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ABSTRACT

Not for the Profit, but for the Training? Gender Differences in Training in the For-Profit and Non-Profit Sectors

We use Canadian linked employer-employee data to examine gender differences in probability, duration, and intensity of firm-sponsored training. We find that women in the for-profit sector are less likely to receive classroom training, and receive shorter classroom training courses. However, we find the reverse in the non-profit sector, with women being more likely to receive both classroom and on-the-job training, and also receiving longer classroom training courses. Our results suggest that women's worse training opportunities in the for-profit sector mainly operate within workplaces. We find no evidence that gender gaps in training in the for-profit sector are driven by lower probabilities of accepting training offers, child or family commitments, weaker labour market attachment, or worker self-selection. We also find that gender differences in expected changes in wages and training opportunities between the two sectors can explain a large portion of women's higher probability of employment in the non-profit sector. Finally, decomposition results suggest that gender differences in training explain some of the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector, which is twice as large than in the non-profit sector.

JEL Classification: J24, L22, M53, O32

Keywords: gender, non-profit, firm-sponsored training, linked employer-employee data, gender wage gap

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1. Introduction

In this study, we use Canadian linked employer-employee data to examine gender differences in probability of receiving firm-sponsored training, as well as differences in the duration and intensity of training episodes. Job training is one of the main sources of skill formation and human capital accumulation. Heckman et al. (1998) estimate that post-school investment, including job training, accounts for more than half of lifetime human capital accumulation. Every year, firms allocate considerable resources to employee training. For example, it is estimated that Canadian (American) employers on average spent $800 ($1195) per employee on training in 2014 (2012).[1]

It is well-documented that women are in a disadvantaged position in terms of their labour market outcomes, such as wages and promotion opportunities, compared to their male counterparts (see the literature review in Blau and Kahn, 2017 and Javdani and McGee, 2017). Given the importance of training as a key source of skill formation and earnings growth (see the meta-analysis from Haelermans and Borghans, 2012), we believe gaining a better understanding of any potential gender differences in training is critical for the analysis of women's labour market outcomes and could help explain the well-documented and persistent gender wage gap.[2]

In fact, there is significant evidence, especially from studies using decomposition methods (e.g. Blinder, 1973; Duncan and Hoffman, 1979; Hall, 1973; Munasinghe, 2004; Stokke, 2016), that suggests differences in returns to labour market experience between men and women can explain a large portion of the average gender wage gap. Moreover, human capital theory, suggests that returns to experience are primarily the result of on-the-job training (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Therefore, examining gender differences in training could also be of considerable importance to better understand the underlying sources of gender differences in returns to experience which seems to be responsible for some of the gender wage gap.

The contribution of our study to the literature on gender differences in training is multi-fold. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first study that exploits a nationally representative sample of workers to examines gender differences in two different types of clearly-defined and very

1 See Learning and Development Outlook, 13th Edition by Conference Board of Canada (2015) and State of the Industry Report by Association for Talent Development (2013).

2 For example, Olsen and Sexton (1996) suggest that lower incidence of training among women can account for a large portion of the gender wage gap.

detailed training measures: formal classroom training (CLT), and informal on-the-job training (OJT). Distinguishing between these two types of training is important given differences in how they are structured, delivered, and their impacts on workers.[3] In addition, distinguishing between different types of training could enable us to reconcile some mixed results from previous studies, and help us identify the type(s) of training in which women are in a disadvantaged position.

We also use the richness of our data to examine not only gender differences in incidence, length, and intensity of training, but also gender differences in the main subject of training, the person who provided the training (e.g. self-learning, supervisor, outside trainer, fellow worker, etc.), and the goal(s) of training. This helps us better understand the underlying sources behind potential gender differences in training, or areas in which it is more likely to occur.

Second, we are the first study to explore potential disparities between the non-profit and for-profit sectors in gender differences in training, and to document a striking difference between the two sectors. Any gender difference between the two sectors can lead to big economy-wide gap as the non-profit sector has been playing an increasing role in employment and production in many countries such as the US, Canada, Germany, France and the UK (Benz 2005). According to Statistics Canada (2009), the non-profit sector accounted for 7 percent of Canada's GDP in 2007, more than the entire retail trade industry, or the mining, oil and gas extraction industry. While these developments in the non-profit sector have attracted some interest by economists (e.g. Devaro and Brookshire 2007, Glaeser 2001 & 2003, Rose-Ackerman 1996, Weisbord 1988), they remain understudied.

Third, we are the first study to examine the extent to which any economy-wide differences in training opportunities between men and women operates within versus between workplaces. Economy-wide gender gaps in training could arise even in the absence of any gender differences within workplaces. They could be driven by crowding of females into workplaces with less training opportunities (i.e. a between-workplace mechanism).[4] For example, females who plan to take a

[3] For example, Dostie (2013) who uses the same data finds that productivity (measured as value-added per worker) returns to CLT are much larger compared to OJT.

[4] As suggested by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Bronars and Famulari (1997), Dickens and Katz (1987), Groshen (1990, 1991), Salvanes et al. (1998), and others, sorting of workers across firms can explain a significant portion of variation in individual wages. This inter-firm sorting could also be responsible for variation in other labour market outcomes such as promotions, training opportunities, etc.

break from their job due to family responsibilities might voluntarily avoid occupations or firms that require regular upgrades of skills through training. Alternatively, firms that require regular training might not be willing to employ females if they are perceived to have weaker labour market attachments. All previous studies that examine gender differences in training focus on economy-wide differences and do not distinguish between these two mechanisms. We believe this distinction is crucial because these two mechanisms are clearly driven by different factors and have different policy implications.

Fourth, we use complementary approaches to examine in more details the role of weaker labour market attachment as a potential reason for women to receive less training (e.g. Barron, 1993; Becker,1964; Gronau, 1988; Lynch, 1991; Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Royalty, 1996). As a first approach, since we observe each worker twice in our data in two consecutive years, we examine whether female workers who leave the labour force voluntarily (especially due to child or family responsibilities) are less likely to participate in training the year before. If the above hypothesis is valid, we should find that these women are less likely to participate in training. As our second approach, we supplement our data using a separate data set (the Canadian Career Handbook) that provides a wide range of measures for different occupations (including measures of aptitudes, interests, environmental conditions, education and training requirements) to examine differences in occupations males and females are employed at along these different dimensions. If females systematically avoid occupations that require more regular skill upgrades, this should be reflected in the characteristics of the occupations they are employed at.

We find that females experience the same average probability of receiving both CLT and OJT compared to observationally equivalent males. However, looking separately at workers employed at for-profit versus non-profit sectors paints a completely different picture. While females in the non-profit sector are significantly more likely to receive both CLT and OJT, females in the for-profit sector are less likely to receive CLT, and also receive fewer CLT courses. Our results also suggest that while women's better training opportunities in the non-profit sector are (partly) driven by their disproportionate sorting into firms that are on average more likely to offer training, their disadvantaged position in the for-profit sector mainly operates within workplaces. We find no evidence that the training gaps experienced by females in the for-profit sector are driven by

females' lower probability of accepting training offers, child and family commitments, weaker labour market attachment, or self-selection into for-profit/non-profit sectors.

We then explicitly investigate the documented differences between for- and non-profit sectors further. We use a simultaneous equations model that accounts for self-selection into the for- and non-profit sectors to estimate, for each worker, the expected changes in wages and training opportunities had the worker been employed in the other sector. We find that men on average are expected to experience significantly larger advantages (smaller disadvantages) in terms of training opportunities and wages by moving to the for-profit sector. In addition, our decomposition results reveal that these expected differentials in wages and training opportunities explain a large portion of females' over-representation in the non-profit sector.

Finally, we find that the gender wage gap (both conditionally and unconditionally) is twice as large in the non-profit sector. While gender differences in training do not explain any of the gender wage gap in the non-profit sector, they explain 2.2 percents of the gap in the for-profit sector. We note that while this might seem like a small effect, it only measures the effect of difference in training received over the course of one year. Training received over the course of one's career, and its indirect impact on wages through its effect on promotions, job mobility, as well as productivity, could quickly compound to a significant impact on wages.

2. Literature Review

There exist numerous studies on gender differences in training, mostly using US data. However, there are several problems with the training measures used in most of these studies. First, the training questions are often not clearly defined in the surveys. It is not always clear whether they measure formal, informal, or both types of training, when the training took place, and whether there have been other types of training received by workers (e.g. the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), or the National Longitudinal Survey of High School Class of 1972 (NLSHS72)).[5] In addition, the NLS is not a nationally representative

[5] For example, NLS asks workers "Do you receive or use additional training (other than schooling training) on your job?" and "what was the longest type of training you have had since the last interview?" As another example, the framing of the training questions in NLSY is narrow and restricted to only training in business colleges, nurses' programs, vocational and technical institutes, and barber and beauty schools.

sample because it only covers young men, women, and mature men aged 14-24, 30-44, and 45-59, respectively.

Second, some of the surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) ask about the amount of time it takes for an "average" worker to be fully-trained as opposed to the actual training received by the worker.[6] Third, some surveys such as Current Population Survey (CPS) contain incomplete information about the total amount of training received.[7] Lynch (1990) points out that "the CPS questions are unlikely to provide information on the training experience of older workers if this training was acquired from previous employers." Fourth, the training information provided in the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) are restricted to the most recent hires.[8] In addition, the surveyed population in EOPP mainly includes the economically disadvantaged from the low-wage firms. Fifth, the training measures in the NLSY only ask about the types of training that took longer than a month.[9]

Given these measurement and definition issues, it is not surprising that studies examining gender differences in training do not yield a clear consensus about the existence or direction of a gender training gap. Earlier studies often found that female workers are less likely to receive formal OJT. Duncan and Hoffman (1979) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find large differences in the amount of training received by gender. Lillard and Tan (1992) use the Current Population Survey, the National Longitudinal Survey, and the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects Survey to examine the characteristics of workers who receives training, the amount of training, reasons for training, as well as the effect of training on earnings and employment. They find mixed results for gender differences in training in different surveys (only comparing unconditional differences). Lynch (1992) finds that while female workers are more likely to receive off-the-job training (training received off the employer premise), they are less likely to receive formal OJT.

[6] The question in PSID is "On a job like yours, how long would it take the average new person to become fully trained and qualified?"

[7] CPS question on training is "What training was needed to get the current or last job and what training is needed to improve skills on the current job?"

[8] The question in EOPP is "describe up to four training events occurring between 1/1/79 and the interview date in 1980" (approximately 1-2 years).

[9] The question in NLSY is "in addition to your schooling, military, and government-sponsored training programs, did you receive any other types of training for more than a month?" and "which category best describes where you received this training?" Restriction on training spells lasting one month or more was removed in 1988.

