

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010691/13
to the Commission
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: Purchase of honey as part of the European Food Aid Programme (PEAD) 2013 in Romania

The Agency for Payments and Intervention in Agriculture (APIA) in Romania has purchased 750 tonnes of honey at prices well above the going market rates, something which could well arouse suspicion.

APIA signed a contract on 8 August 2013 to provide, by the end of the year, 750 tonnes of honey, packaged in 0.25 kg plastic containers. Honey is purchased using the funds provided by the Commission as part of PEAD 2013, the programme for distributing food aid to the most deprived in Romania.

It was purchased for around RON 13.12/kg, compared with the going market price of RON 10-12/kg. This has raised complaints from beekeepers.

Can the Commission offer an opinion on this situation?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission
(29 October 2013)**

The Most Deprived Programme of the EU is broken into national programmes, which, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, are designed and implemented at Member State level. In the framework of these national programmes, the competent authorities open and run tenders in compliance with the national public procurement rules. It is not possible for the Commission to offer an opinion on the situation described by the Honourable Member of the Parliament as it is not involved in the public procurement procedure and does not possess detailed knowledge of the tender description (for example possible inclusion of additional expenses like packaging, labelling or delivery).

In case of any suspicion of non-respect of the public procurement rules, legal remedy may be sought in the framework of the complaint procedure or at the local investigative authorities. Furthermore, any citizen of the EU is free to send information to OLAF if they reasonably believe that an irregularity has been committed.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010692/13
adresată Comisiei**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Dreptul la acces la achiziția de alimente de bază în România

Aproximativ 75 000 de puncte de vânzare a pâinii (din 150 000 existente în prezent) s-ar putea închide de la 1 ianuarie 2014, dacă autoritățile române vor aproba un proiect de hotărâre de guvern care prevede ca pâinea să se vândă numai în magazine specializate sau în raioane organizate în acest scop în magazinele generale. Practic, locuitorilor zonelor rurale le va fi imposibil să cumpere pâine și produse de panificație. Această nouă măsură apare după ce guvernul român a instituit un impozit agricol pe care locuitorii zonelor rurale trebuie să îl achite personal, în localitatea urbană apropiată — în unele cazuri la peste 100 de km. Comisia este rugată să precizeze dacă există vreo solicitare în această privință pe care să o fi adresat autorităților române.

Răspuns dat de dl Tajani în numele Comisiei

(15 noiembrie 2013)

Măsurile care impun condiții pentru vânzarea de produse se pot încadra în domeniul de aplicare a dispozițiilor tratatului privind libera circulație a mărfurilor. Normele referitoare la locul în care pot fi vândute mărfurile sunt considerate „modalități de vânzare” care nu pot discrimina produsele importate din altă țară a UE ⁽¹⁾. Distinsul parlamentar menționează că pâinea poate fi vândută numai în magazine specializate sau în raioane create în acest scop în magazinele generale, ceea ce pare să garanteze un acces larg la acest produs. În absența altor informații, Comisia nu poate aprecia dacă se încalcă principiul liberei circulații a mărfurilor.

Având în vedere gradul limitat de armonizare, la nivelul UE, a normelor în domeniul impozitării directe, statele membre sunt libere să stabilească ce și cum să impoziteze, inclusiv procedurile administrative aferente. Cu toate acestea, ele nu au voie să discrimineze resortisanți ai statelor membre, inclusiv pe cei din propria țară, care își exercită libertățile prevăzute de Tratatul UE. De asemenea, nu pot aplica restricții nejustificate cu privire la exercitarea acestor libertăți. În ceea ce privește impozitul aferent veniturilor din activități agricole impus în România, nu am identificat niciun element transfrontalier și nicio discriminare directă sau indirectă care ar putea indica o încălcare a legislației UE.

A fost ridicată problema sarcinilor administrative impuse contribuabililor (fermieri). Din informațiile disponibile, Comisia înțelege că, în urma adoptării Ordonanței Guvernului nr. 28/2013, acest impozit poate fi plătit și în unitățile fiscale locale din primării, în cazul în care nu există o unitate a Agenției Naționale de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF) în satul sau în orașul în care locuiește contribuabilul. Vor fi încheiate acorduri specifice între unitățile fiscale locale din primării și ANAF.

⁽¹⁾ Cauzele conexe C-267/91 și C-268/91 Keck și Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010692/13
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Right of access to basic food products in Romania

Around 75 000 bread sales outlets (out of 150 000 currently in operation) could close from 1 January 2014 if the Romanian authorities go ahead and approve a draft government resolution stipulating that bread be sold only in specialist shops or in departments set up for this purpose in general stores. This will make it practically impossible for rural inhabitants to buy bread and bakery products. This new measure follows the introduction by the Romanian Government of an agricultural tax which rural inhabitants have to travel to the nearest urban area to pay in person — more than 100 km away in some cases. Can the Commission clarify whether there is any appeal on this matter which it should have submitted to the Romanian authorities?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(15 November 2013)

Measures imposing conditions for the selling of products may fall within the scope of treaty provisions on the free movement of goods. Rules relating to the place where goods can be sold are considered as 'selling arrangements' which cannot discriminate against products imported from another EU country ⁽¹⁾. It is mentioned by the Honourable Member that bread can be sold only in specialist shops or in departments set up for this purpose in general stores, which seems to guarantee a broad access to this product. In the absence of further details, the Commission cannot judge if the principle of free movement of goods is violated.

Given the limited harmonisation at EU level in the area of direct taxation, Member States are free to determine what and how to tax, including any related administrative procedures. However, they are not allowed to discriminate against nationals of Member States, including their own, who exercise their freedoms under the EU Treaty. Nor can they apply unjustified restrictions to these freedoms. Regarding the agricultural tax imposed in Romania, there does not appear to be any cross-border element nor any direct or indirect discrimination which may amount to a violation of EC law.

The issue has been raised regarding the administrative burdens imposed on taxpayers (farmers). On the basis of available information, the Commission understands that, following the adoption of the Government Ordinance no. 28/2013, this tax can be paid also in local tax offices of town halls in case there is no local office of the national tax administration (ANAF) in the village or city where the taxpayer resides. Specific agreements shall be concluded between the local tax offices of town halls and ANAF.

⁽¹⁾ Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010693/13
adresată Comisiei
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Anunțarea tardivă a procedurilor de selectare a partenerilor în România

Ministerul Educației Naționale din România a publicat în data de 23 iulie 46 de anunțuri pentru selectarea de parteneri, entități private, în vederea depunerii de proiecte finanțate din fonduri europene structurale nerambursabile, în care Ministerul Educației Naționale are calitatea de beneficiar. În anunțuri, se arată că termenul pentru depunerea dosarelor este în data de 25 iulie 2013, așadar două zile mai târziu.

A doua zi, 24 iulie, aceeași instituție a mai publicat 5 anunțuri similare, anunțând ca dată pentru depunerea cererilor data de 26 iulie, așadar tot două zile mai târziu.

În total, valoarea celor 51 de proiecte finanțate prin Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane ⁽¹⁾ se ridică la aproximativ 100 de milioane de euro.

Proiectele menționate vizează aspecte importante pentru remedierea deficiențelor învățământului românesc.

Solicit Comisiei:

1. un punct de vedere cu privire la această situație ridicolă;
2. să precizeze dacă desfășurarea acestei proceduri este conformă legislației europene;
3. să precizeze măsurile luate în vederea exercitării controlului asupra acestei proceduri.

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei
(7 noiembrie 2013)

În momentul în care această situație a avut loc, serviciile Comisiei au solicitat autorității de management a SOPHRD să se asigure că Ministerul Educației Naționale din România le oferă potențialilor parteneri suficient timp pentru a-și prezenta propunerile de proiecte și că acesta garantează condiții de concurență echitabile, precum și o procedură de selecție transparentă.

Potrivit informațiilor de care dispune Comisia, Ministerul Educației Naționale din România a anulat procedura de selecție tocmai pentru că propunerile de proiecte nu au putut fi finalizate în termenul prevăzut inițial.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fonduri-structurale.ro/Detaliu.aspx?t=resurseumane>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010693/13
to the Commission
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Late announcement of procedures for selecting partners in Romania

On 23 July the Romanian Ministry of Education published 46 calls to select private entity partners to submit projects financed by non-repayable European Structural Funds, with the Ministry of Education as beneficiary. The announcements state that the deadline for submitting the applications was 25 July 2013, which was two days later.

The next day, 24 July, the same institution published another five similar calls, stating that the date for submitting the applications was 26 July, again two days later.

The 51 projects financed by the Sectoral Operational Programme — Human Resources Development ⁽¹⁾ have a total value of roughly EUR 100 million.

The aforementioned projects cover key aspects aimed at remedying flaws in the Romanian education system.

I would like to ask the Commission the following:

1. What is its view of this ridiculous situation?
2. Can it clarify whether this procedure is being carried out in accordance with European legislation?
3. Can it clarify the measures which have been taken to exercise oversight of this procedure?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(7 November 2013)

At the time when this situation occurred, the Commission services asked the Managing Authority of the SOPHRD to make sure that the MoNE allowed potential partners enough time for the presentation of proper project proposals and to ensure fair competition and transparent selection.

According to information available to the Commission, the MoNE cancelled the selection procedure precisely because project applications could not be finalised within the deadline initially set.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fonduri-structurale.ro/Detaliu.aspx?t=resurseumane>

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010694/13
adresată Comisiei**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Instigare la încălcarea Tratatului, din partea unui ministru olandez

Ministrul pentru Afaceri Sociale și Ocuparea Forței de Muncă al Țărilor de Jos, Lodewijk Asscher, a arătat recent că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să elaboreze noi reguli referitoare la libera circulație a lucrătorilor, care să restricționeze aplicarea acestei libertăți numai la persoanele cele mai sărace din Europa de Vest.

Comisia este rugată să precizeze ce poziție are față de această instigare la încălcarea Tratatului și care sunt demersurile pe care le face pentru a împiedica propaganda politică cu caracter anti-european devenită o constantă a politicii statelor europene.

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei

(7 noiembrie 2013)

Comisia îl invită pe distinsul membru al Parlamentului European să consulte răspunsurile la întrebările E-009936/2013 și E-009726/2013.

În același timp, Comisia reamintește faptul că a publicat, în luna octombrie, un studiu independent care confirmă faptul că marea majoritate a cetățenilor UE se mută în altă țară din UE pentru a munci, și că prestațiile sociale nu sunt utilizate mai intens de către cetățenii provenind din alte țări ale UE decât de către cei ai țării gazdă. Comisia continuă să colaboreze cu toate statele membre pentru a clarifica punerea în aplicare a legislației UE în vigoare.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010694/13
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Incitement by Dutch minister to violate the Treaty

Lodewijk Asscher, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, recently stated that the European Union needs to devise new rules on the free movement of workers to limit the granting of this freedom only to the poorest people in Western Europe.

Can the Commission clarify its stance with regard to this incitement to violate the Treaty and what measures it is taking to prevent anti-European political propaganda, which has become a fixture of politics in European states?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

The Commission draws the Honourable Member's attention to the answers to questions E-009936/2013 and E-009726/2013.

Furthermore, the Commission recalls that it published an independent study on 2014 October which confirms that the vast majority of EU nationals move to another EU country to work, and that people from other Member States use welfare benefits no more intensively than the host country's national. The Commission continues to work with all Member States in order to clarify the implementation of existing EC law.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010695/13
adresată Comisiei
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Fraudarea fondurilor PEAD în România

Directorul general adjunct al Agenției de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură din România (APIA) este urmărit penal, într-un dosar de luare de mită și trafic de influență, în dosar fiind verificate mai multe licitații care implică fonduri europene. Potrivit anchetatorilor, prejudiciul ar fi de două milioane de euro.

Autoritățile arată că, în perioada mai-august 2013, învinuitul a condiționat atribuirea contractelor de achiziție de ulei către o anumită societate comercială de primirea unui comision de 10% din valoarea contractelor, precum și de obținerea altor beneficii materiale. Potrivit anchetatorilor, valoarea contractelor de achiziție publică este de aproximativ 16 milioane de euro.

Comisia este rugată să precizeze dacă are cunoștință de această situație și care sunt măsurile pe care intenționează să le ia în vederea restabilirii funcționării corecte a sistemului PEAD în România.

Răspuns dat de dl Ciolos în numele Comisiei
(15 noiembrie 2013)

În ceea ce privește responsabilitățile care le revin autorităților statelor membre în cadrul programului UE de distribuire de produse alimentare către persoanele cele mai defavorizate, Comisia îl invită pe distinsul parlamentar să consulte răspunsul la întrebarea scrisă E-010691/2013. ⁽¹⁾

Comisia are cunoștință de această situație și își exprimă încrederea în măsurile și acțiunile întreprinse de autoritățile române pentru a asigura cheltuirea corectă a fondurilor UE alocate programului. Comisia, prin intermediul oficiului său de luptă antifraudă (OLAF), va continua să urmărească îndeaproape această chestiune.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/ro/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010695/13
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Fraud in the European Food Aid Programme for the most deprived (PEAD) in Romania

The deputy managing director of the Agency for Payments and Intervention in Agriculture (APIA) in Romania is facing a criminal prosecution, in a case involving bribery and influence peddling, with files being investigated for several tenders involving EU funds. According to the prosecution, the damages could amount to two million euros.

In the period between May and August 2013, the authorities revealed that the accused, fixed the awarding of oil procurement contracts in favour of a particular company, taking a fee of 10% of the contract value as well as obtaining other material benefits. According to the prosecution, the value of the public procurement contracts is approximately 16 million euros.

Can the Commission specify whether it is aware of this situation and what measures it intends to take to restore the proper functioning of the European Food Aid Programme for the most deprived (PEAD) in Romania?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(15 November 2013)

In terms of the responsibilities of Member State authorities in the framework of the Most Deprived Programme of the EU, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-010691/2013. ⁽¹⁾

The Commission is aware of the case and is confident in the steps and actions undertaken by the Romanian authorities in order to ensure correct spending of EU funds on the programme. The Commission, with the involvement of its anti-fraud office OLAF, will continue to follow the matter closely.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010696/13
adresată Comisiei**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Redirecționarea către Germania a unor fonduri destinate României și Bulgariei

Potrivit presei germane, o sumă de 1,7 milioane de euro, alocată inițial persoanelor sărace din Bulgaria și România, va fi redirecționată către Germania pentru integrarea nou-veniților români și bulgari în această țară.

Presa arată că cele două țări nu sunt în măsură să utilizeze sumele de bani respective. De asemenea, se menționează că banii au fost redirecționați „din cauza afluxului de români și bulgari în Germania”.

Pentru a evita confuziile în rândul opiniei publice, Comisia este rugată să precizeze care este sursa exactă a acestor fonduri, baza legală în care s-a operat redirecționarea și destinația precisă a acestor fonduri.

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei

(11 noiembrie 2013)

Informațiile prezentate în articolele de presă la care face referire distinsul membru al Parlamentului European nu sunt corecte. Nu a existat niciun transfer de fonduri structurale europene alocate României sau Bulgariei către Germania.

Resursele alocate statelor membre sunt stabilite o dată la șapte ani (actuala perioadă de programare este 2007-2013, iar următoarea acoperă anii 2014-2020). În cazul în care un stat membru nu își cheltuiește fondurile structurale europene alocate, suma rămâne în bugetul UE și nu este redirecționată către fondurile structurale ale altor țări.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010696/13
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Funds intended for Romania and Bulgaria redirected to Germany

According to the German media, a sum of 1.7 million euros, initially allocated to the poor in Bulgaria and Romania, is to be redirected to Germany to support the integration of newly-arrived Romanians and Bulgarians into that country.

According to the press, these two countries are not in a position to use the respective sums of money. Furthermore, it states that the money was redirected 'as a result of the influx of Romanians and Bulgarians into Germany.'

In order to avoid confusion in public opinion, can the Commission specify the exact source of these funds, the legal basis on which their redirection was undertaken and the precise destination of these funds?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

The press reports to which the Honourable Member refers were incorrect. There has been no transfer of European Structural Funds from Bulgaria or Romania to Germany.

Allocations to Member States are set once every seven years (the current programming period covers 2007 to 2013 and the next 2014 to 2020). Should a Member State not spend its European Structural Funds' allocation, the money remains in the EU Budget and it is not re-allocated to the structural funds of other countries.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-010697/13
adresată Comisiei**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 septembrie 2013)

Subiect: Restrângerea drepturilor ONG-urilor în România

Partidul Social Democrat din România, aflat la guvernare, a prezentat recent o inițiativă legislativă prin care se dorește eliminarea posibilității de finanțare a fundațiilor politice de către entități aflate în afara României.

Având în vedere importanța cooperării dintre structurile neguvernamentale din statele membre ale UE și având în vedere prevederile Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1524/2007, Comisia este rugată să exprime un punct de vedere legat de această inițiativă anti-europeană.

Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei

(9 decembrie 2013)

Comisia nu face observații cu privire la inițiativele politice la nivel național.

Măsurile legislative pentru finanțarea fundațiilor politice la nivel național nu intră în domeniul de aplicare a dreptului UE. Regulamentul nr. 1524/2007 ⁽¹⁾, la care face referire distinsul membru, se referă în mod exclusiv la „partidele politice la nivel european” și la „fundațiile politice la nivel european”. Această legislație a UE nu are niciun impact asupra normelor naționale privind fundațiile politice la nivel național și asupra finanțării acestora.

⁽¹⁾ Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1524/2007 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 18 decembrie 2007 de modificare a Regulamentului (CE) nr 2004/2003 privind statutul și finanțarea partidelor politice la nivel european (JO L343, 27.12.2007, p. 5).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010697/13
to the Commission
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Restricting the rights of NGOs in Romania

The governing Social Democratic Party in Romania recently submitted a legislative initiative which aims to remove the possibility for entities located outside of Romania to finance political foundations.

Given the importance of cooperation between NGOs in EU Member States and in view of the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007, can the Commission express a point of view on this anti-European initiative?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(9 December 2013)

The Commission does not comment on political initiatives at national level.

The legal arrangements for financing political foundations at national level fall outside the scope of EC law. Regulation No 1524/2007 ⁽¹⁾, mentioned by the Honourable Member, concerns exclusively the 'political parties at European level' and to 'political foundations at European level'. This EU legislation has no impact on the national rules concerning political foundations at national level and their financing.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding (OJ L343, 27.12.2007, p. 5).

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010698/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Autopista R-2 de Madrid, en concurso de acreedores — Ayudas públicas desproporcionadas, sostenibilidad del déficit público (follow-up respuesta E-005354/2013)

HENARSA, sociedad concesionaria de la autopista radial R-2, de Madrid a Guadalajara, ha sido declarada en concurso voluntario de acreedores por el Juzgado de lo Mercantil número 5 de Madrid, con una deuda financiera de unos 450 millones de euros, según informaron a *Europa Press* en fuentes del sector ⁽¹⁾.

Con esta última, todas las autopistas radiales de Madrid están ya en proceso concursal, dado que las otras tres (R-3, R-5 y R-4) se declararon insolventes a finales del pasado año. Todas ellas suman un pasivo de unos 3 047 millones de euros. Además, con la R-2 ya son siete las vías que actualmente están en concurso del total de nueve que afrontan riesgos de quiebra y que negocian con el Ministerio de Fomento su integración en una sociedad pública de autopistas para solventar sus problemas económicos y financieros.

El sobrecoste que registraron en las expropiaciones de los terrenos sobre los que se construyeron las vías y el desplome de los tráfico por la crisis constituyen los dos principales factores de la situación que atraviesan estas autopistas de peaje. En el caso de la R-2, cuya sociedad concesionaria está participada por Abertis, ACS, Acciona y Globalvía (firma concesional de FCC y Bankia), se ha visto abocada al concurso por la demora de la Administración a la hora de abonar las ayudas que hace unos años articuló para paliar la situación que atraviesan estas vías de pago.

Fomento debe 180 millones de euros a esta carretera radial en concepto de créditos participativos y cuentas de compensación. La R-2 es una autopista de peaje de 62 kilómetros de longitud.

1. En su respuesta a la pregunta E-005354/2013, de 25 de julio de 2013, la Comisión afirmaba que «procederá a solicitar inmediatamente información y aclaraciones a las autoridades españolas», ¿nos puede la Comisión mandar la información recibida? ¿Está satisfecha con la respuesta recibida por parte de las autoridades españolas?
2. ¿Considera la Comisión que estas ayudas estatales distorsionan la competencia favoreciendo a determinadas empresas?
3. En este contexto de crisis económica y de recortes sociales, ¿considera que estas ayudas públicas son compatibles con la obligación de reducir el déficit público del Estado?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(6 de noviembre de 2013)

Tal y como señaló en su respuesta de 25 de julio de 2013 a la pregunta E-005354/2013 de Su Señoría, la Comisión ha pedido información y aclaraciones a las autoridades españolas sobre la denominada «Empresa Nacional de Autopistas» y las medidas a las que hace referencia la prensa, supuestamente aplicadas a una serie de concesionarios privados de autopistas de peaje. En este momento, la Comisión no tiene suficiente información sobre las medidas arriba mencionadas, por lo que no puede posicionarse sobre si constituirían ayuda estatal en la acepción del artículo 107, apartado 1, del TFUE y, por esta razón, ha pedido más información a las autoridades españolas. Si las medidas constituyeran ayuda estatal, la Comisión actuaría como procediera de conformidad con las normas vigentes en la materia.

En el contexto de los procedimientos de ayuda estatal, no le corresponde a la Comisión comentar la relación entre las medidas y el nivel del déficit español. La Comisión limita su análisis a la existencia de ayuda estatal y su compatibilidad con el mercado interior.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2013-09-17/la-autopista-r-2-de-madrid-en-concurso-de-acreedores_29486/

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010698/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Insolvency of Madrid's R-2 motorway — disproportionate state aid, sustainability of the deficit (follow-up to the answer to Question E-005354/2013)

Europa Press has heard from industry sources ⁽¹⁾ that a commercial court in Madrid (the Juzgado de lo Mercantil No 5) has agreed to a request from Henarsa, the company managing the Madrid to Guadalajara R-2 radial motorway, which has debts of EUR 450 million, to begin insolvency proceedings.

This means that all of Madrid's radial motorways are now the subject of insolvency proceedings, since the other three motorways (R-3, R-5 and R-4) declared themselves insolvent at the end of last year. Their total liabilities amount to some EUR 3.047 billion. What is more, of the nine motorways in danger of bankruptcy which are attempting to resolve their economic and financial problems by negotiating with the Ministry of Public Works on their inclusion in a public motorway company, seven are now insolvent.

There are two main reasons why these toll roads are in this situation. Firstly, the cost of the land on which the motorways were built was higher than originally anticipated and, secondly, there has been a sharp drop in traffic as a result of the economic crisis. The R-2 motorway management company is owned by Abertis, ACS, Acciona and Globalvía (which, itself, is jointly owned by FCC and Bankia), has become insolvent as a result of the government's delay in paying out funds that it had earmarked several years previously with the aim of alleviating the plight of the toll roads.

Spain's Public Works Ministry owes this radial motorway EUR 180 million in shareholder's credits and settlement accounts. The R-2 is a 62-km-long toll motorway.

1. In its reply to Written Question E-005354/2013 of 15 July 2013, the Commission stated that it would 'immediately request information and clarification from the Spanish authorities'. Could it pass on the information it has obtained? Is it satisfied with the Spanish authorities' response?
2. Does the Commission believe that this state aid distorts competition by favouring certain companies?
3. In view of the current economic crisis and cuts to social services, does the Commission believe that this state aid can go hand in hand with the requirement to reduce the deficit?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(6 November 2013)

As noted in its reply of 25 July 2013 to Question E-005354/2013 from the Honourable Member, the Commission has requested information and clarifications from the Spanish authorities on the so-called 'National Motorway Company' and the measures referred to in the press allegedly provided to a number of private toll road concession holders. The Commission does not possess at this stage enough information on the abovementioned measures and therefore cannot take a view on whether they would constitute state aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU and for this reason has requested further information to the Spanish authorities. Should the measures constitute state aid the Commission will take all necessary actions in line with state aid rules.

In the context of state aid procedures, it is not for the Commission to comment on the relationship between the measures and the level of the Spanish deficit. The Commission confines its analysis to the existence of state aid and its compatibility with the internal market.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2013-09-17/la-autopista-r-2-de-madrid-en-concurso-de-acreedores_29486/

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010700/13
al Consejo**

Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Papel de los depositarios centrales de valores en el recaudación de los impuestos sobre las transacciones financieras

La Comisión Europea presentó en el mes de febrero una propuesta de Directiva por la que se establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras que, tras el dictamen aprobado por el Parlamento Europeo en el mes de julio, está pendiente de la decisión que el Consejo adopte al respecto. La propuesta no especifica los mecanismos de recaudación del impuesto sino que contempla la posibilidad de que la Comisión adopte actos delegados en el marco del artículo 11, relativo a las disposiciones relacionadas con los plazos de pago del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras (ITF).

