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## Mapping Diasporas in the European Union and the United States

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# Mapping Diasporas in the European Union and the United States

## Comparative analysis and recommendations for engagement

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# Preface

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This report presents the findings of a study into diasporas in the EU and the US, which provides mapping data for key diaspora groups and also delivers concrete recommendations for their engagement. The study has been funded by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Home Affairs (DG Home). The research was undertaken by RAND Europe in partnership with the Institute for the Study of Labor.

This document is divided into three parts. Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) provides results from a mapping exercise using available national and international datasets on diaspora and migrant populations, to provide an overview – in addition to country-level profiles – of diaspora populations present in the EU and the US. Part II (Chapters 4 through 7) presents results of literature review, desk research, and survey and interview exercises with diaspora organisation representatives. These research activities were directed at understanding diaspora engagement activities taking place through sending countries, receiving countries, and international organisations. Part III provides a synthesis of these findings and culminates in a set of recommendations, policy considerations, potential barriers and drawbacks for diaspora engagement strategies, and suggestions for further research on diaspora engagement.

This report will be of interest to government and civil society actors in the EU and the US – and potentially beyond – who seek to engage with diaspora populations for mutual benefit. The report will also be of interest to academic audiences interested in development, integration, migration, and diaspora studies.

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# Summary

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## Overview

The European Commission has commissioned RAND Europe and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) to conduct a study mapping diasporas in the European Union and the United States. This study aims to provide an overview of diasporas present in Europe and the US, and to deliver concrete recommendations for engaging with diasporas as a bridge to their countries of origin, especially where improvement is sought in relations with those countries. The remit of the study was to:

- 1) Provide an extensive review and compilation of existing studies on the diasporas, and provide an updated overview of all diaspora communities settled in Europe and the US, in particular their demographics and socio-economic profiles.
- 2) Focus on a number of key diaspora groups, selected taking into account their demographic weight in both the EU and US, their engagement with the political and economic development of their countries of origin, and the relations between those countries and the EU/US.
- 3) Analyse the nature and strength of links between these diaspora groups and their countries of origin.
- 4) Survey the existence of official diaspora organisations – and other organisations that have an understanding of the diaspora – and characterise their activities.
- 5) Synthesise findings from the above tasks and propose concrete recommendations for possible EU action, particularly with respect to engaging constructively and effectively with diaspora groups.

Geographically, the remit of this study is diaspora groups in the European Union and in the United States. As stated in the list of objectives above, in its in-depth analysis, this study focused on diaspora groups from 25 selected countries of origin: Afghanistan, Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen, as well as Chechnya and Kashmir.

## Methodology

### *Mapping*

Our mapping process was divided into two distinct, yet related phases, with the aim of allowing us to situate the demographic and socio-economic profiles of diaspora communities in the EU and US in their relation to both the wider populations in their host countries and countries of origin. In the first phase, we focused on collecting information on diaspora groups and general populations in all Member States in the European Union and the United States. The primary purpose of this exercise was to identify diaspora

groups in the European Union and the United States, and to obtain basic socio-economic information (gender, age, education, labour force) on these groups.

In the second phase, we expanded our analysis to include a set of selected countries of origin and to collect the same data on the general populations of those countries of origin. In this phase, we also conducted a comparative analysis across selected diaspora groups, their countries of origin and their receiving countries. The aim of this comparative analysis was to enable insights into any notable patterns of outcomes between different diaspora groups in the same receiving country, between diaspora groups and their receiving country populations, between diaspora groups and the populations of their countries of origin, and between diaspora groups in one country and that same diaspora group in other countries.

Most recent national censuses formed the basis for this research; however, these censuses were not sufficient to cover all indicators sought in the analysis. As a result, we supplemented these with alternative sources of data, such as the Barro-Lee data set on educational attainment and the OECD Migration Database.

### *Desk Research*

At the outset of the project, we undertook a structured literature review of the academic and grey literature related to diaspora engagement. Through this review, we sought to understand broadly the models for, effectiveness of, and challenges in approaches to engaging diasporas for various ends. Following this initial review (the detailed methods for which can be found at Appendix D), we undertook targeted reviews largely outside of the academic literature relating to:

- (a) sending and receiving country strategies for engaging their diaspora populations, among a subset of countries selected for review;
- (b) the dynamics between diaspora groups, and;
- (c) recommendations for diaspora engagement available from prior reports on the topic.

### *Surveys and interviews*

From our review of existing literature on diasporas, we concluded that the most significant gap in empirical evidence is related to tailoring engagement strategies to specific diaspora contexts, which we aimed to address through our Diaspora Expert Survey (DES) exercise. For this survey, we developed an online questionnaire, which we distributed to diaspora organisations internationally through available online contact information, respondent referrals (snowballing), and existing contact networks. In addition, we conducted eight interviews with diaspora representatives identified through the survey.

The objective of the DES was to help us to understand from the views and experiences of diaspora representatives how, and under what circumstances, diaspora engagement strategies should be employed. Of course, actual tailoring of engagement efforts will be case-specific. However, it appeared possible to suggest a set of principles for tailoring engagement efforts based on initial assessments of both the type of strategy(ies) to be used and the type(s) of diaspora organisation(s) to be engaged through a specific initiative or set of initiatives. We designed the questionnaire to provide a comparative basis on which to build and refine such a set of principles.

## Findings

### *Mapping*

Our analysis revealed several noteworthy patterns which may help policymakers better understand the characteristics, priorities and concerns of relevant diasporas. First and foremost, in comparison with their countries of origin, diaspora groups on the whole achieve better outcomes on a range of socioeconomic indicators. Diaspora groups generally show higher rates of high educational attainment, labour force participation in their receiving countries, and, unsurprisingly, tend to have a higher share of working-age population compared with their counterparts in countries of origin.

The comparison with receiving countries offers a more complex picture. Diaspora groups have a higher share of working-age population than the populations in the countries where they settled, but are generally lagging behind with respect to labour force and education outcomes. The size of this gap is much larger for labour force participation rates than for educational outcomes.

Substantial variability exists among receiving countries in how successfully they achieve positive educational and employment outcomes for diaspora groups located in their territories or attract groups with preexisting good outcomes. A particularly striking difference was observed between the United States and EU Member States, though we recognise that this difference may be somewhat attributable to geographical factors. In the European context, groups located in northern and western European countries tend to display better outcomes than their southern counterparts. Patterns such as these are particularly useful for identifying any policy and other contextual factors that could be assessed in seeking to explain the outcome differentials across observed diaspora groups. These policy and contextual factors include both policies that may have generated the differentials and policies designed to address the differentials. Refining questions about these policy and contextual factors through such analyses is important for the effort to identify and assess potential ways to improve outcomes for diaspora communities and, by extension, their countries of origin.

### *Desk research*

Desk research reviewing available literature and government policy and strategy documents suggests that diasporas are increasingly seen as important partners for both sending and receiving country governments' strategies aimed at improving political (and in some cases, security), economic, and cultural outcomes. Our review of existing engagement strategies revealed notable differences in how sending and receiving countries consider diaspora engagement. That is, receiving countries tend to subsume diaspora engagement under broader integration and migration programmes, while the sending countries are increasingly developing diaspora-specific policies and/or creating national-level agencies with oversight of diaspora affairs.

In both sending and receiving contexts, diaspora groups are actively sought as potential partners in building wealth, increasing security and stability, and promoting both receiving country integration and cultural ties with their homelands. We identified economic, political, and cultural/social goals within diaspora engagement policies amongst both sending and receiving countries. A substantial amount of existing diaspora engagement literature and programmes are directed at the strategic use of diaspora individuals, groups and populations for homeland economic development, primarily though not entirely

through remittances and investment. Despite the preponderance of interest in their economic role, a broader potential for diaspora involvement – in skills transfer, facilitating business, supporting engagement with the broader migrant community in host societies, and institution-building in the homeland – is clear in both literature and policy.

Through our review and analysis, we have developed a summary of recommendations common to the available literature on diaspora engagement. The recommendations are outlined below in Table 0-1.

**Table 0-1: Overview of recommendations in existing literature by theme**

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>Know your diaspora</b>	Diasporas are heterogeneous entities and diaspora members may have competing conceptions regarding goals and motivations for engagement. Understand the potential divisions and nuances of position between groups within a diaspora for more successful collaborations and partnerships.
<b>Carefully identify your partners</b>	Diaspora populations may have many possible points of contact, but not all will be suited to specific goals of engagement. Related to the recommendation to 'know your diaspora', governments and others seeking to engage diasporas should consider where potential partners are placed vis-à-vis the broader community and key stakeholders.
<b>Strive for equal partnerships</b>	Some studies have stressed the importance of achieving balance within partnerships with diaspora or migrant groups and organisations. Where a government or resource-rich NGO partner takes too much responsibility or control, the diaspora partner can become detached from both process and outcome.
<b>Support capacity-building</b>	Whether in direct partnership on an initiative, or more broadly seeking to support diaspora communities, diaspora engagement should involve support for capacity-building within diaspora communities so that organisations can operate in a stable and more self-sufficient environment.
<b>Provide funding specific to diasporas</b>	While there are many key aspects to successful engagement, little can be accomplished without adequate funding. Non-traditional or innovative funding mechanisms may be appropriate for some engagement activities – but funding remains important in any form.
<b>Build links across diasporas</b>	Separate diaspora communities or organisations may have common interests or otherwise benefit from linkages. Look for the possibilities for these kinds of partnerships within broader diaspora engagement strategies.
<b>Consider the wider policy context</b>	Engagement takes place within broader social policy initiatives, and the capacities of governments and other organisations to work with diaspora communities may be affected by government policy shifts in seemingly unrelated areas. Equally, diaspora groups may be interested in engaging in broader debates on national issues such as immigration, foreign policy and human rights which acutely affect their members, and may both appreciate their inclusion and provide important perspectives for such debates.
<b>Learn lessons through evaluation</b>	Research on diaspora communities has recently begun to stress the importance of evaluating engagement programmes to develop and improve engagement efforts. Evaluation should be a core component of any initiative and be considered throughout planning and implementation.

While we find no reason evidence that these recommendations are unfounded, we also note that the evaluation culture surrounding the implementation of diaspora engagement strategies is limited. It is not possible to provide an evidence-based assessment of whether or not these recommendations produce or are associated with better engagement. We return to this point in subsequent chapters.

In addition, while we broadly acknowledge the value of engagement with diaspora populations, the literature clearly demonstrates both potential barriers and drawbacks to this engagement. First, these populations are often hard to identify and may not easily take up certain types of engagement where

processes or goals of engagement are unclear. Engagement with certain diaspora groups may also pose risks for partners, both at civil society and government levels. Partners should be aware of the dynamics within a diaspora, as well as its relationship to its home country, in advance of crafting an approach to engagement.

### *Surveys and interviews*

Our survey questionnaire generated 53 responses for analysis. In addition, the survey responses generated a further eight follow-up interviews with diaspora organisation representatives. Respondents to our survey represent organisations serving over 25 separate diaspora communities, with 32 of the respondents representing diasporas from the sending countries selected for in-depth review. Just under one-third of respondents were based in the US, three represented diaspora groups settled in high-income countries outside the EU or the US,<sup>1</sup> and the remaining two-thirds were based in EU Member States.

Headline findings from quantitative analysis of the survey exercise include:

- A consistent pattern between measured levels of engagement between diaspora organisations and external partners (such as receiving country government agencies, sending country governments, or other civil society organisations), and a measured level of their satisfaction with those partners, in addition to levels of engagement with other partners.
- A consistent message – through both free-text question responses and interview respondents – that proactive communication was desired from partners to diaspora organisations.
- Our findings also suggest that while funding remains important to these groups, it was not the only concern identified in the survey. Diaspora groups' substantive goals can often be fulfilled by non-costly interventions such as the ability to provide input on policy processes, audiences with key officials, or technical or administrative support/advice for daily operations.

Our experience from the survey of diaspora organisations reinforces themes in broader literature on diasporas and other migrant groups: they are notably complex populations to access. We recognise that the sample of diaspora organisations to which we reached out is drawn from a much wider unknown population, and that response rates among identified organisations are relatively low, even taking into account that many identified organisations may no longer be active. In particular, we recognise that most or all of the diaspora organisations who provided responses could be considered 'engagement-seeking' in that they exhibit relatively positive attitudes toward engagement with government and civil society partners. We should therefore caveat all results by acknowledging that results may not be transferable to all diaspora organisations, especially for engagement with organisations not seeking engagement with sending and/or receiving country governments. Instead, our findings should be seen as illustrative of experiences and preferences of the responding organisations, with potential lessons (meriting further testing and assessment) for engagement with organisations that could be classified as engagement-seeking.

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<sup>1</sup> We recognise the inclusion of these respondents is beyond the geographical remit of the study. Nevertheless, we consider these responses relevant as they provide an insight from contexts similar to the European Union and the United States.

## Recommendations

Through synthesis of our quantitative mapping and analysis of engagement strategies and survey results, we provide the following recommendations for actors seeking to engage with diaspora groups:

1. Be aware of, and attend to, the complexity and heterogeneity of diasporas.
2. See the potential in each organisation: Many diaspora organisations work far outside their core mission, and others may be interested in expanding their capacity.
3. Reach out: Proactive communication from governments is desired across cases.
4. Provide support and advice, whether direct or in-kind: most diaspora organisations are small and volunteer-led.
5. Make yourself and your activities known to diaspora representatives.
6. Maintain relationships: Higher levels of engagement are correlated with higher levels of satisfaction towards governments and other organisations.
7. Improving diaspora engagement does not have to be costly: identify 'low-hanging fruit'.
8. Sustainability of engagement may be crucial for its success.

Each of these recommendations is based on the evidence examined in this study; in the report, recommendations are accompanied by a discussion of options for policy development. In addition, based on these conclusions and recommendations, we develop a set of nine policy considerations intended to serve as a starting point for policy intervention discussions. The considerations are as follows:

1. Embedding evaluation/learning at all stages of diaspora engagement is integral to building evidence base.
2. Diasporas operate in an ever-changing environment: Keep up-to-date on developments relating to conditions for engagement.
3. Diasporas can provide useful data: Voluntary databases of diaspora organisations could capture key information to facilitate future engagement.
4. There already exists infrastructure for diaspora engagement: Exploring ways to utilise this infrastructure may be the most effective way forward.
5. Overcoming coordination challenges across multiple stakeholders may require sharper focus and clearer goals.
6. Diaspora organisations often face similar challenges to other civil society organisations: coordinating efforts may deliver substantial added value.
7. Funding assistance may entail improving access to already existing sources and/or introducing new types of funding, such as social investment.
8. (Un)willingness to engage may be related to some groups' precarious formal status.
9. Identification of suitable partners can be a challenging and, at times, risky undertaking.

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## Abbreviations

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ACA	Algerian Competences Association
ACE	Arts and Culture Exchange
ADB	<i>Alay Dunong sa Baya</i> (Brain-Gain Programme)
ADPC	African Diaspora Policy Centre
AEP	Afghan Expatriate Programme
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AJ&K	Azad/Pakistani-controlled Jammu and Kashmir
AME	Association of Expelled Malians
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANIMA	Network for the Investment in the Mediterranean
BME	Black and Ethnic Minority
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
BT	Balik-Turo (Teach-Share) and Educational Exchange
CARIM	Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration
CeMIS	Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies
CETUMA	<i>Centre de Tunis pour la Migration et l'Asile</i>
CfD	Connections for Development
CFO	Commission on Filipinos Overseas
CIM	<i>Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung</i> (Centre for International Migration and Development)
COCOF	<i>Franse Gemeenschapscommissie</i> (French Community Commission)
CoMiDe	Initiative for Migration and Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
D2D	Diaspora to Development Initiative
DES	Diaspora Expert Survey

DESPF	Diaspora Engagement Strategic and Policy Framework
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DG(s)	Directorates-General(s)
DI	Diaspora Investment
DIA	Diaspora Investment in Agriculture
DP	Diaspora Philanthropy
DSD	Diaspora Services Department
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ESOL	English Language Acquisition
EU	European Union
EU15	EU 15 Member States as of April 30, 2004
EUR	Euro
FIM	<i>Federaal Impulsfonds voor het Migrantenbeleid</i> (Federal Impulse Fund for Migrant Policy)
GBP	British Pound
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Society for International Cooperation)
GLAAD	Global Legal Assistance Programme
GmbH	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Society for International Cooperation)
GONGO	Government organised non-governmental organisation
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
HCTE	<i>Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l'étranger</i> (High Council of Tunisians Abroad)
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IdEA	International diaspora Engagement Alliance
IDF	World Bank Institutional Development Fund
Ifa	<i>Instituts für Auslandsbeziehungen</i> (Institute for Foreign and Cultural Relations)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMIS	Integrated Migration Information System
INFOCON	The Information Project
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
IZA	Institute for the Study of Labor
JMDI	United Nations joint Migration and Development Initiative
LADP	Local Area Development Programme
LEP	Lateral Entry Programme
LGP	Local Government Programme
LINKAPIL	<i>Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino</i> (Link for Philippine Development Programme)
LOM	<i>Landelijk Overleg Minderheden</i> (National Consultation Platform for Minorities)
M&D	Migration and Development
MACIMIDE	Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development
MCP	Management Capacity Programme
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MIDA FINNSOM	Institutionalizing Healthcare Improvement through Temporary Returns of Somali Health Professionals Residing in Finland
MMC	Medical Mission Coordination
MoDM	Ministry of Displacement and Migration
MONB	Mayor's Office of New Bostonians
MPC	Migration Policy Centre
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
MRE	<i>Marocains Résidant à l'étranger</i> (Moroccans Resident Abroad)
NADICOK	National Diaspora Council of Kenya
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRI	Non-Resident Indian
NUEYS	National Union Eritrean Youth and Students
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OUA	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFs-RED	Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development

OIFC	Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre
PEOIC	Person of Ethiopian Origin Identify Card
POPIN	United Nations' Population Information Network
PPP	Public-private partnership
PRI	Pakistan Remittance Initiative
R&R	Return and Reintegration
RCPI	Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative
REAGE	Network of the Algerian Graduates from the Grandes Ecoles
RQA	Return of Qualified Afghans
RQAN	Return of Qualified African Nationals
SACCOs	Diaspora Savings and Credit Cooperatives
SCYC	Supreme Council of Yemeni Communities
SEMTE	Secretary of State for Migrations and Tunisians Abroad
SIGR	<i>Système Intégré de Gestion des Requêtes</i> (Integrated system for the management of applications)
SLDBs	Sri Lanka Development Bonds
SOPEMI	<i>Système d'observation permanente des migrations</i> (The Continuous Reporting System on Migration)
SPaKTEN	Sudanese Partnership for Knowledge Transfer by Expatriate Nationals
SSWA	Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad
STASPO-USA	Sudanese American Scientific, Technical and Professional Organisation
TALMALI	Mali's Talents
TI	Tourism Initiatives
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
TRQM	Temporary Return of Qualified Migrants
TRQN	Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USTMA	Trade Union for Arab Maghreb Workers
UTIT	Union for Tunisian Immigrant Workers

VGC	<i>Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie</i> (Flemish Community Commission)
WB	World Bank
WOM	<i>Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid</i> (Minority Policy Consultation Act)
YFPDJ	Young People's Front for Democracy and Justice

Two-letter Country Codes (ISO 3166-1 alpha-2)

AF – Afghanistan	LT – Lithuania
AT – Austria	LU – Luxembourg
BE – Belgium	LV – Latvia
BG – Bulgaria	LY – Libya
CY – Cyprus	MA – Morocco
CZ – Czech Republic	ML – Mali
DE – Germany	MR – Mauritania
DJ – Djibouti	MT – Malta
DK – Kingdom of Denmark	NE – Niger
DZ – Algeria	NL – Netherlands
EE – Estonia	PH – Philippines
EG – Egypt	PK – Pakistan
ER – Eritrea	PL – Poland
ES – Spain	PT – Portugal
ET – Ethiopia	RO – Romania
FI – Finland	SD – Sudan
FR – France	SE – Sweden
GB – Great Britain	SI – Slovenia
GR – Greece	SK – Slovakia
HR – Croatia	SO – Somalia
HU – Hungary	SS – South Sudan
IE – Ireland	SY – Syria
IN – India	TN – Tunisia
IQ – Iraq	TR – Turkey
IT – Italy	UG – Uganda
KE – Kenya	YE – Yemen
LK – Sri Lanka	

Three-letter Country Codes (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3)

AFG – Afghanistan	MLI – Mali
AUT – Austria	MLT – Malta
BEL – Belgium	MRT – Mauritania
BGR – Bulgaria	NER – Niger
CYP – Cyprus	NLD – Netherlands
CZE – Czech Republic	PAK – Pakistan
DEU – Germany	PHL – Philippines
DJI – Djibouti	POL – Poland
DNK – Denmark	PRT – Portugal
DZA – Algeria	ROU – Romania
EGY – Egypt	SDN – Sudan
ERI – Eritrea	SOM – Somalia
ESP – Spain	SSD – South Sudan
EST – Estonia	SVK – Slovakia
ETH – Ethiopia	SVN – Slovenia
FIN – Finland	SWE – Sweden
FRA – France	SYR – Syria
GBR – Great Britain	TUN – Tunisia
GRC – Greece	TUR - Turkey
HRV – Croatia	UGA – Uganda
HUN – Hungary	YEM – Yemen
IND – India	
IRL – Ireland	
IRQ – Iraq	
ITA – Italy	
KEN – Kenya	
LKA – Sri Lanka	
LTU – Lithuania	
LUX – Luxembourg	
LVA – Latvia	
LYB – Libya	
MAR – Morocco	



# 1. Introduction

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## 1.1. Why this study?

Diaspora communities are increasingly perceived and engaged as productive and useful members of host countries and as contributors to many aspects of their countries of origin (2009, p. 7; Baubock, 2008, p. 1; Mahroum, Eldridge, & Daar, 2006). They have been identified as bridges between nations, potential mediators between host and home countries, and as transmitters of values and/or promoters of development (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008). Given that diaspora groups may undertake wide-ranging and significant activities within and across host and home countries, identifying, mapping and assessing their presence and potential roles has become increasingly acknowledged as an important and worthwhile undertaking.

Scholars and practitioners consider the local knowledge and connections diaspora [often] possess as an advantage in contributing to and achieving a range of positive outcomes (Ionescu, 2005; Newland & Tanaka, 2010; Vorrath, 2012; Zimmermann, 2013). For example, partnering with diaspora networks has been shown to have a stronger impact on direct poverty reduction in small communities (Newland & Patrick, 2004). Aside from their financial contributions, diaspora members also have the potential to transmit social and political knowledge, as well as other types of expertise, to their country of origin through close collaboration with people in the country of origin or through personally returning (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Scholars have documented the involvement of diaspora members in home country politics through what has been termed a “transnational political field” (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003). Such participation has, in many cases, been encouraged through home country policies allowing and facilitating the voting of expatriates. As such, diaspora communities offer substantial potential for significant roles in home country politics.

While the positive contributions of diaspora are increasingly identified, challenges and concerns remain. For example, ongoing disagreement persists regarding the extent to which diaspora communities, and migrants in general, are, can, and/or should be integrated into host countries. In Europe, an institutional view on the need of immigrant integration comes from the Zaragoza Declaration: “successful integration of legally resident third-country nationals remains the key to maximising the benefits of immigration and defines strategic guidelines in this field” (European Ministerial Conference on Integration, 2010, p. 2). The economic integration of migrants in Europe received coverage in a special issue of *The Economic Journal* in 2010 (Vol. 120). Highlights include the educational and economic integration of first- and second-generation migrants (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010) and the link between immigrant identity and labour market outcomes (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). Where integration has not occurred this can be associated with a range of issues, including potential marginalisation and

vulnerability, the need for welfare support, and real or perceived threats to security (Algan et al., 2010, pp. 4-5; Baubock, 2008). A book edited by Algan, Bisin, Manning, and Verdier (2012) collects studies which explore how cultural and economic integration are intertwined, evidencing challenges for both processes. A recent study analysing the opinions of expert stakeholders involved in migrant and ethnic minority integration process reveals that language barriers, lack of education, discrimination and institutional hurdles are barriers to the social and labor market integration of these groups (Constant, Kahanec, & Zimmermann, 2010). Companion research funded by the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity (Zimmermann et al., 2012) concludes that in spite of their higher poverty risk, migrant groups use welfare less than natives and are therefore more economically vulnerable, ultimately leading to potential social exclusion. In the discourse surrounding diaspora, positive opportunities for development are also contrasted with concerns about religious extremism and radicalisation, especially within Western host countries (Menkhaus, 2009; Whine, 2009).

The range and growing recognition of potential positive impacts of diaspora engagement are attended by a policy interest in optimising these positive influences and in mitigating the challenges and concerns of negative possibilities. In order to inform and develop policy to optimise the potential for positive influences – and to reduce the potential for negative influences of engagement with diaspora – a concerted study is needed regarding the range of groups and activities in which diaspora communities engage, in addition to the relationships between those groups and activities and their countries of origin. In addition, a systematic quantitative mapping of diaspora groups can provide insight into the integration methods and differential outcomes of a range of host countries and diaspora communities. This research area serves as a backdrop to the contributions of this study.

## 1.2. Objectives of this study

In light of the context presented above, The European Commission has commissioned RAND Europe and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) to conduct a study mapping diasporas in the European Union and the United States. The aim of this study is to provide an overview of diasporas present in Europe and the US, and to deliver concrete recommendations for their engagement with third countries. This study can be described by a set of key objectives which shaped our work plan for the project:

- 1) Provide an extensive review and compilation of existing studies on the diasporas, and provide an updated overview of all diaspora communities settled in Europe and the US, paying particular attention to demographics and socio-economic profiles.
- 2) Focus on a number of key diaspora groups, taking into account their engagement with the political and economic development of a number of sending countries, in addition to their demographic weight in the destination countries (i.e. the EU and the US).
- 3) Analyse the nature and strength of links between these diaspora groups and their countries of origin.
- 4) Survey the existence of official diaspora organisations – and other organisations that have an understanding of the diaspora – and characterise their activities.
- 5) Synthesise findings from the above tasks and propose concrete recommendations for possible EU action, particularly with respect to engaging constructively and effectively with diaspora groups.

Geographically, the remit of this study is diaspora groups currently present in the European Union and in the United States. As stated in the list of objectives above, this study paid particular attention in its in-depth analysis on diaspora groups from 25 selected countries of origin. These countries were identified in the tender specification for this research project and slightly modified by the commissioning team at the outset. The selected countries of origin are listed in Box 1. In addition, Chechnya and Kashmir were added to the list of geographical entities selected for in-depth analysis. While there were serious constraints on our ability to perform the research owing to the fact these regions are not independent and sovereign territories (and in the case of Kashmir, even undisputed), we include them in our analysis to the extent possible.

**Box 1. Countries selected for in-depth analysis**

Afghanistan, Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen, as well as Chechnya and Kashmir.

### 1.3. Definition of diaspora for the purposes of this study

The definition of diaspora is not an immediately straightforward task. In the work specifications for this research assignment, diaspora communities have been defined as ‘people with common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their country of origins’ (see tender specification, p.8). Yet many scholars also point to additional qualities of diaspora, such as: ‘a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time, based on a shared history, culture and religion’; the creation of social networks by members of the same group living throughout the world; a sustained/maintained link and connection to the homeland; and an interest in maintaining status in the country of origin (Bakewell, 2008, p. 5; Ionescu, 2005; Vorrath, 2012, p. 7). It is important to distinguish between groups of migrants and a diaspora group, with a diaspora being a specific group whose relationship to the country of origin may be such that they retain a strong attachment to the homeland and to the notion of returning one day (Plaza & Ratha, 2011, p. 3). Sometimes, diaspora groups have been established in the host country for so many generations that they are no longer considered migrants. As Ionescu (2005) states: “the notion of ‘diaspora’ seems to better incorporate populations that are ‘settled’ abroad,<sup>2</sup> people who become citizens of their host country and second-born generations.”

In addition, the terminology concerning countries — where diaspora groups are from and where they are currently living — can be controversial and, at times, misleading. Many factors such as time, place of birth, citizenship, identity and belonging must be considered when defining diaspora groups (Ionescu, 2005). The term diaspora, as Bakewell (2008, p. 3) illustrates, ‘needs to be reserved for particular people living in distinctive relationships with each other and a home land. Not all migrants become diaspora and

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<sup>2</sup> We note the explicit contradiction between focusing on groups having settled in a receiving country and an interest in the notion of returning one day to their country of origin.

not all diaspora [especially second and third generations] can be considered as migrants (although their ancestors may have been so).<sup>7</sup>

For the purposes of this study, we generally use the definition offered by Agunias and Newland (2012), captured in Box 2 below. That said, as discussed in greater detail in relevant methodological sections, in various steps of the research process the team had to make slight adjustments to this working definition to accommodate data constraints and limitations.

## **Box 2. Working definition of diaspora for the purposes of this study**

‘Diasporas are emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. The common thread among these recent arrivals and members of long-established communities is that they identify with their country of origin or ancestry and are willing to maintain ties to it.’

Source: Agunias and Newland (2012)

Two points on usage of language should be made. First, this report uses the terms ‘homeland’, ‘country of origin’ and ‘sending country’ interchangeably and adopts the same approach for ‘hostland’ and ‘receiving country.’ For the purposes of this report and its objectives, there are no analytical differences stemming from the use of any combination of these terms. This is partly in recognition of the fact that the language used in the literature on diasporas – in data sets used in the course of this project, and by diaspora groups themselves – is equally varied, and partly for esthetic reasons to avoid unnecessary repetition.<sup>3</sup>

Second, we understand the singular word ‘diaspora’ as a group of people with shared connection to one particular country of origin. In places, this report also uses the plural form ‘diasporas’ to signify that there are separate diaspora groups, akin to the way the word ‘peoples’ is used to refer to a collection of separate ethnic/national groups.

## **1.4. Structure of this report**

In order to address its objectives outlined above, this report is structured in three major parts, each of which is introduced by a detailed discussion of its methodology. The first part presents the results of the mapping exercise, offering an in-depth analysis of diaspora groups settled in the European Union and the United States, with a particular emphasis on their socio-economic and demographic profiles. This section also includes a comparative analysis of diaspora communities and their countries of origin.

The second part brings together our findings on diaspora engagement. These are a product of several concurrent data collection exercises: 1) a review of existing literature on diaspora engagement, 2) targeted desk research on existing engagement efforts and links between selected diaspora groups and their

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<sup>3</sup> We recognise there may be some sensitivity surrounding terminology. For instance, the term ‘host country’ is sometimes not preferred in the migration community because of the implication that the receiving country is actually hosting those people who arrive (with connotations associated with ‘hosting’ such as welcoming and looking after). In practice, many migrants’ experiences may include feeling unwelcome due to perceived marginalisation, discrimination, restricted access to services and support. In practice, therefore, these migrant experiences may lead to an identification of the country of arrival as the ‘receiving’ country rather than a ‘host’ country, which may be a more fitting term for diaspora groups.

countries of origin, 3) targeted desk research on existing engagement efforts and links between diaspora groups and selected receiving countries, 4) a survey undertaken of diaspora organisations, and 5) stakeholder interviews with diaspora representatives.

Part three is a synthesis of all hitherto presented evidence, on the basis of which the research team formulates policy recommendations for policymakers and other stakeholders on further courses of action with respect to diaspora engagement. We also offer a set of additional policy considerations extrapolated from rather than directly encapsulating our collected evidence. These considerations may be of value as starting points for further policy discussion.

In addition, in the course of the research project, we collected data that, due to space constraints, cannot be presented in the main body of the report. We use a set of appendices to present this data, along with the most important research instruments. The organisation of this report's appendices is outlined in Table 1-1 below.

**Table 1-1. List of appendices and their content**

<b>Appendix</b>	<b>Description of content</b>
Stand-alone document	Detailed data collected and analysed the mapping part of the project
Appendix A	Detailed overviews of diaspora engagement approaches by selected countries of origin
Appendix B	Additional results of diaspora survey analysis
Appendix C	Further information on data sources used in the mapping part of the project
Appendix D	Methodology of Stage 1 literature review
Appendix E	Data extraction template for Stage 1 literature review
Appendix F	Data extraction templates for Stage 2 desk research
Appendix G	Detailed overview of survey methodology
Appendix H	Survey questionnaire in all language versions
Appendix I	Additional data on bilateral remittances



## PART I: MAPPING DIASPORAS

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## 2. Methodology for Part I

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This chapter outlines our approach to data collection and harmonisation and describes the steps undertaken by the research team to prepare the data for the analysis presented in Chapter 3. It presents our definition of diaspora for the purposes of our mapping activities and briefly discusses the challenges stemming from data availability and the lack of common variable definitions across the European Union and the United States.


Our mapping process was divided into two distinct yet related phases. In the first phase, we focused on collecting information on diaspora groups and general populations in all Member States in the European Union and the United States. The primary purpose of this exercise was to identify diaspora groups present in Europe and in the United States, and to obtain basic socio-economic information on these groups.

In the second phase, we expanded our analysis to include a set of selected countries of origin and collected the same type of data pertaining to their general population. In this phase, we also assembled all available information to conduct a comparative analysis across selected diaspora groups, their countries of origin and their receiving countries. The aim of this exercise was to comment on any observed differences and patterns therein across a set of possible comparison pairs, including:

- Between diaspora group from country A in country X and general population in country X.
- Between diaspora group from country A in country X and general population in country A.
- Between diaspora group from country A in country X and diaspora group from country A in country Y.
- Between diaspora group from country A and diaspora group from country B in country X.

Ultimately, our analysis fed into the final synthesis and formulation of policymakers for engagement with diaspora groups. Figure 2-1 below presents a schematic overview of our activities undertaken in this part of the research project.

**Figure 2-1. Process map of mapping analysis**



## 2.1. Definitions vary across individual countries' data sources

For the purposes of our data-based mapping, we had to operationalise the working definition of a diaspora offered in Box 2 in a way that would accommodate the constraints caused by issues surrounding data availability. As a result, the research team decided to define diaspora groups as equivalent to the stock of immigrants in a given receiving country. This definition, albeit imperfectly rendering an analysis beyond first generation migrants very limited, is in line with approaches utilised in other studies on mapping diasporas identified by our literature review (see Chapter 4). In addition, this definition is the only way to achieve at least some harmonisation of data across various sources in order to conduct the comparative analysis described above with a reasonable degree of confidence in its validity. While the mapping/quantitative approach requires some generalisation in the definition of diaspora, complementary information on various diaspora groups will be provided through both the analysis of the literature and of the survey of diaspora organisations.

The primary variable that we used to capture diaspora groups is country of birth. This variable is the one most commonly used in migration and demographic studies and is used by the majority of datasets employed in this study. An obvious disadvantage of its use is its inextricable link to geopolitical realities and its consequent inability to capture those groups that do not hail from a single independent country. This is the case for two groups specifically selected for in-depth analysis in this project (Chechnya, Kashmir) but applies also to other groups that may be significant. An example thereof is the Kurdish community, which by some estimates in Europe alone totals nearly one million people,<sup>4</sup> but since its

<sup>4</sup> Baser (2013) notes that whilst no recent or reliable census of the Kurdish population in Europe has been undertaken, the most widely accepted estimates are that about 850,000 Kurds are dispersed throughout Western Europe, with approximately 500,000-600,000 of those living in Germany.

territory of origin spans several countries, is not captured by the country of birth variable. This is not necessarily a criticism of the variable but rather an acknowledgement of its limitations.

Where information on the basis of country of birth was not available, we used as a second-best option the citizenship of the immigrant communities or their self-declared ethnicity. The use of citizenship and self-declared ethnicity, as opposed to country of birth, is especially prevalent in some Eastern European countries. Each of these two second-best variables has its advantages and limitations. Data based on citizenship might lead to underestimates of the size of diaspora groups since some people may no longer have the citizenship of their country of origin when settled in their receiving country. In some contexts, this may be offset to some extent by second-generation members of the diaspora who have been able to acquire the citizenship of their parents' country of origin through that country's citizenship laws; however, we were unable to analyse in detail whether and to what extent this is indeed the case. Finally, using self-declared ethnicity as a definitional variable had the advantage of allowing us to include non-first generation members and might, *stricto sensu*, be closest to the traditional meaning of diaspora as those people maintaining links to their country of origin. However, there are also two principal disadvantages to its use. First, the use of this variable is confined to a relatively narrow group of countries and its comparability with data in other settings is extremely challenging. Second, the information obtained through self-declared ethnicity needs careful interpretation, particularly in countries with large 'traditional' minority groups, which may have been a result of changes in border demarcations rather than large population movements.

In line with the tender specifications for this research project, we initially set out to identify in each host country every immigrant community composed of more than 20,000 people in a given receiving country. However, collected data show that some small diaspora with fewer than 20,000 individuals in certain countries still represent an important group when compared with the overall size of the diaspora, or with other diasporas in the same country of destination. In order not to miss this important information, and upon consulting with the commissioning team, we decided to adopt a cut-off rule less conservative than the one originally planned (see Box 3). To select countries, we adopted an algorithm whereby we first include diasporas groups totalling at least 1,000 individuals across all covered destination countries. This excluded from our analysis the Djibouti diaspora. We then excluded countries of destination in which the total size of all diasporas combined is below 1,000 individuals. This leads to the exclusion of Poland, Latvia and Estonia. Third, in each country of destination, we excluded all diasporas with counts inferior to 100. In addition to these thresholds defined in absolute terms, we implemented a cut-off rule that takes into consideration the relative size of each diaspora in the country of destination. In particular we exclude diasporas with a level of exposure (diaspora group as a proportion of the receiving country population, as defined in Chapter 3) below 1/100,000 (or 0.00001) within one country. Groups smaller than this level were deemed too small by the research team to be able to confidently comment on their socio-economic profile. The combination of these cut-off rules narrowed our focus to diasporas deemed to be important in terms of both absolute and relative size. While most of our analysis offered in Chapter 3 will be based on data above such threshold, for completeness we will present our initial, basic statistics for all diaspora groups (i.e. including groups below the threshold).

### Box 3. Selection algorithm for in-depth analysis

**Absolute size criteria:**

- 1) Included only groups totalling at least 1,000 individuals across all receiving countries combined
- 2) Included only receiving countries where all diaspora groups combined totalled at least 1,000 individuals
- 3) Included only diaspora groups totalling at least 100 individuals in any particular country

**Relative size criterion:**

- 4) Included only diaspora groups with a level of exposure of at least 0.00001

In addition, for the main receiving countries, namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, we also collected data on the basis of regions (NUTS/NUTS 2) and, in the US context, individual states. For the United Kingdom, the regional analysis was performed only for England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland conduct their own censuses – which, due to the small size of their foreign-born population and population more generally, often do not disaggregate by country of birth.

## 2.2. Most recent national censuses form the basis of our data collection

The first step in our data collection was to check the availability of census data on the websites of national statistical offices in each country covered by the research project. We chose to rely primarily on the census data because of three principal advantages: 1) they offer the most up-to-date data in the form of the 2010/2011 wave of censuses; 2) they give a comprehensive picture of the receiving countries in terms of immigration; and 3) they cover all migrant groups, including, most importantly, those difficult to reach. Whenever the data were publicly available, we downloaded them directly from these websites.

However, not all censuses have been made publicly available. Where this was the case, we made a direct demand to the national statistical offices. Whenever these offices answered positively to our request, we used the data or the link to the data provided. In some cases, the census data were not available at all. In this situation we used data from alternative sources such as population registers. In very rare cases (such as Greece), we used the OECD International Migration Database to map the diasporas.

A similar approach was used in Phase II when collecting data pertaining to the populations of selected countries of origin and their subsequent comparative analysis with the socio-demographic profile of their diaspora groups.

## 2.3. Basic socioeconomic variables often require additional data sources

In addition to estimating the overall size of each diaspora group, we were also interested in the gender, age, level of education and labour force status of diaspora members. In most cases, these variables are included directly in the data available through national censuses. In several instances, however, national censuses either did not collect this information or have not made it available. Consequently, alternative data sources had to be identified. This was particularly the case for data on the education level and the labour force participation of diaspora members.

We encountered this challenge also when collecting data on general populations in selected countries of origin and found that relatively few national censuses collected detailed information on the variables sought by the research team. To some extent, this reflects understandable differences in priorities between countries of origin and receiving countries. For instance, some sending countries selected for in-depth analysis represent lower-income countries primarily interested in indicators related to Millenium Development Goals such as school enrolment rates – as opposed to such indicators as education attainment data, which may be irrelevant for large parts of their populations.

Our approaches to address these various data gaps are discussed in greater detail below.

### *2.3.1. Alternative sources for age and gender data*

For age and gender distribution of diaspora groups we extracted information from the national census data; for countries of origin and destination we obtained data from the United Nations World Population Prospects (2012 Revision), which contains homogenised estimates by age and gender group for all countries of destination and nearly all countries of origin. Homogeneity in these definitions is particularly useful when comparing diaspora groups with, and across, both countries of origin and countries of destination.

### *2.3.2. Alternative sources for educational data*

For information on the educational attainment of diaspora groups, we used the bilateral migration database of the OECD destination countries 1990-2000 developed by Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2007). The main reason for our choice is that this database provides information about migration from 195 source countries to the OECD countries. The sources of their data are the data sets of different statistical offices of the OECD countries, SOPEMI, and the United Nations Population Division. We also use the Comprehensive Migration Matrices by education level and by gender (1990-2000) of Artuc, Docquier, Özden, and Parsons (2013). We chose this database as an alternative source because it is a bilateral database which contains data for both OECD and non-OECD countries. Although the latest data are available for the year 2000, these databases are considered reliable sources and give a good overview of the breakdown by education level in the receiving countries. There is not a data source of a similarly widely-recognised quality that would work with more recent data. In fact, this corresponds with our finding that several national statistical offices have not processed and made available data on education – neither publicly, nor for secondary analysis to other researchers. We pay attention to the three levels of education (low, medium, high)<sup>5</sup> of the immigrant population in the host countries.<sup>6</sup>

For the origin and destination countries, our priority has been once again to find data sources that would enhance the comparability with the diaspora groups. Eventually for both countries of origin and destination we relied on the information provided by the Barro-Lee dataset (Barro-Lee, 2013). This data

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<sup>5</sup> To the extent possible, we tried to match all categories to those defined by the internationally standardised ISCED classification.

<sup>6</sup> In addition, our confidence in the use of 2000 data builds on the observed consistencies in flow types between given sending and receiving countries over time, based on established migrant network relationships. For more information, see for instance Massey et al. (1993), and Fassman and Munz (1992).

source contains homogenised education data (including completed education and enrollment) for all EU-28 Member States and the US, although, as discussed below, the definition of education categories can be slightly different when compared with those adopted for the diaspora groups. For our purposes we adopted a categorization similar to that of the diaspora groups (i.e. low, medium and high).

### 2.3.3. *Alternative sources for labour force data*

When censuses did not include information on labour force participation, we used the following sources of data as alternatives: 1) register-based labour market statistics; 2) the most recent data about the stock of foreign labour by nationality; 3) the stock of foreign-born labour by country of birth. The latter two data sources are provided by the OECD International Migration database. If none of these data were available, we used the working age population as captured by national censuses. By including inactive individuals (such as unpaid household workers), working age population is a broader data source than labour force, which only includes employed and unemployed (seeking work) persons. Hence, working age population should be considered as an upper boundary of the actual labor force. Within a country, however, comparing working population across diaspora groups has the capacity to yield information on differences of labor market participation ‘potential’.

## 2.4. Harmonisation of the different data sets

After obtaining data from all countries covered by the research project (i.e. EU28 and US and selected 25 countries of origin and two regions), we harmonised collected information to enhance the comparability of all socioeconomic variables. The age variable was harmonised in three categories: under 15 years old; between 15-64 years old; 65 years old and over (except for diasporas in France, Bulgaria and the US, which used slightly different age groups – see details in the relevant stand-alone accompanying document). For education level, we used the ISCED classification according to three categories: ISCED 1-2 (classified into low education level) which groups together primary and lower secondary education; ISCED 3-4 (medium education) which includes people with upper secondary school, technical, vocational training, apprenticeship or equivalent; and ISCED 5-6 (higher education) which covers undergraduate and graduate levels, or the equivalent. People with no educational attainment or those whose level of education is not stated were not included in our analysis, with the exception of OECD data, which does not allow a distinction between no schooling and low education. The information on education for countries of origin and destination was accessed from the Barro-Lee dataset. These data have the advantage of being already harmonised across countries. There are however two important considerations. First, the classifications in the Barro-Lee categories are only partially comparable with the ISCED levels used for diasporas. Second, in the case of the majority of countries of origin, where even basic schooling is far from being universal, data on completed education will only refer to a selected subgroup of the total population. Keeping these caveats in mind, the availability of education breakdowns in the origin and destination countries allows us to obtain qualitative comparison about the educational composition of diasporas vis-à-vis the populations in the relevant sending and receiving areas.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Another well-known example of a harmonised data set is one of the main EU databases – the European Labour Force Survey. Regrettably, since its data are not disaggregated down to an individual country of origin, the data set is

For labour force participation, we worked with the following three categories: employed, unemployed and inactive. We used these categories to derive indicators such as employment-to-population ratio and labour force participation rate. Particular caution should be used in interpreting and comparing labour force data from countries of origin. First, labour market data are rather scarce in the majority of the selected sending countries. More importantly, for less-developed or low income countries, measuring labour force outcomes is particularly challenging due to institutional constraints such as informality of employment and administrative processes. Substantial levels of informality might lead to understating the level of unemployment or of precarious employment, leading to potentially distorted figures. Nevertheless, the comparison of these statistics provides an indication of major cross-country differences in labour outcomes and dissimilarities between diaspora members and sending country population.

The tables below present a complete overview of the sources used for each country along with their variable definitions of a migrant. A detailed narrative of individual countries and their data availability can be found in the relevant stand-alone accompanying document.

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of limited use for the purposes of this study. For an illustration of the use of the EU LFS, see for instance Munz and Fassmann (2004).

**Table 2-1. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – overall size**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Reference year</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Individual-level variable</b>
Austria	2011	Census	Country of citizenship
Belgium	2011	Census	Country of citizenship
Bulgaria	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity <sup>8</sup>
Croatia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Cyprus	2011	Census	Country of birth
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Denmark	2011	Census	Country of birth
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Finland	2011	Census	Country of birth
France	2010	Census	Country of birth
Germany	2011	Central Register of Foreigners	Country of birth
Greece	2009	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of birth
Italy	2011	Population registry	Country of birth
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Lithuania	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth
Poland	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth
Romania	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity <sup>8</sup>
Slovakia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence
Spain	2008	OECD Migration Database	Country of nationality
Sweden	2011	Census	Country of birth
United Kingdom	2011	Census	Country of birth
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth

Note: Malta not included due to its small population size.

<sup>8</sup> For Turkish groups in Bulgaria and Romania we used citizenship as the definitional variable, rather than ethnicity. The rationale for this choice was a desire to avoid substantial distortion of collected data. For historical reasons, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania, have large ethnic Turkish populations. Members of these groups, however, unlike all other diaspora groups included in our analysis, have frequently become diaspora not as a result of their movement, but as a result of historical movement of borders. In this context, our use of the citizenship variable is an effort to bring the analysis of Turkish groups in Eastern Europe in line with that of their counterparts in Western receiving countries, though we recognise this approach may obscure some of the complexities behind the existence and characteristics of these two diaspora groups.

**Table 2-2. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – age**

Country	Reference year	Source	Individual-level variable	Definition*
Austria	2013	Eurostat	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Belgium	2011	Census	Country of citizenship	14<15-64>65
Bulgaria	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	19<20-59>60
Croatia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Cyprus	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Denmark	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Finland	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
France	2010	Census	Country of birth	14<15-54>55
Germany	2011	Central Register of Foreigners	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Greece	2001	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-59>60
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Italy	2013	Eurostat	Country of birth	
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Lithuania	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Portugal	2001	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	24<25-64>65
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence	14<15-64>65
Spain	2008	OECD Migration Database	Country of nationality	14<15-64>65
Sweden	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
United Kingdom	2001	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth	24<25-64>65

Notes: Malta not included due to its small population size

\*Definition: 14<15-64>65 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 15 years old; one group considering people aged between 15 and 64 years old; and one group with people who are at least 65 years old.

19<20-59>60 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 19 years old; one group considering people aged between 20 and 59 years old; and one group with people who are at least 60 years old.

14<15-59>60 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 14 years old; one group considering people aged between 15 and 59 years old; and one group with people who are at least 60 years old.

24<25-64>65 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 24 years old; one group considering people aged between 25 and 64 years old; and one group with people who are at least 65 years old.

Note: In the case of Greece, age groups are only available from 15+.

**Table 2-3. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – education level**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Reference year</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Individual-level variable</b>
Austria	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth
Belgium	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth
Bulgaria	2000	Artuc, Docquier, Ozden and Parsons (2013)	Country of origin*
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cyprus	2011	Census	Country of birth
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Denmark	2011	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Finland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
France	2010	Census	Country of birth
Germany	2011	Microcensus	Country of citizenship
Greece	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of birth
Italy	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of citizenship
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Lithuania	2011	Artuc, Docquier, Ozden and Parsons (2013)	Country of origin*
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence
Spain	2000	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth
Sweden	2011	Census	Country of birth
United Kingdom	2011	Census	Country of birth
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth

Note: Unless specified otherwise, educational attainment data pertain to populations aged 15-64. Swedish diaspora data covers population aged 25-64. Malta not included due to its small population size.

\*The source code does not indicate whether this refers to country of birth or country of origin

**Table 2-4. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – labour force participation**

Country	Reference year	Source	Individual-level variable
Austria	2010	Labour Market Statistics	Country of citizenship
Belgium	2009	OECD Migration Statistics	Country of citizenship
Bulgaria	N/A	N/A	N/A
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cyprus	N/A	N/A	N/A
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Denmark	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Finland	2011	Census	Country of birth
France	2010	Census	Country of citizenship
Germany	2011	Microcensus	Country of birth
Greece	2009	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of citizenship
Italy	2006	OECD Migration Database	Country of citizenship
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence
Spain	2008	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
Sweden	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth
United Kingdom	2011	Census	Country of birth
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth

Note: Malta not included due to its small population size

## 2.5. Classification of countries for in-depth analysis

To help identify noteworthy patterns across countries in our in-depth analysis of socioeconomic profiles of selected diaspora groups, we organised both selected countries of origin and European receiving countries into several broad categories. Countries of origin were grouped in the following three categories: 1) South and Southeast Asia, 2) Middle East and North Africa, and 3) Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>9</sup> European

<sup>9</sup> We recognise that the definition of the MENA region can vary. In our classification effort, we followed the example of the World Bank (2013a).

receiving countries were also split into four regional groups in line with definitions used by the United Nations: 1) Eastern, 2) Northern, 3) Southern, and 4) Western.<sup>10</sup>

The following two tables show the composition of each category.

**Table 2-5. Classification of selected countries of origin**

<b>South and Southeast Asia</b>	<b>Middle East and North Africa</b>	<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>
Afghanistan India Pakistan Sri Lanka The Philippines	Algeria Djibouti Egypt Iraq Libya Mauritania Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Yemen	Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Niger Somalia South Sudan Sudan Uganda

**Table 2-6. Classification of EU receiving countries**

<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Southern</b>	<b>Northern</b>	<b>Western</b>
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Romania	Croatia Cyprus Greece Italy Malta Portugal Slovenia Spain	Denmark Estonia Finland Ireland Latvia Lithuania Sweden United Kingdom	Austria Belgium France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands

## 2.6. Concluding points on data limitations

Several points pertaining to data limitations should be stressed before the findings from our data analysis is presented. First, available data present only a snapshot of a particular moment in the past; the situation on the ground might have changed substantially since the data were collected. While we endeavored to obtain as recent data as possible – such as the latest round of national censuses in each studied country – in some instances, data used in this analysis is slightly more dated due to availability constraints or comparability requirements. Moreover, even where the latest data are used, significant geopolitical developments may have occurred which could substantially affect their value. For instance, in some countries the latest census was conducted in 2010 or 2011. This means that the diaspora from South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, is not necessarily listed as a separate entity and therefore does not feature in our analysis in the next chapter. Another example is the Syrian civil war, begun in 2011 and leading to substantial outward flows of people, which would not be captured by existing data sets.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The UN definitions can be found (United Nations, 2013). One of our modifications was to include Cyprus, which the UN classifies as Western Asia, in Southern Europe.

<sup>11</sup> According to the UN, by late 2013, the number of Syrians who have fled their country has surpassed three million (SBS, 2013).

Second, while we made every effort to achieve maximum harmonisation across various data sets, it was not always possible to have ideally comparable data – primarily because definitions occasionally differ across covered countries. This issue is much less of a concern for receiving countries, but substantial variation can also occur across selected countries of origin, based on how they conceptualise various indicators. Most notably, variations exist in cases where labour force statistics are not in line with guidance provided by the International Labour Organization. To mitigate this concern, our analysis makes use of data sets already harmonised by third parties, thus tackling potential disparities across various countries such as the Docquier/Marfouk or the Barro-Lee educational data sets. In addition, we state up front the sources and definitions behind the data used in our analysis and urge caution in instances where there are slight differences in assumptions underlying the data.

Third, while the data presented in our analysis represent a useful tool for understanding the characteristics of diaspora groups, the high-level and cross-national nature of our work may point toward important nuances without carrying sufficient explanatory power to capture fine details. For instance, for several sending countries we observed a substantial difference in educational attainment between men and women. It may be worthwhile to explore whether these discrepancies are to be found in diaspora groups as well. However, this may not be possible for a variety of reasons such as unavailability of data, very small size of certain diaspora groups, or very small share of women within diaspora groups.



## 3. Findings on diaspora mapping

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This chapter presents the results of our analysis of diaspora groups settled in the European Union and in the United States. In line with the preferences of the commissioning team, the chapter briefly discusses high-level patterns of the location and size of diaspora groups and subsequently devotes the majority of attention to detailed analysis of these groups' socio-economic characteristics.


In the course of our analysis, we produced a set of maps, graphs and tables to compile an 'atlas of diasporas', as envisaged in the specifications for this research project. This atlas is attached as a stand-alone accompanying document to this report and serves as a repository of detailed information covering themes discussed in this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, we selected visuals and graphs which offer a high-level yet comprehensive overview in support of the main findings.

### 3.1. Diaspora groups are predominantly concentrated in large Western European countries

We begin the presentation of our findings by examining where diaspora groups from all sending countries are present in the European Union and the United States. Figure 3-1 shows the aggregate level of diaspora groups from selected countries of origin and demonstrates a substantially varied distribution across the European Union and the United States. There is an apparent difference between EU15 Member States, where the vast majority of diaspora groups are located, and new Member States (i.e. those joining the EU in/after 2004) where very few diaspora groups are present. We urge caution when assessing the results for former communist countries due to the prevalent use of the self-declared ethnicity variable and subsequent interpretation challenges as described in Chapter 2.

Receiving countries in the figure below are grouped into quartiles and shaded accordingly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this figure demonstrates that the highest overall diaspora levels are found in large northern and western European countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France, followed by smaller countries such as the Netherlands or Portugal.

**Figure 3-1. Map with overall levels of diasporas in EU/US**




When assessing the size of diaspora groups in their receiving countries, a diaspora in a large country is likely to be less prominent than a diaspora of the same size in a less populous receiving country. For that reason, we also calculated the exposure levels of individual diaspora groups, defined as  $M_{ij}/M_j$  where  $M_{ij}$  is the count of diaspora members from the country of origin  $i$  in country of destination  $j$  and  $M_j$  is the total population of country  $j$ , which take into account the size of the receiving country. Exposures, as well as the following statistics, are calculated only for groups above the functional threshold described in Box 3.<sup>12</sup>

Figure 3-2 below captures overall exposure of diaspora groups in the EU and the United States and also groups countries into quartiles to allow their faster comparison. It emerges that the highest diaspora exposure levels are to be found in smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> We recognise that in some context, exposure index can refer to a measure of residential segregation. In this report, we use exposure indices exclusively as used by migrant economists, for instance by Borjas (2000), i.e. as a proportion of the receiving country population.

<sup>13</sup> For the analysis of exposure, we opted not to include former Eastern bloc countries as it would substantially distort the quartile visualisation. For instance, self-declared ethnic Russians account for over a quarter of the total Estonian population, which would put the country at the top of the ranking.


**Figure 3-2. Map with overall exposure of diasporas in EU/US**



The other aspect of our high-level analysis was to identify which diaspora groups from selected countries of origin are located in the European Union and the United States, and to determine how large these groups are. Figure 3-3 provides an overview of aggregate levels of diasporas by their countries of origin. By far, the three largest groups hail from India, Turkey, Morocco and the Philippines, all of which comprise more than two million individuals. In the case of the Indian and Filipino diaspora, the United States alone accounts for nearly two million in each case, while the Turkish and Moroccan diaspora are almost exclusively located in Europe.<sup>14</sup> The Pakistani diaspora is the only other group to exceed one million members while the Algerian group falls slightly short of this benchmark. On the opposite end of the spectrum, African groups hailing from Djibouti, and Niger and Libya total less than 30,000 individuals each.

<sup>14</sup>A detailed breakdown of group locations can be found in the relevant stand-alone accompanying document.

**Figure 3-3. Bar chart of selected diaspora group levels in all receiving countries combined**



Note: South Sudan missing due to unavailability of data

### 3.2. Diaspora groups vary substantially in their exposure levels relative to general populations of receiving countries

The next step of our analysis was to disaggregate the levels of diasporas and examine them by individual receiving countries. We identified 339 diaspora groups from selected countries of origin currently present in the European Union and the United States. Their overall levels are reported in Figure 3-4 below.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Please note the very small levels of some diaspora groups in countries such as Estonia. In fact, it is entirely possible that some countries have similarly small diasporas from the selected sending countries but were not captured in official data because authorities opted not to report groups below a certain threshold. This is in line with the reasoning behind our cut-off algorithm described in Box 3.

Figure 3-4. Overall levels of diaspora groups from selected countries of origin settled in the European Union and the United States

receiving countries EU28 + US		24 selected sending countries					Middle East and North Africa											Sub-Saharan Africa								Total	
		Asia																									
		Alghonistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda		
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	9,317	6,465	3,182	4,879	435	776		5,042	2,723	291	989	1,865	1,724	160,145	67	83	337	658	74	17	13	1,518	414	146	201,160	
	Belgium	2,050	6,928	3,827	3,113	626	8,984		1,235	3,308		81,943	1,809	3,965	39,551			742			859	1,026	784			160,750	
	Denmark	11,434	8,960	12,166	10,151	7,703	890	20	1,591	21,074	229	5,253	4,031	863	32,066	157	306	1,992	1,495	48	25	15	9,963	656	1,382	132,470	
	Estonia	12	101	29	15	8	13		37	9	4	14	5	6	79	1		4	2		2		2	4	2	349	
	Finland	2,862	4,286	1,541	2,114	763	709	7	856	7,882	159	1,738	468	574	5,409	39	70	1,631	980	5	13	19	8,767	814	142	41,848	
	France		32,964	18,916		38,070	729,814					671,225		241,904	245,714					61,466	14,191					2,054,264	
	Germany	56,563	53,386	31,842	19,370	26,218	13,350		12,711	82,438	4,880	63,037	32,878	23,610	1,607,161	2,879	7,567	10,228	9,414	709	468	821	6,631	2,346	1,460	2,069,967	
	Ireland		17,856	8,329	13,833										1,402												41,420
	Latvia	29	111	27			16		37			15	17		81												333
	Lithuania																										
	Luxembourg	51	880	107	498	58	657		140	229	25	1,151	60	493	585		21	109	58	30	6	129	54	13	9	5,363	
	Netherlands	40,064	21,729	19,408	16,719	10,722	7,835		21,073	52,858	1,096	355,883	10,659	8,690	388,967	576	1,628	11,547	3,328	273	423	407	31,237	6,208	1,624	1,012,954	
	Sweden	17,489	18,622	10,539	10,349	6,790	2,660	171	4,345	125,499	1,589	7,779	22,357	4,258	43,909	825	11,994	14,314	2,730	106	50	35	40,165	2,148	3,140	351,863	
United Kingdom	62,723	694,148	482,137	122,625	127,242	23,929		29,821	72,974	15,046	21,246	8,848	5,832	91,115	17,774	17,282	15,209	137,492				101,370	17,467	59,815	2,124,095		
Southern Europe	Cyprus		2,996	1,533	10,009	7,327		3,292	1,946			3,272		501										294		31,170	
	Croatia													367												367	
	Greece		3,233	22,549	2,705	435	613		13,554	5,028	504	1,068	8,242	476	6,081									433		64,921	
	Italy	3,811	121,036	75,720	134,154	81,094	25,935		90,365	2,812	1,516	452,424	4,029	106,291	19,329	239	13,368	8,593	1,787	1,263	688	1,131	8,112	2,398	442	1,156,537	
	Malta																										
	Portugal		8,129	2,015	474		278		211			2,436		135	537				157								14,372
	Spain	418	36,662	68,279	41,020	574	59,201		3,998	1,656	770	772,126	4,993	2,657	3,572	90	119	3,375	1,447	22,016	10,418	246	246	345	186	1,034,414	
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria													2,741												2,741	
	Czech Republic																										
	Hungary																										
	Poland		900																							900	
	Romania														2,873												2,873
Slovakia																											
United States	55,416	1,817,506	309,562	1,898,341	43,620	17,777		145,172	164,132		72,380	58,962		115,664	48,167	27,980	179,578	85,901				83,210	50,370	19,645	5,193,383		
Total	262,239	2,856,898	1,071,708	2,290,369	351,685	893,437	198	333,480	544,568	26,109	2,510,707	162,495	401,478	2,767,849	70,814	80,418	247,659	245,449	85,990	27,160	3,842	292,059	83,910	87,993	15,698,514		

Colour coding: Above 20,000

As gleaned from the figure above, the levels of some diaspora groups, where diligently reported by national statistical offices, are extremely small. Therefore, to calculate the exposure levels of identified diaspora groups and to perform the subsequent in-depth analysis, we applied our cut-off algorithm as described in Box 3. This measurement led to the exclusion of 70 groups, leaving 269 groups in the set for subsequent analysis.

The results of this analysis reiterate the difference between EU15 countries and newer Member States in the number and size of diaspora groups present in their territories. In fact, of newer Member States only Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania were found to have diaspora groups large enough to clear the threshold for inclusion in our in-depth analysis, the latter two only due to the inclusion of Turkish diaspora groups in our analysis. With a few notable exceptions,<sup>16</sup> countries of the former Eastern bloc do not have sizeable minority groups from countries other than their neighbours and several other former communist bloc countries.

Among EU15 countries, a relatively clear distinction can be drawn between countries with long traditions of immigration – such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands – and countries with comparatively shorter histories of being receiving countries – such as Portugal, Spain or Italy – in the number of sizeable groups present on their territories.<sup>17</sup>

From the perspective of countries of origin, notable differences exist in the number of receiving countries in which their diaspora groups are located. On the lower end of the spectrum, the Djibouti diaspora does not clear the inclusion threshold in any country, while sufficiently large diaspora groups from Niger, Mali and Mauritania are present in only five countries. By contrast, large Turkish diaspora groups can be found in 19 countries, Indian and Pakistani in 17 countries, Filipino in 16 countries, and Moroccan, Algerian and Egyptians in 15 countries.

Figure 3-5 shows a matrix of levels of exposure for the 269 groups included in our in-depth analysis. The highest observed exposure was that of the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden (2.57%), followed by Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands (2.34% and 2.14%, respectively). In total, there are ten diaspora groups that total more than 1% of the total population of the receiving country. Sweden and Cyprus are the destination of the highest number of diaspora groups with the top 10% of exposure levels across all diaspora groups – though this finding is to a large extent attributable to the relatively small total populations of the two countries. Turkey, Morocco and India are the sending countries of the highest number of diaspora groups with exposure rates in the top 10% of observations (at least four cases each).

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<sup>16</sup> For instance, the Vietnamese in the Czech Republic are the fourth most populous minority group, after the Slovaks, Ukrainians and Polish.


<sup>17</sup> There is no necessarily uniform way to define ‘long’ and ‘short’ traditions of immigration. For instance, Dustmann and Frattini (2012) use the ratio between the stock of foreign born populations in 2010 and 1960 as an indicator. Using this metric, EU15 countries included in their analysis are ranked in an ascending order as follows: France, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain.