Using the PSID, the results of Olsen and Sexton (1996) suggest that women's acquisition of training can account for a significant portion of the gender wage gap. Royalty (1996) also uses NLSY data and finds that females are less likely to receive training, although predicted probability of job turnover (used as a proxy for labour market attachment) explains one-quarter of this gap. On the other hand, using PSID data, Gronau (1998) finds that females' probability of separation has a small effect on their amount of training received. More recent studies such as Frazis et al. (2000) also find that males are more likely to receive formal training.[10] Using German Socio-Economic Panel, Burgard (2012) finds that females are less likely to receive employer-provided training, although the gap disappears after controlling for own and partner's time use variables (i.e. hours of work, housework, child care).[11]

Veum (1996), however, uses the NLSY (1986-1991) and does not find any gender difference in the incidence of formal OJT. He also examines duration, intensity and the number of formal OJT events and finds no gender differences in these outcomes. Several other studies also find no gender differences in the probability of receiving formal OJT, but contrary to Veum (1996) they find gender differences in the duration of formal OJT. Altonji and Spletzer (1991) use the National Longitudinal Survey of High School Class of 1972 (NLSHS72).[12] Their results suggest that "although women working more than 1,040 hours per year are slightly more likely than men to report some training, women receive a smaller quantity of training." Similarly, using the EOPP data, Barron (1993) finds that "while training intensity during the first three months of employment is similar in positions filled by males and females, females are employed in positions that have a shorter duration of on-the-job training." In Canada, Cook and Zeytinoglu (2006) use the 2003 and

[10] They use the 1995 Survey of Employer Provided Training (SEPT95) that only includes establishments with 50 or more employees, with many non-responses to training questions. This reflects in the anomalously high rate of incidence of formal training of around 72% found by their study.

[11] The sample is restricted to couples, and it only examines classroom training.

[12] They use four different training measures but the distinction between some of them is not very clear. For example, they use employer-provided job training during working hours (on or off employer premise) as well as informal on-the-job training. However, informal OJT is also often provided by employer, so it is not clear whether informal OJT is already part of the employer-provided training or not. Similarly, it is not clear whether employer-provided training is referring to formal, informal, or both types. Their sample also suffers from potential attrition bias since they only include individuals who were surveyed in each of the 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1979 and link them to the 1986 follow up survey that includes training measures. In addition, they eliminate almost half of the individuals from their sample (going from 5984 to 3181) due to "missing data or lack of information from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles about the requirements of the particular occupations" which raises sample selection concerns.

2005 waves of the WES and find that while in the overall sample there are no significant gender difference in training, among low-income workers females are less likely to receive training.

There are also studies that find women are more likely to receive training compared to their male counterparts. Using the British Labour Force Survey, Green and Zanchi (1997) find that women' participation in training was higher than men in 1995 due to a trend of increasing access to training for women.[13] Wooden and Van den Heuvel (1997) use the Australian Survey of Training and Education survey and find that "the likelihood of a female employee participation in some form of OJT, be it structured or unstructured, was greater for women than men in 1993". These findings are consistent with an earlier study by Miller (1994) using Australian How Workers Get Their Training Survey. Inspired by these British and Australian studies and findings, Simpson and Stroh (2002) use the American National Household Education Survey (NHES) of 1995 and find that incidence of training was higher for women in formal OJT, and off-the-job training (with and without employer support).[14]

More recently, using the NLSY79 and a longitudinal sample from 1979 to 2004, O'Halloran (2008) also finds that while women are more likely to receive OJT, men receive longer-duration OJT and this gap does not narrow after controlling for measures of labour force attachment and expected tenure.[15] The findings of higher incidence of training for women could be attributed to possible women sorting into occupations or firms that require more training (Green and Zanchi, 1997). Alternatively, females' weaker labour market attachments and employer tenure might require them to receive more training as they are more likely to be new hires in a firm.

Finally, Backes-Gellner et al. (2014) find that while men experience a negative part-time/full-time training gap, the gap is negligible for women. They argue that this is driven by statistical discrimination and due to gender differences in the effect of "future firm attachment" on training.

[13] Earlier British Studies had found that women have lower access to job training (e.g. Arulampalam and Booth, 1997; Blundell et al., 1996; Booth 1991; Green, 1991; Greenhalgh and Stewart, 1987).

[14] The training question in NHES is an indicator that is equal to one if respondents indicated that they have participated in a "targeted career or job-related training" (one of seven broadly defined adult educational activities), and indicated that their primary motivation was either "to improve, advance, or keep up to date on current job" or "to train for a new job or a new career." They also use follow up questions to identify if the training received was on or off the job training.

[15] The sample used by O'Halloran (2008) also suffers from potentially sever sample selection and attrition bias.

They argue that while part-time employment is a signal of lower future firm attachment for men, it sends no special signal to employers for women apart from the fact that they are female.

3. Data

Our study uses the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), a longitudinal survey of workplaces and their employees administered annually by Statistics Canada between 1999 and 2006.[16] The target population of employers consisted of all business locations in Canada with paid employees in March of the survey year.[17] The sample of employers was refreshed with new employers in odd years to maintain a representative cross section. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) classify WES as a survey in which both the sample of workplaces and the sample of workers are cross-sectionally representative of the target population.

A maximum of twenty-four employees were interviewed from each sampled firm in each odd year and re-interviewed the following year.[18] The sample of employees is redrawn after two years and starts anew. When properly weighted, the employee sample is representative of the Canadian workforce in the target population of employers; all our analysis incorporates sample weights from Statistics Canada. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the workplace level.

We use two samples for different parts of our analysis. For most of our analysis, we use pooled 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 cross-sections. We don't use data from even-numbered years to avoid potential sample selection problems associated with employee attrition between the first and second interviews. As it was discussed before, part of our analysis examines whether gender differences in training are different for females who voluntarily leave their employer during the second interview year (i.e. females with weaker labour market attachments), especially those who leave due to family responsibilities. To do this we need to follow workers between the two interviews to identify those who leave their employer during the second interview. Therefore, for

[16] In 2006 only the employer part of the survey was administered.

[17] Employers in Yukon, Nunavut and Northwest Territories and employers operating in crop production, animal production, fishing, hunting, trapping, private households, religious organizations and public administration were excluded from the sample. Public administration, which includes establishments primarily engaged in the enactment and judicial interpretation of laws and their pursuant regulations and the administration of programs based on them, accounts for around 6.5 percent of employment in Canada (Statistics Canada, Table 281-0024).

[18] The number of workers interviewed from each firm was proportional to firm's size except for workplaces with fewer than four employees in which all employees were surveyed.

this part of our analysis we use pooled 1999, 2001, 2003 cross-sections of employees who were also interviewed the year after (i.e. we exclude workers who attrite between the two interviews).[19,20] We restrict both samples to non-aboriginal workers between the ages of 25 and 64 from workplaces that have at least two workers sampled over the entire period they appear in the survey.

WES is an exceptionally rich data set especially when it comes to training. We therefore exploit this richness and use several dependent variables in our analysis. To examine gender differences in probability of receiving CLT we use an indicator that is based on the question "In the past twelve months, have you received any classroom training related to your job? Classroom training includes: (1) All training activities which have a pre-determined format, including a pre-defined objective, (2) Specific content, (3) Progress may be monitored and/or evaluated". All employees who report they received classroom training were also asked about the number of different training courses they have taken in the past 12 months, the duration (measured in days) of the last training course completed (asked to "include only the time actually spent in training sessions"). We use these two questions to construct dependent variables to examine gender differences in the number and duration of courses taken.

To examine gender differences in probability of receiving OJT we use an indicator that is based on the question "In the past twelve months, have you received any informal training related to your job (that is on-the-job training)?" Employees who answered positive to this question were also asked the following question: "In the past twelve months, how much time in total was spent for on-the-job training? (Include only the time actually spent in training.)" We use answers to this question to examine gender differences in duration of OJT. Employees who receive CLT and/or OJT were also asked to report the main subject of their training, and the person who provided it. We use answers to these questions to examine gender differences in the subject of training received as well as the person who provided it. Finally, employees in our data were also asked "In the past twelve months, was there job-related training offered to you that you decided not to take?" We use

[19] We cannot use the 2005 cross-section of employees because there was no employee survey in 2006 to link them to.
[20] Workers might attrite due to several reasons that we cannot identify in our data such as refusal, unable to contact or locate, absent for duration of survey, own illness, deceased, or unusual or special circumstances. The average attrition rate in our data is not very high compared to other similar data and is around 16 percent.

the answer to this question to examine whether there are any gender differences in probability of rejecting a training offer.

The control variables in our regressions (reported in table 1) are: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, and coarse occupations (6 categories). Some of our regressions also include controls for detailed occupations (47 categories), industry (14 categories), and firm fixed effects. We also use several firm-level characteristics (reported in table 1 and in the online appendix A1) in some of analyses. Finally, we augment our data with occupational characteristics using Career Handbook data by Employment and Social Development Canada and use them to compare occupational differences between men and women and to examine whether they can explain the gender differences in training opportunities.[21]

Table 1 reports weighted sample means separately for men and women in for-profit and non-profit sectors. Around 17 percent of workers in our final sample work in the non-profit sector. We also note that women are significantly over-represented in the non-profit sector. More specifically, 71.4 percent of employees in the non-profit sector are female workers, while this number is only 46.4 percent in the for-profit sector.

In terms of training, while women seem to experience the same incidence of CLT and OJT overall, they are relatively more likely to receive both CLT and OJT in the non-profit sector compared to men. Of note, the CLT incidence for women in the for-profit sector is almost 15% lower than for men. Women also receive fewer CLT courses and this is true for both sectors. Female workers' only advantaged position in the for-profit sector is the longer CLT course duration. They however spend less time on OJT in both for-profit and non-profit sectors. These comparisons highlight notable differences in training opportunities between the for-profit and non-profit sectors that warrant further investigation.

[21] See the following website for more details on the data set and its measures: http://noc.esdc.gc.ca/English/CH/Welcome.aspx?ver=06&sub=0&ch=03

In terms of personal characteristics, women in our sample are, not surprisingly, more likely to have completed college, and are less likely to have education less than high school. They are also less likely to be married, and have fewer children. In terms of job characteristics, they have shorter labour market experience and tenure with employer. There are also clear gender differences in terms of occupation, industry, and firm characteristics.

4. Gender differences in training

4.1. Gender differences in the incidence of OJT and CLT

Table 2 presents our results for gender differences in probability of receiving on-the-job training. These results are from a linear probability model where the dependent variable takes on the value one if a worker received OJT and zero otherwise.[22] Different panels present results for three different samples: all workplaces, for-profit workplaces, and non-profit workplaces. Each column reports results from specifications including different set of covariates. Our most preferred specifications in Table 2 are the ones that include personal and job characteristics, tenure, coarse occupation, and industry (i.e. column 6) as well as workplace fixed effects (column 9).[23]

Looking at all workplaces, less-comprehensive econometric specifications suggest that women are more likely to receive OTJ, but the positive effect quickly disappears once we turn to more complete specifications. Looking separately at for-profit and non-profit sectors, our estimates also suggest that there are no gender differences in the probability of receiving OJT in the for-profit sector. However, we find that in the non-profit sector, females are more likely to receive OJT. More specifically, result from our most preferred specification reported in column (6) suggests that women are 3.1 percentage points more likely to receive OJT in the non-profit sector compared to their male counterparts. Controlling for detailed occupations (column 7) and workplace fixed effects (column 9) makes the estimated gap small and statistically insignificant. Therefore, comparing our results reported in column (6) to those reported in columns (9) suggests that in the

[22] For robustness check, we also use probit to estimate our models. Results from the probit models are very similar to LPM. We choose to use LPM since it is easier to estimate specifications that include workplace fixed effects.