En paralelo a este texto, y de forma independiente, se está debatiendo, también, la propuesta de Reglamento sobre la mejora de la liquidación de valores en la Unión Europea y los depositarios centrales de valores, presentada por la Comisión en marzo de 2012. En este caso, el procedimiento legislativo está pendiente de que el Consejo adopte una posición común después de que la Comisión de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios aprobara su informe en febrero de 2013.

Los impuestos sobre las transacciones financieras son una realidad en diferentes jurisdicciones. En muchos casos, los depositarios centrales de valores desempeñan un papel fundamental en su recaudación. Algunos observadores señalan que para cumplir adecuadamente con los compromisos asumidos en el marco de la tasación de transacciones financieras es necesario concluir ambas iniciativas de manera coordinada.

¿Comparte el Consejo este análisis? ¿Estima la el Consejo que sería necesario asegurar durante el procedimiento legislativo su compatibilidad garantizando el acceso de las autoridades fiscales a la información e integrando las operaciones de liquidación de las transacciones? ¿Cuándo tiene intención el Consejo de adoptar una decisión con respecto a ambos textos?

Respuesta

(18 de noviembre de 2013)

Considerando que se están llevando a cabo negociaciones sobre las dos propuestas legislativas mencionadas por Su Señoría, no se ha planteado en el Consejo la cuestión de concluir simultáneamente los trabajos sobre la propuesta de Reglamento sobre la mejora de la liquidación de valores en la Unión Europea y los depositarios centrales de valores y se modifica la Directiva 98/26/CE ⁽¹⁾, y sobre la propuesta de Directiva por la que se establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ doc. 7619/12.

⁽²⁾ doc. 6442/13.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010700/13
to the Council**

Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: The role of central securities depositories in the collection of financial transaction tax revenue

In February 2013, the Commission tabled a proposal for a directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax. Following the adoption of the European Parliament report in July 2013, the file is now awaiting a decision from the Council. The proposal does not specify which methods will be used for the collection of tax revenue. Instead, it proposes that the Commission adopt, under Article 11, delegated acts on the provisions relating to time limits for payments of the financial transaction tax.

The proposal for a regulation on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories, which the Commission published in March 2012, is being discussed in parallel to — yet independently of — this proposal. Following the adoption of the report by Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in February 2013, the Council must now agree on a common position.

Financial transaction taxes already exist in many jurisdictions. Central securities depositories often play a critical role in the collection of the tax. Some observers have stated that, in order to comply with the commitments made within the context of the financial transaction tax, it is important to finalise the work on the two legislative proposals at the same time.

Does the Council share this view? Does it believe that it is necessary to ensure that the two are compatible during the legislative procedure, thereby guaranteeing tax authorities' access to information and the inclusion of transaction settlement operations? When does the Council intend to adopt decisions on the two proposals?

Reply

(18 November 2013)

Whereas negotiations are ongoing on the two legislative proposals referred to by the Honourable Member, the question of simultaneously finalising the work on the Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directive 98/26/EC ⁽¹⁾ and the Commission proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax ⁽²⁾ was not discussed within the Council.

⁽¹⁾ 7619/12.

⁽²⁾ 6442/13.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010701/13
a la Comisión**

Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Papel de los depositarios centrales de valores en el recaudación de los impuestos sobre las transacciones financieras

La Comisión Europea presentó en el mes de febrero una propuesta de Directiva por la que se establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras que, tras el dictamen aprobado por el Parlamento Europeo en el mes de julio, está pendiente de la decisión que el Consejo adopte al respecto. La propuesta no especifica los mecanismos de recaudación del impuesto sino que contempla la posibilidad de que la Comisión adopte actos delegados en el marco del artículo 11, relativo a las disposiciones relacionadas con los plazos de pago del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras (ITF).

En paralelo a este texto, y de forma independiente, se está debatiendo, también, la propuesta de Reglamento sobre la mejora de la liquidación de valores y en la Unión Europea y los depositarios centrales de valores, presentada por la Comisión en marzo de 2012. En este caso, el procedimiento legislativo está pendiente de que el Consejo adopte una posición común después de que la Comisión de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios aprobara su informe en febrero de 2013.

Los impuestos sobre las transacciones financieras son una realidad en diferentes jurisdicciones. En muchos casos, los depositarios centrales de valores desempeñan un papel fundamental en su recaudación. Algunos observadores señalan que para cumplir adecuadamente con los compromisos asumidos en el marco de la tasación de transacciones financieras es necesario concluir ambas iniciativas de manera coordinada.

¿Comparte la Comisión este análisis? ¿Estima la Comisión que sería necesario asegurar durante el procedimiento legislativo su compatibilidad garantizando el acceso de las autoridades fiscales a la información e integrando las operaciones de liquidación de las transacciones?

Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión

(28 de octubre de 2013)

La Comisión ha velado por la coherencia de sus iniciativas legislativas relacionadas con el impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras con otras iniciativas suyas, como las dirigidas a regular mejor el sector financiero y así seguirá haciéndolo en el futuro.

Por el momento, el Consejo no ha alcanzado un acuerdo sobre la configuración concreta del impuesto; desde este punto de vista, no está claro hasta qué punto las infraestructuras financieras, tales como los depositarios centrales de valores, participarán en el proceso de recaudación del impuesto.

La Comisión conviene en que no solo las autoridades de control, sino también otras autoridades pertinentes como las autoridades fiscales, deben tener acceso a la información necesaria para el ejercicio de sus funciones.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010701/13
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: The role of central securities depositories in the collection of taxes on financial transactions

In February the Commission presented a proposal for a directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax which, following the opinion approved by Parliament in July, is pending the Council's decision. The proposal does not specify the tax collection mechanisms, but does consider the possibility of the Commission adopting delegated acts within the framework of Article 11 on the provisions relating to the payment of financial transaction tax (FTT).

In parallel to this text, and independently, discussions are also being held on the proposal for a regulation on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (CSDs), presented by the Commission in March 2012. In this case, the legislative process is pending the Council's adoption of a common position after the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted its report in February 2013.

Financial transaction taxes are a reality in different jurisdictions. In many cases, central securities depositories play a key role in collecting them. Some observers point out that to adequately address all commitments made in the area of financial transaction tax, both initiatives must be coordinated.

Does the Commission share this analysis? Does the Commission believe that it would be necessary to ensure their compatibility during the legislative process, guaranteeing tax authorities access to information and integrating settlement transactions.

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(28 October 2013)

The Commission has ensured the consistency of its legislative initiatives on the financial transaction tax with other Commission initiatives, such as those designed to better regulate the financial sector, and will continue to do so in the future.

For the moment, the Council did not reach an agreement about the precise design of the tax; from this perspective, it is not clear yet to which extent financial infrastructures, such as central securities depositories, will be involved in the tax collection process.

The Commission agrees that not only supervisory authorities but also other relevant authorities, such as tax authorities, should have access to information necessary to the exercise of their functions.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010702/13
a la Comisión**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Incumplimiento de la Directiva 2008/98/CE en la gestión de residuos en la Comunidad Valenciana

Por las muchas denuncias que ha recibido, la Comisión es conocedora de la situación de los residuos en la Comunidad Valenciana y de las manifiestas carencias en su gestión por parte de sus autoridades. Si bien, en cumplimiento de la Directiva 2008/98/CE, el Gobierno de la Generalitat presentó el Plan Integral de Residuos (PIRCV-2013), su aplicación real presenta numerosas dudas y parece alejarse notablemente de la legislación comunitaria en materia de gestión y tratamiento de residuos.

En concreto, en la aplicación del PIRCV-2013:

- se estarían incumpliendo los apartados b) y d) del artículo 28 de la citada Directiva, pues las autoridades no están adjuntando al Plan información suficiente sobre la ubicación, emplazamiento y capacidad de las instalaciones existentes o futuras;
- no se respetan los preceptos del artículo 4 sobre jerarquización de los residuos priorizando la incineración antes que la prevención, la reutilización o el reciclado;
- no se establece una clara diferencia entre sus objetivos de incineración (eliminación simple) y valorización energética (aprovechamiento);
- al priorizar la incineración para hacer frente al desmesurado volumen de residuos derivado de la incorrecta gestión en el pasado, se olvidan salidas más sostenibles como prevé el artículo 11 de la Directiva, que fija un 50 % mínimo para reutilización y reciclado de los materiales más comunes;
- no se contempla la posibilidad de avanzar en la recogida selectiva de los RSU, de manera que se pierda de nuevo la oportunidad de potenciar la reutilización y el reciclado.

Vista la situación de desbordamiento por el volumen de residuos existente en la Comunidad Valenciana, parece que la Generalitat opta por la fácil solución de la incineración masiva sin tener en cuenta los excelentes instrumentos de gestión que se ofrecen desde la Directiva y despreciando cualquier política de prevención que ponga freno real al incremento generalizado de los residuos.

¿Conoce la Comisión el contenido del PIRCV-2013 y su estado de aplicación?

¿Considera la Comisión que los primeros pasos en la aplicación de dicho Plan podrían no responder a los preceptos de la Directiva 2008/98/CE y, por lo tanto, dar motivo a la apertura de una investigación o de un procedimiento de infracción de la legislación de la UE?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de noviembre de 2013)

La Comisión todavía no ha sido informada por las autoridades competentes españolas del plan de gestión de residuos adoptado en 2013 para la Comunidad Autónoma de Valencia, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 33, apartado 1, de la Directiva 2008/98/CE ⁽¹⁾, sobre los residuos.

La Comisión pedirá a las autoridades competentes españolas que den cumplimiento a esta obligación de información y, posteriormente, evaluará el plan de gestión de residuos a fin de comprobar si este cumple con los requisitos establecidos en la Directiva antes citada.

⁽¹⁾ DO L 312 de 22.11.2008.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010702/13
to the Commission**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Breach of the directive 2008/98/EC on waste management in the Community of Valencia

Due to the numerous complaints it has received, the Commission is fully aware of the waste situation in the Community of Valencia and of its authorities' flagrant deficiency in managing it. While, in compliance with Directive 2008/98/EC, the Regional Government presented the Integral Waste Plan (PIRCV-2013), its actual implementation raises many doubts and seems to deviate considerably from Community legislation on the management and treatment of waste.

Specifically, the implementation of PIRCV-2013:

- would be in breach of Article 28 (b and d) of the aforementioned Directive since the authorities are not attaching sufficient information to the Plan in relation to the location, site and capacity of existing or future facilities.
- does not comply with the clauses of Article 4 on waste hierarchy since it prioritises incineration over prevention, re-use and recycling.
- does not make a clear distinction between the aims of incineration (simple disposal) and energy recovery (exploitation).
- by prioritising incineration to address the excessive volume of waste as a result of past mismanagement, overlooks more sustainable solutions as provided for in Article 11 of the directive, which sets a minimum of 50% re-use and recycling of the most common materials.
- does not allow for the possibility of separate collection of municipal solid waste (MSW), thereby missing the opportunity to maximise re-use and recycling once again.

Given the overflow situation as a result of the existing volume of waste in the Community of Valencia, it appears that the Regional Government is opting for the easy solution of massive incineration without taking into account the excellent management tools offered by the directive, disregarding any prevention policy that would really curb the general increase in waste.

Is the Commission aware of the content of the PIRCV-2013 and its state of implementation?

Does the Commission consider that the first steps in implementing this Plan could fail to comply with the clauses of the directive 2008/98/EC and thus give rise to the opening of an investigation or proceedings for infringing EU legislation?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

The Commission has not yet been informed by the competent authorities in Spain of the waste management plan adopted in 2013 for the Autonomous Region of Valencia as required in Article 33 (1) of Directive 2008/98/EC ⁽¹⁾ on waste.

The Commission will ask the Spanish competent authorities to comply with the above obligation of information and will subsequently assess the waste management plan in order to check its compliance with the requirements laid down in the aforementioned Directive.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 312 of 22.11.2008.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010703/13

a la Comisión

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Listado de países de pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (IUU)

El pasado 12 de junio de 2013, el Pleno del Parlamento Europeo aprobó una Resolución legislativa sobre la propuesta de Reglamento del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo que modifica el Reglamento (CE) n° 1005/2008 del Consejo por el que se establece un sistema comunitario para prevenir, desalentar y eliminar la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada ⁽¹⁾.

En los debates previos en el seno de la Comisión de Pesca se ha debatido, en más de una ocasión, sobre los terceros países y los buques que realizan este tipo de pesca.

La Comisión comentó, en su día, que estaba trabajando en un listado de ambas cuestiones.

¿Podría informar la Comisión en qué situación se encuentra dicho listado? ¿Ha habido algún avance? ¿Qué países se encuentran en ese listado? ¿Está Guinea incluida en el mismo? ¿No cree la Comisión que la adopción de sanciones contra países en vías de desarrollo, como es el caso de Guinea, debe ser muy meditada dado que no solucionan el problema y puede perjudicar, además, a los propios intereses pesqueros europeos de los buques que legítimamente pescan en esas aguas sobre la base de acuerdos privados validados por los canales administrativos y diplomáticos impuestos por los Estados miembros de la UE? ¿Sigue la Comisión adelante con la idea del listado por buques?

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión

(13 de noviembre de 2013)

Tras haber identificado a ocho países terceros ⁽²⁾ que no cooperan en la lucha contra la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (INDNR), la Comisión ha propuesto un plan de acción específico para cada uno de esos países y ha examinado con ellos las medidas necesarias para corregir sus deficiencias respectivas.

En julio de 2013, la Comisión confirmó que Fiyy, Panamá, Sri Lanka, Togo y Vanuatu habían realizado avances dignos de crédito y pudo ampliar así hasta febrero de 2014 el período de diálogo entablado con ellos. En el caso de Belice, Camboya y Guinea, se comprobó que los avances no habían sido satisfactorios y la Comisión está estudiando en estos momentos los pasos que deban darse ahora.

La Comisión ha aplicado los mismos criterios para todos esos países, incluida Guinea, y ha investigado el nivel de cumplimiento de cada uno de ellos y su grado de compromiso con la lucha contra la pesca INDNR. En el caso de Guinea, ha tenido especialmente en cuenta el nivel de desarrollo de ese país, cuya capacidad administrativa ha sido reforzada por la ayuda financiera y técnica que le ha prestado la UE en los últimos años en el marco del Acuerdo de Asociación Pesquero (AAP) entre ambas Partes, así como por la asistencia técnica que se le ha proporcionado en 2012 para la lucha contra la pesca INDNR.

La Comisión ha modificado la Parte B de la lista de buques INDNR de la UE ⁽³⁾ y está trabajando actualmente en la Parte A de esa lista. Desde 2010 ha investigado más de 200 casos de buques de 27 países que ejercían presuntamente actividades de pesca INDNR y, como resultado de ello, ha habido casi 50 buques que han sido sancionados por el Estado de su pabellón (8 Estados) o por los Estados ribereños (4 Estados). Las investigaciones necesarias son complejas dado que exigen la búsqueda de hechos y el cumplimiento de múltiples requisitos procedimentales tanto con el Estado del pabellón como con los operadores. La inclusión en la lista de buques solo es posible si se cumplen las exigencias legales que impone el Reglamento relativo a la pesca INDNR ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012)0332 — C7-0158/2012 — 2012/0162(COD).

⁽²⁾ Los países en cuestión son Belice, Camboya, Fiyy, Guinea, Panamá, Sri Lanka, Togo y Vanuatu. Véase la Decisión de la Comisión, de 15 de noviembre de 2012, por la que se cursa una notificación a los terceros países que la Comisión estima susceptibles de ser considerados terceros países no cooperantes conforme al Reglamento (CE) n° 1005/2008 del Consejo por el que se establece un sistema comunitario para prevenir, desalentar y eliminar la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (DO C 354 de 17.11.2012).

⁽³⁾ Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 672/2013 de la Comisión, de 15 de julio de 2013, que modifica el Reglamento (UE) n° 468/2010, por el que se establece la lista de la UE de los buques que practican una pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (DO L 193 de 16.7.2013).

⁽⁴⁾ Reglamento (CE) n° 1005/2008 del Consejo (DO L 286 de 29.10.2008).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010703/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Listing of countries that practise illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing

On 12 June 2013, the plenary of Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing ⁽¹⁾.

In prior debates the Committee on Fisheries has, on more than one occasion, discussed third countries and the vessels that engage in this type of fishing.

At the time the Commission commented that it was working on a listing of both issues.

Could the Commission advise how this list is progressing? Has there been any progress? Which countries are on the listing? Has Guinea been included in it? Does the Commission not believe that adopting sanctions against developing countries, such as Guinea, should be well thought-out since they do not solve the problem and may also be contrary to the Community's fishing interests concerning vessels legally fishing in these waters on the basis of private agreements validated by administrative and diplomatic channels imposed by Member States of the EU? Will the Commission proceed with the idea of a listing by vessel?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(13 November 2013)

The Commission pre-identified 8 countries as non-cooperating third countries ⁽²⁾ in the fight against IUU fishing. The Commission has proposed a tailored action plan for each of the eight pre-identified countries and followed up with them the necessary actions in order to address their respective shortcomings.

In July 2013 the Commission has established that Fiji, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu made credible progress and the Commission has extended the period of a dialogue with them until end February 2014. For Belize, Cambodia and Guinea the progress has not been satisfactory and the Commission is currently elaborating on its possible next steps.

For all of these countries, including Guinea, the Commission has used the same criteria, and carefully investigated the compliance record of each of those countries and the degree of their commitment in fighting IUU. In particular, the Commission has taken into account the level of development of Guinea. Guinea's administrative capacity has been reinforced by the EU's financial and technical assistance in the past years, within the FPA between the EU and Guinea, as well as the technical assistance provided in respect to the fight against IUU fishing in 2012.

The Commission has amended Part B of the EU IUU vessels ⁽³⁾. Work on Part A of the list is ongoing. Since 2010 the Commission has investigated more than 200 cases of presumed IUU fishing by vessels from 27 countries. As a consequence, 8 flag States and 4 coastal States have imposed sanctions on almost 50 vessels. The investigations are complex, as they entail fact finding and multiple procedural steps with both flag States and operators. Listing can only be possible if legal requirements of the IUU Regulation ⁽⁴⁾ are fulfilled.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 0332 — C7-0158/2012 — 2012/0162(COD).

⁽²⁾ The countries being: Belize, Cambodia, Fiji, Guinea, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu. See: Commission decision of 15 November 2012 on notifying the third countries that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ C 354, 17.11.2012.

⁽³⁾ Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 672/2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in IUU fishing, OJ L 193, 16.7.2013.

⁽⁴⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, OJ L 286, 29.10.2008.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010704/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Negociación de acuerdos pesqueros

La flota atunera congeladora europea está sufriendo en los últimos años las consecuencias de la falta de acuerdos europeos con terceros países. La flota vasca representa una parte importante de la misma y se caracteriza por tener los niveles más bajos de capturas accesorias (*by-catch*) en la pesca industrial, además de contar con medidas de mitigación voluntarias, en el marco de códigos de buenas prácticas pesqueras que son pioneros en el mundo.

El sector pesquero vasco está demostrando una participación activa en la sostenibilidad en el marco de las ORPs, la UE y los institutos científicos, con la presencia voluntaria de observadores, con certificaciones de pesca responsable, siendo generador de empleo en las regiones como Euskadi en las que tiene su implantación.

Además es generador de empleo en los países en desarrollo. Es, en definitiva, un sector estratégico y con alta responsabilidad corporativa.

Por todo ello, se ruega a la Comisión que responda a las siguientes preguntas:

1. ¿Cómo ve la Comisión la negociación de nuevos acuerdos de pesca atuneros?
2. ¿No considera la Comisión que las asociaciones que representan al sector, habiendo demostrado su responsable trabajo, podrían aportar posibles mejoras al contenido de los acuerdos si se les diera entrada en las rondas negociadoras en calidad de expertos, al igual que ocurre en el caso de las delegaciones de los propios países ribereños?
3. ¿Cómo ve la Comisión el apoyo a este sector en aquellos países en donde, por las razones que sea, no se firman acuerdos de pesca pero, por razones estratégicas, es importante la presencia y el respaldo de la Unión Europea?

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión

(13 de noviembre de 2013)

La flota atunera de la UE se beneficia actualmente de diez acuerdos de pesca que incluyen los principales caladeros de los océanos Atlántico, Índico y Pacífico. Dos protocolos adicionales (con Marruecos y Mauricio) se encuentran en proceso de ratificación. Asimismo, la Comisión ha puesto en marcha estudios de evaluación sobre la conveniencia de firmar acuerdos de pesca con otros países.

Las partes interesadas, entre las que se encuentra el sector pesquero vasco, están participando en la preparación de todas las negociaciones: se les realizan consultas en relación con las evaluaciones, participan en las reuniones preparatorias organizadas por la Comisión, y tanto esta como los Estados miembros les informan periódicamente de los resultados de las negociaciones, inclusive al margen de las negociaciones en caso de estar presentes.

Por último, en beneficio de los países que no cuentan con acuerdos de asociación en el sector pesquero, la Comisión contempla mejorar la transparencia de los acuerdos privados entre la flota de la UE y terceros países a fin de garantizar la igualdad de condiciones, la seguridad jurídica y la pesca sostenible. A tales efectos, la Comisión tiene previsto proponer una revisión del Reglamento sobre la autorización de las actividades pesqueras.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010704/13
to the Commission
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Negotiation of fisheries agreements

In recent years, the European tuna freezer fleet has been suffering as a result of the lack of European agreements with third countries. The Basque fleet represents a large portion of the Community fleet and is noted for having the lowest levels of by-catches in industrial fishing. In addition, it has adopted globally innovative voluntary mitigation measures within the framework of good fishing practices.

The Basque fisheries sector is demonstrating active involvement in sustainability within the framework of the regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), the EU and scientific institutes, with the voluntary presence of observers and responsible fishing certification, thus generating employment in regions such as Euskadi where the fishing sector has been established.

Furthermore, it is creating jobs in developing countries. Ultimately, it is a strategic sector with a high degree of corporate responsibility.

Therefore, the Commission is invited to answer the following questions:

1. How does the Commission see the negotiation of new tuna fisheries agreements?
2. Does the Commission not consider that the associations which represent the sector, having demonstrated their responsible work, could make potential improvements to the content of the agreements if allowed to enter the rounds of negotiations as experts, as in the case of the delegations of the riparian countries?
3. How does the Commission view support for this sector in the countries where, for whatever reason, fishing agreements are not signed, but, for strategic reasons, the presence and the backing of the EU is important.

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(13 November 2013)

The EU tuna fleet currently benefits from 10 fisheries agreements covering the main fishing grounds in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. Two additional protocols (with Morocco and Mauritius) are under ratification procedure. The Commission has launched evaluation studies on the opportunity to have fisheries agreements with additional countries.

Stakeholders, including the Basque fisheries sector, are involved in the preparation of all negotiations: they are consulted in the context of evaluations, they participate to preparatory meetings organised by the Commission and they are regularly informed by the Commission and the Member States on the outcomes of negotiations, including at the margin of negotiations when they are present.

Finally, for countries where no FPA exists, the Commission is envisaging to improve the transparency of private agreements between the EU fleet and third countries to ensure level-playing field, legal certainty and sustainable fishing. To that end, the Commission is intending to propose a review of the Fisheries Authorisation Regulation.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010705/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Pesca entre la UE y Mauricio

La flota atunera congeladora europea se está viendo seriamente perjudicada por la disminución de los acuerdos de pesca con terceros países. La mayor parte de la flota atunera se encuentra en Euskadi. Se trata de un sector estratégico generador de importante mano de obra en los buques, así como en los astilleros y en las industrias auxiliares. Igualmente, su presencia en terceros países genera un importante impulso de su economía y numerosos puestos de trabajo en el ámbito local.

Sin embargo, su actividad se está viendo claramente perjudicada por la ausencia de una estrategia europea clara para culminar los referidos acuerdos. Por otro lado, habiendo negociado y firmado acuerdos de pesca con terceros países, por razones internas de la propia UE, estos devienen inaplicables como es el caso del Acuerdo de Mauricio, o sufren retrasos que complican la continuidad y planificación de las actividades pesqueras atuneras.

1. ¿Puede informar la Comisión de la situación en que se encuentra el Acuerdo de Pesca con Mauricio?
2. ¿No cree la Comisión que estas situaciones dañan claramente la imagen de la UE con terceros países y dificultan el mantenimiento y la ampliación de la red de acuerdos atuneros en el futuro?

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión

(30 de octubre de 2013)

El proceso de adopción de decisiones para la aprobación del acuerdo de colaboración en el sector pesquero (ACP) con Mauricio está actualmente en curso. Después de las negociaciones que se celebraron en febrero de 2012, la Comisión presentó las propuestas relativas a las correspondientes decisiones del Consejo en julio del mismo año. Ambas Partes firmaron el Protocolo el 21 de diciembre de 2012.

Corresponde al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo finalizar este proceso.

