




Federal Office
for Information Security

BSI TR-03108-1: Secure E-Mail Transport

Requirements for E-Mail Service Providers (EMSP)
regarding a secure Transport of E-Mails

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Document history

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0.9	08/20/2015	BSI	Initial public draft
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1.0.1	11/09/2016	BSI	Added <i>Section 3.4: Deviations from referenced Specifications</i>

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1 Introduction

Nowadays, most of our communication takes place digitally. E-mails have become one of the primary mediums for exchanging digital messages. However, these messages are often sent without the application of IT security measures such as encryption and signatures. One reason for this is that measures such as end-to-end encryption have not encountered general user acceptance because key management appears complex and time-consuming.

In this context, the technical guideline addresses e-mail service providers (EMSP). It describes an option to provide a standardized higher level of security regardless of the IT capabilities of the user of the e-mail service. Among the EMSPs who comply with this technical guideline this higher security level is implemented in a way that shall be transparent to the user.

1.1 Concept

The basis for the requirements in this technical guideline is a security concept which the EMSP shall create and implement in accordance with the specifications in *Section 3.1: Security Concept*. In addition, the technical guideline contains specific technical and general requirements the EMSP must implement in accordance with *Section 3.2: Technical Requirements* and *Section 3.3: Additional Requirements*. The following *Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Requirements* contains an overview of the basic concept.




Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Requirements

The requirements to be implemented by the EMSP optionally are encircled with dashes in *Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Requirements*.

The requirements in this technical guideline are solely targeted to individual EMSPs. An association or group of EMSPs is not considered. The requirements for individual EMSPs and their interfaces were formulated to

achieve comparability among EMSPs. Furthermore, they shall encourage a greater pervasiveness of secure communication connections and securely operated e-mail services in order to ultimately increase the security of the e-mail infrastructure as a whole.

An overview of the scenario of communication between EMSPs this technical guidelines aspires to is shown in *Figure 2: Excerpt of the Inter-EMSP Communication*.




Figure 2: Excerpt of the Inter-EMSP Communication

In addition to communicating with other certified EMSPs that provide their services in accordance to this technical guideline, a certified EMSP for example also communicates with other:

- EMSPs that are not certified but do have a security concept and provide interfaces with high-quality cryptography (yellow circle, green interface),
- EMSPs that have a security concept and provide poor-quality cryptography (yellow circle, yellow interface) and
- EMSPs that have not implemented any security at all (red circle, red interface).

The *Figure 2: Excerpt of the Inter-EMSP Communication* and the list above do not cover all the possible constellations, but do indicate the complexity of the communication relationships. They also show that alongside interfaces to other certified EMSPs, certified EMSPs have parallel interfaces to EMSPs that implement fewer or no security measures at all. The complexity of this relationships was taken into account while formulating the requirements of this technical guideline. This ensures that the certified EMSPs always chose the highest possible security level.

1.2 Certification

An EMSP has the option to prove its conformity to the requirements of this technical guideline as part of a certification. With a certification, the EMSP can prove it is especially trustworthy and therefore, able to fulfill the role of a certified EMSP. There are basically two scenarios for a certification in accordance with this technical guideline which are described in the following.

1.2.1 Certification according to this Technical Guideline

If the applicant (EMSP) wants to prove its conformance to this technical guideline he **MUST** contact an auditor certified by the BSI. The requirements from *Section 3: Requirements* with the obligations described there apply in this case and the auditor shall perform a certification procedure according to [BSI TR-03108-2]. In addition to the requirements of this technical guideline, the applicant also **MUST** provide a security concept in accordance with the German Telecommunications Act [TKG 109] or a similar law applicable in the country in which he is operating his infrastructure. The security concept **MUST** be updated in the intervals specified by the applicable national law.

1.2.2 Certification according to ISO 27001

In addition to a certification according to this guideline, it is **RECOMMENDED** for the applicant to be certified by an accredited organization according to [ISO/IEC 27001]. The requirement for an information security management system (ISMS) is replaced by the implementation of a security concept in accordance with [TKG 109] or a national, equivalent law. The [ISO/IEC 27001] certificate is issued separately from the certificate for a successful evaluation in accordance with this technical guideline. The following *Figure 3: Certification according to ISO 27001* shows the participating parties of the certification process.




Figure 3: Certification according to ISO 27001

1.3 Key Words

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [IETF RFC 2119]. The key word “CONDITIONAL” is to be interpreted as follows:

CONDITIONAL: The usage of an item is dependent on the usage of other items. It is therefore further qualified under which conditions the item is **REQUIRED** or **RECOMMENDED**.

2 Infrastructure

This chapter defines the participants in the e-mail infrastructure, their interfaces with each other and the tasks of the EMSP according to this technical guideline.