[23] We are reluctant to control for detailed occupational categories in our most preferred specifications because we consider the potential differential sorting of women across different detailed occupations as a mechanism through which gender differences in labour market outcomes, including training opportunities, could manifest themselves as opposed to an independent explanation (Albrecht et al. 2013, Lemieux 2011).

non-profit sector women are on average sorted into workplaces with more OJT opportunities, but within these workplaces they face the same probability of receiving OJT. [24,25]

Table 3 presents coefficient estimates of gender differences in probabilities of receiving classroom training. Similar to OJT, our results show no indication that women are less likely to receive CLT than men when we examine all workplaces. The only exception is column (8) that suggests females are 3.1 percentage points less likely to receive CLT compared to their male peers within the same workplace. However, when we control for coarse occupations this gap disappears. Interestingly, looking at the gender gap in classroom training separately for the non- and for-profit sectors paints a starkly different picture. Similar to our results on OJT, we find strong evidence that women employed in the non-profit sector are more likely to receive CLT (around 4-6 percentage points). However, those employed in the for-profit sector are less likely (around 2-3 percentage points) to receive CLT.

The fact that women are less likely to receive CLT in the for-profit sector could be driven by different factors. First, among for-profit workplaces, women may be disproportionately employed at workplaces that offer fewer CLT opportunities, a so-called *sorting effect*. However, comparing our estimated economy-wide and within-firm gender gaps in CLT in the for-profit sector (i.e. models that exclude and include workplace fixed effects, respectively) does not support this hypothesis. The estimated within-firm gender gap is slightly larger than the estimated economy-wide gap (-3.1 versus -2.1 percentage points), indicating that females do slightly worse within-workplaces than they do economy-wide. This suggests that if anything, in the for-profit sector

[24]Appendix Table A2 shows that estimated coefficients of other covariates are mostly in line with the literature. For example, it shows that workers who receive more firm-sponsored training are younger and more highly educated than those who do not receive such training. Managers also get more firm-sponsored training than all other occupations.

[25]Models that exclude workplace fixed effects estimate economy-wide gender differences in average training outcomes, $\hat{\delta}$. They capture (a) any systematic differences in sorting of men and women into workplaces offering different training opportunities, (b) the correlation between gender and unobserved worker characteristics related to training outcomes (after controlling for X), and (c) firms' preferences for providing training to women relative to men. In contrast, models that include workplace fixed effects measure conditional gender differences in average training outcomes *within firms*, $\tilde{\delta}$ (i.e. (a) is not part of the estimated gap anymore). If $\hat{\delta} < 0$, women are on average less likely to receive training (economy-wide) than men, conditional on their observed characteristics. If $\hat{\delta} < \tilde{\delta} \leq 0$, then one average women are systematically sorted into workplaces with fewer opportunities for training. If $0 \leq \tilde{\delta} < \hat{\delta}$, then on average women are systematically sorted into workplaces with more training opportunities. If $\tilde{\delta} = \hat{\delta} < 0$, then we infer that the average economy-wide difference in training outcomes for women relative to men results entirely from difference in advancement *within* firms rather than systematic sorting of workers into firms with different advancement opportunities.

female workers are (weakly) sorted into workplaces with more training opportunities, but it is within these workplaces that they face disparities in CLT compared to their male peers. Similarly, in the non-profit sector, women are also on average employed at workplaces with more classroom training opportunities. The estimated within-firm gender gap is smaller than the estimated economy-wide gender gap (4.1 versus 6.3 percentage points) suggesting that females perform less well within-workplaces than economy-wide.

Second, it is possible that women are provided as much classroom training opportunities as men but are refusing those opportunities (for example due to other family commitments). We explore this hypothesis, as well as possible gender gaps in other training measures in the next section.

4.2 Gender differences in other measures of training

Table 4 takes a closer look at other related measures of training. With respect to classroom training, panel A examines whether there are any gender differences in the number of courses taken in the last 12 months. Results suggest that the lower incidence of classroom training for women in for-profit workplaces reported in table 3 is paralleled by a lower number of courses. In addition, the estimated within-firm gender gap is twice as large as the economy-wide gap, suggesting that women are on average sorted into firms that offer more courses, but it is within workplaces that they experience a disadvantage in the number of courses taken compared to their male counterparts. This sorting effect is in line with what we also reported previously in table 3.

Panel B looks at the length of classroom training (in days) and finds that females receive longer CLT courses (1.2 days more, or 30 percent more than an average of 3.75) in the for-profit sector which somewhat compensates for their lower probability of receiving CLT and fewer CLT courses received. On the other hand, while we found women in the for-profit sector are more likely to receive CLT, results in panel B suggest that they receive shorter CLT courses compared to their male counterparts (1.5 days less, or 40 percent less than an average of 3.75). Like our previous results, comparing estimates between models that include and exclude firm fixed effects suggests that females do worse within workplaces, which again, suggests that they are on average sorted into workplaces that offer longer CLT and OJT courses. With respect to OJT, Panel C of Table 4 finds no statistically significant differences in duration between men and women.

In panel D, we examine whether there are any gender differences in probability of refusing a training offer. This panel uses a question in the WES that provides information on whether workers

have rejected job-related training offers in the past twelve months. The results suggest that women are 2.3 percentage points less likely to refuse job training offers in for-profit workplaces compared to their male peers. This runs contrary to the idea that women's lower probabilities of receiving CLT in for-profit workplaces are due to their higher propensity to turn down training offers for example due to family commitments.

Other results (reported in online appendix A3) also suggest that our documented gender gaps in training are not reflected by differences in who provided training (e.g. self-learning, supervisor, fellow worker, outside trainer, etc.) and the goal(s) of these training courses. However, there seems to exist some differences in the subject of training received between men and women with women being more (less) likely to receive training in computer hardware and team building, leadership, and communication (apprenticeship). Female's higher probability of receiving training in team building, leadership and communication could be driven by stereotypes in the workplace that perceive women less favorably than men in their management skills (Eagly & Karau 2003). Alternatively, it could be due to genuine gender differences in management skills that requires women to participate in more training in these areas.

To investigate other potential channels that could shed more light on gender differences in training, we explore in the next section whether there are systematic differences in gender gaps in training opportunities among different subgroups of workers.

4.3. Heterogeneous effects

It is well documented that the gender wage gap is larger for married women, for those with young children, and increases with education and age (e.g. Goldin et al, 2017).[26] To find out whether similar patterns hold for training gender gaps, we first we examine whether family responsibilities can explain women' disadvantaged position in the for-profit sector. Women with families may be less likely to invest in training due to time constraints and family responsibilities. For instance, firm-sponsored classroom training is more likely to be provided outside regular working hours or outside the usual workplace, and therefore it might be harder for women to make the arrangements necessary to attend such training. Alternatively, firms might be less likely to offer training

[26] Recent evidence from Norway also suggests that women with families are less likely than other women to move up the career ladder (Kunze 2014).Javdani and McGee (2017) also document a family gap in women's wage returns to promotion.

opportunities to women with families if they believe productivity-enhancing potential of training is smaller for women than for men or if they believe female workers are more likely to leave their job.

To examine this hypothesis, we present coefficient estimates that vary by marital status as well as by whether the worker has dependent children. The results are reported in Tables 5A and 5B. We do not find any meaningful heterogeneous effects in probability of receiving classroom or on-the-job training if we differentiate between single and married women (Table 5A) or if we differentiate between having dependent children or not (Table 5B). However, married women tend to receive fewer CLT courses, which seems to be offset by longer CLT courses. In addition, while single women are similarly likely to turn down a training offer compared to men, married women are less likely to refuse training opportunities. These results therefore do not seem to favor an explanation based on life-cycle fertility decisions for the lower classroom training incidence for women in the for-profit sector, nor do they explain the higher incidence of classroom training in the non-profit sector.

Table 5C investigates the role of labor force attachment in driving training decisions. It uses the fact that new employees are selected into the sample every two years (1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005), and followed for one more year. About one fifth of the employees are no longer at the same workplace in the second year. One notable result is that the lower probability of receiving classroom training is not driven by those with weaker labour force attachments (i.e. those who leave their firm the year after) but rather by those women who stay with the same employer between the two interviews. These results run contrary to the idea that women with weaker labour market attachments are less willing to participate in training, or that employers can identify and exclude these females because of their shorter expected job tenure.

Finally, we examine heterogeneity in gender differences in training by education level which we take as a proxy for skill. Skilled and unskilled workers operate in very different labour markets and therefore the differences we observe in training are likely to be different across these markets. Our results reported in table 5D suggest that females' positive training outcomes (i.e. higher probability of receiving CLT and OJT in the non-profit sector) are mainly driven by those with a bachelor's degree or higher, while their negative training outcomes (i.e. lower probability of receiving CLT in the for-profit sector as well as their shorter CLT courses in the non-profit sector)

are mainly driven by those without a bachelor's degree. One potential explanation for these results is that since lower-educated females have lower labour force participation rates (Statistics Canada 2017), they might face more stereotypes or statistical discrimination. Employers might consider their labour market attachments weaker than men and therefore might be less willing to invest in their training.[27]

5. A model of sorting between for-profit and non-profit sectors

As was discussed above, our results in Table 3 show that while women are more likely to receive CLT in the non-profit sector, they are less likely to receive CLT in the for-profit sector. Several potential explanations for this phenomenon explored previously such as gender differences in sorting across workplaces with different training opportunities, in the probability of taking up training offers, family responsibilities, or in labour market attachment, do not seem to explain these differences. In this section, we look at sample selection, or systematic differences in characteristics of men and women who sort into these two sectors, as another potential explanation for the documented difference between for-profit and non-profit sectors. For example, if jobs in the for-profit sector offer higher wages but have less desirable work environment (including family-friendly working conditions) relative to jobs in the non-profit sector, they might attract male and female workers with systematically different characteristics in a way that could also affect gender differences in training.

To test this hypothesis, we adopt a simultaneous equations model similar to Preston (1990), which is based on an estimation technique developed by Lee (1978). This estimation technique allows us to simultaneously estimate (1) a probit model of sector choice decisions that depend explicitly on expected wage and training differentials between the two sectors; (2) wage regressions for non- and for-profit sectors; (3) training regressions for non- and for-profit sectors. Modeling the sector choice decision allows for the estimation of the wage and gender training gaps accounting for potential self-selection. This model also permits us to perform a structural estimation of the sectoral choice and measure the extent to which gender differences in expected training between the two sectors affects females' over-representation in the non-profit sector.

[27] It could also be that returns to training investments by the employer are higher for workers with more education.

The estimation procedure is as follows. Choice of employment in non-profit sector can be modeled using the following latent variable framework:

$$NP_i^* = \boldsymbol{bZ_i} + e_i \ , \qquad (1a)$$

$$NP_i = 1 \ if \ NP_i^* > 0; \ , \qquad (1b)$$

$$NP_i = 0 \ if \ NP_i^* \leq 0 \ \ , \qquad (1c)$$

in which NP_i^* is the worker's evaluation (or net utility) of employment in the non-profit sector, which is unobservable and determined by a vector of explanatory variables, $\boldsymbol{Z}$. We, however, observe the result of this evaluation (i.e. whether the worker works for the for-profit or non-profit sector), captured with the binary variable NP_i. Gender is one of the variables that determines the employment evaluation, given females' clear over-representation in the non-profit sector. There are, however, more fundamental factors behind females disproportionate sorting into the non-profit sector, such as occupational composition, wage structure, and non-wage benefits, including training opportunities which is the main focus of our study.[28]

Specifically, we assume a worker's choice of employment sector depends on her occupation ($occupation_i$), expected wage differential $\left(lnW_{fp} - lnW_{np}\right)_i$, and expected differences in training opportunities between the for-profit and non-profit sectors $\left(\boldsymbol{TR_{fp}} - \boldsymbol{TR_{np}}\right)_{\boldsymbol{i}}$, where **TR** is a vector of training measures including whether the worker has received CLT, the number of CLT courses, the length of CLT, as well as whether the worker has received OJT and the length of OJT.