El Parlamento dio su aprobación el 16 de abril de 2013. No obstante, el 4 de octubre de 2013 el Consejo presentó una petición de enmienda de la aprobación del Parlamento en relación con la celebración de este Acuerdo y de su Protocolo, aduciendo la siguiente razón:

Dado que el ACP, incluido el Protocolo, también incluye medidas sobre la fijación de las posibilidades de pesca, que no pueden considerarse únicamente accesorias a los demás elementos del Acuerdo, el Consejo decidió el 23 de septiembre de 2013 modificar la base jurídica sustantiva del proyecto de Decisión sobre la celebración del ACP con Mauricio, de manera que haga referencia al artículo 43 del TFUE en su totalidad.

La enmienda no tiene incidencia alguna ni en la aprobación del ACP ni en el procedimiento que debe aplicarse a efectos de su celebración. Sigue siendo necesaria la aprobación del Parlamento Europeo.

La Comisión confía en que este procedimiento pueda finalizar a la mayor brevedad, con objeto de evitar cualquier otra demora que, efectivamente, podría ir en perjuicio de la imagen de la UE ante terceros países.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010705/13
to the Commission
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Fisheries Agreement between the EU and Mauritius

The European tuna freezer fleet is being badly affected by the reduction in fishing agreements with third countries. Most of the tuna fleet is in Euskadi. This is a strategic sector, creating an important source of labour on the vessels as well as in the shipyards and the auxiliary industries. Similarly, its presence in third countries gives an important boost to the economy, producing numerous jobs locally.

However, its activity is being adversely affected by the absence of a clear EU strategy to achieve these agreements. On the other hand, having negotiated and signed fishing agreements with third countries, for reasons internal to the EU itself, these become inapplicable as in the case of the Mauritius Agreement, or suffer delays that complicate the continuity and planning of tuna fishing activities.

1. Can the Commission supply information about the progress of the Fisheries Agreement with Mauritius?
2. Does the Commission not believe that these situations clearly damage the image of the EU with third countries, and make it difficult to maintain and expand the network of tuna agreements in the future?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(30 October 2013)

The decision-making process for the adoption of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) with Mauritius is ongoing. After the negotiations which took place in February 2012, the Commission presented the proposals for the relevant Decisions to the Council in July 2012. Both Parties signed the Protocol on 21 December 2012.

The completion of this process lies with the European Parliament and the Council.

Parliament gave its consent on 16 April 2013. However, on 4 October 2013 the Council submitted an amended request for the Parliament consent for the conclusion of this Agreement and its protocol, with the following motivation:

Considering that the FPA, including the Protocol, also includes measures on the fixing of fishing opportunities, which cannot be considered as only incidental to the other elements of the Agreement, the Council decided on 23 September 2013 to amend the substantive legal basis of the draft decision on the conclusion of the FPA with Mauritius so as to refer to Article 43 TFEU as a whole.

The amendment has no effect on either the consent of the FPA, or the procedure to be applied for the purpose of its conclusion. The consent of the European Parliament is still required.

The Commission expects that this process can be completed very quickly in order to avoid any further delay, which indeed risks to damage the image of the EU with third countries.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-010706/13

an die Kommission

Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)

(19. September 2013)

Betrifft: Zulassung des gentechnisch veränderten Mais „SmartStax“ als Futtermittel in der EU

Die gentechnisch veränderte Maissorte „SmartStax“ des Herstellers Monsanto steht kurz vor der Zulassung in der Europäischen Union. Wissenschaftler warnen jedoch vor möglichen negativen Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit von Mensch und Tier. So wurde unter anderem von Forschern der Universität Caen/Frankreich bemängelt, dass die sechs Insektizide, die der Mais ausbildet, nicht hinlänglich auf Gesundheitsrisiken getestet wurden. Eine an Ratten durchgeführte Testreihe der Universität kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass Tiere nach zweijähriger Fütterung mit gentechnisch verändertem Mais Tumore entwickelten und unfruchtbar wurden. In Australien stellten Forscher nach der Verfütterung von Genmais an Schweine schwere Entzündungen in Magen und Darm fest.

Kann die Kommission vor diesem Hintergrund folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Wie bewertet die Kommission die beschriebenen Forschungsergebnisse und vorgebrachten Bedenken bezüglich einer Zulassung von „SmartStax“ in der Europäischen Union?
2. Wurden die betroffenen Insektizide ausreichend auf Gesundheitsrisiken getestet?
3. Wurden Studien, auf denen die Zulassung der betroffenen Insektizide beruht, vom Hersteller Monsanto finanziell gefördert?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission

(31. Oktober 2013)

1./2. Wir weisen den Herrn Abgeordneten auf die Antworten der Kommission auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-004125/2013 und E-009675/2013 ⁽¹⁾ hin. Die Europäische Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit (EFSA) ⁽²⁾ hat die vom Herrn Abgeordneten angeführte australische Studie (Carman et. al. (2013)) ausgewertet und ist zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass die Untersuchung nicht den Standardverfahren/Leitlinien für die toxikologische Bewertung entspricht und mehrere Ungenauigkeiten und Lücken hinsichtlich des Versuchsaufbaus, der Methodik und der Auswertung der Ergebnisse aufweist. Insgesamt ist die Studie nach Dafürhalten der EFSA nicht geeignet, um Schlussfolgerungen hinsichtlich der Organtoxizität genetisch veränderter Pflanzen bei Schweinen zu ziehen.

3. Die EFSA führt die Risikobewertung von GVO durch, indem sie eine relevante Anzahl von Studien bewertet, die entweder von den Antragstellern gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1829/2003 eingereicht werden oder bei denen es sich um unabhängige Peer-Review-Studien handelt.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/event/130703a-m.pdf>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010706/13
to the Commission**

Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Authorisation of genetically modified SmartStax maize as an animal feed in the EU

Genetically modified SmartStax maize from Monsanto is soon to be authorised in the European Union. Scientists are, however, warning of possible adverse effects on human and animal health. Researchers at Caen University in France, for example, have criticised the fact that the six insecticides against which the maize variety is resistant have not been adequately tested for health risks. In a series of tests on rats, the university came to the conclusion that after being fed with the genetically modified maize for a period of two years, animals developed tumours and became infertile. Researchers in Australia report finding serious inflammatory disease in the digestive tract of pigs fed on genetic maize.

In the light of these findings, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What is the Commission's assessment of the above research results and the reservations expressed regarding authorisation of SmartStax in the European Union?
2. Were the insecticides concerned sufficiently tested for their health effects?
3. Were studies on which the authorisation of these insecticides is based given any financial support by Monsanto?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(31 October 2013)

1 and 2. The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's answers to questions E-004125/2013 and E-009675/2013 ⁽¹⁾. The Australian study (Carman et al. (2013)) mentioned by the Honourable Member was analysed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) ⁽²⁾ and was found to be non-compliant with the standard practices/guideline for toxicological assessment and to show several inaccuracies and incompleteness in the experimental settings, methodological approaches and data evaluation. Overall, the study is considered by EFSA not suitable for concluding on GM plants-related organ toxicity in pigs.

3. The risk assessment of GMOs is performed by EFSA, which evaluates a relevant number of studies submitted by the applicants on the basis of the provisions of Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, and also independent, peer-reviewed studies.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/event/130703a-m.pdf>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010707/13
προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)
Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE)
(19 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Ασφάλεια στον κυβερνοχώρο των οργάνων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατες αναφορές στον διεθνή τύπο, η Υπηρεσία Εθνικής Ασφαλείας των ΗΠΑ (NSA), σε μία προσπάθεια εύκολης υποκλοπής των παγκόσμιων ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών, υποσκάπτει συστηματικά την ασφάλεια και την κρυπτογράφηση του εξοπλισμού και του λογισμικού που κατασκευάζεται από αμερικανικές εταιρείες. Επί πλέον, η υπηρεσία αυτή έφτασε μέχρι του σημείου να κλονίζει τα ευρέως αποδεκτά πρότυπα, ενσωματώνοντας κερκόπορτες (back doors), γεγονός που ανάγκασε το Εθνικό Ινστιτούτο Προτύπων και Τεχνολογίας των ΗΠΑ να αρχίσει την επανεξέταση ορισμένων εκ των προδιαγραφών του. Η NSA φέρεται να έχει υποσκάψει την ασφάλεια του 2006, «Dual EC DRBG standard», το οποίο εγκρίθηκε αργότερα από τη Διεθνή οργάνωση τυποποίησης, μία οργάνωση με μέλη 163 χώρες. Συμβαίνει όμως η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των υποδομών της τεχνολογίας των πληροφοριών και των τηλεπικοινωνιών που χρησιμοποιούν τα όργανα της ΕΕ να προέρχεται από εταιρίες με έδρα στις ΗΠΑ για τις οποίες είναι γνωστό ότι συνεργάζονται στενά με την NSA. Είναι επίσης γνωστό ότι αυτές οι αμερικανικές εταιρίες παρέχουν στην NSA πρόσβαση μέσω κερκόπορτας στους εξοπλισμούς, λογαριθμούς και δεδομένα τους. Για παράδειγμα, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο χρησιμοποιεί:

- Ηλεκτρονικούς υπολογιστές με λειτουργικά συστήματα της εταιρίας Microsoft που έχει έδρα στις ΗΠΑ.
- Ηλεκτρονικό ταχυδρομείο και λογισμικό επικοινωνίας που κατασκευάζονται από την εδρεύουσα στις ΗΠΑ Microsoft.
- Βιντεοτηλέφωνα και τηλεφωνικά κέντρα που κατασκευάζονται από την εταιρεία Cisco, με έδρα στις ΗΠΑ.
- Εξοπλισμό δικτύου και ενσύρματα και ασύρματα δίκτυα που κατασκευάζονται από την εταιρεία Cisco, με έδρα στις ΗΠΑ.
- Εξοπλισμό κρυπτογράφησης για την ασφάλεια των εξ αποστάσεως συνδέσεων που κατασκευάζονται από την εταιρία EMC που εδρεύει στις ΗΠΑ.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι η NSA παρακολουθεί τις επικοινωνίες της αντιπροσωπείας της ΕΕ στον ΟΗΕ, στη Νέα Υόρκη, και εν όψει των προσεχών διαπραγματεύσεων για μία διατλαντική εμπορική συμφωνία:

1. Δεν θεωρεί η Ύπατη εκπρόσωπος ότι η κατάσταση αυτή συνιστά απειλή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και για τα συμφέροντά της;
2. Μπορεί η Ύπατη εκπρόσωπος να εγγυηθεί ότι οι ηλεκτρονικές επικοινωνίες των ευρωπαϊκών θεσμικών οργάνων, ιδιαίτερα δε του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, δεν διατρέχουν κανένα κίνδυνο από τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των ΗΠΑ;
3. Πρόκειται η Ύπατη εκπρόσωπος να ζητήσει επίσημες διαβεβαιώσεις από την κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ ότι τα ευρωπαϊκά θεσμικά όργανα, και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ιδιαίτερα, δεν παρακολουθούνται από τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των ΗΠΑ;
4. Η Ύπατη εκπρόσωπος καλείται να ενημερώσει ανοικτά τους βουλευτές του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και τους πολίτες της ΕΕ σχετικά με την απάντηση που θα λάβει από την κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ.

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010708/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE)
(19 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Ασφάλεια στον κυβερνοχώρο των οργάνων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατες αναφορές στον διεθνή τύπο, η Υπηρεσία Εθνικής Ασφαλείας των ΗΠΑ (NSA), σε μία προσπάθεια εύκολης υποκλοπής των παγκόσμιων ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών, υποσκάπτει συστηματικά την ασφάλεια και την κρυπτογράφηση του εξοπλισμού και του λογισμικού που κατασκευάζεται από αμερικανικές εταιρείες. Επί πλέον, η υπηρεσία αυτή έφτασε μέχρι του σημείου να κλονίζει τα ευρέως αποδεκτά πρότυπα, ενσωματώνοντας κερκόπορτες (back doors), γεγονός που ανάγκασε το Εθνικό Ινστιτούτο Προτύπων και Τεχνολογίας των ΗΠΑ να αρχίσει την επανεξέταση ορισμένων εκ των προδιαγραφών του. Η NSA φέρεται να έχει υποσκάψει την ασφάλεια του 2006, «Dual EC DRBG standard», το οποίο εγκρίθηκε αργότερα από τη Διεθνή οργάνωση τυποποίησης, μία οργάνωση με μέλη 163 χώρες. Συμβαίνει όμως η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των υποδομών της τεχνολογίας των πληροφοριών και των τηλεπικοινωνιών που χρησιμοποιούν τα όργανα της ΕΕ να προέρχεται από εταιρίες με έδρα στις ΗΠΑ για τις οποίες είναι γνωστό ότι συνεργάζονται στενά με την NSA. Είναι επίσης γνωστό ότι αυτές οι αμερικανικές εταιρίες παρέχουν στην NSA πρόσβαση μέσω κερκόπορτας στους εξοπλισμούς, λογαριθμούς και δεδομένα τους. Για παράδειγμα, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο χρησιμοποιεί:

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- Βιντεοτηλέφωνα και τηλεφωνικά κέντρα που κατασκευάζονται από την εταιρεία Cisco, με έδρα στις ΗΠΑ.
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- Εξοπλισμό κρυπτογράφησης για την ασφάλεια των εξ αποστάσεως συνδέσεων που κατασκευάζονται από την εταιρία EMC που εδρεύει στις ΗΠΑ.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι η NSA παρακολουθεί τις επικοινωνίες της αντιπροσωπείας της ΕΕ στον ΟΗΕ, στη Νέα Υόρκη, και εν όψει των προσεχών διαπραγματεύσεων για μία διατλαντική εμπορική συμφωνία:

1. Δεν θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι η κατάσταση αυτή συνιστά απειλή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και για τα συμφέροντά της;
2. Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να εγγυηθεί ότι οι ηλεκτρονικές επικοινωνίες των ευρωπαϊκών θεσμικών οργάνων, ιδιαίτερα δε του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, δεν διατρέχουν κανένα κίνδυνο από τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των ΗΠΑ;
3. Πρόκειται η Επιτροπή να ζητήσει επίσημες διαβεβαιώσεις από την κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ ότι τα ευρωπαϊκά θεσμικά όργανα, και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ιδιαίτερα, δεν παρακολουθούνται από τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των ΗΠΑ;
4. Η Επιτροπή καλείται να ενημερώσει ανοικτά τους βουλευτές του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και τους πολίτες της ΕΕ σχετικά με την απάντηση που θα λάβει από την κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ.

Κοινή απάντηση της Υπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(10 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή συμμερίζεται τις ανησυχίες του Αξιότιμου Μέλους του Κοινοβουλίου σχετικά με τους ισχυρισμούς για κατασκοπεία σε εγκαταστάσεις της ΕΕ. Η ΥΕ/ΑΠ ήγειρε επανειλημμένως τις ανησυχίες αυτές στις αρχές των ΗΠΑ, συμπεριλαμβανομένων του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών John Kerry και της Συμβούλου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας του Προέδρου των ΗΠΑ Susan Rice, και ζήτησε σχετικές διευκρινίσεις και διαβεβαιώσεις.

Η αντικατασκοπία απαιτεί συνεχή επαγρύπνηση, την οποία η Επιτροπή και η Ευρωπαϊκή Υπηρεσία Εξωτερικής Δράσης αντιμετωπίζουν με πολλή προσοχή. Τόσο για πρακτικούς, όσο και για νομικούς λόγους, τα θεσμικά όργανα δεν έχουν το δικαίωμα να δημοσιοποιήσουν τις οικείες εκτιμήσεις κινδύνου, καθώς και τα μέτρα ασφαλείας. Στις 9 Ιουλίου 2013, ο Εκτελεστικός Γενικός Γραμματέας της ΕΥΕΔ ενημέρωσε *in camera* την Επιτροπή Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου (AFET) για τα μέτρα ασφαλείας που ελήφθησαν στη συνέχεια των ισχυρισμών του Τύπου.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010707/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Cybersecurity of EU institutions

Recent reports in the international press show that, in an effort to intercept global electronic communications, the US National Security Agency (NSA) has systematically undermined the security of, and the encryption of equipment and software manufactured by, US companies. Furthermore, the NSA has gone so far as to undermine widely accepted security standards by introducing 'back doors', leading the US National Institute of Standards and Technology to initiate a process for re-scrutinising some of its standards. The NSA has presumably undermined the security of the 'Dual EC DRBG standard', from 2006, later adopted by the International Organisation for Standardisation, an organisation which counts 163 countries as members. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of the IT and telecommunications infrastructure used by the EU institutions comes from US-based companies that have been known to cooperate closely with the NSA. These US companies have been known to provide the NSA with 'back door' access to their equipment, algorithms and data. For example, the European Parliament uses:

- Computer servers and PCs running operating systems made by the US-based company Microsoft.
- Email and communication software made by Microsoft.
- Video telephones and a telephone centre made by the US-based company Cisco.
- Networking equipment for wired and wireless networks made by Cisco.
- Encryption equipment for securing remote connections made by the US-based company EMC.

Taking into consideration that the NSA was intercepting the communications of the EU delegation to the UN in New York, and in light of the forthcoming negotiations for a transatlantic trade agreement:

1. Does the Vice-President/High Representative feel that this situation poses a threat to the European Union and its interests?
2. Can the VP/HR guarantee that the electronic communications of the European institutions, and in particular those of the European Parliament, have in no way been compromised by US intelligence agencies?
3. Will the VP/HR officially ask for the US Government's assurances that the EU institutions, and in particular the European Parliament, are not being monitored by US intelligence agencies?
4. The VP/HR is asked to disclose fully to the Members of the European Parliament and to the citizens of the EU the answers it receives from the US Government.

**Question for written answer E-010708/13
to the Commission**

Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Cybersecurity of EU institutions

Recent reports in the international press show that, in an effort to intercept global electronic communications, the US National Security Agency (NSA) has systematically undermined the security of, and the encryption of equipment and software manufactured by, US companies. Furthermore, the NSA has gone so far as to undermine widely accepted security standards by introducing 'back doors', leading the US National Institute of Standards and Technology to initiate a process for re-scrutinising some of its standards. The NSA has presumably undermined the security of the 'Dual EC DRBG standard' from 2006, later adopted by the International Organisation for Standardisation, an organisation which counts 163 countries as members. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of the IT and telecommunications infrastructure used by the EU institutions comes from US-based companies that have been known to cooperate closely with the NSA. These US companies have been known to provide the NSA with 'back door' access to their equipment, algorithms and data. For example, the European Parliament uses:

- Computer servers and PCs running operating systems made by the US-based company Microsoft.
- Email and communication software made by Microsoft.
- Video telephones and a telephone centres made by the US-based company Cisco.
- Networking equipment for wired and wireless networks made by Cisco.
- Encryption equipment for securing remote connections made by the US-based company EMC.

Taking into consideration that the NSA was intercepting the communications of the EU delegation to the UN in New York, and in light of the forthcoming negotiations for a transatlantic trade agreement:

1. Does the Commission feel that this situation poses a threat to the European Union and its interests?
2. Can the Commission guarantee that the electronic communications of the European institutions, and in particular those of the European Parliament, have in no way been compromised by US intelligence agencies?
3. Will the Commission officially ask for the US Government's assurance that the EU institutions, and in particular the European Parliament, are not being monitored by US intelligence agencies?
4. The Commission is asked to disclose fully to the Members of the European Parliament and to the citizens of the EU the answer it receives from the US Government.

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(10 December 2013)

The Commission shares the Honourable Member's concerns about the allegations of spying on EU premises. The HR/VP has raised these concerns on several occasions with the US authorities, including Secretary of State John Kerry and the US President's National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and requested clarifications and assurances in this regard.

Counterespionage is a matter of continuous vigilance to which the Commission and the European External Action Service devote a lot of attention. For both practical and legal reasons, the institutions cannot publicly disclose their threat assessments and the details of their security measures. On 9 July 2013, the Executive Secretary General of the EEAS briefed *in camera* the AFET Committee of the European Parliament on the security measures taken in the aftermath of the press allegations.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010709/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Obszar chroniony na Morzu Rossa

W czerwcu 2013 r. Unia Europejska przedstawiła propozycję utworzenia obszaru chronionego na Morzu Rossa. W negocjacjach nad utworzeniem tego obszaru chronionego uczestniczą Rosja, Stany Zjednoczone, Nowa Zelandia i Australia. Ostatnio projekt dotyczący Morza Rossa utknął w mozaice napięć amerykańsko-rosyjskich. Rosja wniosła sprzeciw w oparciu o interesy własnego rybołówstwa krótko przed tym, jak Stany Zjednoczone zaproponowały zmniejszenie obszaru o 40 %, likwidację statusu ochrony stałej oraz wykluczenie z ochrony niektórych tarlisk. Moskwa zakwestionowała także prawo Komisji do ogłaszania obszaru chronionego. Pew Charitable Trusts prowadzący projekt Rezerwaty Oceanu Południowego sądzi, że negatywny wpływ na plany utworzenia morskiego obszaru chronionego mają dwustronne napięcia związane z sytuacją w Syrii i Iranie. Obszar chroniony Morza Rossa obejmowałby 2,3 mln km² jednego z najbardziej wrażliwych ekosystemów na świecie, ale inicjatywa jest zagrożona z powodu obecnych napięć międzynarodowych.

Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel jest świadoma tego, że ten ekosystem morski jest zagrożony? Jaka jest strategia UE w tej dziedzinie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Marię Damanaki w imieniu Komisji

(14 listopada 2013 r.)

Komisja jest świadoma zagrożeń, na jakie narażona jest Antarktyka i inne ekosystemy morskie, i zgodnie ze swoimi międzynarodowymi zobowiązaniami w pełni angażuje się w ochronę oceanów i ustanawianie morskich obszarów chronionych. W tym celu UE przedstawiła wniosek dotyczący utworzenia morskich obszarów chronionych na wodach Antarktyki na forum Komisji do spraw Zachowania Żywych Zasobów Morskich Antarktyki (CCAMLR), której jest członkiem.

UE będzie kontynuować działania na rzecz ustanowienia morskich obszarów chronionych w CCAMLR. UE przedstawiła także wspólnie z Francją i Australią zmieniony wniosek dotyczący ustanowienia morskich obszarów chronionych w Antarktyce Wschodniej. Zmieniony wniosek w sprawie ustanowienia morskiego obszaru chronionego na Morzu Rossa przedstawiły również Stany Zjednoczone i Nowa Zelandia.

Propozycje te omówiono na dorocznym posiedzeniu CCAMLR w Hobart (Australia) w dniach 23 października-1 listopada 2013 r.

W ramach przygotowań do tego dorocznego posiedzenia Komisja oraz ministrowie spraw zagranicznych Australii, Francji, Nowej Zelandii i Stanów Zjednoczonych podpisali wspólne oświadczenie, w którym zaapelowali do wszystkich członków CCAMLR o wyrażenie zgody na utworzenie powyższych morskich obszarów chronionych.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010709/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Marine reserve in the Ross Sea

In July 2013 the EU presented a proposal to create a marine reserve in the Ross Sea. Russia, the United States, New Zealand and Australia are all involved in negotiations concerning this marine reserve. Recently, however, the Ross Sea project has been caught in the crossfire of US-Russian tensions. Russia had raised objections, based on its fishing interests, shortly before the US proposed cutting the reserve area by 40%, undoing its permanent status and removing the protected status of some fish breeding grounds. Moscow has also questioned the authority of the Commission to declare a reserve area. The Pew Charitable Trusts' Southern Ocean Sanctuaries project believes that bilateral tension over the situations in Syria and Iran are to blame for the difficulties facing the marine reserve plans. The Ross Sea reserve would protect 2.3 million square kilometres of one of the most fragile ecosystems in the world, but the initiative is in danger because of current international tensions.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the dangers this marine ecosystem is facing? What is the EU's strategy on this matter?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(14 November 2013)

The Commission is fully aware of the dangers the Antarctic and other marine ecosystems are facing and we are fully committed to the protection of oceans and the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), in line with our international commitments. To that end the EU has made proposals in the past to create MPAs in the Antarctic waters in the forum of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), to which the EU is a party.

The EU will continue to work for the establishment of MPAs in CCAMLR. The EU has submitted together with France and Australia an amended proposal for the establishment of MPAs in Eastern Antarctica. A revised proposal was also made by the US and New Zealand to establish MPA in the Ross Sea.

These proposals were discussed at the CCAMLR Annual Meeting in Hobart, Australia, from 23 October to 1 November 2013.

In preparation of that Annual Meeting the Commission has signed together with the Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, New Zealand and The United States a joint statement to call on all Members of CCAMLR to agree on the establishment of these MPAs.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010710/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Groźby Rosji wobec Mołdawii

UE i Mołdawia prowadzą obecnie negocjacje w sprawie układu o stowarzyszeniu. Rosja grozi Mołdawii „poważnymi konsekwencjami”, twierdząc, że przyszłość Naddniestrza będzie zagrożona. Rosjanie stanowią jedną trzecią populacji Naddniestrza, a w regionie tym znajdują się ich znaczne siły wojskowe. Rosja ostrzega również, że podpisanie układu o stowarzyszeniu pociągnie za sobą konsekwencje dla mołdawskich pracowników w Rosji oraz dla eksportu mołdawskich towarów do Rosji. Groźby te przypominają groźby wobec Ukrainy, które Rosja stosuje ze względu na możliwe podpisanie przez Ukrainę układu o stowarzyszeniu z UE.

