cycle leading up to the command post exercise (interview 3).
- Second, the project has recently started to provide support on the documentation of lessons learned regarding ECOWAS projects. It finances a publication on the ECOWAS project in the Gambia which has been jointly elaborated by several departments of the Commission and is currently under review in the Office of the President (interview 6). In addition, a publication on ten years of electoral observation is currently being developed (Results monitor, consulted 22.09.2017).

Analysis of overall effectiveness

This subchapter presents findings related to the achievement of the project objective which are the result of (the interplay between) all three different units. This subchapter thereby addresses the achievement of **outcome indicators 1.1 and 1.2**, which measure the perception of interview partners regarding progress on the ECOWAS Commission in terms of steering, implementing and monitoring ECOWAS decisions. Since a merely quantitative presentation of progress against these indicators only provides limited value, a narrative presentation of findings in this regard is embedded in a contribution analysis. To better locate the information related to the indicators, the indicators are highlighted in bold in the text. An overview of progress against all outcome indicators in table form can be found in the subchapter 'overall assessment of effectiveness' at the very end of the effectiveness chapter.

The **contribution analysis** in this chapter focusses on the interplay of the three different units to achieve the project's objective: 'The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy'.

As explained in chapter 4.4, in the overall **results model**, unit one, organisational development, is deliberately placed in the centre, its outputs contributing to the outputs of unit two, trade and customs, and unit three, peace and security. The outputs of all three units shall in turn contribute to the project objective of strengthening the Commission in its capacities for steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy. However, no results hypotheses have been formulated in writing to accompany the graphic representation of the results model and to explain intended

synergies between the units. The following analysis of how the interplay between the three units contributes to the project objective is therefore based on discussions with the project team at the outset of the evaluation.

In the results model, the intervention provides support to organisational development at the level of the whole organisation, and strategic, thematic and logistical support in the thematic areas (see previous subchapters). The capacity development measures of the intervention thereby target different levels. The Commission's ability to steer and monitor the results of its own work and of the ECOWAS Community at an aggregate level is supported through the CSF and the results-based monitoring processes that accompany it. The Commission's ability to plan, implement and monitor progress on specific areas in the field of economic and trade policy and security policy is reinforced through advisory services to the relevant thematic directorates and units within the organisation (see previous subchapters). Initially, the support was also intended to put the Commission in the position to monitor the implementation of ECOWAS agreements in the member states. In practice, the intervention has however realised that this is not realistic, as there is little political will for this in the member states. Therefore, while the intervention provides support to ad hoc monitoring of the implementation of key processes such as CET and ETLs, there is currently no focus on establishing formal monitoring mechanisms of implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the member states.

The different levels at which the project aims to bring about change are intertwined. For example, the capacity to plan and monitor within thematic directorates and units can feed into the capacity to monitor of the whole organisation. In addition, the capacity of the Commission to coordinate interests of stakeholders and to make technical progress on relevant issues in the field of economic and trade policy and peace and security is a precondition for the implementation of ECOWAS processes in the member states. This implementation in the member states can then be monitored – given the necessary political will.

In terms of achievement of the objective, the first outcome indicator formulated in the project's progress proposal intended to measure the perception of the ECOWAS member states on progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions by the Commission via an online survey.³² This indicator could not be measured as planned, because the Commission did not agree to a survey on such a politically sensitive matter (GIZ 2016a). The evaluation team thus formulated two alternative **indicators**, **indicators 1.1. and 1.2.**, that involved primary data collection of an assessment of progress towards the project's objective from the perspective of Commission staff, and from the perspective of donors:

- **Adapted indicator 1.1:** 75% of Commission staff interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security
- **Adapted indicator 1.2:** 60% of other donors interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security

Over the last three years (current project started March 2014).

These indicators were intended to measure progress on a five-point scale. During the data collection, it became clear that interview partners did not deem it feasible to boil down their assessment of such a complex subject matter in a highly political environment to a five-point scale. Interview partners were however able to provide a nuanced analysis of context factors for and progress towards the project's objective. In this regard, they judge the overall achieved progress as adequate in all three units. However, they also highlighted that the project's objective so far is only partly achieved, as it is strongly influenced by external factors outside of the project's sphere of influence. On the basis of this feedback, the evaluation team's assessment is that the adapted indicators 1.1. and 1.2 are partly achieved.

³² The exact formulation of the indicator is: „75% of the ECOWAS Focal Points in the Member States rate the contribution made by the ECOWAS Commission to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy as either 'good' or 'very good'".

One of the external factors which affect the achievement of the project's objective is the highly political context in which the Commission operates. Interview partners pointed out that the implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will (interview 11, 3). Theoretically, by introduction of a new legal regime for Community Acts in 2007, ECOWAS decisions are now binding on all member states without being subject to Parliamentary ratification processes (ECOWAS 2017b).³³ This set-up is however not universally accepted, since there are people who argue that this is not in line with the Constitutions of some of the member states, which call for ratification of treaties to make them binding at national level³⁴ (interview 7). In addition, foregoing ratification processes at the national level also means foregoing an opportunity for debate in the public sphere of the member countries, which may in turn weaken ownership (ibid.). This means some ECOWAS decisions may be little known in the member states. The fact that there is little political will in the member states for monitoring of implementation of ECOWAS agreements – and much less for sanctioning lack of implementation – per se limits the room for manoeuvre of the Commission in terms of steering and implementation of ECOWAS decisions.

Second, interview partners and the project's progress report point to the fact that the personnel situation affects the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies (interview 10, 4, 9). As a result, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organisation (interview 11, 10). The personnel situation affects the Commission's aptitude to absorb capacity development services from development partners, including the advisory services delivered by the project (interview 4, 6, 3). To attenuate this, the project units two has GIZ advisors 'embedded' directly in the partner structures (interview 3).

Finally, the reorganisation process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the project. Like most reorganisation processes, the imminent reorganisation of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organisation will have to these processes. This factor was specifically brought up regarding the Common Strategic Framework supported by unit one (interview 10).

Taking into account these context factors, the assessment of the achievement of the project's objective has to differentiate between the different levels at which the project intends to bring about change. Interview partners saw progress regarding the capacities of the units and directorates of the Commission working on economic and trade policy and peace and security to steer, monitor and implement processes in their respective fields (interview 4, 22). They however saw little progress on the capacities developed for steering and monitoring of the whole organisation (interview 17, 16, 3). The lack of progress on the capacity for steering and monitoring at the level of the whole Commission was mainly explained by the weak capacity of the Directorate for Strategic Planning and the Monitoring Unit, who only have one staff member each. In addition, the evaluation team observes that the complexity of steering and monitoring at the level of the whole organisation is much higher than at the level of units and directorates. Finally, as explained above, the Commission's capacities to monitor implementation of ECOWAS decisions at the level of the member states remain weak due to lack of a mandate for this.

The contribution of the project to strengthen the capacities of the Commission was assessed positively by interview partners. Even though the capacities to plan and monitor at the level of the whole organisation are still considered weak, relevant instruments are available to the Directorate for Strategic Planning and the Monitoring Unit because of support from the project (interview 19, 20). Regarding progress on the capacities of the units and directorates working in the thematic areas, several interview partners stressed that the project

³³ For more information on the new regime for community acts, see: <http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/how-ecowas-decisions-are-made/>

³⁴ E.g. section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution stipulates that 'No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly'.

made a substantial contribution through technical advice, but also through its logistical support and by bridging capacity gaps with embedded advisors (interview 4, 28, 15). The necessity to provide logistical support and to bridge capacity gaps however raises the question whether the current level of capacity could be sustained without the project (see also chapter on sustainability).

No unintended results related to the interplay of the three units of the project could be identified in the evaluation.

Overall assessment of effectiveness

With regard to the assessment of effectiveness, the evaluation team realised during the evaluation mission that the outcome indicators do not adequately reflect the complexity of the project. While indicators always only capture part of a project, the evaluation team found that in this case, key processes supported by the project were not adequately reflected in the indicators. This only became apparent after the inception phase, because the evaluation team could only fully apprehend the project after the presentations delivered during the kick-off session in Abuja (see also chapter data sources and data quality and the chapter on evaluation process). From the perspective of the evaluation team, it is a weakness that none of the outcome indicators measure progress on processes supported by unit one (organisational development), and only one indicator measures progress on processes supported by unit three (peace and security), whereas several indicators relate to unit two (trade and customs). The evaluation team does not consider this adequate, even if unit two receives substantially more funding than the other units because of the EUR 10 million EU cofinancing (see chapter on efficiency). The fact that the indicators do not adequately represent the processes supported by all three units can be explained by the fact that the project is highly complex and could, by the project team's own accounts, easily constitute three projects (see also chapter on data sources and data quality)..

To give a more balanced assessment of the contribution of the three units to the project's objective than an analysis strongly based upon the indicators would allow for, the evaluation team had suggested to show some flexibility with regard to the assessment dimensions defined by the GIZ evaluation unit and how strongly they factor into the overall assessment of effectiveness. Upon discussion with the GIZ evaluation unit, it was however ultimately agreed to apply the assessment dimensions and scoring approach defined by the GIZ evaluation unit for all central project evaluations.

The evaluation team comes to the assessment that the project's objective ('The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy'), measured against progress on the outcome indicators, is partly achieved. Two indicators are achieved and three are partly achieved. In addition to progress against the outcome indicators at the time of the evaluation, the evaluators' assessment takes into account that some of the indicators not yet achieved may still be achieved by the end of the project, which is ongoing until February 2019. Moreover, the assessment also takes into account that indicators which are already achieved (indicators 2 and 3) or are likely to be achieved by the end of the project (indicator 4) are particularly relevant for the project objective. Lastly, this assessment takes into account that the outcome indicators 1.2 and 1.2 as well as 5, which are partly achieved and not likely to be fully achieved by the end of the project, are partly outside of the project's sphere of influence. Since this is a weakness in planning and not in implementation, from the perspective of the evaluation team, this should not adversely affect the assessment of effectiveness (it is however taken into account in the assessment of production efficiency). On this basis, the evaluation team awards 31 out of 40 points in the first evaluation dimension of effectiveness.

The table below gives an overview of the achievement of the outcome indicators defined for this evaluation. The indicators that are achieved relate to the project's contribution to the dismantlement of tariff trade barriers (adapted indicator 2) and to the adoption of regional agreements/development of instruments compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade (indicator 3 from project proposal). The

indicators which are partly achieved measure progress on the Commission's ability to steer, implement and monitor ECOWAS decisions from the perspective of interview partners consulted in this evaluation (adapted indicators 1.1 and 1.2), the development of instruments in the field of peace and security (indicator 4 from project proposal) and the mainstreaming of female participation in regional economic integration processes (indicator 5 from project proposal).

With regard to the indicators which are partly achieved, the evaluation team comes to the assessment that it is rather unlikely that the adapted indicators 1.1/ 1.2 will be fully achieved by the end of the project, as the Commission's capacity to steer, monitor and implement ECOWAS decisions is per se limited by the very nature of the organisation and by context factors which are unlikely to change by the end of the project. Regarding the nature of the organisation, since ECOWAS is a regional organisation, the Commission's capacity to steer, implement and monitor decisions is largely dependent on political will of the member states. Political will in the member states depends on the subject matter and may vary depending on the political climate and the governments in power in the member states. In addition, the Commission's capacities are weakened, among others, by a lack of adequate personnel to support key processes. Regarding indicator 4, by contrast, the evaluation team deems it possible to achieve this indicator by the end of the project. So far, already eight out of ten instruments in the area of mediation, early warning and the ESF have been developed and/or applied in alignment with APSA requirements. From the perspective of the evaluation team, the conditions for making further progress in this area are good. The region as a whole has an interest in maintaining peace and security, and mediation and early warning come at less costs than intervening in conflicts. In addition, the ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalising conflict prevention and management (see also chapter on impact). This is a good precondition for the development of further concepts. Lastly, with regard to indicator 5, related to the mainstreaming of female participation in regional economic processes, the evaluation team comes to the assessment that this indicator is less likely to be achieved, because gender aspects do not gain much traction at the level of the partners. Even if the indicator were to be achieved, it is questionable whether gender aspects would in that case not merely be taken into account pro forma.

| Indicator | Degree of achievement |
|---|---|
| Adapted indicator 1.1: 75% of Commission staff interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security | Partly achieved, unlikely to be fully achieved by end of the project (see above) Highly relevant to project objective, but partly outside of the project's sphere of influence because project objective itself is partly outside of the project's sphere of influence |
| Adapted indicator 1.2: 60% of other donors interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least 'good' progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security Over the last three years (current project started March 2014) | Details: Interview partners did not deem it feasible to boil down their assessment on such a complex matter in a highly political environment on a five-point scale. However, interview partners concurred that while progress has been made on certain aspects of the Commission's capacity to steer, implement and monitor, the overall capacity remains limited due to external factors outside of the project's influence |
| <u>Source:</u> closed question in interviews with answers on a five-point scale, 'good' being the second best option. | |
| Adapted indicator 2: In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the hypothesis related to the connection | Achieved Highly relevant to project objective |

| Indicator | Degree of achievement |
|--|---|
| <p>between the project's measures to support the CET process and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed.</p> <p><u>Source:</u> closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale.</p> | <p>Details: During the evaluation, it became clear that the five-point scale did not do justice to the complexity of the subject matter. Respondents were not comfortable with it and preferred to provide a narrative assessment. In sum, interview partners deemed the projects' measures to support the CET process played a significant role in the Commission's contribution to dismantling trade barriers.</p> |
| <p>Indicator 3 from project proposal: For each of the following three core processes for compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade, either a new regional agreement has been adopted or a new instrument introduced which improves the implementation of an existing agreement: a.) programme of tax and customs duties reform, b.) value added tax and c.) excise duties.</p> | <p>Achieved Relevant to project objective</p> <p>Details: Draft directives in all three fields have been adopted by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in December 2017</p> |
| <p>Indicator 4. from project proposal: ECOWAS instruments and conceptual approaches for fulfilling its mandate in the area of peace and security, e.g. developing the civilian components of the ESF, meet the AU requirements for the APSA.</p> | <p>Partly achieved, but likely to be achieved by end of the project (see above) Highly relevant to project objective</p> <p>Details: To make this indicator measurable, the project has measured the following proxy indicator: '10 instruments/concepts/guidelines in the area of mediation, early warning and the ESF have been developed and/or applied in alignment with APSA requirements.' So far, eight instruments/concepts/guidelines in the area of mediation, early warning and the ECOWAS Standby Force have been developed and/or are applied in line with APSA requirements</p> |
| <p>Indicator 5 from project proposal: Four trade or fiscal policy recommendations aimed at improving female participation in regional economic processes are discussed in the relevant ECOWAS decision-making bodies.</p> | <p>Partly achieved, unlikely to be achieved by end of the project (see above) Partly outside of the project's sphere of influence</p> <p>Details: A gender study has been completed and recommendations have been discussed, and at least one recommendation has been validated. However, the project team acknowledges that gender aspects do not gain much traction at the level of the partners</p> |

The evaluation team further comes to the assessment that the services implemented by the project contribute to the achievement of the objective as agreed upon with the BMZ and awards 25 out of 30 points in this dimension. One weakness with regard to this evaluation dimension is that the project's objective is partly outside of the project's sphere of influence (see above and assessment of relevance). For this reason, the project can only partly contribute to the achievement of the indicators that measured the assessment of interview partners regarding progress towards the achievement of the project's objective. Since this is a weakness in planning, and not in implementation, this is however not strongly factored into the assessment of

effectiveness.

Several of the other indicators measure whether instruments, policies or policy recommendations have been developed, introduced or discussed. The different partners of the project interviewed for this evaluation concurred in saying that the project was making considerable contributions to the development of instruments and policies, through advisory services from the project team as well as from external consultants funded by the project. In addition to providing technical expertise, the project is also credited with facilitating the elaboration of products through ongoing support in the field of organisational development and by providing logistical support for high-level meetings where instruments and policies are discussed.

Looking beyond the indicators, adequate progress has been made on key processes supported by the three units. In unit one, the elaboration of the Community Strategic Framework has equipped the partners with a tool to plan, steer and monitor at the level of the ECOWAS Community. The dissemination of this tool and the development of a results-based mind-set is however still work in progress. In unit two, substantial progress has been made on the introduction of the Common External Tariff: 14 out of 15 member states are currently applying it. However, the actual level of implementation at the borders is difficult to assess, as there is no political will in the member states for a formal monitoring mechanism. According to some interview partners, there is still a need for further training of customs agents on the Common External Tariff. In unit three, capacities for early warning are being consolidated. The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response System Strategic Action contributes to improve clarity on processes, roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the establishment of the five first National Early Warning Centres is under way. They will provide information for the regional peace and security observation system, which is intended to help policy makers avert or resolve situations of conflict or instability.

Taking into account that achieving the project's objective is only partly within the project's sphere of influence, the evaluation team finds that the results achieved still make a valuable contribution to this objective. External factors such as the weak absorption capacity of key stakeholders and the dependency on the political will of the member states limit progress in terms of the Commission's steering, implementation and monitoring capacities. Still, over the past years, progress on key processes has been made. In this regard, interview partners consulted during the evaluation credited the project as a partner having played a major role on facilitating the elaboration of the Community Strategic Framework, on moving the Common External Tariff forward and in developing instruments in the field of early warning, to name but a few. In addition, some partners credited the project with clarifying processes within their teams and improving cohesion and coherence, thereby ultimately strengthening the capacity to deliver.

With regard to the third evaluation dimension, the evaluation team comes to the assessment that the project is monitoring unintended positive and negative results and is taking remedial actions where necessary. It awards 28 out of 30 points in this dimension. The full score is not awarded because some unintended negative results have occurred. This however does not strongly affect the score, as remedial action has been taken. Unintended positive results include the scaling-up of initiatives instigated by the project by other development partners. Most notably, the initial impetus for establishing National Early Warning Centres came from an evaluation of early warning processes conducted by the predecessor project. This process has gained momentum with USAID's commitment to support the establishment of five National Early Warning Centres. In addition to monitoring unintended positive results, the project team also seizes additional opportunities for further positive results by accepting requests for support by the Commission that were not part of the initial planning, but that contribute to the project objective (see chapter on relevance). Examples for this are the support to the revision of staff regulations, and support to the HR department of organisational development provided by unit one, as well as support to the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in unit three. With regard to unintended negative results, the project has identified and is taking remedial actions regarding adverse effects on the pharma sector that have occurred due to the tariffs governing chemicals under CET. The overall score for the assessment criterion effectiveness adds up to 84 out of 100 points: successful.

| Criterion | Assessment dimension | Score |
|------------------------------|---|------------------|
| Effectiveness | The project achieves the goal on time in accordance with the TC-measures' goal indicators agreed upon in the contract. | 31 of 40 points |
| | The services implemented by the project successfully contribute to the achievement of the goal agreed upon in the contract. | 25 of 30 points |
| | <p>The occurrence of additional (not formally agreed) positive results has been monitored and additional opportunities for further positive results have been seized.</p> <p>No project-related negative results have occurred – and if any negative results occurred the project responded adequately.</p> | 28 of 30 points |
| Overall Rating effectiveness | | 84 of 100 points |

5.3 Impact

The impact criterion measures the extent to which the intended overarching development results have occurred, and the extent to which the project contributes to the achievement of overarching development results. It also takes into account unintended positive and negative results.

Evaluation basis for assessing impact

For assessing the intended impact of the project, all three programme objective indicators from the associated overarching programme proposal (part A) are used:

- Programme objective indicator 1: Two-thirds of the export-oriented companies surveyed state that the general conditions for cross-border trade in ECOWAS have improved by one level in selected key areas (customs duties, administrative procedures, and quality infrastructure).
- Programme objective indicator 2: The Common External Tariff is correctly applied to 75% of imports into ECOWAS.

- Programme objective indicator 3: 75% of the representatives from CSOs in the region rate their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue (for instance in the harmonisation of tax systems) and conflict prevention (for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts) as 'good'.

In addition, the evaluation team also analysed the extent to which the project contributes further intended impacts that go beyond the indicators. In this regard, the contribution to selected aspects of the SDGs was examined: inclusive growth (SDG 8) and peace (SDG 16).³⁵ The project's contribution to inclusive growth was analysed by means of a literature analysis of impact of the CET on different countries and different segments of society within the ECOWAS Community. The project's contribution to conflict prevention, mediation and resolution was analysed on the basis of interviews conducted as well as an analysis of the project reports. As previous chapters have already laid out, while the project has contributed to progress on core processes related to economic and trade policy and peace and security at the level of the ECOWAS Commission, there is a substantial attribution gap regarding changes observed in the ECOWAS member states, as these depend largely upon political will outside of the project's sphere of influence. The evaluation team therefore assessed the contribution by means of a contribution analysis (see chapter on evaluation design).

For reasons of clarity, findings in this chapter are presented according to the areas in which the programme objective³⁶ aims for change at the level of the ECOWAS Community: economic and trade policy, and peace and security policy. These two areas correspond to the thematic fields supported by unit two and unit three of the project. The section on impacts in the field of economic and trade policy is longer than the section on impacts in the field of peace and security, because the project provided substantially more support in the area of economic and trade policy. The peace and security unit has been an originally small component, which continuously increases its portfolio and activities (GIZ 2017 f). The cross-cutting work of unit one in the field of organisational development is intended to leverage the project's support in thematic areas. Therefore, there is also an indirect link between the impacts described in this chapter and the work of unit one.

Each section of this chapter first briefly recaps the intended long-term changes to which the project seeks to contribute in the respective area. It then presents progress against the programme's impact indicators. Since indicator 3 is relevant for both the area of economic and trade policy and the area of peace and security, it is split in two for the presentation of findings related to each specific area. In the analysis of progress against indicators, three levels of achievement are distinguished: a.) fully achieved b.) partly achieved c.) not achieved. Subsequently, changes that go beyond those reflected in the indicators, including unintended (positive and negative) impacts, are reflected.

Intended impacts in the field of economic and trade policy

In the results model, the intended impact of the project is: 'The steering, implementation and monitoring of decisions taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy are improved'. The intended impact (programme objective) and intended outcome (project objective) are thus closely intertwined. Both refer to the steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions, but at different levels. The outcome describes the Commission's contribution to improved steering, implementation and monitoring, while the impact describes how this translates at the level of the member states. For the field of economic and trade policy, this means that impact focusses on the implementation of key regional economic integration processes at the level of the member states. In this regard, the indicators from the proposal focus on the conditions for cross-border trade for

³⁵ Intended impacts described in the project proposal that go beyond the programme indicators were related to the MDGs (MDG 1, to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, and MDG 8, to develop a global partnership for development). In addition, the proposal referred to a contribution to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region. Since subsequent project documentation refers to the SDGs, and since the SDGs are the current framework provided by the GIZ evaluation unit to assess overarching development results, the two most relevant SDGs, rather than the MDGs, were selected as a basis for the assessment of impact in this evaluation.

³⁶ 'The steering, implementation and monitoring of decisions taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy are improved'.

companies, the application of the Common External Tariff, and the opportunities of CSOs to shape the regional integration process. However, the underlying rationale for support to regional economic integration processes goes beyond the intended changes described in the programme objective and the indicators. As described in the chapter on relevance, the project documentation posits that trade facilitation and harmonisation of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers contribute to inclusive growth (SDG 8), thereby making the target group of the project the whole population of ECOWAS member states. In addition to the analysis of progress against impact indicators, the evaluation team has thus also undertaken an analysis of impact of the Common External Tariff on different countries and different segments of society within the ECOWAS Community.

Economic and trade policy: progress against impact indicators

In the field of economic and trade policy, the first impact indicator measures the perspective of export-oriented companies on the improvement of general conditions for cross-border trade in selected key areas. The target is that two-thirds of surveyed companies observe an improvement.³⁷ This indicator is partly achieved. In a non-representative survey conducted by the project with 27 companies in 2017, 62% of respondents indicated that cross-border procedures have improved over the last three years. However, companies are still experiencing difficulties with customs duties and administrative procedures. It is also noteworthy that 15% of the respondents to the survey declared to have little or no information about the CET and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) (GIZ 2017d). In this regard, the assessments provided to the evaluation team by sector experts also pointed out that relevant stakeholders, including customs agents, still have knowledge gaps on the CET (see chapter on effectiveness).

The second impact indicator related to the field of economic and trade policy measures the application of the Common External Tariff. Specifically, its target is that the CET is correctly applied to 75% of imports into ECOWAS.³⁸ This indicator is also partly achieved. According to information provided by unit 2, CET is correctly applied to more than 75% of imports in 14 of the 15 member states (GIZ 2017d). The data presented in the macro-economic sector policy review attended by the evaluation team points in the same direction. At the same time, interviews also made clear that since no formal monitoring mechanism exists, it is hard to assess the level of actual compliance at the borders (see chapter on effectiveness).

In this regard Cape Verde is the only country that does not apply the CET. Cape Verde had applied to the Commission for a special status as an island state to be taken into consideration during the negotiations on the CET. Cape Verde is highly dependent on food imports, for which the consumer prices are expected to rise, since for Cape Verde the CET would bring about an increase in tariffs (interview 18). Application of the CET under its current form would thus potentially bring about a negative unintended result for Cape Verde. The project is aware of this and is exploring how remedial actions can be taken (interview 18).

The last impact indicator relevant in the field of economic and trade policy intends to measure the perception of CSOs regarding their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue, for instance in the harmonisation of tax systems.³⁹ This indicator could not be measured as of yet, as the project was not able to identify CSOs working in this field. Since the project did not attempt to involve CSOs not yet working in this field in the regional economic integration process, the indicator is considered not achieved by the evaluation team.

³⁷ The exact wording of the indicator is 'Two thirds of the export-oriented companies surveyed state that the general conditions for cross-border trade in ECOWAS have improved by one level in selected key areas (customs duties, administrative procedures, quality infrastructure).

³⁸ The exact wording of the indicator is 'The Common External Tariff is correctly applied to 75% of imports into ECOWAS'.

³⁹ Technically, this is a joint indicator for the field of economic and trade policy and the field of peace and security. Since results in this chapter are presented according to the thematic fields, only the aspect related to economic and trade policy has been described here. The full wording of the indicator is '75% of the representatives from civil society organisations in the region rate their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue (for instance in the harmonisation of tax systems) and conflict prevention (for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts) as 'good'.

Other impacts related to economic and trade policy: Potential impacts of CET on the population of ECOWAS member states

Looking at the impact of the Common External Tariff on the ECOWAS member states and their population, studies consulted by the evaluation team foresee different impacts for different countries, and within countries, different impacts for different segments of society. It emerges that the expected magnitude of the impact, and whether the impact is expected to be positive or negative, depends to a great extent on the economic characteristics of the respective member states, especially with regards to trade. The reviewed research focuses on the CET's short-run effects such as price changes and their implications for welfare. On the other hand, the CET is part of a long-run process of regional economic integration that bears potential for future growth, if it is supported by adequate policy reforms (MacLeod et al. 2015).

With regard to the trade characteristics of its member states, the ECOWAS Community is characterised by a strong heterogeneity. While ECOWAS exports are projected at approx. \$137.3 billion and imports at around \$80.4 billion, Nigeria alone accounts for approx. 76 percent of the region's total trade, followed by Ghana with 9.2 percent and Côte d'Ivoire (8.64 percent). The overall trade surplus (i.e. exports are exceeding imports) of the region is estimated at around \$47.3 billion and can be mainly attributed to Nigeria, which runs a surplus of \$58.4 billion, and Côte d'Ivoire (\$3.4 billion). All other ECOWAS members show trade deficits, i.e. they import more than they export (ECOWAS 2017).

This substantial asymmetry in trade might help to explain why within the group of member states, the expected outcomes of the CET differ significantly. These different expected outcomes are due to the fact that some countries have to raise their average tariffs when moving to the CET, while others have to lower their tariffs. Depending on these average increases or decreases, two main mechanisms come into play: In the case of higher tariffs, revenues of customs authorities are expected to increase, signalling a wider fiscal scope for the respective governments. Yet, for higher tariffs the effective prices for goods imported from non-ECOWAS countries are likely to rise, which is particularly critical for goods like rice, which to a great extent forms the consumption basket of the poor (De Melo and Laski 2014a).

Due to the lack of comprehensive meta-studies assessing the economic impacts of the new tariff structure on the entire region, the analysis will highlight projected impacts on selected ECOWAS states and their populations, with a special focus on the poorest ECOWAS members and the effects of CET-induced price changes on their consumers.

De Melo and Laski (2014b), who focus on the CET's impact in Liberia, group the five ECOWAS countries with the then-lowest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger – as they primarily rely on export baskets of raw agricultural and extracted commodities. Foodstuffs that are largely imported in these countries received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised. De Melo and Mancellari (2013) estimated that moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods. Still, De Melo and Mancellari (2013) argue that Liberia should eventually benefit from deeper integration in ECOWAS, although these benefits can only be assessed in the long run.

Adjusting tariff rates also affects larger members such as Senegal, with bound rates below the highest CET band of 35 percent. For ECOWAS' fourth biggest economy, the CET would lead to a slight increase in the trade weighted average tariff from 6 to 6.3 percent. Thus, tariff revenues would increase slightly by between 2 and 5 percent. Turning to consumers, increased trade protection leads to an increase between 0.9 and 1.2 percent in

the price of the average consumption bundle. As a result of increased output prices, the average Senegalese firm would profit from the CET, but these gains would be clustered on a few firms at the top end of the distribution representing only 10 percent of the workforce (Marchat et al. 2016).

For Ghana, the second-largest economy of ECOWAS, MacLeod et al. (2015) find that the CET leads to an overall increase in the tariffs faced by non-ECOWAS members. This increase in tariff protection from 7.9 to 9.8 percent leads to an increase in tariff revenues by an estimated 2.8 percent, an increase in ECOWAS imports by 5 percent and a fall in total imports by an estimated 1 percent. As a result of higher output prices, lowest-income Ghanaian households experience a 0.8 percent increase in the price of their consumption bundle. Manufacturing firms are split more or less equally into winners and losers.

For Nigeria, the largest ECOWAS economy, Von Uexkull and Shui (2014) project significant benefits for consumers and for the majority of manufacturing firms.