Note that the coefficients in the wage and training equations are allowed to differ between for-profit and non-profit sectors. In details, we estimate the following equation system:

$$NP_i^* = \alpha_1 gender_i + \alpha_2 race_i + \alpha_3(occupation_i) + \beta\left(lnW_{fp} - lnW_{np}\right)_i + \boldsymbol{\lambda}\left(\boldsymbol{TR_{fp}} - \boldsymbol{TR_{np}}\right)_i + e_i \ , \qquad (2a)$$

$$lnW_{fp,i} = \boldsymbol{\rho_{fp}} \boldsymbol{X_{fp,i}} + \epsilon_{fp,i} \ , \qquad (2b)$$

$$lnW_{np,i} = \boldsymbol{\rho_{np}} \boldsymbol{X_{np,i}} + \epsilon_{np,i} \ , \qquad (2c)$$

[28] Preston (1990) highlights that "high representation of women *[in the non-profit sector]* may be the result of occupational locus rather than sector choice. Therefore, the vector of explanatory variables in the sector choice equation should include detailed controls for occupation."

$$\boldsymbol{TR_{fp,i}} = \boldsymbol{\theta_{fp}}\boldsymbol{X_{fp,i}} + \vartheta_{fp,i}\ , \qquad (2d)$$

$$\boldsymbol{TR_{np,i}} = \boldsymbol{\theta_{np}}\boldsymbol{X_{np,i}} + \vartheta_{np,i}\ , \qquad (2e)$$

in which $gender_i$ is a female indicator, $race_i$ includes four indicators for ethnicity and immigration status (white Canadian-born (omitted), visible minority Canadian-born, white immigrant, visible minority immigrant), and $Occupation_i$ includes indicators for 47 occupational categories. $\boldsymbol{X}$ includes a vector of observed individual and job characteristics that influence $i's$ wages and training opportunities.[29]

To estimate this simultaneous system of equations involving qualitative and limited dependent variables, we first substitute equations (2b), (2c), (2d), and (2e) into the probability equation (2a). We then estimate the reduced-form probit model and construct selectivity-correction variables $-\frac{f(NP_i)}{F(NP_i)}$ and $\frac{f(NP_i)}{1-F(NP_i)}$ that we include in the non-profit (2b) and for-profit (2c) wage equations, respectively. We do the same for the training equations that involve non-binary training measures.[30] This in turn allows us to construct selectivity-corrected predicted wage/training differentials between the for-profit and non-profit sectors which we then include in the re-estimation of the non-profit sector choice equation (2a).[31]

Preston (1990) shows however that for binary measures "inclusion of selectivity correction variables to the probit equations does not result in the correct adjustment of the error term." Therefore, to consistently estimate the probit equations that include binary training measures, we use a maximum likelihood probit model with sample selection described in Heckman (1976) to produce consistent estimates of $\boldsymbol{\theta_{fp}}$ and $\boldsymbol{\theta_{np}}$ for these binary outcome measures. Specifically, we jointly estimate both the probability of receiving CLT/OJT separately for for-profit and non-profit sectors and a selection equation for working in a non-profit workplace.

[29] These variables include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories).

[30] Lee (1978) shows that inclusion of these terms will render zero mean error terms and therefore OLS estimation of these augmented equations produces consistent estimates of the parameter of interest.

[31] As Preston (1990) points out, this model is identified as long as the number of exogenous variables excluded from the non-profit sector choice equation (i.e. variables in $\boldsymbol{X}$) is greater than the number of endogenous regressors in this equation (i.e. expected difference in wage and the five training measures).

The selection equation includes all the variables in $\boldsymbol{X}$ described above but the identification comes from including additional regressors that affect the probability of working in the non-profit sector but not the probability of receiving training. Specifically, our instruments include firm-level measures of the quality of the labor-management relationship, standardized measures of the firm's benefits, compensation systems, and innovative work practices, as well as quite rate.[32] We argue that these instruments measure factors that influence the decision to work for a non-profit firm but should be unrelated to training outcomes for any given worker conditional on our additional controls. Specifically, our controls for the size of the firm, the proportion of new hires, the proportion of unfilled vacancies, proportion of employees downsized, and log of training expenditures per worker are meant to proxy for the training opportunity at a given firm.

Similar to our wage regressions, we then use these selection-corrected estimates to produce selectivity-corrected predicted probability of classroom or one-the-job training between the for-profit and non-profit sectors which we include in the re-estimation of equation (2a).

5.1 Gender, wages, training, and the decision to work in the non-profit sector

First, examining the estimated coefficients from the wage equations in table 6. Panel A suggests that overall the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector is twice as large as the gap in the non-profit sector (15 versus 7.6 percent). These gaps stay the same after taking into account potential selection into non-profit sector. Results reported in remaining panels similarly suggest that correcting for potential selection bias does not change the estimated gaps in training.

Turning to the choice of employment sector, Table 7 shows estimates of expected change in wage and training opportunities as a result of moving from non-profit to for-profit sector, separately for male and female workers. Keep in mind that we use our selectivity-corrected estimates to construct expected wage differential $\left(lnW_{fp} - lnW_{np}\right)_i$, and expected differences in training opportunities

[32] Quality of labour-management relationship is measured by an indicator that is equal to one for fair and good, and zero for poor. Our z-score measure of innovative work practices (sum of standardized z-scores binary indicators for each firm in a given year) includes (1) Employee suggestion program, (2) Flexible job design, (3) Information sharing with employees, (4) Problem-solving teams, (5) Joint Labour-management committees, (6) Self-directed work groups. Our z-score of non-wage benefits includes (1) Dental care, (2) Pension plan, (3) Group RRSP, (4) Stock purchase or other saving plans, (5) Life insurance plan, (6) Supplemental medical (7) other non-wage benefits. Our z-score for compensation systems includes (1) Productivity/Quality gain-sharing, which are systems that reward individuals on the basis of group output or performance, (2) Individual incentive, such as bonuses, piece-rate, and commissions are systems that reward individuals on the basis of individual output or performance, (3) Merit pay and skill-based pay, which is a reward or honour given for superior qualities, great abilities or expertise that comes from training, practice etc., (4) Profit sharing, which is any plan by which employees receive a share of the profits from the workplace.

$\left(\boldsymbol{TR_{fp} - TR_{np}}\right)_{\boldsymbol{i}}$ for each individual. For females, moving from the non-profit to for-profit sector on average is expected to decrease the log hourly wage by 3 percent, while for men the log hourly wage is expected to increase by around 12 percent.[33,34] As for training opportunities, females' probability of receiving CLT and OJT on average is expected to decrease by around 28 and 40 percentage points, respectively, by moving from the non-profit to the for-profit sector. While men are also expected to experience a decrease in probability of OJT by 12 percentage points, they are expected to experience an increase in probability of CLT by 21 percentage points by moving from non-profit to for-profit sector. Finally, by moving to the for-profit sector females are expected to experience a 6 percent increase in the average number of courses taken, a 22 percent increase in the average length of CLT, and an 11 percent increase in the average length spent on OJT. For men, these numbers are an 18 percent increase, a 32 percent decrease, and a 23 percent increase, respectively. Overall, with the exception of the length of CLT, our results suggest that males are expected to experience significantly larger advantages in terms of wages and training opportunities by moving to the for-profit sector.

Next, to quantify the extent to which these expected differences can account for females' over-representation in the NP sector, we use these estimated expected wage and training differentials to perform an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender difference in the choice of non-profit sector. Decomposition results are reported in table 8 and suggest that gender differences in expected differentials in wages and training opportunities between the for-profit and non-profit sectors explain a large portion of the 17-percentage point gender difference in the probability of working in the non-profit sector. More specifically, gender differences in expected differentials in wages between the two sectors explains 27 percent of the unconditional gender gap, while the gender differences in expected differentials in training opportunities explains around 30 percent of the gap. In other words, if females experienced the same expected increase in wages and training

[33] This is after taking into account potential differences in observed personal and job characteristics, including occupation and industry, and correction for potential selection into non-profit sector.

[34] Our results are in contrast with Hirsch et al. (2017) who use panel estimates of wage changes for workers who move in and out of the non-profit sector and find that "wages in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, on average, differ relatively little for similar workers and jobs." We suspect difference in our results could stem from at least two major issues: (1) workers who move in and out of the non-profit sector are clearly not a random sample of workers as opposed to our estimates that are based on a representative sample of workers; (2) this sample selection is further complicated by the fact that only workers who stay at the same residence are followed between the two consecutive years, which results in panels for only "up to half of the respondents in any given year of the survey".

opportunities enjoyed by their male counterparts as a result of moving to the for-profit sector (summarized in table 7), the gender gap in probability of working in the non-profit sector would drop by 10 percentage points to only 7 percentage points.

Including personal and job characteristics in our decomposition (column 2) increases the portion of the unconditional gender gap explained by these two factors to 48 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Including gender differences in occupational composition (column 3) does not change our results. It only slightly reduces the amount explained by expected wage differentials from 8.2 percentage points to 7 percentage points. Moreover, gender differences in occupational composition negatively explains the gender gap. In other words, if women had the same occupational composition as men, their probability of working in the non-profit sector would have been even higher (by 1 percentage point).

5.2 For-profit and non-profit sectors: differences in workplace characteristics

As an alternative explanation, gender gaps in training could also be due to differences in specific workplace characteristics between for-profit and non-profit sectors.[35] For example, for-profit workplaces might offer less classroom training to women or women could be less capable of extracting training opportunities in these workplaces, a so-called *bargaining effect*. For-profit workplaces might in fact offer less classroom training to women because they believe their returns for doing so are lower, either due to a higher probability of losing their investment because of possible women's lower labor force attachments, or due to their belief that classroom training is less productivity enhancing when provided to women.[36] By identifying key workplace characteristics related to the gender training gap, we thus hope to help clarify and focus attention on the organizational conditions that may influence differential treatment of employees based on gender (Tolbert and Castilla, 2017).

While we cannot examine differences between for-profit and non-profit sectors in terms of unobserved characteristics that could drive gender gaps in training, such as discriminatory behaviour or workers' bargaining power, we can investigate differences in observed characteristics

[35] For example, Preston (1990) provides evidence that suggests women's over-representation in non-profit sector is mainly driven by different compensation structures, occupational composition, and the type of opportunities and responsibilities provided to women in this sector that are not available to them in the for-profit sector.

[36] It is important to note that even if these assumptions about females are on average correct, it does not rule out the possibility of statistical discrimination against women when it comes to gender disparities in provision of training opportunities.

between the two sectors. To do so we estimate linear probability models with indicator for non-profit employment as the dependent variable and a wide set of individual and job characteristics as explanatory factors. Table 9 reports results from this model. Estimates in column (2) suggest that compared to the for-profit sector, non-profit workplaces on average are more likely to offer OJT, less likely to offer CLT, and have more female workers, fewer visible minority immigrant workers, more educated workers, fewer fulltime workers, more unionized workers, and more workers with longer tenure.