Jakie stanowisko w sprawie napiętych stosunków między Rosją a Mołdawią zajmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel? Czy UE udzieli Rosji wyraźnego upomnienia, by ta powstrzymała się od wywierania na Mołdawię presji gospodarczo-politycznej?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji

(20 listopada 2013 r.)

Komisja przedstawiła już publicznie swoje stanowisko, m.in. w trakcie debaty w Parlamencie Europejskim w dniu 11 września, zgodnie z którym wywieranie przez Rosję presji na wschodnich partnerów UE jest niedopuszczalne. Komisja oraz Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca potwierdziły to stanowisko również w ramach regularnego dialogu politycznego z Rosją, tj. podczas spotkania Wysokiej Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącej Catherine Ashton z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Ławrowem w dniu 24 września, jak również podczas posiedzenia dyrektorów politycznych tydzień wcześniej. UE oczekuje od Rosji uszanowania wolnych, suwerennych i niezależnych decyzji krajów partnerskich w odniesieniu do ich stosunków międzynarodowych, zgodnie z zasadami aktu końcowego z Helsinek. W przypadku wywierania na państwa nadmiernego nacisku Komisja oraz Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca staną w ich obronie.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca i Komisja ściśle współpracują w tej sprawie ze sobą, a także, w stosownych przypadkach, z władzami Republiki Mołdawii. Kilka dni po tym jak Rosja wprowadziła zakaz przywozu mołdawskich napojów alkoholowych (przy czym decyzja ta ma również wpływ na producentów naddniestrzańskich), Komisja zaproponowała, aby znieść unijne kwoty na wino z Mołdawii. Odnośna procedura legislacyjna, z udziałem Parlamentu Europejskiego, powinna się zakończyć jeszcze w 2013 r. Ponadto Komisja zaoferowała Mołdawii pomoc w zakresie środków sanitarnych i fitosanitarnych w celu zwiększenia tempa przechodzenia na zgodny z normami UE system zapewnienia jakości produktów pochodzenia zwierzęcego. Umożliwi to Republice Mołdawii dywersyfikację rynków eksportowych w odniesieniu do produktów rolnych.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010710/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Russian threats against Moldova

The EU and Moldova are currently in negotiations concerning an Association Agreement. Russia is threatening Moldova with 'serious consequences', claiming that the future of Transnistria will be in danger. Russians make up a third of Transnistria's population, and have a strong military presence in the region. Russia also warns that there would be consequences for the Moldovan workers in Russia, as well as for exports of Moldovan goods to Russia. These threats mirror those made by Russia to Ukraine, owing to the latter's potential Association Agreement with the EU.

What is the Vice-President/High Representative's position concerning the ongoing tension between Russia and Moldova? Will the EU give a strong indication to Russia to refrain from economic and political pressure towards Moldova?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(20 November 2013)

The Commission has already publicly stated its position that Russian pressure on the EU's Eastern partners is unacceptable, for instance during the debate in the European Parliament on 11 September. The Commission and the HR/VP have reiterated this position also in the framework of our regular Political Dialogue with Russia, namely during HR/VP Ashton's meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov on 24 September, as well as during a Political Director's meeting the preceding week. The EU expects Russia to respect partner countries' free, sovereign, and autonomous choices with respect to their international relations, in line with the Helsinki Final Act Principles. Where undue pressure is brought to bear on them, the Commission and the HR/VP will stand by them.

The HR/VP and the Commission work closely together on this issue as well as, where relevant, with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. A few days after Russia banned the import of Moldovan alcoholic beverages (a decision that also affects the Transnistria-based producers), the Commission proposed to eliminate the EU quota on the import of Moldovan wine. The corresponding legislative procedure, which involves the European Parliament, should normally be completed by the end of 2013. The Commission has also offered Moldova assistance in the sanitary and phytosanitary area to accelerate the transition to an EU-compliant quality assurance system for products of animal origin, with a view to allowing the diversification of the Republic of Moldova's export markets for agricultural products.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010711/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Południowy Sudan: sprawa plemienia Murle

Armia Południowego Sudanu ponosi winę za bezprawne mordowanie ludności cywilnej. Sytuacja w prowincji Jonglei zmusiła ludność cywilną do wyjścia na ulice, co doprowadziło do aktów przemocy na tle etnicznym. Ludowa Armia Wyzwolenia Sudanu (SPLA) zniszczyła wioski i sterroryzowała niewinnych ludzi w dystrykcie PiBOR, zabijając 94 członków plemienia Murle, z czego 70 to ludność cywilna. Najczęściej celem ataku są należące do plemienia Murle kobiety, dzieci oraz osoby chore umysłowo. Po ucieczce z miast, członkowie plemienia Murle ryzykują, że zostaną zaatakowani jedynie podczas próby powrotu po tak niezbędne pożywienie.

Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel wie o zabójstwach na tle rasowym członków plemienia Murle? Co UE może zrobić, by zapewnić im bezpieczeństwo?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji**

(6 listopada 2013 r.)

UE odgrywa główną rolę w działaniach międzynarodowych w odniesieniu do prowincji Jonglei – prowadziła dwie misje międzynarodowe wysokiego szczebla w tym regionie, wyraziła poważne zaniepokojenie w dwóch oświadczeniach publicznych⁽¹⁾ i podejmuje aktywne działania w stosunku do rządu Sudanu Południowego i odpowiednich podmiotów. Od czasu wybuchu kryzysu humanitarnego i w zakresie praw człowieka UE nieprzerwanie apeluje o znalezienie rozwiązania politycznego, zapewnienie dostępu organizacjom humanitarnym i pociągnięcie do odpowiedzialności winnych pogwałceń praw człowieka w prowincji Jonglei. UE jest przekonana, że rozwiązanie można osiągnąć tylko w drodze negocjacji, i jest gotowa wspierać działania pokojowe rządu Sudanu Południowego wszelkimi sposobami uznanymi za właściwe.

UE niejednokrotnie wyrażała zaniepokojenie doniesieniami o naruszaniu praw człowieka przez SPLA w odniesieniu do cywilów i wzywała rząd Sudanu Południowego do pociągnięcia sprawców do odpowiedzialności. Podjęte niedawno przez rząd Sudanu Południowego pierwsze kroki w tym kierunku są dla UE pozytywnym sygnałem. Prezydent Salva Kiir ogłosił niedawno, że podjęto już dochodzenie w stosunku do wysokich rangą oficerów SPLA oskarżanych o udział w pogwałceniach praw człowieka w prowincji Jonglei, oraz podkreślił, że zadaniem armii jest ochrona kraju i jego obywateli. UE z zadowoleniem przyjmuje również fakt, że w ramach procesu „nowego porozumienia” rząd Sudanu Południowego uzgodnił z darczyńcami, że priorytetem będzie ochrona cywilów i praw człowieka. UE będzie nadal z uwagą śledzić rozwój wydarzeń.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138254.pdf;
<http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/12044/Statement-of-the-EU-Delegation-and-EU-Heads-of-Mission-on-Jonglei.aspx>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010711/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — South Sudan: the case of the Murle population

The army of South Sudan is guilty of unlawfully killing civilians. The situation in Jonglei State has driven civilians from their homes and provoked interethnic violence. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has destroyed villages and terrorised innocent people in Pibor County, killing 94 ethnic Murle of which 70 were civilians. Murle women, children and mentally ill individuals are most often targeted. Having fled the towns, the Murle only risk attack if they try to return to obtain desperately needed food.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the ethnic killings of the Murle? What can the EU do to ensure their safety?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 November 2013)

The EU is at the forefront of international efforts on Jonglei, having led two High-level international missions to the area, expressed grave concern through two public statements ⁽¹⁾ and actively engaging with the Government of South Sudan and relevant actors. Since the humanitarian and human rights crisis broke out, the EU has continuously insisted on finding a political solution, allowing humanitarian access and ensuring accountability for human rights violations in Jonglei. The EU is convinced that a resolution can only be achieved by negotiation, and stands ready to support the Government of South Sudan's peace efforts in any way considered appropriate.

The EU has repeatedly expressed concerns over reports of SPLA's human rights abuses against civilians, and has urged the Government of South Sudan to hold accountable the perpetrators. The EU has recently been encouraged by the Government of South Sudan's first steps in that direction. President Salva Kiir recently announced that senior SPLA officers accused of alleged involvement in human rights violations in Jonglei were already under investigation, stressing that the Army's role is to protect the country and its citizens. The EU has also welcomed that under the New Deal process, the Government of South Sudan has agreed with donors to prioritise the protection of civilians and human rights. The EU will continue to follow developments closely.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138254.pdf
<http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/12044/Statement-of-the-EU-Delegation-and-EU-Heads-of-Mission-on-Jonglei.aspx>

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010712/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 września 2013 r.)**

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – syryjscy uchodźcy

Liczba syryjskich uchodźców sięgnęła 2 mln, a około połowa z nich to dzieci poniżej 11. roku życia. Po ucieczce do Libanu, Jordanii, Turcji, Iraku i Egiptu uchodźcy ci znaleźli schronienie w obozach, z których największy to obóz Za'atri w Jordanii, gdzie przebywa 130 000 osób. Niewystarczające zapasy pożywienia i wody, brak miejsca oraz dostępu do edukacji w obozie są spowodowane niedofinansowaniem oraz zbyt dużą liczbą osób wymagających pomocy. Państwa przyjmujące są również pod ogromną presją z powodu ekonomicznych i politycznych żądań wynikających z napływu uchodźców, a także ze względu na narastające napięcia między lokalnymi społecznościami i uchodźcami, które odzwierciedlają zwiększone zapotrzebowanie na towary i usługi.

Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel wie o sytuacji syryjskich uchodźców? Czy UE posiada plan pomocy uchodźcom oraz państwom przyjmującym?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Kristalinę Georgijewą w imieniu Komisji
(4 listopada 2013 r.)**

UE doskonale zdaje sobie sprawę z niedawnego rozwoju sytuacji związanej z kryzysem w Syrii, w tym z położenia syryjskich uchodźców, i stale zwiększa wysiłki, aby zaspokoić nieprzerwanie rosnące potrzeby, zarówno w Syrii, jak i w państwach sąsiadujących (Libanie, Jordanii, Iraku i Turcji). UE i jej państwa członkowskie są największym darczyńcą w regionie – od końca 2011 r. pomoc wyniosła łącznie niemal 2 mld EUR zarówno w ramach aktualnego przydziału finansowego, jak i w postaci bezpośredniej reakcji na kryzys (budżet Komisji Europejskiej na pomoc humanitarną: 515 mln EUR; pomoc gospodarcza, rozwojowa i stabilizacyjna: 428 mln EUR⁽¹⁾; dwustronna pomoc humanitarna państw członkowskich: 1,023 mld EUR).

Udzielana za pośrednictwem partnerów UE, tj. organizacji należących do tzw. rodziny ONZ, Czerwonego Krzyża/Czerwonego Półksiężycy i międzynarodowych organizacji pozarządowych pomoc humanitarna przeznaczona jest głównie na pomoc medyczną w celu ratowania życia, podstawowe leki, produkty żywnościowe i żywność bogatą w składniki odżywcze, dostęp do wody pitnej, infrastrukturę sanitarną i środki higieniczne, schronienie, podstawowe produkty nieżywnościowe i ochronę w celu niesienia pomocy najbardziej zagrożonym rodzinom (wewnętrznym przesiedleńcom, uchodźcom i społecznościom w kraju przyjmującym uchodźców). W omawianym regionie udziela się również pomocy mającej zaspokoić bardziej długoterminowe potrzeby ludności dotkniętej kryzysem (np. w dziedzinie edukacji lub źródeł utrzymania), zapewnić stabilność państw sąsiadujących oraz łagodzić napięcia między uchodźcami a społecznościami w państwach przyjmujących uchodźców.

Ze względu na skalę kryzysu w Syrii oraz konieczność zaspokajania rosnących potrzeb dotychczasowa reakcja UE miała charakter całościowy przez wykorzystanie wszystkich odpowiednich instrumentów unijnych. Pomimo znacznych działań UE i innych organizacji, ze względu na skalę kryzysu potrzebne będą stałe wysiłki na rzecz gromadzenia funduszy w celu zaspokojenia najbardziej palących potrzeb.

⁽¹⁾ Na pomoc gospodarczą, rozwojową i stabilizacyjną UE ma zostać przydzielona łączna kwota 453 mln EUR. Środki w wysokości 25 mln EUR przeznaczone na Instrument na rzecz Stabilności nie zostały jednak jeszcze oficjalnie przyjęte, w związku z czym nie są one uwzględnione w tej kwocie.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010712/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Syrian refugees

The number of Syrian refugees has reached 2 million, about half of which are children under the age of 11. Having fled to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, these refugees now live in camps, the largest of which is Za'atri, in Jordan, which houses 130 000 people. The camps' supplies of food and water, shelter and education facilities are inadequate because they are underfunded and because of the sheer number of individuals in need of aid. The host countries are also under huge strain owing to the economic and political demands caused by the inundation of refugees, as well as to the growing tensions between local communities and refugees reflecting the increased demands on goods and services.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the Syrian refugee situation? Is there any EU plan to aid the refugees as well as the host countries?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission

(4 November 2013)

The EU is more than aware of the recent developments in relation to the Syria crisis, including the situation of Syrian refugees, and has persistently been increasing its efforts in relation to the constantly growing needs; both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey). The EU and its Member States are the largest donor in the region with a current allocation of nearly EUR 2 billion in total support since the end of 2011 and in direct response to the crisis (European Commission's humanitarian budget: EUR 515 million; Economic, development and stabilisation assistance: EUR 428 million ⁽¹⁾; Member States bilateral humanitarian aid: EUR 1,023 billion).

The humanitarian assistance, channelled through EU partners, i.e. the UN family, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and INGOs, primarily supports life-saving medical emergency responses, the provision of essential drugs, food and nutritional items, safe water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), shelter, distribution of basic non-food items (NFIs) and protection to help the most vulnerable families (Internally displaced persons, refugees, host communities). Development assistance is also provided in the region to address longer term needs of the affected population (Education, livelihoods, etc.), to support the stability of the neighbouring countries and to mitigate tensions between refugees and host communities.

Due to the magnitude of the Syrian crisis and in order to be able to respond to the growing needs, the EU's response to date has been holistic through the mobilisation of all relevant EU instruments. Despite massive efforts by the EU and others, the scale of this crisis means that continuous fundraising efforts will be needed to address the most critical needs.

⁽¹⁾ A total of EUR 453 million is to be allocated for EU economic, development and stabilisation assistance. However, EUR 25 million from the Instrument for Stability has so far not been officially adopted and thus not yet been included in this figure.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010713/13
do Komisji**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wojna handlowa między Macedonią a Kosowem

Istnieje zagrożenie, że obecna wojna handlowa między Macedonią a Kosowem przerodzi się w konfrontację polityczną po nałożeniu przez Skopje podatku na obywateli Kosowa przekraczających granicę. Wcześniej Macedonia ograniczyła ilość mąki i pszenicy importowanej z Kosowa w celu ochrony rodzimej produkcji. W odpowiedzi Kosowo zabroniło importu żywności z Macedonii. Zaledwie kilka godzin później Macedonia nałożyła na osoby wjeżdżające do Macedonii podatek w wysokości 2 EUR (wprowadzono także podatek w wysokości 5 EUR od samochodów osobowych oraz 10 EUR od samochodów ciężarowych i autobusów). Kosowo posunęło się jeszcze o krok dalej i wprowadziło pełne embargo. W przeszłości wspierano stosunki handlowe między tymi dwoma państwami, jednak obecnie obie strony oskarżają się wzajemnie o zaognianie sporu. Na granicy powstały korki, wielu obywateli przekracza granicę pieszo, a Komisja bada kwestię naruszenia Środkowoeuropejskiej umowy o wolnym handlu (CEFTA).

Co może zrobić UE w celu propagowania dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków między Macedonią a Kosowem w kontekście handlu?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji

(21 listopada 2013 r.)

Komisja uważnie śledziła tę sprawę i z zadowoleniem przyjmuje fakt, że w międzyczasie została ona rozwiązana.

UE oferuje perspektywę europejską dla wszystkich krajów Bałkanów Zachodnich w ramach procesu stabilizacji i stowarzyszenia. Jest to najbardziej skuteczne narzędzie zapewniające pokój, stabilność i wzrost gospodarczy w regionie. Dobrosąsiedzkie stosunki niezmiennie stanowią zasadniczy element tego procesu. Działając w tych ramach, UE przyczyniła się również do ustanowienia Środkowoeuropejskiej umowy o wolnym handlu (CEFTA) w celu ułatwienia wymiany handlowej oraz rozstrzygania sporów.

Komisja przypomina, że strony powinny rozwiązywać ewentualne spory zgodnie z mechanizmami ustanowionymi w ramach CEFTA. Komisja nie jest stroną CEFTA, ale śledzi jej funkcjonowanie stanowiące część obowiązku utrzymywania dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków i współpracy regionalnej w ramach procesu stabilizacji i stowarzyszenia.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010713/13
to the Commission**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Trade war between Macedonia and Kosovo

The recent trade war between Macedonia and Kosovo is threatening to turn into a political confrontation after Skopje implemented a tax on Kosovar nationals crossing the border. Previously, Macedonia limited quantities of flour and wheat imported from Kosovo in order to protect domestic production, and Kosovo responded to this measure by banning food imports from Macedonia. Within a matter of hours, a EUR 2 tax was imposed on persons entering Macedonia (as well as EUR 5 for cars and EUR 10 for trucks and buses). Kosovo raised the stakes one last time by imposing a full embargo. In the past, trade between the two countries had been encouraged, but now each side accuses the other of escalating the dispute. The border between the two has become congested, with many citizens crossing on foot, and the Commission is investigating the question of infringement of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).

What can the EU do promote good neighbourly relations between Macedonia and Kosovo in the context of trade?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(21 November 2013)

The Commission has followed the issue closely and is pleased that it has been resolved in the meantime.

The EU offers a European perspective to all the Western Balkan countries through its Stabilisation and Association Process. This is the most effective tool to ensure peace, stability and growth in the region. Good neighbourly relations remain an essential element of this process. Within this framework the EU has also helped set up the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) to facilitate trade and resolve disputes.

The Commission recalls that parties should settle potential disputes according to the mechanisms established by CEFTA. The Commission is not a party to the CEFTA, but it observes its functioning as part of the obligation to good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation under the Stabilisation and Association Process.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010714/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 września 2013 r.)**

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Tunezja i wolność słowa

W dniu 30 sierpnia 2013 r. sąd w Tunezji skazał dwóch raperów na karę pozbawienia wolności za „obrazę rządu”. Dwaj młodzi ludzie opublikowali piosenki obrażające policję, a gdy byli przewożeni na komisariat policji w Hammamet, zostali pobici przez policjantów. Nie poinformowano ich o procesie i dopiero z mediów społecznych dowiedzieli się o wyroku skazującym już po jego wydaniu. Prawo tunezyjskie zezwala na skazywanie osób fizycznych, które wygłaszają twierdzenia uważane przez rząd za niedopuszczalne, chociaż Zasady Johannesburgskie dotyczące bezpieczeństwa krajowego, wolności słowa i dostępu do informacji chronią prawo obywateli do krytykowania „abstrakcyjnych instytucji”, takich jak rząd.

Czy Wysoka Przedstawiciel jest świadoma tego przypadku naruszenia praw człowieka? W jaki sposób UE traktuje przypadki naruszenia wolności słowa w Tunezji?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji
(31 października 2013 r.)**

Unia Europejska zwróciła uwagę władz Tunezji na kwestie związane z wolnością wypowiedzi ze względu na różne ostatnie wydarzenia, w których wydano wyroki ograniczające wolność wypowiedzi, wzywając do zmiany przepisów pochodzących z reżimu Ben Alego, które mogą być wykorzystywane do ograniczania wolności słowa. UE przywiązuje wielką wagę do przepisów prawnych konsolidujących i gwarantujących tę wolność.

W ramach regularnego dialogu politycznego z władzami Tunezji, UE wielokrotnie wzywała do konsolidacji wolności słowa, zgodnie z celami rewolucji tunezyjskiej. Niedawno zawarty, dwustronny plan działania również przewiduje zaangażowanie we wzmacnianie wolności słowa i zgromadzeń, zgodnie z międzynarodowymi standardami.

Ponadto UE ściśle monitoruje ochronę praw człowieka i finansuje szereg projektów, których celem jest wzmocnienie społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Szczególnym przykładem jest program SPRING, w ramach którego w roku 2012 Tunezja otrzymała wsparcie finansowe w wysokości 7 mln EUR przeznaczone na rozwój potencjału społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Ponadto Tunezja otrzymuje wsparcie w ramach Instrumentu na rzecz Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego Krajów Sąsiedztwa oraz Europejskiego Instrumentu na rzecz Wspierania Demokracji i Praw Człowieka (4 mln EUR w latach 2011-2013).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010714/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Tunisia and freedom of expression

On 30 August 2013, a Tunisian court sentenced two rappers to prison for 'government defamation'. The two youths had released songs insulting the police and were then beaten by the police en route to the Hammamet police station. The pair were not informed of their trial and only later learned of their sentencing through social media. Tunisian law allows for the prosecution of individuals who make statements considered objectionable by the government, even though the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information protects the rights of citizens to criticise 'abstract institutions,' such as government.

Is the High Representative aware of this particular violation of human rights? How is the EU addressing the issue of infringements of freedom of expression in Tunisia?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(31 October 2013)

As in different recent events where freedom of expression has been curtailed by judgments, the EU has brought these issues to the attention of Tunisian authorities, calling for the revision of laws inherited from the Ben Ali regime, which can be used to limit freedom of expression. Similarly, the EU attaches great importance to legal provisions consolidating and guaranteeing this freedom.

In its regular political dialogue with the Tunisian authorities, the EU has repeatedly reiterated its pleas for the consolidation of freedom of expression, in line with the aspirations of the Tunisian revolution. The recently concluded bilateral Action Plan also foresees commitments to strengthen freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, in line with international standards.

Additionally, the EU is closely monitoring the protection of human rights and is funding numerous projects aimed at reinforcing civil society. Notably, Tunisia received in 2012 a SPRING allocation of EUR 7 million for a civil society capacity building programme. Moreover it benefits from the Civil Society Facility and from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EUR 4 million for Tunisia in 2011-2013).

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010715/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Wenezuela a prawa człowieka

Decyzja Wenezueli o odstąpieniu od Amerykańskiej konwencji praw człowieka wejdzie w życie 10 września 2013 r. Spowoduje to ograniczenie jurysdykcji Międzyamerykańskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w Wenezueli, a tym samym narazi na ryzyko przyszłe ofiary łamania praw człowieka. Ostatnio Wenezuela popiera wiele inicjatyw związanych z prawami człowieka oraz wzywa inne kraje do ratyfikacji Amerykańskiej konwencji praw człowieka, mimo że sama pozbawia swoich obywateli ochrony oferowanej przez ten system.

Jakie jest stanowisko wysokiej przedstawiciel wobec potencjalnego problemu, jaki może stanowić sytuacja w Wenezueli w kontekście praw człowieka?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel i Wiceprzewodniczącą Komisji Catherine Ashton
w imieniu Komisji**

(21 listopada 2013 r.)

Wenezuelskie wypowiedzenie Amerykańskiej konwencji praw człowieka, formalnie zgłoszone Organizacji Państw Amerykańskich (OPA) we wrześniu 2012 r., weszło w życie w dniu 10 września 2013 r. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wyraża ubolewanie z powodu decyzji rządu Wenezueli.

Konwencja weszła w życie w 1978 r. i została ratyfikowana przez 25 z 35 członków OPA. Unia Europejska dostrzega istotne zmiany w zakresie praw człowieka, jakie miały miejsce w tym regionie oraz uważa, że międzyamerykański system ochrony praw człowieka odegrał w tym procesie istotną rolę.

Należy również przypomnieć, że Rada Praw Człowieka ONZ przyjęła rezolucje mające na celu pogłębianie współpracy i dialogu między międzynarodowymi i regionalnymi podmiotami zajmującymi się prawami człowieka.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010715/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Venezuela and human rights

Venezuela's decision to withdraw from the American Convention on Human Rights will take effect on 10 September 2013. This action will limit the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Venezuela, putting the victims of future human rights abuses at risk. Recently, Venezuela has supported various human rights initiatives and it urges other countries to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights, although the country itself deprives its own citizens of the protection offered by this system.

What is the position of the High Representative concerning the potential problem that this situation in Venezuela could pose for human rights?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(21 November 2013)

Venezuela's denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights, formally notified to the OAS in September 2012, took effect on 10 September 2013. The HR/VP regrets the decision of the Venezuelan government.

The Convention entered into force in 1978 and had been ratified by 25 of the 35 members of the OAS. The European Union recognises the important developments that have taken place in the region in terms of human rights and believes that the Inter-American System of Human Rights has played a significant role in this development.