Fiamohe et al. (2015) model the expected impacts of the CET on the rice sector of different ECOWAS members, which has a key role in providing food security for low-income households. In Guinea and Togo, poverty incidence (as measured by a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indicator) is expected to increase overall, whereas Ghana's and Nigeria's levels of poverty are expected to decline. In Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed as urban household are expected to be worse and rural households to be better off. In order to ease the transition to the CET and to counter possible adverse effects, a regulation of October 2013 introduced so-called Special Protection Measures (SPMs) accompanying the CET. For a period of five years from the introduction of the CET, countries can apply for these measures to mitigate the adjustment effects. One SMP is the Import Adjustment Tax, which allows members to apply an extra tax on imports from non-ECOWAS members beyond the CET range. The rationale of this SPM is to protect nascent or important sectors. However, one major drawback for smaller, import-oriented members is that this tax can only be applied when the CET is lower than the original tariff – countries that apply tariffs lower than those to be implemented by the CET cannot use an Import Adjustment Tax (De Melo and Laski 2014a). De Melo and Laski (2014a) further argue that the exceptions list in the SPM appears to be mostly handpicked by Nigerian producers' associations as it closely resembles the Nigerian Import Ban List. Manufactured goods will have much higher tariffs (10-35 percent) under the CET than raw materials (5 percent), which does protect the competitiveness of exporting nations, but also creates the risk of trade diversion for smaller members, since manufactured goods previously imported from non-ECOWAS members will now be imported for a higher price from within ECOWAS. Moreover, prices for imported food like rice are also likely to rise.

Parallel to the introduction of the CET, ECOWAS is in the process of negotiation and implementation of two other important trade agreements. The EU EPA is a free trade scheme with the European Union which builds on the CET. Moreover, the ETLS promotes free trade within ECOWAS. The assessment of the impact of these agreements on ECOWAS economies goes beyond the scope of this review, which focuses on the effects of the CET *ceteris paribus*.

In conclusion, the above-mentioned studies show that the CET's short-run impact on ECOWAS countries is expected to be rather mixed, with larger members like Nigeria benefitting relatively more, while the population of poorer ECOWAS member states might be adversely affected by the CET. De Melo and Tsikata (2014) argue that this partly reflects the lack of supra-national funds to compensate members for adjustment. On the other hand, there are potential long-run gains of a deeper economic integration of ECOWAS, at best accompanied by productivity-enhancing policy reforms (MacLeod et al. 2015).

Intended impacts in the field of peace and security

In the results model, the intended impact of the project is: 'The steering, implementation and monitoring of

decisions taken by ECOWAS in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy are improved'. The intended impact (programme objective) and intended outcome (project objective) are closely intertwined. Both refer to the steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions, but at different levels. The outcome describes the Commission's contribution to improved steering, implementation and monitoring, while the impact describes how this translates at the level of the member states. The impact indicator from the proposal focusses on the opportunities of CSOs to shape the regional integration process in the field of conflict prevention. However, the underlying rationale for support in the field of peace and security goes beyond the policy level. As described in the chapter on relevance, the project documentation posits that measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace. (SDG 16). Therefore, the evaluation team has also undertaken an analysis of ECOWAS' role in conflict prevention, mediation and resolution, and the contribution the project made in this regard.

Peace and security: progress against impact indicators

For the field of peace and security, only one of the indicators from the project's proposal is relevant. It intends to measure the perception of CSOs regarding their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of conflict prevention, for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts.⁴⁰ This indicator has not yet been measured. However, the evaluation team comes to the conclusion that this indicator is on track, because the ECOWAS National Early Warning Centres that are currently being established will systematically integrate CSOs in the identification, analysis and resolution of conflicts. This was directly instigated by the project (see chapter on effectiveness).

Peace and security: other impacts

Looking at impacts on ECOWAS' role in the field peace and security, the analysis needs to be distinguished into two aspects: impacts in terms of ECOWAS early warning and mediation capacities, and ECOWAS capacities to deploy forces. Overall, interview partners consulted during the evaluation mission perceive ECOWAS to be rather strong in early warning and mediation, and weaker in its capability to deploy forces (interview 4, 18, 28). A simple reason for this is that participation in deployment missions comes at a higher financial cost for member states than participation in early warning and mediation efforts. They also come with the risk of loss of human life. In this regard, ECOWAS member states may have less incentives to participate in ECOWAS missions than in UN missions for several reasons. First, UN missions are better paid and better equipped than ECOWAS missions. Second, unlike UN peacekeeping missions, missions of the ESF may have an offensive mandate, which potentially comes with a higher risk to the participating soldiers. These aspects affect member states' political will to participate in ECOWAS deployment missions (interview 28). However, the assessment that the capability to deploy forces is weak has to be put into perspective: several interview partners pointed out that ECOWAS is in this regard stronger than other RECs in the continent (interview 28, 29).

In the field of early warning and mediation, interview partners perceive the ECOWAS Commission as a stakeholder that manages to have an incidence at a high political level, which contributes to the success of the regional organisation's mediation efforts (interview 4, 28, 18). In this regard, ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalising collective conflict prevention and management (interview 18). Its first mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, adopted in 1999, preceded the AU Peace and Security Protocol (Institute for Security Studies 2016). Furthermore, ECOWAS is credited with several successes in terms of peace and security, e.g. the prevention and management of

⁴⁰ Technically, this is a joint indicator for the field of economic and trade policy and the field of peace and security. Since results in this chapter are presented according to the thematic fields, only the aspect related to peace and security has been described here. The full wording of the indicator is '75% of the representatives from civil society organisations in the region rate their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue (for instance in the harmonisation of tax systems) and conflict prevention (for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts) as 'good'.

election-related crises in Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin (GIZ 2017 e, interview 15).

In this regard, partners stated that the project has made a contribution to early warning and conflict prevention through its support, especially the financing of several long-term election observers, and the sensitisation of media and political parties in member states on hate speech and identity politics (interview 15). For example, low distribution of voter cards (30%) before the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria was detected by long-term observers, and it was recommended to sign a peace agreement between the two main political parties because of the charged political atmosphere during the campaign. After intervention by ECOWAS, the election was postponed and an accord was signed by the two main candidates to the presidency in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the conduct of a peaceful election. Eventually, 80% of voter cards were distributed by the day of the election, and the elections were largely peaceful (GIZ 2017 f, GIZ 2017 3, ECOWAS 2017c). The project's contribution consisted in financing the mission of election observers that detected the need for action, which ultimately led to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Concerning the ability to deploy forces, the commitment of member states to a specific mission is highly dependent on member states' national interest. For instance, the Gambia project is sometimes cited as an ECOWAS success. It was however only possible because Senegal and Nigeria saw it in their national interest to end the crisis and sent troops that far exceeded the number of troops these countries had previously pledged to the ESF. While it can still be seen as a success that Senegal and Nigeria opted for multilateral engagement via the ECOWAS, this Gambia project thus does not speak to the ECOWAS deployment capabilities in general (interview 30). Regardless of this, interview partners stated that the project is making a contribution to the ECOWAS' capabilities to deploy forces through its support to the command post exercise (interview 28).

Overall assessment of impact

As with the efficiency criterion, for the impact criterion, the evaluation team had suggested to show some flexibility with regard to the assessment dimensions defined by the GIZ evaluation unit and how strongly they factor into the overall assessment of impact. From the perspective of the evaluation team, a weakness of the impact indicators is that they do not take into account changes at the level of the target group, the whole population of ECOWAS member states. This is understandable to the extent that there is a substantial attribution gap between advisory services delivered at the level of the ECOWAS Commission, and changes at the level of the population. Still, from the perspective of the evaluation team, the assessment of the plausibility of the project's contribution to changes that benefit the whole population should constitute an important part of the assessment of the impact criterion. Upon discussion with the GIZ evaluation unit, it was however ultimately agreed to apply the assessment dimensions and scoring approach defined by the GIZ evaluation unit for all central project evaluations. For this reason, 70% of the overall score for the impact criterion depend on the achievement of impact indicators (assessment dimension one) and the contribution of the project to the achievement of the impact indicators (assessment dimension two). The remaining 30% of the score depend on the occurrence of not formally agreed (positive and negative) results (assessment dimension three).

With regard to the first assessment dimension, the table below shows that the impact indicators defined in the project proposal are partly achieved. The evaluation team therefore awards 32 out of 40 points in this assessment dimension. In the field of economic and trade policy, the indicators show that the general conditions for cross-border trade have improved, and that Common External Tariff is applied in 14 out of 15 member states. However, the data on which this assessment is based is limited. For the indicator on the improvement of conditions for cross-border trade, current monitoring data of the project relies on a non-representative survey of 27 companies. Regarding the indicator on the application of the CET, it is based on the declarations of member states. Since no formal monitoring mechanism exists, it is difficult to verify whether compliance at the borders is in line with the commitments of the member states. Sector experts interviewed for the evaluation still see some challenges in implementation in the 14 member states that so far have introduced

CET, but acknowledge that substantial progress has been made. The last impact indicator in the field of economic and trade policy is not considered achieved. It intended to measure CSO involvement in shaping regional processes in the area of public revenue, but the project could not identify any CSOs active in this field. In the field of peace and security, there is only one impact indicator. It intends to capture CSO involvement in shaping regional processes in the area of conflict prevention, but has not been measured yet. The evaluation team however considers that the project is on track to achieve this indicator, as CSOs are systematically integrated in the work towards the establishment on National Early Warning Centres.

| Indicator | Degree of achievement |
|---|---|
| Programme objective indicator 1: Two-thirds of the export-oriented companies surveyed state that the general conditions for cross-border trade in ECOWAS have improved by one level in selected key areas (customs duties, administrative procedures, quality infrastructure). | Partly achieved In a non-representative survey conducted by the project with 27 companies in 2017, 62% of respondents indicated that cross-border procedures have improved over the last three years. However, companies are still experiencing difficulties with customs duties and administrative procedures. |
| Indicator 2 from project proposal: The Common External Tariff is correctly applied to 75% of imports into ECOWAS. | Partly achieved CET is correctly applied to more than 75% of imports in 14 of the 15 member. Since no formal monitoring mechanism exists, it is hard to assess the level of actual compliance at the borders |
| Indicator 3 from project proposal: 75% of the representatives from CSOs in the region rate their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue (for instance in the harmonisation of tax systems) and conflict prevention (for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts) as 'good'. | Not achieved in the field of regional economic policy This indicator could not be measured as of yet, as the project was not able to identify CSOs working in this field. Since the project did not attempt to involve CSOs not yet working in this field in the regional economic integration process, the indicator is considered not achieved by the evaluation team. |
| | Partly achieved in the field of peace and security Indicator has not yet been measured. However, the evaluation team comes to the conclusion that this indicator is on track, because the ECOWAS National Early Warning Centres that are currently being established will systematically integrate CSOs in the identification, analysis and resolution of conflicts. |

With regard to the second assessment dimension, the evaluation finds that the project contributed to these intended long-term development results. It therefore awards a score of 24 out of 30 in this assessment dimension. In this regard, the considerable attribution gap between advisory services at the level of the Commission and the application of ECOWAS decisions in the member states has to be taken into account. Notwithstanding, interviews conducted during the evaluation mission with the partners indicated that the project has made a substantial contribution to advancing key ECOWAS processes in the field of trade and customs and peace and security (see also chapter on effectiveness). This includes, among others, progress on the Common External Tariff, and progress on the ETLs, both of which affect conditions for cross-border trade.

With regard to the third assessment dimension, the evaluation team identified positive and negative not formally agreed impacts. Since the identified positive results outweigh the identified negative results, and since

negative results are being addressed, the evaluation team awards 22 out of 30 points in this evaluation dimension.

Looking at long-term results in the field of economic and trade policy that go beyond the changes captured in the indicators, the literature analysis showed a prognosis of mixed impacts of the Common External Tariff at the level of the final beneficiaries. It emerges from the studies consulted by the evaluation team that CET's tariff structure protects larger, exporting nations, while smaller, importing nations are likely to increase their tariff revenue, but at the expense of higher prices for consumers. The analysis further showed that the CET may particularly disadvantage poorer member states that rely on the import of foodstuffs from outside the region. That the introduction of the CET involves trade-offs is not per se surprising, as this lies in the nature of any harmonisation process. The evaluation team also acknowledges that losses in some areas may be justified if outweighed by overall gains. However, the evaluation team finds that since the project is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), its support to regional economic integration needs to build on an analysis of potential impacts of the CET on the population of poorer member states. Such an analysis needs to look beyond government revenue so as to ensure that remedial actions can be taken for countries whose populations may potentially be adversely affected by increases in consumer prices. The fact that Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its effects on consumer prices shows that this is a real concern. The evaluation team acknowledges the project's recognition of Cape Verde's situation and its commitment to find solutions. Finally, the evaluation team points out that the literature analysis showed that CET is part of a long-run process of regional economic integration that bears potential for future growth, if it is supported by adequate policy reforms.

With regard to the analysis of the potential impact of Common External Tariff on the population of the member states, the evaluation team questions whether the CET negotiation process supported under the previous project has been transparent and participatory enough. Several interview partners pointed out a lack of capacities of governments of ECOWAS member states to analyse the potential impacts of CET. While the project has contributed to the production of studies on the impact of CET, the studies which are in the public domain only address the situation of the large economies Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal (see chapter on effectiveness). For the evaluation team, this raises the question whether all relevant actors have been given enough opportunity to understand the potential impacts of the CET and shape its contents. However, given the fact that the negotiation process was supported under the predecessor project, the evaluation team does not factor this in into its assessment. It is however addressed here as a learning point because the issue of adequate participation and transparency remains important for ongoing support to the regional economic integration process. With regard to the current project, the fact that unit two could not identify any CSOs shaping processes on government revenue leads the evaluation team to question whether enough emphasis has been put on actively involving civil society.

In the field of peace and security, looking beyond changes measured by the indicators, the analysis has shown that the ECOWAS Commission is an actor with the capacity to positively influence peace and security in the region through its early warning and mediation instruments and the high political standing of the organisation. This is exemplified by prevention and management of election-related crises in Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin. By comparison, ECOWAS' capacities to deploy forces are considered weaker. They are however considered stronger than those of the other RECs on the continent. Interviews conducted during the evaluation mission showed that the project contributed to conflict prevention in the region through the financing of long-term election observers and the sensitisation of media and political parties on hate speech and identify politics. It also contributed to strengthen ECOWAS capacities to deploy forces through support to the command post exercise.

The overall score for the assessment criterion impact adds up to 76 out of 100 points: rather successful.

| Criterion | Assessment dimension | Score |
|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| Impact | The announced superordinate long-term results have occurred or are foreseen (should be plausibly explained). | 32 of 40 points |
| | The project contributed to the intended superordinate long-term results | 24 of 30 points |
| | The occurrence of additional (not formally agreed) positive results has been monitored and additional opportunities for further positive results have been seized. | 22 of 30 points |
| | No project-related negative results have occurred – and if any negative results occurred the project responded adequately. | |
| Overall Rating impact | | 78 of 100 points Rather successful |

5.4 Efficiency

The efficiency criterion measures the extent to which objectives of a project are achieved cost-effectively. Two aspects form the basis for assessment of efficiency in central project evaluations of the GIZ: production efficiency and allocation efficiency. Production efficiency describes the transformation of inputs to outputs. To perform the analysis of production efficiency, the GIZ evaluation unit has introduced an Excel tool to carry out a 'follow-the—money' analysis. The tool is intended to show how many resources have been spent on the respective outputs, and to analyse this against progress on the indicators associated to each output. In the case of this project, however, the basis for this type of assessment was limited for three reasons. First, the planning of the project did not respect GIZ norms, which foresee that a project can define between 3 and 5 outputs (GIZ 2013c). Since this project had defined eight outputs in the results matrix from the project proposal and subsequently increased the number of outputs to 11 in the results model,⁴¹ it was not possible to use the tool as foreseen. Second, the basis for this type of assessment was limited because the evaluation team only received the necessary data for the efficiency tool at the very end of the mission in Abuja. By then, due to other commitments of the project team, it was not possible to schedule an interview with the project leader and all three heads of components to discuss production efficiency on the basis of the Excel tool. The evaluation team

⁴¹ In unit two, output F from the project proposal has been split into two in the results model: The harmonization of indirect tax rates is improved (R3.1 – Output F.1) and the harmonization of customs procedures is improved (R3.2 – Outputs F.2). In unit three, two outputs have been added to the results model that were not in the results matrix of the project proposal: the approach and programming of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) directorates is aligned with African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) concepts and strategies (R1) and National capacities especially CSOs have effectively contributed to Early Warning and Early Response efforts of ECOWAS (R4).

scheduled a phone interview with the project leader, but did not get the occasion to explicitly discuss production efficiency with the three heads of component. This constituted a challenge because the heads of component are better suited to provide information about the progress on the output indicators and the resources spent in the respective units than the project leader. Third, the basis for this type of assessment was limited because several of the output indicators measure changes outside of the project's sphere of influence. The evaluation team has thus used an adapted approach to come to an assessment of production efficiency: it has used the Excel tool to examine how much money has been disbursed or committed so far for each of the three units of the project, and has undertaken a qualitative assessment of progress on the outputs in each unit. In addition, the evaluation team has analysed external and internal factors that affected the project's implementation efficiency. The project's efforts to achieve implementation efficiency were taken into account in the assessment of production efficiency, since they contribute to maximise outputs.

In contrast to production efficiency, allocation efficiency describes the transformation of inputs to outcomes. The traditional approach for such an analysis is to monetise the added value of outcomes. In the case of this project, however, the evaluation basis for such an approach was limited, since it is not possible to monetise the added value of an increased contribution of the ECOWAS Commission to the improved steering, implementation, and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the area of economic and trade policy and peace and security. On the basis of discussions with the GIZ evaluation unit, in this evaluation, the evaluation team therefore undertook a qualitative assessment of allocation efficiency. In this regard, the evaluation team examined to what extent the outcome has been maximised given the available resources, e.g. through scaling-up and through leveraging resources of other organisations.

No level 2 analysis of efficiency (analysis of efficiency by comparing the project with alternatives or benchmarks) was carried out as the project subject to evaluation is unique and not comparable to other development interventions. First, it cannot be compared to GIZ projects supporting other regional organisations, as the capacities of different regional organisations differ from each other, so that neither the baseline nor the approaches to support these organisations are comparable. Second, it cannot be compared to interventions from other development organisations supporting the ECOWAS Commission, as these have different objectives.

As described above, the first step for the analysis of production efficiency was to examine how much money has been disbursed or committed so far for each of the three units of the project, and how much money is spent on overarching costs ('follow-the-money' analysis). Since the administration team of the project books costs into these categories, the data for this analysis could directly be drawn from the accounting data. The results are presented in figure 1. It shows that 90% of the costs are being billed on the units, and 9% on overarching costs.⁴² Looking at the allocation of resources to the different units, the most significant amount of resources, 64% (14.5 mio. EUR) has gone into unit 2, trade and customs. The amount of resources going into unit one and unit three is significantly lower: they account for 13% (2.9 mio. EUR) of the costs each. This substantial difference between the units can be explained by the fact that there is a cofinancing of 10.5 mio. Euro under an indirect management delegation of the EU in unit two. If one were to look solely into the BMZ funding for each of the units, the difference between unit two and the other units is less pronounced: 3.8 mio Euro of BMZ funding go into unit two, against 2.7 Euro each for unit one and three. The contribution of the ECOWAS Commission to the project is estimated at 500,000 Euro (GIZ 2016b), and goes towards all three units. This is an in-kind contribution that includes the working time of ECOWAS staff and partial contributions to the organisation of workshops and trainings and travel costs of participants.

⁴² The 1 % difference to 100 % can be attributed to rounding.

Figure 1: Costs by unit and overarching costs

| | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Overarching costs |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Units | Organizational development | Trade and Customs | Peace and Security | |
| BMZ costs including obligo | 2,769,196.43 € | 3,863,757.03 € | 2,795,406.37 € | 2,125,685.38 € |
| Co-financing | 0.00 € | 10,500,000.00 € | 0.00 € | 0.00 € |
| Partner contributions | 165,000.00 € | 170,000.00 € | 165,000.00 € | 0.00 € |
| Total costs in % | 2,934,196.43 € | 14,533,757.03 € | 2,960,406.37 € | 2,125,685.38 € |
| Total costs in % | 13% | 64% | 13% | 9% |

At first sight, 9% of the budget being allocated to overarching costs seems moderate. However, a more detailed examination of the booking system of the project reveals that not all cross-cutting costs are billed as overarching costs. Costs booked into the category ‘overarching costs’ include several types of costs incurred by all three units together, such as office space, the salary of the administration team and of support staff working for the whole project, as well as costs for consultancies or events that concern all units. However, the salary of long-term advisors is always booked entirely onto the respective unit for which they work, even if advisors may partly work on cross-cutting issues that do not directly contribute to the outputs of their unit. This is especially relevant for unit one, in which the staff estimates that roughly 50% of measures concern cross-cutting issues not reflected in the outputs. Due to the complexity of the project, the organisational development unit has taken on a portfolio management role for the whole project. This includes financing of the position of a special advisor to the Vice President of the Commission, support to the Commission in its efforts to coordinate development partners, support to the Commission’s External Relations Department, coordination of trainings, and providing internal advisory services to the project to ensure all units are in line with GIZ processes (interview 11). These cross-cutting measures are carried out to help the project achieve its objective, yet they do not directly contribute to the outputs of unit one. They are still booked onto unit one because booking the salary of the staff of unit one elsewhere would require keeping time sheets, and the booking system of GIZ does not foresee this within an project (interview 31).

Discussions with the project team also suggested that the overheads (e.g. administrative costs) are substantially higher than what is booked under the 9% overarching costs. The evaluation team draws this conclusion from observations made by the programme director on the costs incurred in unit two. The programme director estimates that the actual costs incurred by BMZ to leverage the EUR 10 million cofinancing amount to roughly EUR 3 million (interview 3). This is much higher than the BMZ contribution defined in the cofinancing agreement, which is 500,000 Euro (GIZ 2016b). According to the programme director, this substantial discrepancy stems from the fact that the BMZ contribution defined in the cofinancing agreement only takes into account expenses that can be billed under the EU indirect management agreement. Certain costs, including internal services (provided by GIZ services outside of the project), and overhead costs beyond a certain threshold, cannot be billed under this agreement. However, since these administrative costs still arise, they have to be borne from the BMZ budget (interview 3). The evaluation team deems it important to shed light on the actual costs to leverage EU cofinancing, which will also have to be taken into account for the next project and potential EU funding to the area of trade and customs as well as peace and security. However, from the perspective of the evaluation team, a 30% premium for expenses not covered by the EU suggest high overheads.

The analysis has shown that the project’s booking reflects the expenses incurred in each unit, but that not all expenses incurred in the units can be directly related to their respective outputs. This constitutes a challenge for the analysis of production efficiency, which is explained in the following. Figure 2 allows for a comparison between the financial resources billed to each of the three units and the progress against the output indicators of these units. In this figure, dark blue marks a high degree of achievement of indicators, whereas light blue marks a low degree of achievement. However, the degree of achievement of the indicators and the costs incurred in the units cannot be taken as a metric to compare the efficiency of the different units, as it may be much easier to achieve certain indicators than others. In addition, such an analysis would be flawed because a

significant amount of the costs billed to unit one does not go towards the outputs of unit one. Moreover, the fact that several of the indicators are outside of the project's sphere of influence also makes it difficult to draw conclusions on production efficiency. Since the achievement of several indicators is strongly dependent on political will in the member states, the achievement of indicators does not necessarily reflect efficiency.

Figure 2: Costs by unit and degree of achievement of output indicators

| | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Units | Organizational development | Trade and Customs | Peace and Security |
| Total costs in % | 2,934,196.43 € | 14,533,757.03 € | 2,960,406.37 € |
| Total costs in % | 13% | 64% | 13% |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| Output indicators | Three new capacity development instruments – one each in the areas of a.) human resources management, b.) change management and c.) knowledge management – are applied by the ECOWAS Commission. (Output A) | Key results regarding implementation of the medium-term action plan are included in the Annual Report and in the annual Performance Report of the ECOWAS Commission. (Output B) | 75% of the relevant actors (customs officials, entrepreneurs focused on foreign trade) are 'well informed' about the ECOWAS Common External Tariff, the removal of internal tariffs and the potential of this process and the challenges it poses. (Output D) | The ECOWAS Commission follows up on 85% of reports regarding non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade, as submitted by entrepreneurs via a complaint mechanism, with the national authorities. (Output E) | 4 key measures of the medium-term action plan of the PAPS Department have been implemented to improve internal synergy and cohesion within the PAPS Department (Output G) |
| Degree of achievement | 100% | 50% | 105% | 0% | 200% |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | Three arrangements that enable learning and exchange with other regional organisations (East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC)) in the areas of trade and regional integration are used. (Output A) | In the ECOWAS Commission, the specialized ECOWAS institutions and agencies and the 15 ECOWAS Member States, a coherent and harmonised monitoring and evaluation system that assesses the implementation of regional ECOWAS agreements in ECOWAS Member States has been set up. (Output C) | A complaint mechanism to deal with cases of non-compliance with the Common External Tariff is applied. (Output D) | A roadmap with an action plan for implementing tax reforms as part of the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement has been adopted by the ECOWAS Member States. (Output F) | The Directorates Political Affairs and Peacekeeping and Regional Security contribute systematically to reports or results of the early warning system and use them to improve their analyses and activities |
| Degree of achievement | 75% | 5% | 0% | 50% | 0% |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|
| Output indicators | The priorities of the ECOWAS integration process, as reflected in the ECOWAS Commission's strategic plan for 2016–2020 and in the medium-term action plan for 2016–2018, are adopted. (Output B) | Six recommendations for strategic decisions made as part of the ECOWAS integration process based on results from the monitoring and evaluation system (are transferred to the Council of Ministers. (Output C) | The average period of time required to register industrial products under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) is reduced from 90 days to 45 days. (Output E) | Key customs procedures are harmonised in the ECOWAS region. (Output F) | A comprehensive policy document for the operationalization of the civilian dimension of the ECOWAS Standby Force (FES) is in progress. (Output H) |
| Degree of achievement | 100% | 50% | 60% | 80% | 100% |

| |
|--|
| The number of civilian experts corresponding to the guiding principles for the diversity in peace supporting operations and election observations of the AU rises to 300 in the register of the ESF, of that 30% women; in the register for election observation it rises to X |
| 14% |

For the analysis of production efficiency, in the following, the evaluation team therefore presents a summary of progress on the output indicators of each unit (a detailed overview of progress against all indicators can be found in annex 9), but also analyses the extent to which these indicators and outputs are within the project's sphere of influence. It then provides a qualitative analysis of whether the progress in the respective units is commensurate to the resources allocated. This is followed by an analysis of the implementation efficiency of the whole project, which influences production efficiency.

In **unit 1**, de facto, roughly 1.5 million Euro have been disbursed/committed to the outputs (see argumentation above on why this is less than depicted in figure 2). Regarding progress on the outputs, the evaluation team makes the following observations:

- **R1 – Output A, Organisational and Capacity Development of the Commission is strengthened:** The output indicators here measure whether new capacity development instruments are applied by the ECOWAS Commission (100% achieved) and whether arrangements that enable learning and exchange with other regional organisations are being used (75% achieved). The project has directly contributed to the elaboration of these instruments and arrangements through the advisory services it delivered (interview 11, 16)
- **R3 – Output C, The ECOWAS Commission implements a Community Strategic Framework (CSF) and an action plan that set particular priorities:**
The first output here measures whether the CSF is adopted. As described in the chapter on effectiveness, the CSF has been adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2015 after a comprehensive stakeholder consultation process facilitated by the project over several years (100% achieved). The second output indicator here measures whether key results regarding the implementation of the medium-term action plan are included in the Annual Report and in the annual Performance Report of the ECOWAS Commission (50% achieved). However, according to the project's annual progress report, the project cannot influence the annual reports, since it is being elaborated singlehandedly by the Office of the ECOWAS President (GIZ 2016a). This aspect is thus outside of the project's sphere of influence.
- **R2 – Output B, ECOWAS Commission has made proposals to Council of Ministers regarding strategic priorities from the M&E system:** The first indicator for this output measures whether the ECOWAS Community (the Commission, the specialised ECOWAS institutions and agencies and the 15 ECOWAS member states) implements a coherent and harmonised monitoring and evaluation system (5% achieved). This indicator relates to protocol monitoring (GIZ 2016a), the monitoring of compliance of member states with ECOWAS decisions. It is deemed most likely not achievable by the project team (GIZ 2017c). As shown in the chapter on relevance, there is little political will in the member states for protocol monitoring. This output indicator is thus considered outside of the project's sphere of influence by the evaluation team. The second indicator measures whether recommendations for strategic decisions made as part of the ECOWAS integration process are based on results from the ECOWAS monitoring and evaluation system (50% achieved). So far, an organisation-wide performance report system has been introduced (GIZ 2016a). However, as shown in the chapter on effectiveness, the development of a results-oriented mind-set at the level of the Commission is still work in progress. In this regard, progress is hampered by the weak personnel capacity of key counterparts responsible for driving planning and monitoring processes.

Regarding the production efficiency of unit one, the evaluation team considers the fact that only half of the resources allocated to unit one are being spent on the outputs a weakness. Furthermore, the fact that several output indicators are partly outside of the project's sphere of influence limits the project's possibility to achieve production efficiency in this area, as the inputs of the project may not bring about the intended changes agreed upon with BMZ. Lastly, given that the project is aware of the weak personnel situation of key partners necessary to drive results-oriented planning and monitoring, the use of embedded advisors⁴³ in unit one could

⁴³ The embedded advisors are experts whose office is situated in the ECOWAS offices. They are however not 'integrated experts' as per GIZ definition, as their salary is not paid for by the partners.

have constituted an alternative option to bridge capacity gaps and bring to about more results in this area. On the other hand, the evaluation team identified several positive aspects with regard to the production efficiency of unit one. First, to deliver services, unit one relies on its own advisors whenever possible (GIZ 2017c). This keeps costs down (GIZ 2017 c, interview 11). In addition, this allows for continuity, which helps establish trust with the partners. This is an important factor to bring about change in organisational culture, for example regarding HR processes (interview 11, 16). Second, unit one deliberately seeks out other stakeholders who work on organisation-wide change processes such as the introduction of SAP to ensure that the Community Strategic Framework is well anchored and to increase the likelihood that it will be used as a basis for planning, monitoring and evaluation.