**Figure 3-5. Exposure indices of identified diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States**

receiving countries EU28 + US		Asia					Middle East and North Africa											Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda		
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	0.11	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.01		0.06	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	<b>1.91</b>			0.00	0.01					0.02	0.00	0.00	
	Belgium	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.08		0.01	0.03		<b>0.76</b>	0.02	0.04	0.36			0.01			0.01	0.01	0.01				
	Denmark	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.18	0.14	0.02		0.03	<b>0.38</b>	0.00	0.09	0.07	0.02	<b>0.57</b>	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.03				0.18	0.01	0.02		
	Estonia																										
	Finland	0.05	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01		0.02	0.15	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.10			0.03	0.02				0.16	0.02	0.00		
	France		0.05	0.03		0.06	<b>1.13</b>					<b>1.04</b>		0.37	<b>0.38</b>					0.10	0.02						
	Germany	0.07	<b>0.07</b>	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02		0.02	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.04	0.03	<b>1.97</b>	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01			0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00		
	Ireland		<b>0.39</b>	0.18	0.31										0.03												
	Latvia																										
	Lithuania																										
	Luxembourg		0.17	0.02	0.10		0.13		0.03	0.04		0.22		0.10	0.11			0.02				0.03					
	Netherlands	0.24	0.13	0.12	0.10	0.06	0.05		0.13	0.32	0.01	<b>2.14</b>	0.06	0.05	<b>2.34</b>	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.04	0.01		
	Sweden	0.36	<b>0.38</b>	0.22	0.21	0.14	0.05		0.09	<b>2.57</b>	0.03	0.16	<b>0.46</b>	0.09	<b>0.90</b>	0.02	0.25	0.29	0.06	0.00			<b>0.82</b>	0.04	0.06		
United Kingdom	0.11	<b>1.24</b>	<b>0.86</b>	0.22	0.23	0.04		0.05	0.13	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.25				0.18	0.03	0.11			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		0.36	0.18	<b>1.19</b>	<b>0.87</b>			<b>0.39</b>	0.23		<b>0.39</b>		0.06										0.03			
	Croatia																										
	Greece		0.03	0.20	0.02	0.00	0.01		0.12	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.05									0.00			
	Italy	0.01	0.20	0.13	0.23	0.14	0.04		0.15	0.00	0.00	<b>0.76</b>	0.01	0.18	0.03		0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00			
	Malta																										
	Portugal		0.08	0.02	0.00		0.00		0.00			0.02		0.00	0.01			0.00									
	Slovenia																										
	Spain		0.08	0.15	0.09	0.00	0.13		0.01	0.00	0.00	<b>1.65</b>	0.01	0.01	0.01			0.01	0.00	0.05	0.02						
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria														0.04												
	Czech Republic																										
	Hungary																										
	Poland																										
	Romania														0.01												
Slovakia																											
United States	0.02	<b>0.59</b>	0.10	<b>0.61</b>	0.01	0.01		0.05	0.05		0.02	0.02		0.04	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.03				0.03	0.02	0.01			
Colour coding:		<span style="background-color: red; color: white;"> </span>	Top 10%																								

Third, we also calculated a measure of spatial clustering of diasporas. This is defined as  $(M_{ij}/M_i)/(M_i/M)$  where  $M_i$  is the total population from country of origin  $i$  (across a set of host countries) and  $M$  is the overall population across the countries of destination (in our case EU28 and the US). The relative clustering normalises the exposure index by the relative size of the diaspora group in the host country. The advantage of this additional measure is that it helps identify groups which may not be particularly numerous in absolute terms but represent a notable concentration of diaspora members in one country in relative terms. The clustering index for selected diaspora groups is set in Figure 3-6. As a qualitative benchmark, values above 1 indicate a relatively clustered group. One can note how the Indian and Filipino diasporas are the least clustered, while the Niger diaspora contains the highest clustering index, i.e. focused on a relatively narrow group of receiving countries.

**Figure 3-6. Clustering index of identified diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States**



Building on the matrices above, we also compiled a series of tables with the five largest diaspora groups in each receiving country. These tables bring together information included in the figures above and, in the case of spatial clustering, introduce a disaggregate value of the measure at the national level. For instance, as seen in Table 3-3, the Syrian diaspora in Cyprus is smaller than three other identified diaspora groups. However, the Syrian group’s relatively high clustering value suggests that it is nevertheless sizable in the comparative terms of the Sri Lankan diaspora.

**Table 3-1. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Austria**

Group	Level	Exposure	Clustering
Turkey	160,145	1.91	5.73
Afghanistan	9,317	0.11	3.13
India	6,465	0.08	0.2
Egypt	5,042	0.06	1.33
Philippines	4,879	0.06	0.19

**Table 3-2. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Belgium**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Morocco	81,943	0.76	2.23
Turkey	39,551	0.36	1.1
Algeria	8,984	0.08	0.69
India	6,928	0.06	0.17
Tunisia	3,965	0.04	0.67

**Table 3-3. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Cyprus**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Philippines	10,009	1.19	3.84
Sri Lanka	7,327	0.87	18.33
Egypt	3,292	0.39	8.69
Syria	3,272	0.39	17.72
India	2,996	0.36	0.92

**Table 3-4. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Denmark**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Turkey	32,066	0.57	1.72
Iraq	21,074	0.38	5.11
Pakistan	12,166	0.22	1.5
Afghanistan	11,434	0.2	5.75
Philippines	10,151	0.18	0.58

**Table 3-5. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Finland**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Somalia	8,767	0.16	4.11
Iraq	7,882	0.15	1.98
Turkey	5,409	0.1	0.3
India	4,286	0.08	0.21
Afghanistan	2,862	0.05	1.49

**Table 3-6. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in France**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Algeria	729,814	1.13	9.35
Morocco	671,225	1.04	3.06
Turkey	245,714	0.38	1.14
Tunisia	241,904	0.37	6.9
Mali	61,466	0.1	8.18

**Table 3-7. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Germany**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Germany	1,607,161	1.97	5.91
Iraq	82,438	0.1	1.37
Morocco	63,037	0.08	0.23
Afghanistan	56,563	0.07	1.95
India	53,386	0.07	0.17

**Table 3-8. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Greece**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Pakistan	22,549	0.2	1.38
Egypt	13,554	0.12	2.66
Syria	8,242	0.07	3.32
Turkey	6,081	0.05	1.16
Iraq	5,028	0.04	0.6

**Table 3-9. Top four diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Ireland**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
India	17,856	0.39	1.02
Philippines	13,833	0.31	0.99
Pakistan	8,329	0.18	1.27
Turkey	1,402	0.03	0.09

**Table 3-10. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Italy**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Morocco	452,424	0.76	2.24
Philippines	134,154	0.23	0.73
India	121,036	0.2	0.53
Tunisia	106,291	0.18	3.29
Egypt	90,365	0.15	3.37

**Table 3-11. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Luxembourg**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Morocco	1,151	0.22	0.66
India	880	0.17	0.44
Algeria	657	0.13	1.06
Turkey	585	0.11	0.34
Philippines	498	0.1	0.31

**Table 3-12. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in the Netherlands**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Turkey	388,967	2.34	7.03
Morocco	355,883	2.14	6.29
Iraq	52,858	0.32	4.31
Afghanistan	40,064	0.24	6.78
Somalia	31,237	0.19	4.75

**Table 3-13. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Portugal**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
India	8,129	0.08	0.2
Morocco	2,436	0.02	0.07
Pakistan	2,015	0.02	0.13
Turkey	537	0.01	0.02
Philippines	474	0	0.01

**Table 3-14. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Spain**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Morocco	772,126	1.65	4.86
Pakistan	68,279	0.15	1.01
Algeria	59,201	0.13	1.05
Philippines	41,020	0.09	0.28
India	36,662	0.08	0.2

**Table 3-15. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in Sweden**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Iraq	125,499	2.57	34.89
Turkey	43,909	0.9	2.7
Somalia	40,165	0.82	20.82
Syria	22,357	0.46	20.83
India	18,622	0.38	0.99

**Table 3-16. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in the United Kingdom**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
India	694,148	1.24	3.2
Pakistan	482,137	0.86	5.93
Kenya	137,492	0.25	7.39
Sri Lanka	127,242	0.23	4.77
Philippines	122,625	0.22	0.71

**Table 3-17. Top five diaspora groups from selected countries of origin in the United States**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Exposure</b>	<b>Clustering</b>
Philippines	1,898,341	0.61	1.98
India	1,817,506	0.59	1.52
Pakistan	309,562	0.1	0.69
Ethiopia	179,578	0.06	1.73
Iraq	164,132	0.05	0.72

### 3.3. Socioeconomic profile of selected diaspora groups

In this section we present an in-depth analysis of the socioeconomic profile of identified diaspora groups. We focus on four basic indicators – gender balance, age composition, educational attainment and labour force participation. Each of these indicators is discussed in turn, utilising a set of three matrices enabling quick comparison across diaspora groups, with the general populations of countries of origin and with sending countries. Detailed tables and graphs can be found in the relevant stand-alone accompanying document.

We reiterate that for the purposes of this in-depth analysis, we include only groups which met the inclusion criteria as presented in Box 3.

#### 3.3.1. Gender balance

We examined the gender composition of all identified diaspora groups to see if any noteworthy patterns and differences existed across diasporas. Figure 3-7 below shows the proportion of males in the population of diaspora groups from selected countries of origin and demonstrates that diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States tend to be predominantly male. This is true for the majority of observed countries, though the departure from gender balance appears to be the largest for diaspora groups hailing from MENA and Western Asian countries. There are also several exceptions to this trend, the most notable of which are Filipino groups, which are generally female-dominated.

It may also be worth pointing out that the departure from gender balance was the smallest among US-based diaspora groups, none of which differed from the 50-50 gender split baseline by more than ten percentage points. The same is true of all Eritrean diaspora groups, though our analysis identified only six such groups in the EU/US.

Figure 3-7. Gender matrix 1 (share of male population in diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States)

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa									Sub-Saharan Africa										
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
receiving countries EU28 + US																										
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	68.6	57.6	68.6	32.8	54.0	75.8	62.8	60.9	58.3	54.8	63.2	69.4	53.1			39.6	29.9					62.0	71.0	50.0	
	Belgium	62.8	59.6	59.6	25.2	59.1	58.1	68.7	64.0		49.8	59.5	61.6	50.2			55.4			79.2	60.0	53.1				
	Denmark	55.8	49.3	54.1	15.9	49.4	61.1	67.0	55.0	60.7	51.7	56.0	66.7	52.1	47.1	49.3	57.3	41.9					53.1	60.1	38.0	
	Estonia																									
	Finland	55.9	62.6	70.9	28.3	57.0	79.0	81.2	61.8	66.7	72.4	64.3	81.4	73.0			58.7	49.3					52.8	54.5	52.8	
	France		51.7	61.7		52.4	52.3					51.9	58.7	53.4					61.2	67.0						
	Germany	56.0	64.0	60.5	17.6	50.7	70.4	66.4	59.3	61.8	54.5	56.5	66.5	52.2	70.8	45.7	47.4	26.2			79.0	61.7	64.9	44.0		
	Ireland		54.3	65.0	41.9										73.8											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		51.7	55.1	18.1		56.6		58.6	62.9		49.3		69.0	54.9			45.9					9.3			
	Netherlands	53.6	57.1	56.2	32.6	53.5	56.2	61.6	57.2	66.8	51.5	53.8	58.1	51.7	58.0	51.0	52.6	45.6	48.7	81.3	72.2	54.5	62.1	49.6		
	Sweden	60.5	50.9	69.5	22.3	43.9	65.0	65.9	54.1	73.3	52.2	51.5	65.8	55.1	59.4	47.9	51.6	42.1	54.7			50.5	55.4	48.2		
	United Kingdom		50.8	52.1	35.6	53.8			63.0						55.0			48.8					43.7			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		58.2	96.6	4.2	15.8		69.7	54.8			78.2		53.9											47.6	
	Croatia																									
	Greece		91.4	87.3	50.4	45.1	13.9	72.7	51.5		91.2	71.3	64.3	47.1										81.8		
	Italy	93.5	60.7	65.5	42.2	55.5	64.9	69.5	72.2	60.9	56.3	63.0	63.4	57.6	56.6	39.5	40.0	64.6	69.8	48.1	59.6	81.9				
	Malta																									
	Portugal		57.2	66.2	21.9		63.7	70.1			56.1		68.1	54.2				40.8								
	Slovenia																									
Eastern Europe	Spain		66.0	77.6	37.2	63.2	67.3	71.3	63.8	63.8	59.4	70.8	68.3	64.9		54.2	29.2	91.2	79.6							
	Bulgaria													81.0												
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
	Poland																									
United States	Romania													82.5												
	Slovakia																									
United States		46.3	52.2	54.4	41.0	49.6	54.7	56.2	52.1		57.7	51.0		53.8	56.8	54.2	50.7	50.9				45.0	57.6	47.9		

Colour coding:   Top 10%   Bottom 10%

Note: Cell values are in percentage points

Figure 3-8 below contrasts the gender balance of diaspora groups with that of the general populations in their respective receiving countries. It does so by subtracting the share of males in general populations from the share of males among identified diaspora groups. The higher the value presented in Figure 3-7, the more skewed the diaspora population is toward males. These patterns are roughly similar to those observed in the previous figure. This finding is attributable to the relatively little variability in the gender balance of receiving countries, all of which are close to a gender-equal 50-50 split.

**Figure 3-8. Gender matrix 2 (difference in the share of males between diaspora groups and general receiving country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa								
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	19.9	8.9	19.9	-15.9	5.3	27.1		14.1	12.2	9.6	6.1	14.5	20.7	4.4			-9.2	-18.8				13.3	22.3	1.3
	Belgium	13.8	10.6	10.6	-23.8	10.1	9.0		19.7	15.0		0.8	10.5	12.6	1.2			6.4		30.1	11.0	4.0			
	Denmark	6.1	-0.3	4.4	-33.8	-0.2	11.5		17.4	5.4	11.1	2.1	6.4	17.1	2.4	-2.5	-0.3	7.7	-7.7			3.5	10.4	-11.6	
	Estonia																								
	Finland	6.9	13.6	21.9	-20.8	7.9	29.9	32.1	12.7	17.6	23.4	15.2	32.3	24.0				9.6	0.2			3.8	5.5	3.7	
	France		3.4	13.3		4.0	4.0					3.5		10.4	5.0					12.9	18.7				
	Germany	7.0	15.0	11.5	-31.4	1.8	21.4		17.4	10.3	12.8	5.5	7.5	17.5	3.2	21.8	-3.3	-1.6	-22.8		30.1	12.7	15.9	-5.0	
	Ireland		4.7	15.5	-7.7										24.3										
	Latvia																								
	Lithuania																								
	Luxembourg		2.2	5.6	-31.4		7.1		9.1	13.4		-0.2		19.5	5.4			-3.6				40.2			
	Netherlands	4.1	7.6	6.7	-16.9	4.0	6.7		12.1	7.7	17.3	2.0	4.3	8.6	2.2	8.5	1.5	3.1	4.0	-0.8	31.8	22.7	5.0	12.6	0.1
	Sweden	10.8	1.1	19.7	-27.4	-5.9	15.2		16.1	4.3	23.5	2.4	1.7	16.0	5.3	9.6	-1.9	1.8	-7.7	4.9		0.7	5.7	-1.6	
	United Kingdom		1.6	2.9	-13.6	4.6				13.8					5.8				-0.4				-5.5		
Southern Europe	Cyprus		7.2	45.6	-46.8	-35.2			18.7	3.8			27.2		2.9									-3.4	
	Croatia																								
	Greece		42.0	37.9	1.1	-4.2	-35.5	23.3	2.1		41.8	22.0	15.0	-2.3										32.4	
	Italy	45.0	12.2	17.0	-6.4	7.0	16.3	21.0	23.6	12.4	7.8	14.5	14.9	9.1		8.1	-9.0	-8.5	16.1	21.3	-0.4	11.1	33.3		
	Malta																								
	Portugal		8.8	17.8	-26.5		15.3	21.7			7.7		19.7	5.8				-7.6							
	Slovenia																								
Eastern Europe	Spain		16.7	28.2	-12.1	13.9	17.9	22.0	14.5	14.4	10.1	21.4	18.9	15.5		4.8	-20.2	41.8	30.2						
	Bulgaria													32.3											
	Czech Republic																								
	Hungary																								
	Poland														33.8										
United States	Romania																								
	Slovakia																								
United States		-2.9	3.0	5.2	-8.1	0.5	5.5	7.0	2.9		8.5	1.8		4.6	7.7	5.0	1.5	1.7				-4.2	8.4	-1.3	

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 30%   percentage point difference between 20-30%  
  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

Finally, we compare the gender composition of diaspora groups with that of the general populations of their respective countries of origin using the same approach as with the comparison with receiving countries. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 3-9. Overall, the picture is again relatively similar to that presented in the two figures above. Generally, diaspora groups tend to be more male-dominated than the populations of their countries of origin. This finding is particularly applicable to groups coming from the MENA region. Again, the very high proportion of females in Filipino groups is very visible; the comparison with sending countries reveals several other groups that have fewer men than their home populations. These groups frequently hail from Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda.

**Figure 3-9. Gender matrix 3 (difference in the share of males between diaspora groups and general sending country population)**

receiving countries EU28 + US		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	17.9	5.9	17.2	-17.4	4.9	25.2		12.6	10.3	7.3	5.7	12.2	19.7	4.0			-10.5	-20.0				12.3	20.9	-0.1	
	Belgium	12.1	7.8	8.2	-24.9	10.0	7.5		18.5	13.4		0.6	8.5	11.9	1.1			5.4		28.8	9.7	3.3				
	Denmark	5.0	-2.4	2.7	-34.3	0.3	10.6		16.8	4.4	9.8	2.6	5.0	17.1	2.9	-3.3	-0.5	7.3	-8.0			3.4	9.9	-12.1		
	Estonia																									
	Finland	5.2	10.9	19.6	-21.8	7.9	28.4		31.0	11.2	15.7	23.3	13.3	31.7	23.9			8.7	-0.6			3.1	4.4	2.7		
	France		0.0	10.3		3.3	1.8					2.7		9.1	4.3					10.9	16.7					
	Germany	5.2	12.3	9.1	-32.5	1.7	19.8		16.2	8.7	10.9	5.3	5.4	16.8	3.1	20.4	-4.1	-2.7	-23.7			28.7	12.0	14.7	-6.1	
	Ireland		2.6	13.7	-8.2																					
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		0.0	3.8	-32.1		6.1		8.4	12.3		0.1		19.3	5.7			-4.1				-41.0				
	Netherlands	2.9	5.4	4.8	-17.6	4.4	5.7		11.4	6.6	15.9	2.4	2.8	8.4	2.6	7.6	1.2	2.6	-4.4	-1.6	31.0	21.9	4.8	11.9	-0.6	
	Sweden	9.8	-0.9	18.1	-27.8	-5.2	14.4		15.7	3.5	22.4	3.0	0.5	16.2	5.9	9.0	-1.9	1.5	-7.9	4.4		0.7	5.3	-2.0		
	United Kingdom		-1.0	0.7	-14.5	4.7				12.4					5.9				-1.1				-6.0			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		6.5	45.3	-45.9	-33.3			19.5	4.2			27.2	4.8										-2.6		
	Croatia																									
	Greece		39.7	35.9	0.3	-4.0	-36.7		22.5	0.9		42.0	20.3	14.7	-2.1									31.6		
	Italy	42.7	8.9	14.1	-8.0	6.4	14.3		19.3	21.6	10.0	7.2	12.0	13.8	8.5		6.8	-10.5	-9.9	14.3	19.4	-2.2	9.9	31.7		
	Malta																									
	Portugal		5.5	14.8	-28.2		13.1		19.9			6.9		18.5	5.1				-9.1							
	Slovenia																									
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
	Poland																									
	Romania																									
Slovakia																										
United States		-4.5	0.5	3.0	-9.1	0.6	4.1		6.0	1.5		8.5	0.0		4.7	6.4	4.4	0.7	1.0			-4.8	7.4	-2.3		

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 40%   percentage point difference between 30-40%  
  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

### 3.3.2. Age distribution

This section discusses the age composition of diaspora groups and how they differ from each other and from the general populations of their sending and receiving countries. The following matrices use as the observed variable the share of working age population (15-64) for each diaspora group. We opted for this variable among all possible age groups because of its significance as the upper limit on labour force size in a given population. Additional data pertaining to this and all other age groups can be found in the relevant accompanying stand-alone document.

Figure 3-10 below shows the share of working age population in diaspora groups located in the United States and in the European Union. As with our matrix on gender balance, the top and bottom 10% of observations across all identified groups are highlighted.

**Figure 3-10. Age matrix 1 (share of working age population in diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	84.5	91.1	88.2	90.7	89.5	92.4		85.2	84.8	85.7	93.4	81.3	93.8	77.0		52.4	90.9				87.4	75.3	81.0	90.1	83.6
	Belgium	78.4	83.0	78.5	86.0	77.6	77.0		83.6	75.2		77.6	75.1	88.0	77.3		84.9									
	Denmark	89.2	80.1	85.3	92.3	94.0	84.2		79.1	91.9	93.0	88.1	78.9	91.3	90.7	78.3	89.2	60.2	89.5					93.1	84.9	89.2
	Estonia																									
	Finland	89.7	87.6	89.0	86.6	90.3	96.3		84.0	89.9	89.3	97.3	83.3	96.7	93.6		83.1	90.7						86.7	85.9	88.7
	France		79.2	79.9		82.3	62.2					69.4		62.5	78.5				77.0	76.3						
	Germany	75.8	88.8	85.1	92.3	85.2	86.9			72.7		84.2	76.5	91.8	79.5		85.2									
	Ireland		81.3	86.8	83.6										91.1											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		84.9	92.5	93.6		88.9		73.6	87.3		93.8		90.1	43.2		87.2					87.0				
	Netherlands	72.0	72.8	72.5	72.0	67.1	70.9		67.3	71.3		64.2	66.7	71.7	70.9		73.1	63.2						64.7	67.2	
	Sweden	87.6	88.5	92.0	89.1	95.6	91.5		83.6	84.7	88.9	91.6	88.4	92.5	88.6	71.4	86.0	90.5	76.5	87.7			81.5	79.2	89.4	
	United Kingdom	84.5	76.1	85.4	86.2	86.5				86.5					91.3				85.4				83.1			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		96.2	98.6	99.1	99.4							89.2	66.3										68.4		
	Croatia																									
	Greece																									
	Italy	97.8	89.8	84.9	92.6	94.5	90.7		83.7	88.8	46.7	90.1	79.9	84.6	84.7	77.8	59.5	88.3	94.3	95.3			86.2	93.1		
	Malta																									
	Portugal		70.7	83.6											96.3											
Eastern Europe	Slovenia																									
	Spain		88.7	86.1	92.0	91.5	88.3		83.9	74.4	81.3	88.7	87.5	88.7	94.3		76.0	94.2	96.2	92.8						
	Bulgaria														58.8											
	Czech Republic																									
United States	Hungary														83.4											
	Poland																									
	Romania																									
	Slovakia																									
	United States	85.6	86.4	88.5	80.9	86.3	85.7		76.1	79.0		87.4	76.1		82.5	74.1	89.9	86.3	80.1				88.8	85.0	88.2	

Colour coding: ■ Top 10% ■ Bottom 10%

Note: Cell values are in percentage points

In comparison with the general populations of both sending and receiving countries, diaspora groups generally have a higher share of working age population. As Figure 3-11 shows, the difference between diasporas and receiving country populations is particularly pronounced for groups located in Nordic countries. This is partly a consequence of the relatively younger age of immigrants from certain diasporas, and partly due to a cohort effect linked to the fact that migration to Nordic countries of these diaspora groups is a recent phenomenon which determines relatively young immigrant stocks. A similar pattern applies to Southern European countries with available data. Conversely, this difference is relatively small – and in a few instances even reversed – for groups located in the Netherlands, which in part reflects the longer tradition of this country as an immigration destination.

In this context, however, it is important to stress that the absence of observed difference in the share of working age population does not mean that age distributions of diaspora groups and receiving country populations are necessarily similar across all age groups. In fact, receiving countries tend to have a greater share of the elderly, while the majority of sending countries (and thus potentially their diaspora groups) have much larger young populations. The relevant stand-alone accompanying document contains detailed charts with bilateral comparisons across all age groups.

**Figure 3-11. Age matrix 2 (difference in the share of working age population between diaspora groups and general receiving country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa									Sub-Saharan Africa										
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	17.0	23.6	20.8	23.3	22.1	24.9		17.7	17.4	18.2	26.0	13.9	26.4	9.5			-15.1	23.5					13.6	22.7	16.2
	Belgium	12.4	16.9	12.4	19.9	11.6	11.0		17.5	9.1		11.5	9.1	22.0	11.3			18.8		21.4	9.3		7.8			
	Denmark	23.8	14.7	19.9	26.9	28.6	18.8		13.7	26.6	27.6	22.8	13.6	25.9	25.3	13.0	23.8	-5.1	24.1				27.7	19.5	23.8	
	Estonia																									
	Finland	23.3	21.3	22.7	20.2	24.0	30.0		17.7	23.5	23.0	31.0	17.0	30.4	27.2			16.7	24.4				20.4	19.5	22.4	
	France		14.4	15.0		17.4	-2.6					4.6		-2.4	13.7					12.2	11.5					
	Germany	10.0	23.0	19.3	26.5	19.4	21.1			6.9			18.4	10.7	26.0	13.7		19.4								
	Ireland		13.9	19.5	16.2										23.7											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		16.7	24.4	25.4		20.7		5.4	19.2		25.7		21.9	-25.0			19.0				18.8				
	Netherlands	5.0	5.8	5.4	4.9	0.0	3.8		0.3	4.2		-2.9	-0.4	4.7	3.8			6.1	-3.8				-2.3	0.1		
	Sweden	22.3	23.2	26.7	23.8	30.3	26.2		18.3	19.4	23.6	26.3	23.1	27.2	23.3	6.1	20.7	25.2	11.2	22.4			16.2	13.9	24.1	
	United Kingdom	18.7	10.2	19.6	20.3	20.7				20.7					25.4				19.5				17.2			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		25.7	28.1	28.5	28.8			-0.1	0.7			18.7												-2.2	
	Croatia																									
	Greece																									
	Italy	32.1	24.1	19.2	27.0	28.8	25.0		18.0	23.1	-19.0	24.4	14.3	18.9	19.0		12.1	-6.2	22.6	28.6	29.6		20.5	27.4		
	Malta																									
	Portugal		3.9	16.7											29.4											
Eastern Europe	Slovenia																									
	Spain		20.7	18.1	24.0	23.5	20.3		15.9	6.4	13.3	20.7	19.5	20.8	26.3			8.1	26.3	28.3	24.9					
	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
United States	Poland																									
	Romania													13.3												
United States	Slovakia																									
	United States	18.5	19.3	21.4	13.8	19.2	18.6		9.0	11.9		20.3	9.0		15.4	7.0	22.8	19.2	13.0				21.7	17.9	21.1	

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 30%   percentage point difference between 20-30%  
  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

The findings from comparisons with receiving country populations are largely mirrored in comparisons with sending country populations, as captured in Figure 3-12. Diaspora groups are likely to have a larger share of working age population than the countries from which they hail. This is particularly applicable to diaspora groups from Sub-Saharan Africa, irrespective of their location in the EU/US. Afghan, Filipino and Iraqi groups based in EU countries also register notably higher shares of working age population.

This finding is in line with the fact that migrant flows consist predominantly of people of productive age and is further accentuated by our use of the country of birth variable, which renders our analysis heavily reliant on the outcomes of first-generation of migrants.

**Figure 3-12. Age matrix 3 (difference in the share of working age population between diaspora and general sending country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	35.2	26.3	28.0	29.7	22.4	24.2		22.2	29.4	19.7	26.5	20.8	24.2	10.7		0.1	36.1					31.5	35.3	34.9	
	Belgium	29.2	18.2	18.3	25.0	10.5	8.9		20.6	19.7		10.7	14.6	18.5	11.1		32.6			31.1	27.8		24.4			
	Denmark	40.0	15.3	25.0	31.3	26.9	16.0		16.1	36.5	27.0	21.3	18.4	21.7	24.5	23.0	34.3	8.0	34.7				43.6	30.1	40.5	
	Estonia																									
	Finland	40.4	22.9	28.8	25.6	23.2	28.2		21.0	34.5	23.3	30.4	22.8	27.1	27.3			30.8	35.9				37.2	31.1	40.0	
	France		14.4	19.6		15.2	-5.9					2.5		-7.1	12.3					26.7	20.0					
	Germany	26.6	24.0	24.9	31.2	18.1	18.7			17.3		17.4	16.0	22.2	13.3			32.9								
	Ireland		16.5	26.6	22.6										24.8											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		20.1	32.3	32.6		20.7		10.6	31.9		27.0		20.5	-23.1			34.9				39.4				
	Netherlands	22.8	8.1	12.2	11.0	0.0	2.8		4.3	15.9		-2.7	6.2	2.2	4.6			20.8	8.4				15.3	12.3		
	Sweden	38.4	23.7	31.8	28.1	28.5	23.3		20.6	29.3	22.9	24.7	27.9	22.9	22.4	16.1	31.1	38.3	21.7	37.4			32.0	24.4	40.7	
	United Kingdom	35.3	11.3	25.2	25.2	19.4				31.1					25.0				30.5				33.6			
Southern Europe	Cyprus		31.5	38.4	38.1	32.3			7.5	15.9			28.7	0.0										13.6		
	Croatia																									
	Greece																									
	Italy	48.6	25.0	24.7	31.6	27.4	22.5		20.7	33.4	-19.3	23.2	19.4	15.0	18.4		22.9	7.2	33.5	44.0	39.0		36.7	38.2		
	Malta																									
	Portugal		6.0	23.3											30.0											
Eastern Europe	Slovenia																									
	Spain		23.9	25.8	31.0	24.4	20.1		20.9	19.0	15.3	21.8	26.9	19.2	28.0		23.8	39.4	45.9	36.5						
	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
United States	Romania													17.1												
	Slovakia																									
United States	36.4	21.6	28.3	19.9	19.2	17.6		13.1	23.6		20.6	15.6		16.3	18.7	35.0	34.0	25.3				39.3	30.2	39.5		

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 40%   percentage point difference between 30-40%   percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

### 3.3.3. Education attainment

Our analysis of educational profiles uses as its key variable the share of people with high levels of education. Additional detailed comparisons focusing on this and other levels of education can be found in the relevant stand-alone accompanying document.

First, as with all the other indicators, in Figure 3-13 we present the absolute values of high educational attainment to enable comparison across diaspora groups. Our analysis revealed a high variability in the proportion of people with high levels of education across identified diaspora groups. Most strikingly, the vast majority of top 10% values across all diaspora groups were concentrated in only three countries – the United States, Luxembourg and Ireland. Conversely, some of the lowest rates of high educational attainment were found among groups settled in Southern European countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain.

For differences across sending countries, groups hailing from Asian nations represented nearly half of the top 10% of observations across all diaspora groups. However, this finding may largely be a function of the fact that these countries have some of their diasporas located in countries with generally high education levels among diasporas. On average, the highest levels of education were recorded by Egyptian groups, followed by Ugandan groups. By contrast, Mali and Mauritania showed the lowest average values.

**Figure 3-13. Education matrix 1 (share of highly educated people in diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States)**

receiving countries EU28 + US		24 selected sending countries					Asia										Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda											
Northern and Western Europe	Austria		13.7	11.3	12.0		23.4		31.8	32.3	30.8	19.3	34.9	8.3	2.5									32.8												
	Belgium	23.9	30.2	15.2	28.7	17.8	14.9		43.0	33.0		10.6	27.9	19.8	5.1		36.9			11.8	36.9	13.1														
	Denmark	27.7	23.4	12.1	20.3	11.2	27.8		39.3	23.2	17.9	15.4	22.9	22.1	6.1	27.9	17.1	23.1	27.5			12.4	24.1	17.3												
	Estonia																																			
	Finland	14.9	12.4	16.9	12.1	10.7	19.0		32.9	10.6	25.0	11.4	29.0	8.5	7.9		29.1	16.1				5.7	18.2	33.3												
	France		32.0	13.0		9.0	13.5					13.6		17.9	5.3				11.5	17.2																
	Germany	12.5							27.5	15.1	31.9	14.5				27.4	45.6				27.5	27.5	27.5	27.5												
	Ireland		81.9	60.7	73.7											45.3																				
	Latvia																																			
	Lithuania																																			
	Luxembourg		66.6	58.6	31.5		44.3		76.1	20.4		39.8		38.7	46.4		42.1				50.0															
	Netherlands	24.3	24.3	24.3	16.3	17.3	19.7		19.7	24.3	19.8	11.1	17.3	17.3	8.3	16.7	19.7	19.7	19.8	20.0	19.5	20.0	17.3	17.2	17.1											
	Sweden	15.7	40.7	39.8	37.2	21.7	26.3		45.5	23.2	29.3	14.9	12.8	12.6	10.6	28.2	7.3	18.7	30.1			5.7	29.8	47.5												
	United Kingdom	34.9	31.7	18.6	33.0	34.4	43.9		42.8	36.3	43.0	42.7	36.3	43.4	23.6	36.0		33.9	31.4			32.6	34.7	34.1												
Southern Europe	Cyprus		16.9	29.5	18.5	3.6			23.2	21.7			8.8																							
	Croatia																																			
	Greece		2.8	2.5	11.7		30.1		25.6	10.4	49.2	21.8	13.0	19.8	11.8									38.3												
	Italy	29.7	12.2	7.3	16.0	5.1	11.2		25.1	30.1	14.7	6.0	28.1	3.8	12.9		6.1	8.4	19.5	12.7	14.8	12.6	11.2	14.6												
	Malta																																			
	Portugal		18.0	8.2	27.8		39.6		70.8			13.4		44.4	32.7			32.1																		
	Slovenia																																			
Eastern Europe	Spain		17.7	8.4	17.6		11.3		22.8		57.1	9.4	45.1	18.6	33.9			4.3	2.9																	
	Bulgaria														9.2																					
	Czech Republic																																			
	Hungary																																			
	Poland														24.3																					
United States		48.8	78.5	62.3	68.8	64.6	59.4		71.0	40.5		57.1	55.2		67.3	19.8	50.4	49.4	62.2			33.3	45.6	67.6												

 Colour coding:   Top 10%   Bottom 10%

Note: Cell values are in percentage points

Our comparison between diaspora groups and general populations of receiving countries reveals similar patterns to those identified above. In all three countries with consistently high educational outcomes (the United States, Luxembourg and Ireland), diaspora groups' educational attainment tends to be higher than that of the general population. In addition, nearly all diaspora groups located in Portugal have a higher share of highly educated people than the general local population. Other notable instances of similarly large differences were found in Sweden, Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece and Denmark, though in these countries the picture was much more mixed.

Overall, the majority of diaspora groups seem to have a slightly lower proportion of highly educated people than the populations of their receiving countries. However, in the majority of cases this difference is less than ten percentage points – whereas when the opposite is true, the difference is generally higher.

Egypt stands out as a country of origin whose diaspora groups, in a large majority of cases, have a higher share of highly educated people than the general population in their receiving country. The same is also true for the majority of groups hailing from India, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Sudan and Uganda, though with respect to the groups from Sub-Saharan Africa, this observation is based on a very small number of cases.

**Figure 3-14. Education matrix 2 (difference in the share of highly educated people between diaspora and general receiving country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria																									
	Belgium	-1.6	4.7	-10.3	3.2	-7.7	-10.6	17.5	7.5	-14.9	2.4	-5.7	-20.4				11.4			-13.7	11.4	-12.4		18.5		
	Denmark	8.7	4.4	-7.0	1.3	-7.8	8.8	20.3	4.2	-1.1	-3.6	3.9	3.1	-12.9	8.9	-1.9	4.1	8.5				-6.7	5.1	-1.7		
	Estonia																									
	Finland	-9.2	-11.7	-7.2	-12.0	-13.4	-5.1	8.8	-13.5	0.9	-12.7	4.9	-15.6	-16.3			5.0	-8.0				-18.4	-5.9	9.2		
	France		11.5	-7.4		-11.5	-7.0													-9.0	-3.3					
	Germany	-6.0						9.0	-3.5	13.4	-4.1				8.9	27.0		9.0			9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0		
	Ireland		50.4	29.2	42.2										13.8											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		50.8	42.8	15.7		28.5	60.3	4.6		24.0		22.9	30.6			26.3				34.2					
	Netherlands	0.6	0.6	0.6	-7.5	-6.5	-4.0	4.0	0.6	-3.9	-12.7	-6.4	-6.5	-15.4	-7.1	4.0	4.0	-3.9	-3.7	4.2	-3.7	-6.5	-6.5	-6.6		
	Sweden	-6.5	18.4	17.5	14.9	-0.6	4.1	23.2	0.9	7.0	-7.4	-9.5	-9.6	-11.6	6.0	-15.0	-3.5	7.9				-16.5	7.5	25.2		
	United Kingdom	11.7	8.5	-4.6	9.8	11.2	20.7	19.6	13.1	19.8	19.5	13.1	20.2	0.4	12.8		10.7	8.2				9.4	11.5	10.9		
Southern Europe	Cyprus		-9.1	3.5	-7.6	-22.4			-2.8	-4.3		-17.3														
	Croatia																									
	Greece						5.8	1.3	-14.0	24.8	-2.5	-11.4	4.5	-12.5										14.0		
	Italy	19.8	2.3	-2.6	6.1	-4.8	1.3	15.2	20.2	4.8	-3.9	18.2	-6.1	3.0		-3.8	-1.5	9.6	2.8	4.9	2.7	1.3	4.7			
	Malta																									
	Portugal		5.8	-4.1	15.6		27.4	58.6			1.1		32.2	20.4			19.9									
	Slovenia																									
Eastern Europe	Spain		-7.0	-16.3	-7.1		-13.4	-1.9		32.5	-15.3	20.4	-6.1	9.3				-20.3	-21.8							
	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
	Poland																									
United States	Romania													12.3												
	Slovakia																									
United States		-3.1	26.6	10.4	16.9	12.7	7.4	19.1	-11.4		5.2	3.3	15.4	-32.1	-1.5	-2.5	10.3				-18.7	-6.3	15.7			

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 30%   percentage point difference between 20-30%  
  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

Finally, a comparison with sending countries shows that diaspora groups generally have a larger share of highly educated people than their home population, suggesting a potential “positive selection” of immigrants from these countries. This is particularly true for groups from Sub-Saharan Africa, all of whom with the exception of the Malian and Mauritanian diasporas in Spain have higher rates of high education. The same observation is true for MENA and Asian groups, though in a somewhat less pronounced manner. Of these regions, only groups from Yemen, Egypt and Syria are all uniformly better educated than their home populations. A notable exception to the overall picture is groups from the Philippines, who are less likely to have high levels of education.<sup>18</sup>

In line with the previous discussion, the United States, Luxembourg and Ireland appear to have groups with the highest difference in educational outcomes, followed by the United Kingdom and Sweden – though the differences across European countries are less pronounced than was the case in the previous analysis. Still, there is a noticeable pattern in that southern European countries fare somewhat worse in this regard.

<sup>18</sup> We note substantial scholarly interest in this area. For instance, in line with our findings, Aleksynka and Tritah (2013) found higher proportions with a tertiary education among immigrants in 22 European countries than in the home country for 73 out of 76 sending countries. In the US context, Feliciano (2005) found higher educational attainment among immigrants than the average educational attainment in all 31 sending countries for which those data were available in 2000.

**Figure 3-15. Education matrix 3 (difference in the share of highly educated people between diaspora and general sending country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria		2.4	1.6	-18.3		8.3		16.4	15.6	4.2	2.2	32.0	-6.9	-10.3										24.2	
	Belgium	6.1	18.9	5.6	-1.6	-0.2	-0.2	27.6	16.2			25.0	4.5	-7.7						8.7	33.3			15.5	13.6	
	Denmark	9.9	12.1	2.4	-10.0	-6.8	12.7		23.9	6.5	-8.6	-1.7	20.0	6.9	-6.8	16.4			23.3							
	Estonia																									
	Finland	-3.0	1.2	7.3	-18.2	-7.2	4.0		17.5	-6.1	-1.5	-5.7	26.1	-6.8	-5.0				11.9					9.6	29.6	
	France		20.7	3.4		-9.0	-1.6							2.7	-7.5					4.3	14.1					
	Germany	-5.4							12.1	-1.7	5.4	-2.6										23.9		18.9	23.7	
	Ireland		70.7	51.0	43.4										32.5											
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		55.3	49.0	1.2		29.2		60.7	3.6		22.7		23.5	33.6											
	Netherlands	6.5	13.1	14.7	-14.0	-0.7	4.7		4.3	7.6	-6.8	-6.1	14.4	2.0	-4.5	5.1			15.6	12.8	16.5	16.4		8.6	13.4	
	Sweden	-2.1	29.4	30.1	6.9	3.7	11.3		30.1	6.4	2.7	-2.3	9.9	-2.6	-2.2	16.7			25.9					21.2	43.7	
	United Kingdom	17.0	20.5	8.9	2.7	16.4	28.8		27.4	19.5	16.4	25.6	33.4	28.2	10.8	24.5			27.2					26.1	30.3	
Southern Europe	Cyprus		5.7	19.9	-11.8	-14.3			7.8	4.9		5.9														
	Croatia																									
	Greece		-8.5	-7.2	-18.6		15.0		10.2	-6.4	22.6	4.7	10.1	4.6	-1.0										29.7	
	Italy	11.8	1.0	-2.4	-14.2	-12.8	-3.9		9.7	13.4	-11.8	-11.1	25.2	-11.4	0.1				15.3	5.6	11.7	9.0		6.0		
	Malta																									
	Portugal		6.8	-1.5	-2.5		24.6			55.4		-3.8		29.2	19.9				28.0							
	Slovenia																									
Eastern Europe	Spain		6.4	-1.3	-12.7		-3.7		7.4		30.6	-7.7	42.2	3.4	21.1				-2.8	-0.2						
	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
	Hungary																									
	Poland																									
United States	Romania													11.5												
	Slovakia																									
United States		31.0	67.2	52.7	38.5	46.7	44.3	55.6	23.7		40.0	52.3		54.5	8.3			58.0						37.0	63.9	

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 40%   percentage point difference between 30-40%  
  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

### 3.3.4. Labour force participation

The last outcome indicator discussed in this section is labour force status. For our comparative analysis, we use labour force participation rate as the main indicator. However, in addition to detailed bilateral charts on labour force participation, the relevant stand-alone accompanying document also contains data on two related variables – the employment-to-population ratio and the unemployment rate.

Figure 3-16 below shows the labour force participation rates for all identified diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States with available data.

**Figure 3-16. Labour force matrix 1 (labour force participation rate of diaspora groups in the European Union and the United States)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa								
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda
Northern and Western Europe	Austria		79.6	77.2	83.8	72.5		76.8	69.1	52.1	75.3	70.6	82.4	44.9										70.0	
	Belgium													54.4											
	Denmark	19.4	64.2	52.0	71.1	65.2	52.6		57.8	25.2	46.8	52.9	32.3	55.7	43.6	41.4	54.9	65.6					20.1	25.4	54.4
	Estonia																								
	Finland	35.0	42.1	49.8	64.9	50.3				27.8		56.8					60.7	68.1					20.0	24.9	
	France		59.9	50.3		63.0	46.8					51.7		58.9					66.9	59.7					
	Germany	43.1													43.1										
	Ireland		82.0	60.8	83.1																				
	Latvia																								
	Lithuania																								
	Luxembourg		60.1	62.3	56.3		70.3		60.6	48.9		72.1		75.8			68.1				60.0				
	Netherlands											58.7			61.3										
	Sweden	26.7	53.1	45.8	59.5	53.9	51.4		44.3	34.0	39.7	50.9	47.7	49.7		33.3	62.0	59.1	52.8	50.0			30.2	38.9	55.3
	United Kingdom	53.4	62.3	51.0	82.9	67.2	56.1		57.2	55.2		57.3	63.7	56.6		64.0	66.1	70.3					48.6	65.3	65.9
Southern Europe	Cyprus																								
	Croatia																								
	Greece		89.8	93.7	86.4	80.9	66.9		46.3	67.3	64.7	66.5	78.3	68.9	18.6									58.4	
	Italy	56.1	60.9	70.9	82.6	74.6	67.2		59.8	55.4	44.1	67.9	63.6	57.8		58.8	58.3	64.5	76.5	80.2	78.3	62.8	53.5		
	Malta																								
	Portugal		57.1	72.6			76.5		72.3			71.3		77.5											
Eastern Europe	Slovenia																								
	Spain		62.2	79.2	69.4	76.2	69.3		64.9	81.1	83.3	65.8	66.1	62.0		72.7	28.6	86.6	87.2						
	Bulgaria																								
	Czech Republic																								
United States	Hungary																								
	Poland																								
	Romania																								
	Slovakia																								
	United States	59.5	71.6	64.4	71.8	76.9	68.8		62.4	55.9		73.0	58.2		65.0	48.7	74.7	78.5	81.4				67.5	67.7	74.2

Colour coding: Top 10% Bottom 10%

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

In comparison with the populations of receiving countries, diaspora groups have generally lower rates of labour force participation (see Figure 3-17). The observed difference is at times substantial – in roughly a third of all observations, the difference between the general receiving country population and the diaspora group in question amounted to more than 30 percentage points. Interestingly, as far as the relatively limited data show, diaspora groups located in some receiving countries achieve much better labour force outcomes. This is most noteworthy for groups located in the United States, where five diaspora groups were found to have higher labour force participation rates than the general American population. In the EU context, diaspora labour force participation exceeded that of the general population in Greece, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Austria. Other similar cases were registered in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg.

Diaspora groups most often found to have comparatively low labour force participation rates tended to hail from countries affected by on-going internal conflict such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. Conversely, diaspora groups with relatively high labour force participation rate were most often found among Asian groups. With the exception of Afghanistan, each Asian country included in our analysis had at least three diaspora groups with higher labour force participation rate than that of the receiving country’s general population.

**Figure 3-17. Labour force matrix 2 (difference in selected labour force indicator between diaspora and general receiving country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa								Sub-Saharan Africa										
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda
receiving countries EU28 + US																									
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	4.5	2.1	8.7		-2.6	1.7	-6.0	-23.0	0.2	-4.4	7.3	-30.2												-5.1
	Belgium												-13.3												
	Denmark	-60.0	-15.2	-27.3	-8.3	-14.2	-26.7		-21.6	-54.2	-32.5	-26.5	47.1	-23.7		-35.8	-38.0	-24.5	-13.8				-59.3	-54.0	-25.0
	Estonia																								
	Finland	-39.6	-32.6	-24.8	-9.8	-24.4			46.9		-17.8							-14.0	-6.5				-54.6	49.7	
	France		-10.6	-20.2		-7.5	-23.6				-18.8		-11.6						3.5	-10.8					
	Germany	-33.6							40.8		-35.2				-33.6										
	Ireland		12.2	-9.1	13.2																				
	Latvia																								
	Lithuania																								
	Luxembourg		-8.1	-5.9	-11.9		2.1		-7.6	-19.3		3.9		7.6				-0.1					-8.2		
Netherlands											-19.5														
Sweden	-52.4	-26.0	-33.2	-19.5	-25.2	-27.6		-34.7	45.1	-39.3	-28.1	-31.4	-29.3		45.7	-17.0	-19.9	-26.2	-29.0			-48.9	-40.1	-23.7	
United Kingdom	-22.9	-14.0	-25.3	6.6	-9.1	-20.2		-19.1	-21.1		-19.0	-12.6	-19.8		-12.3		-10.2	-6.0				-27.7	-11.0	-10.4	
Southern Europe	Cyprus																								
	Croatia																								
	Greece		21.6	25.5	18.2	12.7	-1.3		-21.9	-0.9	-3.6	-1.8	10.1	0.7	-49.6									-9.9	
	Italy	-7.0	-2.2	7.8	19.5	11.5	4.1		-3.3	-7.7	-19.0	4.8	0.5	-5.3		-4.3	-4.8	1.4	13.4	17.1	15.2	-0.3	-9.6		
	Malta																								
	Portugal		-16.9	-1.4			2.5		-1.7			-2.7		3.5											
	Slovenia																								
Eastern Europe	Spain	-12.2	4.8	-4.9	1.8	-5.1		-9.4	6.7	8.9	-8.6	-8.3	-12.4				-1.7	-45.8	12.2	12.8					
	Bulgaria																								
	Czech Republic																								
	Hungary																								
	Poland																								
United States	Romania																								
	Slovakia																								
United States		-14.4	-2.4	-9.5	-2.2	3.0	-5.1		-11.5	-18.0		-0.9	-15.7		-8.9	-25.2	0.8	4.6	7.5			-6.4	-6.2	0.3	

Colour coding:  percentage point difference greater than 30%  percentage point difference between 20-30%  percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

The picture was much more mixed when comparing the labour force outcomes of diaspora groups with the populations of their countries of origin. The majority of diaspora groups had higher labour force participation rates than their home populations. This difference was most prevalent among groups from India, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Cases of the largest positive differences largely mirrored those observed in the comparison with receiving countries (i.e. primarily groups located in the United States, Greece, Italy, Austria and Luxembourg), with notable differences recorded in Portugal and Ireland as well.

By contrast, all identified diaspora groups from Sub-Saharan Africa had lower labour force participation rates than their home populations, though there are concerns surrounding the reliability of the data behind these observations.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> These concerns are mostly related to the unusually high employment rates in the two countries with available data (Ethiopia and Uganda) and the definitions behind these rates. In practice, this is well illustrated using the example of diaspora groups from these two countries settled in the United States. Both groups were found to have higher labour force participation rates than the general American population, yet these rates were 18 percentage points lower than those of their home populations. This discrepancy is counterintuitive at best and exemplifies well the challenges associated with synthesizing data across multiple data sets of various quality and comprehensiveness.

**Figure 3-18. Labour force matrix 3 (difference in selected labour force indicator between diaspora and general sending country population)**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa									
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda	
Northern and Western Europe	Austria	38.3	44.4	16.7		41.9			7.1		39.5		46.9													
	Belgium																									
	Denmark		22.8	19.2	4.0	17.9	22.1		-36.8		17.1		20.1		4.1		-42.1								-37.6	
	Estonia																									
	Finland		0.7	17.0	-2.2	3.0			-34.2		21.0							-36.3								
	France		18.5	17.5		15.7	16.3																			
	Germany																									
	Ireland		40.7	28.0	16.0																					
	Latvia																									
	Lithuania																									
	Luxembourg		18.7	29.5	-10.8		39.8		-13.1		36.3		40.3					-28.9								
	Netherlands										22.9															
	Sweden		11.7	13.0	-7.6	6.6	20.9		-28.0		15.1		14.2			-6.2		-37.9							-36.7	
	United Kingdom		20.9	18.2	15.8	19.9	25.6		-6.8		21.5		21.0		24.5		-30.9								-26.1	
Southern Europe	Cyprus																									
	Croatia																									
	Greece		48.4	60.9	19.4	33.7	36.3		5.3		30.7		33.4													
	Italy		19.5	38.1	15.5	27.3	36.7		-6.6		32.1		22.3					-38.7								
	Malta																									
	Portugal		15.7	39.7			46.0				35.5		41.9													
Eastern Europe	Slovenia																									
	Spain		20.8	46.4	2.4	28.9	38.8		19.1		30.0		26.5				-24.3									
	Bulgaria																									
	Czech Republic																									
United States	Hungary																									
	Poland																									
United States	Romania																									
	Slovakia																									
United States		30.2	31.6	4.7	29.7	38.2		-6.1		37.2				9.3		-18.5								-17.8		

Colour coding:   percentage point difference greater than 40%   percentage point difference between 30-40%   percentage point difference below 0

Note: Cell values are in percentage point differences

### 3.3.5. Regional analysis

Our regional analysis uses the same general indicators (levels, exposure and clustering) seen so far, but applied across regions (NUTS and NUTS2) within each country. This measurement allows us to explore whether diaspora groups tend to cluster or distribute evenly within the country. Due to data availability considerations, the focus is on the six largest destinations, namely: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US. The full set of maps and graphs are available in the stand-alone accompanying document. In general, the picture that emerges demonstrates that most diasporas are somewhat clustered around a few areas, often in or around the capital cities (especially true for London, Paris and Berlin). For the US, most diasporas concentrate in a few states which are both traditional and new ports of entry (New York, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and Texas).

In Figure 3-19 we summarise the clustering index of the diasporas in the six countries. The highest levels of clustering are recorded within the Moroccan diaspora. For example, the 0.77 value for Spain is determined by the relatively high concentration of Moroccans in Catalonia. The Indian diaspora exhibits relatively large values in three out of the six countries. Three other noteworthy cases are the Turkish diaspora in Germany (who are over-represented in northwestern Germany), the Algerian diaspora in

France (who are over-represented in the Ile-de-France and the PACA region), as well as the Filipino diaspora in the US (driven by the clustering of this group in California).

**Figure 3-19. Clustering index of diasporas in countries included in regional analysis**

24 selected sending countries		Asia					Middle East and North Africa										Sub-Saharan Africa								
		Afghanistan	India	Pakistan	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Libya	Morocco	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	Yemen	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Somalia	Sudan	Uganda
largest 6 receiving countries	France	0.000	0.011	0.004	0.000	0.007	0.346		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.356	0.000	0.080	0.157	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Germany	0.047	0.053	0.026	0.012	0.010	0.016		0.014	0.070	0.004	0.024	0.033	0.016	0.627	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.000
	United Kingdom	0.023	0.341	0.248	0.077	0.043	0.008		0.017	0.038	0.014	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.010	0.006	0.002	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.037	0.010	0.023
	Italy	0.000	0.104	0.055	0.091	0.055	0.035		0.032	0.000	0.000	0.494	0.000	0.112	0.016	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Spain	0.000	0.027	0.058	0.029	0.000	0.079		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.772	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	United States	0.010	0.348	0.051	0.293	0.012	0.007		0.025	0.044	0.000	0.021	0.016	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.011	0.060	0.037	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.056	0.030	0.000

### 3.3.6. General comments on analysis across indicators

As the data presented in this chapter demonstrate, substantial variability in socioeconomic outcomes across all diaspora groups can be identified by our mapping exercise. Nevertheless, several noteworthy patterns may help policymakers better understand the characteristics, priorities and concerns of relevant diasporas.

First and foremost, in comparison with their countries of origin, diaspora groups on the whole record better outcomes on a range of socioeconomic indicators.<sup>20</sup> Diaspora groups generally show higher rates of high educational attainment, labour force participation in their receiving countries, and, to the extent this could be perceived as a positive outcome, a higher share of working age population.

The comparison with receiving countries offers a much more complex picture. Diaspora groups tend to have a higher share of working age population than the populations in the countries where they settled, but they are generally lagging behind with respect to labour force and education outcomes. The size of this gap is much larger for labour force participation rates than for educational outcomes.

Crucially, a substantial degree of variability is found among receiving countries in how successfully they achieve positive outcomes for diaspora groups located in their territories or attract groups with preexisting good outcomes. A particularly striking difference was observed between the United States and the EU Member States, though we recognise that this finding may be to some extent attributable to geographical factors. In the European context, northern and western European countries appear to be more successful than their southern counterparts. This type of pattern is particularly useful for pointing out any policy and other contextual factors that may explain the outcome differentials across observed diaspora groups and may identify potential leads in the effort to improve outcomes for diaspora communities and, by extension, their countries of origin.

Additionally, it is equally important to look at linkages across various socio-economic outcomes. While an in-depth causal analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth highlighting several potential

<sup>20</sup> There may be a vast array of explanations for the apparently better socioeconomic outcomes of diaspora groups. These range from self- and state-selection before a person moves between countries to policies and other contextual factors that determine outcomes once a diaspora member is in the destination country. It is beyond the scope of this work to test hypotheses as to what drives the differential outcomes across diaspora groups.

connections to keep in mind. For instance, it has been demonstrated that migrant women achieve worse labour force outcomes than men, an effect even more pronounced for women from non-EU countries of origin (Rubin et al., 2008). This relationship may go a long way to help understand, for example, the Filipino diaspora groups, which have been found to be predominantly female and represent one of the few groups with worse labour force participation rates in comparison with both countries of origin and receiving countries. Similarly, the established link between educational attainment and labour force outcomes may be instrumental in elucidating the consistent pattern in which diaspora groups located in the United States frequently demonstrate better outcomes than their EU-based counterparts.

Understanding the profiles of diaspora groups and the factors that might be shaping them is a prerequisite for successful engagement strategies, as discussed in great length in the subsequent part of this report. Naturally, the analysis offered above presents a high-level overview of the complex picture of diasporas in the EU and the US. In doing so, the overview gives rise to questions as it provides answers. We invite readers to make use of the atlas of diasporas attached in the stand-alone accompanying document to find additional information and detailed data.

## PART II: ENGAGING DIASPORAS

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## 4. Overview and methodology for Part II

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### 4.1. Introduction

The following chapters present our findings on diaspora engagement strategies and initiatives by both sending and receiving country governments and, secondarily, by non-governmental and international organisations. We examine and group engagement strategies used by sending and receiving countries in separate chapters, as we believe there are important qualitative differences between the goals and strategies used by actors at receiving country level, relative to those used at sending country level. However, we do recognise, and highlight where appropriate, that sending and receiving countries may support engagement together – either directly, through jointly developing specific initiatives, or indirectly, for example, through providing a policy context in which engagement is readily achievable by partners in both countries. Nonetheless, dividing strategies along sending and receiving country contexts appears to us the most straightforward approach to analysing the diaspora engagement landscape.

Chapter 5 begins with a broad review of literature on receiving-country engagement strategies, alongside a targeted review of current strategies in place in eight key receiving countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the US) plus a review of strategies in place at EU-level. Chapter 6 moves to a review of engagement efforts at sending-country level, looking specifically at 25 countries<sup>21</sup> selected for review, and draws commonalities and contrasts between overarching and specific engagement initiatives by governments of these countries. Chapter 6 also briefly examines the role of international organisations in diaspora engagement activities relevant to this report. These chapters give the reader an overview of existing legal and policy frameworks through which countries engage their diaspora populations and in particular highlight the recent or current initiatives selected countries have launched to target diaspora engagement.

Given the scope of this review, which did not include evaluative approaches, we are unable to comment on the effectiveness or state of play of most of the sending or receiving country frameworks or initiatives, though we include evidence where available. We note, and discuss at relevant points throughout these chapters, that the evaluation culture around diaspora engagement appears relatively underdeveloped at both sending and receiving country levels. We also recognise that many of the strategies listed here may be currently in planning, partly implemented, or on temporary or permanent hold, rather than fully implemented or operational.

Following review of sending and receiving country strategies, Chapter 7 outlines the recommendations which emerge from the ‘best practices’ literature relating to diaspora engagement. While our findings

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
<sup>21</sup> Alongside, where possible, providing data on the regions of Chechnya and Kashmir.

remain broadly supportive of engagement with diaspora populations, we close the chapter by providing a review of the issues identified in this research regarding the benefits, drawbacks, and potential barriers for engaging diaspora populations, including the importance of understanding intra-diaspora dynamics in developing engagement strategies.

Finally, Chapter 8 provides the results of our survey and interview exercises with diaspora organisations. We first provide a quantitative analysis of our results, which shows *inter alia* potential relationships between levels of engagement between diaspora organisations and external partners and their subsequent satisfaction with that engagement. We follow these results with a qualitative analysis of themes that emerge from our interview and free-text responses, which broadly support our quantitative results and reiterate the likely value of proactive communication toward certain types of diaspora organisations.

Figure 4-1 below presents a schematic overview of activities conducted as part of our engagement analysis.

**Figure 4-1. Process map of engagement analysis**



#### 4.2. Desk research strategy: Our review of current literature on diaspora engagement examined the broader literature, then narrowed our focus to specific countries and questions

At the outset of the project, we undertook a structured literature review of the academic and grey literature related to diaspora engagement. Through this review, we sought to understand broadly the models for, effectiveness of, and challenges in approaches to engaging diasporas for various ends. Subsequent to our initial review (the detailed methods for which can be found at Appendix D), we undertook targeted reviews largely outside of the academic literature, relating to:

- a) sending and receiving country strategies for engaging their diaspora populations, among a subset of countries selected for review;
- b) the dynamics between groups within diasporas, and;
- c) available recommendations for diaspora engagement in prior reports on the topic.

We undertook a review of selected receiving country engagement strategies based on those with the largest diaspora populations in the EU and the US

The countries covered in this search include Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. This review also took into account strategies in place at the European Union level.

Desk research was conducted in order to identify relevant host country diaspora engagement strategies, initiatives and evaluations.<sup>22</sup> As we found several broad-based reports that provided useful guidance in identifying and signposting current receiving country engagement initiatives or strategies, those key documents formed the basis of the targeted search, including:

- ADPC (2010). *Diasporas as partners in conflict resolution and peacebuilding*.
- A.R.S. Progetti s.r.l. (2007). *Final report. The linkage between migration and development. Operational implications for programming and project development*;
- CoMiDe (2012). *European good practice examples of migration and development initiatives with a particular focus on diaspora engagement*.
- De Haas (2006). *Engaging diasporas: how government and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries*.

In addition to these key documents, the Migration4Development<sup>23</sup> database was used as a tool to search for migration and development initiatives of receiving countries.

As a second stage, government and department-specific websites as well as their search engines were accessed to identify national engagement strategies and initiatives. Additionally, the Google search engine and Google Advanced were used as search tools which linked to government, academic and third party documents. Overall, snowballing within websites as well as from references in academic articles and policy papers was used as a search strategy. Although most government documents were available in English, some additional searches (where applicable) were conducted in the following languages: Dutch, French, German and Spanish.

**We used a broad search approach to identify selected country of origin engagement strategies**

To provide the most current information on diaspora engagement activities at the country of origin level, we built our search approach on key documents and information sources identified in the initial literature review. We identified a number of broad-based reports and databases examining various aspects of transnational migrants' experiences, including:

- A series of reports on diaspora engagement by the IOM and Migration Policy Institute (MPI) (Agunias, 2009; Agunias & Newland, 2012; Migration Policy Institute, 2010).
- Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2007), *Voting from Abroad Handbook* and the IDEA Voting From Abroad database.

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<sup>22</sup> This research also looked at engagement initiatives with civil society organisations. A similar (snowballing) approach was used for identifying these initiatives.

<sup>23</sup> Migration for Development, n.d.-b.

- The Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE) dual citizenship database.
- The Migration Policy Centre/Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (MPC/CARIM) Migration Profiles and Factsheets.
- The UN's Population Information Network (POPIN) Western Asia country profiles.

These documents form the basis for the findings in this section and provide signposts to relevant government ministries, policies, laws and initiatives at the country of origin level. From this basis, we also reviewed government documents, websites, academic articles and third-party organisation reports (for example, from IOM and similar institutions) that articulated overarching or targeted activities aimed at diaspora populations. The sending countries examined were Afghanistan, Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen, as well as Chechnya and Kashmir. Findings from the relevant government documents and websites were extracted into a template which can be found at Appendix F. Brief individual profiles of each country examined were subsequently developed and can be found at Appendix A.

### **4.3. Our findings from our initial literature review informed our survey and interview structure and strategy**

As detailed further in the next chapter, our initial review of the literature on diaspora engagement suggested that, broadly speaking, motivations for engagement and types of engagement initiatives can be categorised around reasonably discrete themes of economic engagement, political engagement, and social/cultural engagement. While there was some crossover (such as programmes that sought economic or cultural engagement for political stability-oriented outcomes), these provide some broad terms along which we could seek to divide corresponding diaspora organisations in receiving countries.

Our survey was also developed to determine what, from a diaspora organisation's perspective, might be considered 'good' or successful engagement, as well as understanding the dynamics of the engagement process in terms of who initiates across various sectors, what benefits are perceived by diaspora groups, and how satisfied they are with this engagement. Invitations to participate were sent to the following five groups of diaspora organisations:

- diaspora organisations with whom we already had a relationship through prior work;
- diaspora organisations identified through our literature review;
- diaspora organisations nominated by embassies and consulates of countries with diaspora groups located in the EU and US, all of whom were contacted by the research team;
- diaspora organisations nominated by an office responsible for migration and integration in every EU Member State;
- diaspora organisations identified through a targeted web search.

We also sought to 'snowball' our sample through our questionnaire respondents, providing space at the end of the questionnaire for respondents to provide contact information for other relevant diaspora organisations. In addition, we conducted interviews with those respondents who indicated they would be happy to discuss their views in further detail.

A detailed description of the survey methodology is described in Appendix G. The questionnaire used in the survey and all its seven foreign language iterations are attached in Appendix H.



## 5. Receiving country engagement strategies

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### 5.1. Receiving country engagement strategies have been examined based on their dominant motivations and primary beneficiaries

This section provides an overview of literature on diaspora engagement by receiving countries. Our review findings reflect the three dominant motivations for engagement of diaspora or migrant groups by host states: political/security-oriented engagement, economic engagement, and cultural/social engagement. These motivations can also be subdivided along the lines of homeland and receiving country benefit, where these do not necessarily refer to benefit for the state but can include benefits for diasporas or other civil society groups in the home- or receiving country.

These categories are not mutually exclusive; initiatives may have knock-on effects to the benefit (or potential detriment) of development in other categories. However, each type of initiative appears to be characterised by a dominant motivation, often reflected by the body or agency supporting the engagement, or by the stated goals of the engagement with diaspora, for example.

This section is concerned with diaspora engagement strategies used by receiving country governments and other relevant receiving country organisations. In some cases – for example, concerning the encouragement and facilitation of remittances – both home and host countries have roles to play in supporting engagement strategies. The receiving country's role will remain the focus of this chapter, while Chapter 6 will review home country roles.

In the next two subsections, we describe in further detail the motivations for political/security, economic, and cultural/social engagement by receiving countries – first for homeland benefit, then for receiving country benefit. Within each subsection, we describe available receiving country strategies or mechanisms for engaging with (or otherwise facilitating) diaspora engagement, related implicitly or explicitly to these motivations. Thereafter, we move to a specific review of engagement strategies in eight selected receiving countries plus the EU, then provide a summary typological table of these findings.

#### *5.1.1. There are multiple forms of receiving country engagement of diasporas for homeland benefit, with a focus on economic and post-conflict development emerging as predominant in the literature*

##### Political/Security

Receiving country governments can engage diaspora populations residing in their territories while seeking to achieve political- or security-oriented outcomes in the homeland context. There have been recent efforts to emphasise the role of diaspora in peace-building, especially in post-conflict or transitional states

(Feron & Orner, 2011; Smith & Stares, 2007). Research has also pointed to the potential for diasporas to negatively impact political or security outcomes in the homeland, for example by increasing instability or prolonging violent conflict (e.g. Anderson & Kligman, 1992; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2009). It is important to note that homeland political engagement can be both positive and negative.<sup>24</sup>

Political activities by diasporas may support broader efforts towards peaceful societal reform through diaspora participation in elections, utilisation of national and international media to promote key messages during periods of change, and funding political parties intent on reform, alongside influencing receiving country foreign policy through lobbying (Al-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001; Bloch, 2008; Collyer, 2006; Dijkink & Van Der Welle, 2009; Heindl, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). We return to this latter strategy in the next section.

An additional mechanism through which diasporas can be engaged for homeland development is through the support by receiving countries or international bodies for prominent or talented diaspora members, often exiles, to take part in transitional governments in post-conflict settings. The goal of this strategy for receiving country governments and their allies is thought to be the promotion of a specific, often pro-Western, approach to state administration. In this role, diaspora members can act as advisors for governments and political parties, help draft laws and constitutions, and even return to serve in transitional governments or run for office. This approach to diaspora involvement in homeland politics may not always be welcomed by locals in the homeland, who may be ‘distrusted because of their diaspora pedigree’ (The Guardian, 2012), but may be preferable to intervention in homeland affairs by external, non-diaspora actors (Turner, 2008).