It is also important to recall that the UN Human Rights Council has adopted resolutions aimed at enhancing cooperation and dialogue between international and regional human rights mechanisms.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010716/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Using Scotland's award winning 'active and healthy ageing' practices in Europe

Scotland recently received a double three-star rating in recognition of innovative work on the 'Reshaping Care for Older People' agenda.

What specific steps is the Commission taking to encourage the introduction of efforts similar to those of Scotland in other areas of Europe where there may be a benefit in line with the aims of the Commission's 'Active and Healthy Ageing' flagship initiative?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(6 November 2013)

The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing has awarded 32 cities and regions for their innovative solutions aimed at helping older people. These regions, among them Scotland, have been implementing innovative technological, social or organisational solutions which serve as a reference to how innovation can help the elderly live healthy and active lives.

The European Commission is keen to facilitate the sustainable deployment of such innovative solutions to other regions in Europe and their scaling up, in line with the aims of the Commission's 'Active and Healthy Ageing' flagship initiative.

To that end, these reference regions have been encouraged to make use of national and European resources, including the European Structural and Investment Funds for the restructuring of their care systems based on their national and regional strategies.

The Commission will also organise a Conference of the European Innovation Partnership on the 25 November 2013 to showcase these examples and enhance support from other Member States and regions. A twinning programme will also be launched during this conference with the aim of connecting Reference Sites with other regions which wish to embark on innovative services for older people and promote knowledge exchange.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010717/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Reducing the carbon footprint in Europe

Scotland's global carbon footprint has fallen by 19% since 2007, and is leading Western European countries on emissions reductions.

Is the Commission aware of this result and will it support the approach used in Scotland to help reduce the carbon footprint elsewhere in Europe?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission

(13 November 2013)

The Commission is aware of existence of data published by the Scottish authorities on Scotland's global 'carbon footprint'. This data provide quantitative information about greenhouse gas emissions released in Scotland but also of goods and services produced domestically and abroad and consumed in Scotland. These data show an increase of Scotland's carbon footprint until 2007 and a decrease thereafter.

Unlike with national greenhouse gas emissions inventories compiled according to UNFCCC guidelines, there is no robust agreed methodology for calculating a carbon footprint. As a result, it is very difficult to compare the carbon footprint of Scotland with other regions or countries.

In order to reduce Scotland's global 'carbon footprint', the Scottish authorities are underlining the need to reduce waste, offer more sustainable energy and transport, improve energy efficiency, make more sustainable choices easier and raise public awareness of the impacts of current consumption patterns. These policies are in line with the Commission's priorities as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010718/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Protected Geographical Indication application success rates

Over the years Scottish products have successfully applied for recognition under the Protected Geographical Indication, with items such as Scotch beef and Stornoway Black Pudding benefiting from the EU scheme.

How many applications are submitted to the EU every year from products seeking geographical recognition from within the Member States, and what percentage of applications are successful?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(5 November 2013)

As for what concerns food-products, covered by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 ⁽¹⁾, such as those mentioned by the Honourable member, the Commission has successfully registered so far 1137 designations since 1996, either as protected designations of origin (573), or as protected geographical indications (564).

Over the recent years, the Commission receives on average, per year, around 90 applications — which may include amendment requests regarding already registered designations — whilst around 20 requests are, on average, withdrawn or rejected per year.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 343, 14.12.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010719/13
to the Commission
Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: Plastic bag charge and environmental benefits

Scotland is to introduce a charge on the use of plastic bags in supermarkets in 2014.

Where schemes of this type exist in Europe, what environmental benefits has the Commission identified?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(29 October 2013)**

Plastic carrier bags and their associated littering cause environmental, economic and social problems, including marine pollution, loss of raw materials, and potential impacts on human health. Any reduction of single-use plastic bag consumption will help address these problems. A number of Member States (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium) have taken initiatives to reduce the use of plastic carrier bags, including through pricing methods.

The Commission has undertaken a comprehensive impact assessment to analyse the effectiveness of policies implemented in some Member States to reduce the impact of single use lightweight plastic bags. This assessment will guide the Commission's approach to a forthcoming legislative initiative in this area.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010720/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Eliminating the manufacture of 'legal high' substances

The Commission has announced new plans to tackle 'legal highs'. One example used by Commissioner Reding in her introductory speech of 17 September 2013 highlighted the fatal use of a 'legal high' product in Scotland.

Given that 'legal highs' are easily created, with one new substance being detected somewhere in the EU every week, can the Commission propose to eliminate the manufacture of new substances?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(5 November 2013)

On 17 September 2013, the Commission presented two legislative proposals on new psychoactive substances, aimed at strengthening the EU response to this growing problem. The proposals seek to enhance the monitoring and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances, and to enable swifter and more proportionate answers to reduce the availability of those substances that pose health, social and safety risks, depending on their level of risk.

Under the proposals, new psychoactive substances posing severe health, social and safety risks would be subjected to market restriction across the EU. This means that their production, manufacture, making available on the market, including importation to the Union, transport, and exportation from the Union will be prohibited, except for explicitly authorised uses, and for research and development. This prohibition would be backed by criminal law, as the proposals envisage that new psychoactive substances posing severe health, social and safety risks are subjected to the criminal law provisions that apply to illicit drugs.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010721/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: The Commission's efforts to tackle racial abuse in spectator sports played in Europe

A Scotland football player was racially abused by opposition supporters in a recent international football match.

What role does the Commission play in combating racial abuse in spectator sports played in Europe?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(15 November 2013)

The Commission is committed to contributing to the prevention of spectator violence and racial abuse in sport.

When monitoring the implementation of the framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law ⁽¹⁾, the Commission takes sport-related issues into consideration. It will present its assessment of Member States' compliance with the provisions of the framework Decision by the end of the year. Until 1 December 2014 the Commission is not authorised to launch infringement proceedings on the basis of Framework Decisions. It is up to national authorities to investigate any concrete case of racist or xenophobic speech; and it is for national courts to determine whether such cases incite violence or hatred.

Various projects selected under different EU funding programmes in the fields of justice, education, youth and sport support the fight against intolerance in sport. The Fight Against Racism in Europe (FARE) network — launched with the financial support of the EU — and various initiatives undertaken by organisations like UEFA demonstrate that sport can be an excellent vehicle to fight racism. EU projects in the field have been regularly monitored. They will help to prepare the way for measures that may be supported under the future sport chapter of the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020.

Finally, within the framework of Council Decision 2002/348/JHA amended by Council Decision 2007/412/JHA on security at international football matches, National Football Information Points exchange data, e.g. on potentially disruptive supporters. They also cooperate with national football associations and UEFA.

⁽¹⁾ Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010722/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — La Forza di protezione pubblica dell'Afghanistan rischia il tracollo

Recentemente varie fonti di stampa hanno riportato che la società pubblica incaricata della sicurezza in Afghanistan rischierebbe il tracollo a causa della corruzione diffusa e della cattiva amministrazione. Alla Forza di protezione pubblica dell'Afghanistan, istituita nel 2010 dal Presidente Karzai in sostituzione delle guardie di sicurezza straniere, è stato affidato il compito di proteggere i convogli. Stando al *The Times*, tuttavia, la Forza, finanziata principalmente da Stati e organizzazioni esterni all'Afghanistan, può essere sostenuta soltanto per pochi mesi.

La società è composta da 19 000 addetti alla sicurezza, molti dei quali hanno protestato per la mancata retribuzione e per l'assenza di attrezzature e armi adeguate. Pur temendo che senza l'assistenza straniera la Forza possa incorrere nel rischio di insolvenza, il Presidente Karzai non ha risposto alle domande sulle condizioni finanziarie della Forza. Il 30 luglio 2013 il *Washington Times* ha riportato che la Forza non sarebbe nemmeno in grado di svolgere le funzioni di base. Ciononostante dal 2011 il suo costo è aumentato di ben il 47 %. In risposta a tale situazione il numero dei responsabili della gestione dei rischi impiegati per monitorare le minacce alla sicurezza continua a crescere.

1. I funzionari dell'UE in Afghanistan sono costretti ad affidarsi ai servizi della Forza di protezione pubblica dell'Afghanistan. In quest'ottica qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante nei confronti delle relazioni secondo cui la Forza rischierebbe il tracollo?
2. Dal 2010 qual è stata l'entità del sostegno finanziario dell'UE destinato alla Forza di protezione pubblica dell'Afghanistan?
3. I funzionari dell'UE prevedono l'attuazione di piani di emergenza alla luce del possibile scioglimento della Forza di protezione pubblica dell'Afghanistan?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(12 novembre 2013)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton è pienamente consapevole della difficile situazione in cui versa la sicurezza dei funzionari dell'UE in servizio in Afghanistan. Per garantire la sicurezza, la delegazione dell'UE e la missione EUPOL AFGHANISTAN intendono continuare a ricorrere a società private che operano indipendentemente dalla Forza di protezione pubblica afgana (APPF).

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è altresì pienamente consapevole della grande sfida che rappresenta tuttora il potenziamento delle capacità dei servizi di polizia afgana. La comunità internazionale si è impegnata a fornire ulteriore aiuto a questo scopo. Sostenere l'Afghanistan negli sforzi volti a potenziare la polizia civile e lo Stato di diritto continua a essere una priorità per l'UE, che resta in stretto contatto con il ministero dell'Interno afgano al fine di individuare il modo migliore per raggiungere questo obiettivo. Attualmente l'UE fornisce sostegno sia attraverso la missione EUPOL Afghanistan che con finanziamenti tramite il Fondo fiduciario per l'ordine pubblico gestito dal PNUS. L'UE non ha fornito sostegno finanziario all'APPF e non intende farlo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010722/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Afghan Public Protection Force at risk of collapse

Various news sources have recently reported that Afghanistan's state-owned security company is at risk of collapse as a result of widespread corruption and mismanagement. The Afghan Public Protection Force, set up in 2010 by President Karzai to replace foreign security guards, was given the task of protecting convoys. According to the *The Times*, however, the force — largely financed by states and organisations outside of Afghanistan — can only be sustained for another few months.

The company is composed of 19 000 security personnel, many of whom have complained that they are not being paid and that they lack adequate equipment and weapons. While it is feared that, without foreign assistance, the force risks insolvency, President Karzai has failed to respond to questions about the state of its finances. On 30 July 2013, the *Washington Times* reported that the force is unable to fulfil even basic functions. This notwithstanding, the cost of the force has increased by as much as 47% since 2011. In response, more and more risk managers are being employed to monitor security threats.

1. EU officials in Afghanistan are obliged to rely on the services of the Afghan Public Protection Force. With this in mind, what is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative with regard to reports that the force is at risk of collapse?
2. Since 2010, what has been the extent of EU financial support to the Afghan Public Protection Force?
3. Are EU officials planning to implement contingency plans in light of the possible disbandment of the Afghan Public Protection Force?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 November 2013)

The HR/VP is fully aware of the difficult security situation for EU officials posted and deployed in Afghanistan. The EU Delegation and the EUPOL AFGHANISTAN mission plan to continue to use private companies to provide security — operating independently from the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).

The HR/VP is also fully aware of the still considerable challenge of reinforcing the capacities of Afghan police services. The international community is committed to providing further support to that end. The EU considers it a priority to continue supporting Afghan efforts to strengthen civilian policing and rule of law and remains in close contact with the Afghan Ministry of Interior as to how to best achieve this. At present, the EU provides support through both the deployment of the EUPOL AFGHANISTAN mission and through financial support via the Law and Order Trust Fund, which is managed by the UNDP. The EU has not provided financial support for the APPF and has no plans to do so.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010723/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(19 settembre 2013)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Maliani protestano contro il ritorno dei jihadisti a Gao

Il sito di notizie online *Maghreb* riferisce che il 25 agosto centinaia di giovani maliani sono scesi in strada nella città di Gao, nel Mali settentrionale, protestando furiosamente contro il ritorno degli ex jihadisti. Un insegnante ha dichiarato che «al nord la popolazione è ancora scossa dalla paura e non dimenticherà mai quello che ha passato con gli islamisti. Per questo motivo, la reazione è piuttosto comprensibile, specialmente perché abbiamo appena appreso della fusione del Mujao e della brigata di Belmokhtar». Entrambi i gruppi si erano precedentemente staccati da «al-Qaeda nel Maghreb islamico» (AQIM) e il loro ritorno ha suscitato profonda rabbia e paura nella popolazione locale.

Secondo quanto riferito, i manifestanti sono particolarmente adirati per l'inerzia delle autorità maliane di fronte al ritorno degli islamisti. Gli abitanti hanno esortato la polizia e la gendarmeria a intervenire catturando i jihadisti ricomparsi. Purtroppo, il sito riferisce tuttavia che la polizia si sta lasciando corrompere dai mujaheddin, che vengono pertanto rilasciati (pare che gli alleati dei mujaheddin siano rilasciati in circostanze simili). Dal sito si evince che i manifestanti hanno imposto alle autorità un termine entro cui queste dovranno intervenire, promettendo altrimenti di farsi giustizia da soli.

1. Intende l'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente chiedere alle autorità maliane di adottare provvedimenti per affrontare il problema del ritorno dei jihadisti nella città di Gao?
2. Quale è la valutazione dei funzionari UE nella regione per quanto riguarda la probabilità di nuove violenze, nel Mali settentrionale, orchestrate dal Mujao e dai seguaci di Mokhtar Belmokhtar?
3. Offre attualmente l'UE assistenza al Mali ai fini della lotta alla corruzione e del miglioramento dell'ordine pubblico?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(5 novembre 2013)**

Il rischio di attacchi terroristici in Mali rimane molto elevato. La fusione del MUJAO con la brigata di Belmokhtar e la creazione del nuovo gruppo terroristico Al-Mourabitoun inaspriscono ulteriormente la concorrenza con AQIM e altri gruppi rivali affiliati ad Al Qaeda. I recenti attentati suicidi di Tombouctou e Kidal (28 settembre 2013) e i bombardamenti del MUJAO a Gao (8 ottobre 2013) potrebbero essere seguiti da altri tentativi di condurre operazioni terroristiche estremamente visibili in Mali o nella più ampia regione del Sahel-Sahara.

In questo contesto, la Missione di stabilizzazione multidimensionale integrata delle Nazioni Unite in Mali e l'operazione militare francese Serval hanno innalzato il livello di allerta nella parte settentrionale del Mali e in particolare a Gao. I due battaglioni dell'esercito maliano addestrati dall'UE sono stati schierati a Gao e in altre zone strategiche del Mali centro-settentrionale.

L'UE ha la ferma intenzione di continuare a sostenere i servizi di difesa e di sicurezza, comprese le forze di sicurezza interna, attraverso lo sviluppo delle capacità e le riforme della giustizia e della governance in tutti i settori. La relazione sull'attuazione della strategia UE per il Sahel nel 2012-2013 ⁽¹⁾ contiene informazioni dettagliate sul modo in cui i finanziamenti e le missioni dell'UE sostengono lo sviluppo socioeconomico in Mali e in altri paesi vulnerabili del Sahel contribuendo al tempo stesso a migliorare la sicurezza e a combattere la radicalizzazione.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2013)317.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010723/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Malians protest Jihadists return to Gao

Maghreb24, an online news site, reported that hundreds of young Malians in the northern town of Gao had taken to the streets on August 25, demonstrating in anger at the return of former jihadists. One teacher said that 'People of the north are still shaken by fear and they will never forget what they have experienced with the Islamists. So, their reaction is quite understandable, especially since we just heard about the merger of MUJAO and Belmokhtar's gang.' Both of these groups previously had broken away from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and their return has caused much anger and fear within the local population.

It is reported that the demonstrators are particularly angered by the inaction of the Malian authorities against the Islamists returns. Residents have appealed to police and the gendarmerie to take action by catching the remerged jihadists. Unfortunately, however, the site reports that the police are accepting bribes from the Mujahedeen and subsequently releasing them — allies of the Mujahedeen are allegedly released in similar circumstances. Reports now suggest that protesters have set the authorities a deadline to take action, promising a vigilante response if action is not forthcoming.

1. Will the High Representative/Vice-President ask that the Malian authorities take steps to address the problem of jihadists moving into the town of Gao?
2. What is the assessment of EU officials in the region regarding the likelihood of renewed violence in Northern Mali orchestrated by MUJAO and followers of Mokhtar Belmokhtar?
3. Is the EU offering assistance to Mali for the purposes of combatting corruption and improving law and order?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(5 November 2013)

The risk of terrorist attacks in Mali remains very high. The merger of MUJAO and Belmokhtar's group and the creation of a new terrorist group — Al-Mourabitoun — are exacerbating further the competition with AQIM and other rival Al Qaeda affiliated groups. Recent suicide attacks in Timbuktu, Kidal (28 September 2013) and bombings by MUJAO in Gao (8 October 2013) may be followed by other attempts to conduct highly visible terrorist operations in Mali or the broader Sahel-Sahara region.

In this context, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and French military operation Serval have enhanced their level of alert in the north of Mali and Gao in particular. The two EU trained battalions of the Malian army were deployed in Gao and other strategic locations in the centre and the north of Mali.

The EU is determined to continue its support to defence and security services, including internal security forces through relevant capacity building, justice and governance reforms across the board. The 2012/2013 implementation report of the EU Sahel Strategy ⁽¹⁾ provides details on how EU funding and missions are supporting the socioeconomic development in Mali and other vulnerable Sahel countries while helping to improve security and combat radicalisation.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2013) 317.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010724/13
to the Commission**

Marta Andreasen (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Finance and accountancy training for Commission staff

What training on accountancy and finance is offered internally to Commission staff?

Who are the course providers, how are they selected, and how long do the contracts last?

What exactly are the courses offered, and what is the attendance for each course per year from 2009 to 2012? What is the projected attendance for 2013?

In what languages are the courses provided?

How many courses have been dropped and what are the criteria for this decision? How many new courses have been added?

Who selects and provides the course materials?

How often are the course materials updated in light of the new accountancy standards and other legislative changes?

What opportunity is given to the participants to provide feedback at the end of a course?

Is there any course assessment carried out based on the feedback given?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission

(25 October 2013)

1. Staff is offered around 60 different courses on financial procedures, accountancy and the IT software for budget management (ABAC).
 2. Courses are provided either by internal trainers or external contractors, selected through open call for tender procedures. Running contracts are with DEMOS (ends 9/6/2016) and Deloitte (ends 7/3/2016).
 3. 22 courses relate to financial procedures, around 30 to ABAC, and the accounting curriculum, presently under revision, will comprise 7 modules. The total number of participants was 5 764 in 2012 and up to now 5 158 in 2013.
 4. Courses are given in English and French.
 5. Regular revisions of course contents (see No 7 below) lead to the merge, split or renewal of courses.
 6. The trainers provide the course material, after validation of the competent service.
 7. Courses are updated any time their content is affected by external changes (e.g. new release of IT software, revision of Financial Regulations or implementing rules, new accountancy standards) or whenever pedagogical or strategic reasons make it necessary.
 8. An evaluation sheet is filled in by each participant after each course.
 9. Courses are assessed on the basis of the evaluation sheets to ensure high quality standards.
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(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-010725/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL)
(19 september 2013)

Betreft: VP/HR — behandeling van minderheden bij Pakistaanse verkiezingen

In het eindverslag van de EU-verkiezingswaarnemingsmissie naar de Pakistaanse verkiezingen in 2013 wordt erop gewezen dat minderheden in Pakistan, en met name de Ahmadiyya-gemeenschap, nog steeds worden gediscrimineerd. In tegenstelling tot andere minderheden moeten de leden van deze gemeenschap gebruikmaken van een apart kiezersregister. Dat staat haaks op internationale verplichtingen. Bovendien is vastgesteld dat verkiezingsspotjes waarin niet-moslims worden opgeroepen om te gaan stemmen, niet door de staatsomroeporganisaties zijn uitgezonden.

Is de HV/VV, vanuit een streven naar vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen, bereid de discriminatie van de Ahmadiyya-gemeenschap aan de orde te stellen bij de Pakistaanse regering?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(11 november 2013)

De kwestie omtrent de behandeling van de Ahmadiyya-gemeenschap betreft een dossier dat de EU herhaaldelijk bij de Pakistaanse autoriteiten aan de orde heeft gesteld, en aan de orde zal blijven stellen.

In zijn gesprekken met de Pakistaanse regering en met de verkiezingscommissie drukte Europees Parlements lid Michael Gahler, hoofdwaarnemer van de verkiezingswaarnemingsmissie van de EU (EOM) in Pakistan in 2013, in aanloop naar de verkiezingen persoonlijk zijn bezorgdheid uit over de afzonderlijke lijst voor de Ahmadi-kiezers. Het EOM-eindverslag vat de aanbeveling dat „de afzonderlijke lijst voor de Ahmadi-kiezers moet worden afgeschaft, zodat alle kiezers een uniforme kiezerslijst vormen, al naargelang de eisen inzake leeftijd en Pakistaans burgerschap”.

De EU is bereid om samen met Pakistan de aanbevelingen van de verkiezingswaarnemingsmissie op te volgen om het verkiezingsproces in overeenstemming met haar internationale verbintenissen te verbeteren, onder meer door een inclusieve aanpak van alle Pakistaanse minderheden aan te moedigen.

De EU ondersteunt het democratiseringsproces in Pakistan met de financiering van capaciteitsopbouwende projecten in de federale en provinciale instellingen, met inbegrip van de bescherming van de rechten van de mens, van de toegang tot het rechtswezen voor kwetsbare groepen en van de versterking van maatschappelijke organisaties.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010725/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Treatment of minority communities in the Pakistan elections

The Final Report of the EU Election Observation Mission Pakistan 2013 highlighted the continued discrimination against minority communities in Pakistan, in particular the Ahmadiyya community. Unlike in the case of other minority groups, this community's members are required to use a separate electoral register. This is at odds with international obligations. Additionally it was noted that that voter spots promoting non-Muslim participation in the elections were not aired by state-owned broadcasters.

In the context of free and fair elections, is the HR/VP ready to address the issue of discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community with the Government of Pakistan?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

The issue of the treatment of the Ahmadiyya community is one that has been raised by the EU repeatedly with the Pakistani authorities, and will continue to be raised.

Michael Gahler MEP, Chief Observer for the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Pakistan in 2013, personally raised concerns about the separate list for Ahmadi voters in his discussions with the Government of Pakistan and the Election Commission in the run up to elections. The EOM final report recommends that 'the separate list for Ahmadi voters be abolished so that all voters are one unified electoral roll, according to requirements for age and Pakistani citizenship'.

The EU is ready to accompany Pakistan in following up on recommendations from the EOM to improve the electoral process in line with its international commitments, including by encouraging an inclusive approach to all of Pakistan's minorities.

The EU is engaged in supporting the democratic process in Pakistan with funding for capacity-building projects in the federal and provincial institutions, including protection of human rights, access to justice for vulnerable groups and strengthening civil society organisations.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-010726/13

an die Kommission

Britta Reimers (ALDE)

(19. September 2013)

Betrifft: GVO-Zulassung

Das EU-System zur GVO-Zulassung nimmt deutlich mehr Zeit in Anspruch als die Zulassungssysteme der wichtigsten Exportländer von GV-Produkten des amerikanischen Kontinents, bei denen genauso strenge Risikobewertungen vorgesehen sind. Diese Kluft nimmt zu und entwickelt sich schnell zu einer großen Herausforderung für den Handel. Auf der Website der Kommission und in mehreren von der Kommission finanzierten Berichten wird darauf hingewiesen, dass das System der EU effizienter sein könnte, ohne dass dabei die hohen Sicherheitsstandards beeinträchtigt würden. Die Kommission hat im Juni 2012 eingestanden, dass — was die GVO-Zulassungen betrifft — die rechtlichen Zeitrahmen regelmäßig nicht eingehalten werden können (Antwort auf die parlamentarische Anfrage E-004184/2012). Der Kommission kommt die eindeutige rechtliche Verpflichtung zu, die GVO mit befürwortender Stellungnahme der EFSA innerhalb von drei Monaten den Mitgliedstaaten zur „Komitologie“-Abstimmung vorzulegen. Dieser rechtlich vorgeschriebene Zeitrahmen scheint in anderen Komitologiebereichen im Allgemeinen eingehalten zu werden, im Falle der GVO allerdings nicht.

1. Teilt die Kommission die Auffassung, dass ihre Untätigkeit eine Bedrohung für den Handel mit Agrarerzeugnissen darstellt?
2. Wie sind nach Ansicht der Kommission diese unzulässigen und unnötigen Verzögerungen mit den WTO-Verpflichtungen der EU zu vereinbaren?
3. Wird die Kommission von nun an ihren rechtlichen Verpflichtungen nachkommen und die GV-Produkte mit einer befürwortenden Stellungnahme der EFSA innerhalb von drei Monaten in der Sitzung eines ständigen Ausschusses zur Abstimmung stellen?
4. Hat sich die Situation seit Juni 2012 verbessert?
5. Welche Schritte wird die Kommission unternehmen, um sicherzustellen, dass die rechtlichen Verpflichtungen in Bezug auf die Zeitrahmen künftig erfüllt werden?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission

(11. November 2013)

1./2. Die Frau Abgeordnete wird auf die Antwort der Kommission auf die Anfrage E-0008611/2013 ⁽¹⁾ verwiesen.