In **unit 2**, roughly 14.5 million Euro have been disbursed/committed to the outputs, out of which 10.5 million Euro are cofinancing from the EU. In addition to the BMZ indicators formulated for unit 2, additional indicators have been formulated as part of the cofinancing agreement with the EU. For reasons of brevity, this report focusses on the BMZ indicators. Regarding progress on the outputs, the evaluation team makes the following observations:

- **R1 – Output D, The ECOWAS Commission harmonises and dismantles tariff trade barriers:** The first indicator for this output measures whether customs officials and entrepreneurs trained by the project are well informed about the ECOWAS CET and the removal of internal tariffs (105% achieved, target values exceeded). So far, the project conducted trainings for more than 2000 customs officials and freight forwarders via a training-of-trainers approach, and an evaluation showed that participants consider themselves well informed on key contents (see chapter on effectiveness). The second indicator measures whether a complaint mechanism to deal with cases of non-compliance with the CET is applied (0% achieved). While the project has financed ad hoc monitoring missions on the status of implementation of the CET, there is little political will in the member states for a formal monitoring mechanism (see chapter on effectiveness). While the project has contributed to the elaboration of three draft documents on possible options for a complaint mechanism which have been submitted to the ECOWAS Commission and member states for discussion (personal communication 08.12.2017), from the perspective of the evaluation team, this indicator is thus partly outside of the project's sphere of influence. At the same time, the chapter on effectiveness has shown that the project has made important contributions to the introduction of the CET which are not captured in the indicators for output D.
- **R2 – Output E, The ECOWAS Commission makes a greater contribution to dismantling non-tariff trade barriers:** The first indicator for this output measures the reduction in the average period of time required to register industrial products under the ETLS (60% achieved). The project has contributed by providing inputs to ECOWAS texts to reduce the approval time. The second indicator for this output measures the extent to which the ECOWAS Commission follows up on reports regarding non-tariffs barriers to intra-regional trade, as submitted by entrepreneurs via a complaint mechanism with the national authorities (0% achieved). While an e-mail address for complaints has been set-up, complaints are not systematically followed up on (GIZ 2016a). The project has provided financial support to the activities of a high-level task force monitoring progress on the implementation of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme through site visits in the member states, but there is little political will in the member states for a formal monitoring mechanism (see chapter on effectiveness). From the perspective of the evaluation team, it is thus questionable whether the second output indicator for output E will be achieved. At the same, the evaluation team considers the activities of the high-level task force an important contribution to the dismantling of non-tariff trade barriers, which is not adequately captured in the output indicators.
- **R 3.2 – Output D, The harmonisation of customs procedures is improved:** The indicator for this output measures the harmonisation of key customs procedures in the region (80% achieved). The Customs, Code, which is relevant for the application of both the CET and the ETLS, has been adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of States in December 2017 (personal communication 08.12.2017). As described in the chapter on effectiveness, its elaboration was largely driven by one of the embedded advisors of unit two in close liaison with the World Customs Organisation (interview 18).

- **R 3.1 – Output F.1, The harmonisation of indirect tax rates is improved:** The indicator for this output measures the adoption of a roadmap with an action plan for implementing tax reforms as part of the Economic Partnership Agreement (50% achieved). The roadmap exists, although it has been delinked from the Economic Partnership Agreement process (personal communication 08.12.2017).

Regarding the production efficiency of unit two, the evaluation team finds that several of the output indicators defined are outside of the project's sphere of influence, as political will for the establishment of formal monitoring mechanisms of the implementation of the Common External Tariff and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme is not given in the member states. At the same time, with the ad hoc monitoring mechanism of the CET and the high-level task force on the ETLs, the project has financed measures that were key to making progress on output E and D, even though they are not reflected in the output indicators. The ad hoc monitoring mechanism and the high-level task force were key to raise awareness about the state of implementation of the CET and the ETLs in the member states, which has been a necessary condition to identify areas that still need improvement. The project has thus flexibly adapted its planning in order to deliver on the outputs in spite of limitations in its sphere of influence. At the same time, by the project's own accounts, both the ad hoc monitoring mechanism and the high-level task force have been expensive instruments. The expenses going towards these instruments built momentum on the CET process and the ETLs process, but these instruments cannot be sustained in the long run in light of their costs. Finally, with regard to the production efficiency of unit two, the evaluation team observes that the embedded advisors⁴⁴ who share offices with the partners have played an important role towards achieving progress on the processes supported by unit two (see also chapter on effectiveness). Since partners see an added value in the proximity of the embedded advisors and the continuity of their advisory services (see also chapter on relevance), the evaluation team considers the use of embedded advisors a cost-effective instrument, compared to other options. The evaluation team further considers it a good choice that in addition to embedded advisors, unit two works with regular GIZ advisors and external consultancies depending on the expertise needed. Finally, the use of the training-of-trainers approach for the trainings on the CET is considered efficient by the evaluation team.

In **unit 3**, roughly 2.9 million Euro have been disbursed/committed to the outputs. Regarding progress on the outputs, the evaluation team makes the following observations:

- **R1, The approach and programming of PAPS directorates is aligned with APSA concepts and strategies:** R1 was not part of the results matrix of the project proposal, it has been added in the results model elaborated subsequently. Since no output indicators have been formally agreed with BMZ on R1, progress against indicators for R1 is not discussed here. However, the chapter on effectiveness showed that the measures conducted by the project contributed to the alignment of the approach and programming of directorates of the Department of PAPS with APSA concepts and strategies.
- **R 2- Output G: Internal synergy and cohesion is enhanced within PAPS through improved inter-directorate planning and implementation:** The first indicator for this output measures whether key measures of the medium-term action plan of the PAPS Department have been implemented to improve internal synergy and cohesion within the PAPS Department (200% achieved, target values exceeded). The second indicator for this output measures whether the Directorates Political Affairs and Peacekeeping and Regional Security contribute systematically to reports or results of the early warning system and use them to improve their analyses and activities (0% achieved). According to the project's last progress report, the Directorate for Early Warning is not systematically providing its reports to other divisions (GIZ 2016a). However, the chapter on effectiveness showed that the project has instigated a survey on the usefulness of products and services of the Early Warning Directorate for key stakeholders at the Commission. On the basis of the results, a reflection process was conducted to improve early warning products and services (interview 6, 15).

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- **R 3 – Output H, PAPS capacities to identify, deploy and manage civilian experts for conflict prevention, management and resolution are enhanced:** The first indicator for output H measures whether a comprehensive policy document for the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ECOWAS Standby Force is being implemented (100% achieved). The second indicator measures the increase in the number of civilian experts and election observers in the roster (14% achieved). As described in the chapter on effectiveness, partners are not very active in filling the database (interview 3, 6).
- **R4, National Capacities especially CSOs have effectively contributed to Early Warning and Early Response efforts of ECOWAS: R4 was not part of the results matrix of the project proposal, it has been added in the results model elaborated** subsequently. Since no output indicators have been formally agreed with BMZ on R1, progress against indicators for R4 is not discussed here. However, the chapter on effectiveness showed that the measures conducted by the project contribute to bring the concept of the National Early Warning Centres to life.

Regarding the production efficiency of unit three, the peace and security unit has been an originally small component, which continuously increases its portfolio and activities (GIZ 2017 f). As shown in the chapter on effectiveness, the project team has carried out a series of measures to support the establishment of the National Early Warning Centres, which does not contribute to either of the two outputs formally agreed with the BMZ. Working on outputs not formally agreed with the BMZ constitutes a potential threat to production efficiency. On the other hand, as the chapter on effectiveness has shown, the project has already made a contribution to the two outputs agreed upon with the BMZ: the Department of PAPS internal synergy and cohesion and its capacities to identify, deploy and manage civilian experts for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Even though not all indicators associated with these outputs are achieved, it is questionable whether investing more resources would have made a difference in this regard. The indicators that are not yet fulfilled measure information sharing at the partner level, and progress on filling the roster for civilian experts and election experts. Both of these aspects need commitment from partners. From the perspective of the evaluation team, making progress on this is not necessarily a matter of additional resources.

Looking at the whole project, the analysis of production efficiency has shown that several of the output indicators measure changes beyond the project's sphere of influence. At the same time, a qualitative distinction needs to be made even between those indicators that appear to be outside of the project's sphere of influence. Several of these indicators measure whether policies or instruments are adopted or implemented, yet some are much more ambitious than others. In this regard, the different levels at which the project operates have to be taken into account. Some output indicators measure the adoption of policies at the level of the member states (e.g. a roadmap for implementing tax reform supported in unit two), while others describe the adoption of instruments by the Commission (e.g. the implementation of the action plan of the PAPS Department supported by unit three). Since the Commission is the immediate counterpart of the project, changes at this level are more likely to be within the project's sphere of influence than changes that require approval of the member states. At the same time, it is not necessarily the case that all changes that involve the adoption of a policy by member states are difficult to achieve, as this largely depends on the political will for the specific subject matter. From the evaluation team's perspective, a focus on the adoption or implementation of policies also is a limited perspective on the progress on key processes supported by the project (see also chapter on effectiveness). For example, an instrument may be adopted, but still lack ownership at the operational level, as is the case for the Community Strategic Framework supported by unit one. On the other hand, it may well be possible that certain instruments are not formally adopted, but significant progress on an issue has still been made. For example, two of the output indicators of unit two are not achieved, as there is no political will in the member states for the establishment of formal complaint mechanisms related to the implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the field of economic and trade policy. Yet, as the chapter on effectiveness showed, substantial progress has been made on the implementation of key decisions in this area, most notably the Common External Tariff.

Looking beyond indicator achievement, the qualitative assessment of the head of programme is that most progress towards the outputs has been made in unit two (interview 3). This is partly because unit two is the unit to which most resources have been allocated. Another aspect that plays into this is that in the perception of the project team, the absorption capacities of the partners in unit two are higher than the absorption capacities of the partners of the other units (interview 6, 11, 18). The use of embedded advisors in unit two has contributed to this. With regard to the selection of modes of delivery, alternative options have been considered. Currently, the project employs regular GIZ advisors, embedded advisors⁴⁵ and external consultancies. Direct financing has been considered as an alternative option, but ultimately it was decided against it, because the ECOWAS Commission did not pass the EU pillar assessment for being entrusted with budget implementation (see also chapter on sustainability).

Finally, several aspects of **implementation efficiency** affect the production efficiency of the whole project. Regarding internal factors influenced by the project, the project shows commitment to efficiency because it does not pay the ECOWAS rate of per diems for the workshops and trainings it organises (interview 15, 16). While no official numbers could be obtained, several other development partners described ECOWAS per diem rates as unreasonably high (interview 4, 23). Against this background, the evaluation team concurs with the project team that paying the ECOWAS rate of per diems would not be in line with the principle of efficiency.

According to interviews with the project team, several aspects outside of the project's sphere of influence also affect production and implementation efficiency in all three units. Since these aspects are outside of the project's sphere of influence, they are not factored into the evaluation team's assessment. They are however presented in the following for purposes of learning regarding the project's cost structure. The first external aspect influencing implementation efficiency is that the project works with high-ranking officials whose schedule is subject to changes on short notice on the basis of current (political) events in the region. This means that sometimes events organised by the project are cancelled at the last minute. In such cases, the project still has to pay a retainer for the venue and/or the catering, even if the event does not take place (interview 31).

A further aspect that affects the efficiency of all three units is that the project regularly has to rely on support from GIZ country offices in the ECOWAS region. The project works with 12 different country offices which have different procedures for the same processes, such as drafting consultancy contracts (GIZ 2017 f). Adjusting to these different processes creates a strain for the project's administration team. In addition, the country offices perceive the solicitations from the project as a burden and therefore do not necessarily prioritise requests for support from the project. To improve working relationships, the project's head of administration has visited the different country offices in the region to sensitise them for cooperation (interview 31, 3).

In addition to the project having to work with many different country offices, GIZ regulations call for cooperation with country offices in cases where this makes little practical sense. For example, according to the GIZ procedures, when an activity is carried out in a country where there is no GIZ office, the closest neighbouring country office is to be involved. This means that to carry out an activity in Cape Verde, the project would theoretically have to go through the country office in Senegal. However, since different languages are spoken and different currencies are used in Senegal and Cape Verde, it would not make much sense for the project to call upon the office in Senegal. For the most part, such issues could be solved by the project's administration team by obtaining an exemption from the regulations from GIZ headquarters. Obtaining such exemptions is however cumbersome and can lead to delays in the implementation of activities (interview 31).

Finally, two additional issues have also affected the implementation efficiency were cash flow problems and bottlenecks at the level of the contracting department of GIZ headquarters. Regarding cash flow, at the

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beginning of the current year, only between 60 – 70% of the budget was available and it was uncertain whether the rest would become available (interview 31). Eventually, the whole budget became available, but the uncertainty at the beginning of the year made planning of activities difficult and has forced the project to curtail some consultancy missions (interview 3). Lastly, bottlenecks at level of the contracting department in Germany caused several months of delay for international consultancies, which is why the second round of trainings on results-based management could not be implemented so far (interview 3).

Looking at perspectives for the next project, the project team is well aware of the need to re-examine its support to early warning in unit 3, since USAID has introduced a substantial support package in this field (interview 6, GIZ 2017 e). If no coordination occurs, this could lead to duplications, which constitutes a potential threat to efficiency. Along the same lines, in planning the project's support to trainings on results-based monitoring in unit 1, coordination with Transtec is important. Transtec had initially worked on a planning and monitoring tool for PAPS, but is now expanding the scope of this tool to the whole Commission (interview 19, 22). The project will therefore need to liaise with Transtec to avoid duplication.

With regard to **allocation efficiency**, the transformation of inputs to outcomes, the project has been reflecting alternative options to exert more of an influence on the implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the member states. For the planning of the next project, the project team had considered an alternative project architecture in which the project would put more focus on advisory services in the member states, rather than at the level of the Commission (interview 3). Ultimately, this option was not pursued, as working in the member states would have meant a more expensive support structure.

In addition to reflecting alternative options, the project contributes to allocation efficiency by achieving synergies with other GIZ projects and by sharing costs with other GIZ projects. Unit one contributes to the allocation efficiency of German development cooperation by committing resources to enable access to the Commission for other GIZ projects to reduce the number of stakeholders the partner has to liaise with. Since several new GIZ projects in cooperation with ECOWAS are currently being planned, the amount of resources of unit one devoted to coordination has gone up significantly. In light of this development, it is planned to put into place an ECOWAS cluster in the next project. This cluster shall constitute a forum for coordination between different GIZ projects working with the Commission. It is foreseen that participating projects contribute part of their budget to cover for the coordination efforts (interview 3). If the costs for the coordination efforts are shared with other projects, this will increase the efficiency of this project because personnel costs for unit 1 would decrease. Furthermore, in unit two contributed to allocation efficiency by sharing costs for the implementation of training workshops on the Common External Tariff in Nigeria with the bilateral GIZ project 'Pro-poor Growth and Employment Promotion in Nigeria' (SEDIN) (interview 25, 18). This cost sharing was initiated in reaction to cash flow difficulties. Possibilities for future synergies at this level are however limited because the bilateral project is phasing out (interview 25, 18). In addition, unit three contributes to allocation efficiency by liaising with several GIZ projects supporting the APSA to improve alignment on APSA (interview 6, 30). However, from the perspective of some interview partners, coordination has declined since a position in GIZ headquarters supporting the coordination between APSA projects has been made redundant (interview 30).

Finally, synergies with other external actors, scaling-up of initiatives taken by the project by other development partners, and cofinancing from the EU constitute an important factor for the project's allocation efficiency. In unit one, the project liaises with the consultancy that has been contracted by the ECOWAS Commission to introduce SAP to ensure that the Community Strategic Framework will be anchored in this new IT system (interview 11, 10, 19, 17). In unit two, the 10 million Euro cofinancing of the EU constitutes a substantial leverage effect. In unit three, several initiatives taken by the project have been scaled up by other development partners. In this regard, the position of the Head of Civilian component, which was previously funded by the project, is now being funded by the EU (interview 6, 4, GIZ 2017 e). In addition, USAID is scaling up the implementation of the National Early Warning System (see Section 5.2 on effectiveness). Lastly, perspectives

with regard to future allocation efficiency are good, as the project has two cofinancing agreements with the EU lined up: one in the area of trade facilitation, and one in the area of African Peace and Security Architecture (interview 3, 6, 18).

Overall assessment of efficiency

The evaluation team comes to a mixed assessment of the project's production efficiency. In this regard, the evaluation team observes that an assessment of the production efficiency solely based on the achievement of indicators is not possible, as several of the output indicators lie outside of the project's sphere of influence. This is a weakness in planning which adversely affects the evaluation team's assessment, as it means that regarding some outputs, GIZ has committed to deliver on changes it is not in a position to bring about. On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that the project has made progress on several key processes relevant to the outputs, but which are not reflected in the output indicators. At the same time, the evaluation team sees it as a threat to production efficiency that both unit one and unit three commit considerable funds to processes that do not go towards the outputs formally agreed upon with BMZ. However, the evaluation team also identified several aspects that positively affect the project's production efficiency. First, the modes of delivery, combining expertise from regular GIZ advisors, embedded advisors and external consultants are overall well suited to achieve maximum results. Second, the training-of-trainers approach is a good solution to efficiently transform inputs to outputs. Third, the project's stance on per diems for workshops and trainings with ECOWAS is viewed positively by the evaluation team. Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses, the evaluation team awards 46 out of 70 points in the assessment dimension production efficiency.

In contrast, the evaluation team comes to a more positive assessment of the project's allocation efficiency. In this regard, positive examples for synergies and/or cost sharing with other GIZ projects could be identified in all three units. In addition, positive examples for synergies with external actors, scaling-up of initiatives of the project by other development partners, or cofinancing by the EU could be identified. In this regard, the perspectives for future cofinancing testify to the project's standing among development partners working with the ECOWAS Commission. The evaluation team therefore awards 27 out of 30 points in this assessment dimension. The full score is not awarded because the evaluation team sees minor room for improvement regarding synergies and cost sharing with other GIZ projects. In this regard, the evaluation team observes that cost sharing only occurred out of necessity due to cash flow problems, and had not been explored before. In addition, interviews showed that coordination with other GIZ projects also working on the African Peace and Security Architecture still occurs, but has been stronger in the past.

The overall score for the assessment criterion efficiency adds up to 73 out of 100 points: rather successful.

| Criterion | Assessment dimension | Score |
|---------------------------|--|---|
| Efficiency | <p>The project's use of resources is appropriate with regard to the outputs achieved</p> <p>[Production efficiency: Resources/Services in accordance with the BMZ]</p> | <i>46 of 70 points</i> |
| | <p>The project's use of resources is appropriate with regard to achieving the TC-measures' goal (outcome).</p> <p>[Allocation efficiency: Resources/Services in accordance with the BMZ]</p> | <i>27 of 30 points</i> |
| Overall Rating efficiency | | <i>73 of 100 points</i> <i>Rather successful</i> |

5.5 Sustainability

To assess sustainability, the evaluation team took into account three aspects. First, it examined the extent to which results are anchored in partner structures. Closely intertwined with this is the second aspect of sustainability, a forecast of the durability of results. To analyse these two aspects, the evaluation team differentiated between the extent to which results are anchored at policy level, and the extent to which results are embedded in the partner structures at an operational level. The evaluation team also looked into what the project team does to ensure results are anchored in partner structures. Lastly, the evaluation team also analysed the extent to which results of the project are socially and economically balanced. An analysis of ecological sustainability was not relevant for this evaluation.

Looking at the anchorage of results at policy level, interviews and documentary review showed that key results in the field of trade and customs and peace and security are per default institutionally anchored in the partner's structures as they derive from regional policies. Among others, this concerns the introduction of the CET and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), which are objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty, and the implementation of the early warning system, which is an element of the African Peace and Security Architecture. However, monitoring of the CET and the ETLS is not rooted in the partner structures, as this is not foreseen in relevant framework documents, and the ECOWAS Commission does not have a mandate for this from the member states (see chapter on relevance). The current solutions, the ad hoc monitoring mechanism of CET, and the high-level task force on ETLS are, by the project's own account, expensive solutions which cannot be sustained in the long run (interview 18).

In addition to supporting the implementation of existing frameworks, the project has supported the development of a new frameworks, some of which have been adopted at policy level: A key result of unit one, the

Community Strategic Framework, has become an official reference document of the ECOWAS Community through its adoption by the Council of Ministers (interview 11). Overall, there is thus good anchorage of results of the project at policy level.

Looking beyond the policy level, several results of the project are embedded in the partner structures at operational level. In the field of peace and security, the civilian component of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) has become an integral part of the ECOWAS Peace Support Operations Division. The partner thereby started to implement the framework for the civilian component developed by the project together with Swiss cooperation (interview 3, 15). Another result of the project which is gaining traction at operational level are the National Early Warning Centres. They receive funding from other development partners who contribute to the implementation of the instrument. As described in the chapter on effectiveness, the initial impetus for these Centres came from a recommendation of an evaluation of early warning processes financed under the predecessor project. The current project is contributing to bring these Centres to life by piloting the identification of CSOs in five countries. The process is however especially gaining traction since USAID is implementing a substantial support package in the field of early warning, which includes a commitment to finance the five first National Early Warning Centres. While this scaling-up is positive in terms of sustainability, it also forces the GIZ project to rethink its support to early warning, as several of its intended areas of support to early warning were replicated in the USAID package with significantly more resources (interview 6, GIZ 2017 e). Further examples of scaling-up of instruments on which the project has provided advisory services include EU support to the roster and long-term election observation deployment. In addition, there is a concrete perspective for the EU providing co-funding to the follow-up project in two areas: trade facilitation and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (GIZ 2017 f, interview 4).

In spite of the fact that key results are anchored in the partner system, weak capacities of the Commission constitute a challenge to sustainability at operational level (GIZ 2017 f, interview 11). Even if policies and frameworks are officially adopted, the capacity to implement them remains weak in some areas. Both the highly political environment and the personnel situation contribute to this (see also chapter on effectiveness). This is a perception shared by other development partners, also with regard to their own programmes (interview 4, 22). However, it does not affect all processes supported by the project to the same extent. For some processes there is more political momentum in the member states than for others, which affects both the partners' capability to act and the sustainability of results. Also, at the level of the Commission, some departments and directorates have a better personnel situation than others, which again affects implementation and sustainability. Not only the capacities, but also the commitment of the counterparts of the three units varies. Regarding the thematic areas of support, the counterparts in the field of economic and trade policy are perceived to be more active in the cooperation than the counterparts in the field of peace and security (interview 18, 6). In the field of economic and trade policy, embedded advisors employed by the project have played an important role to bring about results (interview 18, 6, 5, 13, 14). From the perspective of the evaluation team, the embedded advisors can contribute to develop capacities and anchor results through day-to-day cooperation with the partners. At the same time, reliance on embedded advisors can be a threat to sustainability if lack of personnel at the level of the counterparts make it difficult to pass on responsibilities. Unit one has no embedded advisors and faces the particular challenge that many of the processes it supports involve different directorates under different political management that work in silos (GIZ 2017c). On the one hand, this speaks to the relevance of the project's support on the Common Strategic Framework and monitoring thereof. On the other hand, this means ensuring ownership from the myriad of actors involved takes perseverance. As described in the chapter on effectiveness, this is still work in progress, and support from the Commission's next management team will be crucial.

Moreover, interviews have shown that the project bridges capacity gaps in the Commission to bring about results. This favours effectiveness, yet also raises the question whether results achieved by bridging capacity gaps are sustainable. Both embedded and regular GIZ advisors sometimes take over tasks of the partners to ensure progress on certain processes, e.g. drawing up minutes of meetings convened by the partners

(interview 11, 15, 6). This flexibility is highly valued by the Commission, for whom this is one of the qualities of the partnership. Some of the other development partners however question whether the project does not go too far in its flexibility towards the Commission (interview 4, interview 28), sometimes at the expense of ownership (interview 28). One example given in this regard was a high-level meeting in the field of peace and security, where the restitution of discussions was done by members of the project team rather than by the partners. The perception of the evaluation team is that the project is aware of the trade-offs involved in bridging capacity gaps at the level of the Commission and is committed to find a balance between making progress on key processes and nurturing ownership. In this regard, the project itself perceives it as limitation that it currently is in charge of all administrative processes of the cooperation, such as tendering consultancies. From the perspective of the project, it would be preferable to implement part of the cooperation via direct financing to put more responsibility into the hands of the partner. However, since the Commission has not passed the EU pillar assessment for being entrusted with budget implementation, this is currently not an option. Should the Commission meet requirements in the future, the project is open to provide direct financing, which it perceives as mode of delivery favouring sustainability (interview 3). However, discussions conducted by the evaluation team showed that not all partners were aware of the possibility of receiving direct financing from GIZ if specific conditions are met (interview 12). From the perspective of the evaluation team, it would make sense to openly discuss advantages, disadvantages and conditions for the different modes of delivery in the GIZ portfolio with the administration and finance department of the Commission.

In addition, the project team adheres to several cooperation principles which favour sustainability (interview 3, GIZ 2017c). In addition to alignment to ECOWAS policies and priorities, this includes ensuring that the Commission is in the lead for the different activities carried out by the project. For example, for the trainings carried out with support of the project, the Commission sends out the invitations. This contributes to ownership and strengthens the Commission's profile vis-à-vis member states and external actors. Moreover, the project cooperates with relevant third parties to anchor results. For example, it drew on the expertise of the World Customs Organization to ensure the Customs Code adheres to international standards, which will favour its acceptance within ECOWAS and beyond. Another example is the collaboration with the private sector to advocate for moving forward with the implementation of regional trade policies (interview 18). In this case, involving outside actors contributes to creating momentum for a process, making it more difficult to reverse the process. Another cooperation principle is the mobilisation of regional expertise wherever possible, to ensure advisory services are relevant to the West African context and accepted by the partners. Depending on the type of expertise needed, modes of delivery include long-term and short-term advisors to contribute to capacity development.

In terms of social and economic sustainability of the project's results, the analysis of potential impacts of CET in a previous chapter showed that not all member states will benefit equally from regional economic integration. Several interview partners observed that this lies in the nature of a harmonisation process, and is justified if the overall benefits for the population outweigh the costs (interview 18, 3). Studies commissioned by the project before the introduction of the CET provided estimations of the impact on government revenue on the member states (see chapter on impact). There is however no differentiated analysis of how the CET will affect the poorer populations within the ECOWAS Community in the project proposal. Furthermore, no involvement of civil society in shaping regional integration processes related to government revenue could be identified (see chapter on impact). Given that the project is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), the evaluation team finds that an analysis of how poor people in the region are affected by results would have been called for, and that more efforts should have been made to ensure participation of the poor in the support to regional economic integration, e.g. by having their perspective represented by CSOs.⁴⁶ In addition, an analysis of how CET affects different segments of society would also be called for in light of the 'Leaving no one behind' principle of the Sustainable Development Agenda. However, since the Sustainable

⁴⁶ The BMZ criteria to award the MSA marker include 'Poor people in the region/the country benefit to a significant degree from the indirect project results', 'Key mechanisms are in place for participation by the poor in political and societal decision-making processes' and 'Plausible results chain between the measure and improvement in the lives of the poor' (GIZ 2014)

Development Agenda was only introduced after the project was planned, the evaluation team does not take this into account in its rating.

Overall assessment of sustainability

With regard to the first assessment dimension of sustainability, the evaluation team found that results are very well anchored at policy level. On the other hand, results are only partly anchored at operational level due to weak absorption capacities of the Commission. The project is however very proactive in trying to ensure that results are anchored in partner structures both at policy and at operational level. The evaluation team therefore awards 35 out of 40 points in this assessment dimension.

Many results of the project are per default anchored in the partner structures at policy level, because the project directly supports the realisation of objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty and other relevant frameworks. For example, in the field of economic and trade policy, the introduction of the Common External Tariff and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme are goals of the ECOWAS Treaty. In the field of peace and security, support to early warning is in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture. In contrast hereto, in the field of organisational development, the project did not support the implementation of an existing framework, but contributed to elaborate a new strategic framework for the ECOWAS Community which has since been adopted at policy level: the Community Strategic Framework.

In spite of a good anchorage of results at policy level, at operational level the sustainability of results is not yet consolidated. This is mainly due to weak absorption capacities of the partners, which affects some areas of support more than others. This directly plays into the second assessment dimension of sustainability, the forecast of durability. In the area of organisational development, the project works with counterparts in different directorates and units which are not under the same leadership and work in silos. In addition, stakeholders who are key for the implementation of the Common Strategic Framework are highly understaffed. Therefore, the CSF is not yet well anchored in the organisation. In the field of economic and trade policy and peace and security the project has bridged capacity gaps by employing embedded advisors. This has been instrumental in bringing about results, yet it also carries a risk in terms of sustainability of results. The evaluation team's forecast of results in these areas is still positive. In the field of regional economic integration, the counterparts at the Commission are invested in the processes on which the project provides support. With the introduction of the Common External Tariff in 14 out of 15 member states, the integration process has gained momentum. In the field of peace and security, key counterparts of the project in the Commission are not as committed. However, since there is political will for early warning and for mediation efforts in the member states and substantial interest of the development community to consolidate the regional peace and security architecture, prospects for results in this area to be sustainable are still good. The planned activities of both the project and USAID/the US State Department towards the establishment of National Early Warning Centres can be expected to strengthen the sustainability of early warning (see Section 5.2 Effectiveness). In light of these prospects, the evaluation team awards 22 out of 30 points in the assessment dimension related to the forecast of durability. This assessment takes into account that in an environment characterised by weak absorption capacities of the partners, the project still does its best to anchor results in the partner structures. It does so by ensuring all support emanates by requests from the partners and by showing flexibility to also support the partners at operational level. In addition, it does so by liaising with other development partners and external actors to ensure results are integrated into relevant processes and in line with international standards. As a result, the perspective for anchoring the Community Strategic Framework supported by unit one in the future SAP system of the Commission is good, and the Customs Code elaborated with the support from unit two is in line with standards of the World Customs Organization.