## Economic

While the predominant focus in the literature has highlighted homeland roles for economic engagement of diasporas (as outlined further in section 6.1.2, below), receiving country policies can facilitate or inhibit this engagement by homelands. As Sandra Paola Alvarez Tinajero (2009, p. 8) notes, the extant policy environment is a key constraint on the ways in which diasporas can contribute to economic development:

[R]emittances’ development impacts are highly contextualized and depend also upon the opportunities offered by specific political and legal frameworks. This is why it is fundamental to understand remittances’ characteristics, their impacts on beneficiaries and the political and legislative frameworks in which such transfers occur, in order to create enabling environments for remittances and harness their potential developmental impacts.

De Haas (2006, p. ii) identifies four areas in which receiving country governments can support homeland development:

1. Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances;
2. Supporting migrants to set up small enterprises in countries of origin and facilitating ‘brain circulation’;
3. Supporting collective development projects initiated or implemented by diaspora organisations and their members; and,
4. Supporting diaspora networks and capacity building of diaspora organisations along with creating durable alliances with established development actors.

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<sup>24</sup> We return to a discussion of the potential drawbacks from engagement with diasporas at section 7.3.2.

De Haas further highlights the importance for the host state to build on existing diaspora mobilisations rather than seeking to lead development initiatives, as well as increasing coherence between migration and development policies, setting realistic expectations, and avoiding ‘dual agendas’, a point we will return to when discussing barriers to engagement.

In recent years, receiving country and international policies surrounding financial transfer have changed in response to concerns over money-laundering, organised crime and terrorist financing. Makarenko (2012, p. 29) highlights the possibility that the informal *hawala* remittance system is potentially being used as a money-laundering tool in Greece, and Europol (Europol, 2011) has also suggested *hawala* is connected to money-laundering among Somali diaspora members in the EU. Official bank transfer systems have also changed in response to security concerns, which has had an unintended but negative impact on the abilities of diaspora members to effectively send remittances to homeland recipients. Supporting a recent UK advocacy campaign, Labour MP Rushanara Ali and Somali-born British Olympic athlete Mo Farrah petitioned to stop changes to Barclay’s cash transfer policies, noting that these would have the hardest impact on places like Somalia where Barclay’s system was one of the last effective formal options for remittance (BBC, 2013a).

To encourage the use of formal channels, France has undertaken a broad codevelopment policy that includes reforms of the financial sector to support diaspora and migrant contributions to homelands:

France has broken new ground for European migration policies by defiscalizing migrants’ savings. “Defiscalization” is a term French codevelopment policies use to label tax exemptions provided with the purpose of stimulating investments in the country of origin...The bancarization strategy, whereby commercial banks are authorized by the French Government to grant tax breaks on migrant savings, also stimulates retail banking as a source of employment in developing countries.

Defiscalization encourages migrants to use formal channels for transferring funds, thereby encourages the “bancarization” of savings and transfers. This, in turn, discourages the use of money transfer companies, which in West Africa handle 70 percent of official payments...or reliance on the informal “Fax” system, predominant in the Comoros, Mali, and Senegal, where it is based on the *Hawala* “banking” tradition of mutual trust (Panizzon, 2011, pp. 199-200).

It is not yet clear whether this system has affected the use of informal methods of transfer or increased migrant remittances, but it highlights the proactive steps a host country may use to encourage homeland development.

### Cultural/Social

In the literature we reviewed, engagement of diasporas by receiving countries for cultural or social development in the homeland was related to diffuse strategies either entwined with non-economic remittances, such as education and mentorship (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Bloch, 2008; Petree & Baruah, 2007), or in other related uses of diasporas in political reform, peace-building or post-conflict transitions as outlined above.

Levitt (1998, p. 926) defines these aspects of non-economic remittances as ‘social remittances’: ‘the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country communities.’ Kremer (2008, p. 9) argues that ‘the return of expatriates to their home country is widely perceived as good for development because they may be more effective than foreigners in transferring knowledge back home because of their understanding of local culture... Diasporas, research shows, can be a great

promoter of accountability, democratisation and responsibility.’ Other scholars (De Haas, 2010; Gardner, 1993; Taylor, Moran-Taylor, & Ruiz, 2006) highlight the capacity of social remittances to effect social change on class, gender and ethnic roles through ‘gradual challenge and erosion’ (Taylor et al., 2006, p. 41) of traditional roles through return migration and related diaspora remittances.

For example, De Haas (2010, p. 10) cites research showing that migration to Europe from African countries has ‘contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms’; and Taylor et al. (2006) found that social remittances in Guatemala had the effect of challenging traditional gender roles. In this sense, social remittances can expose homeland populations to alternative modes of social organisation, which may prepare a foundation for social change. The impact of social remittances, however, is not always regarded as positive. FitzGerald (2013) highlights how migrants can be perceived by home communities as having undergone a process of cultural ‘dissimilation’. As a result, the ‘dissimilated’ culture brought home by returning migrants is seen as a threat, particularly in the areas of religion, education, public comportment and work (Ibid, p. 120).

### *5.1.2. There are multiple forms of receiving country engagement for receiving country benefit, with political/security and cultural/social aspects of engagement highlighted in the reviewed literature*

#### **Political/Security**

The literature we reviewed regarding political or security-oriented engagement of diasporas for receiving country benefit were concerned primarily with diaspora engagement in organised crime, terrorism and radicalisation, and/or transported conflicts from the homeland context (either internal conflict within the diaspora, or conflict between diaspora groups). There is also a minor component within the reviewed literature that discusses diaspora participation in receiving country politics, though in all cases where this component was mentioned, the discussion was aimed at diaspora efforts to change receiving country law and policy in favour of diaspora groups, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Additionally, reviewed literature that does discuss diaspora engagement for security purposes (whether homeland or receiving country level) often highlights that most diasporas do not pose threats to host states and most diaspora activity is benign or beneficial to host states in other terms (Brynen, 2002; Feron & Orrnert, 2011; The Change Institute, 2008b; Turner, 2008). Perrin and Martinello (2011a), using qualitative research evidence from the European Commission-funded INFOCON Project,<sup>25</sup> suggest that most homeland-oriented activity by diaspora groups – including political activity – actually encourages integration in the host society, contrary to popular and some academic belief that such activity inhibits full integration with receiving country values (see also Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011). Perrin and Martinello (2011a) recognise that there are exceptions to this assertion, but generally refute the notion that integration into a receiving country necessitates rejection of homeland ties. Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes (2006) similarly confirm, based on quantitative evidence in the Dutch context, that transnational or homeland-oriented activity does not impede integration into host societies. However, their data suggest that in some cases low levels of labour-market participation among specific migrant groups may negatively affect migrant identification with the receiving country.

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<sup>25</sup> A multi-institution project on diaspora and transnational migrant organisations (The Information Project, n.d.).

Nonetheless, some activity on the part of diaspora members can pose a threat to host states. Regarding security implications of diaspora political activity, Brynen (2002) lists four levels of attitude towards diaspora, from activity valued by hosts to that perceived as a threat or concern:

- 1) **No Threat/Valued:** Brynen sees these activities as legitimate and potentially integrative to political participation in host country politics, and/or supporting the host state in engagement with the homeland government or homeland militant action supported by the host state;
- 2) **Low Threat:** These are activities by members of diaspora communities that support illegitimate or militant activities elsewhere (e.g. through fundraising or recruitment), where that militant action is not supported by the host state;
- 3) **Medium Threat:** These are diaspora activities such as intelligence-gathering and direct logistical support for militant groups against the home state; diaspora support of terrorist activity in third countries; and criminal activity within the host state such as fraud; and,
- 4) **High Threat:** direct violence, terrorism or large-scale criminal operations in the host state involving members of a diaspora community.

Addressing problematic diaspora political activities is often considered a preventive task, and engagement with at-risk groups or those involved in problematic political or security activity appears as a primary strategy in the reviewed literature. The most comprehensive study of engagement strategies for counter-radicalisation purposes, and one of the few large-scale cross-context studies on engagement within the reviewed literature, was produced by The Change Institute (2008b). While their report is oriented primarily toward civil society and Muslim community organisations (not necessarily connected to a specific diaspora), it outlines the following ‘key themes’ (p. 4) for consideration in engaging civil society for counter-radicalisation purposes<sup>26</sup>:

- a. ‘Indirect’ and subtle approaches that do not necessarily overtly and directly address issues of violent radicalisation are key components of effective work with civil society organisations;
- b. Protecting the actual and perceived autonomy and initiative of civil society organisations is central to the development of effective activity;
- c. Genuine joint ownership of projects and partnerships is also central to legitimating cooperation and making it effective;
- d. The complexity of questions of violent radicalisation limits and even precludes evaluation of initiatives based on crude assessment of the direct and visible impacts of initiatives intended to turn people away from violent radical paths.

Related to a more specific security issue, Perrin and Martinello (2011b) discuss engagement strategies related to threats posed by transported conflicts. It has been recognised for some time that diasporas may ‘import’ conflicts from the homeland and play these conflicts out in receiving country contexts, for example in the ‘ethnicisation’ of migrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia in receiving countries throughout the EU (p. 90). However, understanding these conflicts has not been a central concern within

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<sup>26</sup> These principles emerged from extensive study of engagement practices in multiple initiatives across eight European countries as well as examination of broader examples from outside of Europe.

the study of diasporas. In general, Perrin and Martinello suggest that these conflicts can manifest at the ‘discursive level’, whereby members of diaspora groups in conflict with one another maintain negative language and symbolism related to the other group; and in ‘violent confrontations’ which can include property destruction, vandalism, fighting and harassment, and more serious forms of physical harm. They promote the use of dialogue-based approaches such as roundtables, unifying projects, and third party mediators where conflict between diasporas is likely or has occurred. They also outline receiving country government roles for supporting these approaches including funding support for preventive initiatives, and/or by acting as third-party mediators.

In relation to organised crime – which may facilitate radical activities but is often an end in itself – studies specifically focusing on criminal activity (Europol, 2011; Makarenko, 2012) tend to highlight the facilitating nature of diaspora communities in host societies, where these communities are in many cases seen as vulnerable to exploitation by organised and transnational crime rather than necessarily seeking or benefiting from it. Diaspora communities, or subsections of them, may be less organised or have fewer economic opportunities than other communities in the host society, and/or provide an entrenched trade infrastructure with homeland elements seeking to engage in illegal (or a mix of legal and illegal) activities. Diaspora communities may be implicated in these ways, typically in drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal immigration, fraud, money laundering, and trafficking in counterfeit or stolen goods. Studies such as these emphasise policing and security responses to problems such as proactive identification of new criminal opportunities, better partnerships between law enforcement, and development of more reliable data on size and scope of criminal activity (Europol, 2011; Sheptycki, Bigo, & Ben Jaffel, 2011).

However, the role of diaspora in transnational crime should not be overestimated; while these reports discuss criminal activity organised around ethnic identities, this should not be equated with the increased likelihood of diaspora engagement in organised crime. As Sheptycki et al. (2011, p. 15) note, ‘it is not because a diaspora exists in a country that this diaspora will automatically serve as “soldiers of crime” of a mafia, and it is not because drug trafficking exists that we can infer a mafia exists.’<sup>27</sup> Indeed, they argue that available evidence gives us no reason to believe that diaspora groups under the definition used in this report – to wit, transnational migrants maintaining ties to their homeland – are more engaged in, or susceptible to, criminal activity than other groups.

## Economic

Diaspora engagement for receiving country economic benefit does not appear as a central theme in any of the reviewed sources.<sup>28</sup> Where it does appear, it is almost exclusively in terms relating to facilitation of transnational trade (e.g. GFMD, 2007; Liwerant, 2013). The mechanism by which this proceeds is rarely elaborated, though tends to hinge on the personal connections of individual diaspora members. It may be facilitated through creating infrastructure or programmes supporting diaspora entrepreneurship and easing import-export regimes; however, these policy options are not well-explored in the reviewed

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<sup>27</sup> In this context, they are using ‘mafia’ as a synonym to organised crime rather than the narrower definition emphasizing a protection racket.

<sup>28</sup> It should be kept in mind that the reviewed sources mention from time to time the importance of immigrant populations for receiving country economic benefit through workforce participation, but immigrant workers should not be equated with diaspora members; this report will not suggest that they are analytically equivalent.

literature. Diaspora and migrants' groups may also improve economic conditions of diaspora members within the receiving country, for example through helping new migrants find housing, job training, and with finding employment (Bloch, 2008; Lukes, Vaughan, & San Juan, 2009), though again this was a minor aspect of the sources where mentioned. This observation should not be taken to mean that diaspora groups cannot boost economic outcomes at the receiving country level, but rather that this potential contribution has been largely left unexplored in the literature.<sup>29</sup>

### Cultural/Social

Diaspora groups can participate in receiving country civil society to the benefit of receiving country culture. Diaspora groups certainly engage broadly in homeland-oriented cultural and social activities, often acting as a social hub or outlet for diaspora members to feel a sense of belonging. The community members may establish clubs, events and gatherings; contribute to media such as diaspora websites, newspapers, TV and radio programmes for the diaspora as well as for home and receiving country (non-diaspora) populations; develop performances and other forms of art for exhibition in the receiving country; and establish educational programmes for diaspora members as well as for other receiving country citizens (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Bloch, 2008; Wiesand et al., 2008). Some obvious benefits, such as contributing to arts and culture, multicultural and multilingual knowledge, and social cohesion may emanate from these activities (ibid).

Other benefits, perhaps less obvious, also have been identified. For example, intercultural dialogue through these kinds of activities is identified in a report by Wiesand et al. (2008) as a mechanism to decrease intolerance towards 'outsider' groups, as well as to bridge prior divides between ethnic or national groups in conflict. Exposure to intercultural education initiatives – such as projects promoting tolerance or expanding knowledge about specific cultures in educational settings – can enhance 'civic competence'<sup>30</sup> more broadly (p. viii).

The role for receiving countries in supporting these activities can be wide-ranging. These can include, for example, funding for arts, language, sports and education programmes within diaspora groups or other transnational or migrant communities. This role could also include reforms to the broader system of education within a receiving country to encourage exposure to different cultural viewpoints, alongside and potentially in conjunction with broader social policy initiatives such as anti-racism and other public-awareness campaigns (Ibid).

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<sup>29</sup> It is also conceivable that its exclusion is a function of the literature review's search strategy; however, the broad focus of terms such as 'engag\*' and 'organis/z\*' should have been able to identify at least some literature regarding diaspora economic engagement or organisation for receiving country benefit, if such literature were available. We further recognise that there is substantial literature on the economic contribution of immigrants and immigration to host societies, but this literature is rarely linked to the 'diasporic' nature of immigrant groups and is therefore not under consideration here.

<sup>30</sup> In this context, 'civic competence' is thought of as the ability of people 'to fully participate in civic life based on knowledge of democracy, citizenship and civil rights.' (Wiesand et al., 2008, p. 112)

### 5.1.3. *A targeted review of selected receiving countries suggests that receiving countries engage diasporas under broader migration and integration and development initiatives*

This section describes the findings of the document review of host country governments' diaspora engagement or other similar outreach policies that work with diaspora groups. The countries covered in this search include Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. This review also took account of the European Union. The reason for the selection of these countries is twofold: 1) they represent countries with some of the largest diaspora groups present on their territories, and 2) the vast majority of respondents from the Diaspora Expert Survey were based in these countries, and we intended to situate our policy recommendations in the context of the most applicable countries.

The conceptualisation of diaspora may vary across countries, and the term may not always feature in official language. For instance, existing initiatives and frameworks may refer to 'migrant groups' while offering useful lessons for the field of diaspora engagement. In order not to miss potentially relevant information, we include such initiatives in our review and in doing so employ the terminology found in official documents.

#### **Diaspora engagement spans across government levels and agencies**

We first considered whether or not the engagement of diaspora groups was an area of specific policy consideration, reflected in national strategies or similar initiatives. We defined a formal national diaspora engagement strategy as a national policy document that specifies why and how a given country works with diaspora populations or organisations. While, as we report in section 5.3.1, sending countries tend to have such documents related to their own diasporas, this review did not generally identify any existing formal national diaspora engagement strategies for the receiving countries reviewed. Two notable exceptions are the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) issued a statement of objectives in the 1997 White Paper on International Development which read "we will seek to build on the skills and talents of migrants and other members of ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of origin" (DFID, 1997). In 2004<sup>31</sup> and 2007<sup>32</sup> this objective was reiterated, for example by stating that "DFID will extend and develop further its work with the range of UK diaspora communities in order to strengthen its partnership in support of activities that promote poverty reduction and development in developing countries".<sup>33</sup> Similarly, in 2008, the Dutch government issued a *Beleidsnotitie Internationale Migratie en Ontwikkeling* (Policy Note International Migration and Development) which included six policy priorities, including strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations in development cooperation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2008). The *Voortgangsrapportage Internationale Migratie en Ontwikkeling 2012* (Progress Report

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<sup>31</sup> House of Commons International Development Committee (2004). Migration and Development: how to make migration work for poverty reduction. Sixth report of session 2003-04, volume I. In this paper, the Committee noted that "progress with meeting this commitment has been slow" (pp. 66-67).

<sup>32</sup> (DFID, 2007)

<sup>33</sup> (DFID, 2007, p. 23).

International Migration and Development 2012) indicated that the Dutch government spent 756,438 euros on this diaspora policy priority in 2012.<sup>34-35</sup>

However, the absence of a diaspora strategy document does not mean that diaspora engagement is not taking place. In fact, a multitude of diaspora engagement initiatives are in place. From an organisational point of view, these engagement initiatives span two fundamental axes: 1) horizontally across various government portfolios, and 2) vertically across various levels of government. Thus, there is acknowledgement of engaging with diasporas – or migrants more broadly – in other policy initiatives, yet this engagement is not expressed in formalised overarching strategies as such.

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<sup>34</sup> In 2012, the total amount spent for all six M&D policy priorities was around 13 million euros (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2013).

<sup>35</sup> This mainly involves support in terms of funding, for example the *Migratie en Ontwikkeling 2011-2013* (Migration and Development) project of the Seva Network Foundation for strengthening capacity of migrant organisations (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2013). The Dutch government also supports the African Diaspora Policy Centre's Strengthening Policymaking Capacities of Emerging Diaspora Ministries in Africa (SEDIMA) capacity building programme (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2013). The programme aims to "improve the skills of diaspora-oriented policymakers [in home countries] in terms of designing effective policy instruments to facilitate the integration of diaspora-driven development into the overall national development agenda in their respective countries" (African Diaspora Policy Centre, n.d.).

**Table 5-1. Schematic overview of government levels and policies that cover diaspora engagement**

Level/Country	European Union	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	The Netherlands	Spain	The United Kingdom	The United States
National level	*								
Regional/local level	NA	*		*					

**Green** = development policies

**Orange** = integration/migration

**Purple** = combination of development and integration policies

**Yellow** = other

\* Not identified

\*\* Cooperation between national and local

*Note that this table is schematic only and therefore does not cover all possible modalities. This table represents both past and current initiatives.*

Engagement takes place across various ministries, agencies and levels (i.e. national, regional/state and local; see

Table 5-1). The main cabinet-level bodies involved in diaspora or migrant-related issues are ministries with portfolios covering interior/home affairs, foreign affairs and international development (with slight differences in their names across covered countries). Other relevant agencies include offices for immigration, migration and refugees. At the EU level, relevant DGs include DG Home Affairs and DG Development and Cooperation. A similar breadth is applicable to the European Parliament where Committees such as Development, Employment and Social Affairs, and Foreign Affairs deal with issues around diaspora engagement, integration and related policies.

Besides actions taken at the national level, local authorities in some countries have also developed instruments to engage with immigrants and diaspora groups. For instance, in Italy there are co-development projects in the Milan and Veneto Region (Cicione, n.d.), and in Spain, the Murcia region supported a project aimed at development in Morocco (Migration for Development, n.d.-a).

### Diaspora engagement is embedded primarily in development and integration policies

Diaspora engagement is mainly embedded in development policies and integration/migration policies. Of these two, development tends to be the predominant reason to engage with diaspora organisations. A combination of policies aimed at home country development as well as host country integration is also identified in host country and EU policies and initiatives. Furthermore, whether the focus is on integration or development varies per level of government. With some exceptions (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands), development initiatives are mainly implemented at the national level, while integration initiatives can be found at the local level.

#### *Development policies*

At EU level, several agencies and bodies are responsible for diaspora engagement, mainly in the area of migration and development. For example, under the Stockholm Programme, an EU roadmap in the field of justice and home affairs, one of the priorities in the area of migration and development is to understand ‘how diaspora groups may be further involved in the Union development initiatives, and how Member States may support diaspora groups in their efforts to enhance development in their countries of origin.’ (European Council, 2010).

Since the mid-2000s, the German federal government is focusing more on diaspora engagement, with a main focus on development in home countries (Ragab, 2013). Migration and development is mainly implemented by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ) and its *Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung* (Centre for International Migration and Development, CIM), on behalf of the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ).<sup>36-37</sup> With the exception of North Rhine Westphalia, engagement for development purposes is

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<sup>36</sup> (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), n.d.; European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 2013)

<sup>37</sup> CIM is run jointly by GIZ and the German Federal Employment Agency (Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung [CIM], n.d.).

hardly present at the level of individual Laender, let alone the municipalities (Baraulina, Hilber, & Krienbrink, 2012).

For Italy, though the country's international development cooperation law does not recognise migrants as partners in development,<sup>38</sup> the Italian government has undertaken co-development initiatives together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in which African diaspora communities were involved (see Box 10 for the MIDA project) (Cicione, n.d.). In general, however, mainly local governments (regions and municipalities) have a 'co-development approach in migration and cooperation policies' (Mezzetti & Piperno, 2005, p. 4). This can be seen as a result of Law 49/87 that sees a role for local authorities in development cooperation (A.R.S. Progetti s.r.l., 2007).

The Dutch national budget for 2014 regarding foreign trade and development cooperation states that in 2014, the Netherlands will pay 'enhanced attention to engaging the diaspora for development in developing countries'.<sup>39</sup> In 2013, at the local level, the city council of The Hague has awarded grants for transnational projects (mainly from African communities) for *inter alia* supporting agriculture and stimulating return migration (Gemeente Den Haag, 2013).

In Belgium, four 'pillars' of development cooperation can be distinguished: all levels of government, multilateral organisations, NGOs and universities, and a 'heterogeneous group of non-traditional development actors' including migrant groups (CeMIS, 2012, p. 11).<sup>40</sup> This heterogeneous group receives, among others, funding from the Belgian government. Although the federal government still has a Migration and Development policy (e.g. through a MIDA project), according to CeMIS (2012), engaging with migrant groups for development purposes is limited. At regional, provincial and local levels, however, several initiatives support migrant groups (who are mainly seen as part of the fourth pillar instead of separate) for development purposes. For example, the Flemish region established the *Steunpunt vierde pijler* (Focal Point Fourth Pillar), currently run by an umbrella organisation of Flemish NGOs, which provides non-financial support such as training and meeting days to fourth pillar development initiatives (4depijler, n.d.; CeMIS, 2012).

### *Integration policies*

Elements of diaspora engagement are also found in existing policies aimed at the integration of migrants and migrant groups. For example, the European Union's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility highlights the need to foster effective integration and enhance dialogue with and involvement of diaspora and migrant groups (European Commission, 2011). Similarly, in the Netherlands, the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden* (National Consultation Platform for Minorities, LOM) as initiated (and later withdrawn) by the Dutch government (see Box 11), was aimed at discussing integration policies with immigrants and minority groups (De Haas, 2006). Furthermore, integration policies do not have to be centrally planned and implemented. For instance, in Germany, integration policies often take place at the subnational level (Baraulina et al., 2012). In the United States, the Boston-based Mayor's Office of New Bostonians initiative (see Box 5. The New Bostonians' Initiative) is an example of engagement for immigrant

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<sup>38</sup> The law only outlines roles for Italian citizens in international development activities.

<sup>39</sup> Own translation (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014, p. 21).

<sup>40</sup> This fourth pillar is defined by Develtere in 2005 (CeMIS, 2012).

integration at the local level (City of Boston, 2014a). In the Netherlands, at the local level, the city council of The Hague sets out in its *Integratienota 2010-2014* (Integration note 2010-2014) that it will seek dialogue and cooperation with migrant organisations, role models and other individuals to discuss integration (Gemeente Den Haag, 2011). In Belgium, integration falls within the competencies of the regions (Federaal Migratie Centrum, n.d.-b).<sup>41</sup> In Flanders, for example, the Flemish government established a *Minderhedenforum* (Minorities' forum) that has a legal basis since 1999 and acts as a so-called participation organisation providing a 'forum for organisations of special target groups.' (Integratiebeleid, n.d.). Within this role, the *Minderhedenforum* makes, *inter alia*, recommendations for the Flemish government (Minderhedenforum, n.d.). The *Minderhedenforum* also has a specific Brussels *Minderhedenforum*. Although integration falls mainly within the competencies of the regions in Belgium, the federal government does have 'supporting tools' for public and private initiatives (Integratiebeleid, n.d.). One example is the *Federaal Impulsfonds voor het Migrantenbeleid* (Federal Impulse Fund for Migrant Policy, FIM) that 'supports projects that promote the social integration of people of foreign origin, those that work on intercultural dialogue and discrimination prevention' (Federaal Migratie Centrum, n.d.-a; Integratiebeleid, n.d.). In 2013, for example, FIM awarded the Unie van Turkse Verenigingen (Union of Turkish Organisations) with a 25,000 Euro grant (Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie, 2013).

#### *Mix of development and integration policies*

Finally, some existing policies and initiatives recognise the linkages and overlap between development and integration policies and bring them together under one overarching policy framework. Interestingly, a study found that development projects of diaspora organisations can have a mutually beneficial relationship with integration in the host country: integration and participation in the host country has a positive effect on the success of development initiatives in home countries whilst at the same time 'transnational relations are conducive to the integration' of the diaspora members involved (Da Graça, 2010). For example, through involvement in development projects, organisations gain knowledge about the host country society through dealing with funding representatives (Da Graça, 2010). Similarly, a study in Antwerp showed that 'cooperation between migrant organisations and the development cooperation agency of the city of Antwerp [and other actors in a programme] had a positive influence on the relations between the city and these organisations'.<sup>42</sup>

The Spanish *Plan estratégico ciudadanía e integración 2011-2014* (Strategic plan for citizenship and integration 2011-2014) focuses on integration and citizenship, with the intention of 'strengthen[ing] the link between migration and development, through voluntary return policies'.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, within this strategy, the Spanish government wants to ensure that its migration and development activities are beneficial for Spanish society, home countries, and immigrant organisations. Similarly, the work of Germany's Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) spans both areas of development

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<sup>41</sup> In the *Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest* (Brussels-Capital Region), both the *Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie* (Flemish Community Commission, VGC) and the *Franse Gemeenschapscommissie* (French Community Commission, COCOF) are responsible for integration policy (Federaal Migratie Centrum, n.d.-b).

<sup>42</sup> Own translation, (CeMIS, 2012, p. 74).

<sup>43</sup> Own translation, (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 2011, p. 184).

and integration. CIM is a joint operation of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the German Federal Employment Agency. It implements the Program "Migration for Development", which is funded the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). "Migration for Development" comprises four components: Returning Experts; Business Opportunities for Development; Promotion of the Development Activities of Migrant Organizations; and Migration Policy Advice. The efforts of the component Promotion of the Development Activities of Migrant Organizations (see Box 6) 'both advance the social engagement of the migrant organisations and promote the integration of migrants within Germany' (Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung, n.d.). Along similar lines, the United Kingdom's Common Ground Initiative for African development, as co-funded by the Department for International Development (DfID), aims to support 'African development through UK-based small and diaspora organisations' and also to 'strengthen the capacity of small and diaspora organisations in the UK' (Department for International Development, 2013).<sup>44</sup>

Finally, an example from Italy shows that diaspora engagement can be subject to context specific challenges. Box 4 describes these nation-specific challenges in diaspora engagement using the example of Italy and its domestic political context.

#### **Box 4. The Italian immigration case**

In their article about the Somali diaspora in Italy, Mezzetti and Guglielmo (2009) discuss the Italian immigration policy, which focuses on security and public order, with regard to issues in engaging Somali diaspora members as peacebuilders. They conclude that "engaging diaspora organisations in Italy – as compared to other European countries – seems to be hampered by a 'double wall' ". First, the almost total absence of institutional policies for engaging diasporas [in Italy], which impedes any dialogue and common ground for involving diaspora organisations in development, peacebuilding etc. Second, the peculiar condition of Somali immigrants in Italy and the legal limbo in which they are forced to live causes most organisations to call for improvements in their living conditions in Italy rather than devoting their energies to establishing solid and transnational networks in order to serve as development actor at home" (Mezzetti & Guglielmo, 2009, p. 25). Furthermore, another study found that if Somali diaspora engagement is undertaken for peacebuilding purposes (i.e. political conflict analysis) in Italy, this is mainly done informally and via individuals, instead of via diaspora organisations.<sup>45</sup>

#### **Diaspora engagement initiatives can and do take multiple forms**

Not surprisingly, as diaspora engagement is mainly embedded in development policies, initiatives identified through this review are mainly centred around migration and (economic) development. The German government also works with migrant organisations for peace-building purposes through its Zivik

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<sup>44</sup> The Common Ground Initiative was a five-year initiative which ended in March 2014, though grants allocated to organisations will continue beyond that date. Comic Relief released a tender for the evaluation of the Common Ground Initiative in which it is stated that the evaluation is expected to be completed 15 June 2014. More information on this evaluation is not identified as of 2 April 2014 (Common Ground Initiative, n.d.).

<sup>45</sup> This was the main strategy in the 1990s, however, 'in many cases it has favoured the establishment of long-lasting relationships that still remain active' (Sinatti et al., 2010, p. 13).

programme, part of the *Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen* (Institute for Foreign and Cultural Relations, ifa) and funded by the Federal Foreign Office (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (ifa), n.d.; Sinatti et al., 2010). In practice, however, diaspora engagement initiatives can take many forms.

First of all, engagement can enable diasporas' or migrants' access to resources or services. In Spain, for example, the *Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social* (Ministry of Employment and Social Security) set up Integra Local, a web portal for local entities which aims 'to promote access to different services and information which are provided at the level of Spanish municipalities and which are related to integrating immigrants' (Integra LOCAL, 2007). This platform collects information regarding strategic documents, initiatives and relevant statistic data in the area of migration and integration – all of which is publicly available.<sup>46</sup>

Secondly, diaspora engagement can take place via the involvement of diaspora groups in the implementation and realisation of projects in their countries of origin. An example of this approach is the aforementioned German Program "Migration for Development" which supports migrant organisations in development initiatives (see Box 6) (Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung, n.d.).

Thirdly, engagement can include setting up an infrastructure for mutual dialogue and sustained communication. This approach is exemplified in the EU's intention to continue the work on establishing a diaspora organisations' database that can, *inter alia*, enhance engagement of these groups in the policy dialogue (European Commission, 2011). Another example is LOM in the Netherlands (see Box 11) and the *Minderhedenforum* in the Flemish Region. Policy dialogue can also take the form of a one-off high-profile event, possibly with the expectation to build momentum for sustainable engagement. In 2012, for example, UK Prime Minister David Cameron met with members of the Somali, Kenyan and Tanzanian diaspora to discuss how they think the government could support the diaspora in the UK in helping Somalia (Gov.uk, 2012).

Fourthly, receiving country governments can work to facilitate and enhance linkages between diaspora groups and their countries of origin. One way to do so would be promoting return migration, through, for example, easing the circular flow of people (by removing restrictions on travel or expediting necessary permissions), easing the repatriation of income or goods by those seeking return to home countries, and/or incentivising the return of diaspora members in broad or targeted fashion, potentially to attract those with valuable skills or knowledge.<sup>47</sup> A number of countries now promote greater circulation and flow of ideas and expertise from diaspora members back to their country of origin. In Spain, for example, the Atime association together with l'Agence de L'Oriental developed an exchange of professional abilities between Murcia (Spain) and the Oriental Region of Morocco, particularly in the agricultural sector. The key goal of the project is 'to promote the participation and involvement of immigrants in the development of their origin communities' (Migration for Development, n.d.-a). This project is supported

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<sup>46</sup> The Integra Local projects' database mainly includes integration initiatives as developed by municipalities. Although aimed at local entities, the publicly available Integra Local website might be used by CSOs and diaspora or migrant organisations as well.

<sup>47</sup> We recognise that some return migration programmes are connected to broader anti-immigration policies and therefore may not be intended to benefit migrants or home countries. This is a point we return to in section 7.3.2.

by both the Murcia region and the *Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social* (Ministry of Employment and Social Security, formerly Spanish Ministry of Labour and Migration).<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the variability in goals and methods, diaspora engagement initiatives can take many forms including, from the perspective of business processes, funding and management/oversight. With respect to funding, engagement policies have for obvious reasons been funded predominantly by governments. However, we also identified instances where private institutions and investors interested in improving a range of outcomes for diaspora groups have been involved. In this context, public-private partnerships represent a modality of bringing together a multitude of funders and stakeholders. An example of such an arrangement is the International diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA) in the United States. In 2011, IdEA, a public-private partnership (PPP), was set up by the Secretary of State's Global Partnership Initiative in collaboration with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (U.S. Department of State, n.d.-a; USAID, 2013). Besides these two government agencies, IdEA is also managed through the Calvert Foundation (IdEA, 2014). IdEA is a 'non-partisan, non-profit organization that engages global diaspora communities, the private sector, civil society, and public institutions in collaborative efforts to support economic and social development' (IdEA, 2014). IdEA's programme includes organising networking opportunities for diasporas (IdEA, 2014). Of course, PPPs are not unique to working with diaspora organisations or migrant groups, but have been applied to other types of collaboration with civil society groups. For instance, the Dutch government has made PPP funds available for partnerships between the government, the private sector and civil society organisations as part of the Dutch development policy (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.; Nederlandse Regering, n.d.).

In this context, funders are not always automatically those tasked with carrying out a given policy. Instead, for some cases, implementation or management is delegated to other governmental, non-governmental or intergovernmental organisations. Besides IdEA, examples are the German Program "Migration for Development" (see Box 6) and the European Commission and United Nations joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMIDI) which has been implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (Sandra Paola Alvarez Tinajero & Sinatti, 2011).

The following boxes describe local and national initiatives working with diaspora groups in Boston (US) and Germany, respectively.

#### **Box 5. The New Bostonians' Initiative**

The Mayor's Office of New Bostonians (MONB) was founded in 1998 with a mission 'to strengthen the ability of diverse cultural and linguistic communities to play an active role in the economic, civic, social and cultural life in the city of Boston; to act as a catalyst for providing opportunity, access and equality for immigrants; to highlight the contributions and the essential role that immigrants have played and continue to play in making Boston the world class city that it is' (City of Boston, 2014a). Among its activities, the MONB helps facilitating collaboration between immigrant communities and other parties (City of Boston, 2014a). An example is the New Bostonians

<sup>48</sup> It is unclear if this project is still active.

Summit Initiative which started in 2007 and brought several stakeholders together (like the immigrant community and government) 'to develop an ongoing New Bostonians Agenda to address top priorities identified by Boston's immigrant communities: educational attainment for their children (K-12 Education), English language acquisition (ESOL), and economic opportunities through sustainable employment (Jobs)' (City of Boston, 2014b).

In addition to this local level example focused on integration of immigrants, Box 6 provides a national example of engagement through supporting migrant organisations in implementing development projects in home countries.

### **Box 6. CIM Program Migration for Development Germany**

The Program "Migration for Development" has been implemented by a governmental organisation called *Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung* (Centre for International Migration and Development, CIM) since 2011.<sup>49</sup> CIM is 'jointly run by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the International Placement Services (ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency' (Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM), n.d.). Their work is financed by the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ) (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2012). According to its website: CIM 'supports migrant organisations that are implementing projects in their countries of origin that are relevant to development policy' through the provision of not only financial support but also training and networking opportunities. The stated aim of these efforts is to 'both advance the social engagement of the migrant organisations and promote the integration of migrants within Germany' (Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung, n.d.). In addition, the Program also aims to enhance 'the visibility of migrant organisation activities in Germany and in their countries of origin' (Keusch & Schuster, 2012, p. 36). Migrant associations are eligible when, among others, they are a registered non-profit organisation based in Germany with most of its members from the migrant community. In addition, they should have a strong partner organisation in the country of proposed project. In terms of funding, the Program supports the project for up to 50% (maximum of 50,000 EUR) and the migrant organisation should contribute 50% minimum (minimum of 10% financial and the rest may be other forms of input, including other funds) (Keusch & Schuster, 2012).

### **Possible transferable lessons: engagement with civil society groups**

We also recognise that diaspora engagement might not be too dissimilar from governmental engagement strategies with other civil society groups. Civil society groups can face the same issues as diaspora organisations relating to funding, capacity and representativeness; as such, we included an examination of

<sup>49</sup> From 2007 to 2010 it was run by GIZ, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH*, as part of the sector Programme 'Migration and Development'. In 2006, GIZ commissioned research into diaspora organisations in Germany, held conferences and advertised the Program. Subsequently, a pilot programme started in 2007 with a budget of 650,000 EUR for three years.

civil-society engagement strategies within this review.<sup>50</sup> Box 7 and Box 8 describe two noteworthy civil society engagement initiatives.

### **Box 7. Governmental engagement strategies with other civil society groups**

#### ***‘Engagement Global – Service for development initiatives’: Germany’s one-stop shop concept***

In 2012, the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ) set up *Engagement Global - Service für Entwicklungsinitiativen* (Engagement Global – Service for development initiatives) which brings together all government-funded initiatives and civil and municipal development initiatives under one central service point, a so-called ‘one-stop shop’ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 2014). Engagement Global offers information, consultancy, further needs-based training and education and financial assistance (Engagement Global, n.d.).

### **Box 8. ‘Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society’: the United States’ working group approach**

Engagement with civil society is a ‘cornerstone’ of US foreign policy (The White House, 2013). Established in 2011, the Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society of the US Department of State ‘provides a forum for cooperation with civil society and a vehicle for telling the story of our ongoing work to support and protect the freedoms of association and expression’ (US Department of State, n.d.-b). Representatives of civil society groups from several countries, the US government and US-based international NGOs are involved in the Dialogue which is now carried out by a Federal Advisory Committee (US Department of State, n.d.-b). Virtual participation in the Dialogue through US embassies is also a possibility. Under this initiative, thematic working groups are held which focus on, for example, empowering women, governance and accountability and labour (US Department of State, n.d.-b). Following the Mission and Washington-based working groups, civil society representatives came up with policy recommendations brought to the State Department by the Federal Advisory Committee for discussion (US Department of State, n.d.-b).

#### ***Evaluations of diaspora engagement initiatives are relatively rare and face serious challenges***

Project evaluations are essential for informing future development of diaspora engagement initiatives. However, in general there appears to be a relative paucity of available evaluations of diaspora engagement initiatives, though notable exceptions exist, particularly in regard to migration activities of the bodies of the European Union, which have been building a strong culture of evaluation.<sup>51</sup> The few evaluations that exist focus mainly on initiatives with development purposes. Box 9 and Box 10 provide examples of evaluations conducted in the UK and Italy, respectively, and demonstrate the importance of commitment by the diaspora organisations concerned (and for the Italian example, the home country as well).

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<sup>50</sup> It is worth mentioning that civil society-led engagement might also take other forms not discussed here. An example comes from the practice of diaspora-led efforts to organise Sister City arrangements between home and host communities (for a discussion of the brokering role played by Mexican diaspora groups within the US in such arrangements see FitzGerald (2000)).

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, article 16 of Council Decision No 2007/126/JHA that requires interim and ex-post evaluations of the Specific Programme ‘Criminal Justice’ (Council of the European Union, 2007).

There are several reasons which might contribute to the observed dearth of evaluations.<sup>52</sup> As discussed above, diaspora integration policies often cut across portfolios of several governmental departments both horizontally and vertically. As such, no single body or department agency tends to be seen as primarily responsible for engaging diaspora groups and therefore charged with setting up and learning from evaluations. This absence of a clear division of duties poses problems for the formulation of goals and objectives, particularly given the aforementioned lack of overarching formulated strategy for diaspora engagement. As a consequence of this complexity, defining appropriate performance indicators is a serious challenge, especially in areas of diaspora engagement with no standard and widely-accepted indicators.<sup>53</sup>

In addition, the challenge is further compounded by the fact that attribution of impact is inherently difficult due to a multitude of possible confounding factors. As a result, existing evaluations are often structured more as activity reports than systematic assessments of the intervention's or programme's impact.

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<sup>52</sup> For a discussion of some of the challenges inherent in evaluating integration policies and initiatives refer to Ardittis and Laczko (2008); Rinne (2012).

<sup>53</sup> For instance, this is somewhat less of an issue for initiatives targeting the economic integration of diaspora groups in the receiving country, as they can utilise measures such as educational attainment or employment rate.

### Box 9. UK's Connections for Development initiative

With the 1997 White Paper on International Development (DFID, 1997) as a rationale, which included an objective on engaging with migrants and other ethnic minorities, DFID supported the establishment of an umbrella organisation for diaspora organisations and individuals called Connections for Development (CfD) in 2003 (Naru, Condy, & Humphries, 2007). This initiative was funded through a three-year Strategic Grant Agreement (£750,000 in total) and was extended to 2007 (De Haas, 2006). This initiative was aimed at the UK's Black and Ethnic Minority (BME) civil society. According to De Haas (2006), 'CfD's aim [was] not to undertake international development projects, but to help its BME members to become actively involved in development through establishing a network, undertaking research, informing about all aspects of development, lobbying for BME participation in policy making and through supporting its membership members and connecting them to training and funding agencies' (De Haas, 2006, pp. 60-61). The Connections for Development programme is a government organised non-governmental organisation (GONGO) (International Policy Network, 2009). An independent evaluation of the programme was conducted by Naru et al. (2007), conducting desk research, key stakeholder interviews and a survey among CfD members. The evaluation found that, among others, there was weak organisational management (though this later improved); DFID should have considered better operational support; SGA was not the best mechanism for engagement;<sup>54</sup> and that 'there is a lack of clarity over the purpose of the organisation and how it should meet the needs of both its membership and its engagement with Dfid' (Naru et al., 2007). Unclear objectives in the SGA made it difficult to implement and measure CfD's outcomes and impact. Furthermore, the evaluation found that 'there is demand from CfD's member organisations for increased capacity building and networking opportunities and less obvious demand for engagement on policy issues' (Naru et al., 2007, p. 3). Additionally, it was unclear whether all organisations had 'a common interest in international development' (Naru et al., 2007, p. 12). Also, interviewees were concerned that a large proportion of the members were not engaged in the initiative anymore. Several recommendations were made in the evaluation report including improving organisational capacity building, making aims and objectives better achievable, and 'providing several phases of tiered core funding to CfD for an agreed period of time that will guarantee the operational activities of CfD and give CfD the opportunity to plan for a more sustainable future' (Naru et al., 2007, p. 4).

### Box 10. The Italian MIDA project

MIDA is a programme by the IOM together with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), set up in 2001 (International Organization for Migration, n.d.-b). It is 'a capacity-building programme, which helps to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa's development' (International Organization for Migration, n.d.-b). The MIDA Italy pilot project for Ethiopia and Ghana was funded by the Italian government (520,000 EUR) and was fully evaluated.<sup>55</sup> The MIDA Italy pilot project aimed 'to promote the transfer of knowledge and expertise as well as the engagement of the diaspora communities in the form of investments and deployment of remittances and to promote capacity building of the Ethiopian and Ghanaian governments in dealing with diasporas' (De Haas, 2006, p. 20). It 'encouraged the engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora in the

<sup>54</sup> According to the evaluation, this was because 'the original architects of CfD were over-ambitious in that they did not consider fully the resource implications and task at hand and they hoped that there would be capacity and commitment within the BME community to deliver the SGA outcomes' (Naru et al., 2007, p. 3).

<sup>55</sup> However, as the evaluation of the MIDA Italy Project cannot be accessed online, the De Haas (2006) article will be used to describe the project.

development of micro-enterprises in the agricultural sector [and] for the Ethiopian community, the goal was the creation of a comprehensive website that would allow an exchange of information for the Ethiopian diaspora' (De Haas, 2006, p. 20). The major problem of the project was the lack of commitment by home country governments. For example, the Ghanaian government appeared not to be interested in micro-enterprises. Furthermore, the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian diaspora did not support or were not enthusiastic about the programme respectively. However, the pilot project was continued by the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Ghana/Senegal (International Organization for Migration, 2007) in 2006 and 'several steps have been taken to avoid the previous mistakes and to ensure greater collaboration between the IOM, the participating government and the diaspora members' (De Haas, 2006, p. 21).

#### 5.1.4. Conceptual typology of receiving-country engagement strategies

Based on the above review, we provide the following summary typology of motivations for and focus of receiving country strategies for engagement. The table outlines the axes of the typology as presented at the outset of the section, and in each box relevant examples of receiving country engagement activity can be found.

**Table 5-2. Typology of receiving country diaspora engagement strategies**

*Focus of receiving country engagement with diasporas*

		Political/Security	Economic	Cultural/Social
<i>Beneficiary</i>	<b>For Homeland Benefit</b>	Support diasporas as 'peace-builders' (not 'peace-wreckers') Promote 'western'/democratic or human-rights values in post-conflict situations Involve diaspora members in transitional politics and administration	Diasporas for development Facilitating remittances Brain gain/skill transfer Return migration programmes involving e.g. business and investing mentorship	Non-economic remittances Return migration programmes involving e.g. higher education in the host country Diaspora contributions to homeland media
	<b>For Receiving country Benefit</b>	Interventions to avoid transported conflicts Counter-terrorism/extremism activities Anti-hate/xenophobia campaigns Anti-organised crime, illegal immigration, human trafficking	International business facilitation Economic development for diaspora members (e.g. job seeking and training assistance)	Intercultural dialogue activities Promotion of arts, sport Urban renewal/celebration Education of 'native' population Anti-hate/xenophobia campaigns



## 6. Selected sending country engagement strategies

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### 6.1. Selected sending country engagement strategies have been examined based on their dominant motivations

For a number of key countries, we examined the strategies for diaspora engagement in place at sending-country level to understand the degree to which governments take an interest in their expatriate and transnational migrant communities. As illustrated below, diasporas are economically, politically and culturally important for a multitude of development goals in virtually all of the selected sending countries. While the means used to connect with diasporas may differ from country to country, there is a widespread pattern among homeland governments towards seeing their diasporas as key players in the national future.

As with our review of receiving country strategies, we examined sending country strategies for political, economic, and cultural/social engagement activities. While many of these engagement activities likely have effects on security outcomes as well, we did not see this factor as a dominant motivation in the language used by sending countries relative to their engagement strategies. As such, we refer only to political rather than political/security engagement in this and subsequent sections. Additionally, in contrast to the receiving country review, we did not consider homeland engagement for receiving country benefit and assume that in all cases the diaspora engagement identified exists for homeland benefit primarily or entirely.

The selected countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen, as well as (where possible) the regions of Chechnya<sup>56</sup> and Kashmir. We will also discuss relevant initiatives in other countries where it is illustrative to do so, but these 25 countries provide the core content for this section.

The following is a synthesis of our findings within the areas of: national strategy towards diaspora; economic initiatives for diaspora participation in the country of origin; political rights of the diaspora; and initiatives to encourage social and cultural connections between diaspora members and/or to the homeland culture, language or society. An overview of key aspects of diaspora engagement can be found below in Table 6-1. Alongside this chapter, we have developed summary profiles on each of the countries selected for in-depth review. The profiles can be found in Appendix A.

While Table 6.1 provides an indicative overview of the relative levels of engagement with and structures supporting diasporas at the sending country level, a few brief but important caveats highlight the

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<sup>56</sup> In our search, we have been unable to find any evidence of diaspora-oriented policies or initiatives specific to Chechnya.

complexity of making direct comparisons between various diaspora engagement regimes. First, the presence or absence of a national strategy is not a definitive marker of whether or not a country is engaged with its diaspora population. Many countries without such strategies nonetheless have extensive engagement initiatives in various areas of government. Second, our search was not exhaustive of all areas in which sending countries may engage with their diaspora populations. We focused on national-level initiatives identified through official documents and reports; in particular, we do not account for the various local-level and regional sub-national initiatives which may be in place.

Third, the presence or absence of diaspora-specific economic policies or initiatives is not necessarily indicative of the strength of diaspora participation in the sending country economy; diasporas may fall within other groups incentivised to invest, such as foreign investors, or they may be treated as fully equal to resident citizens for investment purposes. Consequently, initiatives which are not ‘diaspora-specific’ may still generate diaspora investment. As well, the presence of diaspora-specific policies is not necessarily an indicator of the actual or potential volume of economic engagement of diaspora. For example, some countries have incentives in place for highly-skilled or professional members of diaspora, which are not intended to have broad reach but may have targeted impacts on specific economic sectors. Moreover, remittances flow to countries that incentivise and/or ease the remittance process as well as to those that tax and/or complicate it. As a result, we cannot determine the impact of various tax regimes on repatriation of diaspora income.

Finally, the presence or absence of political rights, particularly external voting rights, are only as valuable as the facilities in place to support them. Many selected countries have the possibility of these rights in a constitutional or legislative sense, but in practice not all members of diaspora populations can exercise these rights due to structural limitations. Furthermore, many individuals with the ability to vote may not make the effort. These points will be elaborated further in the following subsections.

**Table 6-1. Sending Country Synthesis Table**

Country	Highest level of government dedicated to diaspora engagement	Official national strategy for diaspora engagement	External Voting Allowed <sup>57</sup>	Dual Citizenship Allowed <sup>58</sup>	Citizenship rights for children in diaspora	Identified diaspora-specific economic policies/ initiatives
<b>Afghanistan</b>	None found	No national strategy; few programmes in place	No	Yes	Either parent <sup>59</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found
<b>Algeria</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Delegate Ministry in Charge of the National Community Established Abroad <sup>60</sup>	No national strategy; multiple programmes in place	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>61</sup>	Financial incentives for return migration of science and research diaspora <sup>62</sup>

<sup>57</sup> From IDEA External Voting Database, accessed 23 Jan 2014.

<sup>58</sup> Using MACIMIDE database information unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>59</sup> (MultipleCitizenship.com, 2007a).

<sup>60</sup> (Migration Policy Centre, 2013a).

<b>Azad Kashmir</b> <sup>63</sup>	Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell <sup>64</sup>	Nine-point Mandate of the Cell <sup>65</sup>	No	Yes	Either parent or grandparent <sup>66</sup>	Targeted investment opportunities for Pakistani-Kashmiris <sup>67</sup>
<b>Djibouti</b>	None found	No national strategy; few programmes in place	Yes	Yes	Father <sup>68</sup>	Diaspora investment in agriculture (DIA) <sup>69</sup>
<b>Egypt</b>	Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Emigration Sector*	No national strategy; multiple programmes in place	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>70</sup>	Tax relief for remittances/formal transfers of income for diaspora <sup>71</sup>
<b>Eritrea</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Abroad*	No national strategy; few programmes in place	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>72</sup>	Diaspora investment conferences <sup>73</sup> Targeted investment opportunities for diaspora <sup>74</sup> Diaspora tax*** <sup>75</sup>
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate General	Ethiopian Diaspora Policy	No	No (origin card only, with limits to Eritreans of Ethiopian origin) <sup>76</sup>	Either parent, grandparent or great grandparent (origin card only) <sup>77</sup>	Diaspora bonds <sup>78</sup> Targeted investment opportunities for diaspora <sup>79</sup> Formal remittance service <sup>80</sup>
<b>India</b>	Ministry of Overseas Affairs*	Strategic Plan for the next five years <sup>81</sup>	Yes	No	Either parent (citizenship); Parent or	Special Economic Zones Act 2005 Shared bank accounts

<sup>61</sup> (Republic of Algeria, 1970).

<sup>62</sup> (ERAWATCH, 2012).

<sup>63</sup> For this section, we only include Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in this table, as this territory has relative autonomy from Pakistan. For all practical purposes, Indian Kashmir's policies are under the purview of India's relevant ministries.

<sup>64</sup> (Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell, n.d.).

<sup>65</sup> (Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell, n.d.).

<sup>66</sup> (Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989).

<sup>67</sup> (Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell, n.d.).

<sup>68</sup> (Republic of Djibouti, 2004).

<sup>69</sup> (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011).

<sup>70</sup> (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2004).

<sup>71</sup> (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 114).

<sup>72</sup> (Provisional Government of Eritrea, 1992).

<sup>73</sup> (US Department of State, 2013).

<sup>74</sup> (Ibid.; CapitalEritrea, 2012).

<sup>75</sup> (Africa Review, 2013).

<sup>76</sup> (Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate, 2011).

<sup>77</sup> Ibid; the Person of Ethiopian Origin Identify Card (PEOIC) can be obtained through either parent, grand-parent or great-grandparent having Ethiopian citizenship, but citizenship is not transferable to children in the diaspora.

<sup>78</sup> (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 87).

<sup>79</sup> (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

<sup>80</sup> (Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate, 2011).

<sup>81</sup> (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, n.d.).

							grandparent (origin card) <sup>82</sup>	between NRI and Indian residents <sup>83</sup> Tax and investment incentives for diaspora (excl. agricultural sector) <sup>84</sup>
<b>Iraq</b>	Ministry Migration Displaced*	of No and strategy; programmes in place	national few in	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>85</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found	
<b>Kenya</b>	Diaspora Directorate <sup>86</sup>	Affairs Kenya (DRAFT, 2011); Diaspora Engagement and Strategic Policy Framework (forthcoming) <sup>87</sup>	Policy of (DRAFT, 2011); Diaspora Engagement and Strategic Policy Framework (forthcoming) <sup>87</sup>	No	Yes	Either parent <sup>88</sup>	Diaspora bonds <sup>89</sup> Diaspora Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) <sup>90</sup> Diaspora tax amnesty 2011 <sup>91</sup>	
<b>Libya</b>	None found	No national strategy; programmes in place	national few in	Yes	No	Either parent (some limits on mother) <sup>92</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found	
<b>Mali</b>	Ministry of Aliens Abroad and African Integration*	No national strategy; programmes in place	national multiple in	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>93</sup>	Exemptions on taxes and duties for import of certain goods, equipment and investment <sup>94</sup>	
<b>Mauritania</b>	None found	No national strategy; programmes in place	national few in	Yes	No	Either parent <sup>95</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found	
<b>Morocco</b>	Ministry Charged with the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad*	Action Plan to meet the expectations of the <i>Marocains Résidant à l'étranger (MRE)</i> <sup>96</sup>	Plan to the the expectations of the <i>Marocains Résidant à l'étranger (MRE)</i> <sup>96</sup>	No	Yes	Either parent <sup>97</sup>	Investment support <sup>98</sup> Tax incentives/ reduction for certain housing investments <sup>99</sup>	

<sup>82</sup> (Republic of India, 1955).

<sup>83</sup> (The Times of India, 2011).

<sup>84</sup> (Jonkers, 2008).

<sup>85</sup> (Republic of Iraq, 2006).

<sup>86</sup> (World Bank, 2011b).

<sup>87</sup> The implementation of a comprehensive national diaspora policy is part of the broader Kenya Vision 2030 programme (Kenya Vision 2030, 2011).

<sup>88</sup> (Republic of Kenya, 2010, 2011a).

<sup>89</sup> (AllAfrica, 2011).

<sup>90</sup> (Business Daily, 2013).

<sup>91</sup> (Kenya Revenue Authority, n.d.).

<sup>92</sup> (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2010).

<sup>93</sup> (Republic of Mali, 1995).

<sup>94</sup> (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 101).

<sup>95</sup> (Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury, & Perrin, 2010b).

<sup>96</sup> (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2012a).

<sup>97</sup> (Kingdom of Morocco, 2007).

<sup>98</sup> (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2010a).

<sup>99</sup> (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2010b).

<b>Niger</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African and Abroad*	Foreign No strategy; programmes in place Nigeriens	national few in	Yes	No	Either parent <sup>100</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found
<b>Pakistan</b>	Ministry Overseas Pakistanis*	of National Policy for Overseas Pakistanis <sup>101</sup>	national few in	No	Yes	Either parent <sup>102</sup>	Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) <sup>103</sup> Property investment rights <sup>104</sup>
<b>Philippines</b>	Commission Filipinos Overseas	on Diaspora Development (D2D) initiative <sup>105</sup>	national few in	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>106</sup>	Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development (OFs-RED) initiative (incl. tax and other incentives for remittances) <sup>107</sup>
<b>Somalia</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diaspora (ODA)	Foreign Office for strategy; programmes in place	national few in	In transition	Yes	Unclear	Diaspora Investment in Agriculture (DIA) initiative <sup>108</sup>
<b>South Sudan</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Cooperation, GOSS Liaison Offices (embassies – not dedicated to diaspora affairs) <sup>109</sup>	Foreign and strategy; programmes in place	national few in	In transition	Yes	Unclear	No diaspora-specific policies found
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Ministry of foreign employment promotion and welfare*	foreign No strategy; and programmes in place <sup>110</sup>	national multiple in	No	No	Either parent <sup>111</sup>	Diaspora bonds <sup>112</sup> Special facilities for non-resident Sri Lankans on remittances, import and export, and repatriation of investment income <sup>113</sup> Foreign currency loans to Sri Lankans employed abroad <sup>114</sup>
<b>Sudan</b>	Secretariat Sudanese Working	of No strategy;	national few	Yes	Yes (with limits to South)	Either parent <sup>117</sup>	No diaspora-specific policies found

<sup>100</sup> (MultipleCitizenship.com, 2007b).

<sup>101</sup> (International Labour Organization, 2013).

<sup>102</sup> (Directorate General of Immigration & Passports, n.d.).

<sup>103</sup> (Dawn.com, 2012).

<sup>104</sup> (Barrister Tahseen Butt & Associates, 2007).

<sup>105</sup> (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014a).

<sup>106</sup> (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014b).

<sup>107</sup> (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014c).

<sup>108</sup> (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011).

<sup>109</sup> (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2012).

<sup>110</sup> However, ‘a comprehensive approach to harness the potential of the expatriate community’ was recommended in the 2011 *Report from the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation* (p. 314).

<sup>111</sup> (Department of Immigration and Emigration, 2014).

<sup>112</sup> (Government of Sri Lanka, n.d.).

<sup>113</sup> (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010).

<sup>114</sup> (Ibid.).

	Abroad (SSWA) <sup>115</sup>	programmes in place	in	Sudanese) <sup>116</sup>			
<b>Syria</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates*	Five Year Plan of and the Ministry of Expatriates (prior to the ongoing Syrian conflict)	Yes	Yes	Father <sup>118</sup>	Tax and investment incentives for diaspora Favourable exchange rate for remittances <sup>119</sup>	
<b>Tunisia</b>	Ministry of Social Affairs – Office for Tunisians Abroad ( <i>L'Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger</i> , OTE) <sup>120</sup> and Secretary of State for Migrations and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE) <sup>121</sup>	National Immigration Strategy <sup>122</sup>	Yes	Yes	Either parent <sup>123</sup>	Special bank accounts for diaspora <sup>124</sup> Tax, customs and investment incentives <sup>125</sup> Savings incentives <sup>126</sup>	
<b>Turkey</b>	Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities <sup>127</sup>	No national strategy	In transition (for 2014 Presidential elections). <sup>128</sup>	Yes	Either parent <sup>129</sup>	Foreign currency accounts with increased interest rates offered by Central Bank of Turkey <sup>130</sup>	
<b>Uganda</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Services Department <sup>131</sup>	National Diaspora Policy (forthcoming)	No	Yes	Either parent or grandparent <sup>132</sup>	Diaspora bonds (planned) <sup>133</sup> Tax on international remittances*** <sup>134</sup> Tax on mobile phone transfers and	

<sup>117</sup> (Republic of the Sudan, 2005).

<sup>115</sup> (Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad, n.d.).

<sup>116</sup> (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, & Perrin, 2012).

<sup>118</sup> (Syrian Arab Republic, 1969).

<sup>119</sup> (Migration Policy Institute, 2010).

<sup>120</sup> (Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger (OTE), 2013a).

<sup>121</sup> (Boubakri, 2013).

<sup>122</sup> (Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger (OTE), 2013b).

<sup>123</sup> (Republique Tunisienne, 2008, Chapter 1, Article 6).

<sup>124</sup> (Migration Policy Institute, 2012, p. 206).

<sup>125</sup> (Katterbach, 2010).

<sup>126</sup> (Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury, & Perrin, 2010c).

<sup>127</sup> (Yurtnaç, 2012).

<sup>128</sup> (EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, 2014).

<sup>129</sup> (Kadirbeyoglu, 2012).

<sup>130</sup> (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, n.d.).

<sup>131</sup> (Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

<sup>132</sup> (Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, 2010).

<sup>133</sup> (Parliament of Uganda, 2012).

<sup>134</sup> (BBC, 2013b).

						international phone calls*** <sup>135</sup>
Yemen	Ministry of Expatriate Affairs**	of Recommendations of the 3rd General Conference of Expatriates <sup>136</sup>	Yes	Yes	Father <sup>137</sup>	Expatriates' Bank <sup>138</sup> Preferential investment terms for expatriates (under consideration) <sup>139</sup> Removal of fees on remittance and transfer <sup>140</sup>

\*From Agunias and Newland (2012)

\*\*From MPI Taxonomy (2010)

\*\*\*Identifies economic policies requiring specific contribution from diaspora

### 6.1.1. National strategies toward diaspora: Most sending countries we examined are developing strategies to engage with their diaspora for development purposes

Our goal in this review has been to identify whether, and to what degree, national governments of the selected countries had developed a structured approach to and identified priorities for diaspora engagement. Beginning with the charting done by Agunias and Newland (2012) in this area, we sought to develop an inventory of the highest levels of government devoted either wholly or in part to diaspora affairs.

There is a trend toward development of branches of government dedicated to diaspora

To support diaspora engagement, numerous homeland countries have developed branches of government specifically dedicated to engagement with the diaspora, both within our selected countries as outlined in the table above, and among sending countries more broadly. While the motivation is often to encourage economic remittances or other benefits such as return or circular migration (discussed in the next subsection), these strategies may also encourage a more general interest in, or 'political bond' (Chander, 2006) with, the homeland among diaspora populations. However, as a quick reading of the above table will reveal, the levels at which these branches of government are held differ significantly across these countries.

Regarding naming of the highest-level body overseeing diasporas, we found that Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya all explicitly use the term 'diaspora' in the name of the relevant ministry, while others refer to these populations as 'overseas' or 'expatriate' communities. Regarding location of the body within the broader government apparatus, we found that Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka have included diaspora engagement explicitly in the remit of a national body also charged with jobs, labour or capacity development. India, Azad Kashmir, Mali, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey<sup>141</sup> and

<sup>135</sup> (Ibid.).

<sup>136</sup> (Alquhali, 2013; Presidency of the Republic of Yemen, 2010).

<sup>137</sup> (Republic of Yemen, 1990).

<sup>138</sup> (Alquhali, 2013).

<sup>139</sup> (YemenFox, 2012).

<sup>140</sup> (Alquhali, 2013).

<sup>141</sup> While the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities is not technically a ministry, Turkey has been included in this list due to the Presidency being a diaspora-dedicated, stand-alone body attached at a high governmental institution, namely, the Prime Ministry Office.

Yemen have each created ministries solely dedicated to the expatriate or diaspora population, while Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Uganda have all incorporated diaspora activities into offices within the Foreign Affairs sphere of activities.

It is not possible from this research to fully examine and set out the material consequences of these administrative structures on the actual approach to diaspora engagement at each country level, and in particular whether or not such structures are predictive of policy directions from the home country. Certainly, countries that place diaspora engagement within those ministries also concerned with jobs, employment and labour have also emphasised the importance of diaspora employment and facilitation of circular migration, remittances, and similar vehicles for homeland wealth creation in their national strategy or policy approaches.

However, other countries such as India, Pakistan and Morocco, which have dedicated diaspora ministries, also emphasise the importance of job creation and facilitation of employment and education outside of the home country. Moreover, these countries all differ in their overarching policy orientation in this vein. Where India's policy focuses on the potential return of high-skilled labour (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, n.d.), Pakistan's is much more interested in ensuring Pakistani access to foreign job markets (International Labour Organization, 2013). This difference may be associated with the relative levels of opportunity and wealth in each country, rather than the structures of diaspora engagement.

Brain gain (or brain circulation) nonetheless remains important in countries also seeking access to foreign labour markets. Countries such as Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka all have active diaspora-relevant ministries who negotiate return migration protocols with receiving countries to help facilitate brain-gain from migration. Such efforts may be broadly-oriented or targeted to specific sectors; for example, Ethiopia (Migration Policy Institute, 2011), Eritrea (Agunias and Newland 2012: 161) and the Philippines<sup>142</sup> have partnered with diaspora and receiving countries to encourage development in medicine and health education and practice; as we discuss later in this chapter, programmes such as the Afghan Expatriate Programme and the UN's TOKTEN have involved international organisations partnering with home country governments to improve capacity in public institutions.

### **Coordinated diaspora strategies are increasingly common, but levels of implementation of strategies are not always clear**

Multiple levels of government often work on diaspora issues in one form or another, and these may be linked to either (or both) the national ministry responsible for diaspora and the national diaspora strategy where such a strategy exists. However, this coordination is not a certainty, as local diaspora engagement programmes may run autonomously from national initiatives, and the national strategy is not always developed entirely through the diaspora ministry. Virtually all of our selected countries that have a national strategy also have multiple ministries identified for involvement in diaspora engagement, yet many countries are only just recognising the importance of whole-of-government approaches to diaspora engagement.

Most countries selected for examination have begun to embrace the notion that a coherent and coordinated, cross-government strategy must be employed to fully engage the diaspora population.

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<sup>142</sup> See e.g. the Medical Mission Coordination [MMC] (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014a).

However, the level of implementation of such policies is not always clear; for example, Turkey, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia all have diaspora policies which are still in the process of development. Moreover, while it appears at present that many of the programmes listed in various diaspora policies and similar documents are currently at an aspirational stage – meaning we could find no concrete evidence that the highlighted activities were operational or even initiated – this does not mean that no steps are being taken either towards these or other relevant programmes.