In column (3) we further include industry indicators. Interestingly, the difference in provision of CLT and OJT documented in the first two columns disappears after we add controls for industry. This suggests that differences across industries in the provision of CLT and OJT opportunities drive differences in average training opportunities between the for-profit and non-profit sectors documented in column (2). Results in column (3) also suggest that, within industries, women are equally likely to be employed in the for-profit and non-profit sectors. This suggests that female's over-representation in the non-profit sector is due to their sorting into industries that are more likely to be in the non-profit sector. Our results show that the top three industries dominating the employment in the non-profit sector are Education and Health Services; Real States, Rental and Leasing Operations; and Information and Cultural Industries. Adding indicators for coarse occupations in column (4) also suggest that workers in the non-profit sector are more likely to be professionals and managers, compared to the for-profit sector.

Table 10 reports results from similar specifications, but this time including different firm-level characteristics as explanatory variables. Our results suggest that non-profit workplaces are on average larger, less likely to be foreign-owned, less likely to face competition, more likely to have a formal/informal grievance system, have fewer full-time employees, more likely to provide benefits, more likely to have innovative work practices in their workplace, less likely to have incentive schemes in their compensation system, and have lower quit rates. These differences hold even after taking into account industry, occupation, and worker characteristics. Finally, in terms of skill measures, we find that non-profit workplaces on average require more general learning ability, but less numerical and verbal ability. In terms of interests, they are more directive, innovative and methodical but less objective or social. The work conditions in non-profit firms are also less likely to be subjected to discomforts. In terms of education and training requirements,

they are more likely to require no formal education or training, as well as apprenticeship and specialized training.

In summary, recall that, one the one hand, results reported in table 3 suggested that in the non-profit (for-profit) sector, women are more likely (less likely) to receive CLT compared to their male counterparts who are employed in the same industry. On the other hand, results reported in tables 9 and 10 suggest that there are no differences in average training opportunities within industries between the non-profit and the for-profit sectors. Together, these two sets of results seem to suggest that women's positive (negative) training gap in the non-profit (for-profit) sector is not driven by the abundance or scarcity of training opportunities in different industries where women are over-represented or under-represented. These gender differences operate within industries and seem to be rather driven by other industry-specific or sector-specific factors that are more favourable to women, at least in terms of training and wages.

One possible explanation for these results is Sape (1993) who develops a model that shows that the proportion of women in the bargaining unit affects their bargaining power and ability to extract rents. This is consistent with our finding that in the non-profit sector where females are over-represented, they receive more training compared to their male counterparts, and also experience smaller wage gaps, while in the for-profit sector where they are under-represented they receive lower training opportunities, and face larger wage gaps. Altonji and Blank (1999) also formulate a model of discrimination and segregation where technology used by one sector (e.g. fewer possibilities to balance working responsibilities and family activities) could make certain groups of workers, such as women with families, less productive and affect their labour market outcomes. Another (complementary) explanation is that female-dominated industries or occupations might engage less in discriminatory behavior, while females in male-dominated industries and occupations might have to compete harder for training opportunities.

6. Does training explain gender wage gaps in the for-and non-profit sectors

Since classroom training is generally thought as being more productivity enhancing than on-the-job training, and has a bigger impact on wages (Dostie 2013; Zwick 2005; Barrett and O'Connell 2001; Black and Lynch 1996), our results suggest that women are likely to suffer from human capital under-investment by participating less in CLT. This under-investment is then likely to

explain part of the gender wage gap. In this section, we thus use the Oaxaca-Blinder method to separately decompose the gender wage gap in the two sectors and investigate whether gender differences in training opportunities between the two sectors can explain some of the gender wage gap, and whether this is different between the two sectors.

Table 11 illustrates these results. We find that the unconditional gender wage gap is significantly larger in the for-profit compared to the non-profit sector (29 versus 16 percent). Gender differences in observed characteristics explains 55 and 59 percent of the gender wage gap in the for-profit and non-profit sectors respectively. While gender differences in training do not explain any of the gender wage gap in the non-profit sector (column 2), they explain a small part (2.2 percent) of the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector (column 6). It also worth highlighting that in terms of overall explained and unexplained portions of the gender wage gap, in the for-profit sector, the addition of training increases the explained part by 2.5 percent, while in the non-profit sector in actually decreases the explained part by around 4.5 percent. This is consistent with our results that women experience positive (negative) gaps in training in the non-profit (for-profit) sector.

Finally, we would like to note that while training seems to contribute little to the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector, it only measures the effect of gender differences in training received over the course of one year (the reference category for all training measures is the last 12 months before the survey). Training received over the course of one's career, and its indirect impact on wages through its effect on promotions, job mobility, as well as productivity, could quickly compound to a significant impact on wages.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, although we do not find any evidence of gender gaps in participation in firm-sponsored classroom and on-the-job training on average, we do find some startling differences when we compare the for- and non-profits sectors. We find that women in the for-profit sector are both less likely to receive classroom training and receive shorter classroom training courses. The reverse is true in the non-profit sector, women being more likely to receive both classroom and on-the-job training, and also receiving longer classroom training courses.

We find no evidence that the negative training gaps experienced by women in the for-profit sector are driven by their (1) differential sorting in workplaces with less training opportunities, (2) higher

refusal rates of training opportunities, (3) family commitments or responsibilities as proxied by marital status and the presence of children, or (4) weaker labour force attachment. However, some results seem to indicate differential training outcomes by education (skill), with higher-educated women mainly enjoying a positive gap in CLT in the non-profit sector and the lower-educated women mainly facing a negative gap in training in the for-profit sector.

We then estimate an endogenous switching regression model to investigate whether self-selection into the for- or non-profit sector can explain these gender training gaps. Our results indicate that gender training gaps cannot be explained by systematic differences in observed or unobserved characteristics between male and female workers who sort into the non-profit and for-profit sectors. Moreover, we find that after accounting for self-selection, men are expected to reap big wage gains (around 12 percent) if they move to the for-profit sector, while women are expected to experience a wage reduction (around 3 percent). In terms of expected changes in training, women are expected to gain significant increases in probability of receiving CLT and OJT (28 and 40 percentage points, respectively) by moving to the non-profit sector. While men are also estimated to experience an expected increase in probability of receiving OJT (12 percentage points) by moving to the non-profit sector, they are expected to experience a significant decrease (21 percentage points) in the probability of participating in CLT.

Overall, these results suggest employment in the for-profit sector is associated with large wage and training premiums for men. For women, it seems to be associated with significant penalties in terms of both wages and training opportunities. Using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, we find that expected differentials in wages between the two sectors explains 27 percent of females' over-representation in the non-profit sector and expected differences in training explain another 30 percent.

Based on these findings, we are left to conclude that the gender gaps in training are due to differences in workplace-specific characteristics between for-profit and non-profit sectors. One of the potential contributory factors consistent with this idea is discriminatory behaviour by employer. For example, if jobs in the non-profit sector are more family-friendly and less subjected to stereotypes about females, then females will be subjected to less discriminatory behaviour in the non-profit sector and experience better training and wage outcomes, as our results suggest.

These differences in working conditions, stereotypes, and discriminatory behaviour between the two sectors could be driven by different technologies that dictate different treatments (Altonji and Blank 1999), or higher proportion of women in the non-profit sector due to occupational locus (Preston 1990). There are non-discriminatory factors that could be also responsible for these differences such as bargaining effect and the ability to extract training from workplaces (Sape 1990), specific workplace characteristics linked to the returns to training and the unobserved ability of the worker, or organizational processes within workplaces which leads to stratification in training opportunities (Tolbert and Castilla, 2017).

Finally, we investigate the extent to which the gender gap in training can explain the gender wage gap in for-profit and non-profit sectors. Results from Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions suggest that while gender differences in training do not explain any of the gender wage gap in the non-profit sector, it explains a small part (2.2 percent) of the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector. We argue that while this effect might seem small, it only measures the effect of gender differences in training received over the course of one year. Training received over the course of one's career, and its indirect impact on wages through its effect on promotions, job mobility, and productivity could quickly compound to a significant impact on wages.

On the policy front, our results indicate that there could be some role for supporting workplace female-friendly policies geared toward providing women with more training (Huffman, King and Reichelt 2017). In doing so, studying the practices and work culture in non-profit organizations could provide some helpful insights. The fact that the training gaps in the for-profit sector seem to be entirely driven by disparities within firms, together with women's better training opportunities in more female-dominated workplaces/industries, also seem to suggest that paying attention to women's labour market opportunities should not be limited to their access to certain workplaces or industries. In order to further improve females' labour market outcomes we also require policies that could continue to support women within their workplaces, for example by ensuring that they receive equal opportunities for promotion and training, and could mitigate male-oriented cultures and norms that put women in disadvantaged positions within their workplace.

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Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Men			Women		
	For-profit	**Non-profit**	**Total**	**For-profit**	**Non-profit**	**Total**
% received CLT in the last 12 months	0.362	0.462	0.375	0.315	0.508	0.373
Number of courses for CLT in the past 12 months	2.539	2.654	2.557	2.394	2.637	2.493
Time spent on CLT (in days)	3.575	4.131	3.664	4.487	3.09	3.917
% received OJT in the last 12 months	0.291	0.32	0.295	0.292	0.348	0.309
Time spent on OJT (in days)	7.707	5.381	7.38	6.879	4.559	6.096
% who declined the offer of OJT	0.094	0.242	0.114	0.073	0.218	0.117
Education:						
MSC, PHD, Degree in medicine	0.033	0.166	0.050	0.021	0.090	0.042
Teachers college, university above BSC	0.017	0.050	0.021	0.018	0.035	0.023
BSC	0.127	0.223	0.14	0.12	0.197	0.143
Some university, university below BSC	0.079	0.088	0.080	0.084	0.086	0.084
College completed	0.166	0.174	0.167	0.24	0.283	0.253
Trade-vocational, some college, industry certified, other	0.261	0.179	0.251	0.219	0.183	0.208
High school graduate	0.178	0.074	0.165	0.206	0.093	0.172
Less than high school	0.136	0.044	0.124	0.091	0.032	0.074
Marital status:						
Married	0.619	0.650	0.623	0.578	0.605	0.586
Common-law	0.147	0.126	0.144	0.138	0.120	0.133
Separated	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.038	0.027	0.034
Divorced	0.035	0.039	0.035	0.075	0.083	0.077
Widowed	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.015	0.013	0.014
Single	0.17	0.158	0.168	0.156	0.151	0.154
Ethnicity and Immigration status:						
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.014	0.019	0.015	0.020	0.011	0.017
White immigrant	0.113	0.133	0.116	0.105	0.103	0.104
Visible minority immigrant	0.099	0.055	0.093	0.105	0.048	0.087
White Canadian-born	0.773	0.792	0.776	0.771	0.837	0.791
Number of children						
Zero	0.473	0.48	0.474	0.503	0.495	0.5
One	0.177	0.176	0.177	0.19	0.164	0.183
Two	0.248	0.251	0.249	0.223	0.258	0.233
Three	0.079	0.069	0.078	0.070	0.063	0.068
Four or more	0.021	0.024	0.022	0.014	0.018	0.015
Age:						
25 to 29	0.116	0.081	0.112	0.130	0.088	0.118
30 to 34	0.153	0.106	0.147	0.138	0.110	0.13
35 to 39	0.169	0.124	0.163	0.173	0.134	0.161
40 to 44	0.175	0.168	0.174	0.183	0.175	0.181
45 to 49	0.152	0.165	0.154	0.158	0.192	0.168
50 to 54	0.121	0.178	0.129	0.114	0.162	0.129
55 to 59	0.079	0.129	0.085	0.069	0.109	0.081
60 to 64	0.034	0.048	0.036	0.034	0.031	0.033
Actual (full-time) labour market experience	19.93	21.21	20.1	16.62	16.93	16.71
Years of tenure with current employer	9.357	11.75	9.667	7.656	10.89	8.624
Full-time	0.904	0.623	0.868	0.632	0.436	0.574
Member of a union or collective bargaining agreement	0.219	0.626	0.272	0.133	0.620	0.279