The evaluation team's assessment is mixed regarding the economic and social sustainability of results. The evaluation team acknowledges that by supporting the introduction of the Common External Tariff, the project supports a decision taken by the ECOWAS member states. The evaluation team further acknowledges that the

measures supported by the project are part of regional economic integration process that bears potential for future growth, if it is supported by adequate policy reforms (see chapter on impact). However, the evaluation team sees it as a shortcoming that the project has not conducted an analysis of the impact of the regional economic integration process on the population of poorer member states in its proposal, and did not adequately involve civil society in project implementation. From the perspective of the evaluation team, this runs counter to the commitment of comprehensive poverty reduction of a project with the BMZ policy marker 'MSA' (see also chapter on impact). The evaluation team therefore awards 21 of 30 points in the third assessment dimension of sustainability.

| Criterion | Assessment dimension | Score |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| Sustainability | Prerequisite for ensuring the long-term success of the project: results are anchored in (partner) structures | <i>35 of 40 points</i> |
| | Forecast of durability: Results of the project are permanent, stable and long-term resilient | <i>22 of 30 points</i> |
| | Are the results of the project ecologically, socially and economically balanced? | <i>21 of 30 points</i> |
| Overall Rating sustainability | | <i>78 of 100 points Rather successful</i> |

5.6 Long-term results of predecessor

The predecessor projects play an important role in understanding the long-term results that can be observed today. There is a strong continuity between the objectives of the first project (2008 – 2010), the second project (2011-2013) and the current project (2014 – 2019). While the exact wording⁴⁷ differs, all three projects aimed at strengthening the Commission in its coordination and steering role. Furthermore, in all three projects, the respective project was organised into several units that included organisational development, economic integration (finance and trade) and peace and security. In addition, several key processes supported in the current project, such as results-based management, strategic planning, the Common External Tariff and the

⁴⁷ The objective of the first project (2008-2010), was „The economic and political integration process of ECOWAS has been competently brought forward and coordinated by the ECOWAS Commission and fits into the reform and security architecture in the region' (GIZ 2007).

The objective of the second project (2011- 2013) was 'The ECOWAS Commission fulfills its role in shaping, coordinating and monitoring the regional integration process competently, thereby increasingly contributing to improved implementation of its decisions in the fields of economic and trade policy as well as peace and security policy at the level of member states' (GIZ 2010).

The objective of the current project (2014 – 2019) is 'The ECOWAS Commission is increasingly contributing to the improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy'

alignment of instruments in the field peace and security with the African Peace and Security Architecture were already supported in the first project (GIZ 2013b).

Work done under the first project, 2008-2010, was important to establish a good working relationship based on trust with the partner (GIZ 2013b), which can plausibly be assumed to have constituted a basis for achieving results in the subsequent projects. However, at the end of the first project, few outcomes and impacts could be observed. In this regard, the first internal project progress review points out that the project team of the first project was only fully staffed rather late.⁴⁸ This affected results to the extent that advisory services in the fields of finance and trade as well as peace and security were taken up rather late by GIZ advisors, even though short-term consultancies in these fields were already conducted before. Consequently, results described in the first project progress review focus on outputs.

The second project, 2011 – 2013, produced results in all three areas of support that the current project could build upon. In the field of organisational development, due to the trusting relationship established by the end of the second project, the project has been invited to support the elaboration of the ECOWAS Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020 (GIZ 2013b), which became the Community Strategic Framework in the current project (interview 11). The internal project progress review of the second project also credits the programme with contributing to the region-wide strengthening of monitoring and evaluation (GIZ 2013b). However, the assessment provided by interview partners consulted for this evaluation was not as positive. Interview partners confirmed that a monitoring manual for the Commission has been developed and trainings were conducted under the previous project (interview 20), but pointed out that a result-oriented mind-set has not yet fully taken root in the organisation (interview 3, 22, 11).

Additionally, in the second project, in the field of trade and customs, the project supported the negotiation of the Common External Tariff and carried out sensitisation (GIZ 2013 b, interview 18). It thereby made possible the adoption of the CET in October 2013, which occurred at the beginning of the current project (interview 13) and which was a prerequisite for the work on the implementation of the CET conducted under the current project (interview 18). The last project progress review of the second project also described the establishment and implementation of a mechanism to verify continuous application of the CET as a result of the second project. In this regard, the assessment provided by interview partners of this evaluation was once again not as positive. Interview partners confirmed that a consultancy conducted under the second project had elaborated various options for monitoring the implementation of the CET, which informed the work done under the current project (interview 18). They however also made clear that no mechanism to verify continuous implementation of the CET is in place, because of lack of political will of the member states for a formal monitoring mechanism. According to the interviews conducted for this evaluation, the use of the ad hoc monitoring mechanism only started under the current project (interview 18, 13). Beyond support to the CET process, the predecessor project had also already provided support on the harmonisation of customs procedures, the elaboration of a coherent regional trade policy, and the implementation of ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (GIZ 2013b). The current measures of the project build upon this work (interview 18).

Moreover, in the second project, in the field of peace and security, support was provided to the implementation of strategies and procedures for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The last internal project progress review came to the conclusion that results in this area had been relatively weaker than results in the field of organisational development and peace and security, because of weak absorption capacities. In addition, the review found that the civilian dimension, which was then the focus of the peace and security unit, had not been given the highest priority by the Department of PAPS (GIZ 2013b). Still, the review and interviews conducted for this evaluation showed that several processes initiated under the predecessor project could be built upon to achieve results in the current project. For example, the project initiated annual retreats of the PAPS Department under the predecessor project. These retreats have contributed to the improved

⁴⁸ Eight months before the project progress review was conducted at the beginning of the third year.

coordination and cohesion observed by several interview partners (interview 18, 15, 22). In addition, the roster for election observation missions was already available at the end of the predecessor project (GIZ 2013b) and is being consolidated with more candidates under the current project (interview 3, 18). The Commission has started using the roster for recruitment of election observers (interview 15, 3), even though other channels are also still being used (interview 3).

In spite of the continuity between the predecessor projects and the current project, lessons learned on processes that have already been supported in previous projects are not well documented. In consulting the documentation of the predecessor project, the evaluation team found several indicators that closely resembled the indicators of the current project (see annex 5). However, these indicators were not formulated in exactly the same way, and there is no document that comprehensively documents progress on processes from the start of the predecessor project until today. For example, both the predecessor project and the current project have an effectiveness indicator on the existence of ECOWAS instruments in the field of peace and security aligned with APSA. However, since the formulation of this indicator differs slightly between the two projects, and the reporting on the indicators of the project is partly narrative, it is difficult to gauge the progress made between the beginning of the second project and today. The project team acknowledges that a purely quantitative reporting on indicators in a highly political environment has limitations and narrative reporting has an added value to provide context. However, if there is no continuity in the narrative reporting on progress on processes supported over several projects, the potential for learning is limited. In this regard, the indicators of the predecessor and the current project that measure the planning, steering and monitoring capacities of the Commission are a further example. Finally, the indicator on trade or fiscal policies aimed at improving female participation is nearly identical between the two projects. Its baseline at the beginning of the second project is '0', but there is no reflection of why the indicator is still at zero if it is the same intended change that has already been targeted under the predecessor project.

5 Overall rating and conclusions

The Support Programme to the ECOWAS Commission is highly **relevant** in all three areas it supports. In the field of trade and customs, it supports objectives which directly emanate from the founding treaty of the ECOWAS. The harmonisation and dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the harmonisation of customs procedures and indirect tax rates are key elements of regional economic integration. In the field of peace and security, support to Early Warning and Early Response processes and to the civilian component of peacekeeping strengthen the partner in fulfilling its mandate within the African Peace and Security Architecture. The fact that the support in the thematic areas directly emanates from ECOWAS policies is positive in terms of **sustainability**. In the field of organisational development, cross-cutting support to strategic planning and results-oriented monitoring and the improvement of HR and communication processes strengthen the organisation's capacity to deliver. There are thus synergies between support to organisational development and the thematic areas.

The project's **complexity** is however not adequately captured in the proposal and reporting to BMZ. In practice, the three units of the project could each constitute a project of its own. With 11 outputs, the results model is significantly more complex than what is foreseen by the GIZ standards. There is also no narrative explanation of the results model and no written documentation of why the current results model encompasses two more outputs than the results model from the project's proposal. Moreover, the impact and effectiveness indicators do not adequately reflect the support in the fields of organisational development and peace and security. The fact that the documentation does not do the project justice constitutes a challenge for steering, monitoring and evaluation.

In addition to being complex, the project's results model is very **ambitious**. Many of the intended results are outside of the project's sphere of influence. This is due to the fact that project's partner is a regional organisation, but ultimately the cooperation intends to bring about changes at the level of the member states. The results of many of the processes supported by the project depend on political will in the member states. To exert a more direct influence on changes in the member states, the project would have to put a stronger focus on implementation in the member states. This however would make the project more costly. The current set-up is thus a good choice in terms of **cost structure**. However, the fact that part of the intended output indicators lie outside of the project's sphere of influence adversely affects the project's **production efficiency**.

Limitations regarding the project's sphere of influence also have to be taken into account when assessing results. Looking at the project's results, the intended outcomes and impacts are closely intertwined. At outcome level, the project aims to improve the Commission's contribution to improved steering, implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the field of economic policy and peace and security. The intended impact is for this to translate to changes at member state level. The **target group** of the project is defined as the whole population of ECOWAS member states. However, there is a substantial gap between providing advisory services at the level of the Commission and observing changes at the level of the population. Also, none of the indicators of the project measures changes at the level of the population.

Looking at the project's **results**, the progress on key processes supported is strongly influenced by two major context factors: the personnel situation at the level of partners, and political momentum for a given process. Since the three units of the project work with different stakeholders in the Commission and on different areas, this plays out differently for each of the three units.

- In the area of **organisational development**, the project has played a major role in the elaboration of the **Community Strategic Framework (CSF)**, the first results-oriented strategic framework for the ECOWAS

Community. The development of the document was based on an extensive stakeholder consultation process involving not only the Commission, but also other ECOWAS organisations and the member states. The adoption of the CSF by the Council of Ministers gives it official weight. However, the CSF is not yet being fully used in the Commission because the key stakeholders responsible for steering this process are highly understaffed and belong to different units/departments that work in silos. As a result, the CSF is not yet well known by all actors in the organisation. In addition, the establishment of a results-oriented mind-set in the organisation is still work in progress. A first round of trainings has already been conducted with support from the intervention. It is planned to consolidate the capacities developed through a further round of training involving more stakeholders and with a concrete application of concepts of results-based management to the CSF. In parallel, the project is liaising with the consultancy in charge of introducing SAP in the Commission, to ensure the future IT solution foresees a linkage between budgetary planning and the CSF.

- In the **area of trade and customs**, which benefits from EUR 10 million cofinancing from the EU, the project has played a major role in the introduction of the **CET**, which is currently being applied in 14 out of 15 member states. The project has contributed to this by supporting the sensitisation of key stakeholders ranging from parliamentarians to CSOs, by facilitating dialogue between customs authorities of the member states, and by supporting trainings for customs authorities and freight forwarders. In addition, ad hoc monitoring missions of application of the CET at the borders have helped identify and address implementation gaps. All this support has been channelled via the Commission, to strengthen it in its role of coordinating the CET process vis-à-vis the member states. Currently, the ECOWAS Community is still in the transition period for introducing the CET, and there are thus still some implementation gaps in the 14 member states where application has started. However, the progress made on the introduction of the CET is considerable. The fact that Cape Verde has not introduced CET out of concern for its effects on consumer prices is however to be taken seriously. The project is aware of the need to take remedial action in this regard.
- In the **area of peace and security**, the capacities of the partner in terms of **early warning** have been strengthened at several levels. At the level of the Commission, support to planning, teambuilding and feedback processes have contributed to improve the work across different directorates and within the Early Warning Directorate. In addition, the project is currently providing support to the identification of CSO for the five first National Early Warning Centres, which will increase capacities in the member states to provide information to the region's Early Warning system. The project's support to early warning is highly appreciated by the partners. However, the project's support in this field will have to be reassessed, because USAID/the US State Department have introduced a substantial support package in the field of early warning which covers many of the areas in which GIZ has been active.

Given the complexity of the project, this overview does not comprehensively address all results. Overall, taking into account the weak absorption capacities of some key counterparts and the highly political environment in which the project operates, the **effectiveness** of the project is considered good. The Commission has been equipped with instruments and know-how to steer, implement and monitor ECOWAS decisions in the area of economic policy and trade and customs. However, monitoring solutions to take stock of progress on the implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the member states in the field of trade and customs are ad hoc mechanisms. Since the Commission has no mandate to enforce compliance of ECOWAS decisions in the member states, there is no political will for formal monitoring mechanisms. For this reason, the project's possibilities to bring about structural change regarding the Commission's capacity to monitor the implementation of ECOWAS decisions are very limited. In spite of this limitation, the support provided by the project has substantially contributed to advance key processes such as the Common External Tariff, Early Warning and Early Response.

Progress on key ECOWAS processes in the field of economic policy and peace and security has contributed to tangible **impacts** at the level of the member states in terms of a dismantlement of barriers to trade and the

prevention and mediation of conflicts, for example in the context of the election-related crises in the sub-region. While impacts in the field of peace and security can be considered entirely positive, the introduction of the Common External Tariff globally improves the conditions for trade in the region, but with different impacts to be expected in different ECOWAS member states. The tariff structure favours larger, exporting nations, while smaller, importing nations are likely to increase their tariff revenue, but at the expense of higher prices.. No differentiated analysis of the impact of regional economic integration on poorer member states is included in the project proposal. This is a shortcoming since the project is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (BMZ marker 'MSA'). While the project has successfully contributed to knowledge about the application CET at the level of customs officials (effectiveness), several interview partners consulted in this evaluation pointed out a lack of capacities of governments of ECOWAS member states to analyse the potential impacts of CET. No CSOs were involved in shaping regional economic integration processes in the field of public revenue, because the project could not identify any CSOs active in this field. This raises the question whether the process leading up to the introduction of the CET has been participatory and transparent enough. In light of the mixed picture that emerges, the impact criterion is rated rather successful.

In terms of unintended positive results, the project plays a strong role in coordinating German development cooperation with ECOWAS, thereby reducing the number of stakeholders the partner has to liaise with. In addition, progress in terms of internal communication and service-orientation of the ECOWAS Commission's HR department also constitute a result that was not initially planned, but to which the project contributed after a request for support from the partner. A further unintended positive result lies in the scaling-up of initiatives from the project by other development partners. Most notably, the initial impetus for establishing National Early Warning Centres came from an evaluation of early warning processes conducted by the predecessor project. This process has gained momentum with USAID's commitment to support the establishment of five National Early Warning Centres. Regarding unintended negative results, where these occurred, remedial actions were taken. In this regard, the pharma sector was affected by an increase in tariff rates under the Common External Tariff, but receives support to utilise regulations to address these unintended consequences.

Looking at how results were achieved, progress on many of the key processes supported in the current project builds upon groundwork laid in the **predecessor project**. The predecessor project had a nearly identical objective and also provided support in the areas of organisational development, trade and customs and peace and security. Many of the changes targeted in the predecessor project were similar to the changes targeted by the current project, as evidenced by a similarity in the indicators. However, in spite of their similarity, the indicators are not identical and the documentation does not allow for a systematic analysis of progress on given processes between the beginning of the predecessor project and today. This is a missed opportunity in terms of lessons learned.

In the current project, the **modes of delivery** are a success factor for effectiveness. In unit two, the project bridges capacity gaps of the partners by employing embedded advisors who have their offices in the Commission. This allows for a very close collaboration with the partners, who appreciate the project's flexibility to pitch in with routine tasks to make progress on processes supported by the project. On the one hand, working hand in hand with the partners can allow for a transfer of competencies. On the other hand, the potential for transferring know-how and responsibilities is limited if partners remain understaffed. This constitutes a threat in terms of **sustainability**. The close working relationship with the partners however enables the project to systematically identify evolving priorities of the Commission and seize windows of opportunity to achieve results in areas for which there is momentum. The deliberate reallocation of resources to areas the project can make a difference positively affects the project's **relevance**. At the same time, the fact that the project allocates considerable resources to processes that do not directly contribute to the outputs agreed upon with BMZ constitutes a challenge in terms of production **efficiency**. In addition, the project's implementation efficiency is adversely affected by heavy administration processes. Administration is heavy because as a regional programme, the project relies on support from 12 GIZ country offices, all of which have different procedures. In addition, administration is heavy because the project takes on all administrative

elements of the cooperation, because an EU pillar assessment has found the Commission currently does not meet requirements to be entrusted with budget implementation. Taking into account both efficiency and sustainability considerations, providing direct financing could be an option in the future if the Commission meets requirements. In spite of some challenges with regard to efficiency, the evaluation team also identified several positive aspects. Regarding production efficiency, the modes of delivery are well suited to achieve results cost-effectively. In addition, the project's stance on per diems is assessed positively. Lastly, it is a strength that the project is successful in achieving synergies with other GIZ projects as well as other development partners, and has managed to acquire substantial co-funding.

Overall, the strengths of the project lie in its high relevance and in the modes of delivery well suited to bring about results. Part of the project's relevance stems from a high degree of flexibility towards evolving needs of the partner. The project is very aware of the political and organisational intricacies of the environment in which it operates. It is skilled at identifying the areas in which it can make a difference in a highly political context and given a weak personnel situation of some key counterparts at the ECOWAS Commission. To achieve results, the project sometimes resorts to bridging capacity gaps with regular GIZ advisors and embedded advisors working in the offices of the partners. To a certain degree, this close collaboration between the project team and the partners contributes to develop capacities by jointly working on issues on a day-to-day basis. The possibility to sustainably consolidate capacities are however limited if the personnel situation of key counterparts remains weak. Furthermore, the project's high degree of flexibility to accommodate request for support voiced by the partner sometimes comes at the expense of focussing on results formally agreed upon with the BMZ. In addition, achieving the results formally agreed upon with the BMZ is in parts difficult because some intended changes at output level lie outside of the project's sphere of influence. The project thus has weaknesses with regard to its results model. A further weakness lies in the fact that the project documentation does not do justice to the complexity of the project, which makes it unwieldy to steer, monitor and evaluate. Finally, a current strength as well as an opportunity for the future lie in the project's capacity to achieve synergies with other actors and to acquire co-funding to leverage the BMZ resources.

| Criterion | Score | Rating |
|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Relevance | 95 of 100 points | Very successful |
| Effectiveness | 84 of 100 points | Successful |
| Impact | 78 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Efficiency | 73 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Sustainability | 78 of 100 points | Rather successful |
| Overall Score and Rating for all criteria | $408 / 5 = 81,6$ | Successful |

| 100-point-scale (Score) | 6-level-scale (Rating) |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 92-100 | Level 1 = very successful |
| 81-91 | Level 2 = successful |
| 67-80 | Level 3 = rather successful |
| 50-66 | Level 4 = rather unsatisfactory |
| 30-49 | Level 5 = unsatisfactory |
| 0-29 | Level 6 = very unsatisfactory |

6 Key recommendations

Based on the analysis and conclusions in the previous chapters, ten recommendations are put forward. They are addressed to GIZ, and within GIZ to specific stakeholders.

Strategic recommendations for the planning of the next project –addressed to the project team and members of the planning mission

Recommendations concerning the whole project – addressed to the whole project team and members of the planning mission

Recommendation one: Support to organisational development, trade and customs as well and peace and security should be maintained, but split into three projects.

The evaluation has shown high relevance of the work done in the three units. For this reason, work in all three areas should be continued. At the same time, the evaluation has shown that under the current set-up, the project proposal and the reporting do not capture the complexity of the project. The evaluation team therefore recommends to turn each of the units into a project of its own to facilitate steering, monitoring and evaluation. This will also facilitate the administration of the two co-funding agreements with the EU.

Recommendation two: Joint planning and coordination between support to organisational development, trade and customs and peace and security should be maintained

The evaluation has shown synergies between support in the field of organisational development and support in the thematic areas. To maintain these synergies, the evaluation team recommends a joint planning mission for the three areas of support, even if the support will be split into three projects. Ideally, this planning mission should include one expert for each of the three areas of support, and there should be regular reflection sessions during the mission to identify potential for synergies. In the same vein, close coordination between the three areas of support should be maintained in the implementation. For example, the teams should continue to operate from the same office, and a regular jour fixe should be maintained. In addition, the three project should continue to operate as part of one programme. The emphasis should be on coordination between support to organisational development and support to trade and customs as well as between organisational development and peace and security, respectively. The reason for this is that organisational development is of cross-cutting relevance for the two thematic areas, whereas opportunities for synergies between the two thematic areas are less obvious.

Recommendation three: The definition of the target group should be reassessed

The evaluation has shown that there is a substantial gap to bridge between advisory services at the level of the ECOWAS Commission and results at the level of the target group as currently defined: the whole population of ECOWAS member states. In addition, the analysis showed that the project's monitoring does not capture changes at the level of the target population. The evaluation therefore recommends to re-examine the definition of the target group. In this regard, the project proposal could still make reference to the whole population of ECOWAS member states, but it should also be made clear that the immediate target group at the level of which changes can be observed is not the whole population. If the project proposal makes reference to the whole population of ECOWAS member states, it should include indicators that capture changes at the level of the population.

Recommendation four: The modes of delivery should be reassessed once the outcome of the reorganisation process of the Commission is being implemented

The evaluation has shown that the modes of delivery of the project are appreciated by partners. It has also

shown that the embedded advisors employed by unit two contribute to bridge a capacity gap at the level of the partners. In unit one, where there are no embedded advisors, the personnel situation at the level of the Commission's strategic planning directorate and monitoring unit however currently constitute a challenge for the results of the project. The evaluation team therefore recommends to examine the possibility of working with embedded advisors in all three units/projects in the future. This should be carefully weighed against the risk for substitution and take into account potential changes to the personnel situation to be brought about by the upcoming reorganisation of the Commission. In addition, in view of sustainability, an open dialogue should be maintained with the Commission regarding conditions to be met for making use of the direct financing instrument in the future.

Recommendation concerning unit two– addressed to the team of unit two, the programme director and the members of the planning mission

Recommendation five: Support in the field of trade and customs should take into account the Leave-No-One-Behind principle

The evaluation has shown that the project proposal did not include a differentiated analysis of the impact of CET on the population of different ECOWAS member states. In light of the Leave-No-One-Behind principle, the proposal for the next project(s) should reflect how poorer member states and their populations are expected to be impacted by regional economic integration in the field of trade and customs. The project proposal should further reflect how adverse effects can be mitigated.

Recommendation concerning unit three – addressed to the team of unit three, the programme director and the members of the planning mission

Recommendation six: The perspective for future GIZ support to early warning should be discussed with PAPS and other development partners.

The evaluation has shown that the partners value GIZ support to early warning. At the same time, a substantial support package to early warning has been introduced by USAID. The evaluation team therefore recommends conducting a joint coordination meeting between the Department of PAPS, USAID and potentially other development partners to avoid duplications.

Operational recommendations for the implementation of the next project(s) – addressed to the project team

Recommendations concerning the whole project – addressed to the whole project team

Recommendation seven: Documentation of lessons learned should be strengthened

The evaluation has shown that the groundwork for many of the processes supported in the current project has been laid under the previous project. It has also shown that many of the indicators of the current project closely resemble indicators of the previous project. Yet, information on the progress on key processes already supported under the previous project has not been carried over into the monitoring of the current project (e.g. as a baseline). There is also no systematic documentation on lessons learned on support to key processes. The evaluation team therefore recommends to establish a short, informal documentation on lessons learned on the support to key processes that should be updated quarterly. Since this documentation would mainly serve for internal learning purposes, it could take the form of bullet points to avoid creating more work than necessary. The evaluation team suggests to structure this documentation along the outputs of the results matrix, and, where appropriate, sub-results. This documentation should account for the activities implemented to deliver the respective outputs. It should further briefly document success factors and stumbling points where appropriate (e.g. coordination with other actors, ownership or lack thereof from the partners, administrative bottlenecks). Lastly, activities that were carried out that do not directly contribute to the outputs should also be briefly documented, as well as the rationale behind them. While this documentation can be brief and in bullet

points, it should be written in a format that allows for an outside actor (e.g. a new staff member, a consultancy supporting a specific process, or an evaluation team) to understand the information provided.

Recommendations concerning unit one – addressed to the team of unit one and the programme director

Recommendation eight: The organisational development team should proactively seek out the support of the other two teams for mainstreaming of the CSF and other organisation-wide processes

The evaluation has shown that knowledge of and ownership for the Community Strategic Framework varies widely among the stakeholders within the Commission. The evaluation team therefore recommends that the organisational development team proactively seeks out feedback from the other two teams on how well the CSF is known and used by partners in the field of trade and customs and peace and security. Where appropriate, the organisational development team should call upon the other two teams to mainstream the CSF into their advisory services. The same approach should apply to mainstreaming of other organisation-wide processes supported by unit one, such as results-based monitoring.

Recommendation nine: Mainstreaming of the CSF through dialogue with other development partners and service providers contracted by the Commission should be continued

The evaluation has shown that the project liaises with other development partners and service providers contracted by the Commission to anchor the CSF in processes of the partner. Most notably, the project advocates for the future SAP system to include a linkage between budget proposals and the objectives of the CSF. This type of coordination with other development partners on the CSF should be maintained. Given the CSF's potential role as a basis for monitoring at the level of the whole Commission and beyond, particular attention should be paid to liaising with other development partners also supporting results-based monitoring.

Recommendations concerning unit two – addressed to the team of unit two and the programme director

Recommendation ten: The findings of studies on the impact of regional economic integration should be more widely disseminated, including to actors of civil society.

The evaluation has shown that while the project has commissioned studies on the impact of the CET on government revenue, several interview partners felt that ECOWAS member states lacked the knowledge and capacities to analyse the potential impacts of CET. The evaluation also found that no monitoring of CSO involvement in shaping regional processes in the area of public revenue has taken place, because the project could not identify any CSOs active in this field. To ensure relevant actors have the necessary information to shape regional economic integration, the evaluation team therefore recommends to disseminate the findings of studies on the impact of CET on government revenue and the welfare balance to a wider audience, including to actors from civil society.



Hafen von Nurjama



Sitz der ECOWAS-Kommission in Abuja



Wahlbeobachtungsmission der ECOWAS in Guinea



Workshop des Vorhabens



Taxi mit ECOWAS-Beschriftung

7 Annex

Annex 1: Evaluation matrix

| Relevance | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| The project fits into the relevant strategic reference frameworks. | Which framework conditions or guidelines exist for the project? | 1. The intervention's proposal and progress reports refer to overarching principles / frameworks of development cooperation. a.) International frameworks, e.g. SDGs / Agenda 2030 b.) ECOWAS strategies c.) BMZ strategies | Intervention's proposal and annual progress reports | / | Document analysis | Fair | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>The liberalization of trade among member states and the establishment of a common external tariff, supported by unit 2 of the intervention, were already formulated as objectives of the Community in the first ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and the revised Treaty of 1993. The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 expanded the mandate of the organization on peace and security as well as democratic governance, and formally introduced the peace and security observation system and election observers, both of which are supported by unit 3 of the intervention. The support of GIZ is also in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2020, encapsulated in the vision statement pledging "to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation."</p> <p>By supporting a regional economic community (REC), the intervention is also in line with frameworks of the German Ministry for Economic and Development Cooperation. In the "New Africa policy of BMZ", the Ministry underlines its commitment to strengthening African initiatives both at the level of the African Union and the RECs for continental and regional cooperation (BMZ 2014). Furthermore, the intervention is also in line with the pillars of the German Marshall Plan for Africa, which include, among others, trade as well as peace and security (BMZ 2017). In annual reports to the Ministry, the relevance of the intervention is linked to the SDGs. By the intervention's own accounts, measures in the field of organizational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Trade facilitation and harmonization of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ("Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all") and 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ("Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"). The intervention also links the improvement of living conditions of the ECOWAS population to SDG 1 ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere") and SDG 10 ("Reduce inequality within and among countries") (GIZ 2016 a).</p> | The intervention is in line with international frameworks, the SDGs, the ECOWAS Treaty and relevant BMZ strategies | |