3./4./5. Die Kommission bemüht sich auch weiterhin um Einhaltung der engen rechtlichen Fristen für die Zulassung. In diesem Zusammenhang sei jedoch auch darauf hingewiesen, dass die EFSA in jüngster Zeit unvollständige oder nicht eindeutige Stellungnahmen abgegeben hat, bei denen die Kommission fehlende Angaben von den Antragstellern einholen muss, was wiederum das Zulassungsverfahren verlängert.

Nach Ansicht der Kommission wird die am 8. Juni 2013 veröffentlichte Durchführungsverordnung (EG) Nr. 503/2013 ⁽²⁾ über Anträge auf Zulassung genetisch veränderter Lebens- und Futtermittel zu einer Straffung der Risikobewertung und des Risikomanagements der Erzeugnisse führen, da die Antragsteller aufgefordert werden, mehrere GVO (kombinierte Transformationsereignisse und Unterkombinationen) in einem einzigen Antrag zusammenzufassen, und es wird davon ausgegangen, dass dieses klare Verfahren dazu beitragen wird, die zeitlichen Verschiebungen zwischen den Zulassungen der EU und der exportierenden Drittländer zu verringern.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ ABl. L 157 vom 8.6.2013, S. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010726/13
to the Commission**

Britta Reimers (ALDE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: GMO authorisation

The EU's GMO authorisation system takes significantly longer than those of the major GM commodity exporting countries in the Americas with equally rigorous risk assessments in place. This gap is increasing and is quickly becoming a major challenge for trade. The Commission's website and several Commission-funded reports point out that the EU's system could be more efficient without compromising high safety standards. The Commission admitted in June 2012 that it regularly fails to comply with legal timelines when it comes to GM authorisations (reply to parliamentary Question E-004184/2012). The Commission has a clear legal obligation to put GMOs with a positive EFSA opinion to the 'comitology' vote by Member States within three months. This legally prescribed timeline seems to be generally followed in other comitology areas, but not when it comes to GMOs.

1. Does the Commission agree that its failure to act represents a threat to trade in agricultural commodities?
2. How are these undue and unnecessary delays compatible, in the Commission's view, with the EU's WTO commitments?
3. Will the Commission from now on respect its legal obligations to put GM products with a positive EFSA opinion to the vote at a standing committee meeting within three months?
4. Has the situation improved since June 2012?
5. What steps will the Commission take to ensure that the legal obligations regarding these timelines are fulfilled in the future?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

1 and 2. The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's reply on Question E-0008611/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

3, 4 and 5. The Commission will continue with its efforts to comply with the tight legal timelines for authorisation. However it has to be noted that EFSA recently adopted incomplete or inconclusive opinions for which the Commission is asking the missing data to the applicants which prolongs the authorisation process.

The Commission believes that the implementing Regulation (EC) No 503/2013 ⁽²⁾ on authorisation of GM food and feed, published on 8 June 2013, will streamline the risk assessment and risk management of the products by asking applicants to include different GMOs (stacks and sub-combinations) in one single application and that it is expected that this clear procedure will contribute to reduce the asynchronicity of authorisations between the EU and exporting third countries.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ OJ L 157, 8.6.2013, p. 1-48.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010727/13
to the Commission**

Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: EU legislation on working hours for professional drivers

Professional drivers throughout the EU are required to keep weekly rest reports to track their working hours and to ensure that they are within EU defined safety limits and that no driver has a competitive advantage.

What would the Commission consider a 'fair' fine for minor breaches of the required length of rest time?

Are the Member States obliged to publish a list of escalating fines for different infringements? If so, where is such a list to be found?

If an offence is fined in a Member State other than the one in which it was committed, what is the appeal procedure? Does the Member State in which the offence was committed have jurisdiction over the level of fine or the right to ask for such jurisdiction?

Has the Commission experienced different interpretations of the 'ferry rule' and, if so, how have the disputes been resolved?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 ⁽¹⁾ requires Member States to lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of driving times, breaks and rest periods for drivers and make sure that these are effective, proportionate, dissuasive and non-discriminatory. The Court of Justice gave recently some guidance as regards the appreciation of the criterion of proportionality of such penalties in its judgment of 9 February 2012 ⁽²⁾. According to the Court, Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem to be appropriate to them (the amount of fines may thus depend on socioeconomic situations in the Member States and their penal systems), but should adjust their amount to the seriousness of the breach.

Member States are obliged to notify the Commission of the measures and the rules on penalties. However, there is no requirement to publish the list of such penalties. To gain a detailed overview of penalties applied in different Member States the Commission launched a study in 2012 and its results will be published on the Europa website in the coming months.

The appeal procedure against fines normally follows the rules of the national legal system of the Member State where the fine was imposed. The amount of fines should be determined in accordance with the legislation of that Member States. As regards additional claims from the Member State where the offense was committed, the *ne bis in idem* principle should apply.

To ensure a common understanding and application of the so called 'ferry rule' the Commission issued, in cooperation with Member States, a guidance note, which is published on the Europa website under the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/social_provisions/doc/guidance_6_en.pdf

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA relevance) — OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1-14.

⁽²⁾ Case C-210/10 Márton Urbán.

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-010728/13
upućeno Komisiji
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(19. rujna 2013.)

Predmet: Kako iskoristiti novac iz EU fondova

Republika Hrvatska svoju nepripremljenost za ulazak u Europsku uniju najočiglednije je pokazala kroz izuzetno nisku razinu tzv. absorption rate, odnosno iskorištenost fondova EU-a u smislu postotka isplaćenih sredstava u odnosu na alokaciju sredstava dostupnih kroz pretpristupni program IPA 2007.-2013.

Novac koji Hrvatska mora uplatiti za članstvo u EU, u temeljni kapital Europske investicijske banke te u istraživački fond za ugljen i čelik obvezatan je i fiksiran, dok se malo zna o tome da je novac koji će Hrvatska uprihodovati tek potencijal koji ovisi o nama samima, odnosno o projektima koje ćemo predložiti kako bismo ga privukli.

Uzevši u obzir dosadašnju praksu negativnih rekordera u broju projektnih odbijenica, te također uzevši u obzir najnovija previranja između Komisije i Vlade Republike Hrvatske, iz kojih je već postalo izvjesno to da će Komisija zamrznuti 80 milijuna eura koji su za Hrvatsku predviđeni kroz tzv. privremeni schengenski instrument, moje pitanje vama je postoji li politički mehanizam koji bi europarlamentarni zastupnici iz Republike Hrvatske mogli pokrenuti, a koji bi Hrvatskoj, s obzirom na nezahvalnu situaciju u kojoj se nalazi, mogao pomoći da poboljša apsorpcijske kapacitete za povlačenje sredstava iz strukturnih i kohezijskih fondova te postoji li mogućnost produljenja roka za apliciranje na iste, ako se to u Hrvatskoj pokaže kao realna potreba.

Takva mogućnost za Hrvatsku uvelike bi pomogla da europska Strategija 2020., za koju se zalažete u svom resoru, zaista bude efikasno realizirana u praksi.

Odgovor g. Hahna u ime Komisije
(19. studenog 2013.)

Hrvatska mora nastaviti pripremati i provoditi projekte u skladu s uredbama. Administrativne kapacitete na nacionalnoj i lokalnoj razini potrebno je dodatno ojačati i povećati zapošljavanjem novog osoblja, razvojem sposobnosti zaposlenika i zadržavanjem već zaposlenih u cilju osiguravanja kontinuiteta. Rok za provedbu programa konvergencije za Hrvatsku (okoliš, promet, regionalna konkurentnost, razvoj ljudskih resursa) produžen je na temelju Ugovora o pristupanju s razdoblja n+2 na razdoblje n+3. Udio koji je Komisija isplatila u okviru programa 2007. — 2013. trenutačno iznosi 21 %, posebno zbog činjenice što je nakon pristupanja dodano još 450 milijuna EUR.

Komisija bi mogla, kako je predviđeno Aktom o pristupanju, u siječnju 2014. isplatiti godišnji iznos schengenskog instrumenta za 2014. (80 milijuna EUR) jer je hrvatski parlament donio izmjene Zakona o pravosudnoj suradnji u kaznenim stvarima s državama članicama EU-a kojim će se od 1. siječnja 2014. staviti izvan snage odredbe kojima se Europski uhiđbeni nalog ograničava na kaznena djela počinjena nakon 7. kolovoza 2002.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010728/13
to the Commission
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: How to draw on money from EU funds

The most obvious way in which Croatia demonstrated its lack of preparedness for EU accession was its exceptionally low absorption rate, i.e. the rate of utilisation of EU funds calculated as the percentage of funds paid out in relation to the funds allocated as part of the pre-accession (IPA) programme for 2007-2013.

The funds that Croatia must pay out for EU membership, as base capital for the European Investment Bank and for the Research Fund for Coal and Steel are compulsory and fixed. However, little is known about the money that Croatia will actually receive; these funds are uncertain and will depend on our actions, that is, on the projects that we propose in order to draw on them.

Given that a record number of projects have now been rejected, and given the recent turmoil between the Commission and the Croatian Government, which has led to news emerging that the Commission is to freeze EUR 80 million in funds earmarked for Croatia under the temporary Schengen Facility, I would like to put the following questions to the Commission: Is there a political mechanism that Croatian MEPs could launch to help Croatia, which currently finds itself in an unenviable position, to improve its absorption rates for structural and cohesion funds? Would it be possible, should there be a real need in Croatia, to extend the deadline for applying for such funds?

This would greatly help Croatia to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, which your institution advocates, in an effective manner.

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(19 November 2013)**

Croatia needs to continue preparing and implementing projects according to the regulations. Administrative capacity at national and local level will need to be further strengthened and increased by additional recruitments, by developing the skills of staff and by retaining staff in order to ensure continuity. The deadline for implementation of the convergence programmes (environment, transport, regional competitiveness, human resources development) was extended for Croatia from n+2 to n+3 period by virtue of the Accession Treaty. The rate of payment by the Commission of the 2007-2013 programmes is currently at 21%, notably due to the fact that an additional EUR 450 million was just added following the accession.

The Commission could pay the Schengen Facility annual amount for 2014 (EUR 80 million) in January 2014 as envisaged by the Act of Accession, as the Croatian parliament adopted changes to the Law on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters with the EU Member States which will as of 1 January 2014 put out of force provisions by which the European Arrest Warrant is limited to crimes committed after 7 August 2002.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010729/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Discarica Co.Ve.Ri. di Casale sul Sile in provincia di Treviso: ulteriori approfondimenti

In riferimento alla risposta all'interrogazione E-006906/2013 «Discarica Co.Ve.Ri. di Casale sul Sile in provincia di Treviso», si richiama l'attenzione della Commissione sulle evidenze sollevate in documenti ufficiali dell'Ente parco naturale del fiume Sile. Tale ente è stato istituito con L.R. 28.01.1991, n. 8, al fine di tutelare i caratteri naturalistici, storici ed ambientali della zona e proteggere le acque, il bacino idrografico, il suolo, il sottosuolo e l'intero ecosistema del territorio del fiume Sile.

Considerato che:

- il piano di gestione del bacino del fiume Sile è stato predisposto ai sensi della direttiva 2000/60/CE ed individua un contesto idrografico composto da un territorio che investe in tutto o in parte 41 territori comunali all'interno delle province di Padova, Treviso e Venezia;
- secondo la legge regionale 6 dicembre 1991, n. 349 la nozione di «area contigua ad area protetta» si può far coincidere con l'intero bacino idrografico del fiume Sile;
- il sito in cui si realizzerebbe la discarica si trova in «area contigua ed area protetta» in quanto è ubicato a 700 metri dai confini ovest del Parco e a 1 500 metri dalla zona di pregio naturalistico delle ex Cave di Casale;
- l'unità di progetto foreste e parchi in merito al progetto di questa discarica ravvisa che essa «altera in maniera irreversibile l'ecosistema fluviale del parco [...] incidendo significativamente sull'acqua, risorsa idropotabile di primario valore e fondamento dell'ampio bacino idrografico del Sile nonché bene prioritario del Parco naturale regionale del fiume Sile. Si ravvisa inoltre la totale incompatibilità all'immissione nei fossati di campagna delle acque provenienti dalla prevista discarica»;
- l'Ente parco naturale del fiume Sile non è mai stato coinvolto dalle direzioni regionali preposte alla valutazione del progetto, non ha mai ricevuto risposte alle richieste di chiarimenti e non è stato convocato presso la Commissione V.I.A.,
- nel territorio del Parco sono presenti anche i siti Natura 2000 — SIC e ZPS — che potrebbero venire irrimediabilmente compromessi dall'immissione delle acque provenienti dalla discarica,

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è informata su questi fatti;
2. se ritiene che la procedura di valutazione di impatto ambientale preventiva (VIA) abbia tenuto conto delle pertinenti normative europee: direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti (direttiva quadro sui rifiuti), direttiva 1999/31/CE relativa alle discariche di rifiuti (direttiva discariche) e direttiva 2011/92/UE;
3. se ritiene che sia stata rispettata la direttiva 2000/60/CE che istituisce un quadro per l'azione comunitaria in materia di acque?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(29 ottobre 2013)

Conformemente all'articolo 6, paragrafo 1 della direttiva sulla valutazione dell'impatto ambientale (direttiva VIA) ⁽¹⁾ compete agli Stati membri designare le autorità da consultare, in generale o caso per caso, nell'ambito delle procedure di VIA.

⁽¹⁾ Direttiva 2011/92/UE concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati, GU L 26 del 28.1.2012, pag. 1.

In base alle informazioni fornite dall'onorevole deputato la Commissione non è stata in grado di ravvisare una violazione della direttiva VIA, della direttiva quadro sui rifiuti ⁽²⁾, della direttiva sulle discariche ⁽³⁾ o della direttiva quadro sulle acque ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽²⁾ Direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti, GU L 312 del 22.11.2008, pag. 3.

⁽³⁾ Direttiva 1999/31/CE relativa alle discariche di rifiuti, GU L 182 del 16.7.1999, pag. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ Direttiva 2000/60/CE che istituisce un quadro per l'azione comunitaria in materia di acque, GU L 327 del 22.12.2000, pag. 39.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010729/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Update on Co.Ve.Ri landfill in Casale sul Sile in the Province of Treviso

Further to the Commission's reply to Written Question E-006906/2013 (Co.Ve.Ri landfill in Casale sul Sile, Treviso) I would like to draw attention to a number of facts brought to light in official documents from the River Sile Regional Nature Park authority. This authority was established under Regional Law No 8 of 28 January 1991 with a view to protecting the area's natural, historical and environmental features, in particular, the water, the river drainage basin, the soil and the subsoil.

The Sile river basin management plan was set up under Directive 2000/60/EC and covers a drainage area that runs through all or part of 41 municipalities in the provinces of Padua, Treviso and Venice.

The entire Sile river basin may be considered an 'area adjoining a protected area' within the meaning of Regional Law No 349 of 6 December 1991.

The area where the landfill is to be built is clearly an area 'adjoining a protected area', as it is located 700 metres from the western edge of the Regional Nature Park and 1 500 metres from the 'Ex Cave di Casale' area of natural beauty.

The Regional Forestry and Parks Planning Unit takes the view that the proposed landfill 'will irreversibly alter the park's river ecosystem [...] and have a significant impact on the water, which is of key importance to drinking water supplies and a fundamental feature of the vast Sile river basin and Regional Nature Park'. The unit also recognises that the release of waste water from the proposed landfill into drainage ditches would be completely wrong.

The Sile River Regional Nature Park authority was not consulted by the regional authority departments responsible for assessing the project. What is more, it received no replies to its requests for clarifications and was not asked for its opinion by the EIA Commission.

Moreover, there are Natura 2000 sites in the park (SCIs and SPAs), which could be irreparably compromised by waste water released from the landfill site.

1. Is the Commission aware of the above?
2. Does it believe that proper account was taken of the relevant European laws including Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste and Directive 2011/92/EU during the environmental impact assessment?
3. Does it believe that Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy has been complied with?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(29 October 2013)

According to Article 6(1) of the EIA Directive ⁽¹⁾ it is the duty of the Member States to designate which authorities should be consulted as part of the EIA procedures, either in general terms or on a case-by-case basis.

From the information provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission could not identify a breach of the EIA Directive, the Waste Framework Directive ⁽²⁾, the Landfill Directive ⁽³⁾ or the Water Framework Directive ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008.

⁽³⁾ Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999.

⁽⁴⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010730/13

alla Commissione

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Nuova discarica nel Comune di Paese in provincia di Treviso: a rischio la salute dei cittadini e la sicurezza ambientale

Il comune di Paese in provincia di Treviso convive da anni con le problematiche ambientali derivanti dalla presenza sul suo territorio di ben 29 cave e 14 impianti di smaltimento rifiuti. Gli effetti della presenza di tali installazioni si ripercuotono pesantemente sulle falde acquifere della zona con rischio di contaminazione da agenti chimici, quali ad esempio bromacile e mercurio. Attualmente è stato presentato, da parte di un'azienda locale, un progetto per riclassificare la discarica sita in via Toti nel comune di Paese, al fine di ottenere l'autorizzazione a modificare il suo attuale uso ed adattarla alla ricezione anche di rifiuti classificati come CER 17.06.05: «Materiali da costruzione contenenti amianto». La capacità di stoccaggio del sito diverrà di 650.000 mc di materiali, dei quali 190.000 mc di rifiuti inerti e 460.000 di rifiuti contenenti amianto per una durata stimata di circa 10 anni.

Considerato che:

- in questa discarica sono già stoccati 55.000 mc di rifiuti CER 17.06.05 in seguito ad autorizzazione concessa dalla Provincia di Treviso con D.D.P n. 843/2004 del 21 ottobre 2004;
- lo stesso anno il comune di Paese si costituiva in giudizio per richiedere l'annullamento di tale disposizione;
- la sentenza del Consiglio di Stato n. 1329 del 20 marzo 2007 annullava il decreto provinciale n. 843/2004 dichiarando contestualmente i materiali contenenti amianto conferimenti illegittimi per il tipo di sito;
- il progetto adesso presentato non fornisce una stima delle polveri disperse in fase di trasferimento dei rifiuti;
- gli automezzi adibiti al conferimento dei materiali percorreranno zone abitate e lo studio d'impatto risulta carente di un'appropriata procedura emergenziale in caso di verificarsi di incidente;
- la concentrazione di discariche e siti di trattamento rifiuti nella zona — elevata,

può la Commissione riferire:

1. se ritiene che una tale concentrazione di siti che stoccano e trattano rifiuti sia in linea con le direttive europee 1999/31/CE e 2008/98/CE;
2. se ritiene che una nuova discarica in cui conferire materiali contenenti amianto, sita nel comune di Paese, il cui territorio ed ecosistema è già stato compromesso da questo genere di attività sia in linea con la normativa europea;
3. come intende agire per tutelare l'ambiente e la salute dei cittadini di Paese;
4. se ritiene che la valutazione di impatto ambientale (VIA) sul sito sopra descritto vada eseguita tenendo conto non solo del singolo progetto, ma anche della criticità territoriale in cui esso si inserisce?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(7 novembre 2013)

Spetta alle autorità competenti degli Stati membri decidere in merito alle autorizzazioni delle discariche, rispettando le pertinenti prescrizioni della legislazione dell'UE, in particolare la direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti ⁽¹⁾ («direttiva quadro sui rifiuti»), la direttiva 1999/31/CE relativa alle discariche di rifiuti ⁽²⁾ («direttiva Discariche») e la direttiva 2011/92/UE concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati ⁽³⁾ («direttiva VIA»).

⁽¹⁾ GUL 312 del 22.11.2008.

⁽²⁾ GUL 182 del 16.7.1999.

⁽³⁾ GUL 26 del 28.1.2012.

In base alle informazioni fornite dall'onorevole deputato sul progetto di discarica per rifiuti contenenti amianto nel comune di Paese, non si rileva alcuna incompatibilità con la pertinente legislazione dell'UE sui rifiuti. Va tuttavia fatto presente che in generale lo smaltimento in discarica è la soluzione ritenuta meno ottimale sul piano della gestione dei rifiuti, in base alla gerarchia dei rifiuti stabilita nella direttiva quadro summenzionata.

A norma dell'articolo 4, paragrafo 3, della direttiva VIA, gli Stati membri, nell'esaminare i singoli casi o nel fissare le soglie o i criteri per la valutazione, devono tenere conto dei relativi criteri di selezione riportati nell'allegato III della direttiva stessa. L'allegato include anche le caratteristiche dei progetti per quanto concerne il cumulo con altri progetti e/o l'esistenza di impianti nelle vicinanze.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010730/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: New landfill site in the Paese municipality in the Province of Treviso — public health and environmental safety at risk

For years the Paese municipality in the Province of Treviso has been obliged to live with environmental problems caused by the 29 quarries and 14 waste disposal installations in the area. These installations have serious ramifications for the groundwater in the area, bringing a risk of contamination with chemical agents such as bromacil and mercury. A plan to reclassify the landfill site located in via Toti in the Paese municipality is currently being put forward by a local business with a view to obtaining authorisation for it to be used for waste classified under the code CER 17.06.05 (construction materials containing asbestos). The site's capacity would increase to 650 000 m³ — 190 000 m³ for inert waste and 460 000 m³ for waste containing asbestos — for an estimated 10-year period.

Fifty-five thousand cubic metres of CER 17.06.05 waste is already stored at this landfill site following the authorisation granted by the Province of Treviso under Provincial Decree No 843/2004 of 21 October 2004.

In 2004, the Paese municipality requested the annulment of this decree in court.

Council of State ruling No 1329 of 20 March 2007 annulled the decree, finding that it was unlawful for the materials containing asbestos to be stored at this type of site.

The reclassification plan that has been put forward does not include an estimate of the volume of particles that will be dispersed during the transfer of waste.

The vehicles used to transport the waste will travel through residential areas, and the impact assessment did not cover emergency procedures in the event of an accident.

There are a large number of landfill and waste treatment sites in the area.

Does the Commission consider such a high density of waste storage and treatment sites to be in line with Directives 1999/31/EC and 2008/98/EC?

Does it consider the opening of a new landfill site in the Paese municipality (where the ecosystem is already under threat) where materials containing asbestos will be stored to be in line with EC law?

What measures does it intend to take to protect the environment and public health in the area?

Does it think that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) should take account of not only the reclassification plan but also the high number of waste treatment and landfill sites already in the area?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(7 November 2013)**

Decisions about the authorisation of landfills shall be taken by the competent authorities in Member States, which must comply with relevant requirements in EC law, particularly the directive 2008/98/EC on waste ⁽¹⁾ (the 'Waste Framework Directive'), Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste ⁽²⁾ (the 'Landfill Directive') and Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment ⁽³⁾ (the 'EIA Directive').

On the basis of the information provided by the Honourable Member concerning the planned landfill for asbestos waste in the Paese municipality, no inconsistency with relevant EU waste legislation can be established. It should be noted however that in general landfilling of waste is seen as the least optimal waste management solution according to the waste hierarchy set out in the Waste Framework Directive.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 312, 22.11.2008.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 182, 16.7.1999.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

According to Article 4(3) of the EIA Directive, when carrying-out a case-by-case assessment or setting thresholds or criteria for the EIA screening, Member States must take into account all the relevant criteria foreseen by Annex III of the directive. This also includes the characteristics of the projects having regard to the cumulation with other projects and/or the neighbouring existent facilities.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010731/13
do Komisji**

Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Finansowanie ze środków UE działań ograniczających populację bezdomnych psów w Rumunii

Czy ze środków UE były finansowane działania zmierzające do ograniczania populacji bezdomnych psów w Rumunii? Jeżeli tak, to kiedy to nastąpiło, na jakich warunkach i jakie kwoty zostały przyznane?

W szczególności proszę o informację, czy w ramach tych projektów dopuszczalne było zabijanie bezdomnych psów?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johannes Hahna w imieniu Komisji

(14 listopada 2013 r.)

Według informacji, które Komisja otrzymała od instytucji zarządzającej programem regionalnym na lata 2007-2013, żaden z projektów wybranych do finansowania nie obejmuje celów dotyczących bezpańskich psów.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010731/13
to the Commission**

Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: EU funding for measures to reduce the stray dog population in Romania

Have EU funds been used to finance measures to reduce the stray dog population in Romania? If so, when did this occur, under what conditions and what amounts were allocated?

In particular, I would like to know whether the killing of stray dogs was permitted as part of these measures.