Table 1 (continued): summary statistics

	Men			Women		
	For-profit	**Non-profit**	**Total**	**For-profit**	**Non-profit**	**Total**
Industry:						
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction	0.055	0.029	0.052	0.025	0.004	0.019
Communication and other utilities						
Manufacturing	0.286	0.013	0.251	0.150	0.002	0.106
Construction	0.080	0.018	0.072	0.022	0.002	0.016
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale	0.166	0.022	0.147	0.099	0.003	0.071
Retail trade and consumer services	0.196	0.025	0.174	0.303	0.021	0.219
Finance and insurance	0.033	0.014	0.030	0.090	0.014	0.067
Real estate, rental and leasing operations	0.015	0.030	0.017	0.021	0.009	0.017
Business services	0.117	0.034	0.106	0.143	0.023	0.107
Education and health services	0.015	0.778	0.115	0.109	0.892	0.344
Information and cultural industries	0.035	0.032	0.035	0.036	0.024	0.033
Occupation:						
Managers	0.195	0.137	0.187	0.112	0.057	0.095
Professionals	0.108	0.420	0.149	0.114	0.439	0.211
Technical/Traders	0.531	0.360	0.509	0.348	0.279	0.327
Marketing/Sales	0.035	0.002	0.031	0.124	0.009	0.089
Clerical/Administrative	0.061	0.045	0.059	0.245	0.163	0.221
Production Workers	0.069	0.035	0.064	0.057	0.052	0.055
Firm size:						
1 to 19	0.305	0.097	0.278	0.387	0.111	0.305
20 to 99	0.355	0.152	0.328	0.329	0.193	0.289
100 to 499	0.229	0.211	0.227	0.203	0.202	0.202
500 and more	0.111	0.540	0.167	0.080	0.494	0.204
Firm characteristics:						
Quite rate	0.088	0.049	0.083	0.103	0.059	0.089
Proportion of full-time workers	0.841	0.601	0.810	0.710	0.548	0.661
Log of training expenditures per worker	3.576	4.579	3.706	3.072	4.491	3.497
Sum of different benefits z-scores	-0.879	0.828	-0.658	-1.637	1.048	-0.833
Sum of different innovative work practices z-scores	-0.411	1.244	-0.197	-0.649	1.721	0.060
Sum of different compensation schemes z-scores	0.132	-1.640	-0.097	-0.028	-1.644	-0.512
Indicator for labour-management relationship being good	0.693	0.906	0.72	0.653	0.918	0.732
N	38704	4629	43333	25113	8605	33718

Note: All means are computed using sample weights provided in the data. Statistics Canada does not permit reporting these means without using the weights.

We include 14 industry categories in our regressions. However, due to confidentiality restrictions imposed by Statistics Canada, we need to collapse some of the industries together in our table of summary statistics when we report sample means.

Non-wage benefits include dental care, life insurance, supplemental medical, pension plan, group RRSP, stock purchase. Compensation practices include group incentive systems (productivity/quality gain-sharing), individual incentive systems (bonus, piece-rate, and commissions), merit pay and skill-based pay, and profit sharing. Innovative work practices include employee suggestion programs, flexible job design, information sharing with employees, problem-solving teams, joint labour-management committees, self-directed work groups.

Table 2: Gender differences in probability of receiving OTJ training (Linear Probability Model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
All workplaces									
Female	0.014*	0.022***	0.023***	0.016*	0.006	0.010	0.004	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N					77051				
Non-profit workplaces									
Female	0.028	0.031*	0.032*	0.030*	0.017	0.031*	0.017	0.009	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
N					13228				
For-profit workplaces									
Female	0.001	0.017*	0.017*	0.011	0.005	0.006	0.003	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
N					63813				
Controls:									
Personal and job characteristics		YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Tenure			YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Occupation (coarse)				YES		YES			YES
Occupation (detailed)					YES		YES		
Industry						YES	YES		
Workplace fixed effects								YES	YES

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Personal and job characteristics include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement.

Table 3: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
All workplaces									
Female	-0.002	0.003	0.003	0.010	-0.001	-0.006	-0.007	-0.031***	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N					77051				
Non-profit									
Female	0.047**	0.051***	0.053***	0.057***	0.030	0.063***	0.034*	0.032*	0.041**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)
					13228				
For-profit									
Female	-0.047***	-0.021**	-0.021**	-0.011	-0.012	-0.021**	-0.017*	-0.049***	-0.031***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
N					63813				
Controls:									
Personal/job characteristics		YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Tenure			YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Occupation (coarse)				YES		YES			YES
Occupation (detailed)					YES		YES		
Industry						YES	YES		
Workplace fixed effects								YES	YES

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Personal and job characteristics include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement.

Table 4: (most preferred specifications)

A: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.104	-0.171*	-0.139	-0.273**	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.146)	(0.155)
N	29915		23425		6480	

B: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
Female	0.430	0.206	1.198**	1.135*	-1.487**	-1.804**
	(0.460)	(0.499)	(0.588)	(0.621)	(0.709)	(0.736)
N	29915		23425		6480	

C: Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
Female	0.115	0.372	0.300	0.772	-0.445	-0.524
	(0.775)	(0.901)	(0.981)	(1.157)	(0.833)	(1.105)
N	21945		17515		4410	

D: Gender differences in probability of rejecting job-related training offer
Population: All employees

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
Female	-0.023***	-0.014*	-0.023***	-0.017**	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.019)
N	77051		63813		13228	
Controls:						
Personal and job characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
tenure	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Occupation (coarse)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry	YES		YES		YES	
Workplace fixed effects		YES		YES		YES

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 5A: by Marital status (most preferred specifications)

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(single)	0.004	-0.016	-0.014	-0.037**	0.077**	0.053*
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Female * I(married)	-0.011	-0.013	-0.026**	-0.030***	0.065***	0.043**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.020)
N	77051		63813		13228	
B: Gender differences in probability of receiving OJ training						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(single)	0.021	0.007	0.026	0.009	0.021	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Female * I(married)	0.008	-0.004	0.001	-0.011	0.038*	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.021)
N	77051		63813		13228	
C: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(single)	0.049	-0.030	0.005	-0.072	0.043	0.022
	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.226)	(0.231)	(0.180)	(0.202)
Female * I(married)	-0.146*	-0.224**	-0.189*	-0.362***	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.085)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.120)	(0.175)	(0.175)
N	29915		23425		6480	
D: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(single)	0.213	0.149	0.920	1.054	-1.910*	-1.746
	(0.568)	(0.552)	(0.668)	(0.698)	(1.068)	(1.142)
Female * I(married)	0.508	0.296	1.313*	1.258	-1.374	-1.860**
	(0.581)	(0.605)	(0.736)	(0.771)	(0.887)	(0.894)
N	29915		23425		6480	
E Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training						
Female * I(single)	0.434	0.038	0.704	0.117	-0.353	-0.534
	(1.400)	(1.851)	(1.715)	(2.357)	(0.995)	(1.126)
Female * I(married)	0.244	0.460	0.545	0.924	-0.455	-0.412
	(0.963)	(0.849)	(1.252)	(1.058)	(0.960)	(1.259)
N	21945		17515		4410	
F: Gender differences in probability of rejecting job-related training offer						
Population: All employees						
Female * I(single)	-0.000	-0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.014
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Female * I(married)	-0.029***	-0.016**	-0.031***	-0.022***	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.020)
N	77051		63813		13228	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Comparison group is all males (regardless of their marital status).

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 5B: by existence of children (most preferred specifications)

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(with children)	-0.010	-0.009	-0.019	-0.025*	0.051*	0.047*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female * I(without children)	-0.003	-0.015	-0.024*	-0.033***	0.084***	0.041*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.023)
N	77051		63813		13228	
B: Gender differences in probability of receiving OJ training						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(with children)	0.015	-0.007	0.012	-0.008	0.034*	-0.004
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Female * I(without children)	0.010	0.005	0.009	0.001	0.029	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.026)
N	77051		63813		13228	
C: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(with children)	-0.187*	-0.279**	-0.225**	-0.460***	-0.114	-0.062
	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.144)	(0.229)	(0.212)
Female * I(without children)	-0.052	-0.069	-0.116	-0.102	0.155	0.095
	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.145)	(0.157)	(0.125)	(0.140)
N	29915		23425		6480	
D: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(with children)	-0.035	-0.114	0.367	0.552	-1.020	-1.497*
	(0.317)	(0.443)	(0.350)	(0.502)	(0.646)	(0.794)
Female * I(without children)	0.761	0.397	1.892*	1.540	-2.116*	-2.097*
	(0.810)	(0.808)	(1.022)	(1.041)	(1.284)	(1.225)
N	29915		23425		6480	
E: Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training						
Female * I(with children)	-0.936	0.245	-0.780	0.459	-1.204	-0.888
	(0.843)	(1.097)	(1.020)	(1.360)	(1.325)	(1.707)
Female * I(without children)	1.330	0.846	1.554	1.498	-0.052	-0.549
	(1.311)	(1.291)	(1.634)	(1.685)	(0.816)	(0.997)
N	21945		17515		4410	
F: Gender differences in probability of rejecting job-related training offer						
Population: All employees						
Female * I(with children)	-0.027***	-0.008	-0.031***	-0.018**	-0.002	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Female * I(without children)	-0.018**	-0.019**	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.022	-0.038
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.024)
N	77051		63813		13228	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Comparison group is all males (regardless of whether they have children or not).