2.1 Participants and associated Components

The following *Figure 4: Participating Infrastructure Components* shows the components that participate in the infrastructure and their communication relationships to each other.




Figure 4: Participating Infrastructure Components

The goal of the requirements described here is to create an infrastructure in which secure connections between certified EMSPs and their users are established ordinarily. Through secure communication from component to component, point-to-point security from the e-mail sender to the recipient shall be achieved.

The assumption here is that the systems of the individual EMSP communicate via an open network (Internet) and also include communication with non-certified EMSPs. In the communication with non-certified EMSPs, the requirements formulated here are intended to create a condition under which connections generally are as secure as possible.

The individual components that participate in the communication and their roles within the infrastructure will be considered in the following sections. In the context of this technical guideline, a security statement can only be made for the exchange of e-mails between certified EMSPs and their users. In *Section 2.2.2: Transparency*, the regulations required for this type of security statement are set.

2.1.1 User (Sender and Recipient)

The user is to be understood as the end user of the infrastructure described here. He uses the services of one or several EMSPs to send and receive his e-mails. At this point, it is not differentiated between sender and recipient role, because from the EMSP's perspective, the same security measures **MUST** be applied to both roles. The EMSP **MUST** ensure that the user sends and receives his e-mails in compliance with "EMLREQ_1: TLS (user to EMSP)". Furthermore, the EMSP **MUST** inform the user of security-relevant incidents in accordance with the [IT-Sicherheitsgesetz]. The EMSP **MUST** also provide assistance with regard to IT-security-relevant topics in accordance with "ADDREQ_2: Obligation to provide information" to the user.

2.1.2 Certified E-Mail Service Providers

This EMSP has been certified according to this technical guideline and is the operator of a mail transfer agent (MTA). The EMSP offers his service to one or more users. In the role of a sender, it accepts the e-mails of its users and forwards them to a receiving EMSP. In its role as recipient, it accepts the e-mails from a sending EMSP and provides them to its users, who can retrieve them. The requirements of this technical guideline apply to an EMSP and his interfaces to other EMSPs and his users.

2.1.2.1 Sending E-Mail Service Provider

Before an e-mail from the sending EMSP is sent on behalf of the sender, the EMSP **MUST** check whether or not cryptographic information (e.g. public key or hash over public key or certificate) from the receiving EMSP in accordance with *Section 2.2.1: Trustworthy Certificate Exchange* is already present or can automatically be retrieved. Next, the EMSP **MUST** attempt to create a connection in accordance with "EMLREQ_3: TLS (outgoing)".

If a secure connection cannot be created, although cryptographic information is present, the e-mail **MUST NOT** be sent. If a secure connection can be created, the e-mail **MUST** be sent to the receiving EMSP via this secure connection.

If security-relevant errors arise while the connection is being created or during the connection, the connection shall be canceled. It is **RECOMMENDED** to also log the event. Furthermore, the certified EMSP **SHOULD** contact the receiving EMSP via a third channel in order to remedy the error as quickly as possible. At the same time, the parties **MUST** adhere to the reporting obligations according to the [IT-Sicherheitsgesetz] IF the EMSP is operates in Germany. If certificate information from an EMSP is present but does not support the command to create a secure connection, this **MUST** be classified as an error.

2.1.2.2 Receiving E-Mail Service Provider

The receiving EMSP provides an interface for receiving e-mails from other (sending) EMSPs in accordance to "EMLREQ_2: TLS (incoming)". Via this interface, the certified EMSP accepts the e-mails from the sending EMSP and handles the email according to its local delivery guidelines. The recipient **MAY** reject the incoming Email when the sending party is known to improper abuse handling or if the email is identified to contain malware, spam or similar content.

If security-relevant errors arise while the connection is being created or during the connection, the connection shall be cancelled. Again, it is **RECOMMENDED** to log this event. Furthermore, the EMSP **SHOULD** contact the sending EMSP via a third channel in order to remedy the error as quickly as possible. At the same time, the parties **MUST** adhere to the reporting obligations according to the [IT-Sicherheitsgesetz] IF the EMSP operates in Germany.

2.1.3 Non-Certified E-Mail Service Providers

Unfortunately this technical guideline cannot directly consider e-mail service provider (EMSP) without certification. They presumably do not match the requirements described in this technical guideline. For this reason, they can not be subject to any requirements. Since a certified EMSP is per se unable to differentiate between certified and non-certified EMSPs, the interfaces are subject to the same requirements and hence, secure connections with non-certified EMSPs SHOULD also generally be created.