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(14 November 2013)

According to the information the Commission received from the managing authority of the 2007-2013 regional programme, none of the projects selected for financing includes specific objectives related to stray dogs.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-010732/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL) e João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)
(19 de setembro de 2013)

Assunto: Assassinato de Pavlos Fyssas por militantes do grupo fascista Aurora Dourada

Pavlos Fyssas, músico grego de 34 anos de idade, foi assassinado às primeiras horas de hoje, quarta-feira, 18 de setembro, em Keratsini, na Grécia. Sabe-se que este assassinato foi perpetrado por militantes do grupo fascista Aurora Dourada cuja atividade tem beneficiado da cumplicidade das autoridades gregas. Este grupo fascista atua com o objetivo de intimidar os trabalhadores e a juventude grega, tentando impedir e usando da violência contra quem luta e defende os seus direitos.

Este brutal assassinato junta-se a outros atos de enorme gravidade que têm vindo a ocorrer na Grécia e em outros países da UE, demonstrando um preocupante recrudescimento de grupos e partidos de extrema-direita e fascistas.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento desta situação? Como a avalia?
2. Considera que há relação entre o recrudescimento de grupos fascistas e a crise económica e social na UE?

Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão
(15 de novembro de 2013)

A Comissão remete para a declaração de 9 de outubro de 2013 ao Parlamento Europeu sobre a ascensão do extremismo de direita na Europa.

A Decisão-Quadro 2008/913/JAI do Conselho relativa à luta contra o racismo e a xenofobia obriga todos os Estados-Membros a punir com sanções penais a incitação pública intencional à violência e ao ódio com base na raça, cor, ascendência, religião ou origem nacional ou étnica, bem como a prever circunstâncias agravantes ligadas à motivação racista ou xenófoba. A Comissão apresentará um relatório sobre as medidas adotadas pelos Estados-Membros para dar cumprimento às disposições da decisão-quadro nos próximos meses.

A investigação de situações individuais em matéria de racismo ou xenofobia e a aplicação das legislações nacionais de transposição da decisão-quadro pertence às autoridades nacionais. Em especial, cabe aos tribunais nacionais determinar, em função das circunstâncias e do contexto, se a situação representa uma incitação à violência ou ao ódio.

A Comissão não dispõe de dados concretos sobre a ligação direta entre a crise económica e o extremismo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010732/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL) and João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: Assassination of Pavlos Fyssas by activists of the Golden Dawn fascist group

Pavlos Fyssas, a 34-year-old Greek musician, was murdered in the early hours of Wednesday, 18 September 2013 in Keratsini, Greece. It has been established that he was killed by militants of the Golden Dawn fascist group, the activities of which have been shielded by the complicity of the Greek Government. This fascist group carries out actions aimed at intimidating Greek workers and youth, by trying to prevent people from fighting to defend their rights and using violence against them.

This brutal murder is one more in a string of extremely serious incidents which have been taking place in Greece and other EU countries, and indicates an alarming rise in far-right and fascist groups.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation? What is its view of it?
2. Does it see any relationship between the upsurge in fascist groups and the economic and social crisis in the EU?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(15 November 2013)**

The Commission refers to its statement of 9 October 2013 to the European Parliament about the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe.

Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia obliges all Member States to sanction with criminal penalties the intentional public incitement to violence and hatred based on race, colour, descent, religion, or ethnic or national origin, as well as to provide for aggravating circumstances in relation to crimes with a racist or xenophobic motivation. The Commission will present a report on the Member States' compliance with the provisions of the framework Decision in the coming months.

The investigation of individual situations of racism or xenophobia and the application of national laws transposing the framework Decision belongs to national authorities. In particular, it is for national courts to determine, according to the circumstances and context, whether a situation represents an incitement to violence or hatred.

The Commission does not have concrete data about a direct link between the economic crisis and extremism.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-010733/13
do Komisji**

Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wsteczny przepływ gazu z UE na Ukrainę

Od pewnego czasu państwa członkowskie i Komisja prowadzą dyskusję na temat wstecznego przepływu gazu z UE na Ukrainę. Dotychczas porozumienia techniczne umożliwiające taką sprzedaż gazu zawarto z Polską (Gaz-system) i z Węgrami (MOL Földgaszallito), natomiast nie zawarto jeszcze takiego porozumienia ze Słowacją. Ma to kluczowe znaczenie, ponieważ jedynie słowacki rurociąg ma dostateczną przepustowość – około 30 mld m³ – aby dostarczyć zamierzoną ilość gazu: bez niego dostawy gazu byłyby bardzo ograniczone.

Według bieżących informacji Gazprom może naciskać na Eustream, aby podniósł kwestie administracyjne, w tym problemy dotyczące kodów dostawców, natomiast Słowacja nie wyraża woli zawarcia porozumienia technicznego z Ukrainą, co zagraża wstecznej przepływowi gazu na Ukrainę.

Poza brakiem woli ze strony Słowacji, sprawozdania podają, że należy rozwiązać kwestie techniczne dotyczące stacji pomiarowej gazu po ukraińskiej stronie granicy. Ponadto istnieją poważne powody, dla których należałoby zakwestionować okres obowiązywania i handlowy charakter taryfy Eustreamu dla punktu wejścia w Lanžhot (położonego na czesko-słowackiej granicy), która została zatwierdzona przez słowacki krajowy organ regulacyjny, ÚRSO. Trzyipółkrotny wzrost taryfy transgranicznej przepustowości dla punktu wejścia może wyprzeć RWE z rynku, czyniąc przesył gazu na Ukrainę nieopłacalnym.

Czy Komisja mogłaby odpowiedzieć na następujące pytania:

1. Czy Komisja podejmie jakiekolwiek działanie w związku ze wspomnianymi kwestiami? Czy Komisja wyraziła gotowość do wsparcia wysiłków mających na celu zawarcie takiego porozumienia? Czy Komisja przedyskutowała te kwestie ze słowackimi i ukraińskimi operatorami systemów przesyłowych?
2. Czy Komisja jest przekonana, że problemy techniczne mogą zostać rozwiązane, a jeśli tak, jakie działania może podjąć, aby przyspieszyć zastosowanie potrzebnych środków?
3. Czy Komisja jest zdania, że Gazprom powinien odegrać jakąkolwiek rolę w tej dyskusji? Jeśli nie, jaki nacisk może wywrzeć Komisja jako przeciwwagę dla takiej ingerencji?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji

(17 października 2013 r.)

1. Ukraina mogłaby odgrywać istotną rolę na zintegrowanym europejskim rynku energii i wyraziła zainteresowanie dywersyfikacją swoich szlaków dostaw gazu. Komisja zdecydowanie popiera zarówno wirtualny, jak i fizyczny wsteczny przepływ gazu na Ukrainę z UE, w tym przez Słowację, i aktywnie ułatwia ustanowienie takiego przepływu, tworząc forum dla wszystkich zainteresowanych stron, w tym dla odpowiednich OSP, na którym mogą one omówić możliwe rozwiązania istniejących problemów technicznych, prawnych i politycznych.
 2. Strony nadal pracują nad jasnym określeniem wszystkich istniejących przeszkód, aby znaleźć sposoby ich pokonania. Aby przyspieszyć ten proces, organizowane są regularne spotkania.
 3. Ustanowienie wstecznego przepływu gazu jest obowiązkiem operatorów systemów przesyłowych.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010733/13
to the Commission**

Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Reverse gas flow deliveries from the EU to Ukraine

The Member States and the Commission have been discussing the question of reverse gas flow deliveries from the EU to Ukraine for some time. While technical agreements enabling such gas sales have been reached with Poland (Gaz-system) and Hungary (MOL Földgázzsallító), no such agreement has yet been reached with Slovakia. This is significant as only the Slovak pipeline is of sufficient capacity — about 30 bcm — to deliver the intended volume of gas: without it, the gas deliveries would be very limited.

Current information suggests that Gazprom may be pressuring Eustream to raise administrative issues, such as problems pertaining to shipper codes, and that Slovakia has been unwilling to sign a technical agreement with Ukraine, jeopardising the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine.

In addition to Slovakia's lack of will, reports cite technical issues to be resolved concerning a gas metering station on the Ukrainian side of the border. There are also serious reasons to question the timing and commercial nature of Eustream's tariff for the Lanžhot entry point (on the Czech-Slovak border), which has been approved by the Slovak national regulator, ÚRSO. A 3.5-times increase of the entry cross-border capacity tariff may push RWE out of the market, thereby making it unprofitable to ship gas to Ukraine.

Could the Commission answer the following:

1. Is it taking any action with regard to these issues? Has it offered to assist efforts to reach such an agreement? Has it discussed these issues with the Slovak and Ukrainian transmission system operators concerned?
2. Does it believe that the technical issues can be overcome and, if so, what can it do to speed up the measures needed?
3. Does it believe that Gazprom should have any role in this discussion? If not, what pressure can the Commission apply to counter-balance such interference?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(17 October 2013)

1. Ukraine could play an important role in the integrated European energy market and has expressed interest in diversifying its own gas supply routes. The Commission strongly supports both virtual and physical reverse flows of gas to Ukraine from the EU, including via Slovakia, and is actively facilitating the establishment of such flows by bringing all parties concerned together, including the relevant TSOs, to discuss possible solutions to the technical, legal and political obstacles that currently still exist.
 2. The parties are still working on identifying clearly all the barriers that currently exist in order to find solutions on how to overcome them. Meetings are organised regularly to speed up the process.
 3. The establishment of reverse flows is the duty of transmission system operators.
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(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-010734/13

aan de Commissie

Marianne Thyssen (PPE)

(19 september 2013)

Betreft: Schuldbemiddelingsactiviteiten in het kader van een particuliere insolventieprocedure

Onlangs werd ik aangesproken door het Vlaams Centrum Schuldenlast (VCS), een door de Vlaamse overheid gesubsidieerd steunpunt en expertisecentrum inzake de schuldenmatiek in Vlaanderen.

Het VCS wil de kwaliteit van de dienstverlening die verleend wordt door budget- en schuldhulpverleners stimuleren en verhogen. Doelgroepen zijn zowel de medewerkers van de erkende instellingen voor schuldbemiddeling in Vlaanderen (zoals OCMW's) als andere beroepsgroepen die in Vlaanderen aan schuldbemiddeling mogen doen (advocaten, gerechtsdeurwaarders, notarissen).

Er werd mij verteld dat er mogelijk een Europees regelgevend initiatief in de maak zou zijn dat er toe zou strekken de activiteiten van schuldbemiddeling, onder meer in het kader van een collectieve schuldenregeling, in de toekomst enkel voor te behouden aan advocaten.

Graag verneem ik van de Commissie of een dergelijk initiatief voorzien wordt, en zo ja waarom de Commissie van mening zou zijn dat dit een aangelegenheid is die op Europees niveau moet worden geregeld?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie

(7 november 2013)

Volgens Richtlijn 2008/52/EG moet bemiddeling/mediation op een doeltreffende, onpartijdige en bekwame wijze manier worden geleid. De gedragscode voor bemiddelaars/mediators bepaalt dat de bemiddelaars deskundig en vertrouwd moeten zijn met de bemiddelingsprocedure. De lidstaten zijn bevoegd voor de uitvoering van deze bepalingen.

In december 2012 stelde de Commissie een herziening van Verordening (EG) nr. 1346/2000 voor betreffende insolventieprocedures die in een grensoverschrijdende context actief is. Het voorstel behandelt echter niet de verschillen tussen de nationale insolventiewetgevingen die tot rechtsonzekerheid en een onvriendelijk ondernemingsklimaat kunnen leiden. Daarom heeft de Commissie in haar mededeling van december 2012 de bezinning in gang gezet betreffende een nieuwe Europese aanpak van bedrijfsfaillissementen en insolventie. Doel is te komen tot een „redding en herstel“-cultuur voor ondernemingen en personen in financiële moeilijkheden. Van juli tot en met oktober 2013 werd een openbare raadpleging gehouden om de standpunten van belanghebbenden te horen op gebieden waar toenadering van het nationale insolventierecht voordelen kan opleveren. Met name één vraag heeft betrekking op de verschillen in nationale wetgeving die een belemmering kunnen vormen voor de werking van de interne markt, zoals de verschillen betreffende de kwalificaties en de toelatingscriteria voor de benoeming, het verlenen van vergunningen, de regelgeving en het toezicht van de vereffenaar. De Commissie zal de resultaten van de raadpleging beoordelen en zal op basis daarvan alle nodige, passende maatregelen treffen.

Daarenboven werkt de Commissie momenteel aan een studie over de te grote schuldenlast van huishoudens. In de studie worden onder andere de rol van het schuldadvies en de mogelijke hulp in geval van te zware huishoudelijke schuldenlast onderzocht.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010734/13
to the Commission**

Marianne Thyssen (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Debt mediation activities in connection with a private insolvency procedure

I was recently approached by the Flemish Indebtedness Centre (VCS), a support and expertise centre concerned with debt problems in Flanders which is subsidised by the Flemish Government.

The VCS wishes to promote and improve the quality of services provided by budget providers and debt advisers. Target groups include both staff of recognised debt mediation bodies in Flanders (e.g. public social welfare centres) and other occupational groups which are permitted to engage in debt mediation in Flanders (lawyers, bailiffs and notaries).

I was told that a European regulatory initiative may be in preparation which would in future reserve debt mediation activities — *inter alia* in connection with a collective debt settlement — solely to lawyers.

Is the Commission planning such an initiative and if so, why does the Commission consider this to be a matter which requires regulation at European level?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

According to Directive 2008/52/EC mediation should be conducted in an effective, impartial and competent way. The Code of Conduct for Mediators stipulates that mediators must be competent and knowledgeable in the process of mediation. Member States are competent to implement these provisions.

In December 2012 the Commission proposed a revision of Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings which operates in a cross-border context. However, the proposal does not address the disparities between national insolvency laws which can create legal uncertainty and an unfriendly business environment. Therefore the Commission Communication of December 2012 has launched a process of reflection on a new European approach to business failure and insolvency. The aim is to move towards a 'rescue and recovery' culture in cases of companies, and people in financial difficulties. A public consultation was launched from July to October 2013 to seek views from stakeholders on areas where approximation of national insolvency law could bring benefits. In particular one question deals with the differences in national law on the qualifications and eligibility for the appointment, licensing, regulation and supervision of liquidators that may hamper the functioning of the single market. The Commission will assess the results of the consultation and on that basis it will consider any appropriate action.

In addition, the Commission is currently carrying on a study on households over-indebtedness. The study analyses, among other issues, the role of debt advice and the possible help it may provide to over-indebted households.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010735/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Refinanciación de créditos

Una de las estrategias seguidas por las entidades bancarias para disminuir las tasas de morosidad es la refinanciación de los créditos. Por ello, siempre que creen que existe la posibilidad de recuperar el dinero a medio plazo, el crédito es refinanciado. Si el cliente deja de pagar los intereses y amortizaciones, se cuenta como moroso.

Las entidades tienen, pues, incentivos para refinanciar especialmente aquellos préstamos de gran volumen, normalmente a grandes empresas. Para proteger su balance es más práctico refinanciar un préstamo de cien millones que cien de un millón, y este hecho provoca una distorsión en la asignación de créditos en contra de las PYME.

A la luz de lo anterior, ¿está de acuerdo la Comisión en que las entidades bancarias tengan más incentivos para prestar a grandes empresas que a las PYME?

¿Piensa la Comisión que es posible promover algún cambio legislativo para rectificar esta situación?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión

(14 de noviembre de 2013)

En función de su estrategia empresarial, el banco o institución financiera se concentra más en las PYME o en empresas más grandes. Los bancos de ahorro y cooperativos, en particular, han sido socios fiables de las PYME durante la crisis y las han seguido apoyando con su financiación.

Por otro lado, desde el inicio de la crisis financiera, los bancos han endurecido considerablemente las condiciones de préstamo a sociedades no financieras. Los últimos datos disponibles del BCE indican que en agosto de 2013 se produjo la mayor disminución del crédito a sociedades no financieras en la zona del euro. La Comisión está atenta a esta evolución.

En el ámbito legislativo, el paquete DRC IV, que incorpora las nuevas normas mundiales sobre el capital bancario (Acuerdo de Basilea III) a la legislación de la UE mediante un Reglamento y una Directiva, y que se aplicará a partir del 1 de enero de 2014, introducirá un elemento de apoyo a las PYME con el fin de reducir los requisitos de capital para los préstamos a estas empresas. La disposición está destinada a fomentar los préstamos a las PYME respecto a otros tipos de financiación e inversión. El límite de exposición del comercio al por menor para beneficiarse de la reducción de las cargas de capital será de 1,5 millones de euros, con el fin de abarcar el mayor número posible de PYME. Las PYME se identifican de acuerdo con la recomendación de la Comisión de 2003 (es decir, son aquellas empresas que no superen un volumen de negocios máximo de cincuenta millones de euros anuales).

Las instituciones de financiación deberán informar cada tres meses a las autoridades competentes sobre la cuantía total de su exposición en relación con las PYME.

Asimismo, en el plazo de treinta y seis meses a partir de la entrada en vigor del Reglamento en cuestión, la Comisión informará acerca del impacto de la medida relativa al crédito a las PYME y adoptará las medidas adecuadas, incluida una propuesta legislativa si es preciso.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010735/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Loan refinancing

One of the strategies banks use to reduce the rates of default on loans is to refinance them, as long as they believe there is a possibility of the money being recovered in the medium term. Clients who fail to pay the interest and principal are considered to be in default.

Banks therefore have a particular incentive to refinance large loans, usually to large companies. In terms of safeguarding their balance sheet, it is more practical for them to refinance a single loan for a hundred million than a hundred loans of one million. But this distorts the allocation of credit to the detriment of SMEs.

Would the Commission not agree, therefore, that banks have a greater incentive to lend to large companies than to SMEs?

Does the Commission believe this situation could be improved by amending the legislation?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(14 November 2013)

Depending on the business strategy of the bank or financing institution, these concentrate more on SMEs or larger corporates. Savings and cooperative banks, in particular, have been reliable partners of SMEs during the crisis and continued to support them with financing.

At the same time considerable tightening has been undertaken by banks in their lending conditions for loans to non-financial corporations since the beginning of the financial crisis. The latest available data by the ECB suggest that August 2013 saw the greatest decrease in credit to non-financial corporation in the euro area. The Commission is keeping an eye on these developments.

In the legislative field the CRD IV package, which transposes the new global standards on bank capital (the Basel III agreement) into EC law via a regulation and a directive and will apply from 1 January 2014, will introduce an SME Supporting factor with the purpose of reducing capital requirements on SME loans. The provision is intended to encourage lending to SMEs vis-a-vis other types of financing and investments. The retail exposure limit in order to benefit from the lower capital charges will be equal to EUR 1.5 million so as to cover a larger group of SMEs. SMEs are identified in accordance with the Commission Recommendation of 2003 (i.e. they shall feature an annual turnover of not more than EUR 50 million).

Financing institutions will have to report to competent authorities every 3 months on the total amount of their exposures to SMEs.

Furthermore the Commission shall, within 36 months after the entry into force of this regulation, report on the impact of the measure on lending to SMEs and take the appropriate steps, including a legislative proposal if necessary.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010736/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Tarjeta sanitaria europea en el Estado español

El pasado mes de mayo, la Comisión lanzó un procedimiento de infracción contra España por no aceptar la tarjeta sanitaria europea en hospitales públicos de zonas turísticas y obligar a los pacientes comunitarios a pagar por los tratamientos, que son gratuitos para los españoles. El expediente fue el resultado de las numerosas quejas recibidas presentadas por ciudadanos europeos ⁽¹⁾. La Comisión dio un plazo de dos meses a España para tomar medidas en el asunto.

¿Tiene constancia la Comisión de alguna medida tomada, por parte de las autoridades españolas, para solucionar este problema? En caso negativo, ¿qué medidas piensa tomar la Comisión?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión

(5 de noviembre de 2013)

El 23 de julio de 2013, el Consejo Interterritorial del Servicio Nacional de Salud de España adoptó un acuerdo sobre el acceso de los ciudadanos europeos al sistema sanitario español. Este acuerdo estipula que el sistema sanitario español debe aceptar la tarjeta sanitaria europea (TSE) de aquellas personas que estén aseguradas en otros Estados miembros y no debe exigirles que presenten otros seguros (a excepción de los casos de accidentes de tráfico, laborales o deportivos). Además, el acuerdo establece que aquellas personas que declaren ser beneficiarios de los derechos otorgados por la TSE pero no puedan demostrarlo deberán recibir asistencia, en la medida de lo posible, para obtener el certificado provisional sustitutorio (CPS). No obstante, si el ciudadano es incapaz de demostrar su derecho a recibir la asistencia sanitaria que necesita mediante la presentación de la TSE o del CPS durante una estancia temporal en España, se le cobrará la asistencia sanitaria con arreglo a los precios públicos y se le expedirá una factura detallada.

Este acuerdo se adoptó en respuesta a la carta de emplazamiento enviada por la Comisión en mayo de 2013. En la actualidad, la Comisión está evaluando el acuerdo y su puesta en práctica por parte del sistema sanitario español.

Se remite asimismo al Señor Diputado a la respuesta a la pregunta E-10592/13 ⁽²⁾ sobre una cuestión similar.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europapress.es/salud/noticia-bruselas-expedienta-espana-no-aceptar-tarjeta-sanitaria-europea-20130530134017.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010736/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: European sickness insurance card in Spain

In May 2013, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against Spain for failing to accept the European sickness insurance card in public hospitals located in tourist areas and forcing patients from EU countries to pay for treatments which are provided free of charge to Spanish citizens. The procedure arose from numerous complaints made by European citizens ⁽¹⁾. The Commission gave Spain two months in which to address the situation.

Does the Commission know whether the Spanish authorities have taken any steps to resolve this problem? If not, how does the Commission intend to respond?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(5 November 2013)

On 23rd July 2013 the Interterritorial Council of the Spanish National Health System adopted an agreement for action on European citizens' access to healthcare in Spain. This agreement states that the Spanish health services will accept the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) of persons insured in other Member States and will not (with the exception of road traffic, work or sporting accidents) require the presentation of any other insurance cover. In addition, the agreement states that persons, who declare they benefit from the rights conferred by the EHIC but are unable to prove this, shall, insofar as possible, be assisted to obtain the Provisional Replacement Certificate (PRC). If the citizen is however unable to prove the right to receive necessary healthcare during a temporary stay in Spain by presentation of either an EHIC or PRC, he or she shall be billed for the healthcare according to public rates and issued with a detailed invoice.

This agreement was adopted in response to the Commission's Letter of Formal Notice sent in May 2013. The Commission is currently assessing the agreement and its implementation in practice by Spanish health providers.

The Honourable Member is referred also to the reply to Question E-10592/13 ⁽²⁾ on a similar matter.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europapress.es/salud/noticia-bruselas-expedienta-espana-no-aceptar-tarjeta-sanitaria-europea-20130530134017.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010737/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Phil Bennion (ALDE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Allegations of torture in Jericho Prison in the West Bank

Further to the Vice-President/High Representative's answer to my Question E-004006/2013, I have received further reports that prisoners in Jericho Prison in the West Bank are being severely tortured by Palestinian Authority security services.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of allegations of torture inside Jericho Prison?

Can the Vice-President/High Representative provide the specific date and details of the next meeting of the EU-PA 'Human Rights, Good Governance and Rule of Law' Sub-Committee in order that NGOs can provide specific information and engage with this issue?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 November 2013)

The High Representative/ Vice-President is aware of the allegations of torture recently reported by the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in the United Kingdom and, as stated in the previous reply, detention conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continue to be a matter of concern. The EU raises the issue with the Palestinian Authority each time such reports are received and will continue to do so. The EU also reports on the overall human rights situation in Palestine in the annual European Neighbourhood Policy progress report.

The next session of the subcommittee on 'Human Rights, Good Governance and Rule of Law' is scheduled to take place on 26 November 2013. The EU undertakes consultations with civil society prior to such meetings as a matter of course.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010738/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Tratta di esseri umani negli Stati dell'Africa occidentale

Nel continente africano sono purtroppo ancora tantissime le vittime della tratta di esseri umani, anche se, data la vastità di questo triste fenomeno, appare difficile fornire delle cifre esatte.

Tutti i paesi membri della Ecowas (Comunità economica degli Stati dell'Africa occidentale) si stanno impegnando per ridurre questa piaga che coinvolge milioni di persone nella regione: donne e uomini, adulti e minori.

Secondo le statistiche fornite da alcune ONG, circa dieci milioni di persone che migrano ogni anno da uno Stato all'altro dell'Africa occidentale rischierebbero di finire vittime dei trafficanti di esseri umani.

Migliaia di migranti provenienti da paesi come Togo, Ghana, Guinea e Mali si ritroverebbero a lavorare per 10 ore al giorno nelle miniere del Senegal; vicino ai luoghi di scavo sorgerebbero spesso anche dei bordelli dove le ragazze sono costrette a prostituirsi.

Nel sud della Nigeria le vittime della tratta spesso spaccano pietre per le imprese di costruzione, guadagnando l'equivalente di pochi centesimi di euro al giorno e dormendo dove capita; in Togo, invece, molti bambini lavorano nei mercati, mentre in Costa d'Avorio vengono sfruttati nelle piantagioni di cacao e caffè e in Burkina Faso nelle miniere d'oro o nei giacimenti di altri metalli preziosi.