National diaspora ministries as well as national strategies may therefore be more limited in practice than they appear in policy. Nonetheless, whatever the capacity of national agencies concerned with diaspora affairs, or the actual state of implementation of diaspora engagement programmes, the creation of these organisations and documents helps point towards countries' plans for their ideal relationships with diaspora; to the degree that receiving countries are interested in supporting these goals, they may provide a signal in some cases that partnerships with sending countries are possible.

From our research, we have not been able to identify a government body dedicated wholly or partly to diaspora engagement in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, or Sudan, and by extension cannot identify a national engagement strategy or policy for any of these countries. In the case of Afghanistan, we are aware that a number of ministries will have interactions with diaspora members, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs, and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations. However, it is not apparent that any of these bodies have a discernible priority on diaspora affairs. In addition, it must be explicitly stated that all findings regarding Syria relate to the state of affairs prior to the current conflict, and we cannot verify the present arrangement of institutions or speculate on the future approach to diaspora that will emerge in a post-conflict Syria.

### **Diaspora conferences or official consultative bodies exist or are planned in many of the selected countries**

In recent years, a number of countries have developed, or are in the process of developing, officially-recognised consultative bodies made up of diaspora representatives. These bodies tend to be selected by a larger diaspora body, such as those who attend a national conference of the diaspora, though it is not clear how representative these bodies are (or can be). They serve to inform government policy on diaspora engagement and issues. Ten of our selected countries maintain a national council including members of their expatriate communities, or have such a council planned. Two of these – Algeria and Yemen – maintain a larger conference of expatriate leaders, which also elect the national council members. The government of Egypt has historically maintained the Conference of Egyptians Abroad, though does not have an official council body.<sup>143</sup> A listing of these bodies is provided in Table 6-2.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> The General Union of Egyptians Abroad appears to play a similar role to some of the national advisory councils. It is officially non-governmental, though it maintains ties to government and other Egyptian institutions, and is described further in Appendix A.

<sup>144</sup> Efforts have been made to verify the appropriate English-language translation of each body; however, in some cases official documents have minor distinctions. For example, we have found reference to Algeria's 'Consultative Council of the National Community Abroad' and Yemen's 'Higher Expatriates Council', but these appear to be the same as the bodies named in this list.

**Table 6-2. Official diaspora councils, selected countries**

Country	Body
Algeria	National Advisory Board of the National Community Abroad <sup>145</sup>
Egypt	Conference of Egyptians Abroad <sup>146</sup>
Ethiopia	National Diaspora Council (planned) <sup>147</sup>
Kenya	National Diaspora Council of Kenya (NADICOK) (planned) <sup>148</sup>
Mali	High Council of Malians Abroad <sup>149</sup>
Morocco	Council for the Moroccan Community abroad <sup>150</sup>
Niger	High Council of Nigeriens Abroad <sup>151</sup>
Syria	Syrian Expatriate Advisory Council <sup>152</sup>
Tunisia	High Council of Tunisians Abroad ( <i>Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l'étranger</i> , HCTE) (planned) <sup>153</sup>
Turkey	Advisory Board of Overseas Citizens within the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities <sup>154</sup>
Yemen	General Conference of the Yemeni expatriates <sup>155</sup> and Supreme Council of Yemeni Communities (SCYC) <sup>156</sup>

### Electronic infrastructure is emerging as an engagement method within many national approaches

We found that Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kashmir, Kenya, Morocco, Sudan and Yemen all include an IT-oriented approach to engaging their diaspora within their national strategy, though it is unclear if they have been sufficiently developed for engagement or development purposes.

The scope or use of government diaspora databases in Ethiopia, Kashmir, Sudan, and Yemen is not entirely clear at present, and in some cases appears to be an ambition rather than a reality. The established resources we have identified in this area include Egypt's IMIS system, which tracks labour migration and provides a portal for migrants and diaspora members to maintain links with Egypt and access resources and information; Algeria's 'competences' database, which allows talented Algerians abroad to voluntarily register their contact details and skills and abilities; Morocco's S.I.G.R (*Système Intégré de Gestion des*

<sup>145</sup> (Migration Policy Centre, 2013a).

<sup>146</sup> (International Organization for Migration, 2013b; State Information Service, 2013).

<sup>147</sup> (Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate, 2011).

<sup>148</sup> (Republic of Kenya, 2011b).

<sup>149</sup> (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. vii).

<sup>150</sup> (Migration Policy Centre, 2013d).

<sup>151</sup> (Nigériens de l'Extérieur, 2014).

<sup>152</sup> (ICPMD - IOM, 2010, p. 11).

<sup>153</sup> (Portail des Tunisiens à l'Étranger, 2014).

<sup>154</sup> (Yurtnaç, 2012).

<sup>155</sup> (Alquhali, 2013; Presidency of the Republic of Yemen, 2010).

<sup>156</sup> (International Organization for Migration, 2013c).

*Requêtes* or integrated system for the management of applications), which supports Moroccans abroad facing legal or administrative issues;<sup>157</sup> and the database of Kenyan diaspora organisations maintained by the Kenyan embassy in Washington (Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, n.d.-a), which aims to provide a resource for better organisation of Kenyan expatriates in the US.

Other programmes, such as the UN Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme, also create and maintain databases of select – usually skilled or high-profile – diaspora members in host countries, in similar fashion to the Algerian competences initiative. For example, the Sudanese TOKTEN initiative boasts a database of 500 ‘willing expatriates’ prepared to contribute to development (United Nations Development Program, 2013b). Morocco’s Hassan II foundation also maintains data on the community of Moroccans abroad (Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger, n.d.).

While we cannot comment on the level of uptake for most of these resources, in theory they may provide a relatively low-cost mechanism through which interested diaspora members may connect with one another and their homeland, and through which countries may keep track of diaspora populations or targeted sub-sets (e.g. those with administrative, medical or other specialist capacities, or community organisations). We return to this point in our policy considerations in Chapter 9.

### *6.1.2. Economic engagement of diaspora: Country of origin diaspora engagement strategies are primarily focused on economic development, but the means they use differ in important ways*

As noted above, governments of sending countries are increasingly looking at whole-of-government or at least multi-agency approaches to diaspora engagement. The logic of this approach derives from a growing recognition that individual programmes cannot manufacture the kind of mainstream changes to national institutions required to recognise, engage and harvest the potential of diaspora populations for development across social, political and economic goals. It is worth reflecting in particular on how intertwined are the economic and security dimensions of homeland development. The use of remittances to improve economic outcomes in the homeland, the use of brain-gain policies to support skills transfer, and reforms of the financial system to encourage and support remittances and homeland investment all have potential security implications at the homeland level and in some cases at the receiving country level as well.

Nonetheless, the dominant language and apparent underlying logic in most diaspora engagement strategies, where such strategies exist, approaches diasporas as potential sources of various economic levers for development purposes. While the potential for diaspora to increase the wealth of a country of origin is broadly accepted by low and middle income nations, the methods through which that wealth might be shared or created through diaspora activity differs significantly between cases. This is reflected in the types of programmes that nations promote, in which diasporas may be treated as sources of: remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI) in business, investors in government and infrastructure (such as through diaspora

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<sup>157</sup> (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2013).

bonds), and also as mentors, trainers, trade and investment facilitators, and skilled workers who may return temporarily or permanently.<sup>158</sup>

### Remittances are centrally important to many of the selected countries' economies

A good deal of existing literature and development activities involving diasporas is focused on the strategic use of remittances. Indeed, some national economies rely significantly on remittances as a major driver of consumption and investment. World Bank data<sup>159</sup> show that in 25 countries worldwide 10% or more of GDP comes from personal remittances<sup>160</sup> alone, and in nine countries remittances account for 20% or more of GDP. Reliance on remittances is not geographically concentrated, with heavily reliant economies in South America, Europe, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.

Most remittances are received at the household level (Lum, Nikolko, Samy, & Carment, 2013) and can take the form of cash transfers, as above, as well as goods and services not accounted for in cash transfer data but may nonetheless have significant value at the individual and aggregate levels. Among other benefits – such as providing needed medication, or educational resources – Lum et al (2013) suggest that these remittances can subsequently decrease levels of violence in the homeland by improving education, training and work opportunities.

Homelands have been a primary driver of the use of remittances and other diaspora economic engagement. Indeed, the vast majority of literature reviewed primarily focuses on the role of homelands in harnessing diaspora resources for economic development. The political and economic importance of diaspora members is evidenced by homeland governments' interest in facilitating diaspora involvement. This is not a new phenomenon: in the early 1990s, for example, there were multiple cases of government officials promoting targeted campaigns to leverage diaspora members. The Grenadian Minister of Agriculture and Development visited his 'constituency in New York' to encourage involvement in supporting new agricultural development in their homeland. Similarly, Filipino migrants have been periodically approached by government representatives encouraging investment in Philippine agriculture; the Filipino President Marcos even specifically reached out to the *balikbayan* ('homecomers') in a national speech encouraging diaspora members to visit the Philippines annually (Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1992, pp. 2-4).

Notably, many of these government efforts are focused on establishing a sense of empowered potential for well-established immigrants with steady incomes and employment, emphasising to these diaspora members that they have the power and influence to sway opinion and contribute resources to the homeland population (Ibid). Former Haitian President Aristide even went so far as to refer to the 'bank of the diaspora', referencing their economic importance to Haitian development (Al-Ali et al., 2001). In

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<sup>158</sup> Some nations, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Algeria, and Yemen have also developed systems of return migration to facilitate their seasonal workers' ability to work in neighbouring or nearby states for short periods. However, given the report's focus on migration between EU/US and sending countries, these kinds of agreements are not necessarily within the scope of discussion though are worth recognising within the broader landscape of migration from these countries.

<sup>159</sup> World Bank Data: 'Personal Remittances, received (% of GDP)', for 2011 (World Bank, 2014a).

<sup>160</sup> World Bank, supra: 'Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals.'

some cases, such as Eritrea, the US and Switzerland, remittances in the form of a tax on diasporas can be a legal or quasi-formal obligation of diaspora members (Kalm, 2013).

#### **Analysis of remittances pertaining to selected case study countries**

The research team sought to obtain a more in-depth picture of remittances pertaining to the set of selected case study countries of origin and to analyse in greater detail the financial ties between these countries and their diasporas. Table 6-3 provides a quick snapshot on the pairs of countries assumed to generate noteworthy remittance traffic. The analysis below is based on remittance data comprised entirely of country-level GDP and bilateral remittance estimate figures from the World Bank's datasets (World Bank, 2012); all figures are from 2012 and are measured in US dollars. The methodologies for the World Bank's bilateral remittance dataset come from the 2007 Ratha and Shaw study, *South-South Migration and Remittances* (Ratha & Shaw, 2007).



Appendix I contains a detailed discussion of the methodology and its implications, along with additional charts and tabulations not presented in the main body of this report.

**Table 6-3. Matrix of noteworthy bilateral remittance flows**

	AUT	BEL	BGR	CRO	CYP	CZE	DEN	EST	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE	HUN	IRL	ITA	LAT	LIT	LUX	MLT	NED	POL	POR	ROM	SVK	SLO	SPA	SWE	UK	USA
AFG																													
ALG																													
DJB																													
EGY																													
ETH																													
IND																													
IRQ																													
KEN																													
MLI																													
MAR																													
NER																													
PAK																													
PHL																													
LKA																													
SDN																													
SYR																													
TUN																													
UGA																													
YEM																													

Note: A greyed field denotes the existence of a notable remittance flow. The threshold was set by the research team at 1 million USD annually

### The importance of remittances varies substantially across studied countries


The selected countries' proportion of remittances relative to overall GDP varies substantially, ranging from Iraq's inward remittances totaling less than one percent of total GDP, to the Filipino and Sri Lankan inward remittances comprising ten percent of their respective GDPs. There is also considerable variance of remittances relative to the receiving country's governmental expenditure. Sri Lanka's remittance volume relative to governmental expenditure is the largest of the priority countries, at 50%, with Uganda, Syria, Pakistan, and Egypt being the only other countries to exceed the 25% mark. There are also several countries whose remittances in relation to government expenditures are nearly insignificant, with Algeria and Iraq's proportions being 2% and 4%, respectively.

While the significance of remittances as a proportion of other sources of state-level income differs significantly across the priority countries, the significance of the EU/US based diaspora to total remittance inflows also varies substantially across priority countries. Algeria and Yemen's EU/US diaspora contributions are at the lowest end of the scale, at 7% and 9% respectively, while there are six countries who gain at least half of their overall remittances from the EU/US.<sup>161</sup> It should be noted that the Francophone Algeria and Tunisia countries are at the high end of the scale, with the volume of remittances coming from France at 76% and 47% respectively, significantly driving up the aggregate EU/US remittance figure.

<sup>161</sup> These countries are Algeria (90%), Ethiopia (50%), Kenya (71%), Morocco (89%), the Philippines (53%), and Tunisia (79%).

**A small number of receiving countries is assumed to be the point of origin of a sizable share of remittances**

Several host-countries are notable for being significant sources of remittance generated across a wide range of priority countries. Diasporas from all 18 of the diasporas for which data is available have sent home remittances of over one million USD from the United States and France, for instance, with the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK all being countries where at least 15 of the identified priority diasporas send home remittances equaling one million or more. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the largest generators of remittances amongst the selected host countries, with nearly 75% of remittance activity by the selected diasporas in the EU/US stemming from the three countries.



**The diversity of remittance source countries varies substantially across receiving countries**

Some countries receive substantial remittances from diaspora groups located in a large number of foreign countries; other countries receive remittances from a much smaller group of sources. For instance, India, which generates nearly 20 billion USD from EU/US remittances, predictably has the most diffuse penetration of countries from which its diaspora makes significant remittances, though other countries have similar penetration across the EU/US but far lower volumes of remittances. Syria, for instance, enjoys significant remittance activity across diaspora groups in 20 countries, although it is only 8<sup>th</sup> highest country in terms of the total volume of remittances generated. Additionally, there are several host countries which are proportionally very large sources of remittances for certain diasporas. As discussed above, this is the case for some remittances originating in France. The United States is a similar hub for large-scale remittances, with the Kenyan and Filipino diasporas sending 34% and 43% of total remittances from the US, respectively.<sup>162</sup>

<sup>162</sup> Total remittances in this instance refer to global remittance outflows, not just from the EU and US.

### Some countries are both significant recipients and senders at the same time

There is also significant remittance activity between priority countries. Since the World Bank uses migrant stock levels as a disaggregating weight, it is to be expected that neighbouring countries have the largest volume of remittances. For instance, 54% of Uganda's total remittances originate from Kenya, reflecting the large amount of cross-border migration and employment. Discounting priority countries who border on each other, there are other interesting trends; Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen are disproportionately frequent sources of remittance amongst the priority countries, with Sudan sending remittances of over one million to nine other priority countries, Egypt and Iraq each sending remittances of over one million to seven other priority countries, and Yemen sending remittances of the same amount to five other priority countries.

### Volume of remittances appears to be positively associated with good governance indicators

We attempted to make comparisons between remittance data and a set of political indicators of the country of origin, as developed by the World Bank in their 2013 World Governance Index (World Bank, 2013b). Our analysis revealed several interesting relationships that are either significant or border on statistical significance. For instance, there is a positive correlation ( $p=0.19$ ,  $\rho=0.67$ ) between the total of remittances as a share of total GDP with the index of rule of law in the country of origin. While our analysis does not indicate the direction of this relationship, this may suggest that countries with capable law enforcement and anti-corruption regimes may implicitly encourage their diaspora to remit. This points to a somewhat counterintuitive inference that countries with a more stable domestic system are likely to generate more remittances from their diasporas. It may be that migrants who come from countries with higher respect for the rule of law are not deterred by considerations of corruption or malpractice when remitting their earnings to the home country. This proposition, however, must be tempered by multiple words of caution. Among other possible explanations, regimes with higher rule of law ratings are also more likely to have better functioning accounting and financial systems which can measure incoming remittances more than those countries with poorer governance systems. Also, it may be that in contexts where the rule of law is minimal and corruption widespread, migrants *deliberately* send their remittances outside the formal banking system. In addition, there is a plausibly long time lag effect between how and when money is remitted and the manifestation of its potential relationship with local governance.

### Banking and transfer facilities for diaspora can be designed to encourage diaspora savings, remittances and investment

Many selected countries including Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen are all reported to have modified their systems of foreign exchange and international remittances to ensure that remittances can be completed easily, cheaply and with fair exchange rates. Kenya has gone so far as to regulate a series of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) in the UK and US (with more planned) where Kenyans abroad may facilitate remittances, purchase of goods and services for friends and family (including financial services such as insurance), and invest in real estate and property developments. Yemen has also created 'expatriate banks' which similarly are intended to decrease the cost of remittance and decrease the administrative risks associated with country of origin investment

and cash transfer. India, Tunisia, Turkey and Sri Lanka have opted to create special accounts or similar facilities within domestic banks which allow diaspora to invest or save more easily than through standard international bank transfers.

### **Most selected countries have tax systems that require little contribution from diaspora, and many offer tax breaks on repatriated income**

Most of the selected countries do not require tax to be paid by non-residents. Those members of diaspora who are intermittently resident in the home country are normally allowed to credit any income tax paid to another government against any tax they would pay at home. This type of tax regime is achieved through double taxation treaties (which ensure that citizens of a country will only be subject to taxation on income of the country in which the income was earned), as well as general national tax laws that grant exceptions to income earned overseas. On top of this general framework, about one-third of the selected countries have developed tax and import incentives for repatriation of income, remittances, or return of household and other goods.

Eritrea is a well-known exception to this convention in tax collection. While the US and Switzerland also engage in the 'rare phenomenon' of emigrant taxation (Kalm, 2013, p. 387), Eritrea's taxation practices represent a 'singular path... imposing a "voluntary tax" on emigrants' (Ibid), which asks Eritreans abroad to contribute 2% of their income to national development. The practice has come under fire recently, possibly less because of the rule itself and more due to allegations that Eritrean officials are using extortionate methods to extract tax from citizens abroad, including threats against members of diaspora families still in the homeland. Uganda is the only other of the selected countries to impose new taxes directed specifically at diaspora-related activity, instituting a series of taxes in 2013 on international remittances, mobile phone transfers and international phone calls; while these activities are not specifically limited to diaspora, the new taxes are expected to disproportionately affect diaspora members (BBC, 2013b).

On the other side of the tax-collection spectrum, Kenya issued a tax amnesty in 2011 for all unpaid tax owed by citizens in the diaspora from 2010 and prior. This appears to have been done to encourage future economic interaction between the diaspora and Kenya, as well as to achieve an account of the investment potential held in the diaspora (Business Daily, 2011). Yemen's Minister of Expatriate Affairs claims that Yemen has also done away with a number of fees previously charged to members of diaspora, which he suggests were 'arbitrarily' levied in the past (Alquhali, 2013).

### **At least half of the selected countries offer diaspora-specific investment vehicles, and most promote investment opportunities to diaspora in some form**

Our research revealed diaspora-specific investment opportunities in twelve of the selected countries, where diaspora-specific means that they include terms favourable to diaspora members particularly (normally more favourable than to other kinds of foreign investors, and potentially more favourable than to domestic investors). We identified current or recent specific investment initiatives, such as diaspora bonds or other targeted investment opportunities, in Azad Kashmir, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, as well as reference in policy or government websites to investment incentives for

diaspora in India, Mali, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.<sup>163</sup> Many countries also actively promote both specific and general opportunities; for example, Eritrea has recently held a number of investment conferences for diaspora members and Turkey organised assemblies for Turkish entrepreneurs residing abroad, in a bid to establish better links between them and their home country. Other countries develop promotional materials and guidance books for marketing investment opportunities to the diaspora.

Interestingly, while promoting investment opportunities to diaspora members including a diaspora bond, the Ugandan government has not extended tax incentives to Ugandan citizens abroad that would otherwise be enjoyed by foreign investors (allAfrica, 2013b), but this is decidedly against the pattern found in other selected countries.

### *6.1.3. Political engagement of diaspora: External voting and citizenship rights for diaspora are the norm among selected countries, but regimes differ in how these are provided*

In our research we examined three key kinds of political rights for members of the diaspora, among the countries selected by the Commission for further examination: External voting rights, dual citizenship rights, and rights for children in the diaspora.<sup>164</sup> The synthesis Table 6-1, above, provides a summary of these findings. Of course, such a summary belies some complexity, and not all external voting or citizenship rights regimes are the same in all aspects. In the following subsections, we explore in more depth the similarities and differences among the reviewed regimes.

#### **Most of the selected countries allow some form of external voting, but this does not guarantee access or participation for diaspora members**

Many of the countries examined in this section have provisions in their constitutions or relevant legislation for external voting. However, among those that allow some form of external voting procedure for citizens living outside of the country, there are usually limits to the kinds of elections in which diaspora members can participate. Based on data from the IDEA Voting From Abroad database, we found that 16 of the 25 selected countries allow voting from abroad for national elections (either or both of presidential or legislative elections), and six of those – Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan and Yemen – also have provisions for expatriate voting in referenda. Algeria also provides for voting at sub-national levels, and Algeria, Mali and India all provide proxy as well as personal voting rights for expatriates.

Some states, such as Eritrea and Afghanistan, have allowed for external voting in exceptional circumstances; in the case of Afghanistan, the 2004 Presidential elections, and in Eritrea, the 1993 independence referendum were both one-off opportunities for diaspora votes and have not been replicated

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<sup>163</sup> We recognise that in some cases a ‘diaspora bond’ may actually be available to non-diaspora investors as well, and is simply a government bond marketed to diaspora but with no specific purchasing incentives relative to other investors. Nonetheless, we include all instances of diaspora bonds identified here, since we see these as a form of engagement regardless of specific investment terms. We discuss examples of these in the country profiles found at Appendix A.

<sup>164</sup> We also looked at related rights, such as the ability of diaspora members to stand in elections, citizenship rights for partners, and the existence of elected representation for the diaspora or expatriate community in local or national legislatures. These are summarised briefly below.

in either case. Turkey recently passed a legislation allowing voting from abroad and is set to implement it for the first time during the 2014 Presidential Election (EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, 2014).

Even where countries have provisions for external voting, this is no guarantee that external voting will be available for all citizens or in each case. Yemen, for example, normally allows external voting but in its most recent presidential election could not support external voting facilities due to an exceptionally short timeline. In addition, many countries only allow voting in person at embassies, and specify a select number of embassies that will have voting facilities. Such an arrangement may deter some eligible voters from participating in the elections due to the logistical complexities and costs involved. Finally, certain countries are in 'transition' phases,<sup>165</sup> including South Sudan and Somalia, where measures to allow external voting have been brought forward but await implementation.

### **Most selected countries provide dual citizenship or similar rights to their expatriate communities**


Based on the MACIMIDE database, we found that 19 of the countries reviewed in this research allow for dual citizenship, and in many cases this is a recent policy change, with Djibouti, Iraq, Kenya, Philippines, Somalia and Uganda all adopting dual citizenship laws since 2004. Four of the selected countries – Eritrea, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen – also prohibit renunciation of home country citizenship, while all others allow for loss of citizenship.

The proportion of selected countries allowing dual citizenship is in line with overall international trends toward dual citizenship, represented below in Figure 6-1, adapted from the MACIMIDE database resource. Approximately 70% of countries worldwide allow dual citizenship in one form or another as of 2013, with the trend toward dual citizenship growing since the 1960s.

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<sup>165</sup> Cited in the IDEA Voting From Abroad database as 'in transition' as of 2012. The IDEA database identifies Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan as being 'in transition', but in the case of Eritrea more recent research has identified that external voting has been implemented (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 100).

**Figure 6-1: Worldwide rules on loss of citizenship after voluntary acquisition of other citizenship (1960-2013)**



**Source: Vink, De Groot and Luk (2013)**

However, even in those countries where dual citizenship is not possible, where individuals lose country of origin citizenship through either themselves or their parents taking other citizenship, some of the countries selected for review offer regimes opening up adequate rights to people of origin for full and stable economic and social participation. For example, India and Ethiopia have both opted against dual citizenship; however, each offer ‘origin’ identity documents for expatriates who have renounced their citizenship for whatever reason. These documents can facilitate access to many resources and facilities available to citizens, though generally limiting political rights such as the ability to vote or stand for office, as well as work in certain branches of government.

It is worth noting that two of the selected countries have specific exclusions for transfer of citizenship or similar rights, stemming from prior conflict. Sudan has specified a limit against the acquisition of dual citizenship for South Sudanese citizens, and Ethiopia denies its ‘origin’ identity card to Eritrean citizens.

### Most selected countries allow transfer of citizenship from either parent to children in the diaspora

In terms of the transfer of citizenship to children in the diaspora, all but five of the selected countries allow transfer of citizenship from either a mother or father to children in the diaspora (though regimes in Somalia and South Sudan were unclear from our research). However, a number of states impose certain limits on transfer from mother to child, while not imposing similar restrictions on transfer from the father. For example, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia all provide children of a mother with citizenship (and a foreign or stateless father) the right to choose or renounce their citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, but also impose a time limit for when the child may make this decision. Only Djibouti, Syria and Yemen limited citizenship rights to the father alone.

Ethiopia and India provide extensions of quasi-citizenship rights (for those holding ‘origin’ cards but not full citizenship), such that children of those with origin cards may enjoy the same limited suite of rights in the home country as their parents. All but two of the selected countries require at least one parent to have established citizenship for a child to gain citizenship; Uganda allows citizenship to be taken through a grandparent, and India allows the limited ‘origin’ rights to be claimed through grandparents as well.

#### *6.1.4. Cultural engagement of diaspora: Many selected countries seek to encourage identification with the homeland within broader engagement strategies*

Some countries maintain initiatives to encourage ‘affective’ ties to the homeland through funding for language, cultural and/or religious school training. While we expect all countries examined here wish to maintain such ties, not all make explicit reference within their national strategies to such a goal nor identify programmes through which this may be done, at least at national level. Nonetheless, at least ten of the selected countries were found to promote diaspora community through cultural identification with the homeland, promotion of language training, or cultural education programmes, within their national strategies. These include Algeria,<sup>166</sup> Egypt,<sup>167</sup> Eritrea, Morocco, Somalia,<sup>168</sup> Syria,<sup>169</sup> Tunisia,<sup>170</sup> Turkey<sup>171</sup> and Yemen.

In some instances where these programmes were identified, we found that they were likely a part of a broader development initiative. For example, Arts and Culture Exchange is one of the ten points of the Philippines Diaspora to Development (D2D) strategy (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014a). Similarly, Morocco’s Hassan II Foundation, which is perhaps the most substantial vehicle for promotion of homeland culture to diaspora members among selected countries, has contributed in the region of €67M to language and cultural programmes since 2009 (Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger, n.d.). This foundation is technically separate from the government but works in close partnership on many aspects of expatriate wellbeing, including economic goals and services and material support for emigrants.

Cultural engagement may also be intended to encourage support for a political position. For example, in Eritrea, the National Union Eritrean Youth and Students (NUEYS), which is closely aligned with the government and known to promote the government position, also organizes trips to Eritrea for diaspora youth to encourage national identity (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 216). Another case of politically-oriented cultural engagement is that of Turkey, whose diaspora engagement efforts are seen by scholars and practitioners as influenced by the country’s foreign policy goals (Bilgili, 2012; Yurtnaç, 2012). In particular, in a bid to employ diaspora groups as a soft power tool within host countries, Turkey opposes the assimilation of Turkish communities abroad and tries to maintain active socio-cultural and ideational

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<sup>166</sup> (Migration Policy Centre, 2013a, p. 12).

<sup>167</sup> (Dawood, 2012).

<sup>168</sup> (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 74).

<sup>169</sup> (ICPMD - IOM, 2010, pp. 14-15)

<sup>170</sup> (Ibid p. 7).

<sup>171</sup> (Yurtnaç, 2012; Desiderio & Weinar, 2014, pp. 24-25).

links with them through cultural and religious institutions (Avci, 2005; Bilgili, 2012; Bilgili & Siegel, 2011; Today's Zaman, 2012).

#### ***6.1.5. International organisations play a leading role in building homeland capacity through skills transfer programmes***

A growing body of literature highlights diverse forms of remittances and diaspora economic engagement. The IOM and MPI strategic handbook for diaspora engagement for development (Agunias & Newland, 2012) identifies 'six programme areas in which diasporas have played a positive, central role: remittances, direct investments, human capital transfers, philanthropic contributions, capital market investments, and tourism' (p. 17). While four of these – remittances, direct investments, philanthropic contributions and capital market investments – are concerned primarily with direct financial contributions by diaspora, there is a growing belief that other contributions by diaspora, including return migration, 'brain circulation' and 'virtual return'<sup>172</sup> may be just as valuable for economic development as direct financial contributions (Agunias & Newland, 2012). The latter two strategies do not require full return for diaspora members to contribute skills, knowledge, and services. The benefits to homeland include both provision of services and mentorship and training for local populations.

A number of selected countries' governments are working in partnerships with international organisations to support their migration strategies, including diaspora engagement. While we recognise that there are many potential roles for international and national NGOs in diaspora engagement for homeland development,<sup>173</sup> our research suggests that a particular role has developed for these organisations in supporting development of homeland state administrative capacity and facilitate 'brain gain' in the civil service and other key sectors, which is thought to potentially have broader peace- and stability-building effects (Simpson, 2006).

Initiatives such as the Palestinian Expatriate Professional Project (World Bank, 2014b) and the Afghanistan Expatriate Programme (AEP) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012) were both founded to support the development of skills of talented expatriates who would subsequently return to homeland civil service roles. These specific initiatives did not attract the level of diaspora engagement anticipated nor result in broad institutional change. However, upon evaluation they were thought to be potentially valuable models for development if timelines for the initiatives were extended past the short-term, and if broader support mechanisms were put in place to develop institutional capacities (Simpson, 2006).

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<sup>172</sup> 'Brain circulation' and 'virtual return' are strategies for diaspora engagement that seek to deploy diaspora members as intellectual resources for the homeland. These can include mentorship and training initiatives, short-term visits and electronic correspondence. They are attractive to diaspora members as they do not require full return to the homeland, and are in some cases backed by generous financial subsidy from the homeland government (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

<sup>173</sup> Indeed, we are aware of the extensive role played by the IOM in refugee resettlement, family reunification, and related support as well as in supporting labour-related migration activities in many of our selected countries. However, in most cases IOM and similar programmes were largely supporting migration between neighbouring or nearby states, rather than between these states and the EU or US. However, these kinds of activities did not appear as particularly significant aspects of diaspora engagement within the parameters of this report, specifically diaspora engagement within the EU and US.

The AEP had existed in a previous guise under an IOM programme called the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) project, and IOM has undertaken similar capacity-building activities through its Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, which had previously been the Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) initiative. Among selected countries, we found MIDA projects active in Sudan, Somalia and Kenya.

Similar activities have been undertaken by the UN Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme in Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Morocco and Niger among the selected countries. This initiative has also been implemented in Turkey, where it originated in 1977 (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 169). At present, however, the Turkish programme is not active anymore and transfer of knowledge initiatives are limited to the individual level (Bilgili & Siegel, 2011, p. 24). The Sudanese programme has received positive assessments regarding developing expertise at homeland level (Marzalik, 2012).<sup>174</sup> However, interestingly, a report on a similar initiative – the UNDP’s Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) in South Sudan – suggests that TOKTEN failed in the South Sudanese context (Rajan & Magidu, 2012) and the authors suggest re-examining underlying assumptions of such programmes.<sup>175</sup>

Narrower country-specific diaspora engagement initiatives may also contribute to skills development. For example, the Ethiopian Diaspora Volunteer Programme is one of a handful of volunteer medical missions that is helping the country improve its healthcare capacity, particularly around HIV/AIDS. Mali, Eritrea and the Philippines are also reported to have similar skills-transfer programmes aimed at health professionals, with the Malian programme operating under the TOKTEN rubric. Academic capacity has also been an area of diaspora engagement; for example, the TALMALI (Mali’s Talents) programme, also operating under TOKTEN was founded to broadly support research and teaching at the University of Mali (UNESCO, 2001).

We are also aware of smaller-scale NGO support of migration for development, such as a recent partnership between an Italian NGO, Svilppo, and the Malian government to support return migration of 80 Malians to an agricultural area of Mali for its development (Ministère des Maliens de l’Extérieur, 2014). We are not in a position to comment on the degree to which this kind of return migration is supported by NGOs elsewhere as it was not our specific area of inquiry; nevertheless it is worth noting that this kind of NGO activity may supplement receiving country capacity as well as sending country capacity for co-development initiatives.

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<sup>174</sup> While these examples were led by intergovernmental organisations or homelands, such an initiative could conceivably involve receiving country governments as well.

<sup>175</sup> The report’s authors were in particular concerned with rules around use of UN volunteers, which prohibit a citizen of a country to work as an international volunteer in their country of origin, which unsurprisingly hindered recruitment. We do not know the degree to which this issue has been raised in other TOKTEN settings.

## 7. A review of common recommendations and cautions put forward for diaspora engagement

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In the previous two chapters, we have provided an outline of available strategies for diaspora engagement divided along the lines of the primary strategic goal. In this chapter, we move from a description of strategies to a discussion of key messages found in available literature relating to designing and implementing of these strategies. We begin by outlining common recommendations on engagement of diaspora and migrant populations. We then examine potential cautions for engagement, first relating to intra-diaspora dynamics, and subsequently to more general barriers and drawbacks relating to engagement.

### 7.1. Recommendations found in the literature on best practices for diaspora engagement cluster around eight themes

As discussed in the methodology section above, we reviewed literature on diaspora engagement in order to take into account existing policy recommendations in the process of synthesising our research findings. Policy recommendations available from reviewed literature revolve around eight broad themes, as summarised in Table 7-1 below. Each of these themes is briefly discussed afterward, with key literature references.

**Table 7-1. Overview of recommendations in existing literature by theme**

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>Know your diaspora</b>	Diasporas are heterogeneous entities and diaspora members may have competing conceptions regarding goals and motivations for engagement. Understand the potential divisions and nuances of position between groups within a diaspora for more successful collaborations and partnerships.
<b>Carefully identify your partners</b>	Diaspora populations may have many possible points of contact, but not all will be suited to specific goals of engagement. Related to the recommendation to 'know your diaspora', governments and others seeking to engage diasporas should consider where potential partners are placed vis-à-vis the broader community and key stakeholders.
<b>Strive for equal partnerships</b>	Some studies have stressed the importance of achieving balance within partnerships with diaspora or migrant groups and organisations. Where a government or resource-rich NGO partner takes too much responsibility or control, the diaspora partner can become detached from both process and outcome.
<b>Support capacity-building</b>	Whether in direct partnership on an initiative or more broadly seeking to support diaspora communities, diaspora engagement should involve support for capacity-building within diaspora communities so that organisations can operate in a stable and more self-sufficient environment.

<b>Provide funding specific to diasporas</b>	While there are many key aspects to successful engagement, little can be accomplished without adequate funding. Non-traditional or innovative funding mechanisms may be appropriate for some engagement activities, but in whatever form, funding remains important.
<b>Build links across diasporas</b>	Separate diaspora communities or organisations may have common interests or otherwise benefit from linkages. Look for the possibilities for these kinds of partnerships within broader diaspora engagement strategies.
<b>Consider the wider policy context</b>	Engagement takes place within broader social policy initiatives, and the capacities of governments and other organisations to work with diaspora communities may be affected by government policy shifts in seemingly unrelated areas. Equally, diaspora groups may be interested in engaging in broader debates on national issues such as immigration, foreign policy and human rights, which acutely affect their members, and may both appreciate their inclusion and provide important perspectives for such debates.
<b>Learn lessons through evaluation</b>	Research on diaspora communities has recently begun to stress the importance of evaluating engagement programmes to develop and improve engagement efforts. Evaluation should be a core component of any initiative, and be considered throughout planning and implementation.

### Know your diaspora

Agunias and Newland (2012, p. 27) tell governments to ‘know your diaspora’ when seeking engagement. The vast majority of studies with policy recommendations identified in our review stressed the heterogeneous character of diaspora groups across the world and the need to take into account their context-specific characteristics. This is a message also explicitly made by Keusch and Schuster (2012) in their compendium of European good practice examples on migration and development and by Van Hear, Pieke, and Vertovec (2004) in his assessment of the contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction produced for the Department for International Development (DfID). Similarly, an analysis of diaspora partners in conflict resolution and peacebuilding by the African Diaspora Policy Centre (Sinatti et al., 2010) urged policymakers not to expect to work with a homogeneous diaspora group, highlighting the fact that diaspora groups, particularly from developing countries, are often fragmented. This message is also included among the lessons from a project in Antwerp, which stressed that the level of engagement varies per organisation and recommended a tailored approach looking at specific needs and goals of organisations (CeMIS, 2012).

Talbot’s report (2011) on working in partnership with diasporas, prepared for the UK Voluntary Service Overseas, recommended policymakers to be sensitive of cultural differences at the organisational level. Writing specifically within the development context, Chikezie and Thakrar’s outline of a diaspora engagement framework for DfID (2005) mentioned that diaspora groups have a distinctive approach that needs to be taken into account by development agencies and other stakeholders.

To overcome this challenge, OECD’s paper on policy options to work with diasporas to foster development prepared for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012) calls for collecting relevant statistics on diaspora groups such as data on migrant skills, migrants’ expectations, or determinants of return migration, a point we return to in our own policy considerations.

### Carefully identify your partners

A related challenge stemming from the heterogeneity of diaspora groups is identifying the most suitable partner for engagement. In their report on the Somali Muslim community in England, the Change Institute (2009) concluded that the best partners are community organisations that are able to engage with both authorities and communities. In the development context, Chikezie and Bala (2005) suggested

that the most reliable indicator of suitability as an interlocutor is a group's ability to facilitate their members' views and interests. The authors identified a selection of 'support networks', such as the Confederation of Indian Organisations and the Asian Foundation for Philanthropy, with whom engagement would presumably allow policymakers to reach a wide variety of stakeholders and groups within the diaspora. The authors also highlighted differences in how diasporas approach development issues versus how such issues are 'mainstreamed' by policymakers; for instance, the African diaspora places more emphasis on ethnicity and religion when organising development initiatives, while policymakers often assume that other forms of ideology are more important to the organisation of the African diaspora. Having a more granular understanding of how diaspora organisations can mobilize and influence diaspora members was found to be much more significant than who the group claims to represent.

### **Strive for equal partnerships**

Once suitable partners are identified, a recurrent theme across the reviewed literature is the desirability to establish the working partnership with diaspora representatives on an equal basis. One way to achieve that is to make diaspora co-owners of mutual projects (Keusch & Schuster, 2012) (Civil Society Day 2007) and, according to a report on the African diaspora in Europe and their impact on democracy building in Europe, involve them in a structured way in undertaken initiatives and processes (Awil, 2009). Similarly, in the context of English Somali communities, the Change Institute (2009) called for direct recognition of the diaspora group in local consultations and other decision making fora. Of course, as Chikezie and Bala (2005) pointed out, the establishment of equal partnerships is a two-way process and both policymakers and diaspora groups should be more facilitating towards the other party.

### **Support capacity-building**

Recognising that diaspora groups likely face basic constraints on their activities and capabilities, numerous recommendations made in the reviewed literature revolve around capacity building efforts. This, in connection with frequent consultation, is one of CoMiDe's suggestions (Keusch & Schuster, 2012). Similarly, bolstering capabilities of decentralized cooperation between sending countries and local governments in the receiving country, along with harnessing new technologies to facilitate information within diasporas and with their countries of origin, is recommended by the OECD. At the same time, Civil Society Day (2007) argue that the onus is on diaspora organisations to take responsibility for developing a full range of their capabilities and consider this an issue of leadership and management.

### **Provide funding specific to diasporas**

Efforts to boost diaspora organisations' capacities are inextricably linked to the question of funding. Civil Society Day (2007) explicitly called for governments and funders interested in international development to earmark resources specifically for diasporas and migrant groups. On a similar note, Awil (2009) suggested establishing funds to promote good governance and democratization initiatives run by diaspora organisations. The Change Institute (2009) pointed out that diaspora organisations often compete for funding with other diaspora groups and called for more targeted funding and capacity building activities accessible by all interested parties. Finally, acknowledging limitations and constraints on traditional types of cooperation and funding, ADPC (Sinatti et al., 2010) urged diaspora advocates to think beyond existing modes of engagement and devise innovative models of collaboration. While not explicitly

mentioned by ADPC, social investment, discussed in greater detail in section 9.2.8 might be an example of such an arrangement.

### **Build links across diasporas**

Several authors recognised that diaspora groups and organisations may create networks and working relationships which can lead to more effective forms of engagement. This observation, for instance, is made by Van Hear et al. (2004) who urged policymakers to build on linkages across diasporas. The same conclusion was reached by Civil Society Day (2007), though the authors argued that the responsibility rests with diaspora organisations to combine forces with fellow diasporas on national, regional and global levels.

### **Consider the wider policy context of engagement**

Finally, diaspora engagement does not occur in isolation; rather, it is a product of the wider policy context. Several authors discussed the ability of policymakers to contribute to a more effective engagement by promoting policies of great interest and importance to migrant and diaspora groups. For instance, CoMiDe (Keusch & Schuster, 2012) listed human rights protection of migrants and authorization of dual citizenship, to name but a few. Similarly, a report for the European Commission on the linkage between migration and development (A.R.S. Progetti s.r.l., 2007) recommended, among other suggestions, working to promote legal and fruitful labour migration while focusing on low-skilled migration.

### **Learn lessons through evaluation**

Several studies stressed the importance of learning and capturing lessons from on-going engagement projects. One of the recommendations put forward by CoMiDe (Keusch & Schuster, 2012) was to promote project evaluation amongst participating organisations. At a more fundamental level, ADPC (Sinatti et al., 2010) advised policymakers to critically assess the value added derived from engaging diasporas. As we discuss below, this has not previously been a priority area for government-led engagement with diaspora groups.

#### ***7.1.1. The evaluation culture regarding diaspora engagement initiatives is either weak or non-existent in both sending and receiving countries***

Within the reviewed literature, there is no comparative analysis of ‘what works, where and for whom’ based on formal evaluations, though the literature provides many principles and examples regarding ‘best practice’ based on broad-based qualitative studies. We recognise that many programmes, particularly those with support of international organisations such as the UN or IOM, produce review and evaluation reports valuable for understanding what has worked in a given case or set of related cases. We also reported in our review of receiving country strategies that some programmes had been evaluated, though systematic evaluations are not yet the norm. Where they are produced, evaluations are usually stand-alone studies, and only limited work has been done to synthesise existing knowledge in an evidence-led manner.

A number of relatively recent studies have been commissioned with the explicit purpose of identifying best practices for diaspora engagement, and these are largely focused on the potential of diaspora groups for homeland development and peacebuilding (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Feron & Ornert, 2011; Ionescu). While many of their recommendations have been reiterated in multiple sources, and are

reflected in our review of recommendations above – and most appear at face value reasonable, sensible, consistent and coherent with one another – we have not been able to identify strong systematic evidence that they are effective when implemented, or that tracking has been put in place to assess outcomes and effects where recommendations have been followed.

Further, except on a very small scale (e.g. Lukes et al. (2009), which discusses the experience of two diaspora groups in the UK trying to influence hostland policy), within the body of literature reviewed we did not encounter comparative studies examining the relationship between diaspora organisations and receiving country governments or assessing the quality of engagement strategies in comparative terms. Consequently, a systematic assessment of what works across cases is not possible at present.<sup>176</sup>

## **7.2. Intra-diaspora dynamics may affect capacities and strategies for engagement**

Both our survey work, reported in subsequent chapters, and our literature review identified certain dynamics that may create schisms between various segments of a diaspora population as well as affect the ways in which certain diaspora members view their relationship with the homeland. Indeed, a key recommendation identified in Section 7.1 is to ‘know your diaspora’, and this is a point we return to again in our own recommendations in Chapter 9. Diasporas are heterogeneous entities, and the relationships and divisions between different segments of a diaspora may affect the capacity of engagement initiatives to connect with these populations. Important factors may include the potential for transportation of divisions from the sending to the receiving country context such as class, ethnic, political and religious divides, and the effects of timing of migration from the sending country – for example, whether a member of the diaspora migrated for economic reasons or owing to conflict or instability. We also note that factors associated with the receiving country may introduce new divisions in diaspora groups, related, for example, to levels of prosperity and integration achieved by migrants. We explore these factors in the following subsections.

### ***7.2.1. Divisions in the diaspora may persist from the homeland or emerge through new hostland contexts***

Internal dynamics of the diaspora are shaped by cross-cutting factors that stem from both home country origins and host country situations. Diaspora groups often carry homeland divisions with them through the migration process. These divisions may be expressed in multiple ways, with some transferring directly to new communities and others adapting to receiving country contexts. Additionally, positions and

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<sup>176</sup> In this context, there have been limited efforts to draw lessons across cases for receiving country governments. The Change Institute (2008b) study on counter-radicalisation interventions with civil society, including Muslim, groups across the EU is a notable exception. It provides broad-based and possibly transferable lessons relating to security-oriented diaspora engagement, based on empirical evidence derived from case studies in multiple countries. However, it is worth remembering that faith-based organisations are not the same as diaspora organisations, though they may share similar characteristics. Further, security-oriented engagement, while possibly having cultural and economic components, may differ in tone and content from other forms of diaspora engagement.

pressures in the hostland society may introduce entirely new points of tension for diaspora groups, both within and between countries of settlement.

Dynamics within a diaspora may stem from a variety of societal divisions that are sustained from their country of origin. Factors such as religious or political affiliation may determine which diaspora members associate with each other and feel a sense of shared identity. Divisions stemming from homeland class structures may also be carried over to migrants' new communities. This is true for the Afghan diaspora, whose socioeconomic divisions – for example around urban/rural residency or royal/non-royal blood ties – have carried over to new communities abroad (Sadat, 2008, p. 335). Similar patterns have been found in the Iranian diaspora, for example (McAuliffe, 2008, p. 68).

Migrants' ability to successfully integrate with their host societies may introduce additional divisions to diaspora communities. Sadat points out that 'personal characteristics such as age, language proficiency, transferability of skills, and education levels' may all influence migrants' ability to adjust and thrive in their new communities (Sadat, 2008, p. 335). Some migrants' adoption of new cultural norms may also contribute to tensions within diaspora communities, particularly when home- and host-country norms are highly divergent (Pnina Werbner, 2004).

The influence of host country context should not be underestimated as a mediating factor in shaping intra-diaspora dynamics. Scholars have pointed out that both local and national contexts are significant in influencing migrants' self-identification along particular ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic lines (George, 2011; Gibau, 2005; Sadat, 2008; Wahlbeck, 2002). Diaspora members in different countries may be received in very different ways, with greater or lesser opportunities for integration with their new communities. Opportunities for integration can vary by country, as is the case with Kurdish and Afghan populations who experience widely varying economic and social reception in countries of settlement (Sadat, 2008, p. 333; Wahlbeck, 2002, p. 233). This point is also reiterated in our analysis of mapping data, which reinforces the differences between members of the same diaspora across different countries.

### *7.2.2. Divisions in diasporas are also informed by the nature and timing of the migration process*

Intra-diaspora dynamics may also be informed by the nature and timing of the migration process itself. Different migration waves can create 'cohorts' within the diaspora which are characterised by varying homeland experiences and migration motivations. Generational differences may also influence members' balance of connections to their home- and hostland societies.

The timing of migration can be a strong cross-cutting factor in diaspora populations. Different migrant cohorts may leave their home country for very different reasons, resulting in varied relationships with the homeland and with other diaspora cohorts. This issue has been identified in studies of the South Asian, Cuban, and Cape Verdean diasporas (Baldassar & Pyke, 2013; Berg, 2009; Duarte, 2005; Garapich, 2007; Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009). For example, those who left their homelands during a time of conflict may differ in their relationships to the homeland compared to those who left for economic or other reasons, and they may not identify with one another in the host society context. Migrant cohorts can be particularly strong within diasporas emerging from conflict situations, as the time of migration

may play a key role in establishing to which refugee group an individual belongs (Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009, p. 26).

Power dynamics, and in some cases divisions, may also emerge between 'old' and 'new' generations within the diaspora group (Sawyer, 2008, p. 100). In the South Asian diaspora, for example, there has been a wave of creative works by diaspora members that focus on intra-family tensions between an older, more traditional generation and their second-generation children who have strong cultural allegiances to new communities of residence (Pnina Werbner, 2004, p. 901). This difference in diaspora members' cultural orientation can translate into strongly divergent views and relationships with their country of origin.

### *7.2.3. Internal dynamics influence and mediate diaspora members' engagement with their homelands*

Internal dynamics influence both the desire and the ability of migrants to engage with their homeland. Personal views, including political affiliation, may determine how diaspora members wish to interact with the government or conflict in their home country. At the same time, personal characteristics may impact practical access to transnational opportunities, alternately constraining or empowering migrants' ability to engage with the wider diaspora.

A number of characteristics may determine migrants' desires to engage with their homeland and the transnational diaspora as an entity. Group characteristics, such as religious and ethnic background, may influence how migrants were treated in their homeland. In the case of the Iranian diaspora, Muslim migrants are much more likely to cultivate a transnational Iranian identity than their Baha'i counterparts, who tend to identify themselves as part of a religious rather than a national diaspora (McAuliffe, 2008, p. 77). A similar divergence has been observed between Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Assyrians in England: while Arabs (the majority ethnic group) express a strong desire to return to Iraq, Assyrians (a minority ethnic group) do not feel as strongly connected to an Iraqi homeland and are more likely to settle abroad permanently (Ghorashi & Boersma, 2009, pp. 675-676).

Political views are another powerful source of division within the diaspora. Diaspora communities often bring with them the full spectrum of political agendas and sectarian tensions that exist in the homeland (Conrad, 2006, p. 252; Pnina Werbner, 2002, p. 131). Political affiliation is particularly central for diaspora groups whose migration was shaped by conflict or regime change in the homeland. In the Iranian diaspora, for example, many members see political identity as 'the key defining factor in the way they initially related to Iran and position themselves outside Iran.' (Ghorashi & Boersma, 2009, p. 672). Similarly, the Eritrean diaspora experienced a significant political split following the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean conflict, with the subsequent regime dividing diaspora allegiances into pro- and anti-government camps (Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009, p. 37). Migrants' origins may also determine how political views are realised through transnational engagement. In the Kurdish diaspora, for example, origins in multiple states (Iran, Iraq and Turkey) result in widely variant allegiances and perspectives on how Kurds should assert themselves in different national conflicts (Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009, p. 16).

Individual characteristics can also constrain migrants' practical access to opportunities for transnational engagement. The role of gender, for example, may influence migrants' employment choices and their subsequent access to broader social networks. Fikes has observed that African women in the diaspora tend

to obtain jobs conducted primarily in seclusion (such as janitors, nannies and cooks), while men are more likely to engage in jobs such as construction or carpentry that give them access to wider diasporic social networks (Fikes, 2008, pp. 54-55).

The 'digital divide' may also influence how migrants are able to adapt and engage with both hostland and homeland. The role of online communities in asserting diasporic identities has been highlighted by numerous scholars, but access and understanding of this technology may depend heavily on migrants' age and socioeconomic status (Benítez, 2006, p. 187; Conrad, 2006). As stated before, legal status is another mediating factor with practical consequences for transnational engagement, as those with established legal status may have the capacity to travel more freely and thus maintain heightened links with their home country.

#### *7.2.4. These findings reinforce the importance of approaching diasporas as heterogeneous entities*

Recognising the complex sphere of intra-diaspora dynamics is important in understanding how diasporas self-identify and assert their views on a national or international level. Heterogeneity within the diaspora is a strong mediating factor that helps determine the presence and extent of community unity and activism (Garapich, 2007, p. 3; Kleist, 2008, p. 320). Moreover, identities of diaspora members and groups are not static, but instead may shift or splinter with new waves of migration or changes in the homeland.

For a given diaspora group, there is no single unified identity or political stance. This is particularly true for diasporas emerging from homeland conflict and more likely to be 'characterised by social heterogeneity and internal antagonism.' (Berg, 2009, p. 284). The diverse characteristics of diaspora populations shape the interactions of their members, both with each other and with their home- and hostland societies. In order to develop strategies for engagement, it is thus critical to understand the intra-diaspora dynamics that inform the identification and allegiances of diaspora members.

Diversity within the diaspora does not mean that diaspora members do not often have shared identities, goals and transnational agendas. However, any understanding of diaspora engagement should take into account the varying perspectives of sub-groups formed by personal and political characteristics. In other words, 'rather than automatically considering the diaspora to be united, it is more useful to view diasporas as moral and political communities that can in certain contexts be mobilised towards certain common goals' (Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009, p. 9). This nuanced consideration of diaspora enables a more realistic and useful assessment of their varying engagement strategies and desires.

### **7.3. While diaspora engagement can be beneficial for home and host societies, it requires consideration of potential concerns**

The literature and trends in policy at both sending and receiving country levels are broadly supportive of engagement with diaspora populations as an important area of government activity going forward. While we recognise the potential benefits of engaging diasporas, we also recognise that literature and reports of the practical implementation of engagement initiatives highlight some areas for consideration both in advance of and during engagement activities.

### *7.3.1. There are potential barriers to engagement at the receiving country level*

One barrier to engagement may relate to the composition of a diaspora within a receiving country, and in particular the status of its members in that society. Depending on the diaspora organisation, its members may seek to avoid direct or regular contact with receiving country governments where participants in the diaspora organisation are illegal migrants, asylum seekers or refugees whose status in the host society is in question or problematic (Bloch, 2007).<sup>177</sup>

Equally, as reported in the mapping section of this report, diaspora populations are also often hard to identify, let alone approach, through information currently available at the receiving country level. Issues surrounding how statistics are kept on both migration and ethnicity, and the need for distinctions between ‘migrant’ and ‘diaspora’ groups often make the identification of appropriate points of entry to diaspora communities complicated for interested local and national governments. Established diaspora organisations may represent links with the community, but the presence of intra-diaspora dynamics as described above suggests that diaspora organisations are unlikely to be representative of a ‘whole’ diaspora population.

Another barrier to engagement identified by prior research was a lack of knowledge within diaspora organisations and communities regarding available funding for diaspora initiatives (Trans & Vammen, 2011). In other cases (Lukes et al., 2009; The Change Institute, 2008b), the issue of uncertainty to and changes in funding structures for diaspora and related community organisations was highlighted as negatively impacting diaspora engagement through destabilising or disrupting existing diaspora organisation activities. These are points we return to in our survey results.

### *7.3.2. There are potential drawbacks to engagement at the receiving country level*

There are also instances where receiving country engagement with diaspora groups may be inadvisable – at least, the potential consequences should be considered beforehand. Some of these consequences are related to pre-existing intra-diaspora dynamics. In particular, issues may arise where receiving country governments, or certain other receiving country political representatives such as members of the opposition, engage with diaspora groups through supporting the demands of a specific diaspora group against either rival factions within the same diaspora (Bloch, 2008; Collyer, 2006), or supporting diaspora demands against other states (Baser & Swain, 2009).

In certain cases, support of this sort will be in line with a state’s existing foreign policy, but in others the position of the diaspora may be out of touch with the homeland realities and the foreign policy intervention may be counterproductive, as discussed below relating to Armenian lobbying in the US. Moreover, competition between diaspora groups for receiving country support can have the effect of creating violent conflict in the receiving country between these groups, as has happened in multiple EU cities in relation to Turkish and Kurdish activism (Miall, 2011).

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<sup>177</sup> Bloch (2007) discusses the particular challenges of conducting research with refugees, asylum seekers, and ‘hidden’ populations, noting that attempts to contact certain migrant populations for research to support social service or health provision have been resisted or avoided by those whose position in the host society is vulnerable to state action.

In addition, available literature on engagement for counter-radicalisation has noted that efforts to engage ethnic or religious minorities for security purposes can send signals that the group is being profiled, that the group is believed to include persons who present a risk to the community, or that community organisations are being co-opted by state interests. This kind of signal can impact on the group members' feelings of belonging in a society as well as their beliefs about the consequences of association within their community. In turn, this unintended consequence may weaken social organisations in already marginalised communities, which is often contradictory to the aims of the initial engagement (The Change Institute, 2008b).

Further, engagement strategies such as encouraging return migration or diaspora assistance in development may not be welcomed by all diaspora members or homeland groups for a number of reasons. First, strategies may overlook the often traumatic experience of return migration for many diaspora members. Diaspora members often have ambiguous relationships with their homelands both in general and individual terms, whereby diaspora members maintain affective and material connections to the homeland but also seek to integrate and settle in the receiving country. In some cases this is due to their knowledge that reintegration into their home society, even with the intention of supporting reconstruction or peace efforts, may be received with hostility (Al-Ali et al., 2001). Particularly in the cases of those who have escaped their homelands during periods of conflict, diaspora members can on their return be treated as outsiders or, potentially, as betrayers of responsibility, as has been the case for example in Bosnian return since 1995 (Al-Ali et al., 2001).

Secondly, diaspora members may prefer their lives in their host societies. Al-Ali et al. (2001) cite research showing a preference for non-return among many diaspora populations including Haitians, Salvadoreans, and Eritreans, not only because of potential personal risks of return but also, pragmatically, the quality of life in their host society is simply more desirable for the individual. Where migrants leave a homeland that is undesirable for them, return migration programmes may be viewed as unwelcome, especially where these are connected to wider anti-immigration campaigns. Where this is the case, such strategies may discourage, or be viewed as negative forms of, engagement. Indeed, De Haas (2006, p. ii) suggests that 'dual agendas' of homeland development and receiving country anti-migration will be recognised and avoided by diasporas.

Finally, it is worth noting that some groups at the homeland level have expressed fears regarding the consequences of homeland dependence on diaspora contributions, including remittances. Rather than being considered beneficial, diaspora contributions are seen by some in the homeland as promoting instability in homeland growth, largely because remittance flows are unpredictable and unstructured (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011; Cisterino, 2011). For example, recent research involving the Somali diaspora in homeland development efforts suggests that some Somali residents felt diaspora members were taking Somali jobs or were out-of-touch with homeland realities, and that support of the diaspora by western governments may engender distrust or otherwise hinder development efforts (The Guardian, 2012).

### *7.3.3. Diaspora involvement in homeland affairs is not always peace- or development-oriented.*

While we recognise potential peace-building or neutral roles for diasporas relative to homeland conflict, we also understand that, particularly in countries where conflict is current or recent, diasporas are seen by some as ‘peace-wreckers’ (Smith & Stares, 2007). Certain diasporas, often well-organised in specific host countries, may fund – and thus fuel – on-going conflict through remittances and donations to rebel and insurgent groups, rival political factions, and so on. This has been the case with many conflicts including in Turkey, Sri Lanka, Ireland, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Hall & Kostic, 2009; Lum et al., 2013; Makarenko, 2012; Turner, 2008).

Sometimes, financial support for homeland conflict can be unwitting or unwilling; for example, Sri Lankan diaspora members who were unwilling to support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were threatened with retribution against family members living in Sri Lanka (Makarenko, 2012, p. 32). However, we also recognise that there may be knowing and willing support for conflict in the homeland by other diaspora groups and individuals. While in these examples receiving country governments were not promoting this activity, it is important to recognise this aspect of the range of diaspora activity (although, as Turner [2008, p. 8] notes, diaspora remittances generally represent a ‘tiny amount’ of the funding for militant groups).

Diasporas may also potentially derail peace processes and negotiations (Hall & Kostic, 2009) and can apply pressure on their receiving country governments to support policies that make it difficult for homeland groups to engage in reconciliation, such as economic sanctions against home or rival states, until a particular outcome is achieved. This is a form of engagement that can maintain conflicts, even when these receiving country policies are intended to support a just resolution to conflict. This has been the case, for example, with the Armenian diaspora in the US, who are thought by some to have stalled the reconciliation processes between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan through influencing US foreign policy towards Turkey and Azerbaijan in potentially detrimental ways (Baser & Swain, 2009).

Due to cases like these – whether or not diasporas can be shown to actually be a major cause for continued or renewed conflict – diasporas have been dubbed by some as ‘long-distance nationalists’ (Anderson & Kligman, 1992), and in such instances may be perceived by critics as acting irresponsibly toward a homeland population often less committed to a particular cause – such as independence, reparation, or recognition – than its diaspora counterpart. This perception is said to stem from the particular composition of diasporas, which often include refugees and asylum-seekers who may be at odds with the homeland regime. These individuals may take leadership positions as diaspora advocates and may find it easier than homeland residents to hold hard-line views on the homeland, both due to the factors that moved them away from the homeland and due to their likely distance from the consequences of articulating their views (Ibid). A number of empirical academic studies since the late 1990s have shown that diasporas can indeed have these wide-ranging impacts, both on foreign policy and in supporting and potentially extending conflict situations (Lum et al., 2013).

In contrast to the body of literature emphasising the abilities of diasporas to extend or exacerbate conflict, we would re-emphasise that there are also counter-discourses that contrast the image of diasporas as ‘negative security risks’ with an image as ‘potential partners in peace-building’, especially in transitional or

post-conflict situations (Turner, 2008). Diaspora participation in homeland politics can be seen as either 'interference' or 'engagement' from the perspective of homeland governments, and the position of both diasporas and governments on this matter remains largely ambiguous and context-specific (Dijkink & Van Der Welle, 2009). In this sense, transnational political participation should not be seen as fundamentally positive or negative as a tool for engagement, but rather a potential mechanism for both positive and negative political outcomes at the homeland level.

## 8. Survey and interview results and analysis

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### 8.1. Our survey of diaspora organisations provides insight into important differences between different kinds of diaspora organisations

In the following chapter we provide an analysis of our survey results and findings from our follow-up interviews with survey respondents. Our survey was designed to understand the views and preferences of diaspora organisations regarding engagement with external partners, particularly with host society governments, as well as with homeland governments, international organisations and civil society groups. Our survey provides quantitative and qualitative indicators of these organisations' levels of, satisfaction with, and goals for engagement with these various institutions. As diasporas are notably complicated populations to access, the survey also required thoughtful approaches to identifying and contacting potential survey respondents, involving desk research, respondent referrals (snowballing) and working through key stakeholder groups to facilitate initial contacts. Information collected through this exercise provides a basis on which we can start to differentiate among different types of diaspora organisations, based on key organisational characteristics that may inform the shape and direction of engagement activities.

In the previous chapter, we outlined a typology suggesting that diaspora engagement by receiving countries could be subdivided into roughly three categories of orientation: political/security engagement, economic engagement, and cultural/social engagement. In turn, when designing our survey instrument, we wanted to understand whether or not diaspora organisations also clustered around these kinds of activities; in other words, whether organisations were political, economic, or cultural/social in orientation. To the degree that these do represent meaningful distinctions between types of organisations, we then wanted to determine if, and in what ways, these types of organisations may differ among one another in what they seek to achieve and how they go about doing so.

Below, we examine the relevance of this typology while also uncovering other distinctions relating to the orientation of diaspora organisations and the potential implications of characteristics – such as organisational size, age, focus and levels of engagement on organisational activities, partnerships and levels of satisfaction. We also categorised respondents by type of activity to better understand whether some organisations had activities and interests more aligned with the aim of engaging with a particular partner, such as the home country, than others.

We first outline a quantitative analysis of categorical and continuous variables from survey responses, and then complement this with a qualitative analysis of free-text responses and follow-up interviews with

survey respondents.<sup>178</sup> We close the chapter with considerations of transferability of our results to the broader population of diaspora organisations, which provides a foreground for our synthesis and recommendations in subsequent chapters.

Lastly, before we present our findings, we feel it is important to stress the limitations of the undertaken analysis, stemming largely from the fact that respondents to our survey were not selected using random sampling methods. The population of diaspora organisations and its parameters are unknown; therefore, it cannot be reasonably estimated how representative our sample is. This limitation introduces potential bias to our analysis and constrains our ability to make statistical inferences.

### 8.1.1. Quantitative analysis of survey responses

#### Respondents' characteristics

Our survey questionnaire was accessed in 219 instances, of which, after consolidating several cases of multiple entries by the same organisation, 53 responses were deemed sufficiently complete and thus suitable for analysis.<sup>179</sup> In addition, the survey responses generated a further eight follow-up interviews. Respondents to our survey represent organisations serving over 25 separate diaspora communities,<sup>180</sup> with 32 of the respondents representing diasporas from the sending countries selected for in-depth review. Just under one-third of respondents were based in the US, three represented diaspora groups settled in high-income countries outside the EU or US,<sup>181</sup> and the remaining two-thirds were based in EU Member States. Table 8-1 presents the composition of survey respondents from the perspective of countries of origin, while Table 8-2 shows the breakdown of their current geographical locations.

**Table 8-1. Breakdown of survey respondents by country of origin**

Country of origin	Per cent
Country selected for in-depth analysis	60%
Other country of origin	25%
Unable to determine	15%

Note: N=53

<sup>178</sup> Please note that the presentation of quantitative survey results contains only high-level main messages. A comprehensive repository of survey data, including additional detailed breakdowns of selected indicators, is given in Appendix G.

<sup>179</sup> Responses to the survey were designed as optional, which enabled respondents to access and view the questionnaire without having to answer any questions. As a result, we are unable to state whether non-completion was a result of an inability to or unwillingness to provide answers. Responses were deemed suitable for analysis if they included, at a minimum, a complete description of the organisation's activities and/or information on the frequency and nature of their engagement with policymakers and other stakeholders.

<sup>180</sup> Some of our respondents represented organisations that have an 'umbrella' function and may thus represent more than one organisation in real terms; however, it is not possible to determine precisely which organisations had multiple constituent groups. It is more important to recognise that this may be an aspect of many of these organisations, since in a sense they are 'representative' organisations of often unknown populations and sub-groups.

<sup>181</sup> We recognise that the inclusion of these respondents is beyond the geographical remit of the study. Nevertheless, we consider these responses relevant as they provide an insight from contexts similar to the European Union and the United States.

**Table 8-2. Breakdown of survey respondents by receiving country**

Receiving country	Per cent
EU Member State	57%
United States	30%
Outside EU/US	6%
Unable to determine	7%

Note: N=53

*Most organisations providing responses were under 10 years old, with few staff or volunteers*


In terms of size and age, just under three-fifths (58%) of our respondents represented organisations in operation for ten years or less, but nine in ten of these had existed for over two years (see Table 8-3). Almost all (91%) had between zero and ten paid staff, and most (67%) had between zero and 20 volunteers. However, about 70% of organisations reported having a membership of over 100, with about one in four organisations claiming a membership of over 500 people.