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| | | 2. Relevant framework conditions and risks for the program cited by interview partners are reflected in the intervention's proposal and / or in annual progress reports. | Intervention's proposal and annual progress reports | Interviews with partners and external stakeholders | Comparison between framework conditions and risks described in project documentation and by interview partners | Fair | <p>Document analysis: From intervention's proposal "Ein erstes Risiko liegt in einem nachlassenden politischen Willen der ECOWAS-Mitgliedstaaten, die fortschreitende regionale Integration (etwa die Einführung des CET) voranzutreiben. Die Motivation könnte durch den Eindruck, zu den Verlierern des regionalen Integrationsprozesses zu gehören, oder durch eine Überforderung der politischen Strukturen abgeschwächt werden. Ein weiterer Grund könnte darin liegen, dass Partikularinteressen zentraler Stakeholder (wichtiger Politiker, einflussreicher Unternehmer) einzelnen Reformen entgegenstehen. Hinzu tritt das Risiko fehlender oder begrenzter zeitlicher Verfügbarkeit von relevanten Führungs- und Fachkräften der ECOWAS-Kommission sowie relevanter Institutionen der ECOWAS-Mitgliedsländer (Ministerien, Zollverwaltungen) für Beratungsleistungen des Vorhabens. Dies kann auf das Missverhältnis zwischen der Anzahl an Fachkräften und deren Aufgabenfeldern sowie auf die starke Reisetätigkeit von Führungs- und Fachkräften zurückzuführen sein.</p> <p>Im Hinblick auf das Monitoring der Umsetzung von Vereinbarungen der ECOWAS auf nationaler Ebene besteht ein Risiko, dass Politiker und Beamte aus den ECOWAS-Mitgliedstaaten – ggf. aufgrund eines geringen Zielerreichungsgrads – eine zu große Transparenz dieser Ergebnisse fürchten. Ein weiteres Risiko besteht darin, dass fortlaufende Prozesse der Organisationsreform in der ECOWAS-Kommission, etwa die Erhöhung der Anzahl an Kommissaren, andere Reformen der regionalen Integration verlangsamen oder gar blockieren bzw. das Augenmerk von notwendigen Verbesserungen des internen Managements in der Kommission ablenken.</p> <p>Besondere Risiken liegen im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit. Einerseits besteht die Gefahr, dass einzelne Führungskräfte (etwa der Direktor für Politische Angelegenheiten) kein oder kaum Interesse daran haben, mit dem Vorhaben der deutschen EZ zusammenzuarbeiten. Schließlich ist das Risiko gegeben, dass Maßnahmen zur Förderung der zivilen Dimension der ESF nicht vorangehen. Dies kann darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass die zivile Dimension von Führungskräften in PAPS keine adäquate Priorität erhält oder Stellen in PAPS, die der Förderung der zivilen Dimension dienen, nicht besetzt werden. "</p> <p>Interviews: Int 19: The Commission has been understaffed since the beginning of the intervention Int 16: Corruption may impede compliance with revised staff regulations Int 3, int 6: The commitment of partners in the field of peace and security does not always meet expectations of the partners Int 3, 23, 28: Commission staff is traveling all the time, there is an incentive for them to do that because of high per diems, this adversely affects their availability Int 25, 26: protectionist tendencies in Nigeria have slowed down the CET process</p> | The framework conditions and risks described in the intervention's proposal and annual reports correspond to the risks and framework conditions described by interview partners |
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| | <p>To what extent does the project contribute to the implementation of the underlying strategies (if available, especially the strategies of the partner countries)?</p> | <p>1. The intervention's proposal and progress reports refer to overarching principles / frameworks of development cooperation. a.) International frameworks, e.g. SDGs / Agenda 2030 b.) ECOWAS strategies c.) BMZ strategies</p> | <p>ECOWAS Community Strategic Framework 2016 - 2020, Results matrix and results models for the intervention</p> | <p>Interviews with intervention staff and partners</p> | <p>Contribution analysis, Comparison between partner strategy and results model, document analysis</p> | <p>Fair</p> | <p>Document analysis: From intervention's proposal "Der Ansatz des EZ Programms spiegelt wichtige Ziele des Konzepts „Deutschland und Afrika“ der Bundesregierung wider. Es ordnet sich ebenfalls in zentrale Strategien der ECOWAS, etwa der Vision 2010 und dem Strategieplan 2011-2015 ein." (...) Die Maßnahmen des EZ-Programms orientieren sich dabei am PAPED, einem der Rahmenwerke für die Umsetzung prioritärer Aktivitäten im Bereich Handelserleichterung. (...) Zudem werden die Förderung von regionaler Integration sowie Frieden und Sicherheit in den Profilen „Regionale wirtschaftliche Integration“, „Regionale Unterstützung Afrikanischer Governance-Reformprozesse“ sowie „Unterstützung von Frieden und Sicherheit auf panafrikanischer und regionaler Ebene in Afrika“ explizit als Ziele der Ausrichtung des BMZ festgelegt." (...) "Die Maßnahmen des EZ Programms integrieren sich weitestgehend in die Strategien des Partners, insb. die Vision 2020, den Strategieplan 2011-2015 und das PAPED." (...) "Durch seine Unterstützung der Zollunion leistet es einen Beitrag zu Artikel 3 des Revised Treaty der ECOWAS." In annual reports to the Ministry, the relevance of the intervention is linked to the SDGs. By the intervention's own accounts, measures in the field of organizational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Trade facilitation and harmonization of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ("Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all") and 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ("Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"). The intervention also links the improvement of living conditions of the ECOWAS population to SDG 1 ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere") and SDG 10 ("Reduce inequality within and among countries") (GIZ 2016 a).</p> | <p>The intervention's documentation reflects frameworks of German development cooperation, strategies of the partner and the SDGs</p> |
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| | <p>To what extent does the TC-measure fit into the programme?</p> | <p>1. There is a clear differentiation between the program objective and the intervention's objective 2. There is a plausible causal linkage between reaching the intervention's objective and reaching the program objective 3. The GIZ intervention and the PTB intervention complement each other in contributing to the program objective</p> | <p>Intervention's proposal (part B) and program proposal (part A), results models</p> | <p>Interviews with intervention staff, GIZ country director and PTB representative</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation</p> | <p>Interviews: Int 11: The program objective and the intervention's objective are closely intertwined: the programme objective aspires to the same changes as the intervention's objective, but at member state level instead of at the level of the ECOWAS Commission. Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly dependent on political will in the member states. There is no political will for protocol monitoring Int 3, int 33: The intervention and PTB do not cooperate on a day to day basis, information is exchanged when the joint report to BMZ is prepared int 33: PTB is relevant to make companies fit for competition</p> | <p>The program objective and the intervention's objective are closely intertwined: the programme objective aspires to the same changes as the intervention's objective, but at member state level instead of at the level of the ECOWAS Commission There is a plausible link between the intervention's objective and the programme objective, but both are dependent on political will in the member states and therefore the intervention's objective is partly outside the intervention's sphere of influence Both the PTB and the GIZ intervention are relevant for the program objective, but they do not cooperate on an operational level</p> | |
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| | <p>What mechanisms ensure that the intervention's implementation is flexible towards evolving needs of the partner?</p> | <p>1. The steering structure and modus operandi of the intervention are responsive to evolving needs of the partner.</p> <p>a.) overall intervention</p> <p>b.) Unit 1 (organizational development)</p> <p>c.) Unit 2 (trade and customs)</p> <p>d.) Unit 3 (peace and security)</p> | <p>Documentation on steering structure for intervention and by unit</p> | <p>Interviews with intervention staff and partners</p> | <p>Qualitative assessment</p> | <p>Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation</p> | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>PPT for the presentation during the evaluation's kick-off: There is no formal steering structure, except in unit 2</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, 6, 11, 18: There is no formal steering structure, except in unit 2</p> <p>int 3: the only counterpart that is familiar with all three areas of support is the Commission's VP, yet he is very busy, so he does not know the details</p> <p>int 5, 13, 14, 15: partners are only familiar with the area of support which concerns them</p> <p>int 5, 13, 14, 15: partners are highly satisfied with flexibility of the intervention to adapt to evolving needs.</p> <p>int 11: a certain degree of flexibility is necessary to ensure success of the intervention, as it evolves in a highly political environment which is characterized by evolving priorities</p> <p>int 13, 15, 6, 18: embedded advisors in unit 2 and 3 ensure very close day to day cooperation, which contributes to the intervention being highly attuned to evolving needs and priorities of the partners</p> <p>int 3, 11, 12: because the intervention finances the post of the special advisor to the VP, it is well attuned to priorities of the leadership of the Commission and can quickly react to requests for support</p> <p>int 3, 11: Examples for current areas of support that were not part of the initial results matrix include support in the field of human resources by unit one, and support in the field of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework by unit three</p> | <p>There is no formal steering structure, except for unit 2</p> <p>The intervention works with a myriad of partners and none of the partners have an overview of the whole intervention</p> <p>However, close cooperation ensures that intervention is responsive to evolving needs of the partners, this applies to all 3 units</p> | <p>Split the intervention into 3 different interventions to make it easier to plan, steer and monitor</p> |
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| | <p>To which SDGs does the project contribute? To what extent is the contribution of the intervention to the global SDGs reflected in the ToC?</p> | <p>1. The intervention's contribution to one or more SDGs can plausibly be explained. 2. The intervention's contribution to one or more SDGs is reflected in the results models.</p> | <p>Intervention's proposal and annual progress reports, results models</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation</p> | <p>Document analysis: Results model: The intervention's results model does not reflect contribution to the SDGs Results matrix: The intervention's indicators do not reflect changes at the level of the population, which is the target group of the intervention according to the intervention's proposal Annual reports to BMZ: In annual reports to the Ministry, the relevance of the intervention is linked to the SDGs. By the intervention's own accounts, measures in the field of organizational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Trade facilitation and harmonization of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ("Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all") and 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ("Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"). The intervention also links the improvement of living conditions of the ECOWAS population to SDG 1 ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere") and SDG 10 ("Reduce inequality within and among countries") (GIZ 2016 a).</p> | <p>The intervention's contribution to several SDGs can be plausibly explained. There is however a substantial gap between advisory services at the level of the Commission and changes at the level of the ECOWAS population (target group of the intervention) The intervention's contribution to the SDGs is not reflected in the results models</p> | <p>Reassess the definition of the target group, define indicators at the level of the population</p> |
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| | <p>Cross-sectoral change strategies, etc. Where has work been carried out on a supra-sectoral basis and where have such approaches been used to reinforce results/avoid negative results?</p> | <p>1. Cross-cutting issues are appropriately taken into account in the implementation of the intervention a.) Gender b.) Do-No-Harm</p> | <p>Intervention's proposal, Gender analysis, results models</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation</p> | <p>Document analysis: Intervention proposal, reporting and results monitor: intervention has indicators on gender which are on track Gender analysis: a gender analysis has been conducted Interviews: int 3, 11: Mainstreaming gender is a challenge because it is not a priority for the partners int 11: the introduction of a provision against sexual harassment in the revised staff regulations has been an impt achievement in terms of gender Int 3: No analysis of the potential impact of CET differentiated by member country or segment of society was undertaken when the intervention was planned int 18: The intervention commissioned studies on the impact of the CET on government revenue in the member countries int 18, int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns that it might adversely affect its welfare balance int 3, int 13, int 7: Some countries will benefit from CET, while others might not</p> | <p>The intervention attempts to mainstream gender into ist activities, but the partner is not very receptive in this regard No analysis of the CET on the welfare balance has been carried out prior to providing support in this area</p> | <p>Conduct analysis of the effects of regional economic integration on the welfare balance of ECOWAS member states</p> |
| | <p>To what extent are the interactions (synergies/trade-offs) of the intervention with other sectors reflected in conception and ToC – also regarding the sustainability dimensions (ecological, economic and social)?</p> | <p>1. Complementarity between the three units of the intervention is plausible</p> | <p>Intervention's proposal, results models</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation</p> | <p>Document analysis: Results model for whole intervention puts unit one in between of unit two and unit three Interviews: Int 3, 6, 11, 18, 16: strengthening the organization in the area of organizational development strenghtens the whole organization and therefore also strengthens its work in the areas of economic policy and trade and customs int 3: Examples are better recruiting practices and better coordination of extenal actors int 16: better recruiting practices will benefit the whole organizations int 6, int 22, 13, 4: not everyone in the Commission is aware of the CSF, and not everyone who is aware of it uses it.</p> | <p>Complementarity between organizational dev unit and thematic units is given, however unit one could work more closely with the thematic units to mainstream CSF to all counterparts of the intervention</p> | <p>Unit 1 should be more proactive in asking the two thematic units for support in mainstreaming the CSF and other processes relevant to the whole Commission</p> |

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| Suitability of the strategy? The conception? to match core problems/needs of the target groups | To what extent was the concept designed to reach particularly disadvantaged groups (LNOB principle)? Which prerequisites were addressed for the concept and used as a basis? | 1. In the planning stage of the intervention, an appropriate analysis of economic and social impacts of the intervention on the target group (population of ECOWAS member states). Appropriate = differentiated analysis of different types of members states / population | Intervention's proposal, project progress review of two predecessor phases | Interviews with partners, intervention staff and external stakeholder | Contribution analysis | Fair | Document analysis: The intervention's documentation does not include an analysis of the impact of CET differentiating by member states of segments of society. PPR of first phase of intervention recommended to conduct an analysis of impact of the intervention with a focus on the poor Interviews: Int 3: No analysis of the potential impact of CET differentiated by member country or segment of society was undertaken when the intervention was planned | No analysis of the CET on the welfare balance has been carried out prior to providing support in this area | Conduct analysis of the effects of regional economic integration on the welfare balance of ECOWAS member states |
| | How are the different perspectives, needs and concerns of women and men represented in the change process and how are the objectives represented (Safeguard & Gender)? | 1. Cross-cutting issues are appropriately taken into account in the conception of the intervention a.) Gender b.) Do-No-Harm | Intervention's proposal, Gender analysis, results models | Interviews with partners and intervention staff | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation | Document analysis: Intervention proposal, reporting and results monitor: intervention has indicators on gender which are on track Gender analysis: a gender analysis has been conducted Interviews: int 3, 11: Mainstreaming gender is a challenge because it is not a priority for the partners int 11: the introduction of a provision against sexual harassment in the revised staff regulations has been an impt achievement in terms of gender Int 3: No analysis of the potential impact of CET differentiated by member country or segment of society was undertaken when the intervention was planned int 18: The intervention commissioned studies on the impact of the CET on government revenue in the member countries int 18, int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns that it might adversely affect its welfare balance int 3, int 13, int 7: Some countries will benefit from CET, while others might not | The intervention attempts to mainstream gender into ist activities, but the partner is not very receptive in this regard No analysis of the CET on the welfare balance has been carried out prior to providing support in this area | Conduct analysis of the effects of regional economic integration on the welfare balance of ECOWAS member states |
| | To what extent is the chosen TC-measures' goal geared to the core problems/needs of the target group? | 1. Partners confirm that the intervention's objective is relevant to their needs. 2. Partners and training participants confirm the relevance of activities and outputs to their needs. | External evaluation of CET trainings, external evaluation of EU-financed part of unit 2 ("WATIP") | Interventions with partners | Contribution Analysis | Possibility of bias because partners may be interested in follow-up intervention. Can be mitigated by differentiated probing: e.g. asking for examples, asking for potential for improvement | Interviews: int 13, 14: support in the field of trade and customs helps achieve the objectives of the ECOWAS treaty int 15: support in the field of peace and security is in line with APSA and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework int 9, 16, 19, 20: support in the field of org dev helps the Commission fulfill its mandate int 16, 13, 15, 17: partners are highly satisfied with how the intervention takes into account evolving needs in the support it provides, its high degree of flexibility distinguishes the intervention from other dev partners | Partner confirm relevance of the intervention objective as well as of activities and outputs. One support area however is not relevant because there is no political mandate for it at member state level. This concerns protocol monitoring | |

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| The design of the project is adequately adapted to the chosen goal. | <p>Results logic as a basis for monitoring and evaluability (Theory of Change)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Are the hypotheses plausible? o Are the risks presented plausibly? | <p>1. The outputs, outcomes and impacts described in the results models correspond to the BMZ definition for these types of changes</p> <p>2. The causal hypotheses in the results models are plausible</p> <p>3. Risk and external factors are presented plausibly</p> <p>4. The results model is being used by the intervention staff to reflect achievement towards the intervention's objective</p> | Intervention's proposal, results models | Interviews with intervention staff | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Results model: The outputs, outcomes and impacts described in the results model correspond to the BMZ definitions.</p> <p>PPT supporting the presentations delivered by the intervention at the kick-off of the evaluation show risks and external factors are presented plausibly and the results model is being used to reflect achievement towards the intervention's objective. For details, see these documents</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, int 6, 11, 18: whether changes occur is partly dependent on political will in the member states.</p> | <p>The outputs, outcomes and impacts described in the results model correspond to the BMZ definitions. They are however very ambitious because whether changes occur is partly dependent on political will in the member states.</p> <p>The results model is not an adequate basis for monitoring and evaluability because it does not reflect the complexity of the intervention. Risks and external factors are presented in the intervention's proposal, but are not part of the results model.</p> <p>In spite of these limitations, the results model is being used by the intervention staff to reflect progress towards the intervention's objective</p> | Split the intervention into 3 different interventions to make it easier to plan, steer and monitor |
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| | Is the strategic reference framework well anchored in the concept? | 1. The intervention's proposal and progress reports refer to overarching principles / frameworks of development cooperation. a.) International frameworks, e.g. SDGs / Agenda 2030 b.) ECOWAS strategies c.) BMZ strategies | Intervention's proposal and annual progress reports | / | Document analysis | Fair | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>The liberalization of trade among member states and the establishment of a common external tariff, supported by unit 2 of the intervention, were already formulated as objectives of the Community in the first ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and the revised Treaty of 1993. The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 expanded the mandate of the organization on peace and security as well as democratic governance, and formally introduced the peace and security observation system and election observers, both of which are supported by unit 3 of the intervention. The support of GIZ is also in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2020, encapsulated in the vision statement pledging "to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation."</p> <p>By supporting a regional economic community (REC), the intervention is also in line with frameworks of the German Ministry for Economic and Development Cooperation. In the "New Africa policy of BMZ", the Ministry underlines its commitment to strengthening African initiatives both at the level of the African Union and the RECs for continental and regional cooperation (BMZ 2014). Furthermore, the intervention is also in line with the pillars of the German Marshall Plan for Africa, which include, among others, trade as well as peace and security (BMZ 2017). In annual reports to the Ministry, the relevance of the intervention is linked to the SDGs. By the intervention's own accounts, measures in the field of organizational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Trade facilitation and harmonization of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ("Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all") and 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ("Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"). The intervention also links the improvement of living conditions of the ECOWAS population to SDG 1 ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere") and SDG 10 ("Reduce inequality within and among countries") (GIZ 2016 a).</p> | The intervention's proposal and annual reports refer to international frameworks, the SDGs, the ECOWAS Treaty and relevant BMZ strategies | |
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| | To what extent does the strategic orientation of the project address changes in its framework conditions. How is/was the complexity of the framework conditions and guidelines handled? How is/was any possible overloading dealt with and strategically focused? | 1. Changes in the framework conditions for the intervention are reflected in the intervention's progress reports (if applicable) 2. The intervention can describe criteria for adapting the implementation to evolving needs from partners | Intervention's proposal and annual progress reports | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Comparison between framework conditions and risks described in project documentation and by interview partners | Fair | Document analysis: The project documentation does not adequately reflect the complexity of the intervention, e.g. there is no narrative that documents the current results model Interviews: Int 3, 11: The intervention adapts the implementation based on political momentum / requests on the partners as long as new support areas contribute to achieve the intervention's objective. Examples for current areas of support that were not part of the initial results matrix include support in the field of human resources by unit one, and support in the field of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework by unit three | The project documentation does not adequately reflect the complexity of the intervention, e.g. there is no narrative that documents the current results model The intervention can provide plausible example of how evolving needs of the partner are taken into account as long as new areas of support contribute to the programme objective | Split the intervention into 3 different interventions to make it easier to plan, steer and monitor |
| The conceptual design of the project was adapted to changes in line with requirements and re-adapted where applicable. | What changes have occurred? How were the changes dealt with? | 1. The intervention is capable of providing an overview of changes in implementation that resulted from framework conditions a.) Unit 1 (Organizational development) b.) Unit 2 (Trade and customs) c.) Unit 3 (Peace and security) | Intervention's proposal, annual reports and results models | Interview with intervention staff and partners | Analysis of evolution of intervention's conception | Fair | Document analysis: The project documentation does not adequately reflect the complexity of the intervention, e.g. there is no narrative that documents the current results model Interviews: Int 3, 11: The intervention adapts the implementation based on political momentum / requests on the partners as long as new support areas contribute to achieve the intervention's objective. Examples for current areas of support that were not part of the initial results matrix include support in the field of human resources by unit one, and support in the field of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework by unit three | The project documentation does not adequately reflect the complexity of the intervention, but the presentations delivered by the intervention team to kick-off the evaluation team provided an overview of changes in implementation that were undertaken as a response to evolving needs of the partners | Split the intervention into 3 different interventions to make it easier to plan, steer and monitor |

| Effectiveness | | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| The project achieves the goal on time in accordance with the TC-measures' goal indicators agreed upon in the contract. | To what extent has the agreed TC-measures' goal already been achieved at the time of evaluation, measured against the goal indicators? | Adapted indicator suggested by evaluation team: 1.1. 75 % of Commission staff interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least "good" progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security a.) over the last three years (current phase of the intervention started March 2014) b.) over the last ten years (first | / | Interviews with Commission staff | Contribution analysis, closed question in interviews with answers on a five-point scale, "good" being the second best option | Possibility of bias because partners may be interested in follow-up intervention. Can be mitigated by differentiated probing: e.g. asking for examples, asking for potential for improvement | Note: Interview partners found it challenging to provide assessment on 5-point scale, therefore in practice a narrative assessment was provided Interviews: Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will | | The intervention's objective is partly outside of the sphere of influence. Given the complexity and highly political environment of the intervention, a rating on a five-point scale does not adequately capture progress against the intervention's objective. The intervention's objective is partly achieved. On the one hand, due to context factors little progress has been made on capacities for planning, monitoring and steering at the level of | Split the intervention in three to make it easier to plan, steer and monitor |

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| | | phase of the intervention started March 2008). | | | | | have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now Int 4, 12: Capacities of the units and directorates of the Commission working on economic and trade policy and peace and security to steer, monitor and implement processes in their respective fields has improved Int 17, 16, 3: There is not much progress on the capacities developed for steering and monitoring of the whole organization | the whole organization. On the other hand, progress has been made on capacities of planning, monitoring and steering of the units and departments working in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security. Regarding capacities for monitoring however one has to differentiate between different levels. Partners are better able to monitor progress on their own work, but monitoring of implementation of ECOWAS decisions in the member states is highly dependent on political will in the member states. | |
| | | Adapted indicator suggested by evaluation team: 1.2. 60 % of external stakeholders (e.g. other donors) interviewed during the evaluation mission state that the Commission has made at least "good" progress towards improved steering, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS decisions in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security a.) over the last three years (current phase of the intervention started March 2014) b.) over the last ten years (first phase of the intervention started March 2008). | / | Interviews with external stakeholders (e.g. other donors) | | | | | |

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| | | Adapted indicator suggested by evaluation team: COMMENT: Based on feedback from the intervention team in the inception phase, it was decided to not only take into account the relevance of trainings on CET, but of all support measures of the intervention concerning CET 2. In the process tracing conducted during the evaluation mission, the relevance of the impact hypothesis related to the connection between training on CET and the Commission's contribution to dismantling tariff trade barriers is confirmed ("hoop test"). | / | Interviews with Commission staff, intervention staff and external staff | Process tracing, closed questions in interviews in which respondents are asked to rate plausibility of several impact hypotheses on a five-point scale | Possibility of bias because interviewees may be interested in follow-up intervention. Mitigated by data triangulation including external actors, and by differentiated probing as follow-up to closed questions: e.g. asking for examples | Interviews: Int 7, 17, 8, 13, 24: the interventions' measures to support the CET process played a significant role in the Commission's contribution to dismantling trade barriers. Technical support to the Commission, sensitization of different stakeholders and trainings for customs authorities are all relevant Int 17, 7, 34, 13: correct application of CET is to a certain degree outside of the intervention's sphere of influence | The support of the intervention was very relevant for achieving introduction of the CET. At the same time, introduction of the CET is not possible without political will in the member states | |
| | | Indicator from intervention's proposal: 3. For each of the following three core processes for compensating losses in government revenue arising from cross-border trade, either a new regional agreement has been adopted or a new instrument introduced which improves the implementation of an existing agreement: a.) programme of tax and customs duties reform, b.) value added tax and c.) excise duties. | Progress reports to BMZ (For full details on how intervention collects data on indicators, see indicator matrix) | Interviews with Commission staff, intervention staff and external staff | Contribution analysis | Fair. Data and researcher triangulation to verify information from progress reports to BMZ | Document analysis: GIZ results monitor consulted 22.09.2017: On track: Draft directive on harmonisation of VAT exemptions study available (09/2015); 2 draft directives available at ECOWAS for submission to MS (09/2016); 3 draft directives validated by the TWG awaiting adoption by council of ministers - a. Draft Directive on the Institutional framework to monitor and steer the implementation of the FTP was validated by the technical Committee on, Trade, Customs and free movement on 7th July, 2017. The validated draft Directive will be presented to the Council of Ministers for adoption by 31st December, 2017. b. Draft Directive on the harmonization of exemptions from VAT in Member States of ECOWAS was validated on the 6th of July, 2017. The validated draft Directive will be presented to the Council of Ministers for adoption by 31st December, 2017. c. Draft Directive relating to the harmonization of excise duties on Tobacco products in Member States of ECOWAS was validated on 4th July, 2017. The validated draft Directive will be presented to the Council of Ministers for adoption by 31st December, 2017 (09/2017) Interviews: Int 18, int 13, 14: progress on the harmonisation of VAT has been made | . The outcome indicator which measures the introduction and adoption of instruments concerning tax and customs duties reform, value added tax, and excise duties is on track. | |

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| | | <p>COMMENT: The indicator from the intervention's proposal has been replaced by a more specific proxy indicator: "'10 instruments/concepts/guidelines in the area of Mediation, Early Warning and the ESF have been developed and/or applied in alignment with APSA requirements".</p> <p>Indicator from intervention's proposal:</p> <p>4. ECOWAS instruments and conceptual approaches for fulfilling its mandate in the area of peace and security, e.g. developing the civilian components of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), meet the African Union (AU) requirements for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).</p> | <p>Progress reports to BMZ (For full details on how intervention collects data on indicators, see indicator matrix)</p> | <p>Interviews with Commission staff, intervention staff and external staff</p> <p>Document review of APSA requirements</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair. Data and researcher triangulation to verify information from progress reports to BMZ</p> | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>(Presentation component 3 May 2017)</p> <p>ECOWAS Early Warning and Response System Strategic and Action Plan: 100% - Approved, being implemented;</p> <p>Statutes of the Council of the Wise: 90% - Adopted, On-going implementation;</p> <p>ESF Doctrine: 80% - Validated, awaiting adoption by Member States and MSC respectively;</p> <p>Rostering Election: 100 % - Developed, being implemented;</p> <p>Rostering Civilian Standby Roster: 65% - Developed, currently in population phase;</p> <p>ECOWAS Human Resource Policy and SOPs for Civilian Deployment: 80% - Developed, awaiting adoption + implementation;</p> <p>ESF Civilian Policy Framework Document: 100% - Developed, being implemented;</p> <p>ESF Conduct and Discipline Framework: 80% - Developed, awaiting adoption + implementation;</p> <p>Long-term Election Observation Handbook: 100%- Approved, being utilised.</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Interview 6, 15: The intervention provided support to the elaboration of several instruments in the field of peace and security in alignment with APSA</p> | <p>The indicator from the intervention's proposal has been replaced by a more specific proxy indicator. This indicator is on track, as 8 out of 10 instruments in the field of APSA have been developed and / or adopted</p> | <p>Split the intervention in three so that monitoring adequately reflects all 3 areas of support</p> |
| | | <p>Indicator from intervention's proposal:</p> <p>5. Four trade or fiscal policy recommendations aimed at improving female participation in regional economic processes are discussed in the relevant ECOWAS decision-making bodies.</p> | <p>Progress reports to BMZ (For full details on how intervention collects data on indicators, see indicator matrix)</p> | <p>Interviews with Commission staff, intervention staff and external staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair. Data and researcher triangulation to verify information from progress reports to BMZ</p> | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Results monitor, last consulted 22.09.2017: "On track: Gender study completed and recommendations discussed (09/2016); at least 1 recommendation validated at the TWG level (09/2017)"</p> <p>Interview 3, 18: mainstreaming gender into the intervention's activities is a challenge because gender is not a priority for the partners</p> <p>Interview 11, 15: the introduction of a provision against sexual harassment in the revised staff regulations in an achievement in terms of gender</p> | <p>The indicator on gender is on track but gender is not a high priority for the partner.</p> | |