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 5C: by transition status in the second interview year (most preferred specifications)

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	0.181**	0.231	0.183*	0.260	0.396***	0.241**
	(0.086)	(0.155)	(0.097)	(0.185)	(0.107)	(0.116)
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	0.011	-0.008	-0.053	-0.094	0.268***	0.255***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.080)	(0.082)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	0.057	0.038	0.065	0.084	0.063	-0.205
	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.188)	(0.153)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	0.004	0.009	-0.004	0.030	0.163	0.077
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.114)	(0.128)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	0.089	0.095	0.040	0.039	0.364**	0.390***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.147)	(0.126)
Female * I(same employer)	-0.016	-0.022**	-0.035***	-0.042***	0.048**	0.023
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.024)
N	46530		38330		8187	
B: Gender differences in probability of receiving OJ training						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	0.052	0.150	0.137*	0.255	-0.537***	-0.586***
	(0.119)	(0.259)	(0.074)	(0.245)	(0.112)	(0.134)
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	0.048	0.003	0.036	-0.028	0.036	0.050
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.128)	(0.148)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	-0.028	-0.036	-0.004	-0.010	-0.215*	-0.153
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.121)	(0.128)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	0.016	0.066	0.006	0.075	0.132	0.152
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.115)	(0.109)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	0.136*	0.131	0.072	0.063	0.341*	0.336
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.192)	(0.206)
Female * I(same employer)	0.011	0.005	0.011	0.007	0.021	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.020)
N	46530		38330		8187	
C: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	-0.377	-0.672	0.123	0.309	No obs	No obs
	(1.132)	(0.844)	(1.164)	(0.711)		
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	0.558	-0.233	0.895	-0.021	-0.517	-0.916
	(0.409)	(0.284)	(0.691)	(0.482)	(0.558)	(0.604)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	0.770	0.954	0.261	-0.083	2.658*	4.579***
	(0.598)	(0.806)	(0.526)	(0.515)	(1.387)	(1.768)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	-0.314	-0.605	-0.402	-0.504	0.187	-0.718
	(0.551)	(0.669)	(0.626)	(0.687)	(0.434)	(0.959)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	1.674	2.068	-0.559	-0.534	5.551	5.236
	(2.136)	(2.354)	(0.438)	(0.461)	(4.589)	(4.267)
Female * I(same employer)	-0.009	-0.006	0.022	-0.017	-0.100	-0.041
	(0.094)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.197)	(0.212)
N	17990		14050		3930	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Comparison group is all males (regardless of their transition status).

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 5C (continued): by transition status in the second interview year (most preferred specifications)

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
D: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	-0.467	-2.144	0.384	-1.157	No obs	No obs
	(1.984)	(2.600)	(2.567)	(3.701)		
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	0.116	3.841	-0.106	4.947	-0.278	0.090
	(0.817)	(2.610)	(1.210)	(3.033)	(1.509)	(1.923)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	-2.230	-2.136	-1.749	-1.083	-6.170	-7.310
	(1.632)	(2.252)	(1.791)	(2.646)	(4.194)	(4.486)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	3.498	-2.659	8.548	0.620	-49.23*	-53.06*
	(5.470)	(3.517)	(6.646)	(2.591)	(29.53)	(29.88)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	-1.453	-1.331	-0.951	-0.775	-4.663	-5.237
	(1.293)	(1.410)	(1.430)	(1.799)	(5.945)	(6.306)
Female * I(same employer)	0.817	0.696	1.277*	1.296	-0.083	-0.076
	(0.557)	(0.663)	(0.735)	(0.860)	(0.514)	(0.516)
N	17990		14050		3930	
E: Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	-2.978	-4.365	5.627	-4.045	2.658	-1.208
	(3.016)	(3.010)	(4.727)	(8.541)	(3.740)	(4.358)
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	9.852	11.02	19.78	20.03	-0.046	-0.934
	(8.530)	(7.497)	(15.57)	(13.10)	(2.557)	(4.168)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	-3.323	-1.052	-2.388	-0.556	-8.273	-3.261
	(5.675)	(4.681)	(6.088)	(5.067)	(14.76)	(12.60)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	14.02	13.51	19.42	20.28	1.596	-0.338
	(12.14)	(12.03)	(16.17)	(16.25)	(1.995)	(3.254)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	-10.95	-11.64	-13.95*	-13.88*	0.804	-2.492
	(7.511)	(7.700)	(8.194)	(8.276)	(2.365)	(3.814)
Female * I(same employer)	-0.353	0.041	-0.484	-0.080	-0.233	-0.040
	(0.873)	(1.244)	(1.092)	(1.565)	(1.173)	(1.625)
N	12695		10100		2580	
F: Gender differences in probability of rejecting job-related training offer						
Population: All employees						
Female * I(no employer & quit due to family issues)	-0.003	-0.044	-0.018	-0.029	0.213**	-0.012
	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Female * I(no employer & quit due to non-family issues)	0.020	0.002	-0.008	-0.048**	0.167*	0.198**
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.093)
Female * I(no employer & quit involuntarily)	0.033	-0.003	0.050	0.024	-0.078	-0.186
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.121)
Female * I(new employer & quit voluntarily)	-0.008	0.004	-0.036	-0.016	0.245**	0.196*
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.113)	(0.103)
Female * I(new employer & quit involuntarily)	-0.043	-0.031	-0.040	-0.000	-0.028	-0.144
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.116)	(0.150)
Female * I(same employer)	-0.018**	-0.007	-0.016**	-0.008	-0.027	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)
N	46530		38330		8187	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Comparison group is all males (regardless of their transition status).

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 5D: by education (most preferred specifications)

	All workplaces		For-profit		Non-profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(with bachelor)	0.061***	0.038**	0.035	0.013	0.104***	0.074***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Female * I(without bachelor)	-0.028***	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.044***	0.033	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.023)
N	77051		63813		13228	
B: Gender differences in probability of receiving OJ training						
Population: All workers						
Female * I(with bachelor)	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.012	0.016	-0.016
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female * I(without bachelor)	0.012	-0.005	0.005	-0.013	0.058**	0.034
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.024)
N	77051		63813		13228	
C: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(with bachelor)	-0.141	-0.098	-0.159	-0.170	-0.143	-0.159
	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.125)	(0.173)	(0.260)	(0.240)
Female * I(without bachelor)	-0.050	-0.186	-0.087	-0.269	0.160	0.187
	(0.107)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.170)	(0.141)	(0.161)
N	29915		23425		6480	
D: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job						
Female * I(with bachelor)	0.039	0.449	0.672	1.613**	-0.964	-1.355
	(0.435)	(0.602)	(0.517)	(0.803)	(0.795)	(0.920)
Female * I(without bachelor)	0.542	0.141	1.337*	1.119	-2.036*	-2.503**
	(0.615)	(0.650)	(0.728)	(0.761)	(1.188)	(1.196)
N	29915		23425		6480	
E: Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)						
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training						
Female * I(with bachelor)	1.217	0.011	1.513	0.382	0.286	-0.141
	(1.413)	(1.091)	(2.074)	(1.681)	(0.585)	(0.725)
Female * I(without bachelor)	-0.509	0.650	-0.196	1.066	-1.987	-1.721
	(0.861)	(1.238)	(1.023)	(1.461)	(1.348)	(1.858)
N	21945		17515		4410	
F: Gender differences in probability of rejecting job-related training offer						
Population: All employees						
Female * I(with bachelor)	-0.037***	-0.023*	-0.033**	-0.028*	-0.039	-0.028
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Female * I(without bachelor)	-0.017***	-0.010	-0.017***	-0.012*	-0.003	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.021)
N	77051		63813		13228	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Comparison group is all males (regardless of their education).

Control variables in the most preferred specifications include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories). The second column for each group (columns 2, 4, ad 6) includes the same control variables as well as firm fixed effects.

Table 6: Correcting for sample selection

	For-profit		Non-profit	
	No Correction	With Correction	No Correction	With Correction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A: Gender Wage Gap				
Population: All workers				
Female	-0.150***	-0.150***	-0.076***	-0.076***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.015)
N	63813		13228	
B: Gender differences in probability of receiving classroom training (Linear Probability Model)				
Population: All workers				
Female	-0.018*	-0.018*	0.069***	0.062***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.017)
N	63813		13228	
C: Gender differences in probability of receiving OJ training				
Population: All workers				
Female	0.008	0.007	0.038**	0.038**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)
N	63813		13228	
D: Gender differences in the number of classroom training courses taken in the last 12 months				
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job				
Female	-0.139	-0.139	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.146)	(0.146)
N	23425		6479	
E: Gender differences in the length of the classroom training courses (measured in days)				
Population: All employees who have received classroom training related to their job				
Female	1.198**	1.199**	-1.487**	-1.486**
	(0.588)	(0.587)	(0.709)	(0.710)
N	23425		6479	
F: Gender differences in time spent for on-the-job training (measured in days)				
Population: All employees who have received on-the-job training				
Female	0.300	0.300	-0.445	-0.444
	(0.981)	(0.981)	(0.833)	(0.833)
N	17516		4412	

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Control variables include: the highest level of schooling (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent children (5 categories), immigration and visible minority status (4 categories), a quadratic in years of (actual) full-time labour market experience, a quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time employment, and an indicator for membership in a union or collective bargaining agreement, coarse occupation (6 categories), industry (14 categories).

Table 7: Gender differences in expected differentials in wage and training opportunities between the for-profit and non-profit sectors ($\overline{X_{FP} - X_{Np}}$)

	Females	Males
Log hourly wage	-0.029	0.122
Probability of Classroom Training	-0.276	0.213
Probability of on-the-job training	-0.395	-0.122
Number of courses taken	0.156	0.454
Length of courses taken	0.850	-1.176
Length of time spent on on-the-job-training	0.670	1.674
N	33718	43333

Table 8: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of gender difference in probability of working in the non-profit sector

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Probability of employment in the non-profit sector (males)	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Probability of employment in the non-profit sector (females)	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Raw gap in the probability of working in the non-profit sector	-0.170***	-0.170***	-0.170***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Explained	-0.098***	-0.221***	-0.188***
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unexplained	-0.071***	0.051**	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Explained by differences in characteristics			
Expected Wage Difference	-0.046***	-0.082***	-0.070***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Expected Training Difference	-0.052***	-0.077***	-0.071***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Marital Status		0.003***	0.003**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Children		0.000	-0.000*
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Age		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Experience		-0.003**	-0.003*
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Job Characteristics		-0.058***	-0.053***
		(0.006)	(0.005)
Ethnicity		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Year		0.000**	0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Occupation			0.010***
			(0.003)

Notes: Decomposition is performed using sample weights provided in the data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 8 (Continued): Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of gender difference in probability of working in the non-profit sector

Explained by differences in returns to characteristics			
Expected Wage Difference	-0.013***	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Expected Training Difference	0.027***	0.031***	0.022***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Education		-0.000	-0.001
		(0.005)	(0.005)
Marital Status		-0.020	-0.030**
		(0.015)	(0.015)
Children		0.012	-0.007
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Age		-0.031	-0.046**
		(0.020)	(0.021)
Experience		0.058***	0.052**
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Job Characteristics		-0.167***	-0.113***
		(0.021)	(0.024)
Ethnicity		-0.034**	-0.014
		(0.016)	(0.017)
Year		-0.000	0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Occupation			-0.004
			(0.005)
Constant	-0.085***	0.205***	0.164***
	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.043)
N	77051	77051	77051