**Table 8-3. Age of organisations represented by survey respondents**

Age of organisations	Per cent
Less than two years	5%
Two to five years	25%
Six to ten years	28%
11 to 20 years	19%
More than 20 years	23%

Note: N=43

**Figure 8-1. Breakdown by numbers of paid staff, volunteers and members**



Note: N=43

*Most organisations providing responses were social/cultural in orientation, but most also engaged in activities across economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres*

As noted in the methodology section, we had designed the survey to differentiate between types of organisation types, and were able to determine whether a diaspora organisation was primarily political, economic, or social/cultural in orientation by examining both its stated purpose and its spread of activities. Based on analysis of self-reported organisational purpose, we found that just over half (54%) of our survey respondents represented social/cultural organisations, and about one-fifth (19%) were economic-oriented organisations. A further 19% could be classified as predominantly political organisations,<sup>182</sup> and 9% of respondents did not provide a description of their primary activities. This breakdown is captured in Table 8-4 below.

**Table 8-4. Respondent organisations by their self-reported mission**

Type of organisation	Per cent
Political	19%
Economic	19%
Social/cultural	53%
Mission not indicated	9%

Note: N=53

We then re-analysed these organisations' classifications by the kinds of activities in which they reported being involved, and found similar patterns overall.<sup>183</sup> This was done by creating a 'score' for each sub-category of activities, and then determining which axis of activities scored highest for each organisation.<sup>184</sup> Based on balance of activities, some of the organisations appeared to have multiple priority areas of activity and were thus considered 'blended', carrying the potential for classification along two or all of the possible categories.

<sup>182</sup> It should be noted that the group of 'political' organisations includes entities almost entirely devoted to dealing with acute problems related to refugees and asylum-seekers, in partnership with international organisations such as UNHCR. While these might almost be considered a distinct group possibly labelled 'humanitarian,' we opted for their inclusion in the 'political' group due to their relatively small number (they represented the final 8% of the sample) and to keep the classification of organisations consistent with our theoretical framework outlined in Table 5-2.

<sup>183</sup> As the category 'humanitarian' was not considered in the initial survey design, we could not account for such a classification in the typology by activity type analysis.

<sup>184</sup> To determine the score, we divided each activity into the four broad categories. An organisation would be awarded maximum score in a given category if all activities were ticked.

**Table 8-5. Respondent organisation by their self-reported activity**

Type of organisation	Per cent
Political	11%
Economic	17%
Social	24%
Cultural	21%
Political/Social	4%
Political/Cultural	4%
Social/Cultural	15%
Unable to determine	4%

Note: N=53

The breadth of activities undertaken by surveyed diaspora organisations is well demonstrated in Table 8-6 below, which captures the proportion of respondents who indicated that their organisation is involved in one of the ten most frequently mentioned activities, ranged in a descending order by their frequency.

**Table 8-6. Ten most frequently undertaken activities among respondents**

Activity	Per cent
Social events for members	73.6
Engaging with the media	56.6
Assistance for those seeking employment	54.7
Social events for diaspora member	52.8
Social events for all	52.8
Intercultural events	52.8
Raising awareness of rights in receiving country	50.9
Skills training	50.9
Lobbying government of receiving country for policy change	43.4
Encourage voting in receiving country	39.6

Note: N=53

Since we did not ask for the *volume* of activities but rather the *presence* of each activity within the broader organisational domain, we prefer for further analysis to classify organisations based on their stated main mission where one was stated, and have only used this secondary classification system where no main mission was stated in the survey. Nonetheless, this secondary analysis of organisational type by activity shows that these organisations are often integrated into various aspects of their communities and tend to offer broad services of importance to diaspora and migrant populations. Moreover, as we will see in the qualitative analysis below, some of those organisations who have a relatively limited scope of activity at present may also be seeking an expansion of capacity in the future into new areas, subject to support from external partners.

### Respondents' perspectives on engagement

*Economic organisations showed a tendency to focus on home country engagement, while other organisations tended to emphasize benefits from engagement at receiving country level*

Survey respondents were asked to comment on what benefits may exist for their organisation or initiative from engaging and collaborating with various governments and other stakeholders. There were several notable differences among the three types of organisations with respect to this question, as summarised in Table 8-7 below. For instance, a larger share of economic organisations identified several types of benefits in collaborating with their home government, and, conversely, less often saw benefits in engaging with various bodies of host governments.<sup>185</sup> As a result, diaspora organisations with economic focus might be most receptive to and interested in initiatives involving their home governments. By contrast, political organisations indicated awareness-raising more often in relation to several sectors of host governments.

**Table 8-7. Differences in perception of benefits derived from engagement**

Type of organisation	Frequently cited benefit (80%+ of respondents)
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raise awareness about your activities (social, health, <b>education and police</b> services of host government)</li> <li>• Influence activities and policies (health services of host government)</li> <li>• Exchange information (education services of host government)</li> <li>• <b>Create opportunities for your members (education services of host government)</b></li> </ul>
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Influence activities and policies (home government)</b></li> <li>• <b>Gain support for your activities (home government)</b></li> </ul>
Sociocultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence activities and policies (health services of host government)</li> </ul>

Note: Only included instances where at least five organisations of a given type identified at least one benefit from engaging with a given partner. Bold items indicated cases where the difference between the highest value and the second type of organisation was at least 25% percentage points.

The observed greater orientation of economic organisations on their home governments was matched by differences in levels of engagement across all three types of entities. Respondents were asked to rate the frequency of their engagement with various stakeholders on a scale from 0 (never) to 10 (always); mean values are given in Table 8-8 below. Economic organisations reported a higher level of engagement with their home governments than the other two types of organisations and a lower level of engagement with every sector of host governments with the exception of ‘other services.’

**Table 8-8. Average levels of engagement with various partners by organisation type**

Type of organisation	Home country government	Host country government	Other partners
Political	2.10	4.55	6.31
Economic	5.67	4.05	6.67
Sociocultural	3.38	3.27	6.33
N	48	49	50

Note: Scored on a scale from 0 to 10.

Higher levels of engagement between economic organisations and home governments were also matched by higher levels of reported satisfaction with this collaboration. A similar scale 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) was utilised and results are summarised in Table 8-9. By contrast, of all three types

<sup>185</sup> We offered respondents several options to specify which part of host governments they engage with. The options were: social services, health services, education services, police and legal services, and other services. Where our discussion of survey results refers only to ‘host government,’ data were aggregated across all five sectors, as applicable.

of respondents, representatives of political organisations reported the lowest levels of satisfaction with collaboration with every partner with the exception of other diaspora organisations.<sup>186</sup>

**Table 8-9. Average levels of satisfaction with various partners by organisation type**

Type of organisation	Home country government	Host country government	Other partners
Political	2.50	5.19	5.83
Economic	5.25	5.38	5.98
Sociocultural	3.58	5.91	6.47
N	33	42	46

Note: Scored on a scale from 0 to 10.

*Motivation for engagement varies according to who the other party is: Diaspora organisations expect/hope for different outcomes with different partners*

Benefits derived from engagement with policymakers and other stakeholders identified by survey respondents varied substantially depending on the engagement partner in question, as summarised in Table 8-10 below.<sup>187</sup> The ability to influence policy was among the three most frequent benefits cited for engagement with every governmental actor. In fact, for engagement with the home government and the health and police services of the host governments it was the top reason cited (by 79%, 68% and 45% of relevant respondents, respectively). In regard to collaboration with other NGOs and other diaspora organisations, exchange of information was the most frequently identified benefit in both cases.

<sup>186</sup> Respondents were offered three options to specify what non-governmental partner they engage with. The options were: other diaspora organisations, other NGOs and other. Where survey results are presented in high-level form, ‘other services’ refer to an aggregate of all three types of non-governmental partners.

<sup>187</sup> For this analysis, in order to obtain a better understanding of the motivation of diaspora organisations considered to be in regular working relationships with other stakeholders, we included only respondents who ranked their level of engagement with the partner in question at least five on a 0-10 scale and who identified at least one benefit associated with such engagement.

**Table 8-10. Three most frequently identified benefits by engagement partner**

<b>Engagement Partner</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Three most frequently identified benefits</b>
Home country government	19	Influence policy Gain support Exchange information
Host country government – social services	26	Raise awareness Exchange information Influence policy
Host country government – health services	19	Influence policy Exchange information Raise awareness
Host country government – education services	22	Exchange information Create opportunities Influence policy/Gain support/Raise Awareness*
Host country government – police and legal services	20	Influence policy Exchange information Gain support
Host country government – other services	21	Raise awareness Influence policy Gain support/Exchange information*
NGOs	37	Exchange information Raise awareness Gain support
Other diaspora organisations	39	Exchange information Gain support Raise awareness

Note: \*denotes situations where multiple benefits were identified as the third most frequent benefit

*Funding considerations do not feature prominently in diaspora organisations’ engagement with governments. However, they may be conducive to higher levels of engagement*

Raising funds from governments was not cited very often as a perceived benefit by survey respondents. The highest share was recorded with respect to engaging with the home government (37%); however, even in this instance this benefit ranked jointly sixth out of eight offered options (not including the option to name any other benefit).

The relatively low share of organisations motivated to engage with governments at least partly for fundraising reasons is matched by a relatively low proportion of organisations that reported receiving funding from governments. As Table 8-11 indicates, organisations represented by survey respondents were reliant primarily on funds raised through donations, membership fees and provision of services. In fact, government funding ranked towards the bottom of the list of funding sources.

**Table 8-11. Funding sources**

<b>Source</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Donations from individuals	61.9
Revenue from services/membership fees	52.4
Donations from organisations	35.7
Host country government – regional level	16.7
None	16.7

Host country government – national level	14.3
Home country government	4.8
International organisations	4.8

Note: N=52

At the same time, while funding considerations may not be the primary motivation for diaspora organisations to collaborate with policymakers, they may help reach and maintain increased intensity of working relationships. Our analysis found that organisations that receiving funding from the host country government reported higher average levels of engagement with host government sectors.

*Higher numbers of identified benefits/reasons for engagement were found to be associated with higher levels of engagement*

Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found that the number of benefits from engagement identified by survey respondents was positively correlated with levels of engagement. This relationship was statistically significant for every engagement partner offered to respondents. It was also significant when answers were aggregated across all sectors of host governments and across all non-governmental partners. Finally, the correlation was also significant when results were aggregated across all categories of engagement, as captured in Table 8-12 below. The strength of the relationship varied between  $\rho = 0.65$  for home governments and  $\rho = 0.36$  for the aggregation of all engagement partners.

**Table 8-12. Bivariate correlation between levels of engagement and numbers of identified benefits**

Engagement partner	Correlation coefficient (spearman's rho)	N
Home government	0.65*	47
Host government	0.45*	48
Other partners	0.52*	49
All partners aggregated	0.36*	49

Note: \*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

*Some levels of engagement with one partner were found to be positively correlated with levels of engagement with other partners*

Our analysis found relatively strong positive correlations between possible pairs of engagement levels across all offered sectors of Host government (Social, Health, Education, Police, Other). The strength of the significant correlations varied from  $\rho = 0.76$  for Health & Police and Police & Other to  $\rho = 0.54$  for Social & Education. In other words, organisations that reported high levels of engagement with one sector of home government were more likely to enjoy high levels of engagement with other sectors as well.

The level of engagement with other NGOs was also positively correlated with every other type of engagement, and so was engagement with other diaspora organisations (with the exception of correlation with Host Police). In addition, we found no correlation between Home and any Host engagement. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the intensity of collaboration with the host government is a usable indicator of an organisation's relations with its home government.

All possible pairs of correlations along with their corresponding coefficients are reported in Table 8-13.

**Table 8-13. Bivariate correlation of levels of engagement by engagement partner**

	Home	Host_Social	Host_Health	Host_Education	Host_Police	Host_Other	NGO	Diaspora
Home		.05	.12	.26	.03	.26	.36 <sup>+</sup>	.29 <sup>+</sup>
Host_Social	.05		.69**	.54**	.64**	.54**	.41**	.37 <sup>+</sup>
Host_Health	.12	.69**		.77**	.78**	.77**	.51**	.31 <sup>+</sup>
Host_Education	.26	.54**	.77**		.72**	.75**	.58**	.35 <sup>+</sup>
Host_Police	.03	.64**	.78**	.72**		.78**	.49**	.26
Host_Other	.26	.54**	.77**	.75**	.78**		.70**	.51**
NGO	.36 <sup>+</sup>	.41**	.51**	.58**	.49**	.70**		.66**
Diaspora	.29 <sup>+</sup>	.37 <sup>+</sup>	.31 <sup>+</sup>	.35 <sup>+</sup>	.26	.51**	.66**	

Note: N for individual cases ranges between 43 and 48.

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed Spearman's rho);

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed Spearman's rho)

*We found significant correlations between levels of engagement and levels of satisfaction with home, host and other organisations*

Our analysis revealed that in several instances, the reported level of engagement was positively correlated with respondents' stated satisfactions with this type of engagement. Table 8-14 shows a significant correlation between levels of engagement and satisfaction observed for collaboration with home governments, health services of host governments, NGOs and other organisations. By contrast, with the exception of health services, all other 'expected' relationships between frequency and satisfaction were not strong for home country government. Interestingly, other additional positive correlations were uncovered between level of engagement with one partner and satisfaction from engagement with another. As the table below indicates, in the vast majority of cases, significant correlations were related to satisfaction with engaging social and health services of home governments and NGOs.

**Table 8-14. Bivariate correlation between levels of engagement and satisfaction**

		Satisfaction								
Engagement		Home government	Host government – social services	Host government – health services	Host government – education services	Host government – police services	Host government – other services	NGO	Diaspora	
	Home government	.63**	.02	-.09	-.12	-.08	-.08	.19	-.14	
	Host government – social services	-.07	.19	.31	-.08	-.10	-.16	.12	.07	
	Host government – health services	.13	.42*	.44*	-.00	.06	.18	.23	.13	
	Host government – education services	.14	.38*	.40*	.23	.16	.15	.37 <sup>+</sup>	.27	
	Host government – police services	-.02	.26	.42*	.00	.31	.04	.20	.07	
	Host government – other services	.24	.49**	.51**	.16	.41*	.14	.35*	.12	

NGO	.25	.36*	.57**	.20	.30	.16	.54**	.21
Diaspora	.42*	.35*	.52**	.26	.30	.16	.50**	.45**

Note: N for individual cases ranges from 26 to 38

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Organisations that had been established for longer periods were not necessarily larger, but tended to report more frequent engagement across receiving country sectors than newer organisations*

One hypothesis tested in our survey analysis was that older, more established organisations might enjoy more intensive engagement with policymakers and other stakeholders thanks to the greater time they may have spent in developing the necessary working relationships. This hypothesis was confirmed for engagement with social, health, and education services of host governments. Organisations that have been active for more than five years reported a higher level of engagement than their younger counterparts. Interestingly, younger organisations have reported slightly higher intensity of relationship with Home and other diaspora organisations, though neither of these differences was statistically significant. Table 8-15 below presents an overview of mean reported levels of engagement.

**Table 8-15. Levels of engagement by age of organisation**


	N	Less than Five Years	More than Five Years
Home government	43	3.33	3.00
Host government – social services	43	3	5.38
Host government – health services	40	1	5.04
Host government – education services	43	2.5	5.10
Host government – police services	41	2.45	4.75
Host government – other services	41	3.00	5.04
NGO	44	5.00	6.27
Diaspora	43	6.83	6.72

We did not find any notable relationship between an organisation’s size and the intensity of its engagement. With respect to numbers of paid staff, this may be partly due to very small variability of staffing levels, with the vast majority of organisations reporting having only very few, if any, paid staff members.

*Diaspora organisations are almost always relied on to initiate engagement with government partners, and are most satisfied with partnerships when engagement is initiated jointly*

In order to gain further insight into the nature of existing diaspora engagement, respondents were asked to indicate who usually initiates the collaboration in question – the diaspora organisation represented by the survey respondent, the other party to the collaboration, or both parties roughly equally. Figure 8-2 below shows that in cases where respondents felt this question was applicable, diaspora organisations reported being solely responsible for initiating the majority of engagement with government partners. The picture was different for engagement with other partners, where the most frequent modality was engagement initiated roughly equally by both parties.

**Figure 8-2. Who initiates the engagement?**



Based on the data collected, respondents reported higher frequency of engagement when this was initiated by both parties rather than by the diaspora organisation in question. This was true for every partner in engagement. Similarly, with every partner for engagement except other diaspora organisations, respondents reported higher frequency of engagement when initiated by both parties rather than by the other party alone.

The same picture emerged with respect to perceived satisfaction with the engagement. In every instance, respondents were more satisfied where the engagement was initiated equally by both parties as opposed to by only the diaspora organisation or the government. This difference, however, was much less pronounced than was the case with frequency of engagement, as indicated in Table 8-16 below; highest levels for each row are highlighted in bold.

**Table 8-16. Level of engagement and satisfaction by initiating party**

		Your organisation	Both	The other party	N*
Home	Level	4.63	<b>6.33</b>	N/A	28
	Satisfaction	4.32	<b>4.38</b>	N/A	27
Host_Social	Level	5.27	<b>6.75</b>	N/A	24
	Satisfaction	5.07	<b>5.25</b>	N/A	24
Host_Health	Level	4.36	<b>7.50</b>	5.75	22
	Satisfaction	5.38	<b>7.75</b>	4	21
Host_Education	Level	4.33	<b>6.86</b>	2.00	27
	Satisfaction	5.35	<b>7.50</b>	2.00	25
Host_Police	Level	4.54	<b>7.20</b>	5.00	21

	Satisfaction	4.58	<b>6.80</b>	6.33	20
Host_Other	Level	3.88	<b>7.83</b>	N/A	24
	Satisfaction	6.00	<b>6.50</b>	N/A	21
NGO	Level	6.93	<b>7.28</b>	N/A	34
	Satisfaction	5.62	<b>7.72</b>	N/A	32
Diaspora	Level	6.75	7.50	<b>8.33</b>	35
	Satisfaction	4.83	<b>6.94</b>	4.00	33

Note: highest value highlighted in bold

\*The N size here includes only respondents who commented on who initiates the engagement in question and does not include respondents who gave other answers, such as 'not applicable' or 'don't know'

### 8.1.2. Survey open-answer question and interview qualitative analysis

Our survey provided respondents with the opportunity to expand on the categorical answers with extensive space for free-text responses. Since the engagement of diaspora organisations particularly (rather than of diaspora populations more broadly) has had limited coverage in existing academic and grey literature, we felt it important to allow respondents to identify key issues at this point, which could support more targeted analysis in future research. We also provided them with the opportunity to take part in follow-up interviews, again in the expectation that these would provide depth and detail to clarify the content of the questionnaire responses.

From a grounded-theory<sup>188</sup> analysis of the survey and interview responses, discussed further in Appendix G, we found a number of themes that accord with the quantitative findings, and are also able to provide further details regarding examples of positive practice as well as specific requests that these organisations would make to potential government and non-governmental partners for future collaboration and relationship-building.

#### Survey and interview responses reiterate the importance of sustained communication with diaspora organisations

Survey respondents, when asked how their receiving country government could improve relations with the diaspora organisation, often pointed to communications-oriented initiatives. Half of the 26 respondents who provided answers to this free-text question offered suggestions related to communication, including more proactive outreach, the development of a dedicated agency where diaspora organisations could connect with host governments, opportunities to access decision-makers, and the creation of automatic information-exchange mechanisms between the diaspora and the receiving country government. Similar responses were found when respondents were asked to identify barriers to engagement, where seven respondents identified a limited ability to communicate with various sectors of government.

Interview participants similarly highlighted the importance of communication and proactive or joint engagement from receiving country governments to diaspora organisations. In particular, interviewees appeared to connect clear and regular communication with positive collaboration outcomes, and equally

<sup>188</sup> (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

cited lack of proactive contact as a negative.<sup>189</sup> One interviewee provided the following indicative response when asked what the receiving country government could do to improve the relationship with the diaspora:

First of all, my suggestion is to engage with the local community. They do not proactively contact us... Whenever there is an event [here], local councillors are given a very warm welcome, they should be made welcome. (Interview 3)

This comment also points to another theme, which we return to in our recommendations – that attendance at community events is appreciated by diaspora members and may be one of the easiest ways to build relationships and goodwill for receiving country organisations. However, such contact without substantive results will likely be insufficient; as one interviewee<sup>190</sup> noted, their host society government regularly listens to their diaspora community's concerns, but rarely incorporates them into legislative action.<sup>191</sup>

### Few of the organisations providing responses limit their activities to a narrow scope, and may seek broader capacities

While this point comes through clearly in the quantitative analysis, it may be useful to provide more detail here. In the survey, we asked respondents to specify other kinds of activities or secondary aspects of their organisational missions, and found that many of the organisations were involved in projects or initiatives that were not obviously related to their stated core mission. A key example here relates to the activities of South Asian diaspora groups around heart health and stroke awareness, as their rates of heart-related illness are relatively high within Europe and so South Asian respondents had links to local health providers alongside their broader activities in promoting diaspora interests. This information could not have been deduced from the stated mission of the organisation.<sup>192</sup>

Other organisations may promote research, sponsor students or provide scholarships alongside core advocacy or cultural organising activities<sup>193</sup>, or become involved in specific initiatives in their receiving-country communities such as youth groups<sup>194</sup>, interfaith for intercultural dialogues or exchanges.<sup>195</sup> They may also take part in other non-diaspora oriented activities such as community charities or events.<sup>196</sup> This suggestion is in line with our quantitative survey data, where respondents indicated that they organise social events for diaspora members just as frequently as social events open to all.

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<sup>189</sup> Interviews 3, 5, 7 and 8.

<sup>190</sup> Interview 1.

<sup>191</sup> Our quantitative analysis of survey results did not find any notable systematic differences in levels of satisfaction between respondents who felt their organisation is able to have influence on policy and those who did not. The only exception was satisfaction with engagement with the home country government, where those who considered themselves influential reported much higher levels of satisfaction (4.92 vs 2.57).

<sup>192</sup> For example, survey respondents 20 and 37.

<sup>193</sup> Survey respondents 35, 29, 46, 51.

<sup>194</sup> Survey respondents 3, 5, 21.

<sup>195</sup> Survey respondent 52.

<sup>196</sup> Survey respondent 15.

### Most of the organisations providing responses could identify positive examples of external partnerships

Each survey asked respondents to identify a particularly positive example of partnership with external organisations and 39 of 53 respondents provided an answer to this question. The examples ranged from very small – organising a youth soccer tournament in one case – to somewhat vague, such as ‘awareness raising’ about diaspora issues. Some examples involved large and multi-agency activities, such as a 10-year community visioning exercise for sending country reconstruction at local level.

Importantly, this reinforces the message that, at least among the representatives who provided responses (and their organisations), collaborative engagement with external partners is an established, acceptable and often preferred option for achieving organisational goals, and some explicitly cited government partnerships as positive collaborations.<sup>197</sup> It is worth noting, however, that many of the positive examples of collaboration provided by participants involved non-governmental organisations such as other diaspora groups, other civil society groups, foundations, and/or UN agencies.<sup>198</sup>

### Most diaspora organisations surveyed would appreciate more resources, but also seek non-monetary support

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of respondents identified ‘more resources’ as a way to improve relations with various partners or to achieve organisational goals. Indeed, at least 12 of 33 respondents providing replies to the question of what could help them achieve their goals identified financial support. This number increases to 30 of 33 when we include those who identified general ‘government support’ or a similar mechanism as valuable for their missions. Yet, they could normally identify other means available to governments to assist their organisations as well, and so we may not always interpret ‘government support’ as simply a request for more money. This suggests in particular that they see external partners as playing a substantive role outside of financial support and tend to seek a more genuine partnership with governments than as arms-length funders.

Diaspora organisations may also seek support in accessing the broader diaspora community that they represent, which again can be financial or in-kind support. When asked to identify factors that could help them reach their diaspora, 24 of our respondents<sup>199</sup> identified explicit or implicit roles for government. While 12 of these<sup>200</sup> mentioned funding, other valuable resources suggested by our respondents included: the development of a communications platform for diaspora members<sup>201</sup>; training in administrative skills<sup>202</sup> (ostensibly to increase organisational effectiveness); transportation for diaspora members to make

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<sup>197</sup> Survey respondents 15, 22, 26, 27, 34, 47

<sup>198</sup> Survey respondents 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 32, 33, 37, 42, 43, 50, 51. Note also that many entries of successful practice did not specify partner organisations.

<sup>199</sup> Survey respondents 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 25, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51 and 53

<sup>200</sup> Survey respondents 14, 17, 19, 22, 28, 30, 34, 36, 37, 41, 45, and 53

<sup>201</sup> Survey respondent 27

<sup>202</sup> Survey respondent 41

use of organisational programmes;<sup>203</sup> assistance with promotion of activities and public relations;<sup>204</sup> and providing language training for diaspora members.<sup>205</sup>

While we would not wish to underestimate the importance of financial resources in maintaining organisational capacity, our quantitative analysis did not reveal ‘fundraising’ as a primary benefit of engagement with any external partner. In turn, other forms of support from receiving country governments may be (a) easier to provide and (b) more directly connected to the goals of these organisations. For example, a number of these organisations seek meaningful opportunities to interact with politicians and key government officials, and often invite government officials to organisational events or seek to be included in consultative bodies or exercises, as noted above under the communication-oriented recommendation.

**Diaspora organisation have limited knowledge of and capacity to familiarise themselves with existing support infrastructure and would benefit from assistance in this aspect**

Another form of support requested by respondents was provision of assistance in navigating government institutions. As small, often volunteer-led organisations with limited legal and administrative expertise, the abilities of diaspora organisations to access various resources can be inhibited more by lack of knowledge about processes and procedures than lack of interest or willingness to take part in initiatives.

For example, one of the interviewees<sup>206</sup> represented an organisation whose funding was largely eliminated when the City of London re-structured its rules around the funding of community groups. The interviewee claimed an inability to find alternative streams of funding, at which point the organisation lost its staff and became much more limited in its activities. Another interviewee suggested that their organisation had been trying to support their receiving country government in its initiatives in a developing country, but had been put off by unsuccessful proposals to do so which had been rejected on technical grounds.<sup>207</sup> Questionnaire respondents also identified lack of knowledge about existing programmes, funding and opportunities for collaboration as a barrier to engagement.

Finally, respondents identified the potential value of IT infrastructure in supporting the diaspora. One respondent provided the following, which is indicative of this perspective:

We need a reliable, effective and efficient communications platform to reach all the diaspora. Technology is the key. In addition to the website, mail lists, and facebook pages, we need a more customised platform to facilitate two way communications. (respondent #27)

While governments centrally wrestle with how to identify and communicate with members of diasporas and migrant groups, these organisations also struggle with communication with their potential membership. As we explore in the next chapter – especially since this is a current goal of many sending countries – there may be a role for receiving countries in developing IT-based options for diaspora groups

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<sup>203</sup> Survey respondent 24

<sup>204</sup> Survey respondents 23 and 29

<sup>205</sup> Survey respondent 17

<sup>206</sup> Interview 6

<sup>207</sup> Interview 3

and members in communicating between one another as well as potentially with the sending country for development or other purposes.

### Some diaspora organisations are explicitly uninvolved in political issues

A small subset<sup>208</sup> of our respondents actively stated that they had no interest in engaging with political issues. Reasons for this preference included: an interest in encouraging participation from broad sectors of the diaspora (for example, where known schisms existed within the diaspora, and the association with home country government would be a deterrent); a preference for integration into the receiving society (and thus focusing efforts on receiving country-level engagement); a belief that a-political orientation would be most effective for the organisation's goals (for example, when trying to provide humanitarian relief for refugees); and antipathy or mistrust directed at the sending country. There was also a belief among a handful of respondents that the sending country government was mistrustful of the diaspora's intentions, a dynamic also reflected in the literature reported in the last chapter.

This observation is matched by the findings from the quantitative analysis of the survey results. A notable share of respondents (29%) reported that their organisation does not engage with their home country government at all. That said, unless explicitly stated by the respondents, we are unable to distinguish instances in which this is the case deliberately and where this is due to time, capacity or other constraints. In fact, of those who reported not engaging with their home governments, two respondents were recipients of their funding. In another question, two respondents were able to identify benefits stemming from working with their home government.

## 8.2. We recognise the limits to this sample of survey respondents, but expect a number of findings may be broadly transferable

Our experience from the survey of diaspora organisations reinforces themes in broader literature on diasporas and other migrant groups that they are notoriously complicated populations to access. We recognise that the sample of diaspora organisations is drawn from an unknown population, and that the response rate among identified organisations is relatively low, even taking into account that many of the identified organisations may no longer be active. We should therefore caveat all results by acknowledging that results may not be transferable to all diaspora organisations, especially to those who do not seek engagement with either or both of sending and receiving country governments.

Virtually all of our respondents could be classified as 'engagement-seeking' based on their responses, insofar as they indicated active engagement with external partners, indicated that they often initiated this engagement, and also engaged with our research. We expect some number of diaspora organisations will differ in this likely important regard and cannot estimate the prevalence or importance of non-engaged or insular diaspora groups within diaspora communities either through our own or prior research on the

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<sup>208</sup> Survey respondent 34 states that their organisation has an explicit policy of non-relationship with the home government; respondents 41, 52 and 53 made references to low trust toward home governments owing to corruption or other problems with the home government regime; and respondents 7 and 29 claimed that all of their organisational activities are 'non-political' in orientation.

subject. However, we do expect that our findings are broadly transferable to the wider population of engagement-seeking diaspora organisations, subject to further empirical research.

## PART III: SYNTHESIS

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## 9. Recommendations for diaspora engagement

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### 9.1. Based on our findings, we propose eight main recommendations for receiving countries seeking to engage with diaspora

Considering the data from our diaspora survey, alongside relatively consistent messages in prior literature clustering around key themes for diaspora engagement, below follows a list of recommendations for policymakers intending to engage with diaspora groups.

Two underlying points help situate the proposed recommendations. First, concrete ways to engage with individual diaspora groups need to take into account their characteristics, tailored to specific contexts. Some useful data and indicators on the socioeconomic profile of diaspora groups and how they compare across countries and other groups can be gleaned from the mapping exercise conducted as part of this research project and used as a basis, albeit partial, for building an understanding diaspora groups.

Second, evidence collected through our fieldwork suggests that there is substantial room for improvement with respect to establishing basic principles and good practices for diaspora engagement. The following points reflect this perspective and focus on establishing broad guidelines pertaining to diaspora engagement.

The recommendations are structured as follows. First, a brief statement of the recommendation is provided, followed by an overview of underlying evidence. Subsequently, we discuss issues surrounding implementation of these recommendations and offer relevant existing examples, where applicable.

After the recommendations, we include a section on further policy considerations. These are points and observations that are not necessarily, or are only more loosely, based on our fieldwork and may not be backed up by as strong evidence as our recommendations. Instead, these policy considerations are intended to serve as starting points for further discussion about policy interventions, and it is hoped they may thereby contribute to the on-going policy debate and to generate impetus for strengthening of the existing evidence base.

#### *9.1.1. Be aware of, and attend to, the complexity and heterogeneity of diasporas*

Policymakers should familiarise themselves with the diaspora group and organisation with whom they would like to engage in order to better understand its characteristics and objectives. There are often many groups representing a diaspora. These groups may at times reflect overt schisms; for example, a number of sending-country political parties have branches or committees where their diaspora is concentrated in receiving countries, and members of these communities may not all support the same party or political position. Divisions may also be due to more subtle distinctions, for example where there are diaspora

associations for specific regions of a sending country or where associations are only open to certain members of the diaspora (such as diaspora professional or business organisations). In this context, it is particularly important to build strategies that do not assume that all diaspora organisations have the same aims or engage with various partners for the same reasons.

This is a key point and mirrors every other related study on this matter. It also aligns with our findings on intra-diaspora dynamics and with the main messages derived from our diaspora survey, as exemplified by the spread of data around perceived benefits from engagement by diaspora organisations or the breadth of activities that survey respondents reported undertaking. For instance, representatives of political organisations identified a range benefits in engaging with various sectors of receiving countries' governments, while economic organisations frequently saw benefits in engaging with the government of their countries of origin.

Socio-economic data presented in the mapping section of this report may be a useful starting point in the process of identifying the main characteristics of diaspora groups and their relationships with their country of origin. Subsequently, these will need to be complemented with highly contextualised qualitative information about potential partner organisations, the broader intra-diaspora dynamics, and, if the home country is to be involved, a mapping of up-to-date information about homeland diaspora engagement strategies, policies and initiatives.

### *9.1.2. See the potential in each organisation: Many diaspora organisations work far outside their core mission, and others may be interested in expanding their capacity*

This point is an extension of the previous one. In the process of learning about and engaging with diaspora organisations, policymakers and other stakeholders should keep in mind that the number of areas in which a given organisation would be a suitable partner might be larger than it may seem at first glance.

This recommendation is based on data collected through our survey of diaspora organisations. Of those who responded, many reported engaging in a number of activities not obviously related to their public-facing materials or to their principal areas of activity. Similarly, numerous organisations identified benefits from engagement with partners that would not necessarily be expected given their stated mission. Therefore, diaspora organisations may still be meaningful actors across many spheres, especially local/social ones, and may also be able to partner in development of policy or services for specific migrant groups. In other words, they could assist local/national governments in accessing hard-to-reach populations, and may also be a more trusted/credible delivery mechanism for local services, provided they have the personal and financial resources to do so.

### *9.1.3. Reach out: Proactive communication from governments is desired across diaspora organisations*

Policymakers should keep in mind that diaspora organisations report appreciating shared responsibility for engagement. Therefore, government, to the extent possible, should adopt a pro-active approach to diaspora engagement.

This is one of the clearest findings, based on the diaspora survey and stakeholder interviews. What is more, the finding appears to hold true irrespective of context in our sample, as it applies to both large and small organisations and to organisations of any (political, cultural, social or economic) orientation. Survey respondents reported consistently higher levels of engagement and resulting satisfaction in instances where collaboration was a result of the effort of both parties. This suggests that outreach should be offered by host governments wherever possible (at least to the point that approaches are rebuffed by the organisation). Examples of outreach from host governments can be the so-called ‘minorities’ fora’ in Belgium and the Netherlands, which were set up by the respective governments to establish an ongoing policy dialogue (see section 5.1.3).

#### ***9.1.4. Provide support and advice, whether direct or in-kind: most diaspora organisations are small and volunteer-led***

Diaspora organisations are often small and volunteer-led, and do not necessarily have the capacity to assess the potential implications of new policies or opportunities that governments devise. Host society governments should take this into account and assist diaspora organisations in navigating policies and accessing resources if it is important to a receiving country that diaspora organisations persist and grow as civil-society actors. This is particularly applicable where both host societies and diaspora organisations may benefit from the uptake of government programmes and initiatives by these organisations.

This recommendation is primarily a reflection of interviewees’ testimonies, which highlighted the desirability of having access to support systems and capacity-building resources, and was also a point highlighted in the literature on existing integration and engagement activities. In addition, our survey showed that most organisations are very small in terms of their staff and perform their activities to a considerable extent on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, calls for support should not always be automatically understood as requests for financial assistance, as evidenced by the relatively low prevalence of fundraising as a benefit identified by diaspora organisations. Organisations and other diaspora representatives noted that they would welcome more resources, but many organisations were able to articulate needs outside of, yet related to, direct contributions. An example of a combination of financial and practical support is the Program "Migration for Development" in Germany [refer to Box 6] which supports migrant organisations through financial aids as well as training and networking opportunities.

Where an organisation is (or would like to be) grant-funded, it may be just as important to have accessible staff ready to assist with and explain the existing proposal-writing process to have a pot of money available. Equally, when terms of funding change, sensitive communication including measures to ensure an understanding of these changes may be helpful. This is especially true where policy changes may impact the organisation’s ability to operate/exist. Changes need to be communicated clearly to non-experts and often non-native language speakers who may be unfamiliar with rules and regulations. This finding is in line with lessons derived from a diaspora engagement project in Antwerp, which recommended increasing the city’s role as a matchmaker, to hold information meetings about funding opportunities and for the city of Antwerp to liaise with the Belgian regional and federal government(s) to see to what extent these initiatives can be brought under official development initiatives (CeMIS, 2012, p. 75).

### *9.1.5. Make yourself and your activities known to diaspora representatives*

This recommendation is closely related to the previous one in that policymakers may want to improve the extent to which and the way in which they reach out to diaspora groups. Policymakers and other stakeholders interested in engaging with diaspora groups should not assume that diaspora representatives are familiar with their activities, portfolios or even their existence.

This recommendation is based on the fact that several diaspora representatives reported relatively low levels of familiarity with on-going initiatives to engage diaspora groups and limited ability to navigate existing policy landscape. This is particularly applicable to the European Union and its agencies, which some interviewees admitted they did not consider a potential partner for engagement.

### *9.1.6. Maintain relationships: Higher levels of engagement are correlated with higher levels of satisfaction towards governments and other organisations*

Once working relationships with diaspora groups are established, policymakers should make an effort to facilitate their long-term continuation. Not only are long-term relationships more cost-effective, they may also lead to positive spillovers for other stakeholders and into other forms of collaboration with diasporas.

This recommendation builds on the finding relating to communication between diaspora groups and their partners. Our analysis revealed that levels of engagement with one aspect of host country government are positively associated with the frequency of engagement with other partners, suggesting there may be knock-on effects between various types of engagement. Moreover, levels of engagement with *one* partner were in several instances positively associated with levels of satisfaction with *another* partner. This is potentially of significance because it supports the hypothesis that sustained relationships can produce positive spillovers in both directions – i.e. they can help diaspora organisations engage better with other partners but can also help policymakers reach out to other diaspora groups with whom the engaged organisation has existing relationships.

In addition, some available evidence suggests that continued and sustained relationships qualitatively improve over time to produce tangible results – for instance, in the form of increased diaspora capacity to engage with policymakers. With respect to a local initiative in Belgium mentioned above, its review found that cooperation between the development cooperation agency of the city of Antwerp and migrant organisations ‘led to professionalization of projects and network expansion of the migrant organisations’ (CeMIS, 2012).

### *9.1.7. Improving diaspora engagement does not have to be costly: identify ‘low-hanging fruit’*

It is important to stress that improvements in diaspora engagement do not necessarily need to take the form of creating new offices, initiatives and projects. In fact, policymakers and other stakeholders may be able to reap substantial benefits with steps that are not costly or onerous.

This point is based on comments by diaspora representatives in their survey responses and subsequent interviews. For instance, interviewees tended to express positive sentiments towards officials who had

accepted their invitations to events.<sup>209</sup> Simple gestures such as these seemed to provide real social capital for future engagement and were likely to be truly appreciated by diaspora representatives.

Similarly, survey respondents offered suggestions for improving relationships with host governments that could be achieved at low cost and with limited effort. These included greater acknowledgement or recognition of the organisation or diaspora,<sup>210</sup> as well as inclusion in planning or consultation for government policy and projects.<sup>211</sup> Diaspora organisations' desire for inclusion in government processes is in line with our survey findings, which suggested that diaspora organisations felt more satisfied when the responsibility for engagement did not rest solely with them. This desire is also likely related to the broadly-stated interest from respondents for more, and more regular, communication from the host government, as outlined at a number of points above.

These kinds of gestures do not necessarily represent a heavy burden of commitment on the part of policymakers and public officials, though they do require consideration of whether and how governments want to align with these organisations, and whether and to what degree they would support similar requests from other diaspora organisations. However, to the degree that governments would value such engagement, these kinds of opportunities for increased contact appear to be both valuable and practicable without substantial resource requirements.

While originally applicable to the field of discrimination and prejudice, some further insights related to this recommendation can be gleaned from Allport's contact theory (1954). As Allport suggested (and as further supported by subsequent analysis, see, for example, Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005), positive outcomes can be achieved by increased interaction between diverse groups. What is more, a number of facilitators may increase the likelihood that inter-group contact results in positive outcomes, which could be useful as guidelines to policymakers in the design of future policy initiatives. First, more positive dynamics tend to occur when all groups perceive each other as equals. In addition, when members of different groups are involved in doing something collaborative (sharing and pursuing a common goal), the results of that contact tend to be more positive. Finally, the effects of contact tend to be greater when this contact is supported by law, custom or social institutions, which provide 'norms of acceptance and guidelines for how members of different groups should interact with each other' (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). This point further reinforces the importance of engaging in regular and proactive communication and equal partnership initiatives, especially where the goal of the engagement is to build relationships among diasporas and partner organisations.

#### ***9.1.8. Sustainability of engagement may be crucial for its success***

The effectiveness of collaboration with diaspora groups is to a large extent dependent on the ability to sustain the working relationship for a prolonged period of time. Policymakers need to be aware of the often precarious position in which many diaspora organisations find themselves in and have the longer term in mind.

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<sup>209</sup> Interviewees 3 and 7.

<sup>210</sup> Survey respondents 5, 14, 22 and 32.

<sup>211</sup> Survey respondents 22, 34, 37, and 45.

Higher levels of engagement are associated with greater satisfaction on part of diaspora organisations. Our survey question on levels of engagement asked ‘how often’ diaspora representatives collaborated with other partners, which is a somewhat different question from asking ‘how long’ such a relationship has been in place. Nevertheless, our interpretation of its link to sustainability is supported by the fact that longer-established organisations reported higher levels of engagement. In addition, sustainability considerations featured prominently in stakeholder interviews in which several interviewees reported anxieties about uncertainties in regard to future funding streams, continuation of mutual projects, policy priorities, etc.

Of course, it is not always possible to prevent a discontinuation of a programme or a change in policy. However, it may be feasible to shield diaspora organisations from some of the attendant adverse effects and help them better withstand external shocks, for instance by introducing a gradual phase-out as opposed to abrupt discontinuation. For instance, this approach was adopted in the decision to discontinue the Dutch platform for consulting minorities (see Box 11 below).

**Box 11. How changes in policy may influence sustainability of projects: the Dutch example**

In 1997 the Dutch government set up the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden* (National Consultation Platform for Minorities, LOM) (LOM, n.d.-b). The legal basis for this consultation was laid out in the *Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid* (Minority Policy Consultation Act, WOM) of 1997 (Minister van Justitie, 1997).

LOM was set up by the government 'to discuss its integration policies with interlocutors from the main immigrant and minority groups' (De Haas, 2006, p. 38). LOM works with eight so-called 'alliances' that represent a specific ethnic minority group in the Netherlands. These alliances 'jointly represent more than 1.8 million citizens of Caribbean, Chinese, Moroccan, Moluccan, Surinamese, Turkish and South European descent and refugees in the Netherlands' (LOM, n.d.-a). As a representative for minority groups in the Netherlands, LOM is involved in the policy debate involving these groups in the form of recommendations and solutions (LOM, n.d.-a).<sup>212</sup> The annual funding in 2011 for LOM partnerships was around €3 million in total (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012).

After a first announcement in 2011, the WOM was withdrawn in June 2013 (Nederlands Juristenblad, 2013; Nederlandse Regering, 2011). The accompanying explanatory statement listed several reasons for the discontinuation of the LOM structure, which included, among others (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012):

- The position of migrants had changed with groups having become more diverse in terms of, for example, education level and generation differences (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012).
- The Dutch government argued that 'people should be held accountable on the basis of their individual responsibility as a citizen, instead of on the basis of ethnicity'.<sup>213</sup>
- Furthermore, the government stated that policy on ethnicity places emphasis on differences and hence is 'at odds with the pursuit of common citizenship'.<sup>214</sup>
- One of the goals of the WOM was to strengthen 'the participation in policy processes of minority groups that were not sufficiently represented at different levels, and therefore had fewer opportunities to exert influence'.<sup>215</sup> As the current integration policy is aimed at responsibility of individuals to actively take part in society, this goal is no longer applicable.

Despite the withdrawal of the WOM, the government will continue to discuss integration issues with Dutch society, yet this will take the form of a more flexible dialogue based on current events and themes (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012). From 2012 until January 2015 there is a transition period in which funding is being gradually phased out in order for the LOM partnerships to conclude their activities, to look for other funding sources, to secure their knowledge and networks and thus 'to prepare themselves for an independent future.' (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012).<sup>216</sup> This 'phasing out' period was not laid down in the original Act. However, the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum stated in his explanatory statement that it is 'desirable' that the subsidy arrangement continues for the time being (i.e. until January 2015).<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Following the withdrawal of the WOM, the final consultation under the LOM structure with the government took place at 24 April 2013 (Surinaams Inspraak Orgaan (SIO), 2014). However, LOM as a platform still exists and the LOM partnerships will receive funding until 2015. There can still be a dialogue with the government, yet not as an exclusive interlocutor.

<sup>213</sup> Own translation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012, p. 2).

<sup>214</sup> Own translation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012, p. 2).

<sup>215</sup> Own translation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012, p. 2).

<sup>216</sup> Own translation (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2013, p. 3).

<sup>217</sup> Own translation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012, pp. 4-5).

## 9.2. Policy considerations

The recommendations above are all backed by evidence in existing literature and data gathered for the present study. Some of the following suggestions come from a less extensive or concrete evidence base than that which underpins our recommendations section and may refer to novel or untested, but promising or compelling, factors and components to consider for future policy and practice. We therefore provide the following policy considerations as additional guidance in the interpretation of our recommendations and when planning and implementing engagement initiatives.

### *9.2.1. Embedding evaluation and learning at all stages of diaspora engagement is key for building an evidence base in this area*

As already discussed in section 5.1.3, there is a relative paucity of evaluations in the field of diaspora engagement. In addition, a good number of assessments that do exist and are publically available are closer to progress and activity reports than they are to rigorous assessments of the programme or intervention's effects and impacts. This kind of activity-focused reporting contrasts sharply with official national and pan-European guidance on the need for more evidence-based policies, especially at a time when budget constraints call for careful utilisation of resources to ensure value for money and effectiveness. In order to address this discrepancy, decision makers at all levels of government should consider making evaluation an important component of policy interventions, embedded in their design and implementation. Doing so would help develop the evidence base for current and future decisions and expenditure, while improving clarity and transparency about the aims and rationales of policy choices.

### *9.2.2. Diasporas operate in an ever-changing environment: Keep up-to-date on developments relating to conditions for engagement*

In this report, we have provided typologies of *goals* for and *targets* of engagement, as well as charting initiatives and structures currently in place in selected home and host countries that may bear on possibilities for diaspora engagement in each context. This information will provide starting points for determining how, why, and through which actors, diaspora communities may be engaged. Nonetheless, the terrain on which engagement takes place is constantly shifting. The appropriate target for achieving specified goals, as well as the means through which these are achieved, may also shift during planning for or implementation of engagement initiatives.

Regarding engagement for homeland development, we particularly note that many of the diaspora engagement initiatives and national strategies identified in the selected sending countries are currently in development. Moreover, many existing engagement initiatives are predicated on government institutions which are, in some cases, not coherently organised at present, despite a national intention to do so. Also, in certain states examined within the selected countries, we expect that approaches to diaspora engagement may be re-drawn in the aftermath of recent or ongoing conflict or may be subject to change following political transitions.

Attention to these and related conditions for engagement should thus be foregrounded in future initiatives, and in turn efforts will be required to harness area knowledge from experts, officials, and/or diaspora members as appropriate. This observation is related to the point made in the mapping section

with respect to data limitations. Ultimately, information presented in this report is a reflection of knowledge amassed at a certain moment in time. To ensure its continuous utility, the underlying data should be regularly monitored and updated to reflect the situation on the ground.

Finally, in relation to engagement with specific diaspora organisations, we note that these organisations tend to change in focus and scope over time. New organisations emerge and, conversely, sometimes established groups cease organised activities altogether. Regarding our survey of diaspora organisations, most respondents (58%) represented organisations that had existed for 10 years or less, and many of the organisations we contacted for response were no longer active, suggesting a level of transience in these organisations.<sup>218</sup> In turn, those seeking partnerships with diaspora groups may wish to maintain relationships with multiple representative organisations, and should stay in regular contact with established diaspora organisation partners to remain up-to-date on relevant developments that may impact future collaboration or engagement opportunities.

### *9.2.3. Diasporas can provide useful data: Voluntary databases of diaspora organisations could capture key information to facilitate future engagement*

As outlined in section 6.1.1, a number of governmental and non-governmental organisations have begun using databases of migrants as a part of their broader engagement strategy. The motivations for this approach differ between cases; in some, such as Kenya, the interest is in connecting diaspora groups with one another in host societies, whereas in others, such as the Sudan or Algeria, a targeted database is maintained for skilled or expert members of the diaspora population to support development in the homeland. Databases can thus collect information on individuals or organisations, and the kinds of information collected should be tailored to engagement need. From the results of our survey, we suggest that a database aimed at diaspora organisations may want to collect information on the kinds of activities in which an organisation engages in, or otherwise determine the main goals of the organisation, so that potential partners with diaspora groups can more easily identify appropriate partners.

### *9.2.4. There already exists infrastructure for diaspora engagement: Exploring ways to utilise it may be an effective way forward*

An effective form of engagement with and outreach to diaspora groups does not necessarily have to entail the establishment of new policy infrastructure or the creation of a new policy instrument. As exemplified earlier in the discussion of strategies used by countries of origin, numerous initiatives and programmes are already in place and, as evidenced by survey respondents and follow up interviews, diaspora organisations make use of these, albeit to varying degrees. Receiving countries might consider exploring ways to get involved in official channels of communication and collaboration between various third countries and their diasporas. Policies and contractual arrangements with other countries which would facilitate remittances and circular flow of people, such as the UK and US government engagement with Kenyan financial institutions designed to serve their diaspora, are just one example. This is in line with

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<sup>218</sup> We would suspect that similar levels of transience can be identified among civil society organisations more broadly, so would not suggest that this is a unique feature of diaspora organisations.

observations made elsewhere, which have, among other suggestions, also included calls for strategic relationships with a selected group of countries of origin (A.R.S. Progetti s.r.l., 2007; OECD, 2012).

#### *9.2.5. Overcoming coordination challenges across multiple stakeholders may require sharper focus and clearer goals*

As discussed elsewhere in this report, diaspora engagement is a field that spans multiple policy areas. This span has clear benefits as it invites the participation and buy-in of various stakeholders. At the same time, it creates challenges, not least in the form of coordination complexities, risks of diffusion of responsibility and overall lack of clarity. For example, evaluations of initiatives in Italy and at the EU level highlighted the importance of strong operational partnerships (Charpin & Aiolfi, 2011; De Haas, 2006). Similarly, in Spain, where local authorities have been engaged with diaspora and migrant groups - especially in some of the regions with greater concentration of migrants, like Andalusia, Madrid, Catalonia and Basque Country - issues around coordination and duplication of activities and services have been reported (A.R.S. Progetti s.r.l., 2007).

The situation is further compounded by the fact that receiving countries intent on collaboration with diaspora groups have not generally produced a diaspora engagement strategy or a policy manifesto outlining policy goals and relevant actors. This lack of strategy is in line with the testimony of numerous representatives of diaspora groups who have admitted a relatively low level of awareness of official engagement policies, on-going initiatives and available sources of support.

Therefore, policymakers might consider exploring ways to facilitate access for diaspora groups, improve their ability to navigate across the landscape of relevant organisations and players, and also clarify any existing misperceptions that might exist on the part of officials and policymakers. A clear formulation of diaspora engagement goals and principles might be a useful step in this regard, though it should not be seen as a panacea. A similar recommendation was made in a study reflecting on a local initiative in Antwerp, which found a lack of clarity about whether migrant organisations were supported by both development and integration agencies. In response, the authors called for better alignment of integration policy and development cooperation agency and for the publication of good practices of migrant organisations (CeMIS, 2012).

Another possibility would be to designate a one-stop shop for diaspora groups and organisations that might serve as a gateway and access point to policymakers and other stakeholders charged with signposting to relevant agencies. An example of a related type of arrangement is IdeA, as described in section 5.1.3, which aims to bring together diaspora organisations and assist with their further networking efforts.

#### *9.2.6. Diaspora organisations often face similar challenges as other civil society organisations. There may be substantial added value in coordinating efforts to work with the two.*

It may be worth exploring ways to increase coordination and synergy between initiatives involving diaspora groups and other civil society groups, as well as encouraging collaborative initiatives between multiple diaspora organisations. Our survey suggests that diaspora organisations are regularly engaged with one another, with 39 of 53 respondents indicating regular engagement with other diaspora

organisations, and 37 of 53 indicating regular engagement with NGO and other civil society groups. If existing infrastructure to engage with diaspora groups remains underdeveloped or ineffective, it may be more efficient and cost-effective to identify ways in which the existing infrastructure could work with voluntary, charitable and other civil society organisations.

This observation is based on the similarity between challenges that diaspora representatives report and those commonly associated with the voluntary sector in general. Some of these most consistently mentioned issues included capacity constraints, fundraising concerns or staffing challenges, i.e. issues amply addressed in the academic literature pertaining to the third/voluntary sector (Cairns, Harris, & Young, 2005; Cunningham, 1999; Harris, 1998; Palmer, 2005). Also, as noted, survey respondents consistently reported higher levels of engagement with other civil society organisations than with any government actors. This disparity suggests that platforms for engaging with third sector organisations may serve as useful tools for increasing access to diaspora organisations. This is not to say that diaspora organisations do not have their specific characteristics (such as sensitivity to migration, integration and development policies). Instead, this observation highlights the potential room for efficiency and economy-of-scale gains using existing infrastructure where possible.

An example which recognises the position of diaspora organisations within the broader world of civil and voluntary sector, albeit with a very close link to the US foreign policy establishment, is the US-based Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society, described in Box 8 in section 5.1.3.

### *9.2.7. Choosing appropriate level of analysis and organisation may require careful consideration*

An important consideration for working with diaspora groups is to select the most appropriate organisational level at which to engage with them. This primarily applies to levels of government, but in principle can apply to the vertical hierarchy of diaspora groups as well. As discussed in numerous places in this report, work with diaspora occurs across various levels of government. With that in mind, different levels may be better or worse positioned to act on a particular issue. For instance, our analysis of existing policy tools and frameworks at the level of receiving countries showed that, generally speaking, diaspora engagement from the perspective of home country development is predominantly addressed at the national level, whereas subnational levels are more occupied with an integration-related agenda and other local issues. Added to the mix is the European Union, which, as reported by surveyed diaspora representatives, is not automatically thought of as a potential partner for engagement.

Correspondingly, several levels of collaboration can be distinguished with respect to diaspora groups. Diaspora engagement can take the form of collaboration with diaspora organisations, focus on engaging directly with diaspora populations, or work through diaspora organisations to impact diaspora populations. As a consequence, considerations about the appropriate level of analysis and organisation should be part of any engagement planning process. We develop this point in greater detail below and offer the schematic

Table 9-1, which may prove useful as a guideline for engagement tailoring. In this context, it may be worth noting that given the ad hoc and transient nature of many diaspora organisations, governments may wish to avoid putting all of their eggs into one organisational basket.

### ***9.2.8. Funding assistance may entail improving access to already existing sources and/or introducing new types, such as social investment***

Several more remarks about the role of funding and financial support within the context of diaspora engagement are worth noting. As already suggested in the recommendations above, funding appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful diaspora engagement. In other words, policymakers should not view funding as a goal in itself but as a component that diaspora organisations perceive as instrumental in achieving their goals. Faced with the pervasiveness of budgetary constraints and possible unavailability of additional funding, it may be helpful to consider ways to facilitate access to what has already been made available to diaspora organisations. This suggestion echoes sentiments expressed by several diaspora representatives who have often found funding application processes confusing and excessively onerous.

In addition, while policymakers might not be in a position to increase the volume of direct financial support, they may be able to provide diaspora groups with assistance in accessing other types of funding. Social investment could be an example of such a source of support. As evidenced by the socioeconomic indicators presented in the mapping section, diaspora groups (and the populations of their countries of origin) generally exhibit lower levels of various social outcomes such as educational attainment or labour force participations in comparison with native populations of receiving countries. A significant share of surveyed organisations reported being involved in activities intended to improve these outcomes, which may be of potential interest to socially-minded investors who have shown interest in supporting such activities. This means there may be a role for policymakers to serve as an intermediary between diaspora groups and social investors and help establish and nurture relationships (including potential funding relationships) between the two groups. This point has been echoed in an engagement scheme in Antwerp, which found that the city can be a facilitator between companies/sponsors and migrant organisations (CeMIS, 2012, p. 75).

### ***9.2.9. (Un)willingness to engage may be related to some groups' precarious formal status***

Some reluctance on the part of diaspora groups to engage with authorities may stem from the fact that some diaspora members may not be legally authorised to reside in the receiving countries or may otherwise find their legal status surrounded by uncertainties. They might opt to keep a low profile and avoid entering into relationships with official bodies, even if they would benefit from such collaboration and the other party does not intend to impose any sanctions on them. This consideration did not feature prominently in the survey responses, potentially owing to either the kind of respondents involved or the unwillingness to report such an issue, but it remains present in literature on existing examples of diaspora engagement (see, for instance, Box 4).

Policymakers should recognise this consideration as one of the potential barriers to collaboration with diaspora groups. Some diaspora groups, for instance, might be particularly sensitive to changes in

migration policy and the legal context of its implementation. Building on one of the recommendations made in the previous section, this may be an area where policymakers could make a real difference in their qualitative relationship with diaspora groups with relatively modest steps. Of course, overhauling immigration policy would be a serious political undertaking, which might not be politically desirable. However, tangible benefits might be realised by incremental changes such as tackling long waiting and processing times or reducing the bureaucratic burden placed on participants in the immigration system. For such groups it may also be beneficial to encourage engagement with NGOs and other CSOs, perhaps as less threatening or more informal alternatives. In addition, policymakers may wish to consider the desirability of introducing some form of firewall mechanism between immigration enforcement and diaspora outreach efforts.

#### *9.2.10. Identification of suitable partners can be a challenging and, at times, risky undertaking*

Several important considerations should be kept in mind when identifying suitable partners for engagement with diaspora groups, as discussed below. These points are based mostly on the reviewed literature and our reflections on the diaspora survey and stakeholder interviews. However, unlike other points in this chapter, they reflect the research team's synthesis of available literature and interpretation of survey data rather than any preferences or points explicitly expressed by diaspora representatives.

First, there is a risk of engaging with groups who might hamper long-term collaboration with a diaspora and its country of origin. An example would be an organisation that is clearly on one side of a political debate in its country of origin and could thus carry the potential of alienating potential partners from another side of the divide. Other potential intra-diaspora cleavages that could produce similar effects are discussed in section 7.2.

Second, as exemplified by the relatively low response rate to our contact efforts, diaspora groups can be difficult to reach. Moreover, within diaspora groups substantial differences may exist in the extent to which organisations are willing and able to engage with officials and other stakeholders. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that collaborating with hardest-to-reach groups may yield the largest benefits, depending on the engagement goals in question. Particularly if the aim is to improve the outcomes for diaspora populations, hard-to-reach groups might represent those who would most benefit from such interventions or could enjoy disproportionate access to this population subset. Conversely, those groups that may be more predisposed to or open to collaborating with public officials might not be the most ideal partners. This may be due to, among other factors, incompatibility of objectives or lack of shared sense of priority.

Third, in light of the access difficulties discussed above, policymakers need to be aware that diaspora engagement carries the risk of creating an association, albeit in all likelihood an indirect one, with groups with whom policymakers may prefer not to be linked. Examples of such organisations may be groups with extremist, violent and intolerant views, or groups that advocate non-democratic policies. This is not necessarily a concern with organisations that are most ready to or already are engaging with policymakers but may arise when trying to increase the reach of engagement activities to include lower-profile actors.

Fourth, if it is indeed the case that official engagement efforts fail to find suitable partners, there might be other indirect routes to reach various groups, particularly if policymakers and other stakeholders are intent on engaging with groups in the diaspora country of origin. Social media has been suggested as one such example of a novel medium to get in touch with hard-to-reach groups in challenging contexts (CBC News, 2013; Radio Free Europe, 2013; The Guardian, 2013).

We recognise that these points do not offer conclusive answers to the issues raised; nevertheless, it is hoped that some use is gained by presenting them here in order to set realistic expectations and highlight to policymakers and other relevant parties some challenges likely to be encountered. The following section includes more detailed suggestions of how some of these challenges may be overcome.

### **9.3. Engagement strategies can be directed at specific diaspora groups or individuals, wider diaspora populations, or a combination of these; and may be targeted at specific issues or broader goals**

It should be clear from the preceding chapters that ‘engagement’ is a rather non-specific term which can carry multiple meanings and manifestations. Earlier in the report, we examined engagement strategies based on their dominant motivations – political, economic, or cultural/social – and in the case of receiving countries, by whether they were primarily directed at benefitting either the home or the host society. These distinctions help to illuminate the *goals* of engagement. Equally, we also believe it is worthwhile examining strategies based on the *targets* of engagement, especially when considering future engagement opportunities.

Engagement strategies may be targeted at diaspora populations as a whole, either within one or more receiving countries, or to the diaspora more globally. Strategies may be targeted at diaspora organisations, either individually (i.e. a partnership with a single organisation) or at multiple organisations representing one or more diaspora groups. They may also be targeted at individual or select members of the diaspora, whether or not those individuals are previously organised or connected to one another. Moreover, they may involve a combination of targets, for example seeking to engage the broader diaspora population through well-placed individuals or organisational partnerships.

Some strategies for diaspora may also seek specific outcomes around identified issues, with clear goals and potential for measurement. In contrast, other strategies may be broad-based, or without clear end-points or goals, aiming to facilitate diaspora activity more generally. We provide a typology of these distinctions below at

Table 9-1, with some indicative examples of diaspora engagement strategies in the intersecting cells.

**Table 9-1. Matrix of engagement by breadth and target group**

		Breadth of engagement	
		Broad	Targeted
Target of engagement	Diaspora population	<p>Initiatives aimed at encouraging links with large and potentially undefined sections of the diaspora population, for wide-ranging goals such as integration in the receiving country or encouraging economic or other contributions to the sending country.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>diaspora banks/accounts; diaspora bonds; co-diaspora conferences; voting, representation and citizenship rights for diaspora members; and migrant integration programmes in host societies.</i></p>	<p>Initiatives aimed at a potentially undefined section of the diaspora population, but with a specific goal in mind, such as developing a sector of the sending country economy, financing a specific project or contributing to one aspect of integration.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>diaspora banks/accounts; diaspora bonds; co-diaspora conferences; voting, representation and citizenship rights for diaspora members; and migrant integration programmes in host societies.</i></p>
	Diaspora organisation	<p>Initiatives aimed at developing capacities of diaspora organisations generally, but not necessarily partnering with specific organisations.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>databases of diaspora organisations; funding initiatives for development of diaspora/civil society organisations; and funding for community events.</i></p>	<p>Initiatives aimed at developing diaspora engagement through specific diaspora organisations, with identified goals.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>language and cultural schools; single-issue partnerships (such as engagement with migrant groups at risk of specific health problems); and diaspora branches of homeland political parties.</i></p>
	Individual members of diaspora	<p>Initiatives aimed at individual members or small groups within diaspora communities, with diffuse or general expectations of outcomes from engagement.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>diaspora councils and consultative bodies; databases of skilled members of diaspora; and development of diaspora business councils for trade facilitation between home and host countries.</i></p>	<p>Initiatives aimed at individual members or small groups within diaspora communities, with identified goals from engagement.</p> <p><b>Examples</b> include <i>return of skilled migrants programmes (e.g. directed at sending country health care or administrative capacity); and the use of high-profile diaspora members in awareness campaigns or transitional governments.</i></p>

The boundaries between these distinctions will often be blurred. For example, initiatives such as co-development programmes may be broad or targeted in nature, and may involve diaspora organisations alongside the wider diaspora population in supporting their efforts. Nonetheless, there are qualitative differences between the scope and content of these different approaches to engagement that deserve consideration when seeking to determine appropriate strategies.

#### 9.4. Recognising the characteristics of a diaspora organisation may help in determining appropriate engagement strategies

As noted regularly in this report, the most frequently cited recommendation – both in previous studies of diaspora engagement, as well as in related fields of migration and integration studies – is the importance of knowing each diaspora group when seeking to engage, provide services, assist with integration, or otherwise connect for with these populations. While the previous chapter noted that diaspora organisations were rarely a suitable proxy for entire diaspora populations, diaspora organisations

nonetheless may represent means for accessing potentially significant subsets of diaspora populations. It appears likely that receiving countries and sending countries alike will continue to access relevant diaspora populations through representatives of local, national and international diaspora organisations, fora, and councils, owing to a combination of the convenience of this approach, the lack of a plausible and practicable alternatives, and the often profuse links that key members of diaspora organisations may have to the broader diaspora community, relevant agencies, and other civil society organisations.

It is challenging to categorise diaspora organisations along one defining set of characteristics. The particular axis of characteristics one examines will play a part in determining what appears important in terms of understanding the organisation, yet other considerations are likely to be useful. The following questions may provide a checklist of questions to consider when seeking to ‘get to know diaspora organisations’, and hopefully offers some insight into the consequences of each answer.

#### ***9.4.1. What are the general characteristics of the organisation?***

How big or small, established or new, is this organisation? Does it receive funding from grants, foundations, community members, and/or private donors? Is it volunteer-led, or does it have paid staff? Is it a stand-alone or umbrella organisation? Does it claim to represent all diaspora members from a sending country, or is it oriented to a sub-group of the diaspora (such as a regional, youth-based, or women-specific group)? How does it make its decisions and engage its membership? These basic characteristics will likely bear on the kinds of initiatives in which such an organisation can participate, and how easily it can connect with its membership or the broader diaspora.

#### ***9.4.2. What is the organisation’s main mission?***

While we found that organisations are hard to *strictly* categorise, most have a ‘main’ or primary mission that fits into the goal-orientations we defined earlier (political, economic, or cultural/social) and with a handful of organisations, this mission seems to be their primary or only activity. In particular, we found that some organisations actively make efforts to show that they have no designs on (particularly) home country politics and are only interested in host society policy as it pertains to their smooth integration into the host society or the wellbeing of their membership. Many other organisations, however, have explicitly political goals or interests within their stated sphere of activities, which is perhaps unsurprising and often non-problematic. In all cases, the main focus of the organisation provides a guide for the types of partnerships organisations are willing to engage in, and may impact on the kinds of engagement valued by each.