2.2 General Responsibilities

This chapter describes general responsibilities of the EMSP that are not directly connected to the interfaces of the EMSP's e-mail service or the service itself.

2.2.1 Trustworthy Certificate Exchange

The exchange of public keys contained in the certificates of the EMSP is required for trustworthy communication with an EMSP. In the medium term, this exchange of information SHOULD be automated by using DANE/TLSA in accordance with [IETF RFC 6698] via a connection secured by DNSSEC in accordance with [IETF RFC 6781] and retrieved by the EMSP's DNS server.

For certified EMSPs, the use of DANE is mandatory. However, the EMSP may provide or populate the certificates via alternative procedures like manual exchange or pinning for communication with EMSPs that are not certified.

2.2.2 Transparency

An EMSP's user MUST be able to find out which of their e-mails are sent to certified EMSPs or received from certified EMSPs. This shall give the user a higher level of transparency on the security measure applied to the e-mails he sends and receives.

At the moment, there is no internationally harmonized or widely practiced procedure for function like this. For this reason, the requirement in accordance with "ADDREQ_3: Transparency" MUST initially be met by referring to the list of EMSPs certified in accordance with this technical guideline on the BSI website¹. If however a matching technology becomes available it will be checked if it fulfills the requirements and MAY be taken into account in this technical guideline.

1 <https://www.bsi.bund.de/ZertifizierungProduktenachTR>

3 Requirements

This chapter summarizes all verifiable requirements of the EMSP. In particular, they are intended to support the auditors when conducting an audit according to this technical guideline. In addition to the basic requirement of establishing an information security management system or at least creating a resilient security concept, technical and additional basic requirements are described here.

3.1 Security Concept

The EMSP **MUST** provide a security concept in accordance with [TKG 109] or a similar law applicable in the country in which its infrastructure is located. If the EMSP is operating on a multi-national basis, an applicable security concept **MUST** be provided for each country in which the servers are located. The security concept **MUST** encompass all relevant systems and components used for receiving, processing, saving, sending and delivering data of the user.

Additionally, it is **RECOMMENDED** to operate an ISMS in accordance with [ISO/IEC 27001]. The ISMS **MUST** also encompass all relevant systems and components used for receiving, processing, saving, sending and delivering data of the user. The ISMS **MUST** contain the requirements listed in *Section 3.2: Technical Requirements*.

3.2 Technical Requirements

The following technical requirements are a supplement to the requirements of *Section 3.1: Security Concept* that the EMSP **MUST** implement and are specifically related to the functional operation of an e-mail service. If the EMSP certification is conducted on the basis of a previous certification in accordance with [ISO/IEC 27001], this technical requirements are to be seen as additional controls.

The technical requirements listed here, which **MUST** be audited as part of a certification, are displayed in the following *Table 1: Regulations for the Technical Requirements*.

Requirement	Regulation
EMLREQ_1: TLS (user to EMSP)	Required
EMLREQ_2: TLS (incoming)	Required
EMLREQ_3: TLS (outgoing)	Required
EMLREQ_4: DANE (incoming)	Required
EMLREQ_5: DANE (outgoing)	Required
EMLREQ_6: PKI certificates	Recommended

Table 1: Regulations for the Technical Requirements

EMLREQ_1: TLS (user to EMSP): The communication between the EMSP systems and the users for sending and receiving e-mails, for user identification and all other communication linked to the procedure **MUST** proceed via TLS in accordance with [BSI TR-03116-4]. For this reason, the EMSP **MUST** preferably offer high quality algorithms in accordance with the technical guideline listed above. If the EMSP allows its users to access their e-mails via a webmail interface, this access **MUST** be protected by using HTTPS in accordance with [IETF RFC 2818]. Furthermore, the EMSP **MUST** provide access to the e-mails with the support of STARTTLS in accordance with [IETF RFC 3207]. If no secured communication is possible, a meaningful error message **MUST** be displayed before canceling the communication from the EMSP to the user – even users with no technical experience **SHOULD** be able to understand the reason for breaking off communication.

EMLREQ_2: TLS (incoming): The EMSP **MUST** permit connections from other EMSPs via TLS in accordance with [BSI TR-03116-4]. For all incoming connections, algorithms that provide so-called forward secrecy (also

called perfect forward secrecy; PFS for short) MUST preferably be used. They MUST correspond to the recommendations from [BSI TR-03116-4]. In order to permit secure TLS connections, the EMSP MUST implement STARTTLS in accordance with [IETF RFC 3207].

EMLREQ_3: TLS (outgoing): For connections to other EMSPs, the EMSP MUST use STARTTLS in accordance with [IETF RFC 3207] if the receiving EMSP offers this command. If STARTTLS is supported by the receiving EMSP, they SHOULD preferably negotiate algorithms that provide so-called forward secrecy (also called perfect forward secrecy; PFS for short) and correspond to the recommendations from [BSI TR-03116-4].