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| | <p>To what extent is it foreseeable that unachieved goals will be achieved during the current project term?</p> | <p>1. Interviewed stakeholders deem it likely that intervention objective will be achieved by end of intervention 2. Interviewed stakeholder deem it likely that outcome indicators will be achieved by end of intervention a.) Commission staff b.) Intervention staff c.) External stakeholders 3. Prognosis in progress report to BMZ on achievement of objective and indicators</p> | <p>Last Progress report to BMZ</p> | <p>Interviews with Commission staff, intervention staff and external staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair. Data and researcher triangulation to verify information from progress reports to BMZ</p> | <p>Interviews: None of the partners and external stakeholders are familiar with the whole intervention and the outcome indicators. However, interviewed stakeholders confirmed the progress made in the fields of support described in the outcome indicators. Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now Int 4, 12: Capacities of the units and directorates of the Commission working on economic and trade policy and peace and security to steer, monitor and implement processes in their respective fields has improved Int 17, 16, 3: There is not much progress on the capacities developed for steering and monitoring of the whole organization</p> | <p>None of the partners and external stakeholders are familiar with the whole intervention and the outcome indicators. However, interviewed stakeholders confirmed the progress made in the fields of support described in the outcome indicators. Regarding the likelihood that the objective will be achieved, this is partly outside of the intervention's sphere of influence. It depends, among other things, on political will in the member states</p> | |
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| The services implemented by the project successfully contribute to the achievement of the goal agreed upon in the contract. | What concrete contribution does the project make to the achievement of the agreed TC-measures' goal, measured against the goal indicators? | 1. Interviewed stakeholders state that the intervention / the respective units make a concrete contribution of the intervention objective, measured against the indicators a.) Intervention staff b.) Commission staff c.) External stakeholders 2. Description of concrete examples given for the intervention's contribution | / | Interviews with intervention staff, commission staff, external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair. Data and researcher triangulation | Interviews: The contribution of the intervention to strengthen the capacities of the Commission was assessed positively by interview partners. Int 19, 20: Even though the capacities to plan and monitor at the level of the whole organization are still considered weak, relevant instruments are available to the directorate for strategic planning and the monitoring unit because of support from the intervention Int 4, 28, 15: Regarding progress on the capacities of the units and directorates working in the thematic areas, the intervention made a substantial contribution through technical advice, but also through its logistical support and by bridging capacity gaps with embedded advisors | The intervention's objective is partly outside of the sphere of influence. However, to the extent possible, the intervention makes a contribution to the intervention's objective. | |
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| | Which factors in the implementation contribute successfully to the achievement of the project objectives? | <p>1. Success factors of the intervention cited by interviewed stakeholders</p> <p>2. Success factors cited in the intervention's documentation</p> | Progress reports to BMZ, evaluations of EU-funded parts of component 2, documentation of external consultancies carried out in the field of organizational development | Interviews with intervention staff, commission staff, external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair. Data, method and researcher triangulation | <p>Documentation:</p> <p>PPR phase 1: the support in the first phase was important to build trust</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 25: the intervention has embedded advisors, which is crucial for building trust in such a political environment</p> <p>int 11, 15, 16: the intervention bridges capacity gaps in the Commission to bring about results. This favours effectiveness, yet also raises the question whether results achieved by bridging capacity gaps are sustainable. Both embedded and regular GIZ advisors sometimes take over tasks of the partners to ensure progress on certain processes, e.g. drawing up minutes of meetings convened by the partners</p> <p>interview 16, 13, 15, 17: For all three units, partners attest that a high flexibility towards evolving needs of the Commission contributes to the intervention's relevance</p> <p>int 4, 28: Some of the other development partners however question whether the intervention does not go too far in its flexibility towards the Commission</p> <p>int 11: The intervention team itself views a certain degree of flexibility in day to day cooperation as a necessity, because of the highly political environment in which it operates, which is characterized by changing priorities</p> <p>int 11, 15: To the extent possible, emerging requests of the partners are taken into account even if this involves activities that were not initially planned, as long as they contribute to the intervention's objective</p> <p>int 3, 11: Examples for current areas of support that were not part of the initial results matrix include support in the field of human resources by unit one, and support in the field of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework by unit three</p> | Flexibility of the intervention is a key success factor given evolving priorities in a highly political environment Embedded advisors are a success factor for achieving results, but raises question of sustainability | Documentation of lessons learned should be strengthened so that lessons learned on support to processes that have been supported since the predecessor intervention is documented Modes of delivery should be reassessed after the reorganization of the Commission |
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| | What other/alternative reasons contributed to the fact that the objective was achieved or not achieved? | 1. Description of alternative hypotheses cited in interviews 2. Quantative assessment of strength of alternative hypotheses for select impact hypothesis tested through process tracing | / | Interviews with intervention staff, commission staff, external stakeholders | Contribution analysis, process tracing (only for selected impact hypotheses) | Fair. Data triangulation | <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will</p> <p>Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies</p> <p>Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization</p> <p>Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reor-ganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now</p> <p>Regarding introduction of the CET:</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterog-onous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agree-ment with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prereq-uisite, may have played in favour of the CET</p> <p>int 25: In Nigeria there have been protectionist tendencies Since Nigeria is by far the biggest market in the region, its stance on regional economic integration has implica-tions for the whole ECOWAS</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of gov-ernments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials</p> <p>On support processes in the field of peace and security:</p> <p>int 15: the intervention's measures made a valuable contribution to avert situations of conflict or instability</p> <p>int 4, 8, 28: ECOWAS to be rather strong in Early Warning and Mediation, and weaker in its capability to deploy forces</p> <p>int 28: participation in deployment missions comes at a higher financial cost for member states than participation in Early Warning and Mediation efforts. They also come with the risk of loss of human life. In this regard, ECOWAS member states may have less incentives to participate in ECOWAS missions than in UN missions for several reasons. First, UN missions are better paid and better equipped than ECOWAS missions. Second, unlike UN peacekeeping missions, missions of the ECOWAS Standby Force may have an offensive man-date, which potentially comes with a higher risk to the participating soldiers. These aspects affect member states' political will to participate in ECOWAS deployment missions</p> <p>int 28, 29: the assessment that the capability to deploy forces is weak has to be put into perspective: several interview partners pointed out that ECOWAS is in this regard stronger than other RECs in the continent</p> <p>int 4, 28, 18: In the field of Early Warning and Mediation, interview partners perceive the ECOWAS Commission as a stakeholder that manages to have an incidence at a high political level, which contributes to the success of the regional organization's mediation efforts</p> <p>int 18: In this regard, ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalizing collective conflict pre-vention and management</p> | The fact that the intervention's objective is partly outside of the sphere of influence affects progress towards the objective. Political will in the member states play out differently on different support processes, e.g. protectionist tendencies in Nigeria and a lack of knowledge in the member states about potential impacts of the CET may have delayed the introduction of the CET. In the field of peace and security, there is more support for conflict prevention and mediation than for deployment of forces, because the cost is not as high | Make studies on the impact of CET more widely available |
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| | Are core, support and management processes designed in such a way that they contribute to the achievement of the objective? | 1. Strengths and weaknesses of core, support and management processes according to different stakeholders a.) Intervention staff b.) Partners c.) External stakeholders | / | Self-evaluation of intervention (to be presented during the mission), Interviews with intervention staff, commission staff, external stakeholders including GLZ staff from regional office or other projects | Contribution analysis | Fair. Data triangulation | Interviews: int 11, 18: Attunement to evolving needs of the partners is mainly ensured through informal coordination in day to day work between the units and their respective counterparts at the level of the ECOWAS Commission. The only unit which has a formal steering committee with the partners is the trade and customs unit. In unit two and three, exchange with the partners is facilitated by the fact that the intervention has embedded advisors with offices located directly in the Commission. In addition, the intervention supports the annual retreats of some of the directorates and is invited to attend these, thereby gaining a good understanding of the partners' priorities in a more structured setting | There is no steering committee for the overall intervention, only for unit 2. However, the intervention's close access to the partners ensure that it is highly attuned to the partner's priorities, which is favourable for contributing to the achievement of the objective | |
| | To what extent have risks (see also Safeguards & Gender) and assumptions of the Theory of Change been addressed in the implementation and steering of the project? | | | | | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation | Document analysis: Risks are not explicitly addressed in the ToC, but in the intervention's proposal. Interviews: The intervention could provide various examples for addressing risks and assumptions in implementation and steering, e.g. int 5: no political mandate for protocol monitoring, therefore focus instead on putting the protocols on the ECOWAS website int 15: usaid provides massive support package in the field of Early Warning, therefore need for the intervention to reassess its own support in this area | The risks and assumptions are adequately addressed in the implementation and steering of the project | |
| The occurrence of additional/ not formally agreed positive results and unintended negative results was assessed and adequately addressed where required. | Refers to Option A, Sustainability (determination of interactions in effectiveness and impact): | | | | | | | | |
| | To what extent were risks of unintended results assessed as observation fields by the monitoring system (e.g. compass)? | 1. Description of observation of risks in the intervention's workflow 2. Description of mitigations strategies adopted towards risks by intervention | Intervention proposal, progress reports | Interviews with intervention staff and partners | Contribution analysis | Limited | Document analysis: The monitoring system of the intervention does not include an observation of risks. Interviews: The intervention could cite various unintended results, e.g. int 18: introduction of CET adversely affects pharma sector int 3, 6: by prevention and management of election related crises in Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin | The project documentation does not adequately capture the complexity of the intervention | Split intervention in three to make steering, implementation and monitoring more manageable |

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| | To what extent have the project's benefits produced results that were unintended? | 1. Description of unintended results a.) Unit 1 (Organizational development) b.) Unit 2 (Trade and customs) c.) Unit 3 (Peace and security) | Progress reports to BMZ, evaluations of EU-funded parts of component 2 | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Fair. Data triangulation | Unit 3, 6: by prevention and management of election related crises in Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin | The intervention's documentation does not capture all intended results it is per se difficult to measure the results of measures in the field of conflict prevention, since it is not known how a given situation would have turned out in the absence of these measures. Interview partners consulted however stated that the intervention's measures made a valuable contribution to avert situations of conflict or instability | Split intervention in three to make steering, implementation and monitoring more manageable |
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| | Which positive or negative unintended results (economic, social, ecological) does the project produce? Is there any identifiable tension between the ecological, economic and social dimensions? | 1. Unintended positive or negative results according to interview partners 2. Forecasted effects of CET and EPA on population of ECOWAS member states according to CET | Progress reports to BMZ, external evaluation of EU-funded part of component 2 | Analysis of literature on forecasted effects of CET and EPA, interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Limited | <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> | The CET potentially adversely affects the welfare balance of some ECOWAS member states. There is a potential tension between the development mandate of GIZ, and German and European political interests towards moving forward with the CET as a precondition for the EPA. | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available |
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| | How were negative unintended results and interactions counteracted and synergies exploited? What measures were taken? | 1. Description of mitigations strategies towards unintended results according to intervention team 2. Description of exploitation of synergies according to different stakeholders a.) Intervention staff b.) Partners c.) Other GIZ projects, PTB and other donors | Progress reports to BMZ | Interviews with intervention staff and other GIZ staff and other donors | Contribution analysis | Limited. Potential for bias of interviewed stakeholders, can be mitigated through probing, e.g. asking for concrete examples | int 18: the intervention is providing advisory services to the pharma sector to ensure adverse effects of the CET can be mitigated | The intervention is aware of the need to take remedial action regarding unintended negative results | Make studies on the impact of CET more widely available |
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| Impact | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| The announced superordinate long-term results have occurred or are foreseen (should be plausibly explained). | To which superordinate results should the project contribute (cf. module and programme proposal, if no individual measure; indicators, identifiers, narrative)? | Impact indicator from intervention proposal: 1. Two thirds of the export-oriented companies surveyed state that the general conditions for cross-border trade in ECOWAS have improved by one level in selected key areas (customs duties, administrative procedures, quality infrastructure). | Narrative assessment of progress towards indicator in progress report, data collection is only foreseen at the end of the intervention | Interview with intervention staff and external actors, including interview with representative from National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) | Contribution analysis | Low | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>PPT Presentation of unit 2 for the kick-off of the evaluation: Indicator partially achieved; national priorities affect the implementation of ECOWAS trade policies. Remarks: Baseline: 73 companies; tariffs ≥59 co; admin ≥42 co; QI ≥20. Additional Info: 2017: 27 companies surveyed. Tariffs: 7 Companies – no difficulties; 3 Companies – difficulties Admin 20 companies – satisfactory or worse; 2 companies – good or excellent 48% of respondents rated the general cross-border procedures in the region as good or satisfactory. 62% of respondents indicate that cross border procedures have improved in the last three years. 15% of respondents have little or no information about the CET and the ETLS.</p> <p>114 questionnaires were filled out by traders, freight forwarders, government officials, civil society representatives from 11 MS. 68% of respondents rated the general cross-border procedures in the region as bad and very bad. Almost half of the respondents face problems with customs duties. 58% have little or no information about the CET, more than half of the respondents didn't know about the ETLS.</p> <p>2016: 114 companies surveyed. Tariffs: 55 Companies – no difficulties; 59 Companies – difficulties Admin 93 companies – satisfactory or worse; 21 companies – good or excellent 2015: 73 Companies surveyed Tariffs: 59 companies no difficulties; 14 companies – difficulties Admin: 31 companies satisfactory or worse; 42 companies good or excellent QI: 53 companies satisfactory or worse; 20 companies good or excellent</p> <p>Interviews: int 7, 8, 18: introduction of CET has improved conditions for cross-border trade, but full implementation not yet achieved int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials</p> | Indicator is on track. Overall indicators do not reflect complexity of the intervention | Split intervention in three to make planning, steering and monitoring more manageable |

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| | | Impact indicator from intervention proposal: 2. The Common External Tariff is correctly applied to 75% of imports into ECOWAS. | Assessment of progress towards indicator in progress report | Consultation of trade statistics, Interview with intervention staff, partners and external actors, | Contribution analysis | High | Interviews: int 7, 8, 18: compliance with CET at the borders difficult to monitor because lack of political will in the member states. Substantial progress, but full implementation not yet achieved int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials int 7, 8: Challenges to the application of the CET at the borders are partly explained by lack of awareness of the pri-vate sector, and by a lack of knowledge of customs officials | Indicator is on track but political will for monitoring implementation of CET in the member states is low | |
| | | Impact indicator from intervention proposal: 3. 75% of the representatives from civil society organisations in the region rate their opportunities to help shape regional processes in the areas of public revenue (for in-stance in the harmonisation of tax systems) and conflict prevention (for instance in the early warning and mediation of conflicts) as 'good'. | Assessment of progress towards indicator in progress report | Interview with CSO representatives | Contribution analysis | Low | Document review: Porgress report: Indicator was not yet measured. The ECOWAS Early Warning System integrates civil society organisations systematically in the identification, analysis and resolution of conflicts. Interviews Int 6: C3 would most likely need to develop a proxy indicator that will enable measuring of the possibility to influence processes at the national level. int 18: no csos working in the field of public revenue could be identified | Indicator not on track regarding public revenue, on track regarding conflict prevention | Involve CSOs in future support in the area of trade and customs |

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| | | 4. Analysis of the potential impact of the introduction of the CET on different segments / nations of the population of ECOWAS member states | Narrative assessment in annual report to BMZ | Analysis of academic literature, Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> | <p>The CET potentially adversely affects the welfare balance of some ECOWAS member states.</p> <p>There is a potential tension between the development mandate of GIZ, and German and European political interests towards moving forward with the CET as a precondition for the EPA.</p> | <p>Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available</p> |
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| To what extent will the project contribute to the implementation of the Agenda 2030/to the SDGs? | 1. Assessment of contribution of the intervention to SDGs / Agenda 2030 | Progress reports, evaluation of EU-funded part of component 2 | Interviews with intervention staff and partners | Contribution analysis, Comparison between partner strategy and results model, document analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | Document analysis: Annual progress report to BMZ: measures in the field of organizational development contribute to support the ECOWAS Commission in taking on a stronger role in a West African multi-stakeholder landscape in line with SDG 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Trade facilitation and harmonization of processes and the reduction of tariff barriers positively influence trade, employment and income in the ECOWAS member states. In this sense, the ECOWAS Commission is strengthened in its contribution to the SDGs 8 ("Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all") and 17 ("Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development"). Measures in the field of peace and security contribute to avoid and reduce conflicts in the region and to secure peace, which positively influences the framework conditions for an improvement of living standards of the population. Thereby, these measures contribute to SDG 16 ("Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"). The intervention also links the improvement of living conditions of the ECOWAS population to SDG 1 ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere") and SDG 10 ("Reduce inequality within and among countries") | The intervention's contribution to the SDGs is plausible, except inclusive growth aspect of SDG because of potentially adverse effect of CET on welfare balance of some member states Gap between advisory services at the level of the ECOWAS Commission and target group (whole population of ECOWAS member states) is quite big | Reassess target group definition Conduct analysis of impacts of CET on different segments of society |
| Which dimensions of sustainability (economic, social) does the project affect at impact level? Were there positive synergies on the three levels? | 1. Narrative assessment of economic and social sustainability | Progress reports | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners, Analysis of academic literature of the introduction of CET on ECOWAS member states | Contribution analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | Literature review: Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods Interviews: int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization | CET may disadvantage poorer member states that rely on the import of foodstuffs from outside the region. While losses in some areas may be justified if outweighed by overall gains, an analysis of potential impacts of the CET on the welfare balance should have been conducted prior to supporting the CET, so as to ensure that remedial actions can be taken for countries whose welfare balance is adversely affected. | conduct analysis of CET on different segments of society |
| 'Leave No One Behind': To what extent have targeted marginalised groups (such as women, children, young people, the elderly, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, refugees, IDPs and migrants, people living with HIV/AIDS and the poorest of the poor) been reached and is there evidence of the results achieved at target group level? | 5. Analysis of the potential impact of the introduction of the CET on different segments / nations of the population of ECOWAS member states | Narrative assessment in annual report to BMZ | Analysis of academic literature, Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | Interviews: int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization | In light of the "no one left behind" principle, the evaluation team finds an analysis of potential impacts of the CET on the welfare balance should have been conducted prior to supporting the CET, so as to ensure that remedial actions can be taken for countries whose welfare balance is adversely affected | |

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| The project contributed to the intended superordinate long-term results. | To what extent is it plausible that the results of the project on the output and outcome levels (project goal) contribute to the superordinate results? (contribution-analysis approach) | 1. Narrative assessment of contribution of intervention to program objective ("The steering, implementation and monitoring of decisions taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of economic and trade policy and peace and security policy are improved.") | Narrative assessment in annual report to BMZ | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | A proper clarification between the difference of the intervention's objective (outcome) and the program objective (impact) needs to be established at the beginning of the evaluation mission for an assessment of the progress towards the program objective to provide added value | Interviews: the assessment of the achievement of the intervention's objective has to differentiate between the different levels at which the intervention intends to bring about change Int 7, 8, 13, 24, 17: Regarding introduction of the CET, the intervention's technical support to the Commission, sensitization of different stakeholders and trainings for customs authorities were all deemed important Int 15: partners stated that the intervention has made a contribution to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention through its support, especially the financing of several long-term election observers, and the sensitization of media and political parties in member states on hate speech and identity politics | The intervention's objective and the programme objective are closely intertwined. The achievement of both depends largely on political will in the member states. This underscores a challenge inherent in the planning of GIZ interventions supporting the capacity development of regional organisations. In results-oriented development cooperation, a project is considered successful if its outputs are used by the partner and this brings about changes at the level of the final beneficiaries. Results-oriented planning shall reflect this ambition. If the partner is a regional organisation, however, whether policies are implemented only partly depends on capacities and ownership for policies at the level of the immediate counterpart of the intervention (in this case, the Commission). Implementation of policies is highly dependent on the political will of the member states of the regional organisation. Against this background, there are two options for planning an intervention: 1.) formulating an objective that is within the sphere of influence of the intervention, but which is not results-oriented because it does not take into account whether policies developed are implemented, or 2.) formulating a results-oriented objective that is partly outside of the intervention's sphere of influence. This intervention has opted for the latter, which needs to be taken into account in the assessment of the achievement of the objective. | |
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| | What are the alternative explanations/reasons for the results observed? (e.g. the activities of other stakeholders) | 1. Narrative assessment of reasons for results observed a. Global / regional / national economic or political developments b. Activities of other stakeholders | Evaluation of EU-funded component of unit 2 | Interviews with partners, intervention staff and external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET</p> <p>int 25: In Nigeria there have been protectionist tendencies. Since Nigeria is by far the biggest market in the region, its stance on regional economic integration has implications for the whole ECOWAS</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials</p> <p>On support processes in the field of peace and security:</p> <p>int 28: participation in deployment missions comes at a higher financial cost for member states than participation in Early Warning and Mediation efforts. They also come with the risk of loss of human life. In this regard, ECOWAS member states may have less incentives to participate in ECOWAS missions than in UN missions for several reasons. First, UN missions are better paid and better equipped than ECOWAS missions. Second, unlike UN peacekeeping missions, missions of the ECOWAS Standby Force may have an offensive mandate, which potentially comes with a higher risk to the participating soldiers. These aspects affect member states' political will to participate in ECOWAS deployment missions</p> <p>int 28, 29: the assessment that the capability to deploy forces is weak has to be put into perspective: several interview partners pointed out that ECOWAS is in this regard stronger than other RECs in the continent</p> <p>int 4, 28, 18: In the field of Early Warning and Mediation, interview partners perceive the ECOWAS Commission as a stakeholder that manages to have an incidence at a high political level, which contributes to the success of the regional organization's mediation efforts</p> <p>int 18: In this regard, ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalizing collective conflict prevention and management</p> <p>int 6: USAID / US State Dept has introduced a substantial support package in the field of Early Warning</p> | The achievement of both the intervention's objective and the programme objective depend on external factors, most notably political will in the member states Massive USAID support package has potential to influence results in the field of Early Warning | Reassess the intervention's support to Early Warning to avoid duplication with USAID |
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| | To what extent do changes in the framework conditions influence superordinate long-term results? | 1. Description of framework conditions that influence impacts a. Political or economic developments b. Activities of other stakeholders c. Institutional environment of the partner (e.g. hiring freeze, reorganization process) | Evaluation of EU-funded component of unit 2 | Interviews with partners, intervention staff and external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will</p> <p>Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies</p> <p>Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization</p> <p>Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now</p> <p>Regarding introduction of the CET:</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET</p> <p>int 25: In Nigeria there have been protectionist tendencies. Since Nigeria is by far the biggest market in the region, its stance on regional economic integration has implications for the whole ECOWAS</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials</p> <p>On support processes in the field of peace and security:</p> <p>int 15: the intervention's measures made a valuable contribution to avert situations of conflict or instability</p> <p>int 4, 8, 28: ECOWAS to be rather strong in Early Warning and Mediation, and weaker in its capability to deploy forces</p> <p>int 28: participation in deployment missions comes at a higher financial cost for member states than participation in Early Warning and Mediation efforts. They also come with the risk of loss of human life. In this regard, ECOWAS member states may have less incentives to participate in ECOWAS missions than in UN missions for several reasons. First, UN missions are better paid and better equipped than ECOWAS missions. Second, unlike UN peacekeeping missions, missions of the ECOWAS Standby Force may have an offensive mandate, which potentially comes with a higher risk to the participating soldiers. These aspects affect member states' political will to participate in ECOWAS deployment missions</p> <p>int 28, 29: the assessment that the capability to deploy forces is weak has to be put into perspective: several interview partners pointed out that ECOWAS is in this regard stronger than other RECs in the continent</p> <p>int 4, 28, 18: In the field of Early Warning and Mediation, interview partners perceive the ECOWAS Commission as a stakeholder that manages to have an incidence at a high political level, which contributes to the success of the regional organization's mediation efforts</p> <p>int 18: In this regard, ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalizing collective conflict prevention and management</p> | The achievement of both the intervention's objective and the programme objective depend on external factors, most notably political will in the member states, but also institutional environment of the partner (weak absorption capacities, hiring freeze, reorganization process) Massive USAID support package has potential to influence results in the field of Early Warning | Reassess the intervention's support to Early Warning to avoid duplication with USAID Reassess modes of delivery after reorganization |
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| | <p>To what extent is the effectiveness of the development measures positively or negatively influenced by other policy areas, strategies or interests (German ministries, bilateral and multilateral development partners)? What are the consequences of the project?</p> | <p>1. Analysis of influence of government consultations between German Government and ECOWAS on the effectiveness of the intervention 2. Analysis of interests of the EU with regard to advancing the EPA on the effectiveness of the intervention (e.g. absorption and coordination capacity of partners)</p> | <p>Evaluation of EU-funded component of unit 2, annual reports to BMZ</p> | <p>interview with AA representative at the German Embassy, interview with EU representative, partners and other donors</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair</p> | <p>Document analysis: Intervention proposal of predecessor intervention makes explicit reference to the EPA, the proposal for the current intervention does not 10 mio EU-cofinancing goes to the trade and customs unit of the intervention, which supports the introduction of the CET Interviews: int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET Int 25: EU, also through its cofinancing of SEDIN and the ECOWAS project, is lobbying for the EPA. In the end however the EPA and the CET are not that different. What is significant is that Nigeria (and a smaller country, forgot which) can block EPA as they have never signed it. Nigeria however has signed up for CET, so they can only block it de facto by not following up on implementation, but they can hardly block it officially.</p> | <p>There is a potential tension between the development mandate of GIZ, and German and European political interests towards moving forward with the CET as a precondition for the EPA.</p> | <p>Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available</p> |
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| | <p>To what extent has the project made an active and systematic contribution to widespread impact? (4 dimensions: relevance, quality, quantity, sustainability; scaling-up approaches: vertical, horizontal, functional or combined)? If not, could there have been potential? Why was the potential not exploited?</p> | <p>1. Narrative assessment of the of the leverage effect of the EU-cofinancing to achieve quality and sustainability</p> | <p>External evaluation report on EU co-financed part of unit 2, annual and mid-term reports to EU</p> | <p>Interviews with external actors, donors and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair</p> | <p>Document analysis: 10 mio EU-cofinancing goes to the trade and customs unit of the intervention, which supports the introduction of the CET For unit two, trade and customs, an additional results model has been elaborated for the part co-financed by the European Union. The impacts, outcomes and outputs formulated therein are different than in the results model for unit two elaborated on the basis of the BMZ results matrix. However, as measures carried out in unit two under EU financing and measures carried out under BMZ financing are closely intertwined, Interviews: int 3, 18, 24: eu-cofinancing was instrumental for achieving results in the field of trade and customs int 3: the actual costs incurred by BMZ to leverage the 10 mio. Euro cofinancing amount to roughly 3 mio Euro. This is much higher than the BMZ contribution defined in the cofinancing agreement. This substantial discrepancy stems from the fact that the BMZ contribution defined in the cofinancing agreement only takes into account expenses that can be billed under the EU indirect management agreement. Certain costs, including ZAS and overhead costs beyond a certain threshold, cannot be billed under this agreement. However, since these costs still arise, they have to be borne from the BMZ budget</p> | <p>eu-cofinancing was instrumental for achieving results in the field of trade and customs</p> | |
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| | Referring to the three dimensions of sustainability (economic, ecological, social): How was it ensured that synergies were exploited in the three dimensions? What measures were taken? (-> discussion of interactions in the sense of trade-offs below for unintended results) | 1. The intervention has carried out an analysis of potential trade-offs between economic and social impacts | / | Interviews with intervention staff | Contribution analysis | Limited | <p>Document analysis: Intervention's proposal: The intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker) GIZ guidelines on OECD and BMZ markers (2014): The BMZ criteria to award the MSA marker include "Poor people in the region/the country benefit to a significant degree from the indirect project results", "Key mechanisms are in place for participation by the poor in political and societal decision-making pro-cesses" and "Plausible results chain between the measure and improvement in the lives of the poor"</p> <p>Interviews int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past int 3: no studies on how the CET might affect welfare in the different member states were conducted at the outset of the intervention</p> | Given that the intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), the evaluation team finds that an analysis of how poor people in the region are affected by results would have been called for | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available |
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| Unintended superordinate long-term (positive or negative) results have occurred. | Which unintended positive and/or negative results/changes at the level of superordinate results can be observed in the wider sectoral and regional environment of the development measure (e.g. cross-cutting issues, interactions between the three sustainability dimensions)? | 1. Description of unintended results a.) Positive b.) Negative | / | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 15: the intervention has made a contribution to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention through its support, especially the financing of several long-term election observers, and the sensitization of media and political parties in member states on hate speech and identity politics</p> <p>int 13: cape verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Internal PPT provided by the intervention: low distribution of voter cards (30%) before the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria was detected by long term observers, and it was recommended to sign a peace agreement between the two main political parties because of the charged political atmosphere during the campaign. After intervention by ECOWAS, the election was postponed and an accord was signed by the two main candidates to the presidency in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the conduct of a peaceful election. Eventually 80% of voter cards were distributed by the day of the election, and the elections were largely peaceful</p> <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> | The intervention has contributed to unintended positive results in the field early warning and conflict prevention, e.g. mediation in the 2015 election in Nigeria. In the field of trade and customs, it has contributed to unintended negative results: CET may potentially adversely affect some countries. Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concern for its welfare balance | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states |
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| | To what extent is the (positive or negative) contribution of the project plausible? | 1. Narrative assessment of plausibility of intervention's contribution to unexpected results | / | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, researcher and method triangulation | Int 7, 8, 13, 24, 17: Regarding introduction of the CET, the intervention' technical support to the Commission, sensitization of different stakeholders and trainings for customs au-thorities were all deemed important int 15: partners stated that the intervention has made a contribution to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention through its support, especially the financing of several long-term election observers, and the sensitization of media and political parties in member states on hate speech and identity politics | Intervention's contribution to positive and negative results is plausible | |
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| | What are the alternative explanations/ reasons for the results observed? (e.g. the activities of other stakeholders) | 1. Narrative assessment of reasons for results observed a. Global / regional / national economic or political developments b. Activities of other stakeholders | Evaluation of EU-funded component of unit 2 | Interviews with partners, intervention staff and external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will</p> <p>Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies</p> <p>Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization</p> <p>Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now</p> <p>Regarding introduction of the CET:</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET</p> <p>int 25: In Nigeria there have been protectionist tendencies. Since Nigeria is by far the biggest market in the region, its stance on regional economic integration has implications for the whole ECOWAS</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 25, 26: an external factor affecting implementation of CET at the borders are instances of bribery between businesses and customs officials</p> <p>On support processes in the field of peace and security:</p> <p>int 15: the intervention's measures made a valuable contribution to avert situations of conflict or instability</p> <p>int 4, 8, 28: ECOWAS to be rather strong in Early Warning and Mediation, and weaker in its capability to deploy forces</p> <p>int 28: participation in deployment missions comes at a higher financial cost for member states than participation in Early Warning and Mediation efforts. They also come with the risk of loss of human life. In this regard, ECOWAS member states may have less incentives to participate in ECOWAS missions than in UN missions for several reasons. First, UN missions are better paid and better equipped than ECOWAS missions. Second, unlike UN peacekeeping missions, missions of the ECOWAS Standby Force may have an offensive mandate, which potentially comes with a higher risk to the participating soldiers. These aspects affect member states' political will to participate in ECOWAS deployment missions</p> <p>int 28, 29: the assessment that the capability to deploy forces is weak has to be put into perspective: several interview partners pointed out that ECOWAS is in this regard stronger than other RECs in the continent</p> <p>int 4, 28, 18: In the field of Early Warning and Mediation, interview partners perceive the ECOWAS Commission as a stakeholder that manages to have an incidence at a high political level, which contributes to the success of the regional organization's mediation efforts</p> <p>int 18: In this regard, ECOWAS draws a certain prestige from its pioneer role in formalizing collective conflict prevention and management</p> | The achievement of both the intervention's objective and the programme objective depend on external factors, most notably political will in the member states, but also institutional environment of the partner (weak absorption capacities, hiring freeze, reorganization process) Massive USAID support package has potential to influence results in the field of Early Warning | Reassess the intervention's support to Early Warning to avoid duplication with USAID Reassess modes of delivery after reorganization |
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| No project-related negative results have been observed – and the project responded adequately if any negative results were determined at any time. | Have negative results occurred? | 1. Description of unintended results b.) Negative | / | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>int 13: cape verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 13, int 7: the pharma sector is adversely affected by CET,</p> <p>int 13: the intervention is providing advisory services to mitigate adverse affects of the CET on the pharma sector</p> | Negative results have occurred regarding the CET. Cape Verde is currently not implementing CET out of concern for its welfare balance, and the pharma sector is adversely affected by tariffs | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states |
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| | <p>To what extent were the risks of negative, unintended, superordinate results identified and assessed in the monitoring system? To what extent were these negative results in the sense of (negative) interactions or trade-offs in the ecological, economic and social dimensions already known during the conception of the project and reflected (e.g. in the module or programme proposal)?</p> | <p>1. Risks are included in the intervention's monitoring systems 2. Risks are addressed with the partners and / or other donors</p> | <p>Results Models, Impact Monitor</p> | <p>Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors</p> | | | <p>Document analysis: Risks are not included in the intervention's monitoring system (results model or impact monitor) Interviews: Int 15: The Cape Verde situation is discussed with the partner</p> | <p>There is no formal monitoring of risks in the intervention's monitoring system, but the intervention is identifying risks and addressing them with the partners</p> | |
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| | Was there a corresponding risk assessment in the TC-measures' proposal? How was the ability to influence these risks originally assessed? | 1. The intervention's proposal includes a risk assessment 2. The risks cited in the risk assessment correspond to the risks cited by interview partners 3. Description of mitigation measures by the intervention towards risks | Intervention's proposal | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Fair, data triangulation | <p>Document analysis: The intervention's proposal includes a risk assessment: "Ein erstes Risiko liegt in einem nachlassenden politischen Willen der ECOWAS-Mitgliedstaaten, die fortschreitende regionale Integration (etwa die Einführung des CET) voranzutreiben. [...] Im Hinblick auf das Monitoring der Umsetzung von Vereinbarungen der ECOWAS auf nationaler Ebene besteht ein Risiko, dass Politiker und Beamte aus den ECOWAS-Mitgliedstaaten – ggf. aufgrund eines geringen Zielerreichungsgrads – eine zu große Transparenz dieser Ergebnisse fürchten. Ein weiteres Risiko besteht darin, dass fortlaufende Prozesse der Organisationsreform in der ECOWAS-Kommission, etwa die Erhöhung der Anzahl an Kommissaren, andere Reformen der regionalen Integration verlangsamen oder gar blockieren bzw. das Augenmerk von notwendigen Verbesserungen des internen Managements in der Kommission ablenken. Besondere Risiken liegen im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit. [...] Es besteht ein geringes Risiko, dass die beabsichtigte Kombifinanzierung mit der EU über zusätzliche 10.000.000 EUR nicht zustande kommt." (...) "Auch aufgrund ihres politischen Charakters ist die Beeinflussbarkeit der Risiken durch das EZ-Programm gering."</p> <p>Interviews: Int 19: The Commission has been understaffed since the beginning of the intervention Int 16: Corruption may impede compliance with revised staff regulations Int 3, int 6: The commitment of partners in the field of peace and security does not always meet expectations of the partners Int 3, 23, 28: Commission staff is traveling all the time, there is an incentive for them to do that because of high per diems, this adversely affects their availability Int 25, 26: protectionist tendencies in Nigeria have slowed down the CET process interview 16, 13, 15, 17: For all three units, partners attest that a high flexibility towards evolving needs of the Commission contributes to the intervention's being highly attuned to political priorities in the Commission int 3,11: Because of the embedded advisors and the special advisor to the vp, the intervention has a good understanding of political priorities of the partner</p> | The risks described in the intervention's proposal and annual reports correspond to the risks described by interview partners. It was already set forth in the proposal that the risks are largely outside of the intervention's control because of highly political character. However, through its modes of delivery, the intervention has a good understanding of political priorities and can adapt its implementation accordingly, focussing its support on areas for which there is political momentum | |
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| | <p>To what extent have the project's services caused negative (unintended) results (economic, social, ecological)? Is there any identifiable tension between the ecological, economic and social dimensions?</p> <p>o Economically: Impairment of competitiveness, employability, etc.</p> <p>o Socially: How should the impact be assessed in terms of distributive results, non-discrimination and universal access to social services and social security systems? To what extent can particularly disadvantaged population groups benefit from the results or have negative results for particularly disadvantaged population groups been created?</p> <p>o Ecologically: What are the positive or negative environmental impacts of the project?</p> | <p>1. Description of unintended results b.) Negative 2. Narrative assessment of intervention's contribution to negative results</p> | / | Interviews with partners, intervention staff and external stakeholders | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Literature review: Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods Interviews: int 13: Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization Int 7, 8, 13, 24, 17: Regarding introduction of the CET, the intervention's technical support to the Commission, sensitization of different stakeholders and trainings for customs authorities were all deemed important</p> | The CET potentially adversely affects the welfare balance of some ECOWAS member states. The intervention has made a contribution to the introduction of CET | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states |
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| | What measures have been taken by the project to counteract the risks/negative interactions? | 3. Description of mitigation measures by the intervention towards risks | Intervention's proposal | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Fair | int 13: the intervention is providing advisory services to mitigate adverse affects of the CET on the pharma sector and is aware of the necessity to take remedial actions regarding the potential impact of the CET on Cape Verde's welfare balance | The intervention is aware of the need to take remedial actions regarding adverse effects in the field of trade and customs | |
| | To what extent have the framework conditions for the negative results played a role? How did the project react to this? | 1. Description of framework conditions that influence impacts a. Political or economic developments b. Activities of other stakeholders c. Institutional environment of the partner (e.g. hiring freeze, reorganization process) 2. Description of mitigation measures by the intervention towards risks | Intervention's proposal | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Fair | Document analysis: Intervention proposal of predecessor intervention makes explicit reference to the EPA, the proposal for the current intervention does not 10 mio EU-cofinancing goes to the trade and customs unit of the intervention, which supports the introduction of the CET Interviews: int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agreement with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prerequisite, may have played in favour of the CET Int 25: EU, also through its cofinancing of SEDIN and the ECOWAS project, is lobbying for the EPA. In the end however the EPA and the CET are not that different. What is significant is that Nigeria (and a smaller country, forgot which) can block EPA as they have never signed it. Nigeria however has signed up for CET, so they can only block it de facto by not following up on implementation, but they can hardly block it officially. int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past int 3: no studies on how the CET might affect welfare in the different member states were conducted at the outset of the intervention | There is a potential tension between the development mandate of GIZ, and German and European political interests towards moving forward with the CET as a precondition for the EPA. Given that the intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), the evaluation team finds that an analysis of how poor people in the region are affected by results would have been called for | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available |