Notes: Decomposition is performed using sample weights provided in the data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 9: Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, occupation, and industry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Training:					
Employee has received Classroom training	-0.055***	-0.035***	-0.009***	-0.007**	-0.007***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employee has received On-the-job training	0.031***	0.032***	0.008	0.004	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Employee characteristics:					
Female		0.118***	-0.005	-0.005	-0.001
		(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Visible Minority Canadian-born		-0.025	-0.007	-0.008	-0.003
		(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
White immigrant		-0.001	0.004	0.004	0.005
		(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Visible minority immigrant		-0.081***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.024***
		(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Bachelor degree or higher		0.179***	0.056***	0.030***	0.024***
		(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Married		0.003	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006
		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Number of children		0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age		0.004	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age^2		-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Years of experience		-0.003**	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.002***
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Years of experience^2		0.003	0.005**	0.005***	0.006***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fulltime worker		-0.154***	-0.038***	-0.040***	-0.037***
		(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Union or collective bargaining		0.330***	0.119***	0.120***	0.122***
		(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Tenure		0.005***	0.001	0.001	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Tenure squared		-0.011***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 9 (continued): Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, occupation, and industry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Industry:					
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction			-0.000	-0.007	-0.004
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing			0.013	0.010	0.009
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Secondary product manufacturing			0.010	0.006	0.007
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing			0.003	-0.001	-0.000
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Construction			0.040**	0.039**	0.039**
			(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale			0.030*	0.027	0.027*
			(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Communication and other utilities			0.096***	0.091***	0.092***
			(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Retail trade and consumer services			0.038*	0.038*	0.046**
			(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Finance and insurance			0.062***	0.049**	0.052**
			(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Real estate, rental and leasing operations			0.200***	0.197***	0.195***
			(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Business services			0.061***	0.042*	0.045**
			(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Education and health services			0.732***	0.706***	0.712***
			(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Information and cultural industries			0.140***	0.121***	0.118***
			(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.035)
Coarse Occupation:					
Managers				0.029*	
				(0.017)	
Professionals				0.087***	
				(0.021)	
Technical/Traders				-0.002	
				(0.015)	
Marketing/Sales				-0.015	
				(0.020)	
Clerical/Administrative				0.018	
				(0.021)	
Control for detailed occupation	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
N	77051	77051	77051	77051	77051

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 10: Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, firm characteristics, and occupational measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Training:					
Employee has received Classroom training	-0.012***	-0.004*	-0.010***	-0.003	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employee has received On-the-job training	0.015***	0.007*	0.002	0.004	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Firm characteristics:					
Firm size 20 to 99	0.012	0.020*		0.020*	0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Firm size 100 to 499	0.027**	0.043***		0.043***	0.043***
	(0.013)	(0.012)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Firm size 500 and more	0.147***	0.109***		0.101***	0.101***
	(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Existence of employment equity	0.015	0.016		0.015	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Existence of pay equity	0.024	-0.002		-0.001	-0.002
	(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Foreign ownership 1 to 49%	-0.103***	-0.056***		-0.053***	-0.052***
	(0.021)	(0.015)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Foreign ownership 50 to 90%	-0.099***	-0.053***		-0.052***	-0.051***
	(0.017)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Foreign ownership 90 to 100%	-0.083***	-0.043***		-0.043***	-0.043***
	(0.010)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Competition zero	0.574***	0.422***		0.413***	0.411***
	(0.018)	(0.023)		(0.022)	(0.022)
Competition 1 to 5	-0.001	0.003		0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Competition 6 to 20	-0.003	-0.000		-0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Indicator for formal grievance system	0.130***	0.081***		0.080***	0.079***
	(0.044)	(0.029)		(0.028)	(0.029)
Indicator for informal grievance system	0.095**	0.055*		0.056*	0.056*
	(0.044)	(0.029)		(0.029)	(0.029)
Quite rate	-0.054**	-0.023		-0.017	-0.019
	(0.026)	(0.022)		(0.021)	(0.021)
Proportion of fulltime workers	-0.100***	0.000		-0.011	-0.009
	(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Proportion covered by union	0.026	0.015		0.022	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Labour-management relationship is good	-0.050	-0.031		-0.034	-0.034
	(0.043)	(0.028)		(0.028)	(0.029)
Average annual hours worked z-scores	-0.000***	0.000		-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Sum of different benefits	0.006***	0.004***		0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Indicator for existence of IWP	0.020**	0.016**		0.018**	0.018***
	(0.008)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
incentive schemes in Compensation system	-0.070***	-0.045***		-0.045***	-0.045***
	(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 10 (continued 1): Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, firm characteristics, and occupational measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Industry:					
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction		-0.030*	-0.022	-0.028	-0.027
		(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing		0.008	-0.014	0.004	0.005
		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Secondary product manufacturing		0.006	-0.022	0.004	0.005
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing		0.002	-0.025*	-0.001	-0.000
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Construction		0.056***	0.010	0.048***	0.048***
		(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Warehousing, wholesale		0.027*	0.006	0.023	0.023
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Communication and other utilities		-0.028	0.111***	-0.029	-0.031
		(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Retail trade and consumer services		0.040**	0.017	0.041**	0.039**
		(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Finance and insurance		0.046**	0.031	0.033*	0.030*
		(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Real estate, rental and leasing operations		0.110***	0.176***	0.103**	0.100**
		(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Business services		0.042**	0.020	0.030*	0.028
		(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education and health services		0.397***	0.751***	0.385***	0.381***
		(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Information and cultural industries		0.069**	0.128***	0.048*	0.044*
		(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Occupational measures:					
Aptitude: General learning ability			-0.030	-0.032**	-0.031**
			(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Aptitude: Numerical ability			0.005	0.019*	0.019**
			(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Aptitude: Verbal ability			0.030	0.032*	0.031*
			(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Interests: Directive			0.070**	0.078***	0.080***
			(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Interests: Innovative			0.034*	0.036**	0.038**
			(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Interests: Methodical			0.024	0.026*	0.028*
			(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 10 (continued 2): Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, firm characteristics, and occupational measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Interests: Objective			-0.097***	-0.048**	-0.049**
			(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Interests: Social			-0.080***	-0.029*	-0.029*
			(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
People: Diverting			0.059	-0.018	-0.055
			(0.259)	(0.178)	(0.183)
People: Instructing			0.217***	0.076	0.073
			(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.057)
People: Negotiating			0.033	0.017	0.019
			(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.056)
People: Not Significant			0.087	0.072	0.073
			(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.056)
People: Persuading			0.147*	0.072	0.072
			(0.086)	(0.060)	(0.058)
People: Serving/Assisting			-0.021	-0.016	-0.015
			(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.054)
People: Speaking/Signaling			0.058	0.019	0.018
			(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.055)
People: Supervising			0.077	0.015	0.021
			(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Environment: Discomforts			-0.114**	-0.106***	-0.109***
			(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Environment: Hazards			-0.007	-0.026	-0.023
			(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.022)
No formal education or training requirements			0.225***	0.150**	0.144**
			(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Some high school education			0.147***	0.053***	0.050***
			(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.017)
High school			-0.026	-0.054**	-0.052**
			(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Course work, training, workshops			0.000	-0.010	-0.014
			(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Apprenticeship, specialized training, etc.			0.079***	0.053***	0.054***
			(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)
College, technical school (certificate, diploma)			-0.037	-0.039*	-0.038*
			(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Undergraduate degree			-0.015	-0.025	-0.025
			(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Post-graduate or professional degree			0.008	0.026	0.022
			(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Additional requirement			-0.267***	-0.091	-0.093
			(0.101)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Regulated requirement(s)			0.051***	0.037***	0.036***
			(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 10 (continued 3): Relationship between non-profit status and training, employee characteristics, firm characteristics, and occupational measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Employee characteristics:					
female					-0.003
					(0.004)
Visible Minority Canadian-born					0.003
					(0.010)
White immigrant					0.008
					(0.007)
Visible minority immigrant					-0.010
					(0.007)
Bachelor degree or higher					0.005
					(0.004)
Married					-0.002
					(0.003)
Number of children					-0.001
					(0.001)
Age					0.003**
					(0.001)
Age squared					-0.000**
					(0.000)
Years of experience					-0.001***
					(0.000)
Years of experience squared					0.004***
					(0.001)
Fulltime worker					-0.025***
					(0.006)
Union or collective bargaining					0.020**
					(0.008)
Tenure					-0.000
					(0.000)
Tenure squared					0.000
					(0.001)
N	77051	77051	77051	77051	77051

Notes: All regression coefficients are estimated using sample weights provided in the data. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table 11: Decomposition of the gender wage gap and the role of training

	Non-profit				For-profit			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Overall								
Males	3.158***	3.158***	3.158***	3.158***	3.011***	3.011***	3.011***	3.011***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Females	3.000***	3.000***	3.000***	3.000***	2.721***	2.721***	2.721***	2.721***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Difference	0.158***	0.158***	0.158***	0.158***	0.290***	0.290***	0.290***	0.290***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Explained	0.093***	0.089***	0.101***	0.099***	0.160***	0.164***	0.170***	0.172***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Unexplained	0.064***	0.068***	0.057***	0.058***	0.130***	0.126***	0.119***	0.118***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Explained								
Education	0.014**	0.013**	0.014**	0.013**	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Marital Status	0.004*	0.003	0.004**	0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Children	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnicity	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Experience	0.024***	0.022***	0.021***	0.020***	0.025***	0.023***	0.020***	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Job characteristics	-0.007	-0.007	-0.012***	-0.012***	0.039***	0.037***	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Occupation	0.045***	0.045***	0.043***	0.043***	0.053***	0.052***	0.057***	0.057***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Industry	0.010**	0.011***	0.011**	0.011**	0.042***	0.044***	0.023***	0.025***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Training		-0.000		-0.000		0.006***		0.003***
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)
Firm Size			0.007	0.007			0.008***	0.008***
			(0.004)	(0.004)			(0.001)	(0.001)
Firm characteristics			0.009*	0.009*			0.043***	0.041***
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.005)	(0.005)

Notes: Decomposition is performed using sample weights provided in the data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Firm characteristics include: average quite rate, proportion of full-time workers, log of training expenditures per worker, and z-scores for non-wage benefits, innovative work practices, and compensation practices.

Job characteristics include: indicator for full-time status, union coverage or collective bargaining agreement, and tenure with employer.

Table 11 (continued): Decomposition of the gender wage gap and the role of training

	Non-profit				For-profit			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Unexplained								
Education	0.015**	0.016**	0.010	0.011*	0.003	-0.000	0.010	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Marital Status	0.032*	0.027	0.031*	0.028*	0.007	0.005	0.002	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Children	-0.038**	-0.038**	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.041***	-0.036***	-0.037***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Ethnicity	0.015	0.017	0.009	0.009	0.012	0.015	0.013	0.015
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	0.107	0.111	0.148	0.154	0.005	0.036	0.070	0.083
	(0.232)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.225)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.155)
Experience	0.013	0.012	0.023	0.024	0.027	0.016	0.000	-0.004
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Job characteristics	-0.061**	-0.068**	-0.070***	-0.073***	0.023	0.027	0.006	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Year	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Occupation	-0.000	0.001	-0.007	-0.006	-0.015***	-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.012***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Industry	-0.045	-0.049	-0.040	-0.041	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Training		0.001		-0.009		-0.001		-0.006
		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Firm Size			-0.003	-0.002			-0.003	-0.003
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.006)	(0.005)
Firm characteristics			0.013	0.008			-0.013	-0.016
			(0.046)	(0.047)			(0.032)	(0.032)
Constant	0.026	0.035	-0.014	-0.002	0.113	0.088	0.086	0.086
	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.149)
N	13228				63813			

Notes: Decomposition is performed using sample weights provided in the data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the firm level. Significance levels: ** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.
Firm characteristics include: average quite rate, proportion of full-time workers, log of training expenditures per worker, and z-scores for non-wage benefits, innovative work practices, and compensation practices.
Job characteristics include: indicator for full-time status, union coverage or collective bargaining agreement, and tenure with employer.