EMLREQ_4: DANE (incoming): In compliance with the regulations of the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA²), the domain(s) used by the EMSP MUST be protected by DNSSEC in accordance with [IETF RFC 6781]. Furthermore, the EMSP MUST publish information of his certificate in the DNS record by using DANE/TLSA in accordance with [IETF RFC 6698].

EMLREQ_5: DANE (outgoing): Using DNSSEC in accordance with [IETF RFC 6781], the EMSP MUST check all connections to other EMSPs to determine whether or not the information on using DANE/TLSA has been published in the DNS record of the receiving EMSP in accordance with [IETF RFC 6698]. If the relevant information is present, the authenticity of the connection MUST be verified based on this information and canceled if the certificate information does not match the cryptographic information presented by the receiving EMSP or if no transport security (e.g. STARTTLS) is presented at all.

EMLREQ_6: PKI certificates: All the certificates that the EMSP uses for communication with other EMSPs and the user SHOULD be issued by a certificate authority (CA) that was certified according to [BSI TR-03145].

3.3 Additional Requirements

The following requirements supplement the technical requirements listed above. They contain general conditions the EMSP SHALL create to ensure a secure operation.

ADDREQ_1: Data privacy: The EMSP's systems SHOULD be operated in Germany; therefore the German Data Protection Act [BDSG] is applicable. In exceptional cases, operation in the rest of the EU under equivalent or stricter data protection requirements is allowed. In this cases the General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] with the corresponding national regulation MUST be fulfilled by the EMSP.

ADDREQ_2: Obligation to provide information: The EMSP pledges to inform its users about IT security incidents related to its IT infrastructure, according to the [IT-Sicherheitsgesetz] or a similar law applicable in the country in which its infrastructure is located. Such incidents can for example include cases where the databases of the EMSP have been compromised and user data was obtained by an attacker. Furthermore, it pledges to explain IT-security-relevant topics to its users. The EMSP MAY fulfill this duty by referring to the relevant information offered by the German federal government³.

ADDREQ_3: Transparency: The EMSP MUST inform its users in the best manner possible if e-mails have been sent or received from certified EMSPs. The minimum method for doing so is to refer to the list of certified providers at the BSI⁴. The EMSP MAY also display information on the security level of single e-mails.

3.4 Deviations from referenced Specifications

This chapter contains intended deviations from requirements of specifications referenced throughout this document. The deviations include a reference, a description and an identifier of the deviation.

² <https://www.iana.org/dnssec>

³ <https://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de>

⁴ <https://www.bsi.bund.de/ZertifizierungProduktenachTR>

3.4.1 Deviations from [BSI TR-03116-4]

Regarding	Reference	Description
Timeouts	Section 2.2.1	TLS sessions may not be used for more than two days in total (including Session Resumption). However, due to the nature of IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) sessions frequently used in the context of this Technical Guideline, it is not recommended to implement a policy compliant to this requirement.

Table 2: Deviations from [BSI TR-03116-4]

Reference Documentation

BDSG	BfDI: Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
BSI TR-03108-2	BSI: Testspecification; Conformance Tests for Secure E-Mail Transport in compliance to BSI TR-03108-1
BSI TR-03116-4	BSI: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung Teil 4
BSI TR-03145	BSI: Secure Certification Authority operation
GDPR	EU: General Data Protection Regulation
IETF RFC 2119	IETF: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels
IETF RFC 2818	IETF: HTTP Over TLS
IETF RFC 3207	IETF: SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security
IETF RFC 6698	IETF: The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA
IETF RFC 6781	IETF: DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2
ISO/IEC 27001	ISO/IEC: 27001:2013 Information technology; Security techniques; Information security management systems; Requirements
IT-Sicherheitsgesetz	BMI: Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz)
TKG 109	Bundesnetzagentur: Katalog von Sicherheitsanforderungen nach § 109 Absatz 6 Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG)

Keywords and Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
CA	Certificate Authority
DANE	DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
DNS	Domain Name System
DNSSEC	Domain Name System Security Extensions
EMSP	E-Mail Service Providers
IMAP	Internet Message Access Protocol
ISMS	Information Security Management System
MTA	Mail Transfer Agent
PFS	Perfect Forward Secrecy
TLS	Transport Layer Security

Keywords

DANE.....	10, 12
Data Protection.....	12
DNSSEC.....	12
EMSP.....	5
IMAP.....	13
ISMS.....	7
mail transfer agent (MTA).....	9
security concept.....	11
STARTTLS.....	12
TLS.....	11