| Efficiency | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| <p>The project's use of resources is appropriate with regard to the outputs achieved.</p> <p>[Production efficiency: Re-sources/Services in accordance with the BMZ]</p> | To what extent are there deviations between the identified costs and the projected costs? What are the reasons for the identified deviation(s)?2) | 1. Description of differences between planned and actual costs 2. Description of reasons for differences between planned and actual costs | Current cost commitment report (forthcoming) | Interview with head of programme, heads of unit and head of administration and finance | Comparison and analysis | Fair | Interviews: Int 3, 31: The programme has experienced massive cash-flow problems, which have forced it to delay some activities as it was not sure whether the money would come. In the end, the money came, but the intervention's ability to plan its activities has been adversely affected | Cash flow problems have affected the intervention's ability to plan activities | |
| | To what extent could the outputs have been maximised with the same amount of resources and under the same framework conditions and with the same or better quality (maximum principle)?3) | 1. Qualitative assessment of possibilities for yield maximization | / | Interviews with intervention staff and partners | analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data and researcher triangulation | Interviews: Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will Int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. interview 16, 13, 15, 17: For all three units, partners attest that a high flexibility towards evolving needs of the Commission contributes to the intervention's being highly attuned to political priorities in the Commission Int 3: the intervention has seized several "windows of opportunity" to achieve results by flexibly accommodating requests for support that were not foreseen in the initial planning, but contribute to the intervention's objective. Most notably, this includes support to HR processes in unit one and support on the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in unit three. Second, the intervention is periodically assessing whether it makes sense to continue support in areas where absorption capacities are particularly weak, and what resources are needed to achieve results. Several years ago, the comparatively weaker absorption capacities and commitment of the partners of unit three led the intervention to reassess its support in the field of peace and security. The intervention decided that support in the field of peace and security would only be continued if the Commission funds a staff position working on the Civilian Component of the ESF. Since the partner has demonstrated a certain degree of commitment by funding this position, support has been continued and the intervention | The intervention's objective is partly outside of the sphere of influence. However, the intervention because the intervention systematically examines on which processes it can make a difference and allocates resources accordingly. It does so for example by seizing windows of opportunity to work on processes for which there is momentum at the Commission. In addition, the intervention examines whether results can be achieved in the context of weak absorption capacities, and has selected its personnel instruments accordingly, by increasing the staff in unit 3 and by working with embedded advisors. | Reexamine modes of delivery after reorganization process |
| | To what extent could outputs have been maximised by reallocating resources between the outputs?3) | 1. Qualitative assessment of possibilities for yield maximization | / | Interviews with intervention staff and partners | analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data and researcher triangulation | | | |
| | Were the output/resource ratio and alternatives carefully considered during the design and implementation process – and if so, how? | 1. The intervention team is able to provide examples for considering the output / resource ratio and alternatives | / | Interviews with intervention staff | Analysis | Limited, difficult to verify | | | |

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| | | | | | | | has also made adaption to its strategy by hiring more staff for unit three to be able to achieve results in this field. In both unit two and three, the intervention employs embedded advisors to bridge capacity gaps int 3,11: Because of the embedded advisors and the special advisor to the vp, the intervention has a good understanding of political priorities of the partner | | |
| | For interim evaluations based on the analysis to date: To what extent are further planned expenditures meaningfully distributed among the targeted outputs? | 1. Qualitative assessment of the plausibility of distribution of planned costs to units / outputs | Current cost commitment report (forthcoming) | Interview with head of programme, heads of unit and head of administration and finance | Analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by researcher triangulation | Document analysis: Cost data: The booking data of the intervention shows that 90 % of the costs are being billed on the units, and 9 % on overarching costs . Looking at the allocation of resources to the different units, the most significant amount of resources, 64 % (14.5 mio EUR) has gone into unit 2, trade and customs. The amount of resources going into unit one and unit three is significantly lower: they account for 13 % (2.9 mio. EUR) of the costs each Interviews: Int 11: Roughly 50 % of measures of unit 1 concern cross-cutting issues not reflected in the outputs. Due to the complexity of the intervention, the organizational development unit has taken on a portfolio management role for the whole intervention. This includes financing of the position of a special advisor to the Vice-President of the Commission, support to the Commission in its efforts to coordinate development partners, support to the Commission's External Relations Department, coordination of trainings, and providing internal advisory services to the intervention to ensure all units are in line with GIZ processes Int 31: , the salary of long-term advisors is always booked entirely onto the respective unit for which they work, even if advisors may partly work on cross-cutting issues that do not directly contribute to the outputs of their unit. This is especially relevant for unit one | The outputs are partly outside of the intervention's sphere of influence, which constitutes a challenge for the analysis of production efficiency. Also, the booking data gives an approximation of distribution of costs to units, but resources booked on unit one only partially contribute to the outputs of unit one, again making it challenging to analyse production efficiency | Split intervention in three to make planning, steering and monitoring more manageable |

| Sustainability | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| <p>Prerequisite for ensuring the long-term success of the project: results are an-chored in (partner) structures</p> | <p>What has the project done to ensure that the intended effect can be achieved in the medium to long term by the partners themselves (working aid re-view)?</p> | <p>1. The project works with the partner in a participatory approach</p> | <p>Documentation of consultancy missions on organizational development by external consultancy</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair, data triangulation possible</p> | <p>Interviews: Int 3, 11, 5, 13, 16: In addition to alignment to ECOWAS policies and priorities and ensures that the Commission is in the lead for the different activities carried out by the intervention Int 11: For example, for the trainings carried out with support of the intervention, the Commission sends out the invitations. This contributes to ownership and strengthens the Commission's profile vis-à-vis member states and external actors Int 11, 15, 6: Both embedded and regular GIZ advisors sometimes take over tasks of the partners to ensure progress on certain processes, e.g. drawing up minutes of meetings convened by the partners Int 5, 16: This flexibility is highly valued by the Commission, for whom this is one of the qualities of the partnership. Int 4, int 28: Some of the other development partners however question whether the intervention does not go too far in its flexibility towards the Commission</p> | <p>The intervention works with a highly participatory approach. Flexibility to bridge capacity gaps is highly appreciated by partners, but may come at expense of sustainability</p> | <p>Reassess modes of delivery after reorganization</p> |
| | <p>Which advisory contents, ap-proaches, methods and concepts of the project are an-chored/institutionalised in the (partner) system?</p> | <p>1. Description of contents, approaches, methods, concepts developed within the intervention a. used by the partners b. not used by the partners</p> | <p>Documentation of consultancy missions on organizational development by external consultancy</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair but risk of limited institutional memory for older advisory contents due to staff turnover</p> | <p>Docuemnt analysis: Progress report 2015: "Es bleibt das Risiko, dass Entscheidungen, wie über den gemeinsamen Außenzoll, zwar auf regionaler Ebene getroffen werden, die Umsetzung auf nationaler Ebene aber verzögert wird oder nicht in vollem Umfang geschieht. Die strukturellen Veränderungen, die durch Vereinheitlichungen wie beim Zoll oder durch den Aufbau eines Monitoringsystems geschaffen wurden, werden eine nachhaltige Wirkung entfalten (Nachhaltigkeit). Das Risiko von politisch bedingten Änderungen oder Nichteinhaltung von Regeln ist in einer Regionalorganisation immer</p> | <p>Key results in the field of trade and customs and peace and security are per default institutionally anchored in the partner's structures as they derive from regional policies. However, weak capacities of the Commission</p> | |

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| | <p>To what extent are they continuously used and/or further developed by the target group and/or implementing partners?</p> | <p>1. Description of contents, approaches, methods, concepts developed within the intervention a. used by the partners b. not used by the partners</p> | <p>Documentation of consultancy missions on organizational development by external consultancy</p> | <p>Interviews with partners and intervention staff</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair but risk of limited institutional memory for older advisory contents due to staff turnover</p> | <p>gegeben. "Document analysis and interviews: The liberalization of trade among member states and the establishment of a common external tariff, supported by unit 2 of the intervention, were already formulated as objectives of the Community in the first ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and the revised Treaty of 1993. The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 expanded the mandate of the organization on peace and security as well as democratic governance, and formally introduced the peace and security observation system and election observers, both of which are supported by unit 3 of the intervention. Interviews: Interview 11: : A key result of unit one, the CSF, has become an official reference document of the ECOWAS Community through its adoption by the Council of Ministers Int 11, 4, 22; Even if policies and frameworks are officially adopted, the capacity to implement them remains weak in some areas. Both the highly political environment and the personnel situation contribute to this</p> | <p>constitute a challenge to sustainability at operational level</p> | |
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| | <p>To what extent are (organisational, personnel, financial, economic) resources and capacities in the partner country (longer-term) available to ensure the continuation of the results achieved (e.g. multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs))?</p> | <p>1. Description of budget of ECOWAS commission and qualitative assessment of appropriateness 2. Description of HR situation of ECOWAS commission and qualitative assessment of appropriateness 3. Assessment of potential repercussions of ECOWAS organizational reform on sustainability</p> | <p>Annual reporting to BMZ, External evaluation EU-funded parts of component 2</p> | <p>Interviews with partners, external stakeholders and intervention staff</p> | <p>Analysis</p> | <p>Fair, data triangulation possible</p> | <p>Document analysis: Intervention proposal: "Trotz aller risikomindernder Maßnahmen bleibt festzustellen, dass die ECOWAS sich überwiegend selbst finanziert und daher nicht „geberabhängig“ ist. Hebelwirkung und Einflussnahme von außen werden begrenzt bleiben und sich vor allem auf einen geduldischen Dialog über notwendige Veränderungsprozesse beschränken." Interviews: Annual progress report to EU on co-financed part of unit 2 of current phase (2015-12): "The Sustainability of the project results is not fully ensured yet and depends very much on the human and institutional capacity of the relevant directorates of the ECOWAS Commission and of the MS. Therefore the project has to extend its stakeholders network to private and civil society organizations." nt 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies Int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization Int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now</p> | <p>The personnel situation and upcoming change of management accompanying the reorganization at the level of the Commission will potentially affect the continuation of results achieved at the level of the Commission. At the same time, political will in the member states also plays a role</p> | <p>Reassess modes of delivery after reorganization</p> |
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| | <p>To what extent are mechanisms in place that contribute to the implementation of ECOWAS decisions at member state level?</p> <p>o What is the project's exit strategy?</p> <p>o How are lessons learnt prepared and documented?</p> | <p>1. Description of mechanisms to contribute to implementation of ECOWAS decisions at member state level</p> <p>2. The project has an exit strategy</p> <p>3. Qualitative assessment of the viability of the exit strategy</p> <p>4. The project documents lessons learned</p> <p>5. Description of the documentation and use of lessons learned</p> | / | Interviews with intervention staff and partners | Analysis | Limited | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>In spite of the continuity between the predecessor interventions and the current intervention, lessons learned on processes that have already been supported in previous phases are not well documented. Several indicators of the predecessor intervention closely resembled the indicators of the current phase. However, these indicators were not formulated in exactly the same way, and there is no document that comprehensively documents progress on processes from the start of the predecessor intervention until today</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>Int 3, 11: Implementation of ECOWAS decisions is highly contingent on member states' political will</p> <p>Int 3: Planning of next phase is scheduled for early 2018</p> <p>Int 11: There is room for improvement regarding documentation of lessons learned</p> | <p>The project does not yet have an exit strategy because the planning of the next phase is already scheduled</p> <p>Lessons learned on processes that have already been supported since the predecessor intervention are not well documented</p> | Strengthen documentation of lessons learned |
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| Are the results of the project ecologically, socially and economically balanced? | Evaluation of the outcome results with regard to interactions between the environmental, social and economic dimensions of sustainability | 1. Narrative assessment of economic and social sustainability | Progress reports | Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners, Analysis of academic literature of the introduction of CET on ECOWAS member states | Contribution analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Intervention's proposal: The intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker)</p> <p>GIZ guidelines on OECD and BMZ markers (2014): The BMZ criteria to award the MSA marker include "Poor people in the region/the country benefit to a significant degree from the indirect project results", "Key mechanisms are in place for participation by the poor in political and societal decision-making processes" and "Plausible results chain between the measure and improvement in the lives of the poor"</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural households as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to decrease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>int 13: cape verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterogeneous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 3: no studies on how the CET might affect welfare in the different member states were conducted at the outset of the intervention</p> | The welfare balance of some member states is potentially adversely affected by the CET. , this runs counter to the commitment of comprehensive poverty reduction of an intervention with the BMZ policy marker "MSA". | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available |
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| | Which positive or negative intended and unintended re-sults (economic, social, ecological) does the project produce? (Assign intended and unintended results from the ef-fectiveness evaluation to the three sustainability dimensions) | 1. Description of unintended results a.) Positive b.) Negative | / | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>nterviews:</p> <p>Int 15: the intervention has made a contribution to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention through its support, especially the financing of several long-term election observers, and the sensitization of media and political parties in member states on hate speech and identity politics</p> <p>int 13: cape verde is not implementing CET out of concerns for its welfare balance</p> <p>int 17, 7, 18, 24: member states' commitment to both the adoption and the implementation of CET has been heterog-onous because different member states have different stakes in customs harmonization</p> <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Internal PPT provided by the intervention: low distribution of voter cards (30%) before the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria was de-tected by long term observers, and it was recommended to sign a peace agreement between the two main political parties because of the charged political atmosphere during the campaign. After intervention by ECOWAS, the election was postponed and an accord was signed by the two main candidates to the presi-dency in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the conduct of a peaceful election. Eventually 80% of voter cards were distributed by the day of the election, and the elections were largely peaceful</p> <p>Literature review:</p> <p>Fiamohe et al. (2015): In Benin, the poverty incidence is expected to increase by 3.9 percent for urban and decrease for rural households by 4.6 percent. In Côte d'Ivoire, expected results are mixed comparing urban and rural house-holds as the overall reduction of the poverty incidence by 3.2 percent is driven mainly by the improvement of the rural population's income, while the number of poor urban households increases significantly in their model. For Ghana, their simulations show that the national level of poverty could slightly decline, again mainly due to the reduction in rural poverty. In the case of Guinea, however, Fiamohe et al. (2015) predict a substantial increase in poverty incidence by 10.8 percent, both in urban and rural areas. For Togo, the CET is predicted to have negative effects on poverty incidence in total. Yet, urban poverty was expected to de-crease by 4.9 percent, while a strong increase of 16.6 percent in rural poverty was responsible for the overall increase in poverty levels. At last, Nigeria is predicted to show a minimal expected decrease in poverty of 0.04 percent, with urban households slightly more favored by the reduction of tariffs on rice</p> <p>De Melo and Laski (2014b): Foodstuffs that are largely imported in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Niger received an average tariff of 23 percent before the CET, which is likely going to be raised</p> <p>Melo and Mancellari (2013): moving to the CET would almost double Liberia's average tariff. Hence, tariff revenues would increase while imports would fall. As the majority of imported goods is not produced in Liberia, only few local producers will benefit from this move. Rather, consumers will have to pay higher prices for these goods now coming from other ECOWAS countries. In terms of welfare, urban and rural household would have to spend 3 percent and 6 percent more in order to maintain their level of well-being. The larger increase for rural households reflects the fact their consumption bundle consists to a greater share of tradeable goods</p> | The intervention has contributed to unintended positive results in the field early warning and conflict prevention, e.g. mediation in the 2015 election in Nigeria. In the field of trade and customs, it has contributed to unintended negative results: CET may potentially adversely affect some countries. Cape Verde is not implementing CET out of concern for its welfare balance | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segements of society in the member states |
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| | <p>Is there any identifiable tension between the ecological, eco-nomic and social dimensions?</p> <p>o Economically: Impairment of competitiveness, employability, etc.</p> <p>o Socially: How should the impact be assessed in terms of distributive results, non-discrimination and universal access to social services and social security systems? To what extent can particularly dis-advantaged population groups benefit from the results or have negative results for particularly dis-advantaged population groups been created?</p> <p>o Ecologically: What are the positive or negative environmental impacts of the project?</p> | 5. Analysis of the potential impact of the introduction of the CET on different segments / nations of the population of ECOWAS member states | / | Analysis of academic literature, Interviews with intervention staff, external actors and partners | Contribution analysis | Limited as causal chains to achieve impacts at level of final beneficiaries are quite long | <p>Document analysis: Intervention proposal of predecessor intervention makes explicit reference to the EPA, the proposal for the current intervention does not</p> <p>10 mio EU-cofinancing goes to the trade and customs unit of the intervention, which supports the introduction of the CET</p> <p>Interviews:</p> <p>int 7: In some countries, the prospect of the European Partnership Agreement (EPA), a free-trade agree-ment with the EU for which the establishment of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a prereq-uisite, may have played in favour of the CET</p> <p>Int 25: EU, also through ist cofinancing of SEDIN and the ECOWAS project, is lobbying for the EPA. In the end however the EPA and the CET are not that different. What is significant is that Nigeria (and a smaller country, forgot which) can block EPA as they have never signed it. Nigeria however has signed up for CET, so they can only block it de facto by not following up on implementation, but they can hardly block it officially.</p> <p>int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past</p> <p>int 3: no studies on how the CET might affect welfare in the different member states were conducted at the outset of the intervention</p> | <p>There is a potential tension between the development mandate of GIZ, and German and European political interests towards moving forward with the CET as a precondition for the EPA. Given that the intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), the evaluation team finds that an analysis of how poor people in the region are affected by results would have been called for</p> | <p>Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available</p> |
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| | If negative interactions have been avoided and synergies exploited, how was this ensured? What measures were taken? | 1. Description of measures taken by the intervention to avoid negative interactions 2. Description of measures taken by the intervention to create synergies | Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports, midterm report and external evaluation report of EU-funded part of unit 2 | Interviews with intervention staff | Contribution analysis | Fair | Document analysis: Intervention's proposal: The intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker) GIZ guidelines on OECD and BMZ markers (2014): The BMZ criteria to award the MSA marker include "Poor people in the region/the country benefit to a significant degree from the indirect project results", "Key mechanisms are in place for participation by the poor in political and societal decision-making processes" and "Plausible results chain between the measure and improvement in the lives of the poor" Interviews int 17, 13: a lack of studies on the potential impact of CET by sector / country, and a lack of capacities of governments to analyse potential impact has adversely affected political will towards CET in the past int 3: no studies on how the CET might affect welfare in the different member states were conducted at the outset of the intervention | Given that the intervention is classified as contributing to comprehensive poverty reduction (MSA marker), the evaluation team finds that an analysis of how poor people in the region are affected by results would have been called for | Conduct more analysis on the impact of CET on different segments of society in the member states, make information more widely available |
| <u>Forecast of durability</u> : Results of the project are permanent, stable and long-term resilient | To what extent are the results of the project durable, stable and resilient in the longer-term under the given conditions? | 1. Qualitative assessment of aspects that foster or hinder sustainability a.) Ownership of the partners for services or tools developed within the intervention b.) Budget and HR endowment of Commission c.) Staff turnover / reorganization of Commission d.) Political will of member states | Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports, midterm report and external evaluation report of EU-funded part of unit 2 | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Fair | Document analysis: Intervention proposal: "Trotz aller risikomindernder Maßnahmen bleibt festzustellen, dass die ECOWAS sich überwiegend selbst finanziert und daher nicht „geberabhängig“ ist. Hebelwirkung und Einflussnahme von außen werden begrenzt bleiben und sich vor allem auf einen geduldigen Dialog über notwendige Veränderungsprozesse beschränken." Interviews: int 10, 4, 9: Lack of personnel or personnel which is not qualified affect the Commission's capacity to deliver. In the past, personnel has not always been hired or promoted on the basis of competencies int 11, 10: Because hiring of Commission staff was not always done on the basis of competencies in the past, a hiring freeze has been instigated, which momentarily puts a further strain on the capacity to deliver of some parts of the organization int 10: The reorganization process that is currently underway at the level of the Commission affects steering and monitoring processes supported by the intervention. Like most reorganization processes, the imminent reorganization of the Commission and upcoming renewal of the management team creates uncertainty for staff. This leads to some processes losing momentum until there is clarity | The personnel situation and upcoming change of management accompanying the reorganization at the level of the Commission will potentially affect the continuation of results achieved at the level of the Commission. At the same time, political will in the member states also plays a role | Reassess modes of delivery after reorganization |

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| | <p>What risks and potential are emerging for the long-term protection of the results and how likely are these factors to occur?</p> <p>What has the project done to reduce these risks and exploit potential?</p> | <p>1. Description of risks potentially affecting sustainability</p> <p>2. Assessment of extent to which intervention can influence risks</p> <p>3. Description of mitigation strategies adopted</p> | <p>Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports, midterm report and external evaluation report of EU-funded part of unit 2</p> | <p>Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors</p> | <p>Contribution analysis</p> | <p>Fair</p> | <p>regarding what commitment the future leadership of the organization will have to these processes. This is a reason why the CSF is to a certain extent on hold right now</p> | | |
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| Coordination, coherence, complementarity | | | | | | | | | |
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| Evaluation dimension | Analysis questions | Evaluation indicators / descriptors | Available data sources | Other planned data collection projects | Evaluation strategy (evaluation design, method, procedure) | Expected evidence strength (narrative) | Results | Conclusions | Recommendations |
| Coordination, coherence and complementarity with other donors | To what extent is the intervention (objectives, activities, approaches) coordinated with interventions from other donors? To what extent are there synergies with other donors? | <p>1. Description of other donors active in the relevant fields</p> <p>a.) Organsational development</p> <p>b.) Trade and Customs</p> <p>c.) Peace and security</p> <p>2. Description of coordination mechanisms with other donors and participation of the intervention in these mechanisms</p> <p>3. There are no measures undertaken by both the intervention and other stakeholders, unless there is a plausible reason</p> <p>4. Description of synergies with measures from other donors</p> | Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports, midterm report and external evaluation report of EU-funded part of unit 2 | Interviews with intervention staff, partners and external actors | Contribution analysis | Fair | <p>Document analysis:</p> <p>Programme proposal part A "Zur Stärkung der Geberkoordination wurden Arbeitsgruppen zu bestimmten Themen eingerichtet. Diesen sitzen jeweils die ECOWAS-Kommission und ein Geber vor. Co-Chairs sind Deutschland im Bereich des Capacity Building, die EU auf dem Gebiet der wirtschaftlichen Integration, die Schweiz bei Frieden und Sicherheit sowie Spanien im Hinblick auf die Landwirtschaft. [...] Zur Geberkoordination trägt ebenfalls eine delegierte Kooperation bei, die die GIZ für die EU umsetzen wird. Sie hat ein Volumen von 10 Mio. EUR und eine Laufzeit von 5 Jahren (ab 2014). Maßnahmen, die in diesem Rahmen implementiert werden, fallen in die Bereiche Harmonisierung ECOWAS/UEMOA, Handelsinformationssysteme, gemeinsame Handelspolitik (einschließlich von Trainingsmaßnahmen auf diesem Gebiet), Handelsstatistik, ETLS, CET und fiskalpolitische Maßnahmen."</p> <p>Programme proposal part B: "Das Vorhaben arbeitet eng mit anderen Entwicklungsprogrammen zusammen. Dies umfasst zunächst den Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausch mit den Vorhaben „Unterstützung des EAC-Integrationsprozesses“ (PN 2012.2511.9) bei der ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft (East African Community, EAC) sowie „Stärkung der wirtschafts- und handelspolitischen Kapazitäten und Kompetenzen in der SADC“ (PN 2011.2239.9) bei der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des südlichen Afrika (Southern African Development Community, SADC)."</p> <p>"Zudem bestehen Potenziale der Zusammenarbeit mit Vorhaben zur Förderung der nachhaltigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung in einzelnen ECOWAS-Mitgliedstaaten. Dies wird beispielhaft bei der Kooperation mit der TZ-Maßnahme „Breitenwirksame Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderung“ in Nigeria (PN 2010.2046.0) deutlich. [...] Ein fruchtbarer Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausch besteht mit anderen Vorhaben zur Unterstützung der APSA. [...] Hervorzuheben ist die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Programm zur Unterstützung des Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centres (KAIPTC) in Ghana (PN 2012.2031.8)."</p> <p>Last progress report to BMZ: "Die ECOWAS koordiniert, wie in den letzten Berichten beschrieben, die Geber nur unzureichend oder gar nicht. Auch koordinieren sich die Geber untereinander – bis auf wenige Ausnahmen – kaum. [...] Die ECOWAS Capacity Building Thematic Working Group, bei der Deutschland den Co-Vorsitz hat, hat sich im Berichtszeitraum zweimal auf Initiative Deutschlands und durch Einladung des Vizepräsidenten der ECOWAS getroffen. Allerdings ist mit Ausnahme von EU und Spanien die Teilnahme und das Interesse anderer Geber gering und sporadisch."</p> <p>"Mit den beiden bilateralen Vorhaben in Ghana "Sustainable Economic Development" (PN 2015.2108.4) und "Good Financial Governance" (PN 2015.2090.7) findet ein enger Austausch statt, um die Verzahnung zwischen bilateralen und regionalen Aktivitäten zu verbessern. [...] Auf panafrikanischer Ebene stimmt sich das Vorhaben eng mit den deutschen EZ-Programmen zur Unterstützung der Afrikanischen Union ab. Das Vorhaben „Regionale Koordination Frieden und Sicherheit in Afrika“ (PN 2012.2040.9) sichert die Verzahnung der im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit tätigen EZ-Programme in Afrika. Seit Februar das vom AA finanzierte Vorhaben „Grenzmanagement in Afrika: From Barriers to Bridges – Support to the African Union Border Program" (PN 2015.9019.9) die Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommission durch den Einsatz einer regionalen LZf in Abuja intensiviert, was auch die engere Abstimmung mit dem Vorhaben ermöglicht."</p> <p>Interviews</p> | <p>The intervention is forthcoming in exchanging information with other development partners. There are synergies through the co-financing with the EU in the field of trade and customs, and with ECORYS in the field of HR. However, there are also potential duplications in the field of Early Warning since USAID has come in with massive support and has not been very forthcoming in exchanging information with other development partners. The intervention is aware to reassess its own support in the field of Early Warning against this background. In addition, risk of duplication with Transtec regarding support to the field of results-oriented planning and monitoring.</p> | Reassess support in the field of Early Warning, exchange info with Transtec on support to results-based planning and monitoring to avoid duplication |