#### ***9.4.3. Where does the organisation direct its activities?***

Certain diaspora organisations are almost entirely focused on homeland issues, while others avoid everything to do with the homeland and focus on receiving society integration and participation. Is the organisation host society or home society focused, or does it take a blended or comprehensive approach to diaspora issues? Does it also engage with other civil society groups regularly, and is it involved with intergovernmental and international organisations and initiatives? Understanding the direction of the organisational focus can assist in linking organisations to one another as well as understanding the breadth of partnerships that may be possible.

#### **9.4.4. *Is the organisation narrow or broad-based in its activities?***

Some organisations may only have one goal, such as a specific policy change or awareness around one issue; whether by choice, or due to capacity, they may limit themselves to attempts at success within this specific domain. Certain groups are only interested in business development, for example, and so would have little involvement with more disadvantaged members of their broader diaspora.

While these questions for consideration are apparent from our respondents, these are unlikely to be an exhaustive list of potential considerations. In particular, organisations who responded to the survey are likely to represent only part of the picture, and in particular include organisations more likely to support receiving country integration, intercultural dialogue, sending country economic and political development toward more Western models, and closer ties between sending and receiving countries in terms of business links and brain circulation. It is unclear what proportion of all diaspora organisations would share these characteristics.

#### **9.4.5. *Are there any negative repercussions that could stem from engaging with this group?***

Engagement with diaspora organisations, individuals and populations is broadly perceived as positive in the available literature, as noted above, and proactive engagement was seen by our interview and survey participants as constructive and encouraging further engagement. However, (as outlined in Chapter 7) there are a number of potential cautions for engagement with diaspora groups. Governments and organisations seeking to engage diasporas should be aware of existing schisms within the broader diaspora population, and consider whether their point of contact – for example, an established diaspora organisation – is inclusive or exclusive of certain viewpoints. Similarly, governments and organisations should consider the potential implications of requests made by certain diaspora groups on their relationships with other organisations and governments, both at receiving and sending country levels. This should not discourage governments and organisations from engagement, but rather ensure that potential repercussions from certain types of engagement are understood and to the extent possible avoided or protected against in advance.

### **9.5. Mapping data may be used to help understand the broader diaspora population, and to help tailor engagement initiatives, at the receiving country level**

Generally speaking, there is high heterogeneity of single country-of-origin diaspora groups across EU Member States and the United States. The policy implications of this are that the principle of heterogeneity within and amongst receiving countries must be considered by national-level officials when tailoring engagement initiatives for any one sending country, as the socio-economic profile of one country's diaspora in France will often be very different from its profile in the UK, for instance. Using mapping data to understand the diaspora profile *as related to one specific receiving country and how that compares to other settings* is a useful tool for policymakers to tailor engagement initiatives based on evidence, not on assumptions of the efficacy of initiatives in other countries with a large population of the same diaspora. Similarly, understanding the profile of the diaspora at the receiving country level should

feed back into existing engagement initiatives, which may need to be amended as this profile changes over time.

For policymakers at EU-level, developing holistic engagement strategies for specific sending countries should also bear in mind this heterogeneity-in-dispersion. Mapping data can identify countries in which a diaspora would benefit from home country investment and skilled labour return, along with countries where more effective diaspora engagement could take the form of inward investment such as increased access to education and training.

While mapping data can be used to better identify characteristics of the diaspora population at the receiving-country level, it can also be used for local, national, and international organisations such as the EU to better identify organisations with whom to engage. By identifying the characteristics and needs of diasporas from mapping data, governments can choose organisational partners which may have more of an impact with broad- and single-issue based engagement initiatives. In this context, mapping longitudinal data may be useful to improve understanding of how diasporas develop over time. For instance, there may be notable differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ groups, and composition may change based on home or host country events. Longitudinal data may also help measure the impact of policy changes.



## 10. Concluding Remarks

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Our report provides evidence from two largely separate but related exercises. In Part I, we provided up-to-date data from the best available sources outlining socioeconomic and demographic data for diaspora groups in the EU and US. From this data, we have been able to demonstrate several noteworthy patterns which may help policymakers to better understand the characteristics of relevant diasporas, their priorities and concerns.

First and foremost, in comparison with their countries of origin, diaspora groups on the whole achieve better outcomes on a range of socioeconomic indicators. Diaspora groups generally show higher rates of high educational attainment, labour force participation in their receiving countries, and, to the extent this can be understood as a positive outcome, higher share of working age population.

The comparison with receiving countries offers a much more complex picture. Diaspora groups have a higher share of working age population than the populations in the countries where they settled but generally lag behind with respect to labour force and education outcomes. The size of this gap is much larger for labour force participation rates than for educational outcomes.

Crucially, there is a substantial degree of variability among receiving countries in how successful they are in achieving positive outcomes for diaspora groups located in their territories or in attracting groups with preexisting good outcomes. A particularly striking difference was observed between the United States and the EU Member States, though we recognise that this may be to some extent attributable to geographical factors. In the European context, northern and western European countries appear to be more successful than their southern counterparts. These types of patterns are particularly useful for pointing out any policy and other contextual factors that may explain the outcome differentials across observed diaspora groups and may identify potential suitable leaders in the effort to improve outcomes for diaspora communities and, by extension, their countries of origin.

In Part II, we looked more closely at specific diaspora groups and the frameworks in place for their engagement at both sending and receiving country levels. We also gathered new empirical data in the form of surveys and interviews with diaspora organisation representatives. From these exercises, we are able to propose eight related recommendations for diaspora engagement, as well as a number of additional considerations, concerns and caveats outlining practices and factors that may facilitate or inhibit engagement activities.

This report has provided an overview of common and novel strategies being implemented at national levels, and also recognises a significant role for local-level engagement and partnership with diasporas in both sending and receiving countries, though examination of local initiatives was largely outside our scope

of activity. Of course, the potential for future practice is evidently wide-ranging in this area. Our considerations and recommendations should thus be seen as foundations for, rather than as proscriptive against, potentially innovative developments. There will certainly be circumstances where even our most robust findings – such as knowing a diaspora in advance of engagement – are impracticable, though engagement may be unavoidable or essential within a broader policy programme.

In these terms, we recognise that our recommendations land on an existing policy and social landscape and provide them as guidelines which are sensitive to local conditions. This report provides a high-level analysis of very significant and pressing issues. While diaspora engagement has been a specific area of interest for many countries for decades, many others are only beginning to actively seek out their own diasporas as promising levers of economic and social development at the homeland level. Host countries appear to be less developed than homelands in identifying diaspora engagement as an area for policy and programme development, but diaspora engagement can nonetheless be found within these countries' broader integration and migration policies.

Yet, and returning to the definition of diaspora offered at the outset of the report, diasporas are more complex in some aspects than other migrant groups, as their continued affective and material ties to their homelands can both complicate and enhance the ways in which they integrate and partner with host country actors. The choice that members of diaspora make to maintain links with their homeland underpins their value as potential partners for engagement and collaboration.

## 10.1. Implications for further research

As discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, and again in our policy considerations, there is a particular need for systematic and comparative research on specific engagement initiatives. Greater attention to 'what works, where and for which groups' in future research appears important for understanding the effectiveness of the range of potential approaches to engagement. The European Commission and other bodies supporting studies such as this represent significant steps in this direction. We also recognise that our study has benefitted significantly from previous project reports, evaluations, and broad-based studies of diaspora engagement initiatives cited herein. Nonetheless, we also know that most of the work in this area to date, even evaluation work, has been *post hoc* in orientation and designed in ways that limit our ability to provide cross-case comparisons. Building in systematic evaluation methods to engagement activities requires resources up-front during planning, piloting and implementation. This investment is likely to pay dividends especially for those seeking cross-cutting transferable lessons for ongoing development of engagement initiatives.

Finally, in considering transferability, we would encourage further work to understand the viewpoints of active diaspora organisations in the EU and the US. Like other researchers in this field, we have found accessing diaspora populations to be a complicated matter. While we believe lessons can be learned from our survey of diaspora organisations, we also consider it likely that our sample is biased towards those 'engagement-seeking' organisations whose attitudes toward engagement may already be positive (even where their satisfaction with that engagement is not always high). While it is a relatively simple matter to highlight this issue and a much more complicated matter to address it, we suggest that further research on diaspora organisations not seeking engagement be considered a priority area going forward.

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## Appendix A: Overviews of diaspora engagement approaches by selected country of origin

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## Afghanistan

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

Diaspora engagement does not appear to be under the remit of a single institution in Afghanistan, nor does it appear to be coordinated by a leading body. Our research found that multiple agencies are involved in aspects of diaspora engagement, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs, and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.



While there is no government ministry in the lead for diaspora-related issues, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) includes the Afghan diaspora in its National Consultation Process, which aims to oversee the strategic direction of the ANDS by high-level stakeholders. The government ministries who oversee these broad thematic areas of the ANDS, which would ostensibly involve the Afghan diaspora, are the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of the Economy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008).

Within the ANDS, the Afghan diaspora features in the ANDS's private sector investment initiatives, and in support of civil institutions through brain gain/skill transfer from talented diaspora members. As such, Afghanistan's articulated approach to diaspora engagement focuses primarily on relatively 'elite' members of diaspora and does not address social or wellbeing aspects of the broader diaspora to the same degree as more comprehensive diaspora strategies, except insofar as separate ministries support refugee resettlement and repatriation.

As detailed below, a significant amount of effort has been ongoing in Afghanistan for over a decade to encourage civil service reform, in part through use of diaspora talent. The funders of these programmes have included the World Bank IDA, USAID and IOM.

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**Management Capacity Programme (MCP), Afghan Expatriate Programme (AEP), Return of Qualified Afghans (RQA) and related initiatives:** Since 2002, a number of programmes have been put in place to encourage qualified members of the Afghan diaspora to take part in civil society institutions on temporary or permanent bases. The current iteration of these programmes is the MCP, which succeeds the AEP and the related



### Key facts<sup>5</sup>

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**No dedicated ministry; multiple ministries potentially involved**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**None; external voting was exceptionally allowed in 2004 but not since**

Lateral Entry Programme (LEP) (World Bank, 2011a). The IOM previously supported similar programmes under the RQA, including Temporary Return of Qualified Migrants (TRQM) and The Placement of Afghan Expatriate Professionals Programme - EU (PAEPEU) initiatives (International Organisation for Migration, 2008). Technical, HR and information systems support in relation to these has been provided for civil service reform by the World Bank and USAID, among others (World Bank, 2011a).

## Algeria



### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement <sup>219</sup>

Algeria's government has developed a number of recent initiatives to better engage with the diaspora community, including the establishment of a number of national bodies charged with consultation with diaspora communities and oversight of diaspora affairs. Their primary goals within these initiatives appears to be the development of links with talented Algerians ('competences') within the diaspora as well as creating opportunities for out-migration to developed European neighbourhood countries. There also appears to be a secondary but significant attempt to promote Algerian 'socio-cultural values' within the diaspora through cultural and language programmes. The Migration Policy Centre (2013a, pp. 12-13) identifies the following recent initiatives for diaspora engagement by Algeria:

- Implementation of National Advisory Board of the National Community Abroad
- Consultations by the Secretary of State for the National Community Abroad with diaspora communities
- Implementation of socio-cultural and language education programmes
- Working with host country governments to provide opportunities for Algerians, for example around visa issues in the EU, and specific bilateral arrangements for circulation of persons, for example with Belgium and the UK
- Mobilising 'competences' and investors for development in Algeria

The government, through its embassies, has established a portal (People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, 2013) through which individual Algerian diaspora members and organisations can register to facilitate opportunities for expatriates to contribute to Algeria's development and prosperity. Algeria also has a strong civil society component involved in the facilitation of 'brain gain' or 'brain circulation'. Active groups in this area include the Algerian Competences Association (ACA), the Algerian Association for the Transfer of Technology, the Network of the Algerian Graduates from the *Grandes Ecoles* (REAGE) and the Network for the Investment in the Mediterranean (ANIMA).

Algeria has a notable tradition of promoting political participation within its diaspora and has an external voting regime that provides eight seats in the



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Delegate Ministry in Charge of the National Community Established Abroad**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; multiple programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed; also, Algeria has reserved 8 seats in its legislature for election by the diaspora**

<sup>219</sup>This overview is adapted from MPC's 2013 migration profile of Algeria (Migration Policy Centre, 2013a).

national legislature for election directly by diaspora members, with half of these seats reserved for women. They are among a handful of countries, and one of two of the selected countries, to offer such representation. However, voter turnout among the community abroad is not particularly high, at 14% of registered diaspora voters in the 2012 elections (LeMag, 2012).

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**National Advisory Board of the National Community Abroad:** This initiative was announced in early 2013 and is likely to be implemented in 2014. The Board is elected by the national conference of the community abroad, and will serve a consultative role for Algeria's government.

## Djibouti

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*



Our research has been unable to uncover any instances of active or recent diaspora engagement programmes or initiatives being run by, or in coordination with, the government of Djibouti.

International organisations are providing some support for Djibouti's diaspora to engage with the homeland. For example, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Diaspora Investment in Agriculture (DIA) initiative (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011), which operates in Somalia and Djibouti, aims to use diaspora skill and capital in fostering agricultural development in these countries of origin. The programme was launched in 2013, and partners with diaspora and other civil society organisations to achieve its mission. This in turn is meant to promote better food security in the Horn of Africa as well as better links for diaspora to these states.

IOM also provides support in Djibouti (International Organisation for Migration, 2013a); however, this is mostly in relation to proximal migration and border control issues rather than relating to diaspora relationships in the EU or the US.

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**Diaspora Investment in Agriculture (DIA):** This programme is in place in both Somalia and Djibouti, and is described in further detail in the Somalia profile page.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**None identified**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

## Egypt

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



In recent decades, the Egyptian government has become aware of the significant benefits of having Egyptians abroad. These benefits are mainly related to (new) export markets, new skills coming to Egypt from abroad and the receipt of remittances (International Organization for Migration, 2013b). Therefore, the Egyptian government tries to foster ties with Egyptian expatriates in order to 'a) build confidence for a good investment environment through new opportunities for the private sector: b) improve the positive impact of remittances on national development; c) capitalise on the knowledge and skills-transfer of migrants returning home.'

Diaspora engagement has also been codified in the Egyptian constitution of 2012 (Egypt Independent, 2012), which states in Art. 56, that 'Egypt protects Egyptians living abroad, protect their rights and freedoms, help them fulfilling their public duties toward the Egyptian State and society and encourage their contribution to the development of the nation' (Dawood, 2012). In terms of these duties toward the state, the Egyptian President has recently met with the chief of the General Union of Egyptians Abroad to seek support and consultation from the diaspora for rebuilding efforts (The Cairo Post, 2014).

In terms of economic participation in Egypt, remittances from diaspora members are subject to a relaxed tax and fees regime which has been in place since the early 1980s (Dawood, 2012), and Egyptians abroad who transfer their remittances through banks receive tax breaks for up to ten years from the time of the first formal transfer (Migration Policy Institute, 2012).

### Key policies and initiatives

**Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) Project:** The IMIS project, which was established in June 2001, results from cooperation between the Italian government, the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, and the International Organisation for Migration. It aims to regulate Egyptian labour migration as well as to support and strengthen ties with Egyptians abroad and involve them in investments in their origin country (International Organization for Migration, 2013d). In particular, IMIS provides a portal website of opportunities for potential migrants and



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Emigration Sector**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No strategy document identified; multiple programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

electronic resources for current migrants (Ministry of Manpower & Emigration - Emigration and Egyptians Abroad Sector, 2009).

**General Union of Egyptians Abroad:** Founded in 1985, the General Union of Egyptians Abroad was founded to defend the rights of Egyptian expatriates (Masress, 2011). It is a non-governmental body with links to the Egyptian government as well as media, religious, and educational institutions. The Union also provides religious and cultural education for diaspora members, and organises tours for emigrants to visit family in Egypt (Sawi, 2005).

**Conference of Egyptians Abroad:** To date, the Egyptian government has organised seven General Conferences for Egyptians Abroad, the most recent being in August 2013. The conference is intended to foster 'stronger economic, political and cultural links with the Egyptian diaspora (International Organization for Migration, 2013d). The most recent conference focused on government initiatives across business, development, scientific and political engagement initiatives (State Information Service, 2013).

## Eritrea



### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

We were not able to identify a single overarching strategy for diaspora engagement for Eritrea. Most of the existing efforts by the Eritrean government to engage the diaspora relate to encouraging investment from Diaspora members in Eritrean opportunities (allAfrica, 2012) and levying a controversial ‘diaspora tax’, which is a levy of 2% of income on all members of the diaspora and is meant to be mandatory (Africa Review, 2013). The tax is meant to support national rebuilding and defence efforts. This makes Eritrea one of two countries in the world that taxes its diaspora based on citizenship rather than residency (the other being the US) (The Globe and Mail, 2013).

The tax in particular has damaged relations with other countries and the UN. Canada has expelled the Eritrean consul over the tax (Africa Review, 2013) and the UN Security Council in December 2011 denounced the tax (alongside Eritrea’s collection methods, which are considered often extortionate and illegal) as increasing instability in the region (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Some have alleged that the tax is being used to fund al-Shabaab militants and other Islamist militant groups (Africa Review, 2013), and the notion that Eritrea supports al-Shabaab appears to be accepted by the UN Security Council.

Regarding other efforts for economic stimulus from the diaspora, the government of Eritrea sponsored two investment conferences for diaspora returnees in 2012. They are also seeking diaspora investment and support in areas such as energy, fisheries, and tourism, as well as potentially in the (semi) privatisation of a number of state-run firms (US Department of State, 2013) including telecommunications and insurance (CapitalEritrea, 2012). Shares in a number of state-owned firms were ‘initially offered only to diaspora returnees’ (US Department of State, 2013). However, the US State Department reports that investors in Eritrea face an environment that lacks transparency and has severe infrastructure challenges (US Department of State, 2013), which may discourage FDI from diaspora.

Regarding political and social participation, the youth have become something of a battleground for Eritrean diaspora politics. There appears to be a schism both within the country and in the diaspora. On the one hand are pro-government organisations such as the Young People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (YFPDJ), which has multiple North American and



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Eritreans Abroad**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed and provisions may have recently changed; facilities for overseas voting were only ever made available previously in 1993 referendum on independence**

European chapters, and the National Union Eritrean Youth and Students (NUEYS), which organises trips to Eritrea for diaspora members; and on the other hand are groups such as the Eritrean Democratic Alliance, which is the opposition umbrella organisation with many members in diaspora or in exile. Non-political groups appear to be limited by this schism.

### *Key policies and initiatives*

Our research did not uncover any recent or ongoing diaspora engagement initiatives of particular note. We found reports of certain diaspora engagement activities, such as the NUEYS's 'visit your country' initiative. Agunias and Newland (2012, p. 102) also report, via an Eritrean government official, that German, American and Cuban Eritreans in the diaspora have been supporting the development of a medical school and ongoing medical training in the country. The same source (p. 105) claims that Eritrea has now adopted overseas voting measures. However, we have been unable to find further details on these initiatives.

# Ethiopia

## Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

Ethiopia's approach to diaspora engagement is outlined in their national Diaspora Policy document, which was launched in 2013 (allAfrica, 2013a). This document involves both measures that have been taken to engage diaspora, as well as a number of planned actions. Its major focus is economic, as the government sees diaspora engagement as a 'vital element' (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) in its Growth and Transformation plan, which looks to double the Ethiopian GDP in five years from 2010.



The policy is a federal-level initiative. However, Ethiopia has also created regional state Diaspora Coordination Offices in Addis Ababa, Hawassa, Gambela, Jijiga, and Dre Dawa. This is a reflection of the policy's broader intention to harmonise the activities of multiple national and local bodies such as investment, trade, industry, land development, culture and tourism administrations to facilitate diaspora participation (Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate, 2011).

As with many relatively new diaspora policies, much of the Ethiopia Diaspora Policy discusses actions to be taken, but which are currently either in process or under consideration. Initiatives such as a website and database for diaspora coordination, creation of a National Diaspora Day, and the creation of a National Diaspora Council are all discussed in the Policy, but appear to be on the horizon rather than in place. Also, given the apparent diffusion of the responsibility for aspects of the diaspora policy across many national and regional bodies it is hard to know the degree to which various measures are being implemented.

### Key policies and initiatives

**Person of Ethiopian Origin Identification Card (PEOIC):** Ethiopia does not allow dual citizenship. To encourage those of Ethiopian origin who have lost citizenship to remain involved in Ethiopia's development, in 2002 the government created the PEOIC, or 'Yellow Card', which in particular provides strong economic rights for diaspora members (though does not allow for participation in elections or employment in certain government agencies). The PEOIC is not available to Eritreans of Ethiopian origin.

**Diaspora Account and Formal Remittance Service:** To facilitate remittances and investment, the government since 2004 has regulated a Diaspora Account in Ethiopian banks, where members of Diaspora may open a foreign currency account in USD, GBP or EUR currencies. They have also developed a regulation regime for remittance service providers 'to



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate General**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Ethiopian Diaspora Policy**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Not allowed; however foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin can obtain the PEOIC**

**External Voting**

**Not allowed (under consideration)**

reduce the costs of remittance transfer' and encourage formal remittances from the diaspora (Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate, 2011).

## India

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

India's national approach to diaspora engagement is outlined in the 2000 *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*, which profiles the Indian diaspora by receiving country, and offers recommendations for increasing the 'connectivity' between India and the Indian diaspora (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2001). The report, prepared by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, essentially put forward a two-tiered approach towards diaspora engagement. On one hand, the Report recommended an additional legal status to be extended to Indians living abroad who were not citizens – the Person of Indian Origin status – in order to expand the legal-political framework under which the centre-state could engage with its diaspora. Relatedly, the Report recommended new institutions to facilitate diaspora-home country ties, in order to formalise links with the diaspora and take advantage of the diaspora's economic and cultural potential.



Beyond the High Level Committee, the government of India created a ministry dedicated to the diaspora in 2004. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs positions itself as the primary services ministry for the Indian diaspora. With four 'service' divisions: diaspora, financial, emigration, and management, the Ministry's mandate heavily emphasizes the economic benefits that can be derived from a closer relationship between the diaspora and home country, and the majority of initiatives the Ministry has launched have an economic development focus (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2009).

#### Key policies and initiatives

**Pravasi Bharatiya Divas:** The Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was established by the Ministry in 2004 as a means to celebrate the contribution of the Indian diaspora, and for overseas Indians and the government to exchange business opportunities.

**The Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre:** The facilitation centre provides information to overseas Indians on investment opportunities in India, and aims to reduce the bureaucratic red-tape that may stand in the way of diaspora investment (Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC), 2014).

**Fellowships:** Various Indian ministries offer prestigious fellowships solely awarded to overseas Indians, with the aim of incentivising the return



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Strategic Plan for the Next Five Years**

#### Dual Citizenship

**Dual citizenship is not allowed, although there are several different statuses of Indian residency/nationality that are available to people of Indian Origin.**

#### External Voting

**Allowed**

migration of highly skilled engineers and scientists (Department of Biotechnology, 2013; Department of Science and Technology, 2005; Science and Engineering Research Board, 2014).

## Iraq

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



Iraq does not have a discernible national approach to diaspora engagement. Existing government initiatives prioritise the incentivised return of highly-skilled expatriates across fields of expertise.

The Iraqi government appears to have also devoted significant capacity to issues around displaced persons through the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM), including internally displaced persons, refugees (i.e. those living outside their countries of origin) and returnees (i.e. 'former displaced persons or refugees who returned to their homes or places of habitual residence' (Ministry of Displacement and Migration, 2008)). However, these groups are for the most part different from diaspora groups within the meaning of this study. Outside of their activities toward highly-skilled expatriates, very little diaspora-oriented activity, active or planned, was identified by our research.

Other programmes engaging the diaspora for home country purposes have been supported by international organisations and the US government. In the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, a number of programmes intended in part to harness skills within the Iraqi diaspora appeared, such as in particular the Local Government Programme (LGP) funded by USAID, and more recently the Local Area Development Programme (LADP) described below. Similar to programmes in Afghanistan, these initiatives have sought to bring highly-skilled expatriates back to Iraq to assist with rebuilding efforts and to develop institutions of governance. The success of the LGP has been questioned in an audit (Office of The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008) by the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq, which concluded that while available data suggested positive results of the programme, data tracking throughout the project was poor and value for money remained an open question.

### Key policies and initiatives

**Strategic plan to attract highly-skilled expatriates (no official title found) (Al-Shorfa.com, 2012b):** There has been a recent set of initiatives by the Ministries of Planning, Higher Education, and Migration and Displacement alongside Iraqi embassies to incentivise return migration (Al-Shorfa.com, 2012a), beginning in 2012 (Al-Shorfa.com, 2012a). Al-Shorfa.com reports that incentives have included higher salaries, property



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM)**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

and other benefits 'usually allocated to state employees', and many former state employees have been offered the opportunity to return to positions held prior to the conflict (Al-Shorfa.com, 2012b). After the first campaign round in 2012, '2,430 doctors, engineers, university professors, academic researchers, experts, authors, artists, religious leaders and tribal chiefs returned to Iraq' (Al-Shorfa.com, 2013).

**Local Area Development Programme (LADP), 2007-2015:** The LADP is a multi-agency partnership led by the UNDP that is seeking to 'improve inclusive service delivery, local development and local government accountability' in three regions in Iraq (Järvinen, 2013). In part, the strategy is seeking to use diaspora expertise to develop Iraqi institutions. The UNDP reports that the LADP 'catalysed the establishment of "Bridges to Iraq"; an Iraqi Diaspora led volunteer group working to engage in local development issues in Iraq'; this has in turn facilitated a partnership between diaspora academics and a number of Iraqi universities (United Nations Development Program, 2013a).

## Azad/Pakistani-controlled Jammu and Kashmir

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

The Pakistani-controlled portion of Jammu and Kashmir is technically a self-governing state with its own government, but Pakistan retains de-facto control over its foreign affairs, so the ability of Kashmir to lobby or engage with its diaspora is limited. Despite the state government's limited ability to engage with its diaspora, there does exist an 'Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell' which both provides the Kashmiri diaspora with assistance on social welfare matters, and tries to leverage the diasporas investment into the state (Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell, n.d.).

In addition to the diaspora's role in Kashmiri development, the state government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir has also identified the diaspora as having an important role to play in political lobbying vis-à-vis the India-Pakistan Kashmiri dispute, stating that: 'Overseas Kashmiris are our ambassadors. They have a vital role in the development of AJ&K. They are play very important role in highlighting the Kashmir issue at the international level, which will ensure right to self-determination and put an end to Indian atrocities.'

### *Key policies and initiatives*

No diaspora-specific initiatives were identified.

## Key facts

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**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Overseas Kashmiris Facilitation Cell**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Nine-point mandate of the Cell**

**Dual Citizenship Allowed**

**External Voting Not allowed**

## Kenya

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

The most comprehensive document outlining the national diaspora strategy is the *Diaspora Policy of Kenya* (DRAFT) (Republic of Kenya, 2011b). The document envisages wide-ranging engagement with the Kenyan diaspora, focused primarily but not exclusively on economic development. It focuses on the support, promotion, and in cases where they don't exist, creation, of Kenyan diaspora communities worldwide. The strategy seeks to address and remove obstacles to diaspora contributions including 'curbing high cost of remittances, improving consular services to address diaspora issues, using the Kenyan diaspora to promote tourism, tapping into diaspora talents to reverse brain drain, and designing a system of collection of data on diaspora profiles.' (p. 11).

It proposes (p. 14) the development of a National Diaspora Council of Kenya (NADICOK), comprised of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Human Resource Development, Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Ministry of East African Community, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Education, Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Gender, Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat, Central Bank, Retirement Benefits Authority, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and representatives of Kenya Diaspora Communities.



Since development of the Diaspora Strategy, further progress on finalising a comprehensive Diaspora Engagement Strategic and Policy Framework (DESPF) has been behind schedule (Kenya Vision 2030, 2011). Development and consolidation of the strategy forms part of the medium-term activities of the Kenya Vision 2030 project.

### Key policies and initiatives

#### **IDF Grant for Strengthening Capacity for Diaspora Engagement:**

Kenya is currently in receipt of a World Bank Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant supporting the development of the DESPF, particularly to better engage with the EU and US components of diaspora as partners in development (Institutional Development Fund (IDF), 2013).

**Diaspora SACCOs:** Kenya's relevant ministries have begun to license, regulate and promote Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) operating



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Diaspora Affairs Directorate**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Diaspora Engagement Strategic and Policy Framework (DESPF; in development)**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed; Kenyans not wishing to retain citizenship can opt for an 'Overseas Citizenship Card', equivalent to 'visa for life'**

**External Voting**

**Not allowed**

in the US and the UK, with plans for further expansion. These cooperatives are meant to serve as vehicles to facilitate remittances and investment from the diaspora (Business Daily, 2013).

**Diaspora advisory councils:** The Kenyan Embassy in Washington DC is encouraging Kenyans in the US to form advisory councils, which would liaise with the Embassy in support of development initiatives. These are not meant to replace existing diaspora groups, and are intended as vehicles to strengthen historically weak ties between the diaspora and the Embassy (Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, n.d.-b).

## Libya

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

The Libyan diaspora played an important internal and international message-building and communication role in the 2011 uprising in Libya and is expected to be an important part of state-building and development in the aftermath (The Brookings Institute, 2011). However, our research was unable to identify any national strategy relating to diaspora engagement.



Ministries such as Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Justice; Defence; and Interior may all have roles with aspects of diaspora engagement, but none appear to have an active strategy relating to the diaspora at present. This lack of strategy is likely due to the transitional nature of government in Libya at present, which is currently managing acute migration issues surrounding border management and security (Migration Policy Centre, 2013b).

Historically, the Libyan diaspora was treated with hostility through the 1970s and 1980s. While the adoption of the Green Charter for Human Rights in 1988 in Libya led to a relaxation of rules on returnees, the regime was not particularly active in diaspora recruitment (Maghur, 2010).

More recently, in the early 2000s, the government sought to provide means for skilled Libyans, particularly medical professionals, to return home, including relaxing rules on dual citizenship (Maghur, 2010).<sup>220</sup> However, as of 2010 the effort to encourage return of diaspora skills had ‘not been translated into a clear policy’ (Maghur, 2010, p. 7).

### *Key policies and initiatives*

No significant current policies, programmes or initiatives for diaspora engagement by Libya were identified by our research.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**No dedicated ministry; multiple ministries potentially involved**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**None found, no significant programmes identified**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Not allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

<sup>220</sup> We would note that the state of play for dual citizenship in Libya is unclear from our research. The MACIMIDE database states that dual citizenship is not allowed; however, other sources, such as the MPC profile (2013b) on Libya, states that it is possible with authorisation. The latter position seems more likely.

## Mali

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

Mali's diaspora engagement work is primarily supported by the Ministry of Malians Abroad and African Integration, the High Council of Malians Abroad, and the General Delegation of Malians Abroad. These bodies work with other agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Agency for Promotion of Investments, and provide policy advice on diaspora engagement to the government.



Mali's overall strategy towards its diaspora includes the facilitation of legal migration (alongside programmes to highlight the risks of illegal migration to potential migrants); the support of Malians abroad through the High Council of Malians Abroad, which has offices in 62 countries as of 2010 (Malians abroad are also supported by civil society groups such as the Association of Expelled Malians, AME, which provides services for expelled Malian migrants); and to increase political, social and economic participation of Malian diaspora groups with the homeland (Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury, & Perrin, 2010a).

Mali has agreements in place to support return or circular migration with a number of European countries, including France (Migration Policy Institute, 2012, p. 49), Spain (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010a, p. 4), Switzerland (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010a), and also a recent programme in partnership with an Italian NGO, described below. Mali also encourages return migration by its citizens through a relaxed customs and duties scheme for returning migrants and students (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010a).

Members of the Malian diaspora provided donations to support the war effort during the conflict in 2012-2013 in the north of the country, with total contributions in the range of €25,000 reported in early 2013 by the Ministry of Malians Abroad and African Integration (Ministère des Maliens de l'Extérieur et de l'Intégration Africaine, 2013). Most of the contribution came from outside of the EU and US-based diaspora.

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**Resettlement partnership with Italy:** Mali recently signed an agreement with the Italian NGO Svilppo 2000, which would support the repatriation of 80 Malian nationals currently residing in Italy. Upon return to Mali, this programme will provide the repatriated Malians with training and



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Malians Abroad and African Integration**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No strategy document identified; multiple programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

employment in an agricultural processing centre in the Kayes region of Mali. The project cost €1.65M (Ministère des Maliens de l'Extérieur, 2014).

**TALMALI (UNESCO, 2001):** Mali's government partnered with the UNDP and UNESCO's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme to develop a unique project aimed at developing higher education capacity at the University of Mali (UNESCO, 2001). Called TALMALI [for 'Mali's Talents (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010a, p. 9)], the project was designed to rapidly fill teaching and research needs at the University of Mali as well as establish ongoing dialogue between Malian academics and their expatriate counterparts.

## Mauritania

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*



The 2013 UN Population Information Network (POPIN) profile of Mauritania reports no economic initiatives to encourage diaspora investment, no policy to encourage return migration, nor a dedicated government body dealing with diaspora issues (ESCWA, 2012).

The CARIM/MPC profile (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010b) suggests that there are some efforts to maintain relationships with the Mauritanian Diaspora from various ministries including Interior, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and Economic Affairs and Development. However, these have not been particularly meaningful in scope. The most substantial efforts for diaspora engagement in recent history involved the creation of a 'transitory State Secretariat in charge of Mauritanians abroad' (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010b, p. 6); however, this entity was dissolved in 2008.

Existing initiatives are almost all relating to repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from proximal African nations (Migration Policy Centre, 2013c).

### *Key policies and initiatives*

No initiatives were found.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**No dedicated ministry; multiple ministries potentially involved**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No strategy document found; programmes in place mostly related to refugee repatriation**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Not allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

## Morocco

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

Morocco has a national strategy and action plan that is coordinated by the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad (*les Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger*, normally referred to as the MRE). The strategy objectives of this Ministry are: (1) to assist migrants to settle in the host countries by keeping the links with the MRE; (2) defend the rights of Moroccans abroad and in Morocco; (3) involve skilled migrants in the development of their origin country; (4) encourage investments from the Moroccan Diaspora.



The ministry runs a series of 'key programmes' which include a social support programme for MRE members; a cultural and educational programme consisting of cultural centres in host countries, summer programmes, cultural activities and festivals, and language and cultural teaching initiatives;<sup>221</sup> an 'administrative coaching' programme which provides legal and judicial assistance to the diaspora; a communication and information programme; a MRE investor programme; and a MRE skills mobilisation programme (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2012d).

The government of Morocco also works with the Hassan II Foundation, which was created by Royal decree and receives significant financial support from the government. Hassan II (founded by and named after the late King) supports programmes complementary to those of the Ministry, in cultural promotion, legal and social assistance, economic development, international cooperation and partnership, and supporting an MRE observatory, which maintains data and undertakes analysis on the MRE community (Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger, n.d.).

### Key policies and initiatives

**MRE skills mobilisation programme:** Like many other selected countries, the diaspora strategy expects to make use of skills within the diaspora to aid development at home. Morocco's programme has, to date, supported the creation of skills-exchange networks with the MRE in Germany, Belgium and Canada. This has in turn supported a number of initiatives for training and knowledge exchange between MRE and Moroccans residing in the home country. The skills mobilisation programme, like much of the broader

<sup>221</sup> The language and cultural programmes claim an expenditure of c750M Moroccan Dirham (c€67M) over several years.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs (*Ministre Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger et des Affaires de la Migration*)**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Ministry Strategy and Action Plan 2008-2012**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

national strategy, intends to establish stronger electronic platforms to maintain information on MRE skills abroad and also providing a forum for links between diaspora and Morocco (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2012c).

**Ministry Cultural and Educational Programme:** The overall programme involves multiple mechanisms to support Moroccan culture abroad, including the development of cultural centres<sup>222</sup> in countries with large MRE populations, grant funding of cultural activities, youth camps for MRE children and young adults, and Arabic language and Moroccan cultural schools in receiving countries. The programme claims significant expenditures between Hassan II and government funding across these initiatives (c€67M since 2009), with approximately three-fifths of that going towards the establishment of cultural centres.

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<sup>222</sup> The Ministry webpage suggests that centres are being finalised in Brussels, Montreal, Amsterdam, Tripoli and Tunisia with further centres planned in Barcelona, Milan, Montpellier, Mantes-la-Jolie and Dakar (Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, 2012b).

## Niger

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



The Nigerien government does not appear to have any substantial activity directed to diaspora engagement at national level, though the Nigerien diaspora is under the purview of a national ministry. Niger has identified roles for diaspora primarily in economic development, specifically within the Rural Development Strategy of Niger (Stratégie de développement rural au Niger) and earlier in the 2008-2010 Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

The CARIM profile on Niger reports that an exercise to identify potential benefits of using the UNDP's TOKTEN programme was undertaken in Niger in 2009; since the 2010 military coup the leadership has more actively sought links with the diaspora (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, & Perrin, 2011).

However, we have been unable to identify any existing initiatives to engage the Nigerien diaspora, with the exception of official visits by high-ranking Nigerien officials reported by CARIM, and in these cases only to diaspora representatives within Africa. Niger's engagement with its European or US diaspora appears to be extremely limited.

### Key policies and initiatives

No initiatives identified.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Nigériens Abroad**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Not allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

## Islamic Republic of Pakistan

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

Since the first major exodus of Pakistani workers to the Gulf States in the 1970s, the Pakistani national diaspora strategy has focused on capturing the significant foreign remittances generated by Pakistani overseas workers (Addleton, 2012), and Pakistan's diaspora strategy has henceforth been nearly entirely centred on leveraging the economic benefits the diaspora can offer.

The focus on remittance generated by the diaspora is apparent in national policy, where the 2009 National Emigration Policy identifies remittance facilitation and management as one of nine priority areas for the Government of Pakistan's diaspora-focused agencies. While the Policy places emphasis on other areas affecting the diaspora, the agencies that have a mandate for diaspora management place far greater emphasis on remittances and employment issues than the Policy would suggest.



In 2013, the Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development was created as a result of the consolidation of several diaspora-related government departments. The Ministry and its constituent agencies have a greater emphasis on facilitating remittances and the employment opportunities abroad than other priority areas identified in the National Emigration Policy however, and Pakistan's diaspora agencies have begun to implicitly encourage its unemployed and under-employed to seek jobs abroad to both increase gross remittances and reduce domestic unemployment (Associated Press of Pakistan, 2013).

While Pakistan is unique insofar as it actively encourages its citizens to become members of its international diaspora, the research team could find no initiatives which aimed to incentivise return-migration of highly-skilled diaspora members.

### Key policies and initiatives

**Overseas Pakistanis Foundation:** The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation was established in 1979 and serves as the service provider for overseas Pakistanis, the OPF offers educational facilities, housing projects, and pension benefits for the families of overseas Pakistanis.

**The Overseas Employment Corporation:** The Overseas Employment Corporation was founded in 1976, and implements the strategic objectives of the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment by operating a job



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**National Policy for Overseas Pakistanis**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed. Also, citizens of other countries may become Pakistani citizens in addition to their primary citizenship provided they belong to one of 16 countries with which Pakistan has a dual-nationality arrangement with**

**External Voting**

**Not allowed**

portal for Pakistanis who wish to find employment abroad. The Corporation has provided more than 120,000 Pakistani workers to foreign governments and companies across the world (Overseas Employment Corporation, 2013).

## Philippines

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) was established in 1980 under the office of the President to provide support in the development of policies related to Filipinos in the diaspora as well as liaise between members of the overseas Filipino population and home country agencies. The CFO runs pre-departure orientation seminars for emigrant Filipinos and provide a number of other services related to migration, citizenship, and cultural development within the diaspora.

The CFO also coordinates the Diaspora to Development (D2D) initiative, the main goal of which is to maximise diaspora communities' contributions to home country development. D2D is comprehensive in scope, including economic and non-economic programmes. Building on best practices from elsewhere, the initiative focuses on ten core areas:



- Business Advisory Circle
- Alay Dunong sa Baya (ADB/Brain-Gain Programme)
- Diaspora Philanthropy (DP) (Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino/Link for Philippine Development Programme or LINKAPIL)
- Diaspora Investment (DI)
- Balik-Turo (Teach-Share) and Educational Exchange (BT)
- Tourism Initiatives (TI)
- Global Legal Assistance Programme (GLAAD)
- Medical Mission Coordination (MMC)
- Arts and Culture Exchange (ACE)
- Return and Reintegration (R&R) <sup>223</sup>

Alongside the CFO, a number of other sub-ministry level institutions support Filipinos in the diaspora, primarily providing services to migrant labour. These include the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and Philippine Overseas Labor Offices, which are all under the Department of Labor and Employment; and the Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers' Affairs, which provides legal assistance to migrant workers through the Department of Foreign Affairs (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

### Key policies and initiatives

**LINKAPIL:** In 1989, the CFO designed LINKAPIL to promote philanthropy from the diaspora towards a number of development objectives

<sup>223</sup> (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014a).



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Commission on Filipinos Overseas**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Diaspora to Development (D2D)**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

around health, education, poverty and hunger. The CFO acts as a coordinating agency for multiple stakeholders in the Philippines and overseas including government agencies, sponsors, consulates, and NGOs.

**Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development (OFs-RED):** The Philippine National Economic Development Authority received a UNDP grant to encourage develop policies that would ‘encourage optimum use of remittances for productive activities’ (Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2014c). This project is partnered with Western Union, and is aimed at providing vehicles for ‘collective remittances’ from overseas Filipinos to provide investment capital at home (United Nations Development Program, n.d.).



## Somalia

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

In 2013, the Somali government moved its national diaspora engagement office from the Ministry for Diaspora and Community Affairs to the Office for Diaspora Affairs (ODA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While we cannot identify an articulated national strategy for diaspora engagement, we do note that a number of government agencies may have efforts in place to work with diaspora communities, for example the Ministries of Finance and Planning, Interior, and Rural and Local Development, as well as local-level bodies such as the Office for the Development and Partnership with the Puntland Diaspora Community (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 82). Existing engagement efforts identified by this research hinge on two common themes for development: skills transfer, through programmes supported by international organisations such as IOM and the UN; and investment from the diaspora.

Skills transfer programmes currently or recently in operation in Somalia include MIDA Somalia's Transfer of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) III programme (International Organization for Migration, n.d.-b) and QUESTS-MIDA (United Nations Development Program, 2014), which is a partnership between the IOM MIDA programme and UNDP Somalia. Both of these are brain-gain programmes with similar aims, with particular focus on the European and North American Somali populations. The most notable investment initiative identified is the Diaspora Investment in Agriculture programme, discussed below.

Other international organisations play a role in engaging the Somali diaspora. For example, the African Union Mission in Somalia, discussed below, undertakes international outreach with Somali diaspora populations for development purposes. On a smaller scale, organisations such as FINNSOM, which is a volunteer organisation made up of health professionals of Somali origin living in Finland, provide targeted interventions supporting healthcare capacity (International Organization for Migration, n.d.-a). FINNSOM's assignments are determined through communication and consultation with local authorities and institutions in Northern Somalia (Newland & Plaza, 2013).



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office for Diaspora Affairs (ODA)**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Not allowed**

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**Diaspora Investment in Agriculture (DIA):** The DIA initiative was designed to enhance food security and curtail the need for outward migration in Somalia and Djibouti through diaspora contributions to agricultural and agricultural capacity-building projects in the homeland. The initiative is operated by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the US Department of State, and is being implemented by the Business in Development Network Foundation. It was launched in 2013 and is financed through a competitive bidding process from donors, private, public, and civil society institutions organisations, which propose innovative projects to stimulate agricultural development (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2011).

**The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):** While AMISOM is fundamentally a regional peacekeeping mission, they have recently initiated efforts aimed at engaging the global Somali diaspora for reconciliation and reconstruction, for example through a 2013 ‘consultative conference’ in Minnesota, USA (AMISOM, 2014).

## Sri Lanka

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

Sri Lanka's approach to diaspora engagement is currently rooted in its broader programme of reconciliation following its civil conflict, which ended in 2009. The 2011 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation highlights the need for 'a comprehensive approach to harness the potential of the expatriate community' including reconciling with hostile expatriate groups, particularly associated with Tamil nationalism and separatism (Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, 2011).



Proposed initiatives by the Commission include increased dialogue with hostile groups in diaspora and the development of a more liberal policy relating to diaspora travel, nationality, remittances, and so on. However, like many other countries selected for examination, most initiatives are aspirational rather than realised, as few concrete non-economic initiatives have been identified by our research.

A number of economic diaspora engagement mechanisms currently exist, driven largely by the export of labour. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare houses the Bureau of Foreign Employment, which engages in data collection, registration, pre-departure training for migrants, and liaison with receiving countries. It also houses the Foreign Employment Agency, which assists companies in receiving countries in recruiting Sri Lankans.

Additionally, policies and regulations have been put in place to incentivise FDI activities. For example, the Central Bank and authorised banks and dealers have promoted Sri Lanka Development Bonds (SLDBs) to the diaspora community. These are not strictly for diaspora members or citizens, however, and may be sold to anyone (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). Of perhaps more relevance to diaspora FDI has been a recent tightening of the property ownership regime for foreigners investing in Sri Lanka (Reuters, 2013), which would provide an advantage for Sri Lankans relative to other foreign residents in accessing Sri Lankan land.

### Key policies and initiatives

**WorkInSriLanka:** A volunteer-based initiative called 'WorkInSriLanka' promoting Sri Lanka 'as an attractive destination for highly skilled individuals and high calibre businesses' was launched in 2013. Although the



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; multiple programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Not allowed**

**External Voting**

**Not allowed**

initiative focuses on both Sri Lankans overseas and foreigners ‘the [Central Bank] Governor pointed out that while people may have left Sri Lanka for different reasons, the country must now welcome them back and create new spaces for them in the growing economy as Sri Lanka already has many highly qualified professionals who have remained in the country through difficult times. He also stressed on the significance of returning Sri Lankans integrating themselves into Sri Lankan society and their local communities in order to make brain gain meaningful’ (The Island, 2013).

## Sudan and South Sudan

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



Sudan has many ministries involved in various aspects of migrant support, regulation and tracking. The Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad is the primary body for support of labour migrants, but other relevant ministries include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, the Ministry of Interior, and sub-ministry organisations such as the Commission for Refugees. CARIM (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012) reports that these ministries have overlapping responsibilities and are not coherently coordinated, and that three ministries – of Labour, of Investment, and of Humanitarian Affairs – have key responsibilities around labour migrants, while others may also support refugees and persons displaced by ongoing conflict.

CARIM (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012) also reports that the South Sudanese government has taken a much more coherent stance on migration issues since 2005, even prior to its independence. We were unable to identify a national governmental strategy directed at the Sudanese or South Sudanese diasporas in the EU, US or elsewhere.

Both Sudan and South Sudan allow external voting and dual citizenship, but Sudan refuses dual citizenship to those also claiming South Sudanese citizenship.

The Sudanese diaspora appears prepared to support the Sudan, and a UNDP report (Ipaye, Kabui-Rotich, & Abina, n.d.) notes that there are extensive professional networks of Sudanese expatriates worldwide, who seek to contribute to development. These include for example the Sudan Medical Doctors Union (UK and Ireland) and The Sudanese American Scientific, Technical and Professional organisation (SATSPPO – USA).

Both countries have made efforts toward supporting diaspora skills transfer, in the form of UN TOKTEN programmes in Sudan (and related SSWA initiative, see below) and South Sudan. While the Sudanese experience is reported to have been largely successful, a UNDP report (Rajan & Magidu, 2012) on a replacement programme in South Sudan – the Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) was critical of the attempt to use TOKTEN in the South Sudan context.



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Council:  
Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad (SSWA)**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy; few programmes in place**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed (with exclusion from Sudan to South Sudanese citizens)**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**TOKTEN in Sudan:** UN TOKTEN in Sudan, launched in 2006, claims to have recruited 136 experts, trained almost 6,000 personnel and created a database of willing expatriate professionals at a cost of just over \$2.5M (USD) in that period (United Nations Development Program, 2013b).

**SPaKTEN:** The Sudanese government, through the SSWA, also operated a programme similar to TOKTEN, the Sudanese Partnership for Knowledge Transfer by Expatriate Nationals (SPaKTEN), and is also developing a National Roster of Professional Sudanese Abroad (Ipaye et al., n.d.). It is unclear whether TOKTEN and SPaKTEN are complementary, although SPaKTEN's web domain is currently inactive so the programme may be defunct.

## Syria

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



We are unable to comment on the current state of diaspora engagement by the Syrian government due to the ongoing conflict. All research on Syria therefore relates to the state of affairs prior to the ongoing conflict.

Our research suggests that Syria's most recent diaspora engagement strategy, as part of the Five-Year Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, was primarily focused on economic development through diaspora investment and remittances.

In particular, since the early 1990s, Syria had fostered a legal framework that encouraged FDI from foreigners and members of diaspora. This includes the easing of various import and tax regimes, relief on remittance transfer rates, and assistance with administrative issues such as work permits for foreigners and family members (ECORYS, 2006; ICPMD - IOM, 2010). However, many if not most measures benefit any number of foreign investors and are not specifically targeted to the diaspora.

More recently, a RAND expert on Middle East affairs, Wasif Syed, suggested a potential role for the Syrian expatriate community in peacebuilding and subsequent reconstruction, highlighting in particular the potential role of wealthy and influential Syrian expatriates. A recent policy brief on the Syrian diaspora in Germany (Ragab, 2013) confirms that peacebuilding and reconstruction is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an ongoing effort by diaspora members. A Migration Policy Centre (Migration Policy Centre, 2013e) migration profile also lists the use of diaspora members to support 'dialogue to resolve the crisis', including opposition supporters, as part of the governmental strategy, though the actual implementation of such a strategy is unclear. Nonetheless, given the use of diaspora in seeking to establish peace and stability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka during and post-conflict, this seems to be a very possible future component of the official diaspora engagement strategy.

A political role for diaspora going forward is in particular bolstered by the existing external voting and dual citizenship frameworks in Syria. However, it should be noted that external voting is a somewhat unclear area of activity; IDEA (2007) reports that there is no existing law allowing external voting but that the practice has been customary for many years. The same goes for dual citizenship, according to Agunias and Newland (2012) 'dual citizenship



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates [previously Ministry of Expatriates]**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Previously the Five-Year Plan of the Ministry [2006-2010]**

**Dual Citizenship**  
**Allowed**

**External Voting**  
**Allowed**

is not accepted under Syrian Nationality Act, but it is a recognised and practiced institution' (p. 97).<sup>224</sup>

*Key policies and initiatives*

**No ongoing initiatives identified.**

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

<sup>224</sup> Note that the MACIMIDE database indicates that dual citizenship is generally tolerated in Syria.

## Tunisia

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

In the post-revolution government formed in 2011, Tunisia developed a number of initiatives to better engage its diaspora including large-scale institutional reforms. Boubakri (2013), in a report for the MPC, reports that the new government created a Secretary of State for Migrations and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE). Further, it appears that work is underway to bring various aspects of migration and diaspora engagement under the SEMTE office, reorganising capacities previously held by other ministries such as those of Social Affairs, Employment, and Foreign Affairs (Boubakri, 2013). Prior to the 2011 revolution, treatment of the diaspora by the government may have been characterised as ‘controlling’ and government had oversight of both official and civil-society support organisations (Boubakri, 2013; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010c). However, since the regime change, there has been an expansion of the role of civil society in relation to its expatriate community (Boubakri, 2013). Civil society organisations supporting diaspora engagement between Tunisia and the diaspora include the *Centre de Tunis pour la Migration et l'Asile* (CETUMA) and the *Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l'étranger* (see below) alongside workers’ rights groups such as the Trade Union for Arab Maghreb Workers (USTMA) and the Union for Tunisian Immigrant Workers (UTIT) (Migration Policy Centre, 2013f).

The Tunisian government’s national approach to its diaspora is rooted in its overall immigration strategy as outlined in 2013. The strategy consists of four ‘axes’, two of which are explicitly concerned with diaspora engagement through strengthening ties between diaspora and Tunisia and involving the diaspora in economic and institutional development. In particular, the strategy seeks to mobilise elite and talented diaspora members for brain gain and technology transfer purposes (Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger (OTE), 2013b). In terms of economic participation, like some other selected countries, Tunisian banks offer diaspora accounts which provide preferential terms for deposit, savings and transfer from foreign currency earnings by diaspora members (Migration Policy Institute, 2012, p. 206). Tunisia also maintains tax, interest and customs incentives for Tunisian emigrants and expatriates (Katterbach, 2010, p. 21), and provides ‘[tax] advantages for temporary or definitive return’ (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010c, p. 5).



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Social Affairs – Office for Tunisians Abroad (*L'Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger*, OTE) and Secretary of State for Migrations and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE)**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**National Immigration Strategy**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed; Also, Tunisia reserves 18 seats for election by diaspora in the NCA**

Tunisia is one of two countries selected for review that maintains seats in its national legislature for election by diaspora members, which select representatives from global ‘constituencies’ in the Arab nations, France (10 seats), Germany (1), Italy (3), Canada (2) and Abu Dhabi (2) (TunisiaLive, 2011). The country’s diaspora also has a reasonably high turnout by comparison, with approximately 30 per cent of registered overseas voters participating in the 2011 elections (TunisiaLive, 2011).

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**High Council of Tunisians Abroad (*Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l'étranger*, HCTE):** This initiative is currently in process, and is likely to fill a function similar to other diaspora advisory councils and similar bodies in other countries. A press release on the bill creating the body suggests that it is meant to be an arms-length institution from government, and will be finalised in 2014 (Portail des Tunisiens à l'Étranger, 2014).

## Turkey

### *Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement*

Diaspora engagement in Turkey is carried out by a number of ministerial bodies and state institutions, such as the Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate (FRAWSGD), the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), the Yunus Emre Institutes and the Public Diplomacy Office (Yurtnaç, 2012). To coordinate the activities of these bodies and avoid fragmentation, Turkey established in 2010 the “Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities”. The Presidency comprises an Advisory Board of Overseas Citizens and is organised around eight thematic areas of intervention: Overseas Citizens; Institutional Relations and Communications; Cultural and Social Relations; International Students; Strategy Development; Human Resources and Education; Support Services (Bilgili & Siegel, 2011, pp. 7-15; Desiderio & Weinar, 2014, pp. 24-25; Yurtnaç, 2012).

At present, it was not possible to identify an articulated national diaspora engagement strategy. Scholars and practitioners describe it as influenced by the country’s foreign policy goals (Bilgili, 2012; Yurtnaç, 2012, pp. 3-4). This has translated into a somewhat reduced interest in the economic dimension of diaspora engagement, largely due to the increased economic strength of the country. To illustrate, in 2013, out of the \$93 million budget of the Presidency for Turks Abroad, only \$8.4 million was used as financial aid for projects aimed at engaging diaspora. Moreover, these projects focused on capacity building and mobilization-oriented NGO initiatives, rather than on stimulating FDI or revamping the declining flow of remittances towards the country (Bilgili, 2012; Bilgili & Siegel, 2011, pp. 21-25; İçduygu, 2009, pp. 15-22; Today's Zaman, 2013). This approach has led to the identification of diaspora groups as a potential soft power tool representing Turkey and its stances within host communities (Bilgili, 2012; Bilgili & Siegel, 2011; Today's Zaman, 2012). This idea is reflected by Turkey’s multi-layered engagement approach, which focuses on individuals as well as on civil society organisations and NGOs. The stated goal of this approach is to prevent diaspora assimilation whilst promoting its organised participation within host countries (Today's Zaman, 2013; Yurtnaç, 2012).

Turkey’s attempts to maintain active ideational and socio-cultural links with its diaspora are further reflected by the growing international dimension of

### Key facts

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**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**No national strategy**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**To be allowed and implemented for 2014 Presidential Elections (EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, 2014)**

the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014). This state institution, tasked with administering religious affairs and promoting a state-commended interpretation of Islam, has progressively increased its presence abroad and is now charged with training imams as well as administering mosques throughout Europe (Bardakoğlu, 2009; Çitak, 2013; Euro-Islam.info, 2012). Furthermore, its activities have been seen to span beyond religious affairs to migrants and integration related ones (Avci, 2005, p. 208; Desiderio & Weinar, 2014, pp. 24-25).

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**International assemblies:** In recent years Turkey has organised a number of conferences aimed at boosting diaspora mobilization capabilities and identifying diaspora needs for devising a bespoke engagement strategy. In particular, the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEiK) organised in 2009 and 2011 the “World Turkish Entrepreneurs Assembly”, while in 2012, the “Turkish Diaspora” group brought together representatives from a number of Turkish diaspora associations in the world (Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, n.d.; TACCI, n.d.; Today's Zaman, 2012). Lastly, Turkey held in 2010 the first “General Assembly of Turks Living Abroad”, with a second one being currently planned through a series of workshops and meetings (Today's Zaman, 2013; Yurtnaç, 2012).

**Central Bank Foreign Currency Accounts:** To facilitate the flow of remittances to the country, the Central Bank of Turkey has created two types of accounts for individual migrants: the “Foreign Currency Deposit Account” and the “Super FX Account”. Both accounts allow deposits in foreign currencies and offer interest rates higher than those of commercial banks. The Central Bank, however, sees this initiative as costly and as falling outside of its main responsibilities and is thus likely to terminate it in the long-term (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, n.d.; İçduygu, 2007, p. 4).

## Uganda

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement



Uganda developed the Diaspora Services Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007. The DSD is currently developing a national strategy in the form of a National Diaspora Policy, which is intended to lead to a removal of constraints for full diaspora participation in Uganda's development. Its focus will be on coordination with host countries and partnerships with diaspora members (Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

The available evidence on the developing policy suggests a predominance of economic goals for diaspora engagement. In particular, the Current Programmes page of the DSD website (Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014) highlights infrastructure development and other investment opportunities targeting diaspora support. A number of consultancies to this end are ongoing or completed, including World Bank-funded studies on feasibility of using 'diaspora talent' for development in energy, roads and railway sectors (Parliament of Uganda, 2012; Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Uganda also may begin issuing international bonds, which would be marketed to diaspora members.

While economic concerns are at the forefront of Uganda's diaspora activity, social connectedness between members of the diaspora as well as between diaspora and Uganda also appears to be on the agenda for the aspirational strategy (Uganda Vision Program, 2011). Parliament reports have suggested plans for development of a Uganda Diaspora information portal, which would provide information as well as opportunities for networking. However, these same reports also highlight that plans to fund social outreach in the diaspora have been un-funded or underfunded (Parliament of Uganda, 2012).

Uganda's current strategy does not include preferential treatment for members of the diaspora relative over other foreign investors or over native Ugandans. Indeed, government representatives are reported to have recently rejected the idea of incentivised salaries for return migration of diaspora talent, arguing that preferential treatment could 'incite the population against the returned Diaspora professionals.' (allAfrica, 2013b)

Interestingly, in 2013 the government introduced a number of taxes on diaspora activity, which runs counter to trends in other countries that have sought to reduce transaction costs. These include taxes on international



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diaspora Services Department**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**National Diaspora Policy (in progress)**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed, but anyone holding dual citizenship is barred from holding political office**

**External Voting**

**Not currently allowed, but possible under the Uganda Constitution**

remittances, cash transfers by mobile phone, and international phone calls (BBC, 2013b). It is not yet known what effect these taxes have had on diaspora activity.

### *Key policies and initiatives*

**Annual Home is Best Summit:** The government organises an annual 'Home is Best' Summit and Social Networking Event for Ugandan diaspora members visiting around Christmastime, which promotes both social and investment goals.

**Compendium of Investment Opportunities:** The Uganda Investment Authority and the DSD jointly developed an inventory of investment opportunities available to members of the diaspora. This inventory was launched at the 2012 Home is Best Summit.

## Yemen<sup>225</sup>

### Overview of national approach to diaspora engagement

Yemen has had an active diaspora engagement strategy since at least the 1960s, with the Ministry of Expatriates being created in the 1990s (Alquhali, 2013). The Ministry engages in consultation with the diaspora community through a number of mechanisms, including the Supreme Council of Yemeni Communities and the General Conference of Expatriates (discussed below under Key Policies and Initiatives). It is unclear to what degree these engagement mechanisms are independent of government, but they appear to be influential.



In a working paper delivered to an IOM workshop in 2013, the current Minister of Expatriate Affairs, Mujahed Alquhali, reported *inter alia* the following recent accomplishments in diaspora engagement:<sup>226</sup>

- Abolishing fees collected from Yemeni expats, previously costing them 17 billion YR (c€57.5M) per year
- Restructuring and re-regulating the Ministry and migration law
- Supporting the ‘Higher Expatriates Council’ (see SCYC below)
- Developing the Higher Welfare Council, ‘a ministerial body led by the Prime Minister’
- Creation of an expatriates’ bank
- Preparations for a database for diaspora support, a subsequent 4<sup>th</sup> General Conference of Expatriates, and potential satellite channel for expats

The Minister also makes an explicit link to the facilitation of diaspora migration and integration as a means to reduce levels of violence, crime and extremism.

### Key policies and initiatives

**Supreme Council of Yemeni Communities (SCYC):**<sup>227</sup> Following the first Yemeni Communities Forum in 2013, members of the Yemeni diaspora founded the Supreme Council of Yemeni Communities (SCYC). This body



### Key facts

**Highest level of government involved in diaspora engagement**

**Ministry of Expatriate Affairs**

**Articulated national diaspora engagement strategy**

**Recommendations of the 3<sup>rd</sup> General Conference of Expatriates**

**Dual Citizenship**

**Allowed**

**External Voting**

**Allowed**

<sup>225</sup> A significant amount of information on Yemen was only available in Arabic. We have verified information as far as possible and have only reported details which we could validate in English-language sources.

<sup>226</sup> This is the best English-language account of the current diaspora engagement activities we were able to identify (Alquhali, 2013).

<sup>227</sup> There may be some disagreement on the exact translation of this body’s name; we have seen it alternately listed as ‘the Higher Expatriates Council’ (Alquhali, 2013) and the ‘Yemeni Communities Supreme Council’ (ICPMD - IOM, 2010).

is elected by 'diaspora leaders' (International Organization for Migration, 2013c) and advocates on behalf of Yemeni diaspora issues. They have recently been involved in advocating for Yemeni workers' rights following the re-regulation of foreign labour in Saudi Arabia (Arab News, 2013).

**General Conference of Expatriates:** Every four years, the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs organises The General Conference of Expatriates, which involves hundreds of Yemeni diaspora representatives from multiple countries. The conference provides a forum for representatives to meet with the President and key ministers (Hadramaut Province, n.d.), and its recommendations from the last conference, in 2009, informed the development of an 'executive matrix' of priorities for the Yemeni cabinet from 2011-2015 (Alquhali, 2013; Presidency of the Republic of Yemen, 2010).



## Appendix B: Survey crosstabulations

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**Table B-1. Frequency of activities reported by survey respondents**

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Social events for members	73.6%
Engaging with the media	56.6%
Assistance for those seeking employment	54.7%
Social events for diaspora member	52.8%
Social events for all	52.8%
Intercultural events	52.8%
Raising awareness of rights in receiving country	50.9%
Skills training	50.9%
Lobbying government of receiving country for policy change	43.4%
Encourage voting in receiving country	39.6%
Raising awareness of migrant rights	35.8%
Country of origin language training	35.8%
Help in finding accommodation	35.8%
Cultural schools	32.1%
Encouraging voting in country of origin	28.3%
Providing support for refugee and/or asylum claims	28.3%
Facilitating investment in business in country of origin	28.3%
Lobbying other organisations for policy change	26.4%
Facilitating remittances for family/friends	24.5%
Local official language education	24.5%
Religious youth groups	24.5%
Facilitating remittances for other organisations	20.8%
Prayer Services	20.8%
Lobbying government of country of origin for policy change	17.0%
Religious education	15.1%

**Table B-2. Frequency of perceived benefits by engagement partner**

	<b>Home</b>	<b>Host_ social</b>	<b>Host_ health</b>	<b>Host_ education</b>	<b>Host_ police</b>	<b>Host_ other</b>	<b>NGO</b>	<b>Diaspora</b>
Influence Policy	<b>78.95</b>	38.5	<b>68.4</b>	36.4	<b>45.0</b>	47.6	45.9	46.2

Gain Support	63.16	23.1	36.8	36.4	35.0	42.9	51.4	53.8
Exchange Information	63.16	46.2	52.6	<b>45.5</b>	<b>45.0</b>	42.9	<b>56.8</b>	<b>56.4</b>
Raise Awareness	57.89	<b>53.8</b>	52.6	36.4	25.0	<b>57.1</b>	<b>56.8</b>	48.7
Create Opportunities	42.11	34.6	36.8	<b>45.5</b>	25.0	23.8	43.2	46.2
Fundraise	36.84	19.2	21.1	18.2	5.0	23.8	37.8	30.8
Coproduce Services	36.84	23.1	36.8	27.3	10.0	23.8	48.6	33.3
Legal Requirement	31.58	19.2	10.5	18.2	15.0	19.0	21.6	15.4
Other	10.53	3.8	5.3	4.5	5.0	4.8	8.1	2.6
Sample size	19	26	19	22	20	21	37	39

Note: Most frequently cited benefit highlighted in bold

**Table B-3. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with home country governments by type of organisation**

Benefit	Political	Economic	Sociocultural
Influence Policy	100%	100%	63.6%
Gain Support	50%	83.3%	54.5%
Exchange Information	50%	66.7%	63.6%
Raise Awareness	50%	66.7%	54.5%
Create Opportunities	50%	50%	36.4%
Fundraise	0%	66.7%	27.3%
Coproduce Services	0%	33.3%	45.5%
Legal Req	0%	33.3%	36.4%
Other	0%	16.7%	9.1%
N	2	6	11

**Table B-4. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with social services of host country governments by type of organisation**

Benefit	Political	Economic	Sociocultural
Raise Awareness	80%	0%	55.6%
Exchange Information	20%	66.7%	50%
Influence Policy	40%	0%	44.4%
Create Opportunities	60%	0%	33.3%
Gain Support	20%	0%	27.8%
Coproduce Services	20%	0%	27.8%
Fundraise	20%	0%	22.2%
Legal Req	20%	0%	22.2%
Other	0%	0%	5.6%
N	5	3	18

**Table B-5. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with health services of host country governments by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Influence Policy	80%	0%	81.8%
Exchange Information	60%	66.7%	45.5%
Raise Awareness	80%	0%	54.5%
Gain Support	60%	0%	36.4%
Create Opportunities	60%	0%	36.4%
Coproduce Services	40%	0%	45.5%
Fundraise	0%	0%	36.4%
Legal Req	20%	0%	9.1%
Other	0%	0%	9.1%
N	5	3	11

**Table B-6. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with education services of host country governments by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Exchange Information	80%	60%	33.3%
Create Opportunities	80%	20%	41.7%
Influence Policy	40%	20%	41.7%
Gain Support	60%	40%	25%
Raise Awareness	80%	20%	25%
Coproduce Services	40%	20%	25%
Fundraise	20%	0%	25%
Legal Req	20%	0%	25%
Other	0%	0%	8.3%
N	5	5	12

**Table B-7. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with police and legal services of host country governments by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Influence Policy	60%	33.3%	41.7%
Exchange Information	60%	66.7%	33.3%
Gain Support	60%	33.3%	25%
Raise Awareness	80%	0%	8.3%
Create Opportunities	40%	0%	25%
Legal Req	20%	0%	16.7%
Coproduce Services	0%	0%	16.7%

Fundraise	0%	0%	8.3%
Other	0%	0%	8.3%
N	5	3	12

**Table B-8. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with other services of host country governments by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Raise Awareness	75%	75%	46.2%
Influence Policy	75%	25%	46.2%
Gain Support	75%	50%	30.8%
Exchange Information	50%	100%	23.1%
Create Opportunities	50%	25%	15.4%
Fundraise	0%	25%	30.8%
Coproduce Services	25%	25%	23.1%
Legal Req	25%	25%	15.4%
Other	0%	0%	7.7%
N	4	4	13

**Table B-9. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with NGOs by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Exchange Information	71.4%	62.5%	50%
Raise Awareness	71.4%	75%	45.5%
Gain Support	71.4%	62.5%	40.9%
Coproduce Services	57.1%	50%	45.5%
Influence Policy	42.9%	37.5%	50%
Create Opportunities	57.1%	25%	45.5%
Fundraise	42.9%	25%	40.9%
Legal Req	14.3%	12.5%	27.3%
Other	0%	12.5%	9.1%
N	7	8	22

**Table B-10. Frequency of identified benefits from engagement with other diaspora organisations by type of organisation**

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Sociocultural</b>
Exchange Information	71.4%	57.1%	52%
Gain Support	42.9%	57.1%	56%
Raise Awareness	71.4%	42.9%	44%
Influence Policy	28.6%	42.9%	52%

Create Opportunities	28.6%	42.9%	52%
Coproduce Services	28.6%	14.3%	40%
Fundraise	42.9%	42.9%	24%
Legal Req	14.3%	0%	20%
Other	0%	0%	4%
N	7	7	25

**Table B-11. Frequency of engagement by partner and type of organisation**

	Host country						NGO	Diaspora	Other
	Home country	Social services	Health services	Education services	Police services	Other services			
Political	2.10	4.40	4.00	4.90	4.70	4.56	5.50	6.40	5.40
Economic	5.66	3.43	2.83	4.33	2.75	4.44	6.56	6.89	5.25
Sociocultural	3.38	4.90	4.00	4.40	4.07	4.38	6.13	6.93	4.73

**Table B-12. Satisfaction from engagement by partner and type of organisation**

	Host country						NGO	Diaspora	Other
	Home	Social services	Health services	Education services	Police services	Other services			
Political	2.50	4.50	4.50	5.22	4.38	4.71	5.75	5.67	3.67
Economic	5.25	5.00	N/A	7.33	N/A	5.00	6.71	5.50	N/A
Sociocultural	3.58	5.48	5.71	5.32	5.35	6.19	7.00	5.95	7.00

**Table B-13. Bivariate correlation between frequency of engagement with various partners**

	Home	Host_Social	Host_Health	Host_Education	Host_Police	Host_Other	NGO	Diaspora
Home		.049	.119	.257	.033	.257	.356 <sup>*</sup>	.290 <sup>*</sup>
Host_Social	.049		.686 <sup>**</sup>	.535 <sup>**</sup>	.640 <sup>**</sup>	.539 <sup>**</sup>	.405 <sup>**</sup>	.368 <sup>*</sup>
Host_Health	.119	.686 <sup>**</sup>		.768 <sup>**</sup>	.775 <sup>**</sup>	.771 <sup>**</sup>	.506 <sup>**</sup>	.305 <sup>*</sup>
Host_Education	.257	.535 <sup>**</sup>	.768 <sup>**</sup>		.717 <sup>**</sup>	.745 <sup>**</sup>	.576 <sup>**</sup>	.353 <sup>*</sup>
Host_Police	.033	.640 <sup>**</sup>	.775 <sup>**</sup>	.717 <sup>**</sup>		.775 <sup>**</sup>	.491 <sup>**</sup>	.262
Host_Other	.257	.539 <sup>**</sup>	.771 <sup>**</sup>	.745 <sup>**</sup>	.775 <sup>**</sup>		.701 <sup>**</sup>	.512 <sup>**</sup>
NGO	.356 <sup>*</sup>	.405 <sup>**</sup>	.506 <sup>**</sup>	.576 <sup>**</sup>	.491 <sup>**</sup>	.701 <sup>**</sup>		.657 <sup>**</sup>
Diaspora	.290 <sup>*</sup>	.368 <sup>*</sup>	.305 <sup>*</sup>	.353 <sup>*</sup>	.262	.512 <sup>**</sup>	.657 <sup>**</sup>	

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

**Table B-14. Bivariate correlation between frequency of engagement and satisfaction therewith**

		Satisfaction								
		Home	Host_Social	Host_Health	Host_Education	Host_Police	Host_Other	NGO	Diaspora	Other
Engagement	Home	.625**	.020	-.094	-.128	-.081	-.081	.188	-.138	.077
	Host_Social	-.076	.185	.308	-.077	-.097	-.163	.121	.072	-.131
	Host_Health	.127	.417 <sup>^</sup>	.438 <sup>^</sup>	-.002	.064	.178	.234	.130	-.131
	Host_Education	.143	.380 <sup>^</sup>	.397 <sup>^</sup>	.230	.159	.145	.365 <sup>^</sup>	.266	.206
	Host_Police	-.019	.263	.418 <sup>^</sup>	.001	.312	.042	.197	.070	-.131
	Host_Other	.238	.493**	.514**	.160	.408 <sup>^</sup>	.139	.350 <sup>^</sup>	.117	-.038
	NGO	.251	.359 <sup>^</sup>	.572**	.199	.298	.157	.536**	.212	0.000
	Diaspora	.422 <sup>^</sup>	.345 <sup>^</sup>	.518**	.255	.296	.158	.497**	.451**	.346
	Other	.386	.068	.022	.024	-.146	-.096	.148	.080	.671

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

**Table B-15. Bivariate correlation between the sum of benefits identified from engagement by partner and frequency of engagement**

		Frequency							
		Home	Host_Social	Host_Health	Host_Education	Host_Police	Host_Other	NGO	Diaspora
Number of benefits	Home	.645**	.035	-.088	.070	-.124	.080	.162	.162
	Host_Social	-.220	.438**	.488**	.361 <sup>^</sup>	.447**	.320 <sup>^</sup>	.327 <sup>^</sup>	.181
	Host_Health	-.091	.451**	.602**	.356 <sup>^</sup>	.462**	.414**	.244	.104
	Host_Education	-.048	.206	.310 <sup>^</sup>	.405**	.393**	.226	.255	.158
	Host_Police	-.050	.354 <sup>^</sup>	.356 <sup>^</sup>	.147	.503**	.199	.089	-.065
	Host_Other	.350 <sup>^</sup>	.138	.169	.208	.058	.302 <sup>^</sup>	.328 <sup>^</sup>	.192
	NGO	.247	.198	.230	.308 <sup>^</sup>	.290	.336 <sup>^</sup>	.614**	.372**
	Diaspora	.245	.195	.102	.107	.060	.159	.335 <sup>^</sup>	.488**

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

**Table B-16. Formal membership requirements**

Requirement	Per cent
None	47%
Citizenship of country of origin	4%
Citizenship of receiving country	11%
Occupation in particular field	7%
Other	31%

Note: N=45

## Appendix C: Further information on data sources on diaspora groups

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### Austria (AT)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of citizenship with a breakdown by gender and age. The Education data come from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) for the year 2001 and are provided by the country of birth of immigrants. The labour force participation data come from the Register Based Labour Market Statistics of 2010 and are provided according to the country of citizenship of immigrants. The inactive population include: persons below the age of 15; persons receiving a pension; students 15 and over (not economically active); other currently not economically active persons.

### Belgium (BE)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of citizenship with a breakdown by gender and age. The education data come from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) for the year 2001 and are provided by the country of birth of immigrants. The labour force participation is measured according to the stock of foreign labour by nationality according to the country of origin of immigrants in 2009 and data come from the OECD International Migration database.

### Bulgaria (BG)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by mother tongue with a breakdown by age. Mother tongue is strongly associated with ethnicity and can be used as an argument in support of using language indicators. The age breakdown is given according to these categories: under 19 years old; 20-59 years old; over 60 years old. The breakdown by gender is provided according to the citizenship of immigrants. The education data come from Artuc, Docquier, Ozden and Parsons (2013) for the year 2000. The labour force participation is unavailable.

### Cyprus (CY)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender and age. The education data are only available by citizenship and data concern the population aged 15 and over. “Low education” includes people with an education level “up to lower secondary”; “medium education” include people with an education level “upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary”;

“high education” include people with “Tertiary level (non-university); Tertiary level (University - First degree); Tertiary level - Post-graduate degree; Tertiary level – Doctorate”. For now, there is no data available for the labour force participation.

## Czech Republic (CZ)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by ethnicity with a breakdown by age, education and labour force participation.

## Denmark (DK)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender and age. Education and labour force participation data come from the OECD database and are provided by country of birth for the year 2000.

## Estonia (EE)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by ethnic nationality with a breakdown by age, education and labour force participation. However, for the latter data are only available for Russia.

## Finland (FL)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by age. Education data come from the OECD database and are provided by country of birth for the year 2000. The labour force participation data are from the census 2011 and age given according to the nationality of immigrants. However, data from Former Soviet Union and Sweden are missing.

## France (FR)

The Census 2010 provides the immigrant population by country of birth with a breakdown by age and gender. The breakdown by age done according to these categories: below 15 years old; 15-54 years old; and 55 and more. Data concerning the Diasporas by regions are provided for the immigrant population by country of birth and are from the census 2010. An immigrant is defined as follows: *‘Under the terms of the definition adopted by the High Council for Integration, an immigrant is a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France. Persons who were born abroad and of French nationality and live in France are therefore not counted. Conversely, certain immigrants may have become French while others remain foreign. The foreign and immigrant populations are therefore not quite the same: an immigrant is not necessarily foreign and certain foreigners were born in France (mainly minors). Immigrant status is permanent: an individual will continue to belong to the immigrant population even if they acquire French nationality. It is the country of birth, and not nationality at birth, that defines the geographical origin of an immigrant’* (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, n.d.).

The education data come from INDREG (census 2010)<sup>228</sup> and are provided by citizenship of immigrants. 'Low education' includes people without higher degrees but with an education in primary and lower secondary school; those with a primary or a lower secondary degree. 'Medium education' include people without degree but with an education beyond the lower secondary (upper secondary level); those with an upper secondary degree. 'High education' includes people with an undergraduate (include Tertiary university and tertiary non university) and a graduate degree. The labour force participation is measured according to the Employment status by citizenship from INDREG (census 2010). Inactive include retired people; students; house makers and other inactive.

## Germany (DE)

The Central Register of Foreigners 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender and age. The education data come from the Microcensus 2010 and are provided by the country citizenship of immigrants. 'Low education' groups people without a general degree or completion of a maximum of 7 years of school and no vocational qualification semi-skilled training; 'medium education' groups people with a training for the middle grade in public administration , technical college, Apprenticeship; professional degree at a vocational school / college school, 1-year-old school, professional degree at a vocational school / College school; 'high education' groups Techniker- or equivalent professional degree, completion of a 2 - or 3-year-old School, University of Applied Sciences, and anything more. The labour force participation data come from the Microcensus 2011 and is measured according to the nationality of immigrants.

## Greece (EL)

The OECD International Migration Database 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of origin with a breakdown by gender. The education data come from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) for the year 2001 and are provided by the country of birth of immigrants. The labour force participation is measured through the stock of Foreign-born labour by country of birth in 2009 provided by the OECD International Migration Database.

## Hungary (HU)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by ethnicity with a breakdown by age, education and labour force participation.

## Latvia (LV)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by ethnicity with a breakdown by age, education and labour force participation. However, education data are not available for the Roma Diaspora and the labour force participation data are available only for the employment category and for Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians.

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<sup>228</sup> INDREG file which includes 64 611 814 observations.

## Lithuania (LT)

For this country, only education data at the high level are available.

## Ireland (IE)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrant by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age and education. With respect to education categories, 'low education' includes people with a primary or a lower secondary degree; 'medium education' includes people with an Upper secondary, technical/vocational or advanced certificate/completed apprenticeship degree; 'high education' includes people with ordinary bachelor degree/professional qualification or both, postgraduate diploma or degree, and doctorate (Ph.D). Labour force participation is measured by country of citizenship and includes people over 15 years old. The category other economic activities is not taken into account. The inactive category includes students or pupils, people looking after family, retired people, and people unable to work due to permanent sickness or disability.

## Italy (IT)

Data concern the foreign resident population, data for the total population and the Diasporas came from the population registers 2011 with a breakdown by gender. Data concerning the Diasporas by regions are provided in the same way. There is no information available for the age. The education data come from Docquier et al. (2007) and are provided by the country of citizenship of immigrants for the year 2001. The labour force participation is measured by foreign labour force by nationality in 2006 and data come from the OECD International Migration Database.

## Luxembourg (LU)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age, education and labour force participation. The education variable includes the total population over 15 years old and who have ceased education. 'Low education' includes with a primary or a lower secondary degree. 'Medium education' includes people an Upper secondary degree. 'High education' includes people with a tertiary education. The category unemployed in the labour force participation data includes unemployed people who have never worked and those who have worked before. The inactive category includes housewife or househusband, student, retired and landlord people.

## Netherlands (NL)

The population registers and LFS 2011 provide the number of immigrants by country of origin with a breakdown by gender and age. The education and the labour force participation variables are available only for Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and (former) Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The education and the employed labour force variable include the population over 15 to 65 years old. 'Low education' includes Vmbo which represents pre-secondary vocational education; Mbo1 representing lower secondary vocational education, level 1 and Avo onderbouw standing for lower secondary general education, lower

stages. 'Medium education' includes people a Mbo 2 en 3 meaning that they have a higher secondary vocational education, level 2 and 3; Mbo 4 which represents Higher secondary vocational education, level 4; and Havo for those with a Higher secondary general education, preparing for higher professional education and vwo for Higher secondary general education, preparing for university. 'High education' includes people with a Hbo meaning that they have a higher professional education or a wo bachelor for those with a university bachelor's degree; WO masters, doctor includes people with a university master's degree or a PhD.

## **Poland (PL)**

OECD data for the year 2000 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by age and education. Age data are available only for the category 15-65 and more than 65 years old. There is no data available about the labour force participation. Moreover the total population of Poland being not available, we just provide information about the levels of immigrants and could not calculate the exposure.

## **Portugal (PT)**

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age, education and labour force participation. 'Low education' includes people with a 1st stage of basic education (current 4th year/former primary education/grade 4); and people with a 2nd stage of basic education (current 6th year/former preparatory degree). 'Medium education' includes people with a 3rd stage of basic education (current 9th year/former 5th year of the lyceum programme); a Secondary education (current 12th year /former 7th year of the lyceum programme/pre-university year) and a Post-secondary education (Technological specialisation courses, level IV). 'High education' includes people with Bachelor (includes former middle-level courses); Licentiate; Master's degree and PhD. The inactive category in the labour force participation data includes people less than 15 years; house makers, students, retired or pensioners and people who are permanently disabled for work.

## **Romania (RO)**

The census 2011 only provides information about the education level (medium and high) of immigrants by country of birth. Since the total population of Romania is not available, we just information about the levels of immigrants and could not calculate the exposure.

## **Slovakia (SK)**

OECD data for the year 2000 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by age, education and labour force participation. The total population of Slovakia being not available, we just information about the levels of immigrants and could not calculate the exposure

## Slovenia (SI)

The census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of first residence with a breakdown by gender, age, education and labour force participation.

## Spain (ES)

The Census 2011 provides the resident population by country of birth with a breakdown by gender. Data concerning the Diasporas by regions are provided for the resident population by country of birth and are from the census 2011. The data for the breakdown by age concern the foreign population by country of birth. The education data come from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) for the year 2000 and are provided by the country of birth of immigrants. The labour force participation is measured according to the stock of foreign labour by nationality in 2008 and data come from the OECD International Migration Database.

## Sweden (SE)

The census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age and education. The labour force participation data are provided by country of birth and come from the OECD data in 2000.

## United Kingdom (UK)

The Census 2011 provides the number of immigrants by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age and labour force participation. Data concerning the Diasporas by regions are also provided for the immigrant population by country of birth and are from the census 2011. Data concern the resident population by country of birth in England and Wales. Data for the qualification and the economic activity include people from 16 and over. The education variables in terms of ISCED classification are not available. This specific classification does not allow having a ISCED classification. However, we have information about the level of qualifications. In the near future, we are thinking about the possibility of using this variable as proxy of education.

## United States (US)

American Community Survey (ACS) 2010 provides the information about the residents of United States by country of birth with a breakdown by gender, age, years of education, and labour participation information. The age breakdown is done according to these categories: 15-24; 25-64 and 65 and more. The education breakdown of low, medium, and high refers to persons that have completed up to 8 years of education, more than 8 years but less than 12, and 12 and higher years of education accordingly.

## Overview

Below we reiterate the descriptive tables from Chapter 2 with additional information on data sources by individual socioeconomic variables.

**Table C-1. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – age**

Country	Reference year	Source	Individual-level variable	Definition*
Austria	2013	Eurostat	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Belgium*	2011	Census	Country of citizenship	14<15-64>65
Bulgaria	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	19<20-59>60
Croatia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Cyprus	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Denmark	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Finland	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
France	2010	Census	Country of birth	14<15-54>55
Germany	2011	Central Register of Foreigners	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Greece	2009	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-59>60
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Italy	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	14<15-64>65
Lithuania	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	24<25-64>65
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence	14<15-64>65
Spain	2008	OECD Migration Database	Country of nationality	14<15-64>65
Sweden	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
United Kingdom	2011	Census	Country of birth	14<15-64>65
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth	24<25-64>65

Notes: Malta not included due to its small population size

\*Definition: 14<15-64>65 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 15 years old; on group considering people aged between 15 and 64 years old; and one group with people who are at least 65 years old.

19<20-59>60 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 19 years old; on group considering people aged between 20 and 59 years old; and one group with people who are at least 60 years old.

14<15-59>60 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 14 years old; on group considering people aged between 15 and 59 years old; and one group with people who are at least 60 years old.

24<25-64>65 stands for the 3 groups of age: one group considering people under 24 years old; on group considering people aged between 25 and 64 years old; and one group with people who are at least 65 years old.

Note: In the case of Greece, age groups are only available from 15+.

**Table C-2. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – education level**

Country	Reference year	Source	Individual-level variable	Education Group Categories	No Education Included?	Age Group
Austria	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+
Belgium	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+
Bulgaria	2000	Artuc, Docquier, Ozden and Parsons (2013)	Country of origin*	Low Skilled; Highly Skilled (i.e. post-secondary or college)	YES	25+
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	-		-
Cyprus	2011	Census	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	15+
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	No Education; Primary Education; Incomplete Secondary; Complete Secondary; (...); Not Specified.	NO	15+
Denmark	2011	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	ISCED 0/1/2; ISCED 3/4; ISCED 5/6; Unknown.	YES	15+
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Less than Primary; Primary; (...); Unknown.	NO	15+
Finland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	ISCED 0/1/2; ISCED 3/4; ISCED 5/6; Unknown.	YES	15+
France	2010	Census	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	14+
Germany	2011	Microcensus	Country of citizenship	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	15+
Greece	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+

Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Less than 8 years elementary school; 8 years elementary; Secondary school without diploma; (...); Tertiary Education.	NO	None stated.
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated people	YES	15+
Italy	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of citizenship	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	0; 1; 2a; 2c; ...; 6; Not Known.	NO	15+
Lithuania	2011	Artuc, Docquier, Ozden and Parsons (2013)	Country of origin*	Low Skilled; Highly Skilled (i.e. post-secondary or college)	YES	25+
Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	15+
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	15-65
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	ISCED 0/1/2; ISCED 3/4; ISCED 5/6; Unknown.	YES	15+
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	-
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A	-	-	-
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	ISCED 0/1/2; ISCED 3/4; ISCED 5/6; Unknown.	YES	15+
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence	Basic or Less; Upper Secondary; Tertiary.	YES	15+
Spain	2000	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+

RAND Europe and IZA

Sweden	2011	Census	Country of birth	Primary and Lower Secondary; Upper Secondary; (...); No Info.	Unclear	25-64
United Kingdom	2001	Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007)	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	+25
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth	Low, medium and high educated migrants	YES	25+

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Note: Unless specified otherwise, educational attainment data pertain to populations aged 15-64. Swedish diaspora data covers population aged 25-64. Malta not included due to its small population size. The source code does not indicate whether this refers to country of birth or country of origin

**Table C-3. Data source and variable definition pertaining to diaspora groups – labour force participation**

Country	Reference year	Source	Individual-level variable	Definition	Age Group
Austria*	2010	Labour Market Statistics	Country of citizenship	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Belgium*	2009	OECD Migration Statistics	Country of citizenship	Stock of foreign labour	15+
Bulgaria	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A
Cyprus	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A
Czech Republic	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Employed; unemployed and inactive	'Pre-School' kids and 'Students, Pupils and Apprentices' are listed in separate categories. No age specifications
Denmark	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Estonia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Employed; unemployed and inactive	N/A
Finland	2011	Census	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	0-14 years of age people are listed as such in a special category.
France	2010	Census	Country of citizenship	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Germany	2011	Microcensus	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15-65+
Greece	2009	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	Stock of foreign-born labour	15+
Hungary	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Employed; unemployed and inactive	-
Ireland	2011	Census	Country of citizenship	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Italy	2006	OECD Migration Database	Country of citizenship	Foreign labour force	15+
Latvia	2011	Census	Self-declared ethnicity	Employed people	N/A
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A

RAND Europe and IZA

Luxembourg	2011	Census	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Netherlands	2011	Population registry and labour force survey	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15-65
Poland	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Portugal	2011	Census	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A
Slovakia	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
Slovenia	2011	Census	Country of first residence	Employed; unemployed and inactive	'Children, Pupils and Students' are listed in a separate category. No age specification.
Spain	2008	OECD Migration Database	Country of citizenship	Stock of foreign labour	Not stated
Sweden	2000	OECD Migration Database	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	15+
United Kingdom	2011	Census	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	16+
United States	2010	American Community Survey	Country of birth	Employed; unemployed and inactive	16+

Notes: Malta not included due to its small population size.

In the case of Austria and Belgium, the data sources for some countries are Census (Austria) and ESEG (Belgium) as of 2001, starting with the age of 15+ and by country of birth. In the case of Austria, the countries are: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, India. In the case of Belgium, the countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria and Tunisia.

## Appendix D: Literature review methodology

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We undertook a structured literature review of both academic and grey literature relating to diaspora mapping and engagement, including a focus on security-related issues. As outlined in our inception report, our review was broken into four stages: **Defining the issue(s)** to be addressed by the review, in relation to the research questions; developing a **search strategy** to address the issues identified through available sources and databases; **assessment of eligibility for inclusion** after sources are identified; and, **combining the results** of the included literature to provide a scan of the scope, quality, relevance and recency of available literature bearing on our research problem. We outline the activities undertaken at each stage below, and also provide an overall quality assessment of the literature reviewed.

### Defining the issue

Based on the project's overall goals, we determined that the issues that could be addressed by the literature review included (a) identifying current knowledge and practice relating to mapping diasporas, particularly in the EU and the US; (b) understanding broadly the models for, effectiveness of, and challenges in approaches to engaging diasporas for various ends; and (c) helping identify the names and characteristics of key diaspora organisations and other actors involved in the engagement of diasporas at receiving country level. We also recognised that, especially given the predominance of 'diasporas-as-development-actors' in the literature, a specific search for links between diasporas and security issues would be useful to ensure that security-related diaspora engagement activities were reflected in our review.

Our literature review does not provide comprehensive accounts of country-specific initiatives or examine priority diaspora groups in detail. Rather, it draws broad themes and lessons from across the literature on diaspora mapping and engagement. From this basis, in later stages of the research we will undertake more targeted reviews of specific groups, initiatives and states as identified through validation and consultation exercises.

### Search strategy

From this understanding of the goals of the literature review, we then set out to search the following terms in selected databases and websites, illustrated in Table D-1:

**Table D-1: Search terms, databases and websites**

Terms	Academic literature databases (searching titles and abstracts)	Grey literature – Key websites
Diaspora AND map*	EBSCO	COMPAS
Diaspora AND organis*	Sociological Abstracts	CREAM
Diaspora AND organiz*	Google Scholar (titles only)	<b>European Commission (EC)</b>
Diaspora AND engag*	Social Science Abstracts	GFMD
Diaspora AND secur*	JSTOR	ICMPD
		<b>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</b>
		MPI
		NBER
		OECD
		UN
		<b>World Bank</b>

For all searches, we searched English-language sources only, and we limited results to papers published in 2005 or later to reflect the most current research. All academic-source databases were searched fully against stated terms, with all results exported to an EndNote library where they were then compared for duplication and relevance to the project’s aims.

Grey literature websites listed in bold text in the above table (EC, IOM and World Bank) were searched fully using Google Advanced Search, searching the stated terms within the organisation’s web domain and examining all hits. Follow-up confirmatory searches of remaining websites were then done to ensure an adequate representation of the literature and to ensure no major body of relevant work was overlooked. Whereas full searches of websites involved reviewing all search hits for relevance, confirmatory searches involved reviewing the first 25 results of an Advanced Google search combined with a click-through search of websites themselves.

### Assessment of eligibility for inclusion

Our full searches (of academic databases, EC, IOM and World Bank websites) returned an initial 1,581 academic sources and 2,987 grey literature sources.

**Table D-2. Initial search results**

	map*	organis*	organiz*	engag*	secur*
EBSCO	62	54	234	252	91
Sociological Abstracts	43	28	122	160	36
Google Scholar (title search only)	32	3	14	91	8
Social Science Abstracts	10	3	47	38	16
JSTOR	25	15	85	80	32
World Bank	72	38	61	84	46

<b>European Commission</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>485</b>
<b>IOM</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>n/a<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>279</b>	<b>358</b>

<sup>+</sup>The search for 'organiz\*' in the IOM domain proved impracticable given that the term 'organization' can be found on every page and document within the domain.

We first reviewed academic literature for duplication or near-duplication.<sup>229</sup> We then reviewed for eligibility for inclusion first by title and then by abstract for relevance to the project. We restricted our sources initially to studies involving diasporas in the US or Europe, published in 2005 or later, and including an empirical component (i.e. not only theoretical analysis or comment on policy, but also including research, even if only secondary analysis of data and trends). Our inclusion/exclusion criteria remained flexible; if we came across a source that was clearly relevant but published before the 2005 cut-off date, we would consider it on merits.

This duplication sift of academic literature significantly reduced the overall number, to 1,145 academic sources. Review of titles and abstracts reduced the number to approximately 140 articles which were relevant to the study. These were briefly read and the project team members then selected 45 priority academic articles for in-depth review and inclusion in a data extraction template. The template can be found at Appendix F.

These articles appeared to provide an adequate grasp of the literature, capturing major themes across contexts. Subsequently, reviewers identified additional sources through a 'snowballing' approach, which involved reading bibliographies of particularly relevant sources to identify further literature that had not appeared in initial searches. This enabled the research team to cover seminal literature that did not use the term 'diaspora' but opted for expressions such as 'migrant groups' or 'transnational community' and would thus not have been covered by our initial search terms. Another 11 academic sources were added to the literature sample at this stage.

Grey literature 'hits' were sifted actively during advanced searching. Appropriate sources were downloaded for review based on information presented in the Google results and then read in whole or part as appropriate.<sup>230</sup> This gave us 42 grey literature sources (22 EC, 10 World Bank and 10 IOM), of which a further nine EC and four World Bank sources were excluded after initial reading. Nine more sources, mostly from IOM.int and related sites, were also identified within the results as specifically relevant to a review of mapping strategies, and so were also included in a specific analysis on mapping strategies but not reviewed for other content. Finally, 35 sources were added through validation meetings between project team members as well as with others reviewing early project outputs.

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<sup>229</sup> Duplication includes exact matches of sources appearing in separate searches, where these were not otherwise caught by database duplicate filters. Near-duplication includes similar or related materials, for example a multiple editions of a report or book, multiple separate articles discussing different components of the same study, or summary reports and full reports detailing the same results.

<sup>230</sup> In some instances, a grey literature source would be too large or contain information that did not appear relevant to our review; these could include large-scale reports or books that were only partly about diaspora engagement or mapping. To maximise productive activity, some sections of these larger documents were thus omitted from review.

Table 3: Final search results	Number of sources reviewed in detail
Academic sources	45
World Bank	6
European Commission	13
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	10
Additional sources for mapping review	9
Sources identified through snowballing	11
Sources identified through validation	35
Sources identified through confirmatory website searching	n/a
<b>Total number of sources reviewed</b>	<b>129</b>

The resulting sample of 129<sup>231</sup> sources was then divided between the project team members. Each source was read in detail and relevant findings were recorded in a data extraction template developed for the project.

## Synthesising the results

Following review of sources identified prior to validation activities, we held an internal synthesis workshop to discuss major themes across our key research questions to be addressed by the literature review. The results of the synthesis are presented in the following sections, outlining existing efforts to map diasporas and existing efforts to study diaspora engagement.

### *The reviewed literature was of varying quality, and mostly involving descriptive or inductive analysis*

We reviewed each study for quality as well as content. Within the reviewed literature, the 28 studies that involved quantitative mapping analysis were all descriptive accounts of population stocks or of population or other (e.g. financial) flows between countries. None of these studies involved statistical validation of claims about diaspora groups. The one explicitly quantitative study<sup>232</sup> that was not concerned with mapping (Lum et al., 2013) did test causal links based on secondary data (in this instance, between remittance flows and state fragility indicators), but this is the only instance of this sort of analysis within the reviewed literature.<sup>233</sup>

The remaining 66 studies reviewed prior to validation, which related to diaspora engagement and organisation, were of varying quality in terms of providing empirical support for their claims. Most of these combine normative argument with examination of empirical evidence, often in ways that make it

<sup>231</sup> Please note that confirmatory searching and validation are on-going exercises, and so final literature review numbers cannot be provided at present but will be included in the final report, alongside appropriate modifications to this review. The initial synthesis workshop was done on the basis of 94 identified academic and grey sources, and this review also includes content from a further 35 sources identified through validation and subsequent searching.

<sup>232</sup> A small number of studies, including Bloch (2008) and Van Den Bos (2006), were mixed-method studies that included quantitative accounts of sampling strategies (for a diaspora survey (Bloch, 2008) and sample of websites (Van Den Bos, 2006), but were otherwise qualitative analyses of results).

<sup>233</sup> It is worth also noting that the results of this study were equivocal, leading to no clear conclusions about the connections between remittances and state fragility.

hard to discern which statements are based on evidence. While many of these propose general principles, ideas, and concerns regarding diaspora engagement, with notable exceptions (International Organization for Migration, 2006; The Change Institute, 2008a, 2008b; Wiesand et al., 2008), most did not engage in an explicitly comparative research exercise that could provide empirically-derived principles or rules across multiple diaspora contexts.

Virtually all of the qualitative literature reviewed included inductive analysis, which has the benefit of identifying the presence of certain phenomena within diaspora populations, organisations, and engagement strategies. However, we can know little regarding the prevalence or generalisability of many of these findings. As well, none of the studies reviewed were evaluations of a specific programme or initiative, and so we similarly cannot at this point make claims about the effectiveness of particular strategies for diaspora engagement.

This may not be a particularly severe limitation on available literature, since as we discussed in chapter 7, a number of authors emphasise the context-specific aspects of diaspora engagement, which suggests inherent limits to general principles that will apply across diaspora engagement strategies. Nonetheless, the literature review should be read with the recognition that, where the literature identifies benefits and drawbacks to various engagement strategies, we cannot predict based on the reviewed literature whether these are likely to be effective strategies either generally or in specific situations.

## **Additional notes on site searching**

At a number of points in the website searching exercise, we were required to modify our overall approach to site searching to accommodate the number and types of results we were receiving. Our search of the World Bank site was not modified. However, the IOM domain search turned up results that led us to modify our strategies. The EC site searching was undertaken after the academic, IOM and World Bank searches and so was modified to exclude some areas which we felt had received adequate coverage in earlier searches. A more detailed description of our choices is outlined below.

### ***Notes on IOM site searching***

After initial searches by specified parameters in the [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int) domain, it became clear that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) websites had a great deal of highly relevant information that might not be identified through advanced searches but should nonetheless be included for review, or at least identified for future analysis.

As an example, an initial Advanced Google search turned up an IOM Country Migration Report (CMR) for the Philippines. While much of this document is not relevant to this project, it contains a section charting emigration of Filipinos and has excellent descriptive statistics. It also contains analysis of the effects of migration on various actors and an outline of the migration policy context for the Philippines. In short, it is an excellent reference for this country. This report suggests that it is likely that we will find other CMRs of similar value, relating for example to priority countries in this study. However, due to time constraints and pragmatic considerations, we did not review every CMR or similar document we encountered.

As well, the [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int) website contains a world migration report including supplementary papers on continental trends, and individual country detail pages highlighting basic migration facts for over 150 countries, which may also be of use.

We also note that country-level IOM branches and their publications are not found when searching against the iom.int domain, as they are not contained within the same domain. For example, IOM London – which website includes over 30 diaspora mapping reports relevant to the UK – is on the domain [www.iomlondon.org](http://www.iomlondon.org).

To supplement the search terms, then, we (will) proactively searched these sites as necessary for relevant information as analysis progresses. We have also included a handful of these reports in this initial literature review to understand general principles of IOM mapping and the types of findings that may be available elsewhere. We have further reviewed the world migration reports and documents for 2010 and 2011, and the Handbook for Diaspora Engagement document, as these are overarching documents that help to signpost further relevant data and literature.

We have also reviewed their catalogue of publications 2001-2007 and 2009-2010, which returned two further reports, and also identified a series of reports created by the IOM Budapest surrounding Migration in the Black Sea region. We have downloaded the overview report, and note that there are country-level reports available for all Black Sea countries.

As well, given that the IOM's name includes 'organization', a search of diaspora AND organiz\* was not practicable as it returned the entire website content.

In selecting relevant literature, we have only briefly reviewed the significant body of literature – particularly grey literature, commentary documents and websites related to projects – regarding diasporas as home country development agents. We recognise that this literature makes up a significant component of the available literature relating to diaspora engagement, and recognize that there are competing conceptions of the value and role of diasporas in home country development. However, the volume of literature is significant and mostly focused on home country activity, and so we have preferred overview documents to provide insight on these issues (which relates to the zero results downloaded from the 277 results of the engag\* search, as well as, somewhat curiously, to the low number (8) of downloaded results from the 358 results of the secur\* search).

### *Notes on EC searching*

Our searches of the WB and IOM returned adequate documentation regarding strategies to engage diasporas for homeland development or conflict resolution (or both), whether these strategies emanate from homeland or receiving country. As such, while we recognise that there is significant work being done by the EC to engage diasporas in Europe for homeland development, we have largely ignored this literature for the review, as these efforts are well documented by prior EC studies and we expected that the content of EC reports on diasporas for development or conflict resolution in homeland would not differ significantly from the WB or IOM findings.

As such, in our website search of the EC, we focused on mapping exercises of diasporas in Europe and receiving country policies related to either security or receiving country integration and development.

Further, as EC sources were often very large documents with multiple annexes or supplementary (e.g. country-level) reports available, the scope of our review did not allow time for review of all potentially relevant documents. As such, we normally used key sections of central or synthesis reports where these were available, and draw on supplemental reports where relevant.



## Appendix E: Data extraction template for Stage 1 literature review

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No	Question	Description of what should be recorded
1	First author name and record number	
<b>2</b>	<b>Study focus - THESE QUESTIONS ARE MANDATORY FOR ALL REVIEWED ITEMS</b>	
2.1	Research questions covered	Choose all that is applicable from the following: 1) Existing studies to map diasporas; 2) role of diasporas; 3) diaspora organisation/engagement; 4) on-going efforts to engage diasporas
2.2	Year	What year does the study refer to?
2.3	Geographical scope: host countries	As specific as possible: countries, sub-national regions, cross-national region
2.4	Geographical scope: countries of origin	As specific as possible: countries, sub-national regions, cross-national region
<b>3</b>	<b>Existing studies to map diasporas</b>	
3.1	Aim of the study	Describe in author's words the purpose of the study
3.2	Year	Copy-paste from 2.2
3.3	Methods	What methods does the study use? If possible, cut and paste the relevant section
3.4	Data	What data does the study use? Does it discuss any shortcomings of available data?
3.5	Sampling	Does the study use sampling? If so, how? If possible, cut and paste the relevant section
3.6	Definition of diaspora	How do the authors define diasporas (e.g. 2nd/3rd generation included?) If possible, cut and paste relevant section
3.7	Challenges	What challenges (methodological, definitional, other) did the others face? How did they overcome them? If possible, cut and paste relevant section
3.8	Geographical scope: host countries	Copy-paste from 2.3
3.9	Geographical scope: countries of origin	Copy-paste from 2.4
3.10	Assumptions and hypotheses	In author's words: Copy and paste from the study any discussion about assumptions and hypotheses
3.11	Description of results	Copy and paste exact description of results
3.12	Generalisability and links to other research	Are the results generalisable to all diaspora communities in a city/ country/ region? If so, to what extent? Do they cite other research with which this study agrees/ disagrees?
<b>4</b>	<b>Role of diasporas</b>	

4.1	Political/security	Is this category of roles posited/observed for diaspora groups by the authors? (e.g. host and origin country, information flows, "democratization of sending areas")
4.2	Cultural/social	Is this category of roles posited/observed for diaspora groups by the authors? (e.g. language, values")
4.3	Economic	Is this category of roles posited/observed for diaspora groups by the authors? (e.g. remittances, investment)
4.4	Mechanisms	What are the mechanisms through which these roles are played?
<b>5</b>	<b>Organisation and engagement of diasporas</b>	
5.1	Characteristics of diaspora organisations	In author's words, what are the characteristics of diaspora organisations? What are the main objectives of these organisations?
5.2	External support	Do these diaspora organisations enjoy external support? From the host country? From the country of origin? From somebody else?
5.3	Links between organisation and host and origin countries	In author's words, what is the character of links between the diaspora organisation and the host country? What about links between the organisation and the country of origin?
5.4	Links between host and origin countries	In author's words, what is the character of links between the host country and the country of origin?
5.5	Measurement of links	How is the quality and intensity of the links described above measured? Are there any challenges associated with the measurements proposed?
5.6	Double citizenship	How, if at all, do the links vary depending on whether double citizenship is allowed?
5.7	Formalised links	To what extent are these links formalised (as opposed to informal relationships)?
5.8	Drivers & motivation - country of origin	In author's words, what are the drivers of/motivation for these links/engagement on part of the country of origin?
5.9	Drivers & motivation - host country	In author's words, what are the drivers of/motivation for these links/engagement on part of the host country?
5.10	Drivers & motivation - bilateral relationship	In author's words, what are the drivers of/motivation for these links/engagement on part of the bilateral relationship between the country of origin and the host country?
5.11	Drivers & motivation - diaspora organisation	In author's words, what are the drivers of/motivation for these links/engagement on part of the diaspora organisation?
5.12	Key players	Who are the key players instrumental in organising diasporas? To what extent are they representative of the diaspora as a whole? Does the study identify key players from outside the diaspora as well?
5.13	Key beneficiaries and users	In author's words, who are the key beneficiaries and users of diaspora organising and engagement?
<b>6</b>	<b>On-going engagement efforts</b>	
6.1	Name of initiative	
6.2	Geographical coverage and dates	Geographical coverage both in terms of country of origin and the host country. Copy and paste timeline of the initiative, if available
6.3	Key players	Who are the key players?
6.4	Selection of players	How were the players selected and how representative are they?
6.5	Activities, costs and funding streams	Cut and paste a description from the article/website
6.6	Results	Cut and paste a description from the article/website

6.7	Evaluation of the initiative	Has this initiative been evaluated? Are we able to comment on its effectiveness based on available data/participant feedback?
6.8	Barriers and enablers	What have been the identified barriers and enablers to successful diaspora engagement?
<b>7</b>	<b>Other</b>	
7.1	Other issues	Are there other interesting/noteworthy points made in the study?
7.2.	Quality assessment	Do you have any comments about the study's quality? What research design does it use?



## Appendix F: Data extraction templates for Stage 2 desk research

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### Phase 2 Desk Research Priority Countries – Country of Origin Diaspora Engagement Framework Template

<p><b>Category of information to be recorded.</b> Please note that some information may not be available for all countries. If you can't find specified information, leave cell blank.</p>	<p><b>Description:</b> Please provide a written summary (in your words) of the relevant information here. Please use footnote citations for all sources used, with hyperlinks in footnotes where possible. If source is a pdf article, please also download and include when returning this form.</p>	<p><b>Key policies and initiatives:</b> Record relevant policies, laws and initiatives in this section; hyperlink where possible</p>
<b>Country overview</b>		
<b>Country name:</b>		
<b>Highest level of government devoted to diaspora affairs</b>	Begin with <a href="#">Agunias and Newland (2012)</a> ; then the <a href="#">MPI taxonomy (2010)</a> ; then further searches if necessary	
<b>Other levels of government involved in diaspora engagement</b>	<p>List branches of government and their relevant initiatives/areas of diaspora engagement. Details on government activities and initiatives can then be recorded in relevant cells below, as well as in endnotes.</p> <p><i>Also include relevant International Organization for Migration (IOM) programmes here. Useful links to existing government-partnership migration-oriented programmes may be found from the IOM website (<a href="http://www.iom.int/cms/where-we-work">http://www.iom.int/cms/where-we-work</a>)</i></p>	
<b>Description of national strategy toward diaspora</b>		

Indicators of costs of all or part of Country of Origin engagement initiatives		
Other key Country of Origin (non-government) actors in diaspora engagement		
<b>Political rights</b>		
Laws or policies on dual citizenship and keeping citizenship	*Begin with the <a href="#">MACIMIDE dual citizenship database</a> , then further searches if necessary	
Citizenship rights of children and partners of diaspora members		
Position on overseas voting	*Begin with the <a href="#">IDEA Voting from Abroad Database</a> ; then the <a href="#">IDEA Voting from Abroad (2007) handbook</a> ; then further searches if necessary	
Position on overseas campaigning for country of origin elections		
Elected positions reserved for diaspora/overseas community members		
Data on overseas voting (turnout, political preferences, from where, etc)		
<b>Economic participation</b>		
Initiatives to incentivize return migration (esp. re: high-skilled expats)		
Initiatives to encourage remittances or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from diaspora		
Laws or policies related to remittances		
Laws or policies related to diaspora members' ownership of property (e.g. assets, real estate)		

Laws or policies related to diaspora members' investment in Country of Origin businesses		
Laws or policies related to taxation of diaspora members	Begin with UNCTAD list of double taxation agreements, found here: <a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specific-Lists-of-DTTs.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specific-Lists-of-DTTs.aspx</a> , then further searches	
<b>Other comments</b>		
Please use this space to outline any other information, which is relevant or interesting regarding this Country of Origin's diaspora engagement but did not fit in the above categories		

**EU/US Diaspora organisations engaged identified as engaged with Country of Origin:** *If your research identifies any diaspora organisations or initiatives in the EU or US that are taking part in or taking advantage of any particular engagement strategy offered by this country of origin, please identify those organisations and describe the type of engagement involved.*

Organisation Name	Description of engagement with Country of Origin	Engagement through particular initiative? (please specify if known)

## Phase 2 Desk Research – Questions to be addressed on receiving countries' available diaspora engagement frameworks

*Please provide concise written answers to each of the following questions, with references as well as hyperlinks wherever possible to any source material. Place your response to each question **below the question, and in 'Normal' style text** as this will assist with synthesising the data in NVivo.*

1. Country Name
2. Which agency/agencies (if any) is/are responsible in this country for diaspora engagement, integration, or other similar outreach policies?
3. Is there a formal national strategy for diaspora engagement in place? If yes, please describe. If not, how is diaspora engagement done?
4. Can you identify any evaluation for diaspora engagement and similar initiatives over the past decade? If yes, please describe any tools used, indications of cost/budget for engagement, and the conclusions of the evaluation (including benefits, consequences, barriers to success, etc).
5. Can you identify any noteworthy diaspora engagement initiatives within this country, whether at national or local level? Please describe up to three:
  - 5.1 Diaspora Engagement Initiative 1
  - 5.2 Diaspora Engagement Initiative 2
  - 5.3 Diaspora Engagement Initiative 3
6. What, if any, are the most noteworthy platforms for engagement with civil society groups (whether diaspora or not) within this country? How do they work? Might these strategies be transferable to diaspora engagement?
7. Can you identify any noteworthy civil society engagement initiatives within this country, whether at national or local level? Please describe up to three:
  - 7.1 Civil society engagement initiative 1
  - 7.2 Civil society engagement initiative 2
  - 7.3 Civil society engagement Initiative 3
8. Other comments

## Appendix G: Survey methodology details

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This section details the methodology used in the preparation and implementation of the Diaspora Expert Survey. This can be divided into four basic steps: 1) development of the survey questionnaire, 2) identification of survey respondents, 3) implementation of the survey, and 4) data analysis. Each of these steps is discussed in turn below.

### Development of the survey questionnaire

The basic structure of the questionnaire builds on the findings from our review of existing literature on diasporas. From the review, we concluded that the most significant gap in empirical evidence related to tailoring engagement strategies to specific diaspora contexts, which we aimed to address through our Diaspora Expert Survey (DES) exercise.

The objective of the DES was to help us to understand how and under what circumstances diaspora engagement strategies should be employed. While we recognised that actual tailoring efforts will be case-specific, we nonetheless believed it may be possible to refine a set of principles for tailoring engagement efforts based on initial assessments of both the type of strategy(ies) to be used as well as the type(s) of diaspora organisation(s) to be engaged through a specific initiative or set of initiatives.

We designed the questionnaire to provide a comparative basis on which to build and refine such a set of principles. Specifically, the first two sections of the questionnaire provided responses to questions that helped us categorise diaspora organisations along lines such as:

- Size of organisation (large/medium/small)
- Longevity of organisation (new/established)
- Structure of organisation
  - o Employee/volunteer balance
  - o Source(s) of funding
  - o Membership requirements
- Main activities of organisation
  - o Social/Cultural
  - o Political
  - o Economic
  - o Or a combination of these

The third section of the questionnaire determined levels of, and opinions about, engagement with external groups amongst organisational representatives. These included both scale responses and free-text options, and provided us with indicators about both volume of, and preferences regarding, engagement activities across various sectors.

The final section of the questionnaire provided further research opportunities to expand our evidence base. The questionnaire ended with a request for an interview with the respondent as well as a request for the respondent to identify other relevant organisations who might be interested in participating in our research.

The questionnaire underwent several iterations and modifications based on discussions with the commissioning team. Once a final version was agreed on, we prepared a set of versions in seven other European languages (Danish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish) to facilitate responses from diaspora representatives not residing in Anglophone countries. These languages were based on the results of our mapping exercise and represent European countries with the highest concentration of diaspora communities. Introducing other language versions was not deemed cost-effective by the research team. The full text of the questionnaire in all eight languages is attached to this report in Appendix H.

The questionnaires were then uploaded onto a RAND-proprietary web interface and launched in December 2013. Several comments should be added with respect to the settings of the on-line survey:

- The survey was designed as fully anonymised. The research team were unable to identify survey respondents unless they volunteered information that would enable them to be identified.
- No fields were made obligatory and respondents were able to choose which questions to answer. The principal reason for this was a desire to capture diaspora organisations' perspectives on engagement with policymakers regardless of their readiness to share details about their own organisation.
- There was no deadline set for the completion of the survey. All language versions were left open until 31 March 2014. This is approximately one month after the conclusion of all follow-up efforts and was intended to allow for any very late responses to be counted in the final analysis.
- There was no time limit set with respect to the completion of the questionnaire. Respondents were able to exit the survey and resume at a later stage, should they have wished to do so. In several instances, the export of survey data produced multiple cases attributable to the same organisation. We believe the most likely cause was that the survey was interrupted and resumed from a different device.

## Identification of potential survey respondents

In the planning stages of the survey, we expected a relatively low response rate, which is why we sought multiple avenues to expand our potential sample.

First, included diaspora organisations with whom we already had a relationship through prior work and through working relationships with other organisations in the field of migration and social policy.

Second, we used a database of diaspora organisations developed through our literature review. To develop this database, we recorded all names of diaspora organisations appearing in the literature and found current contact information for each of these (where available).

Third, we contacted embassies and consulates of countries of origin of diaspora groups located in the EU and the US, requesting assistance in identifying key diaspora groups with whom embassies regularly engage or of which embassies are aware.

Fourth, we identified an office responsible for migration and integration in every EU Member States and, as above, requested assistance in identifying key diaspora groups with whom these offices regularly engage or of which these offices are aware.

Fifth, we undertook a targeted web search for diaspora organisations and added the results to the existing database of contacts.

And finally, we sought to ‘snowball’ our sample through our questionnaire respondents, providing space at the end of the questionnaire for respondents to provide contact information for other relevant diaspora organisations.

In an attempt to further boost responses and collaboration from embassies, consulates and EU-based agencies, our requests were accompanied by a cover letter kindly provided by DG HOME. Each email was followed by two chase email, sent generally one week and three weeks after the initially request, respectively.

The table below summarises our outreach efforts to embassies and consulates, along with their effectiveness. Regrettably, these two recruitment drives did not prove to be very successful. As a result, the majority of the survey respondents were identified through the other steps outlined above.

**Table G-1. Identification of survey respondents through contact with embassies and consulates**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Value</b>
Number of requests sent	576
Number of delivered requests (after bounced emails)	396
Responses received	38
Effective response rate	9.6%
Number of nominated respondents	240
Nominations per request	0.6


## Implementation of survey

After the identification of potential survey respondents, invitations were sent to everybody in the compiled contact database, accompanied with the DG HOME cover letter. Invitations to the survey were followed by two chase emails, generally sent a week and three weeks after the initial invitation. For respondents residing in non-Anglophone countries, the research team decided to send first an invitation to the English version of the questionnaire. The reason for this choice was a desire to minimise any risks associated with multilingual surveys<sup>234</sup> and have as large a share of responses in English as possible.

<sup>234</sup> For instance, Heath, Fisher, and Smith (2005) list three main issues that may induce measurement errors in cross-national surveys:

1. Translation: translating a questionnaire into a variety of languages carries the risk of translation errors.
2. Common concepts whose interpretation differs: even if concepts are accurately translated they may still refer to different phenomena in different contexts. Certainty on 'functional equivalence' of concepts is difficult to attain and may in some cases rely on trial-and-error.

However, in recognition of the potential language barrier, the original English invitation was followed by only one chase email, then switched to the language version appropriate for the country in question. The figure below offers a schematic overview of our approach to response solicitation.



**Figure G-2. Response solicitation process**

Our expectations of low response rate were borne out by the survey. As the following table shows, our overall response rate remained in single digits, near 5%. Thanks to the very large number of organisations contacted at first place, this did not prevent us from obtaining a respectable and sufficient sample size; however, it serves as a reminder that reaching out to diaspora organisations can be considerably labour-intensive.

**Table G-3. Survey response rate**

Indicator	Value
Number of invitations sent	1,070
Number of delivered invitations (after bounced emails)	900
Number of times survey accessed	219
Number of valid responses	53
Effective response rate	5.9%
Invitations per response	16.98

3. No common concept to measure: not every concept exists in every country, and thus measurement of such context-specific concepts would be inherently problematic (Heath et al., 2005).

## Data analysis

Our survey received 219 responses, of which, after consolidating several cases of multiple entries by the same organisation, 53 were deemed sufficiently complete and thus suitable for analysis. Response data were exported to the statistical software SPSS for further analysis. Due to the limitations stemming from the non-random character of the survey sample, our quantitative analysis relies primarily on descriptive statistics. In places, we do offer an indication of statistical significance; however, we urge strong caution in interpreting the data.

The survey also included a number of free-text response answers, which were exported into an Excel database and then imported into NVivo 10 software for structured thematic analysis. Interview responses were also included for this component of the analysis. NVivo software supports 'grounded theory' analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which in broad terms requires researchers to iteratively build analytic frames in an inductive fashion, finding codes (patterns suggesting thematic coherence) within available data. This exercise subsequently generates theoretical concepts that can be applied to the specific area of inquiry.

Qualitative survey content was first coded into 'nodes' following the structure of the survey, then individual survey responses within nodes were manually coded to reflect categories emerging from the data. Interview data was then reviewed to confirm or nuance themes from the survey data, and from this process the key messages in Section 8.1.2 were developed.



## Appendix H: Survey Questionnaires

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### English Survey

#### Introduction

Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our study on diasporas and their engagement with policymakers and stakeholders. Our definition of diasporas is based on Agunias and Newland's (2012) definition:

*“Diasporas are emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. The common thread among these recent arrivals and members of long-established communities is that they identify with their country of origin or ancestry and are willing to maintain ties to it.”*

(Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig and Kathleen Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." International Organization for Migration).

#### Activities

First we would like to ask you about the activities of your organisation or initiative.

1. What is your organization or initiative's main focus or mission?
2. Does your organisation or initiative have any other significant focus or mission?
3. Is your organisation involved in any of the following activities?
  - Encouraging voting in country of origin
  - Encouraging voting in receiving country
  - Lobbying government of country of origin for policy change
  - Lobbying government of receiving country for policy change
  - Lobbying other organisations (e.g. European Commission, World Bank, religious organisations) for policy change
  - Providing support for refugee and/or asylum claims
  - Raising awareness of migrants' rights
  - Raising awareness of rights in receiving country
  - Facilitating remittances for family/friends in country of origin
  - Facilitating investment in business in country of origin
  - Facilitating remittances or donations for other organisations (e.g. NGOs) in country of origin
  - Local official language training
  - Skills training
  - Country of origin language training

- Cultural schools
- Assistance for those seeking employment
- Help in finding accommodation
- Social events for members of your organisation/initiative
- Social events for any diaspora members
- Social events for the public/everyone
- Organising events to bring together people from different backgrounds / religions / cultures / etc
- Engaging with the media (to raise awareness of issues, inform the media of challenges faced by your diaspora community, etc)
- Prayer services
- Religious education
- Religious youth groups

4. Please indicate any other activity you would like to note that your organisation or initiative is involved in and that was not listed above

### Engagement

In this section we would like to ask about the extent of your contact and work with various government and non-government people and organisations. We would also like to hear your views on how governments and others can improve the ways in which they work with organisations or initiatives like yours. Your answers will help us form recommendations for the European Commission and other institutions who would like to work well with organisations such as yours.

5. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is never and 10 is always, to what extent do you work or collaborate with each of the following?
- \_\_\_ Home country government
  - \_\_\_ Host country government – social services
  - \_\_\_ Host country government – health and medical services
  - \_\_\_ Host country government – schooling or educational services
  - \_\_\_ Host country government – police and legal services
  - \_\_\_ Host country government – other services
  - \_\_\_ Other civil society organisations
  - \_\_\_ Other organisations representing your diaspora group(s)
  - \_\_\_ Others (please specify in text box below)
6. Please specify other individuals or groups with whom you regularly work, which do not appear in the above list
7. What, if any, are the benefits for your organisation or initiative from collaboration with any of the following?

	Home country government	Host country government – social services	Host country government – health	Host country government – education	Host country government – police and	Host country government – other services	Other civil society organisations	Other organisations representing your

			services	al services	legal services			diaspora group(s)
Influencing their activities or policies								
Getting support from them for your organisation's activities								
Raising public awareness about your organisation's activities								
Your organisation has a legal requirement to engage with them								
Fundraising/securing funding								
Exchanging information with them								
Co-production of services								
Creating opportunities for your organisation or initiative's members								
Other benefits (please specify in text box below)								

8. Please specify any other benefits your organisation or members of your diaspora receive from your collaboration with any of the parties listed above

9. Who usually initiates the collaboration between your organisation or initiative and the following?

	Your organisation or initiative	The other individual or organisation	Collaboration is initiated about equally by both	Not applicable	Don't know

Home country government					
Host country government – social services					
Host country government – health services					
Host country government – educational services					
Host country government – police and legal services					
Host country government – other services					
Other civil society organisations					
Other organisations representing your diaspora group(s)					
Others (please specify in text box below)					

10. Please specify any other individuals or groups with whom you collaborate, and identify who usually initiates this collaboration

11. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all satisfied and 10 completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with your relationship with the following?

- Home country government
- Host country government – social services
- Host country government – health services
- Host country government – educational services
- Host country government – police and legal services
- Host country government – other services
- Other civil society organisations
- Other organisations representing your diaspora group(s)
- Others (please specify in text box below)

12. Please specify any other individuals or groups with whom you collaborate

13. Are there particular issues and policy areas that you think are most important for your organisation or initiative?

14. In your opinion, is your organisation or initiative able to have an influence on these issues and areas?  
If so, on whom and how – please provide examples. If not, please provide any thoughts you have on why not
15. Could you describe how your organisation or initiative sets its priorities?
16. In what ways, if any, could your organisation or initiative's relationship with the following be improved:
  - Host country government
  - Home country government
  - Other civil society organisations
  - Other organisations representing your diaspora group(s)
  - Other relationship (please specify with whom)
17. Can you provide any examples of successful collaboration between your group and other organisations or initiatives?
18. Are there any actions, attitudes or other barriers to working together that make you prefer not to work with particular government or non-governmental organisations?

### **General Characteristics**

In this section, we would like to ask a few questions about your organisation or initiative and the diaspora group you represent. Your answers will help us better understand the range of types of organisations representing diaspora communities in Europe and the US, and will help us understand how different types of organisations prefer to work with governments and organisations in their host countries.

19. Name of your organisation or initiative
20. Which diaspora communities do you represent/support?
21. How many paid staff does your organisation or initiative have?
  - 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. How many volunteer staff does your organisation or initiative have?
  - 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Are there any requirements to becoming a member of your organisation or initiative?
  - No requirements
  - Yes, citizenship of host country
  - Yes, citizenship of home country
  - Occupation in a particular field
  - Other, please specify
24. Approximately how many members does your organisation or initiative have?

- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. How many years has your organisation or initiative existed?
- Less than 2 years
  - 2-5 years
  - 6-10 years
  - 11-20 years
  - More than 20 years
26. How long have you been involved with this organisation or initiative?
27. What is your position within the organisation or initiative?
- Managerial
  - Clerical/Administrative
  - Other, please specify
28. What are your sources of funding?
- Host country government – national
  - Host country government – local
  - Home country government
  - Intergovernmental organisations (e.g. EU agencies, World Bank)
  - Donations from individuals
  - Donations from other organisations
  - Revenue from services/membership fees
  - None
  - Other, please specify
29. What is your largest source of funding among those indicated above?
30. According to your estimate, what is the size of the total diaspora population your organisation or initiative represents in the country in which your organisation or initiative operates?
31. To your knowledge, is the diaspora population concentrated in any particular cities or regions?
- Don't know
  - No
  - Yes, please specify
32. Are you satisfied with how many people from your diaspora community you are able to work with and help or support?
- Yes
  - No
33. How many people in the community you represent know about your organisation or initiative?
34. Is there anything you think would especially help your organisation or initiative do more of the things you think are important?

**Closing questions**

Finally, we would like to give you an opportunity to comment on any other important issues.

35. Is there anything else you would like to comment on?

36. The research team would like to conduct some interviews with representatives of diaspora communities to be able to have more of a discussion about some findings from this survey. Would you be willing speak with one of our researchers? If so, what would be the best email address to reach you on?

No

Yes, please provide and e-mail address

37. Can you recommend any other similar organisations or initiatives who you think would be interested in participating in this survey? If so, can you please provide us with their contact information?

	Name	Organisation	E-Mail address
#1			
#2			
#3			

## Dutch Survey

### Introductie

Hartelijk dank voor uw bereidheid tot deelname aan ons onderzoek over diaspora gemeenschappen en hun betrokkenheid met beleidsmakers en andere actoren. Onze definitie van diaspora gemeenschappen is gebaseerd op Agunias en Newland's (2012) definitie:

*“Diaspora gemeenschappen zijn immigranten en hun nakomelingen die buiten het geboorteland of het land van hun voorouders leven, op tijdelijke dan wel permanente basis, terwijl zij emotionele en materiële banden behouden met het land van herkomst. De rode draad tussen deze recente nieuwkomers en leden van de reeds lang gevestigde gemeenschappen is dat zij zich identificeren met hun land van herkomst of afkomst en dat zij bereid zijn deze banden te behouden”.*

(Agunias, Dovelijn Rannveig and Kathleen Newland. 2012. “Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development.” International Organization for Migration).

### Activiteiten

Ten eerste zouden we u graag wat willen vragen over de activiteiten van uw organisatie of initiatief.

1. Wat is de missie van uw organisatie of initiatief?
2. Heeft uw organisatie of initiatief andere missies of andere punten waar de nadruk op ligt?
3. Is uw organisatie betrokken bij onderstaande activiteiten?
  - Taalcursus (taal uit land van herkomst)
  - Contact onderhouden met de media (om bewustwording te creëren over bepaalde onderwerpen, om de media te informeren over uitdagingen waar uw diaspora gemeenschap mee te maken heeft, etc.)
  - Religieuze educatie
  - Organiseren van evenementen die mensen van verschillende achtergronden / religies / culturen / etc. samenbrengen
  - Vergemakkelijken van investeringen in het bedrijfsleven in het land van herkomst
  - Helpen bij het vinden van accommodatie
  - Lobbyen bij andere organisaties (bijvoorbeeld de Europese Commissie, de Wereldbank, religieuze organisaties) voor beleidsverandering
  - Lobbyen bij de overheid van het gastland voor beleidsverandering
  - Lokale, officiële taalcursus
  - Vaardigheden training
  - Vergemakkelijken van geldovermakingen of donaties voor andere organisaties (bijvoorbeeld NGO's) in het land van herkomst
  - Culturele scholen
  - Sociale evenementen voor leden van uw organisatie/initiatief
  - Gebedsdiensten
  - Bewustwording creëren van rechten van migranten
  - Sociale evenementen voor het publiek/iedereen
  - Lobbyen bij de overheid van het land van herkomst voor beleidsverandering
  - Bewustwording creëren van rechten in het gastland
  - Religieuze jongeren groepen

- Vergemakkelijken van geldovermakingen voor familie/vrienden in het land van herkomst
- Bieden van ondersteuning bij asielaanvragen
- Sociale evenementen voor leden van iedere diaspora
- Aanmoedigen van stemmen in het land van herkomst
- Aanmoedigen van stemmen in het gastland
- Bijstand verlenen voor werkzoekenden

4. Gelieve elke andere activiteit van uw organisatie/initiatief aan te geven die hierboven niet vermeld is

### Betrokkenheid

In dit onderdeel willen we u vragen naar de mate van contact en het werken met verschillende mensen binnen en buiten de overheid en organisaties. Tevens zouden we graag uw mening horen over hoe overheden en anderen de manier waarop zij werken met organisaties of initiatieven als die van u kunnen verbeteren. Uw antwoorden helpen ons bij het vormen van aanbevelingen voor de Europese Commissie en andere instituties die goed willen werken met organisaties zoals die van u.

5. Op een schaal van 0 tot 10, waarbij 0 staat voor nooit en 10 voor altijd, in welke mate heeft u gewerkt met of samengewerkt met elk van onderstaande partijen?
- Overheid in land van herkomst
  - Overheid in gastland – sociale voorzieningen
  - Overheid in gastland – gezondheids- en medische voorzieningen
  - Overheid in gastland – scholing of educatieve voorzieningen
  - Overheid in gastland – politie en juridische dienstverlening
  - Overheid in gastland – andere voorzieningen
  - Andere maatschappelijke belangenorganisaties
  - Andere organisaties die uw diaspora groep(en) vertegenwoordigen
  - Anderen (gelieve deze te specificeren in onderstaand tekstvak)
6. Gelieve de andere individuen of groepen aan te geven met wie u regelmatig werkt, die niet voorkomen in bovenstaande lijst.
7. Indien aanwezig, wat zijn de voordelen voor uw organisatie of initiatief voortkomend uit de samenwerking met onderstaande partijen?

	Overheid in land van herkomst	Overheid in gastland – sociale voorzieningen	Overheid in gastland – gezondheidsvoorzieningen	Overheid in gastland – educatieve voorzieningen	Overheid in gastland – politie en juridische dienstverlening	Overheid in gastland – andere voorzieningen	Andere maatschappelijke belangenorganisaties	Andere organisaties die uw diaspora groep(en) vertegenwoordigen
Beïnvloeden van hun activiteiten of beleid								
Ondersteuning krijgen voor de								

activiteiten van uw organisatie								
Het publiek bewustmaken van de activiteiten van uw organisatie								
Uw organisatie heeft een juridische verplichting met hen betrokken te zijn								
Fondsenwerving/waarborgen van de financiering								
Uitwisselen van informatie								
Samenwerken van diensten								
Creëren van kansen voor leden van uw organisatie of initiatief								
Andere voordelen (gelieve deze te specificeren in onderstaand tekstvak)								

8. Indien van toepassing, gelieve de andere voordelen voor uw organisatie of leden van uw diaspora aan te geven die voortkomen uit de samenwerking met bovenstaande partijen.