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| | | | | | | | <p>Int 11, 10: Not many other development partners active in the field of organizationla development. The consultancy ECORYS is providing support on HR, the intervention is liasing with ECORYS in the context of its own support processes to the revision of staff regulations</p> <p>Int 4, 18: EU provides cofinancing to the intervention in the field of trade and customs</p> <p>Int 4, 6, 28, 27,22 : USAID also provides support in the field of Early Warning</p> <p>int 4, 22, 28: The partner is not very active in terms of donor coordination, but the intervention is perceived as very forthcoming in sharing information with other development partners.</p> <p>int 4, 6, 28: development partners in the field of peace and security have a regular informal coffee meeting to exchange information in the absence of donor coordination through the partner</p> <p>Int 28, 4, 6: USAID is not vey forthcoming in terms of exchanging information with other development partner. Also, with their massive engagement in the field of Early Warning, it is crowding out other development partners</p> <p>Int 6: USAID support in the field of peace and security covers many of the same areas on which the intervention provides support. Against this background, the intervention needs to reassess its support in the field of Early Warnuig</p> <p>Int 6, int 4, int 22: The consultancy Transtec is also providing supporting in the field of peace and security with financing from the EU. Transtec and the intervention are exchanging their activity plans to avoid duplications</p> <p>Int 22, int 19: Transtec is now working on support to results-oriented planning and monitoring for the whole Commission. This support was initially only meant to be provided for PAPS, but was then extended</p> | | |
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| Coordination, coherence and complementarity within German development coordination | To what extent is the intervention (objectives, activities, approaches) coordinated with other GIZ interventions? To what extent are there synergies with other GIZ interventions? | <p>1. Description of other GIZ interventions active in the relevant fields</p> <p>a.) Organizational development of regional organizations</p> <p>b.) Regionall economic integration</p> <p>b.) Peace and security in the region</p> <p>2. Description of coordination mechanisms and coherence with other GIZ interventions</p> <p>3. The intervention identifies potential for synergies with other GIZ interventions and make use of opportunities for synergies</p> <p>4. Description of synergies with other GIZ interventions</p> | Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports | Interviews with intervention staff, GIZ country representative and heads of other GIZ interventions | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by researcher triangulation | <p>Int 30: int the field of peace and security there have been synergies for example through joint financing of a trainign for civilians in peacekeeping by the intervention, the AU intervention, and the SADC intervention</p> <p>Int 30: Up until one year agao, there was a position for in charge of coordination between all APSA interventions of GIZ. This was financed by BMZ, the person who had the position was not part of a "Sektorvorhaben". It was very useful, because given the high workload, the colleagues in the different interventions can not always take as much time for coordination as they'd like to.</p> <p>Int 34, 3, 11: The intervention takes over a strong coordinating role for all GIZ interventions that need access to the ECOWAS Commission</p> <p>Int 25: In the field of trade an customs, good conditions for synergies on trade and taxes with the bilateral SEDIN intervention were created because both interventions had their planning mission at the same time and there was an overlap between the members of the teams planning the two interventions. However in implementation SEDIN soon shifted its focus away from working on regional integration and taxes, as there was no political momentum for this in Nigeria. Therefore, de facto potential for synergies with the itnervention where not as big as initially thought. However, echange between the two interventions was kept up through regular meetings on trade</p> | <p>The intervention has an improtant role to play to coordinate between the different GIZ projects working with the ECOWAS Commission. It also liaises adequately with other regionalor gloabl projects in the field of peace and security and trade and customs. In the past there have been synergies with bilateral interventions, but these bilateral interventions are phasing out.</p> | |
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| Coordination, coherence and complementarity within the programme | To what extent is the intervention (objectives, activities, approaches) coordinated with the PTB intervention? To what extent are there synergies with the PTB intervention? | 1. Description of coordination mechanisms and coherence with PTB 2. The intervention identifies potential for synergies with other PTB interventions and make use of opportunities for synergies 3. Description of synergies with PTB 4. External actors perceive the interention and the PTB intervention as a joint programme | Progress reports to BMZ, Annual reports | Interviews with intervention staff, GIZ country repsentative and heads of other GIZ interventions | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by researcher triangulation | Document analysis: Porgramme porposal part A: "Komplementär zu den Aktivitäten der GIZ im Bereich der Handelserleichterung engagiert sich die PTB beim Aufbau einer regionalen Qualitätsinfrastruktur in der ECOWAS. Diese Interventionen erfolgen in Fortführung des ehemaligen Projektes zur Förderung des Mess- und Prüfwesens mit der WAEMU." Last progress report to BMZ, part A: "Die Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) hat im November 2011 begonnen, den Aufbau von Meteorologie-Dienstleistungen in der ECOWAS-Region koordiniert, arbeitsteilig und nachfrageorientiert zu unterstützen. [...] Es findet ein regelmäßiger Austausch mit den Mitarbeitern des GIZ-Moduls statt. Über einen regelmäßigen Austausch zwischen GIZ und PTB hinaus sind aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Handlungsfelder kaum Synergieeffekte zu realisieren." Interviews: Int 3, 33: PTB works on quality infrastructure. Joint programme, so exchange for reporting, but not a lot of touching points in implementation because PTB support is in a very specific technical area through short-term missions, no presence in Abuja. Synergies are there to the extent that if quality infrastructure is improved, this contributes to the programme obejctive | PTB and the intervention contribute to the same programme objective, but no touching points in implementation | |
| | To what extent are there synergies between the BMZ and the EU funded part of unit 2? | 1. Description of synergies between results models 2. Description of operational synergies 3. Partners and external stakeholders perceive synergies between the BMZ-funded and the EU-funded part of unit 2 | Results models of unit 2 (BMZ funded and EU-funded), Annual progress report to BMZ, Annual reports, mid-term reports and external evaluation of EU-funded part of component 2 | Interviews with staff of unit 2, EU and partners | Contribution analysis | Evaluators' assessment, possible subjectivity bias mitigated by data, method and researcher triangulation | Document analysis: Results model for whole intervention puts unit one in between of unit two and unit three Interviews: Int 3, 6, 11, 18, 16: strengthening the organization in the area of organizational development strenghtens the whole organization and therefore also strengthens its work in the areas of economic policy and trade and customs int 3: Examples are better recruiting practices and better coordination of extenral actors int 16: better recruiting practices will benefit the whole organizations int 6, int 22, 13, 4: not everyone in the Commission is aware of the CSF, and not everyone who is aware of it uses it. | Complementarity between organizational dev unit and thematic units is given, however unit one could work more closely with the thematic units to mainstream CSF to all counterparts of the intervention | Unit 1 should be more proactive in asking the two thematic units for support in mainstreaming the CSF and other processes relevant to the whole Commission |

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Annex 3: Formatting guidelines

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
| <i>Number of pages</i> | <i>40- 50 pages (excluding annex)</i> |
| <i>Margins</i> | <i>→ top, bottom and right 2.5 cm, left 2.25 cm</i> |
| <i>Line spacing</i> | <i>→ at least 14 pt</i> |
| <i>Spacing</i> | <i>→ unless otherwise indicated, spacing after 0 pt – spacing before 0 pt</i> |
| <i>Bullets</i> | <i>→ round in GIZ red – indent left 0.2 cm, special hanging indent 0.4 cm</i> |
| <i>Contents</i> | <i>→ as automatic table of contents</i> |
| <i>Heading 1</i> | <i>→ Arial 18 bold, align left, black – spacing after 40 pt- spacing before 40 pt</i> |
| <i>Heading 2</i> | <i>→ Arial 12.5, bold, align left, black – spacing after 15 pt – spacing before 12 pt</i> |
| <i>Heading 3</i> | <i>→ Arial 9,5, bold, align left, GIZ red – spacing after 10 pt – spacing before 18 pt</i> |
| <i>Running text</i> | <i>→ Arial 9.5; align left, black</i> |
| <i>Text in tables</i> | <i>→ Arial 9.5, align left, black – spacing after 0 pt – spacing before 0 pt</i> |
| <i>Page number in footer</i> | <i>→ Arial 8, bold, GIZ red, align right</i> |
| <i>Footnotes</i> | <i>→ Arial 6 black</i> |
| <i>Image captions and table headings</i> | <i>→ Arial 7.5 italics, GIZ grey</i> |
| <i>GIZ red</i> | <i>RGB 200 – 15 – 15</i> |
| <i>GIZ grey</i> | <i>RGB 111 – 111 – 111</i> |

Annex 4: Terms of Reference

WISSEN WAS WIRKT



Terms of reference

Central project evaluation of the project

'Supporting the ECOWAS Commission through strategic managerial and technical advice'

13.2271.8

81215589

Contents

List of abbreviations

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List of abbreviations

| | |
|----------|--|
| AV | Officer responsible for the commission |
| BMZ | German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| CV | Curriculum vitae |
| DeGEval | DeGEval – Evaluation Society |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH |
| GVR | Joint Procedural Reform |
| OECD-DAC | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) |
| PN | Project number |
| RBM | Results-based monitoring (system) |

1. Central project evaluations at GIZ

1.1 Context and objectives

GIZ's evaluation system is facing a number of new challenges, which include increasingly diverse types of commissions and projects, the growing complexity of implementation contexts and projects, and new information requirements on the part of policy-makers (short-term achievement of results, other evaluation criteria, etc.). In addition, there are the new evaluation requirements arising from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Joint Procedural Reform in commissioning procedures with BMZ. Requirements related to how GIZ evaluations are used have also changed. 'Learning from evaluations' is still an important function of evaluations. The main task here is to process the knowledge generated by the evaluations to precisely facilitate decision-making. In addition, the requirements for accountability (and hence for the quality and independence of evaluations and evaluation reports) have become increasingly rigorous in recent years. Against this backdrop, GIZ's Management Board decided to fundamentally reform the GIZ evaluation system in December 2016. The goals of this reform are particularly:

- **to improve evidence of effectiveness:** The new evaluation system is intended to put GIZ in a better position to observe long-term results and the sustainability and mainstreaming of approaches in the partner structures. In addition, evaluations should be conducted at a time when statements about results and sustainability are possible and appropriate, and should be designed using the appropriate methodologies and procedures to ensure this is the case.
- **Enhance credibility of evaluation findings:** We want to further increase the credibility of our evaluation findings by strengthening the independence of project evaluations. Project evaluations will accordingly be managed by and under the responsibility of the Evaluation Unit, which reports directly to the Management Board and is separated from operational business. Implementation is carried out by specialist external evaluators. Evaluations will be conducted in line with recognised national and international standards and quality criteria, and the evaluation reports will be published.
- **Gearing project evaluations to new challenges:** Central evaluations should take into account the growing complexity of projects and implementation contexts, the increased requirements for accountability and the evaluation challenges arising from the 2030 Agenda and the Joint Procedural Reform.

1.2 Designing implementation of the multi-year evaluation portfolio

Central project evaluations generally concern projects that GIZ carries out on behalf of BMZ. Central project evaluations involve a critical analytical review of the results and implementation of a project. They can be carried out at different times. Completed projects are evaluated some eight months after the end of their term, which is usually three years (final evaluation). Projects with planned follow-on measures are also evaluated during their term (interim evaluation), depending on the intended use (submission for planning the follow-on commission, project steering, reporting to the commissioning party, strategic reflection). Both the interim and final evaluations take predecessor projects into consideration (where substantively relevant) in order to make statements about long-term results and sustainability.

In BMZ business, all projects with a commission value over EUR 3.0 million are included in the evaluation process on a standard basis. A two-stage procedure is used to select projects for evaluation. In the first stage the projects to be evaluated are selected by means of a regionally stratified random sample. In a second stage the sample is supplemented by evaluations that are selected in accordance with specific information requirements (criteria-based selection).

Overall, it is planned to ensure that in the medium term, project evaluations cover between 30% and 50% of the total population of all projects with a commission value exceeding EUR 3.0 million in business with BMZ. This will mean carrying out some 100 central project evaluations a year. The total number of evaluated projects should be large enough to make a representative statement about the assessment of the OECD-DAC criteria

for the total population of all projects.

An EU-wide tender will be carried out for implementation of the first evaluation portfolio. The goal is to enter into framework agreements with pools of evaluators who are structured by technical sector and regional knowledge and experience, and who will carry out evaluations for this random sample up to 2020. As completion of the contract award procedure cannot be expected before the second quarter of 2018, the first pilot evaluations at the end of 2017 and beginning of 2018 will be put out to tender as individual services using a short list or an e-tendering procedure.

2. Object and goal of the evaluation

2.1 Project description and object of the evaluation

Supporting the ECOWAS Commission through strategic managerial and technical advice.

Subject to this evaluation is the technical cooperation module (PN 2013.2271.8) with an overall term starting from 11.03.2014 to 28.02.2019. If relevant, the predecessor module PN 2010.2250.8 (31.10.2010-31.07.2015), 2007.2177.9 (10.06.2008-14.10.2013), 2005.2162.5 (31.10.2005-5.11.2008) should be considered within the framework of evaluation in order to obtain reasonable results on long-term impacts and sustainability of the project.

2.2 Goal of the evaluation

A key element of evaluation work at GIZ is that evaluations should be geared to their intended use. The central project evaluations follow this fundamental approach and are intended to support decision-making.

- Evaluation processes and findings help strengthen the decision-making competence of decision-makers and other change agents.
- This leads to decisions that improve either public policies, the design and implementation of GIZ projects, or GIZ corporate strategies.
- These improvements in turn lead to improved service delivery by partners for their own citizens, by GIZ for its partners and target groups, and for its commissioning parties and employees.
- This will ultimately increase the effectiveness of public policies and GIZ projects for the target groups, and enhance satisfaction among partners, clients and employees.

The evaluation is intended to rate the success of the current module (PN 2013.2271.8). This is done in line with the OECD-DAC criteria, based on data, facts and figures, and within the framework of a predefined rating system. As already noted in Section 2.1 above, predecessor modules are also taken into consideration (if substantively relevant) in order to make statements on the long-term results and sustainability of the project.

As this is an interim evaluation, the evaluation should also offer suggestions for the follow-on measures that can be included in the appraisal of the follow-on measure.

At an initial meeting between the contractor and the Evaluation Unit, the officer responsible for the commission at the project and possibly the partner, the information requirements are spelled out in detail and the object of the evaluation is jointly defined.

3. Process and inputs

3.1 Responsibilities

The Evaluation Unit is responsible for planning and steering the evaluation portfolio of central project evaluations. The contractor is responsible for preparation, implementation, quality assurance and backstopping, and reporting on individual evaluations with due regard to the requirements for inputs listed under Section 4 below. The evaluation team always consists of two members (one international and one local evaluator). The contractor is responsible for the choice and integration of the regional/local evaluator. GIZ assists at various points in the individual process steps.

Support by the project or local country office covers:

- providing relevant documents
- recommendation for a suitably located hotel
- identification of relevant interview partners + coordination / development of interview plan
- local GIZ project driver will be provided

The procedure for the evaluation, including clarification of roles, can be seen in the following process overview. The process chart is based on the experience of the Evaluation Unit with the independent evaluation programme and decentralised project evaluations, and will now be examined within the framework of central project evaluations, and successively modified where necessary. Joint assessment with the contractor at the end of the evaluation is planned for this purpose.

3.2 Overview of central project evaluation process

The following inputs must be provided in the period from 04.09.2017-31.12.2017. The local evaluation mission will take place in Nigeria.

| Work step | When | Responsible | Collaborating | To be informed |
|---|----------------------|--|---|--|
| Preliminary clarifications including agreement on timing of evaluation | Jul. 2017 | Evaluation Unit | AV, partner(s) | |
| Provision of documents | Aug. 2017 | Evaluation Unit (standard evaluation documents) AV, project team (project documents) | | |
| Clarification of commission inc. role clarification in evaluator team | Beginning Sept. 2017 | Evaluation Unit | International evaluator, local evaluator | |
| Launch meeting (if needed) to clarify roles and determine information requirements | Beginning Sept. 2017 | Evaluation Unit | AV, partner(s) international evaluator, local evaluator | |
| Letter informing central stakeholders at the start of evaluation (inc. information on process and roles) | Sept. 2017 | Evaluation Unit | | Director of division, country director or head of section, AV, partner(s), BMZ |
| Desk study inc. initial preliminary clarification of content at GIZ and (if needed) local check (local evaluator) - data available (inc. RBM) - partner systems - partners' information requirements | Sept. 2017 | International evaluator/ Local evaluator | GIZ staff | |
| Preparation for travel (sometimes only possible after inception report) | Sept. 2017 | International evaluator | Local evaluator, AV/project team, (country office) | |

| | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Draft inception report (IR) in accordance with GIZ specifications and template, report language: English | Submission of IR 25. Sept. 2017 | International evaluator | Local evaluator |
| Quality check of IR | Feedback to contractor: 30. Sept. 2017 | Evaluation Unit | AV, partner(s) (for material accuracy) |
| Revision of IR | Until 03. Oct. 2017 | International evaluator | (Local evaluator) |
| Approval of IR | 5.Oct.2017 | Evaluation Unit | BMZ |
| Formulation and agreement of interview plan | weeks 39-41 2017 | Int. & loc. evaluators | AV, partner(s) |
| Performance of mission | weeks 42 and 43 2017 | International and local evaluator | |
| Launch meeting, local briefing | starting week 42 2017 | International and local evaluator | AV/project team, country director, partner(s), embassy |
| Documentation of provisional findings for local final presentation/debriefing (in accordance with GIZ specifications) | week 43 2017 | International and local evaluator | |
| Final presentation, debriefing/ final meeting, local | end of week 43 2017 | International and local evaluator | AV/project team, country director, partner(s), embassy |
| Evaluation, analysis, report | weeks 44/ 45/ 46, 2017 | International evaluator | Local evaluator |
| Submission of evaluation report (in accordance with GIZ specifications and template; report language: English) | 20.Nov.2017 | International evaluator | (Local evaluator) |
| Quality check on evaluation report | Feedback to contractor: until 1.Dec.2017 | Evaluation Unit | AV, partner(s) (for material accuracy) |

| | | | |
|---|--------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Revision of evaluation report (including linguistic and editorial quality assurance) | week 49 2017 | International evaluator | (Local evaluator) |
| Approval of evaluation report | week 50 2017 | Evaluation Unit | |
| Final meeting by Skype (joint assessment of evaluation) | week 50 2017 | Evaluation Unit, int. evaluator | (Local evaluator) |
| Publication of evaluation report | Feb. 2018 | Evaluation Unit | Evaluators AV, partner(s) |

4. Specific requirements for inputs

The inputs must be provided as shown above in Section 3.2 in the period from 04.09.2017 to 31.12.2017. The evaluation report must be submitted by 20.11.2017 in English, any revision based on feedback to the contractor must be completed by the end of week 49 (for the detailed procedure, see process overview in Section 3.2).

4.1 Quality requirements for central project evaluations

In its evaluations GIZ follows the evaluation standards of the Evaluation Society (DeGEval): usefulness, feasibility, fairness and accuracy, and the OECD-DAC quality standards for development evaluation. As a basis for developing quality assurance instruments, the Evaluation Unit defines the quality standards for process quality, methodological quality and product quality.

The **usefulness** of an evaluation ensures that the information requirements of its users are taken into account and the desired information is provided to them.

- Identification of participating and affected parties: the individuals or groups of individuals involved in the object of the evaluation or affected by it should be identified so that their interests can be clarified and, as far as possible, taken into account in setting up the evaluation.
- Clarification of the purposes of the evaluation: it should be made clear what the purposes of the evaluation are, so that participating and affected parties can state an opinion on this and the evaluation team can follow a clear work order.
- Credibility and competence of the evaluator: persons carrying out evaluations should be personally credible and possess the required methodological and technical expertise so that the evaluation findings offer maximum credibility and acceptance.
- Selection and scope of information: the selection and scope of the information collected should enable treatment of the questions to be investigated for the object of the evaluation and at the same time take into account the information requirements of the commissioning party and other recipients.
- Transparency of values: the perspectives and assumptions of the participating and affected parties on which the evaluation and interpretation of findings are based should be described in such a way that the basis for the assessment is clearly comprehensible.
- Completeness and clarity of reporting: evaluation reports should provide all material information, and be easy to understand and verifiable.
- Timeliness of evaluation: evaluation projects should be started and completed in time for the evaluation findings to be incorporated into impending decision-making processes and improvement processes.

- Use and benefits of evaluation: planning, execution and reporting of an evaluation should encourage the participating and affected parties to review the evaluation attentively and use its findings.

The **process quality** meets the DeGEval standards for feasibility and fairness. The way the process of an evaluation is designed is decisive for the use of the evaluation. To make the evaluation as useful as possible for decision-making processes, the following standards should be met.

- Appropriate procedure: evaluation procedures, including the procedure for obtaining necessary information, should be chosen so that there is a reasonable relationship between the burden on the object of evaluation or participating and affected parties and the expected benefits of the evaluation.
- Diplomatic approach: evaluations should be planned and carried out such as to achieve the greatest possible acceptance of the evaluation approach and findings among the various participating and affected parties.
- Efficiency of the evaluation: there should be a reasonable relationship between the effort involved in conducting the evaluation and its benefits.
- Formal agreements: the obligations of the parties to the contract for the evaluation (what should be done, how, who by and when) should be set down in writing so that the parties are obliged to meet all the conditions of the agreement or renegotiate it.
- Protection of individual rights: evaluations should be planned and carried out so that the security, dignity and rights of the persons included in an evaluation are protected.
- Complete and fair review: evaluations should investigate and present the strengths and weaknesses of the object of the evaluation as fully and fairly as possible, so that the strengths can be further developed and the weaknesses addressed.
- Impartial execution and reporting: the evaluation should make clear the different views of participating and affected parties with regard to the object and findings of the evaluation. Reports and the overall evaluation process should demonstrate the impartiality of the evaluation team. Assessments should be made fairly and be as free as possible from personal feelings.
- Publication of findings: the findings of the evaluation should be made accessible to all participating and affected parties as far as possible.

The **methodological quality** of an evaluation relates to the application of the methods of empirical social research for data collection and analysis and corresponds to the DeGEval criterion of accuracy.

- Description of the object of the evaluation: the object of the evaluation should be clearly and accurately described and documented, so that it can be unambiguously identified.
- Context analysis: the context of the object of the evaluation should be investigated and analysed in sufficient detail.
- Description of purposes and approach: the object, purposes, questions and approach of the evaluation, including methods used, should be accurately documented and described so that they can be identified and assessed.
- Citation of sources of information: the sources of information used in an evaluation should be documented with sufficient accuracy to assess whether the information is reliable and appropriate.
- Valid and reliable information⁴⁹: the procedure for obtaining data should be chosen or developed and applied in such a way as to ensure the reliability of the data obtained and their validity for answering the questions in the evaluation in line with technical standards. The technical standards should be aligned with the quality criteria of empirical social research.
- Systematic error checking: the information collected, processed, analysed and presented in an evaluation should be systematically checked for errors.
- Analysis of qualitative and quantitative information: qualitative and quantitative information in an evaluation should be appropriately and systematically analysed to technical standards so that the questions in the evaluation can be effectively answered.
- Justified conclusions: the conclusions drawn in an evaluation should be derived from findings in a way the recipients can follow.

⁴⁹ i.e. verified and reliable information

4.2 Profile for evaluators

- Experience of evaluation
- Experience with complex evaluation designs
- Social-scientific research methods (quantitative, qualitative and participatory methods)
- Sectoral knowledge and experience: organisational development, peace and security, trade and tariffs
- Experience with GIZ
- Country knowledge in West Africa
- Experience in applying and assessing the OECD-DAC criteria
- An excellent written and oral command of English (international and regional/local evaluator) and German (international evaluator) are mandatory and thus, not part of the assessment.

As stated above, the evaluation should be carried out by an (international, regional) evaluation team. The same profile requirements listed above also apply to the regional/local evaluator, except for knowledge of German. Yet, the single requirements will be weighted differently (for details please refer to the assessment scheme). The bid must explain the cooperation and division of labour (see the specifications in Section 5 Scope and content of the bid to be submitted). For reasons of independence, neither evaluator may have participated in designing, planning, implementing, providing advisory services to or evaluating the project.

4.3 Methodological procedure

For the central project evaluations it is generally sufficient as a basis for credible accountability to document as robustly as possible the contribution that the project under consideration has made towards achieving objectives (*contribution*). It is a matter of showing a plausible relationship between the project and the results, i.e. using methodological and data triangulation to collect sufficient evidence that the observed intended results are most probably due to the project. Besides documenting the project contribution, understanding and knowledge should be increased of *what is working and what not*, in order to be able to make sound decisions on the future orientation of the project.

To enable robust proof of results in the central project evaluations, GIZ prescribes a theory-based approach to evaluation. Theory-based approaches, such as realist evaluation, process tracing and contribution analysis, are distinguished by the following methodological elements:

- a *results model*, which is contained in the project proposal at GIZ and visualises expectations of the project's causal relationships and shows pathways from the inputs via activities and outputs to the desired outcomes and impacts.
- A *theory of change* based on the results model, which formulates *hypotheses* and possibly *mechanisms* to explain the causal links embodied in the results model and which can be investigated and assessed in the evaluation. Possible risks involved in implementing the project must also be taken into account.
- A *contribution story* that shows the observed changes and contribution made by the project to achieving results, evaluated on the basis of sound, verifiable and credible evidence. For this, alternative explanations (e.g. context factors or third-party measures) must also be analysed and the *theory of change* modified if necessary.

When selecting theory-based evaluation designs, the central project evaluations should give preference to those that match the information requirements and object of the evaluation. Based on the GIZ results model and RBM system, the indicators formulated in the offer and the hypotheses underlying the results model can be taken as a basis for assessment and examined for plausibility. Appropriate quantitative and qualitative methods are used for data collection, e.g. document analysis, exploratory individual and group interviews and standardised online questionnaires. Theory-based approaches must be supplemented by additional methods to document unintended results and to assess efficiency.

4.4 Participatory approach

Partner orientation is an important characteristic of central project evaluations. This is reflected in the different phases of project evaluation and evaluation management (e.g. by defining the partners' information

requirements in the ToRs, briefing at the local start of evaluation, documentation of partner perspectives, debriefing).

5. Scope and content of the bid to be submitted

The Evaluation Unit would like to ensure that the choice of evaluators conforms to the need for their independence. As defined by the Evaluation Unit, this applies to all evaluators not involved in designing, planning, implementing, providing advisory services to or evaluating the project – this applies to both, the international and the regional/local evaluator. Only those bids are taken into account for assessment that fully meet the criterion of independence. If the criterion is not met, this results in exclusion of the bidder from the competition.

The bid should cover the following aspects and not exceed three to five pages (excluding CV).

- Outline of a methodologically sophisticated procedure including a theory-based approach. Both the design and data collection methodology should be appropriately presented. The Evaluation Unit wishes to see an increase in contribution analysis approaches in future project evaluations. Bids that consider the possibility of implementing this approach will be positively viewed in the assessment.
- Presentation of the division of labour within the evaluation team.
- Experience in German and international development cooperation/international cooperation, particularly with GIZ or its predecessor organisations.
- Extent and quality of evaluation experience
- Sectoral knowledge and experience, or other knowledge and experience relevant for evaluating the project
- Foreign experience (as evaluator or short-term/long-term expert) in the region
- Language skills
- References

Please use the CV template in the annex to this invitation to tender.

6. Specification of inputs

The specification of inputs should not exceed 58 expert-days in total

- Inception phase up to 18 expert-days
- Carrying out mission locally including preparation and travel days up to 26 expert-days
- Analysis and reporting up to 14 expert-days

The ratio of expert-days for the international expert and regional/local expert should be as follows:

International expert up to 37 expert-days (including travel days)

Regional expert up to 21 expert-days

Annexes

CV format

1. Family name, first name:
2. Place of Residence:
3. Contact/Address:
4. Date of birth:
5. Nationality:
6. Civil status:

7. Education:

| | |
|--|-------|
| <i>Institution:</i> | |
| <i>Date: from (month/year)</i> <i>to (month/year)</i> | |
| <i>Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:</i> | |

8. Language skills: (Mark 1 to 5 for competence)

| <i>Language</i> | <i>Reading</i> | <i>Speaking</i> | <i>Writing</i> |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

9. Membership of professional bodies:
10. Other skills: (eg Computer literacy, etc.)
11. Present position:
12. Years within the firm:
13. Key qualifications: (relevant to the programme)

.....

14. Specific Countries experience:

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Date: from (month/year) to (month/year)</i> |
|----------------|--|
| | |
| | |
| | |

15. Professional Experience Record / List of accomplished evaluations:

| | |
|---|-------|
| <i>Date:</i> <i>from</i> <i>(month/year)</i> <i>to</i> <i>(month/year)</i> | |
| <i>Location:</i> | |
| <i>Company:</i> | |
| <i>Position:</i> | |
| <i>Description:</i> | |
| <i>Applied evaluation design and methods of data collection</i> | |

| | |
|---|-------|
| <i>Date:</i> <i>from</i> <i>(month/year)</i> <i>to</i> <i>(month/year)</i> | |
| <i>Location:</i> | |
| <i>Company:</i> | |
| <i>Position:</i> | |
| <i>Description:</i> | |
| <i>Applied evaluation design and methods of data collection</i> | |

| | |
|---|-------|
| <i>Date:</i> <i>from</i> <i>(month/year)</i> <i>to</i> <i>(month/year)</i> | |
| <i>Location:</i> | |
| <i>Company:</i> | |
| <i>Position:</i> | |
| <i>Description:</i> | |
| <i>Applied evaluation design and methods of data collection</i> | |

| | |
|---|-------|
| <i>Date:</i> <i>from</i> <i>(month/year)</i> <i>to</i> <i>(month/year)</i> | |
|---|-------|

| | |
|---|-------|
| <i>Location:</i> | |
| <i>Company:</i> | |
| <i>Position:</i> | |
| <i>Description:</i> | |
| <i>Applied evaluation design and methods of data collection</i> | |

16. Summary of experiences in working with development cooperation institutions
(German and international; name of institution and type of cooperation)

.....

17. Other relevant information (e.g., Publications)

.....

.....

18. References (regarding conducted evaluations)

First reference:

Name:

Position:

Organization:

Email:

Phone:

In respect of which conducted evaluation:

Second reference:

Name:

Position:

Organization:

Email:

Phone:

In respect of which conducted evaluation:

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Photo credits/sources:

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