9. Wie start meestal de samenwerking tussen uw organisatie of initiatief en onderstaande partijen?

	Uw organisatie of initiatief	Het andere individu of de andere organisatie	Samenwerking wordt door beiden geïnitieerd	Niet van toepassing	Weet ik niet
Overheid in land van herkomst					
Overheid in gastland – sociale voorzieningen					
Overheid in gastland – gezondheids- en medische					

voorzieningen					
Overheid in gastland – scholing of educatieve voorzieningen					
Overheid in gastland – politie en juridische dienstverlening					
Overheid in gastland – andere voorzieningen					
Andere maatschappelijke belangenorganisaties					
Andere organisaties die uw diaspora groep(en) vertegenwoordigen					
Anderen (gelieve deze te specificeren in onderstaand tekstvak)					

10. Gelieve de andere individuen of groepen aan te geven met wie u samenwerkt en aan te geven wie normaal gesproken deze samenwerking begint.
11. Op een schaal van 0 tot 10, waarbij 0 staat voor helemaal niet tevreden en 10 heel erg tevreden, hoe tevreden bent u over uw relatie met onderstaande partijen?
- \_\_ Overheid in land van herkomst
  - \_\_ Overheid in gastland – sociale voorzieningen
  - \_\_ Overheid in gastland – gezondheids- en medische voorzieningen
  - \_\_ Overheid in gastland – scholing of educatieve voorzieningen
  - \_\_ Overheid in gastland – politie en juridische dienstverlening
  - \_\_ Overheid in gastland – andere voorzieningen
  - \_\_ Andere maatschappelijke belangenorganisaties
  - \_\_ Andere organisaties die uw diaspora groep(en) vertegenwoordigen
  - \_\_ Anderen (gelieve deze te specificeren in onderstaand tekstvak)
12. Gelieve de andere individuen of groepen aan te geven met wie u samenwerkt en aan te geven.
13. Zijn er specifieke kwesties en beleidsterreinen die u het meest belangrijk vindt voor uw organisatie of initiatief?
14. Naar uw mening, is uw organisatie of initiatief in staat deze kwesties en terreinen te beïnvloeden?  
Indien ja, op wie en hoe - gelieve voorbeelden te geven. Zo niet, gelieve aan te geven waarom u denkt dat dit niet het geval is.
15. Kunt u omschrijven hoe uw organisatie of initiatief haar prioriteiten stelt?
16. Op welke manier kan de relatie tussen uw organisatie of initiatief en onderstaande partijen verbeterd worden, indien dit mogelijk is?
- Overheid in gastland
  - Overheid in land van herkomst
  - Andere maatschappelijke belangenorganisaties

- Andere organisaties die uw diaspora groep(en) vertegenwoordigen
- Andere relatie (gelieve aan te geven met wie)

17. Kunt u voorbeelden geven van succesvolle samenwerkingen tussen uw groep en andere organisaties of initiatieven?
18. Zijn er bepaalde acties, houdingen of andere barrières in samenwerken die ervoor zorgen dat u liever niet samenwerkt met bepaalde overheidsinstanties of niet-gouvernementele organisaties?

### **Algemene kenmerken**

In dit onderdeel willen we u een paar vragen stellen over uw organisatie of initiatief en de diaspora groep die u vertegenwoordigt. Uw antwoorden kunnen ons helpen de verschillende soorten organisaties die diaspora groepen in de Verenigde Staten en Europa vertegenwoordigen beter te begrijpen. Daarnaast kan het ons inzicht bieden in hoe verschillende soorten organisaties graag samenwerken met overheden en organisaties in het land van herkomst.

19. Naam van uw organisatie of initiatief
20. Welke diaspora groepen vertegenwoordigt/ondersteunt u?
21. Hoeveel betaalde werknemers heeft uw organisatie of initiatief?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. Hoeveel vrijwilligers heeft uw organisatie of initiatief?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Zijn er bepaalde voorwaarden om lid van uw organisatie of initiatief te worden?
- Geen voorwaarden
  - Ja, burgerschap van het gastland
  - Ja, burgerschap van het land van herkomst
  - Beroep in een bepaald vakgebied
  - Anders, namelijk
24. Hoeveel leden heeft uw organisatie of initiatief ongeveer?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. Hoeveel jaar bestaat uw organisatie of initiatief?
- Minder dan 2 jaar
  - 2-5 jaar
  - 6-10 jaar

- 11-20 jaar
  - Meer dan 20 jaar
26. Hoe lang bent u betrokken bij deze organisatie of dit initiatief?
27. Wat is uw positie in de organisatie of het initiatief?
- Management
  - Administratief
  - Anders, namelijk
28. Wat zijn uw financieringsbronnen?
- Overheid in gastland – nationaal niveau
  - Overheid in gastland – lokaal niveau
  - Overheid in land van herkomst
  - Intergouvernementele organisaties (bijvoorbeeld instanties van de Europese Unie, de Wereldbank)
  - Giften van individuen
  - Giften van andere organisaties
  - Inkomsten uit diensten/lidmaatschapsgeld
  - Geen
  - Anders, namelijk
29. Van bovenstaande antwoorden, wat is uw voornaamste bron van inkomsten?
30. Naar uw schatting, wat is de omvang van de totale diaspora populatie die uw organisatie of initiatief vertegenwoordigt in het land waar uw organisatie of initiatief actief is?
31. Heeft de diaspora populatie zich geconcentreerd in bepaalde steden of regio's?
- Weet ik niet
  - Nee
  - Ja, namelijk in
32. Bent u tevreden met het aantal mensen van uw diaspora gemeenschap met wie u kunt samenwerken of die u kunt helpen of ondersteunen?
- Ja
  - Nee
33. Hoeveel mensen in de gemeenschap die u vertegenwoordigt zijn bekend met uw organisatie of initiatief?
34. Is er iets dat uw organisatie of initiatief kan helpen om meer dingen te doen die u belangrijk vindt?

### **Afsluitende vragen**

Tot slot willen we u graag de mogelijkheid geven te reageren op andere belangrijke zaken.

35. Zijn er andere opmerkingen die u hier wilt vermelden?
36. Het onderzoeksteam zou graag interviews houden met vertegenwoordigers van diaspora gemeenschappen om een aantal bevindingen van deze vragenlijst te bespreken. Zou u bereid zijn met een van onze onderzoekers te spreken? Zo ja, op welk e-mail adres kunnen wij u bereiken?
- Nee
  - Ja, op het volgende email adres
37. Kunt u andere soortgelijke organisaties of initiatieven aanbevelen die mogelijk geïnteresseerd zijn in deelname aan deze vragenlijst? Indien dit het geval is, kunt u ons hun contactgegevens geven?

RAND Europe and IZA

	Naam	Organisatie	Email adres
#1			
#2			
#3			

## French Survey

### Introduction

Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de participer à notre étude sur les diasporas et leurs relations avec les décideurs publics et autres organisations gouvernementales et non-gouvernementales. Notre définition des diasporas est basée sur la définition de Agunias et Newland (2012) :

*«Les diasporas sont constituées d'émigrés et de leurs descendants qui vivent en dehors du pays de leur naissance ou de leurs ancêtres, temporairement ou de manière permanente, mais qui maintiennent toujours des liens affectifs et matériels avec leur pays d'origine. Le point commun entre ces émigrés récents et les émigrés de longue date est qu'ils s'identifient avec leur pays d'origine ou celui de leurs ancêtres et désirent maintenir des liens avec lui.»*

(Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig and Kathleen Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." International Organization for Migration).

### Activités

Premièrement nous aimerions vous poser des questions sur les activités de votre organisation ou initiative.

1. Quelle est la mission/le rôle principal(e) de votre organisation?
2. Est-ce que votre organisation ou initiative a une autre mission/un autre rôle?
3. Est-ce que votre organisation s'investit dans les activités suivantes?
  - Cours de langue du pays d'origine
  - Activités médiatiques (campagne d'information pour promouvoir la connaissance de certains problèmes, informer les media des difficultés rencontrées par votre communauté, etc).
  - Education religieuse
  - Organisation d'événements pour rassembler des individus de différentes origines, religions et cultures etc
  - Aide à l'investissement dans le pays d'origine
  - Aide au logement
  - Pression sur d'autres organisations (ex: Commission Européenne, Banque Mondiale, organisations religieuses)
  - Pression sur le gouvernement du pays d'accueil en faveur de changements politiques
  - Cours de langue du pays d'accueil
  - Formation professionnelle
  - Aide aux transferts financiers et dons à d'autres organisations (ex : organisations non gouvernementales) dans le pays d'origine
  - Ecoles culturelles
  - Activités sociales pour les membres de votre organisation/initiative
  - Services de prière
  - Campagne d'information pour promouvoir les droits des migrants
  - Activités sociales ouvertes à tous
  - Pression sur le gouvernement du pays d'origine en faveur de changements politiques
  - Campagne d'information pour promouvoir les droits dans le pays d'accueil
  - Groupes religieux pour les jeunes

- Aide aux transferts financiers pour la famille et les amis dans le pays d'origine
- Soutien aux réfugiés et aux demandeurs d'asile
- Activités sociales pour les membres de la diaspora
- Encouragement au vote dans le pays d'origine
- Encouragement au vote dans le pays d'accueil
- Aide à l'emploi

4. Veuillez indiquer toute autre activité dans laquelle votre organisation est impliquée et qui n'est pas mentionnée ci-dessus.

### Engagement

Dans cette section nous aimerions vous poser des questions sur la nature de vos contacts et de vos activités avec différents individus et organisations gouvernementales et non-gouvernementales. Nous aimerions aussi entendre vos vues sur la manière dont ces gouvernements et autres organisations peuvent améliorer leurs relations de travail avec des organisations ou initiatives comme la vôtre. Vos réponses nous aideront à formuler des recommandations pour la Commission Européenne et d'autres institutions qui voudraient avoir de bonnes relations avec des organisations comme la vôtre.

5. Sur une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 correspond à « jamais » et 10 à « toujours », dans quelle mesure travaillez-vous ou collaborez-vous avec chacun des groupes suivants?

- Gouvernement du pays d'origine
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - services sociaux
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – services de santé et médicaux
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – école et services éducatifs
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – Police et services légaux
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - autres services
- Autres organisations de la société civile
- Autres organisations représentant votre (vos) groupe(s) de diaspora
- Autres (veuillez préciser dans le champ ci-dessous)

6. Veuillez préciser avec quels autres individus ou groupes vous travaillez régulièrement et qui n'apparaissent pas dans la liste ci-dessus.

7. Quels sont, le cas échéant, les bénéfices pour votre organisation ou initiative de la collaboration avec les groupes suivants?

	Gouvernement du pays d'origine	Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - services sociaux	Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – services de santé et médicaux	Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – école et services éducatifs	Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – Police et services légaux	Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - autres services	Autres organisations de la société civile	Autres organisations représentant votre (vos) groupe(s) de diaspora
Influencer leurs								

activités ou politiques								
Obtenir leur soutien pour les activités de votre organisatio n								
Faire campagne pour promouvo ir les activités de votre organisatio n								
Votre organisatio n a l'obligatio n légale de s'engager avec eux								
Lever des fonds/obte nir des financeme nts								
Echanger des informatio ns avec eux								
Co- productio n de services								
Créer des opportunit								

és pour les membres de votre organisation ou initiative								
Autres bénéfices (veuillez préciser dans le champ ci-dessous)								

8. Veuillez préciser tout autre bénéfice que votre organisation ou les membres de votre diaspora reçoivent grâce à votre collaboration avec les partis listés ci-dessus
9. Qui généralement est à l'origine de la collaboration entre votre organisation ou initiative et les groupes ci-dessous?

	Votre organisation ou initiative	L'autre individu ou organisation	Les deux partis sont à l'origine de la collaboration	Ne s'applique pas	Ne sait pas
Gouvernement du pays d'origine					
Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - services sociaux					
Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – services de santé et médicaux					
Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – école et services éducatifs					
Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – Police et services légaux					
Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - autres services					
Autres organisations de la société civile					
Autres organisations représentant votre (vos) groupe(s) de diaspora					

Autres (veuillez préciser dans le champ ci-dessous)					
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10. Veuillez préciser quels sont les autres individus ou groupes avec qui vous collaborez, et identifier qui d'habitude est à l'origine de la collaboration.
11. Sur une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 correspond à « pas du tout satisfait » et 10 à « complètement satisfait », dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait de votre relation avec les groupes suivants?
  - Gouvernement du pays d'origine
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - services sociaux
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – services de santé et médicaux
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – école et services éducatifs
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – Police et services légaux
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil - autres services
  - Autres organisations de la société civile
  - Autres organisations représentant votre (vos) groupe(s) de diaspora
  - Autres (veuillez préciser dans le champ ci-dessous)
12. Veuillez préciser quels sont les autres individus ou groupes avec qui vous collaborez.
13. Y-a-t-il des thèmes ou des questions politiques qui soient particulièrement important pour votre organisation ou initiative?
14. Selon vous, est-ce que votre organisation ou initiative a la capacité d'influencer ces questions? Si c'est le cas, en influençant qui et comment – veuillez donner des exemples. Sinon veuillez expliquer pourquoi vous n'avez pas cette capacité.
15. Pouvez-vous décrire comment votre organisation ou initiative définit ses priorités?
16. De quelle manière la relation de votre organisation ou initiative avec les groupes suivants pourrait s'améliorer?
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil
  - Gouvernement du pays d'origine
  - Autres organisations de la société civile
  - Autres organisations représentant votre groupe de diaspora
  - Autres relations (veuillez préciser avec qui)
17. Pouvez-vous fournir des exemples de collaboration réussies entre votre groupe et d'autres organisations ou initiatives?
18. Y-a-t-il des actions, attitudes ou autres barrières qui font que vous préférez ne pas travailler avec des gouvernements ou des organisations non-gouvernementales en particulier?

### Caractéristiques générales

Dans cette section, nous aimerions vous poser quelques questions sur votre organisation ou initiative et le groupe de diaspora que vous représentez. Vos réponses nous aideront à mieux comprendre la variété de types d'organisations représentant les communautés de diaspora en Europe et aux Etats-Unis, et cela nous aidera à comprendre la manière dont différent types d'organisation travaillent avec les gouvernements et organisations des pays d'accueil.

19. Nom de votre organisation ou initiative

20. Quelles communautés de diaspora représentez-vous/soutenez-vous?
21. Combien de salariés votre organisation ou initiative emploie-t-elle?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. Combien de bénévoles votre organisation ou initiative compte-t-elle?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Y-a-t-il des conditions pour devenir membre de votre organisation ou initiative?
- Pas de conditions
  - Oui, nationalité du pays d'accueil
  - Oui, nationalité du pays d'origine
  - Profession
  - Autre, veuillez préciser
24. Combien de membres votre organisation ou initiative compte-t-elle environ?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. Depuis combien de temps votre organisation ou initiative existe-t-elle?
- Moins de deux ans
  - 2-5 ans
  - 6-10 ans
  - 11-20 ans
  - Plus de 20 ans
26. Depuis combien de temps êtes-vous impliqué dans cette organisation ou initiative?
27. Quelle est votre rôle dans cette organisation ou initiative?
- Rôle de direction
  - Rôle administratif
  - Autre, veuillez préciser
28. Quelles sont vos sources de financement?
- Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – niveau national
  - Gouvernement du pays d'accueil – niveau local
  - Gouvernement du pays d'origine
  - Organisations intergouvernementales (ex: Agences de l'Union Européenne, Banque Mondiale)
  - Dons par des individus

- Dons par des organisations
- Revenus issus de services ou de cotisations
- Aucun
- Autre, veuillez préciser

29. Quelle est votre plus grande source de financement parmi celles indiquées ci-dessus?
30. Selon vous, quelle est la taille de la population de la diaspora que votre organisation ou initiative représente dans le pays dans lequel vous déployez vos activités?
31. A votre avis, est-ce que la population de la diaspora se concentre dans une ville ou une région en particulier?
- Je ne sais pas
  - Non
  - Oui, veuillez préciser
32. Etes-vous satisfait du nombre d'individus dans votre communauté avec lesquels vous pouvez travailler, ou que vous aidez et soutenez?
- Oui
  - Non
33. Combien de personnes dans la communauté que vous représentez connaissent votre organisation ou initiative?
34. Y-a-t-il quelque chose qui selon vous pourrait aider votre organisation ou initiative à renforcer son action?

### **Dernières questions**

Finalement, nous aimerions vous donner l'opportunité de parler de toute autre sujet que vous jugez important.

35. Y-a-t-il quelque chose que vous voudriez ajouter?
36. Notre équipe de chercheurs aimerait conduire des entretiens avec des représentants des communautés de diaspora afin de discuter des résultats de ce questionnaire. Accepteriez-vous de parler à un de nos chercheurs? Si oui, à quelle adresse mél peut-on vous joindre?
- Non
  - Oui, veuillez fournir votre adresse mél
37. Pouvez-vous recommander d'autres organisations ou initiatives similaires à la vôtre qui selon vous accepteraient de participer à ce questionnaire. Si oui, pouvez-vous nous donner leurs coordonnées?

	Nom	Organisation	Courriel
#1			
#2			
#3			

## German Survey

### Einführung

Für Ihre Teilnahme an unserer Studie, die sich mit Diasporagruppen und deren Verhältnis zu politischen Entscheidungsträgern und anderen Interessenvertretern befasst, bedanken wir uns sehr herzlich. Unsere Definition einer Diaspora ist von Agunias and Newland (2012) entlehnt:

*“Der Begriff Diaspora beschreibt Migranten und deren Nachfahren, die, entweder temporär oder permanent, außerhalb ihres Geburts- oder Abstammungslandes leben und dennoch eine emotionale und materielle Bindung zu Ihrem Abstammungsland hegen. Ein verbindendes Element zwischen Neuankömmlingen und Mitgliedern einer lange bestehenden Diasporagruppe besteht darin, dass sie sich mit ihrem Herkunfts- oder Abstammungsland identifizieren und sie gewillt sind ihre Bindung zu diesem Land aufrechtzuerhalten”*

(D. R. Agunias und K. Newland (2012). Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries. Genf: International Organisation for Migration).

### Aufgaben

Wir möchten ihnen zunächst einige Fragen zu den Tätigkeitsbereichen ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative stellen.

1. In welchen Themenbereichen ist Ihre Organisation bzw. Ihre Initiative hauptsächlich tätig?
2. Ist Ihre Organisation bzw. Ihre Initiative auch in anderen Themenbereichen tätig?
3. Ist Ihre Organisation in einem der folgenden Themenbereiche tätig?
  - Unterricht in der Sprache des Abstammungslandes
  - Dialog mit den Medien (z.B. zur Sensibilisierung der Medien für die Herausforderungen die Diasporagruppe die Sie vertreten gegenübersteht)
  - Religionslehre
  - Organisation von interkulturellen Veranstaltungen und ähnlichem
  - Förderung von Investitionen in die Wirtschaft des Abstammungslandes
  - Hilfe bei der Unterkunftssuche
  - Lobbying anderer Organisationen (z.B. der Europäische Kommission, der Weltbank oder religiöser Organisationen) um politische Prozesse zu beeinflussen
  - Lobbying der Regierung des Aufenthaltslandes um politische Prozesse zu beeinflussen
  - Unterricht in der Sprache des Aufenthaltslandes
  - Ausbildungskurse
  - Hilfe bei Überweisungen oder Spenden an andere Organisationen (z.B. Nichtregierungsorganisationen) im Abstammungsland
  - Kultureller Unterricht
  - Organisation von Veranstaltungen für die Mitglieder Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative
  - Gebetsdienst
  - Sensibilisierung im Hinblick auf die Rechte von Migranten
  - Assistance for those seeking employment
  - Hilfe bei der Arbeitssuche
  - Organisation von Veranstaltungen für die Öffentlichkeit
  - Lobbying der Regierung des Abstammungslandes um politische Prozesse zu beeinflussen

- Sensibilisierung für das geltende Recht im Aufenthaltsland
- Religiöse Jugendgruppen
- Hilfe bei Überweisungen an Familien und Freunde im Abstammungsland
- Unterstützung von Flüchtlingen und Asylsuchenden
- Organisation von gemeinschaftlichen Aktivitäten für die Diasporagruppe
- Aufrufe zur Wahlteilnahme im Abstammungsland
- Aufrufe zur Wahlteilnahme im Aufenthaltsland

4. Bitte benennen Sie andere Themenbereiche in den Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative tätig ist und die nicht bereits aufgeführt wurden.

### Zusammenarbeit

In diesem Teil der Umfrage möchten wir Sie zum Umfang und der Qualität Ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit politischen Entscheidungsträgern und anderen Interessenvertretern befragen. Zudem möchten wir in Erfahrung bringen wie Ihrer Meinung nach staatliche Einrichtungen ihre Zusammenarbeit mit Ihnen verbessern könnten. Ihre Antworten werden uns dabei helfen Empfehlungen zu formulieren, die der Europäischen Kommission und andere Institutionen dabei helfen werden, Ihre Arbeit mit Organisationen und Initiativen wie der Ihren weiter zu verbessern.

5. Auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10, wobei 0 für „nie“ und 10 für „immer“ steht, wie bewerten Sie die Häufigkeit der Zusammenarbeit mit den folgenden Einrichtungen?

- Regierung des Abstammungslandes
- Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – soziale Einrichtungen
- Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Gesundheitsdienste
- Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Bildungseinrichtungen
- Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Polizei und Justizbehörden
- Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – andere Dienste
- Andere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen
- Andere Organisationen die Ihre Diasporagruppe vertreten
- Andere (bitte erläuterten sie diese näher in dem dafür vorgesehenen Textfeld unter 6.)

6. Bitte benennen Sie andere Einrichtungen oder Organisationen mit denen Sie regelmäßig zusammenarbeiten und die nicht bereits aufgeführt wurden.

7. Welche Vorteile ergeben sich aus der Zusammenarbeit Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative mit den folgenden Einrichtungen und Organisationen?

	Regierung des Abstammungslandes	Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – soziale Einrichtungen	Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Gesundheitsdienste	Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Bildungseinrichtungen	Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Polizei und Justizbehörden	Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – andere Dienste	Andere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen	Andere Organisationen die Ihre Diasporagruppe vertreten
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Einflussnahme auf politische Prozesse und Aktivitäten								
Unterstützung für die Aktivitäten Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative								
Sensibilisierung der breiten Öffentlichkeit für Ihre Aktivitäten								
Erfüllung einer rechtlichen Verpflichtung								
Stärkere finanzielle Förderung								
Informationsaustausch								
Gemeinsame Erbringung von Dienstleistungen								
Neue Möglichkeiten für Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative und deren Mitglieder								

Andere Vorteile (bitte erläuterten sie diese näher in dem dafür vorgesehene n Textfeld unter 8.)								
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8. Bitte benennen Sie Vorteile die sich für Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative oder deren Mitglieder aus der Zusammenarbeit mit den oben genannten Einrichtungen und Organisationen ergeben die nicht bereits genannt wurden.
9. Wer ist im Regelfall für die Initiierung einer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative und den folgenden Einrichtungen bzw. Organisationen verantwortlich?

	Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative	Die Einrichtung oder Organisation mit der sie zusammenarbeiten	Beide	Nicht zutreffend	Ich weiß nicht
Regierung des Abstammungslandes					
Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – soziale Einrichtungen					
Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Gesundheitsdienste					
Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Bildungseinrichtungen					
Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Polizei und Justizbehörden					
Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – andere Dienste					
Andere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen					
Andere Organisationen die Ihre Diasporagruppe vertreten					
Andere (bitte erläuterten sie diese näher in dem dafür vorgesehenen					

Textfeld unter 10.)					
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10. Bitte benennen Sie andere Einrichtungen und / oder Organisationen mit denen Sie zusammenarbeiten und schildern Sie wer diese Zusammenarbeit initiiert hat.
11. Auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10, wobei 0 für „überhaupt nicht zufrieden“ und 10 für „völlig zufrieden“ steht, wie zufrieden sind sie mit der Zusammenarbeit mit den folgenden Einrichtungen bzw. Organisationen?
  - Regierung des Abstammungslandes
  - Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – soziale Einrichtungen
  - Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Gesundheitsdienste
  - Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Bildungseinrichtungen
  - Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – Polizei und Justizbehörden
  - Staatliche Einrichtungen des Aufenthaltslandes – andere Dienste
  - Andere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen
  - Andere Organisationen die Ihre Diasporagruppe vertreten
  - Andere (bitte erläuterten sie diese näher in dem dafür vorgesehenen Textfeld unter 12.)
12. Bitte benennen Sie alle anderen Einrichtungen und Organisationen mit denen Sie zusammenarbeiten.
13. Gibt es bestimmte Themen- oder Politikfelder die von besonderer Bedeutung für Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative sind?
14. Glauben Sie, dass Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative in der Lage ist Einfluss auf diese Themen- oder Politikfelder zu nehmen? Falls dies der Fall sein sollte bitten wir Sie konkrete Beispiele zu benennen. Falls dies nicht der Fall sein sollte bitten wir sie darzulegen warum dies so ist.
15. Bitte beschreiben Sie wie Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative ihre Arbeitsschwerpunkte definiert?
16. Wie könnte die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative mit den folgenden Institutionen oder Organisationen verbessert werden?
  - Regierung des Aufenthaltslandes
  - Regierung des Abstammungslandes
  - Andere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen
  - Andere Organisationen die Ihre Diasporagruppe vertreten
  - Andere Organisationen (bitte erläuterten sie diese näher)
17. Können Sie eine erfolgreiche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative und einer anderen Organisation beschreiben?
18. Gab es in der Vergangenheit bestimmte Ereignisse oder andere Gründe, die Sie dazu veranlasst haben nicht mehr mit bestimmten Regierungs- oder Nichtregierungsorganisationen zusammen zu arbeiten?

### Informationen zu Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative

In diesem Teil der Umfrage möchten wir Ihnen ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative und der Diasporagruppe die sie repräsentieren stellen. Ihre Antworten werden uns dabei helfen zu verstehen, welche Organisationen Diasporagruppe in Europa und den USA repräsentieren und wie verschiedene Organisationen ihre Zusammenarbeit mit Regierungen und Organisationen im Aufenthaltsland gestalten.

19. Name Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative

20. Welche Diasporagruppe(n) repräsentieren und / oder unterstützen Sie?
21. Wie viele Voll- bzw. Teilzeitkräfte beschäftigt Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. Wie viele Freiwillige beschäftigt Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Gibt es bestimmte Voraussetzungen um Mitglied Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative zu werden?
- Keine Voraussetzungen
  - Ja, Staatsbürgerschaft des Aufenthaltslandes
  - Ja, Staatsbürgerschaft des Abstammungslandes
  - Beschäftigung in einem bestimmten Bereich
  - Andere (bitte erläutern Sie Ihre Antwort)
24. Wie viele Mitglieder hat Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. Seit wie vielen Jahren existiert Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative bereits?
- Seit weniger als 2 Jahren
  - 2-5 Jahre
  - 6-10 Jahre
  - 11-20 Jahre
  - Seit mehr als 20 Jahren
26. Wie lange sind Sie bereits für Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative tätig?
27. Welche Position bekleiden Sie innerhalb Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative?
- Führungsposition
  - Verwaltungsposition
  - Andere (bitte erläutern Sie diese näher)
28. Auf welche Finanzierungsquellen können Sie zurückgreifen?
- Regierung des Aufenthaltslandes auf nationaler Ebene
  - Regierung des Aufenthaltslandes auf regionaler Ebene
  - Regierung des Abstammungslandes
  - Internationale Organisationen (z.B. EU Agenturen oder die Weltbank)
  - Einzelspenden
  - Organisationen

- Dienstleistungen / Mitgliedsbeiträge
  - Keine
  - Andere (bitte erläutern Sie Ihre Antwort)
29. Aus welcher Quelle speist sich die Finanzierung Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative in erster Linie?
30. Wie viele Mitglieder der Diasporagruppe die Ihre Organisation bzw. Initiative repräsentiert leben in Ihrem Aufenthaltsland?
31. Ist Ihre Diasporagruppe vorrangig in einer bestimmten Stadt oder Region angesiedelt?
- Ich weiß nicht
  - Nein
  - Ja (bitte erläutern Sie Ihre Antwort)
32. Sind Sie zufrieden mit der Anzahl der Mitglieder Ihrer Diasporagruppe mit denen Sie zusammenarbeiten und die Sie unterstützen können?
- Ja
  - Nein
33. Wie viele Mitglieder der Diasporagruppe die Sie repräsentieren wissen von der Existenz Ihrer Organisationen bzw. Initiative?
34. Gibt es etwas das Ihrer Organisationen bzw. Initiative dabei helfen könnte noch stärker in den Themenbereichen tätig zu werden, die Sie für besonders wichtig erachten?

**Letzte Fragen**

Zum Ende dieser Umfrage möchten wir Ihnen die Möglichkeit geben, Ihre eigenen Ideen und Gedanken einzubringen.

35. Möchten Sie uns etwas mitteilen, das bislang noch nicht thematisiert wurde?
36. Gerne würden wir einige Gespräche mit Vertretern Ihrer Diasporagruppe führen, um die Erkenntnisse dieser Umfrage zu vertiefen. Wären Sie bereit mit einem Mitglied unserer Forschungsgruppe zu reden?
- Nein
  - Ja (bitte geben Sie Ihre E-Mail Adresse an)
37. Möchten Sie uns die Kontaktdaten anderer Organisationen oder Initiativen mitteilen, die Ihrer Organisation bzw. Initiative ähnlich sind und ein Interesse an einer Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage haben könnten?

	Name	Organisation	Email Adresse
#1			
#2			
#3			

## Italian Survey

### Introduzione

Grazie per aver accettato di partecipare a questo studio sulle diaspora e le loro relazioni con policymaker e parti interessate (stakeholder). La nostra definizione di diaspora è basata su quella di Agunias e Newland (2012):

*“Le diaspora sono costituite di emigrati e i loro discendenti che, pur vivendo al di fuori dei loro paesi di nascita o di origine ancestrale, mantengono dei legami affettivi e materiali a questi paesi. La caratteristica che accomuna le persone recentemente arrivate e i membri di comunità stabilite da tempo è che i membri di entrambi i gruppi si identificano con il loro Paese di nascita o di origine ancestrale e che hanno la volontà di mantenere dei legami con esso.”*

(Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig and Kathleen Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." International Organization for Migration).

### Attività

Per iniziare, vorremo fare qualche domanda sulle attività dell'organizzazione o iniziativa che rappresenta.

1. Quali sono la missione e/o le aree d'interesse dell'organizzazione o dell'iniziativa?
2. L'organizzazione o iniziativa ha anche altre missioni o aree d'interesse significative?
3. L'organizzazione è impegnata in una o più delle attività seguenti?
  - Corsi di lingua del Paese d'origine
  - Relazioni con i media (per sensibilizzazione su certe tematiche, informare i media sulle sfide incontrate dall'organizzazione etc.)
  - Educazione religiosa
  - Organizzazione di eventi per facilitare l'incontro tra persone di origini/religioni/culture diverse
  - Facilitazione degli investimenti in imprese nel Paese d'origine
  - Assistenza per trovare alloggio
  - Lobbying per cambiamenti nelle politiche pubbliche presso altre organizzazioni (per esempio la Commissione Europea, la Banca Mondiale, organizzazioni religiose)
  - Lobbying presso il governo del Paese d'arrivo per cambiamenti al livello delle politiche
  - Corsi di lingua nella lingua del Paese d'arrivo
  - Corsi di formazione
  - Facilitazione dell'invio di rimesse o donazioni per altre organizzazioni (ad esempio delle ONG) nel Paese d'origine
  - Scuole sulla cultura
  - Organizzazione di eventi sociali per membri dell'organizzazione/iniziativa
  - Servizi di preghiera
  - Sensibilizzazione sul tema dei diritti dei migranti
  - Organizzazione di eventi sociali per il pubblico/ per tutti
  - Lobbying per cambio nelle politiche al livello del governo del Paese d'origine
  - Sensibilizzazione sul tema dei diritti nel Paese di arrivo
  - Gruppi religiosi giovanili

- Facilitazione dell'invio di rimesse per amici e famiglia nel Paese d'origine
- Supporto per richieste di asilo o di status di rifugiato
- Organizzazione di eventi sociali per tutti i membri di diaspora
- Campagne per incoraggiare la partecipazione al voto nel Paese d'origine
- Campagne per incoraggiare la partecipazione al voto nel Paese d'arrivo
- Assistenza per trovare impiego

4. Per favore indicare se ci sono altre attività nelle quali l'organizzazione è coinvolta e che non sono elencate sopra.

### Impegno

In questa sezione faremo domande sulla natura dei contatti e lavoro con diversi individui ed entità sia di governo che non-governmentali della Sua organizzazione. Inoltre, vorremmo sentire la Sua opinione su come governi ed altre enti possano migliorare le loro pratiche di lavorare con organizzazioni o iniziative simili alla Sua. Le risposte ci aiuteranno nella formulazione di raccomandazioni per la Commissione Europea e per altre istituzioni che vorrebbero lavorare bene insieme a delle organizzazioni simili alla Sua.

5. Su una scala da 0 a 10, dove 0 significa "mai" e 10 "sempre", con quale frequenza la Sua organizzazioe lavora o collabora con le seguenti?
- \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'origine
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sociali
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sanitari
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi scolastici e di educazione
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Polizia e servizi legali
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Altri servizi
  - \_\_\_ Altre organizzazioni della società civile
  - \_\_\_ Altre organizzazioni che rappresentano lo stesso gruppo/gli stessi gruppi di diaspora
  - \_\_\_ Altro (per favore specificare nel riquadro sotto)
6. Per favore indicare se ci sono altre organizzazioni oppure individui con le quali la Sua organizzazione collabora se esse non sono elencate sopra.
7. Quali sono i benefici per la Sua organizzazione/iniziativa dalla collaborazione con le enti elencate sotto?

	Governo del Paese d'origine	Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sociali	Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sanitari	Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi scolastici	Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Polizia e servizi legal	Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Altri servizi	Altre organizzazioni della società civile	Altre organizzazioni che rappresentano lo stesso gruppo/gli stessi gruppi di diaspora
Influenzare le loro politiche o pratiche								
Ricevere supporto								

da esso per le attività dell'organizzazione								
Sensibilizzazione del pubblico sulle attività dell'organizzazione								
L'organizzazione ha un obbligo legale di avere rapporti con esso								
Fundraising/ assicurazione di fondi								
Scambio di informazioni								
Produzione congiunta di servizi								
Creare opportunità per i membri dell'organizzazione								
Altri benefici (per favore specificare sotto)								

8. Per favore indicare altre collaborazioni che non sono elencate sopra.

9. Di regole, da quale parte vengono iniziate le collaborazioni tra la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa e le seguenti?

	La Sua organizzazione o iniziativa	L'altro individuo od organizzazione	Le collaborazioni sono iniziate da entrambi in misura più o meno equa	Non applicabile	Non sa
Governo del Paese d'origine					
Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sociali					
Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sanitari					
Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi scolastici e di educazione					

Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Polizia e servizi legali					
Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Altri servizi					
Altre organizzazioni della società civile					
Altre organizzazioni che rappresentano lo stesso gruppo/gli stessi gruppi di diaspora					
Altro (per favore specificare nel riquadro sotto)					

10. Per favore indicare altri individui od organizzazioni con i quali esistono collaborazioni ed indentificare di regola da quale parte vengono iniziate le collaborazioni.
11. Su una scala da 0 a 10 dove 0 indica per niente soddisfatto/a e 10 indica completamente soddisfatto/a, quanto si sente soddisfatto/a con la relazione tra la Sua organizzazione e le seguenti?
- \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'origine
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sociali
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi sanitari
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo - Servizi scolastici e di educazione
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Polizia e servizi legali
  - \_\_\_ Governo del Paese d'arrivo – Altri servizi
  - \_\_\_ Altre organizzazioni della società civile
  - \_\_\_ Altre organizzazioni che rappresentano lo stesso gruppo/gli stessi gruppi di diaspora
  - \_\_\_ Altro (per favore specificare nel riquadro sotto)
12. Per favore specificare addizionali gruppi od individui con i quali la Sua organizzazione collabora.
13. Esistono delle problematiche ed aree politiche che percepisce come particolarmente importanti per la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa?
14. Nella Sua opinione, la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa ha l'abilità di avere un'influenza su queste problematiche e in quete aree? Se sí, su chi e come- per favore indichi degli esempi. Se no, per favore condivida le Sue idee su quale ne sia la causa.
15. Per favore descrivere il processo attraverso il quale la Sua organizzazione definisce le proprie priorità.
16. In che modo potrebbero le essere migliorate relazioni tra la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa e le seguenti enti?
- Governo del Paese d'arrivo
  - Governo del Paese d'origine
  - Altre organizzazioni della società civile
  - Altre organizzazioni che rappresentano lo stesso gruppo/gli stessi gruppi di diaspora
  - Alra relazione (per favore specificare con chi)
17. Potrebbe condividere degli esempi di collaborazione di successo tra il Suo gruppo e qualsiasi altra organizzazione o iniziativa?

18. Esistono delle azioni, attitudini o altre barriere al lavoro congiunto che Lei fanno preferire di non lavorare con delle particolari organizzazioni di governo o nongovernamentali?

### **Caratteristiche Generali**

In questa sezione vorremmo porLe delle domande sulla Sua organizzazione o iniziativa e sul gruppo di diaspora che Lei rappresenta. Le risposte ci aiuteranno a capire meglio la gamma di tipi di organizzazioni che rappresentano le comunità di diaspora in Europa e negli Stati Uniti, e ci aiuteranno a capire come questi diversi tipi di organizzazione preferiscono di lavorare con governi ed altre organizzazioni nei loro paesi di arrivo.

19. Nome dell'organizzazione o iniziativa
20. Quale gruppo di diaspora rappresenta/sostiene l'organizzazione?
21. Quanti dipendenti remunerati lavorano all'organizzazione/iniziativa?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. Quanti dipendenti volontari lavorano all'organizzazione/iniziativa?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Esistono dei criteri per diventare membri della Sua organizzazione o iniziativa?
- Nessun criterio
  - Sì, cittadinanza del Paese di arrivo
  - Sì, cittadinanza del Paese di origine
  - Occupazione in un campo particolare
  - Altro, per favore specificare
24. Circa quanti membri appartengono alla Sua organizzazione o iniziativa?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. Da quanti anni esiste l'organizzazione o iniziativa?
- Meno di 2 anni
  - 2-5 anni
  - 6-10 anni
  - 11-20 anni
  - Più di 20 anni
26. Da quanto tempo Lei è coinvolta nel lavoro dell'organizzazione o iniziativa?

27. Quale posizione occupa all'interno dell'organizzazione o iniziativa?
- Manageriale/di Gestione
  - Clericale/amministrativo
  - Altro, per favore specificare
28. Da dove provengono i fondi dell'organizzazione o iniziativa?
- Governo del Paese d'arrivo - livello nazionale
  - Governo del Paese d'arrivo - livello locale
  - Governo del Paese d'origine
  - Organizzazioni intergovernamentali (ad es. Agenzie UE, Banca Mondiale)
  - Donazioni da individui
  - Donazioni da altre organizzazioni
  - Entrate da servizi/quote d'iscrizione
  - Nessuna
  - Altro, per favore specificare
29. Quale tra le fonti elencate sopra costituisce la più grande parte dei fondi dell'organizzazione?
30. Secondo le Sue stime, quanto è grande la popolazione totale della diaspora che la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa rappresenta, nel Paese in cui essa opera?
31. Secondo le Sue conoscenze, la popolazione della diaspora si trova concentrata in delle particolari regioni o città all'interno del Paese?
- Non sa
  - No
  - Sí, per favore specificare
32. Lei si sente soddisfatto/a del numero di persone appartenenti alla diaspora con le quali la Sua organizzazione riesce a lavorare insieme e offrire sostegno?
- Sí
  - No
33. Quante persone nella comunità che Lei rappresenta sono alla conoscenza della Sua organizzazione o iniziativa?
34. Quali cose sarebbero particolarmente utili ad aiutare la Sua organizzazione o iniziativa a realizzare più delle attività che Le sono importanti?

### Domande finali

Per chiudere, vorremo offrirLe la possibilità di commentare su qualsiasi altra problematica importante.

35. C'è qualsiasi altro argomento sul quale vorrebbe commentare?
36. Il gruppo di ricerca vorrebbe condurre delle interviste con dei rappresentanti di comunità di diaspora per poter avere una discussione più approfondita su alcuni dei risultati di questo questionario. Lei sarebbe disponibile a partecipare a una conversazione con uno dei nostri ricercatori? Se sí, quale sarebbe l'indirizzo di posta elettronica sul quale La potremmo raggiungere?
- No
  - Sí, per favore indicare indirizzo di posta elettronica
37. Potrebbe suggerirci delle altre organizzazioni o iniziative simili che Lei pensa potessero essere interessate a partecipare a questo questionario? Se sí, potrebbe fornirci i loro contatti?

	Nome	Organizzazione	Indirizzo di posta elettronica
#1			
#2			
#3			

## Portuguese Survey

### Introdução

Muito obrigado pela sua disponibilidade em participar no nosso estudo sobre as diásporas e o seu envolvimento com os decisores políticos e outros intervenientes. A nossa definição de diásporas é baseada em Agunias e Newland's (2012):

“Diásporas são emigrantes e seus descendentes que vivem fora do seu país de nascimento ou ascendência, seja de forma temporária ou permanente, mantendo ainda ligações afectivas e matérias com os seus países de origem. O ponto comum entre esses recém-chegados e membros das comunidades anteriormente estabelecidas é a identificação com o seu país de origem ou ascendência e a vontade de manter laços com ele.”

(Agunias, Dovelvin Rannveig and Kathleen Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." International Organization for Migration).

### Actividades

Em primeiro lugar gostaríamos de saber mais sobre as actividades da sua organização ou iniciativa.

1. Qual é o foco ou missão da sua organização ou iniciativa?
2. A sua organização ou iniciativa tem algum outro foco ou missão relevante?
3. A sua organização está envolvida em alguma das seguintes actividades?
  - Formação linguística do país de origem
  - Envolvimento com os media (acções de sensibilização, comunicação das dificuldades enfrentadas pela sua comunidade de diáspora, etc)
  - Ensino religioso
  - Organização de eventos de confraternização entre pessoas com diferentes origens culturais, religiosas, etc.
  - Apoio ao investimento em negócios no país de origem
  - Ajuda na procura de alojamento
  - Lobby junto de outras organizações (por exemplo, Comissão Europeia, Banco Mundial, organizações religiosas) para uma mudança de políticas
  - Lobby junto do governo do país de acolhimento para uma mudança de políticas
  - Formação linguística da língua oficial do país de acolhimento
  - Desenvolvimento de competências profissionais
  - Facilitar o envio de remessas ou doações para outras organizações (por exemplo, ONGs) do país de origem
  - Educação/formação cultural
  - Eventos sociais direccionados a membros da sua organização/iniciativa
  - Serviços religiosos ou de oração
  - Sensibilização para os direitos dos migrantes
  - Eventos sociais direccionados ao público em geral
  - Lobby junto do governo do país de origem para uma mudança de políticas
  - Sensibilização para os direitos no país de acolhimento
  - Grupos religiosos de jovens
  - Facilitar o envio de remessas a familiares ou amigos no país de origem

- Providenciar apoio a refugiados ou outros pedidos de asilo
- Eventos sociais para membros de qualquer diáspora
- Eventos sociais para membros de qualquer diáspora
- Encorajamento ao voto no país de acolhimento
- Assistência na procura de emprego

4. Por favor indique qualquer outra actividade em que a sua organização ou iniciativa esteja envolvida, não mencionada na lista acima exposta.

### Envolvimento

Nesta secção gostaríamos de perguntar sobre a extensão do seu contacto e trabalho com pessoas e organizações governamentais e não-governamentais. Gostaríamos também de saber a sua opinião sobre a forma como os agentes governamentais e outros podem melhorar o modo de trabalho com organizações ou iniciativas como a sua. As suas respostas irão ajudar-nos a criar recomendações para a Comissão Europeia e outras instituições que gostariam de trabalhar melhor com organizações como a sua.

5. Na seguinte escala de 0 a 10, em que 0 é nunca e 10 é sempre, em que nível é que o seu trabalho colabora com cada um dos seguintes?

- \_\_\_ Governo do país de origem
- \_\_\_ Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços sociais
- \_\_\_ Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços médicos e de saúde
- \_\_\_ Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de ensino ou formação
- \_\_\_ Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de policia
- \_\_\_ Governo do país de acolhimento – outros serviços
- \_\_\_ Outras organizações da sociedade civil
- \_\_\_ Outras organizações representantes dos seus grupos de diáspora
- \_\_\_ Outros (por favor especifique abaixo da caixa)

6. Por favor especifique outros indivíduos ou grupos com quem trabalha regularmente, não listados acima.

7. Quais, se existentes, são os benefícios para a sua organização ou iniciativa advindos da colaboração com os seguintes?

	Govern o do país de origem	Governo do país de acolhiment o – serviços sociais	Governo do país de acolhiment o – serviços de saúde	Governo do país de acolhiment o – serviços de ensino	Governo do país de acolhiment o – serviços judiciais ou de polícia	Governo do país de acolhiment o – outros serviços	Outras organizaçõe s da sociedade civil	Outras organizações representant es do(s) seu(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
Influência nas suas actividades ou políticas								
Obtenção de								

apoios para actividades da sua organização								
Sensibilização da opinião pública sobre actividades da sua organização								
A sua organização está legalmente obrigada a colaborar								
Captação de recursos ou financiamento								
Troca de informações								
Produção conjunta de serviços								
Criação de oportunidades para os membros da sua organização								
Outro benefícios (por favor especifique abaixo)								

8. Por favor especifique qualquer outro benefício que a sua organização ou membros da comunidade diáspora recebam da colaboração com qualquer um dos acima mencionados.

9. Quem, geralmente, inicia a colaboração entre a sua organização ou iniciativa e os seguintes?

	A sua organização ou iniciativa	O outro indivíduo ou organização	A colaboração é iniciada quase igualmente por ambos	Não aplicável	Não sei
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Governo do país de origem					
Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços sociais					
Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços médicos e de saúde					
Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de ensino ou formação					
Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de policia					
Governo do país de acolhimento – outros serviços					
Outras organizações da sociedade civil					
Outras organizações representantes dos seus grupos de diáspora					
Outros (por favor especifique abaixo da caixa)					

10. Por favor especifique outros indivíduos ou grupos com quem colabore, não listados acima, e identifique quem, geralmente, inicia a colaboração.
11. Numa escala de 0 a 10, em que 0 é nada satisfeito e 10 completamente satisfeito, quão satisfeito está com o seu relacionamento com os seguintes?
  - Governo do país de origem
  - Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços sociais
  - Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços médicos e de saúde
  - Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de ensino ou formação
  - Governo do país de acolhimento – serviços de policia
  - Governo do país de acolhimento – outros serviços
  - Outras organizações da sociedade civil
  - Outras organizações representantes dos seus grupos de diáspora
  - Outros (por favor especifique abaixo da caixa)
12. Por favor especifique qualquer outro indivíduo ou grupo com quem colabore.
13. Existem questões particulares e áreas de política que são mais importantes para a sua organização ou iniciativa?

14. Na sua opinião, a sua organização ou iniciativa é capaz de ter uma influência sobre estas questões e áreas? Se assim for, junto de quem e como - por favor indique exemplos. Se não, por favor, forneça quaisquer observações que tenha sobre o motivo.
15. Descreva, por favor, como a sua organização ou iniciativa define as suas prioridades.
16. De que forma, se possível, pode a sua organização ou iniciativa melhorar a relação com os seguintes?
  - Governo do país de origem
  - Governo do país de acolhimento
  - Outras organizações da sociedade civil
  - Outras organizações que representam o(s) seu(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
  - Outras relações (por favor especificar com que indivíduo ou organização)
17. Pode indicar alguns exemplos de colaboração bem sucedida entre o seu grupo e outras organizações ou iniciativas?
18. Há acções, atitudes ou outras barreiras ao trabalho em conjunto que o façam preferir não trabalhar com determinado governo ou organização não-governamental?

### **Características Gerais**

Nesta seção, gostaríamos de fazer algumas perguntas sobre a sua organização ou iniciativa e o grupo diáspora que representa. As suas respostas vão ajudar-nos a entender melhor a gama de tipos de organizações que representam as comunidades da diáspora na Europa e nos EUA, e ainda a compreender como os diferentes tipos de organizações preferem trabalhar com governos e organizações nos seus países de acolhimento.

19. Nome da sua organização ou iniciativa
20. Que comunidades da diáspora representa ou apoia?
21. Quanto pessoal remunerado tem a sua organização ou iniciativa?
  - 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. Quantos voluntários tem a sua organização ou iniciativa?
  - 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. Existem requisitos para se tornar um membro de sua organização ou iniciativa?
  - Não há requisitos
  - Sim, cidadania do país de acolhimento
  - Sim, cidadania do país de origem
  - Ocupação em campo particular
  - Outros, por favor especifique
24. Aproximadamente, quantos membros tem a sua organização ou iniciativa?
  - 1-10

- 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. Quantos anos de existência tem a sua organização ou iniciativa?
- Menos de 2 anos
  - 2-5 anos
  - 6-10 anos
  - 11-20 anos
  - Mais de 20 anos
26. Há quanto tempo está envolvido com esta organização ou iniciativa?
27. Qual é a sua posição dentro da organização ou iniciativa?
- Gestão
  - Administrativo
  - Outra, por favor especifique
28. Quais são as fontes de financiamento?
- País de acolhimento – nacional
  - País de acolhimento – local
  - Governo do país de origem
  - Organizações Internacionais (ex. Agências da UE, Banco Mundial)
  - Donativos particulares
  - Donativos de outras organizações
  - Receitas de serviços ou cotas/honorários de membros
  - Nenhuma
  - Outras, por favor especifique
29. Das acima indicadas, qual a sua maior fonte de financiamento?
30. De acordo com a sua estimativa, qual é o volume da população da diáspora representada pela sua organização ou iniciativa no país em que a sua organização ou iniciativa actua?
31. É do seu conhecimento que a comunidade de diáspora se concentre em cidades ou regiões em particular?
- Não sei
  - Não
  - Sim, por favor especifique
32. Está satisfeito com a quantidade de pessoas da sua comunidade de diáspora com quem é capaz de trabalhar, ajudar ou apoiar?
- Sim
  - Não
33. Quantas pessoas na comunidade que representa sabem sobre a sua organização ou iniciativa?
34. Na sua opinião há algo particularmente benéfico no sentido de ajudar a sua organização ou iniciativa a realizar aquilo que considera importante?

### **Questões Finais**

Por último, gostaríamos de lhe dar a oportunidade de comentar qualquer outro assunto que julgue importante.

35. Existe mais algum assunto que gostaria de comentar?
36. A equipa desta pesquisa gostaria de realizar algumas entrevistas com representantes das comunidades da diáspora para poder discutir alguns resultados deste inquérito. Estaria disposto a falar com um dos nossos investigadores? Se sim, qual seria o melhor e-mail para entrar em contacto consigo?
- Não
  - Sim, por favor forneça o email
37. Poderia recomendar qualquer outra organização ou iniciativa semelhante que possa estar interessada em participar nesta pesquisa? Se sim, poderia fornecer-nos as suas informações de contacto?

	Nome	Organização	Endereço email
#1			
#2			
#3			

## Spanish Survey

### Introducción

Muchas gracias por su interés en nuestro estudio sobre las diásporas y sus relaciones e interacciones con los diseñadores de políticas y otras partes interesadas. Nuestra definición de diáspora se basa en la definición de Agunias y Newland (2012):

*“Las diásporas son emigrantes y sus descendientes que viven fuera de sus países de nacimiento o ascendencia, o de forma temporal o permanente, aunque siguen con lazos afectivos y materiales a sus países de origen. El denominador común entre los recién llegados y los miembros de comunidades de mucho tiempo establecidas es que se identifican con su país de origen o ascendencia y están dispuestos a mantener sus lazos con ello.”*

(Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig y Kathleen Newland. 2012. "Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development." Organización Internacional para las Migraciones).

### Actividades

Primero queríamos preguntarle sobre las actividades de su organización o iniciativa.

1. ¿Qué es el objetivo o foco de atención principal de su organización o iniciativa?
2. ¿Tiene su organización o iniciativa algún otro objetivo o foco de atención significativo?
3. ¿Participa su organización en alguna de las siguientes actividades?
  - Capacitación en idioma del país de origen
  - Involucrar los medios de comunicación (para despertar conciencia o informar a los medios de comunicación de los retos que afrontan su comunidad de diáspora, etc)
  - Educación religiosa
  - Organizar eventos para juntar gente de diversos antecedentes/religiones/culturas, etc.
  - Facilitar inversión en el comercio de su país de origen
  - Ayuda para buscar alojamiento
  - Presionar a otras organizaciones (e.g. la Comisión Europea, el Banco Mundial, organizaciones religiosas) para la reforma política
  - Presionar al gobierno del país de acogida para la reforma política
  - Capacitación en idioma local oficial
  - Capacitación en aptitudes generales
  - Facilitar remesas o donativos para otras organizaciones (eg ONGs) en el país de origen
  - Escuelas culturales
  - Actividades sociales para los miembros de su organización/iniciativa
  - Servicios de oración
  - Despertar conciencia de los derechos de migrantes
  - Actividades sociales para el público/todo el mundo
  - Presionar al gobierno del país de origen para la reforma política
  - Despertar conciencia de los derechos en el país de acogida
  - Grupos juveniles religiosos
  - Facilitar remesas para familia/amigos en el país de origen
  - Apoyar a solicitudes de asilo y/o solicitudes de refugiados
  - Actividades sociales para cualquier miembro de la diáspora
  - Animar la votación en el país de origen

- Animar la votación en el país de acogida
- Apoyar a las personas que buscan empleo

4. Por favor indique alguna otra actividad en que participe su organización que no se agregó a la lista de arriba.

### Participación y cooperación

En esta sección, queríamos preguntarle sobre la extensión de su contacto y trabajo con varias personas y organizaciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales. También queríamos saber sus puntos de vista sobre cómo los gobiernos y otros podrían mejorar la manera de que trabajan con organizaciones o iniciativas como la suya. Sus respuestas nos ayudarán a crear recomendaciones para la Comisión Europea y para otras instituciones que querrían trabajar eficazmente con organizaciones como la suya.

5. En una escala del 0 al 10, en que 0 representa nunca y 10 representa siempre, ¿hasta qué punto trabaja o colabora con cada uno de los siguientes?

- El gobierno del país de origen
- El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios sociales
- El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios de salud/ clínicos
- El gobierno del país de acogida – las escuelas o los servicios educativos
- El gobierno del país de acogida – la policía y los servicios legales
- El gobierno del país de acogida – otros servicios
- Otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil
- Otras organizaciones que representan su(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
- Otros (por favor, especifique en la caja de texto de abajo)

6. Por favor, especifique alguna otra entidad con quien trabaje con frecuencia y que no se agregó a la lista de arriba.

7. En caso de haberlas ¿de qué ventajas aprovecha su organización o iniciativa debido a su colaboración con alguno de los siguientes?

	El gobierno del país de origen	El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios sociales	El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios de salud	El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios educativos	El gobierno del país de acogida – la policía y los servicios legales	El gobierno del país de acogida – otros servicios	Otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil	Otras organizaciones que representan su(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
Influenciar sus actividades o políticas								
Conseguir su apoyo para las actividades de su organización								

Despertar conciencia sobre las actividades de su organización								
Su organización tiene obligación legal de trabajar con ellos								
Captación de fondos								
Intercambiar información con ellos								
Coproducción de servicios								
Crear oportunidades para los miembros de su organización o iniciativa								
Otras ventajas (por favor, especifique en la caja de texto de abajo)								

8. Por favor, especifique alguna otra ventaja que reciban su organización o los miembros de su organización por consecuencia de su colaboración con cualquier de las partes de arriba.

9. ¿Quién inicia generalmente la colaboración entre su organización o iniciativa y los siguientes?

	Su organización o iniciativa	La otra organización o persona	La colaboración se inicia equitativamente por las dos	No aplicable	No lo sé
El gobierno del país de origen					
El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios sociales					

El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios de salud/ clínicos					
El gobierno del país de acogida – las escuelas o los servicios educativos					
El gobierno del país de acogida – la policía y los servicios legales					
El gobierno del país de acogida – otros servicios					
Otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil					
Otras organizaciones que representan su(s) grupo(s) de diáspora					
Otros (por favor, especifique en la caja de texto de abajo)					

10. Por favor, especifique algún otro individuo o grupo con quien colabore e identifique ¿quién inicie generalmente la colaboración?
11. En una escala del 0 al 10, en que 0 representa no satisfecho para nada y 10 completamente satisfecho, ¿hasta qué punto está satisfecho con su relación con los siguientes?
- \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de origen
  - \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios sociales
  - \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de acogida – los servicios de salud/ clínicos
  - \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de acogida – las escuelas o los servicios educativos
  - \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de acogida – la policía y los servicios legales
  - \_\_\_ El gobierno del país de acogida – otros servicios
  - \_\_\_ Otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil
  - \_\_\_ Otras organizaciones que representan su(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
  - \_\_\_ Otros (por favor, especifique en la caja de texto de abajo)
12. Por favor, especifique algún otro individuo o grupo con quien colabore.
13. Para usted ¿hay asuntos y ámbitos de política particulares que son de mayor importancia para su organización o iniciativa?
14. A su moda de ver, ¿puede su organización o iniciativa tener influencia en estos asuntos y ámbitos? En tal caso, ¿a través de quién y cómo? Por favor, provéanos con ejemplos. Si no, por favor explique por qué.
15. Por favor, describa la manera de que su organización o iniciativa establece sus prioridades.
16. ¿De qué manera, si es que hay alguna, se podría mejorar la relación de su organización o iniciativa con los siguientes?
- El gobierno del país de acogida

- El gobierno del país de origen
  - Otras organizaciones de la sociedad civil
  - Otras organizaciones que representan su(s) grupo(s) de diáspora
  - Otra relación (por favor, especifique con quién)
17. ¿Nos puede proporcionar algunos ejemplos de colaboración exitosa entre su grupo y otras organizaciones o iniciativas?
18. ¿Existen algunas acciones, actitudes u otros obstáculos para trabajar juntos que le hace preferir no colaborar con organizaciones particulares gubernamentales o no gubernamentales?

### **Características generales**

En esta sección, queríamos preguntarle sobre su organización o iniciativa y el grupo de diáspora que representa. Sus respuestas nos ayudarán a mejor entender los diversos tipos de organizaciones que representan las comunidades de diáspora en Europa y en los EEUU. También nos ayudarán a entender cómo prefieren colaborar las distintas clases de organizaciones con los gobiernos y otras organizaciones en sus países de acogida.

19. El nombre de su organización o iniciativa
20. ¿Cuáles comunidades de diáspora representa/apoya?
21. ¿Con cuántos empleados remunerados cuenta su organización o iniciativa?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
22. ¿Con cuántos voluntarios cuenta su organización o iniciativa?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
23. ¿Hay algunos requisitos para hacerle miembro de su organización o iniciativa?
- No hay requisitos
  - Sí, ciudadanía del país de acogida
  - Sí, ciudadanía del país de origen
  - Ocupación en algún ámbito particular
  - Otro. Por favor, especifique
24. ¿Con cuántos miembros cuenta su organización o iniciativa aproximadamente?
- 1-10
  - 11-20
  - 21-100
  - 101-500
  - 500+
25. ¿De cuántos años existe su organización o iniciativa?

- Menos de 2 años
  - 2-5 años
  - 6-10 años
  - 11-20 años
  - Más de 20 años
26. ¿Cuánto hace que está involucrado usted con esta organización o iniciativa?
27. ¿Qué es su posición en su organización o iniciativa?
- Dirección
  - Empleado(a) administrativo(a)
  - Otro. Por favor, especifique
28. ¿Cuáles son sus fuentes de financiación?
- El gobierno del país de acogida – nacional
  - El gobierno del país de acogida – local
  - El gobierno del país de origen
  - Organizaciones intergubernamentales (e.g. las agencias de la UE, el Banco Mundial)
  - Donativos por individuos
  - Donativos por otras organizaciones
  - Ingresos a través de servicios/cuotas
  - Ninguna fuente
  - Otro. Por favor, especifique
29. ¿Cuál es su mayor fuente de financiación entre las que ha indicado arriba?
30. Según su estimación, ¿de cuánto es la población total de la diáspora que representa su organización o iniciativa en el país en que trabaja?
31. Según lo que usted sabe, ¿se concentra la población de esta diáspora en alguna ciudad o región particular?
- No lo sé
  - No
  - Sí (por favor, especifique)
32. ¿Está usted satisfecho con la cantidad de gente de su comunidad de diáspora que logra ayudar o apoyar?
- Sí
  - No
33. En la comunidad que representa ¿cuántas personas saben de su organización o iniciativa?
34. Para usted ¿hay alguna cosa que ayudaría particularmente su organización o iniciativa a hacer más de lo que considera importante?

### **Preguntas conclusivas**

Por fin, queríamos darle la oportunidad de comentar sobre cualquier otro asunto que sea importante para usted.

35. ¿Querría hacer observaciones sobre algún otro asunto?
36. El equipo de investigación quería realizar unas entrevistas con representantes de comunidades de diáspora para poder discutir más extensamente algunos de los resultados de esta encuesta. ¿Estaría

dispuesto usted hablar con un(a) investigador(a)? En tal caso, ¿con qué correo electrónico le contactaría?

No

Sí (por favor, proporciónenos un correo electrónico)

37. ¿Podría recomendar otras organizaciones o iniciativas parecidas a que les interesaría participar en este estudio? En tal caso, ¿nos podría proveer con su información de contacto?

	Nombre y apellido	Organización	Correo electrónico
#1			
#2			
#3			

## Appendix I: Further data on bilateral remittances

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### Brief discussion of World Bank's methodology and its implications

The World Bank first obtained the total inflows for each country – based on International Monetary Fund Balance of payment data – representing the sum of worker compensation and personal transfers. The sum total is entered into the dataset, then disaggregated at the bilateral level by using three possible allocation rules used by Ratha and Shaw: i) weights based on migrant stocks on host-countries; ii) weights based on migrants' incomes, derived from a proxy calculation of migrant stocks multiplied by per capita income in the host-countries, and; iii) weights that calculate migrants' incomes in host-countries, as well as country of origin incomes. While the per capita and migrant income data is from 2012 and measured in US dollars, migrant stocks come from 2010 figures.

At a practical level, this approach is based on the assumption that every diaspora group sends the same amount as a proportion of its income. As a consequence, this methodology precludes us from making comparisons across various receiving countries and further adding to the assessment of the relative strength of the economic ties between diaspora groups and their home countries. This should not be automatically understood as a criticism of the method; rather, it is a reminder that an alternative reliable method of disaggregating the data on remittances is not available.

There is missing or incomplete data for Eritrea, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia and South Sudan,<sup>235</sup> as well as for the semi-autonomous regions of Chechnya and Kashmir. Countries for which there is no existing official data are subject to estimates that vary widely in range and methodologies. In the interest of consistency, they have not been included in the analysis here.

The research team applied a threshold of one million USD in sent remittances for inclusion in the table, and rounded decimals up where appropriate. Additionally, though the methodology used to calculate remittances relies upon a stock of a sending country's migrant population in the receiving country, there is still an underlying assumption that remittances sent from the host country to the priority country of origin are generated almost entirely exclusively from members of the diaspora, rather than by individuals with some other type of links to the country of origin.

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<sup>235</sup> For an example of the difficulties in estimating remittance volumes in countries for which no official figures exist, see Masress (2011); Sawi (2005); State Information Service (2013).

## Detailed data on bilateral remittances

**Table I-1. Frequency of remittance destinations by country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of selected diaspora groups who send more than one million USD</b>
France	18
Germany	18
United States	18
Italy	16
Netherlands	16
United Kingdom	16
Denmark	15
Sweden	15
Spain	14
Greece	13
Ireland	12
Austria	11
Belgium	11
Finland	11
Cyprus	7
Luxembourg	6
Poland	5
Czech Republic	4
Portugal	4
Hungary	3
Latvia	3
Slovakia	2
Romania	1
Bulgaria	0
Croatia	0
Estonia	0
Lithuania	0
Malta	0
Slovenia	0

**Table I-2. Number of remittance source countries by diaspora groups**

<b>Diaspora</b>	<b>Number of EU countries/US from which the diaspora remits at least one million USD</b>
India	22
Syria	20
Egypt	19
Tunisia	17

<b>Algeria</b>	16
<b>Morocco</b>	16
<b>Pakistan</b>	16
<b>Philippines</b>	16
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	15
<b>Kenya</b>	14
<b>Sudan</b>	14
<b>Iraq</b>	12
<b>Ethiopia</b>	11
<b>Uganda</b>	10
<b>Afghanistan</b>	7
<b>Mali</b>	5
<b>Yemen</b>	5
<b>Niger</b>	4
<b>Djibouti</b>	3

**Table I-3. Overview of remittance traffic between selected case study countries**

<b>Case study country</b>	<b>Number of other case study countries to which it remits over one million USD</b>	<b>Number of other case study countries to which it remits over one million USD, excluding neighbours</b>
<b>Sudan</b>	9	7
<b>Egypt</b>	7	6
<b>Iraq</b>	7	6
<b>Yemen</b>	5	4
<b>India</b>	4	2
<b>Mauritania</b>	4	3
<b>Ethiopia</b>	3	0
<b>Kenya</b>	3	1
<b>Libya</b>	3	1
<b>Djibouti</b>	2	0
<b>Philippines</b>	2	2
<b>Uganda</b>	2	1
<b>Mali</b>	1	0
<b>Niger</b>	1	0
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	1	0
<b>Afghanistan</b>	0	0
<b>Algeria</b>	0	0
<b>Morocco</b>	0	0
<b>Pakistan</b>	0	0
<b>Syria</b>	0	0
<b>Tunisia</b>	0	0