A rendere ancor più drammatica la situazione ci sono la scarsità di mezzi di cui si lamentano le ONG presenti in loco e l'incapacità, da parte delle autorità locali, di gestire un problema di tale gravità.

Quali misure intende proporre l'Alto Rappresentante per cercare di arginare questo triste fenomeno che sembra riportare nel continente africano lo spettro della tratta degli schiavi avvenuta nei secoli scorsi?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(7 novembre 2013)

L'UE promuove l'attuazione e la ratifica della convenzione OIL n. 182 sull'eliminazione delle forme peggiori di lavoro minorile (che include la vendita e la tratta dei minori, il lavoro forzato e il lavoro che per sua natura, o per le circostanze nelle quali viene svolto, può mettere a rischio la salute, la sicurezza o l'integrità morale).

L'articolo 8 dell'accordo di Cotonou consente all'UE di esprimere regolarmente la sua preoccupazione nell'ambito del dialogo politico su questioni quali la schiavitù e il lavoro minorile e di invitare i paesi ad assumere impegni specifici per affrontare questi problemi, come parte integrante delle strategie dell'Unione in materia di diritti umani per ciascun paese. Nell'ambito dell'accordo di Cotonou vengono finanziati programmi volti a lottare contro il lavoro minorile e a migliorare l'istruzione dei bambini nei paesi ACP.

Sono stati stanziati 26 milioni di euro per un nuovo progetto inteso a favorire la libera circolazione delle persone e la migrazione nell'Africa occidentale in gestione congiunta con l'Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni. Il progetto contribuirà ad ovviare alla mancanza di strategie nazionali globali sulla migrazione e di quadri programmatici dell'ECOWAS e dei suoi Stati membri, nonché a rafforzare l'informazione e la sensibilizzazione a livello regionale in materia di libera circolazione, migrazione dei lavoratori e traffici illeciti. Si sosterranno attivamente le attività degli attori non statali e delle autorità locali volte a informare e proteggere le popolazioni migranti e transfrontaliere, potenziando inoltre le attività di prevenzione, sensibilizzazione e assistenza.

A livello nazionale, l'UE finanzia progetti specifici in Mauritania e in Nigeria, mentre in altri paesi tali questioni sono affrontate nell'ambito di progetti finanziati dall'UE in materia di diritti umani, migrazione, gestione delle frontiere e riforma della giustizia.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010738/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Human trafficking in West African states

It is a sad fact that, in Africa, a huge number of people fall victim to human trafficking, although, given the extent of this distressing phenomenon, it is difficult to provide exact figures.

All the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) are committing to fighting this scourge, which involves millions of people in the region: women and men of all ages.

According to figures from some non-governmental organisations, around 10 million people who migrate from one West African state to another every year risk falling prey to human traffickers.

Thousands of migrants from countries such as Togo, Ghana, Guinea and Mali find themselves working 10 hours a day in the mines of Senegal. In addition, brothels, in which girls are forced to work as prostitutes, often spring up near the pits.

In southern Nigeria, victims of trafficking often break rocks for construction companies, earning the equivalent of a few euro cents per day and sleeping wherever they can. In Togo, many children work in the markets. Children are also exploited on the cocoa and coffee plantations of Côte d'Ivoire, and in the gold and precious metal mines of Burkina Faso.

To make matters even worse, NGOs on the ground complain that there are precious few resources available and that local authorities are incapable of dealing with such a serious problem.

What steps will the High Representative propose in an attempt to tackle this distressing phenomenon, which, in Africa, has echoes of the slave trade of centuries past?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

The EU promotes the implementation and ratification of ILO convention no.182 on the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (which includes the sale and trafficking of children, forced or compulsory labour and work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children).

Art 8 of the Cotonou agreement enables the EU to regularly raise its concern in political dialogue over issues such as slavery and child labour and call upon countries for specific commitments to tackle these problems, as an integral part of our Human Rights Strategies for each country. Under Cotonou programmes fight against child labour and improve education for children in ACP Countries are funded.

EUR 26 million is foreseen for a new project to support the Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa in joint management with the International Organisation for Migration. The project will help address the lack of comprehensive national migration strategies and policy frameworks of Ecowas and its Member States. It will also help reinforce regional information and public awareness in the areas of free movement, labour migration and illegal trafficking. Non State Actors and Local Authorities will be actively supported in their information and protection activities for the benefit of migrant and cross-border populations as well as by strengthening prevention, advocacy and assistance activities.

At national level, the EU funds specific projects in Mauritania and Nigeria, in other countries, such issues are addressed under EU funded projects on Human Rights, migration, border management and justice reform sector.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010739/13

alla Commissione

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Lotta al crimine organizzato nelle aree del sud-est asiatico

Il recente rapporto «Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and Pacific» rappresenta il primo studio completo sulla criminalità organizzata transnazionale in una regione strategica del pianeta.

In base a tale rapporto, appare evidente come i traffici più redditizi gestiti dalla criminalità nell'area riguardino le merci contraffatte, il legname illegale, le droghe e i medicinali contraffatti.

Se la maggior parte delle merci contraffatte giunge — come è ben noto — dalla Cina, il legname esportato illegalmente arriva in Europa prevalentemente da Laos, Indonesia e Myanmar/Birmania, con gravi conseguenze per una regione che vede insieme la maggiore biodiversità del pianeta e il tasso di deforestazione più elevato.

L'altissima percentuale di reati ambientali, con in testa — come detto — il traffico di legname, raramente vede colpevoli certi e perseguiti.

Oltre alle droghe sintetiche e all'eroina prodotte nei paesi dell'Asia sud-orientale, che alimentano fiorenti traffici verso il nostro continente, un'altra seria minaccia è rappresentata dai medicinali contraffatti che invadono i mercati di tutto il mondo.

Tutte queste attività si posizionano molto spesso in aree grigie tra settore pubblico e privato, e i flussi di traffici si sviluppano in parallelo a industrie legittime che operano nel settore farmaceutico, nella produzione di legname o nello smaltimento di rifiuti tossici e scorie pericolose.

Negli ultimi anni l'Unione europea ha compiuto grandi passi avanti per contrastare i fenomeni di criminalità organizzata transnazionale provenienti dall'area del sud-est asiatico; quali ulteriori iniziative intende prendere la Commissione per continuare l'opera di contrasto alle grandi strutture organizzate e alle reti criminali più piccole a queste connesse?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(9 dicembre 2013)

Il riconoscimento dei progressi compiuti dall'Unione europea nella lotta contro la criminalità organizzata transnazionale nel sud-est asiatico viene accolto con profonda soddisfazione.

L'UE fornisce a tale regione un notevole sostegno tecnico e finanziario per aiutarla ad affrontare problemi quali i traffici illeciti (stupefacenti, legname, flora e fauna selvatiche, medicinali contraffatti, ecc.), il terrorismo, le minacce alla sicurezza marittima e i rischi CBRN ⁽¹⁾.

L'UE affronta altresì questioni legate alla criminalità transnazionale nell'ambito del dialogo politico con i paesi della regione, nonché nel quadro dell'ASEAN ⁽²⁾ e nel più ampio contesto del forum regionale dell'ASEAN. Essa sta accentuando, ad esempio, il proprio coinvolgimento nelle pertinenti riunioni intersessioni di tale forum e, di recente, ha intensificato anche le consultazioni tra alti funzionari UE-ASEAN sulla criminalità transnazionale.

Clausole specifiche sulla cooperazione in materia di lotta contro il terrorismo e diverse forme di criminalità organizzata figurano negli accordi di partenariato e cooperazione attualmente negoziati con numerosi paesi della regione o in corso di ratifica ⁽³⁾.

L'UE ha firmato un accordo con l'Indonesia per garantire che soltanto il legname di provenienza legale sia esportato dal paese; accordi analoghi vengono attualmente discussi con altri paesi della regione.

⁽¹⁾ Chimici, biologici, radiologici e nucleari.

⁽²⁾ Associazione delle nazioni del sud-est asiatico.

⁽³⁾ Riguardo, in particolare, ai seguenti paesi: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Filippine, Singapore, Thailandia e Vietnam.

Alcuni paesi della regione del sud-est asiatico partecipano inoltre ad iniziative di cooperazione per far fronte a fenomeni specifici legati alla criminalità organizzata, ad esempio l'Alleanza mondiale contro l'abuso sessuale di minori online ^(*).

L'UE intende confermare e rafforzare il proprio impegno nei confronti della regione per combattere la criminalità transnazionale, compresi nuovi fenomeni come la criminalità informatica. Essa sta esaminando con i partner dell'ASEAN la possibilità di elaborare un piano d'azione specifico sulla criminalità transnazionale.

^(*) All'Alleanza mondiale contro l'abuso sessuale di minori online hanno aderito Cambogia, Filippine e Thailandia.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010739/13
to the Commission
Iva Zanicchi (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Combating organised crime in parts of south-east Asia

The recent report Transnational Organised Crime in East Asia and Pacific is the first comprehensive study of transnational organised crime in a strategic part of the world.

The report clearly shows that trafficking in counterfeit goods, illegal timber, drugs and counterfeit medicines are the most profitable forms of trafficking conducted by criminals in the region.

It is common knowledge that most counterfeit goods come from China, but illegally exported timber comes to Europe primarily from Laos, Indonesia and Myanmar/Burma, with serious consequences for a region that has both the greatest biodiversity in the world and the highest rate of deforestation.

The extremely high percentage of environmental crimes, with timber trafficking chief among them, rarely leads to those responsible being found and convicted.

As well as synthetic drugs and heroin produced in south-east Asian countries, which supply a booming trade in Europe, another serious threat is posed by counterfeit medicinal products that flood markets around the world.

All these activities very often occupy grey areas between the public and private sectors, and trafficking routes develop alongside legitimate industries in the pharmaceutical sector, wood production or the disposal of toxic and hazardous waste.

The EU has made significant progress in recent years in combating transnational organised crime from south-east Asia. What further initiatives will the Commission undertake to continue the fight against large criminal organisations and smaller criminal networks connected to them?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(9 December 2013)

The recognition of the progress made by the EU in combatting transnational organised crime in South East Asia is appreciated.

The EU provides substantial technical and financial support to the South East Asia region to address illicit trafficking (drugs, timber, wildlife, falsified medicines...), terrorism, threats to maritime security and CBRN ⁽¹⁾ risks.

The EU is also addressing transnational crime issues in the framework of political dialogues with the countries in the region as well as ASEAN ⁽²⁾ and the wider ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example, the EU is enhancing its involvement in relevant ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings, and has also recently reinvigorated the EU-ASEAN Senior Officials consultations on Transnational Crime.

Specific clauses on cooperation in the fight against terrorism and different forms of organised crime are included in the partnership and cooperation agreements currently under negotiation with several countries in the region or in the process of ratification ⁽³⁾.

The EU has signed an agreement with Indonesia to ensure that only legally harvested timber is exported from that country; similar agreements are under discussion with other countries in the region.

Countries from the South East Asia region also participate in cooperation initiatives to address specific phenomena related to organised crime, such as the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.

⁽²⁾ Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

⁽³⁾ It concerns in particular the following countries: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

⁽⁴⁾ Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online was joined by Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand.

The EU intends to maintain and develop its engagement with the South East Asia region in fighting transnational crime, including new areas such as cybercrime. The EU is exploring with ASEAN partners the possibility to develop a specific Action Plan on Transnational Crime.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010740/13

alla Commissione

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Impoverimento delle risorse idriche in Europa

Secondo stime recenti un miliardo di persone nel pianeta non avrebbe accesso all'acqua potabile; tra i 3 e i 4 miliardi sarebbero quelle prive di acqua sufficiente al fabbisogno quotidiano; 8 milioni quelle in pericolo di vita a causa di malattie legate all'insicurezza dell'approvvigionamento idrico.

Il problema non riguarda solamente aree da sempre affette da carenze idriche ed anche nel nostro continente l'utilizzo dell'acqua andrebbe sfruttato in modo più efficiente: infatti, l'Agenzia europea per l'ambiente ribadisce come tale problema sia attuale anche all'interno della UE e in particolar modo nei Paesi del Sud.

Le risorse idriche sono in effetti oltremodo sfruttate in molte parti d'Europa: la situazione è in progressivo peggioramento e per questo è importante richiamare i Paesi membri ad un uso più consapevole, gestendo la disponibilità d'acqua con la stessa efficienza impiegata per altre risorse naturali.

Le attività agricole e industriali hanno un forte impatto sulla carenza di acqua potabile e ad esse vanno ad aggiungersi diversi fenomeni legati ai cambiamenti climatici come la diminuzione della portata dei fiumi, l'abbassamento del livello dell'acqua nei laghi e nelle falde acquifere, la scomparsa di aree paludose, con potenziali effetti distruttivi sui sistemi naturali, e di conseguenza, sulla produttività economica.

Nell'Unione europea, secondo i dati dell'Agenzia europea per l'ambiente, sarebbe utilizzato a scopo agricolo circa un quarto dell'acqua che dovrebbe servire all'ambiente naturale, dato questo che può raggiungere l'80 % nell'Europa meridionale. Inoltre, un quinto dell'acqua utilizzata in Europa è destinata alla rete pubblica di fornitura idrica, mentre più di un quarto viene utilizzato per i wc o perso a causa di dispersioni nella falda acquifera.

Quali azioni intende intraprendere la Commissione, dopo l'ulteriore allarme lanciato dall'Agenzia europea per l'ambiente, per fronteggiare il grave problema dell'impoverimento delle risorse idriche in Europa?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(5 novembre 2013)

Nel 2007 la Commissione ha presentato la comunicazione intitolata «Affrontare il problema della carenza idrica e della siccità nell'Unione europea»⁽¹⁾, nella quale è prospettata una gerarchia che permetta di migliorare l'efficienza idrica: la gestione della domanda di acqua dovrebbe occuparvi il primo posto e si dovrebbe contare su metodi alternativi di approvvigionamento idrico soltanto una volta sfruttate tutte le potenzialità di efficienza idrica.

Da tale comunicazione si è profuso in tutta l'UE un grande impegno per dare attuazione alla politica in materia di carenza idrica e siccità, che la Commissione ha riveduto nel 2012 nel contesto dei lavori preparatori del «Piano per la salvaguardia delle risorse idriche europee»⁽²⁾. La revisione ha evidenziato un elevato potenziale di efficienza idrica in tutti i principali settori che utilizzano acqua (agricoltura, industria, reti di distribuzione, immobili e produzione energetica) e ha indicato le misure atte a migliorare la gestione delle acque in Europa.

Tra le misure si annoverano: migliore attuazione degli incentivi e dei prezzi trasparenti dell'acqua (articolo 9 della direttiva quadro sulle acque⁽³⁾), sviluppo della contabilità delle risorse idriche e fissazione di obiettivi di efficienza idrica per le zone sotto stress idrico, promozione dell'impiego di dispositivi che comportano un uso più efficiente dell'acqua, instaurazione in tutta l'UE di pari condizioni riguardo al riutilizzo delle acque, miglioramento dell'efficienza dell'irrigazione con modalità in linea con gli obiettivi della direttiva quadro sulle acque e riduzione delle perdite dalle reti di distribuzione idrica.

La Commissione sta lavorando, in collaborazione con gli Stati membri e i portatori d'interesse, all'attuazione di queste ed altre misure previste dal Piano nel contesto della strategia comune di attuazione della direttiva quadro sulle acque.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2007)414 def.

⁽²⁾ COM(2012)673 def.

⁽³⁾ GU L 327 del 22.12.2000.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010740/13
to the Commission**

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Diminishing water resources in Europe

According to recent estimates, 1 billion people around the world have no access to drinking water, between 3 and 4 billion do not have enough water to meet their daily needs, and 8 million lives are at risk due to diseases associated with water insecurity.

The problem does not just concern areas that have always been affected by water shortages; water should also be used more efficiently in Europe. The European Environment Agency reiterates how this is also currently a problem in the EU and particularly in southern European countries.

Water resources are extremely over-exploited in many parts of Europe: the situation is steadily deteriorating and that is why it is important to remind the Member States to be more aware of their water use, managing supplies as efficiently as other natural resources.

Agriculture and industry have a major impact on drinking water shortages, as well as a number of phenomena linked to climate change, such as reduced river flows, falling lake and groundwater levels and disappearing wetlands, with potentially destructive effects on natural systems, and, consequently, on economic productivity.

According to European Environment Agency figures, agriculture in the EU uses around a quarter of water diverted from the natural environment, and this figure can be up to 80% in southern Europe. Moreover, public water supply accounts for a fifth of water used in Europe, while more than a quarter is used in toilets or wasted due to groundwater losses.

After the latest alert from the European Environment Agency, what does the Commission plan to do to deal with the serious problem of diminishing water resources in Europe?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(5 November 2013)

In 2007 the Commission presented a communication on water scarcity and droughts in the European Union ⁽¹⁾, which put forward a water hierarchy under which water demand management should come first, to increase water efficiency, and alternative water supply options should be relied on only once the potential for water efficiency has been exhausted.

Since then, major efforts have been undertaken across the EU to implement the water scarcity and droughts policy. In 2012 the Commission reviewed this policy during the preparatory process for the 'Blueprint to safeguard Europe's Water Resources' ⁽²⁾. The review showed large potential for water efficiency in all the main water-using sectors (agriculture, industry, distribution networks, buildings and energy production) and identified measures which could improve water management in Europe.

The measures include better implementation of incentives and transparent water pricing (Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) ⁽³⁾), development of water accounts and water efficiency targets for water stressed areas, fostering the use of more efficient water devices, establishing a level playing field for water re-use across the EU, improving irrigation efficiency in ways that are consistent with the WFD objectives and reducing leakage from water distribution networks.

The Commission is currently working jointly with Member States and stakeholders on the implementation of these and other measures presented in the Blueprint in the framework of the Common Implementation Strategy of the WFD.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2007) 414 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2012) 673 final.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 327 of 22.12.2000.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010742/13
do Komisji**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: W sprawie problemów przewoźników towarowych świadczących usługi na trasach UE – Rosja

We wrześniu br. Rosja zamierza wprowadzić niezależnie od posiadanych już karnetów TIR dodatkowe ubezpieczenia dla przewoźników. Według Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej ONZ każdorazowo koszty dla przewoźników mogą wzrosnąć nawet o 1000 euro.

Kolejnym problemem, który może utrudnić ruch towarowy UE z Rosją jest fakt, że od 1 grudnia br. stowarzyszenie AsMAP przestanie być uznawane w Rosji za gwaranta karnetów TIR. Wówczas może zabraknąć podmiotu uprawnionego do wydawania, tym razem rosyjskim przewoźnikom, karnetów TIR. Doprowadzi to do sytuacji, w której rosyjskie ciężarówki na granicy z UE będą poddawane szczegółowym kontrolom.

Działania Rosji uderzą w interesy państw europejskich, a w szczególności w interesy polskich przewoźników, którzy wg Eurostatu w 2011 r. mieli 20 procent udziałów w międzynarodowych przewozach oraz tranzycie międzynarodowym. Polscy przewoźnicy byli również liderami w przewozach na dalekich trasach: od tysiąca km do ponad dwóch tysięcy km.

W związku z powyższym zwracam się do Komisji z następującymi pytaniami:

1. Jakie działania zamierza podjąć Komisja w sprawie narastających problemów przewoźników realizujących zlecenia na trasach UE – Rosja?
2. Czy Komisja posiada plan wsparcia europejskich przewoźników w sporze z Rosją?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji

(31 października 2013 r.)

Komisja zamierza w dalszym ciągu poruszać tę kwestię na odpowiednich szczeblach wielostronnych (np. organów TIR) i dwustronnych, by zagwarantować, że poręczenia TIR będą dostępne w Rosji także po dniu 1 grudnia 2013 r. Komisja uważnie śledzi rozwój sytuacji i podejmuje odpowiednie środki.

Członek Komisji odpowiedzialny za podatki i unię celną, który pozostaje w kontakcie z szefem rosyjskiej Federalnej Służby Celnej (FCS), Andriejem Bieljaninowem, wezwał do odroczenia nowych wymogów z zamiarem ich ewentualnego wycofania. Sytuacja ta była także intensywnie rozpatrywana na szczeblu wielostronnym z Sekretarzem Wykonawczym Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej Narodów Zjednoczonych, Radą Wykonawczą TIR i Międzynarodowym Związkiem Transportu Drogowego. W następstwie tych działań FCS ograniczyła wdrażanie przedmiotowych środków w okręgach celnych Syberii i Dalekiego Wschodu, co de facto odroczy ich stosowanie przy granicy między UE i Rosją do dnia 1 grudnia 2013 r.

Chociaż Komisja będzie w dalszym ciągu aktywnie przyczyniać się do jak najszybszego rozwiązania zaistniałej sytuacji, obecnie nie istnieją programy, w ramach których możliwe byłoby udzielenie wsparcia finansowego poszkodowanym przewoźnikom.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010742/13
to the Commission**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Problems faced by freight companies operating on routes between the EU and Russia

In September this year Russia plans to impose new insurance requirements on transport companies in addition to the TIR carnet. According to the UN Economic Commission for Europe this could cost up to EUR 1 000 for each journey.

Another problem which might further hamper the movement of goods from Russia is the fact that, as of 1 December this year, the AsMAP association will cease to be recognised in Russia as a guarantor of the TIR carnet. This means that there will no longer be a body licensed to issue the TIR carnet to Russian freight companies. This will result in a situation whereby Russian lorries will be subjected to rigorous checks at the EU border.

Russia's actions will have a negative effect on the interests of EU Member States and in particular of Polish hauliers, as these accounted for 20% of international transport and transit in 2011, according to Eurostat. Polish firms also led the field in long-haul transport involving journeys of 1 000 to 2 000 km.

1. What action does the Commission intend to take regarding the increasing problems faced by haulage companies working on routes between the EU and Russia?
2. Has the Commission devised a scheme to support European hauliers in dispute with Russia?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(31 October 2013)

The Commission intends to continue raising the issue at the appropriate multilateral (ie. TIR bodies) and bilateral levels with the aim of ensuring that TIR guarantees remain available in Russia after 1 December 2013. The Commission follows closely the development of the situation and takes the appropriate measures.

The Member of the Commission responsible for Taxation and Customs Union has been in contact with the Head of Russia's Federal Customs Service (FCS), Andrey Belyaninov, and called for a postponement of the new requirements with a view to their eventual withdrawal. The situation has also been actively handled at the multilateral level with the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the TIR Executive Board and the International Road Transport Union. Subsequent to this, the FCS limited the implementation of its measures to the Siberian and Far East customs districts, de facto postponing their application to the EU-Russia border to 1 December 2013.

While the Commission continues to actively contribute to solving the situation as soon as possible, there are at the moment no schemes under which financial support could be made available to affected hauliers.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-010743/13
do Komisji**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(19 września 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Zwiększenie podatku VAT na wyroby medyczne w Polsce

Komisja Europejska w styczniu br. wezwała Polskę do zwiększenia wysokości podatku VAT na wyroby medyczne z obowiązujących 8 % do 23 %. Należy zwrócić uwagę, że w obecnej, niezwykle trudnej sytuacji finansowej szpitali w Polsce zwiększenie wysokości podatku VAT na wyroby medyczne w krótkim czasie doprowadzi do dalszego pogorszenia ich sytuacji ekonomicznej, co w konsekwencji ograniczy dostęp pacjentów do usług medycznych.

Postępowanie Komisji Europejskiej, które skutkować będzie ograniczeniem dostępu do opieki zdrowotnej, stoi w sprzeczności z artykułem 35 Karty Praw Podstawowych, który mówi m.in., iż: „każdy ma prawo dostępu do profilaktycznej opieki zdrowotnej i prawo do korzystania z leczenia (...)”

Pamiętając o kryzysie w polskiej ochronie zdrowia oraz w nawiązaniu do art. 35 KPP, zwracam się z pytaniem, czy Komisja wstrzyma działania zmierzające do wymuszenia na Polsce zwiększenia podatku VAT na wyroby medyczne?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji

(8 listopada 2013 r.)

Polska ustawa o podatku od towarów i usług przewiduje stosowanie obniżonej stawki podatku, wynoszącej 8 %, w odniesieniu do niektórych wyrobów medycznych i produktów farmaceutycznych, niewymienionych w pkt 3 i 4 załącznika III do dyrektywy VAT ⁽¹⁾.

Przepisy dotyczące obniżonych stawek podatku VAT – stanowiących wyjątek od ogólnej zasady, która wymaga stosowania stawki podstawowej w odniesieniu do dostaw towarów i świadczenia usług – muszą być ściśle interpretowane i przestrzegane. Zasada ta jest ugruntowana i została wielokrotnie potwierdzona przez Trybunał, ostatnio w wyroku w sprawie C-360/11 przeciwko Hiszpanii.

Komisja, jako strażnik traktatów, wymaga od wszystkich państw członkowskich przestrzegania przepisów dotyczących podatku VAT, które państwa te same jednogłośnie przyjęły.

Przepisy obowiązujące w Polsce stanowią odejście od tej rygorystycznej zasady, co jest równoznaczne z naruszeniem prawa UE. Dlatego też Komisja w dniu 26 września 2013 r. postanowiła przekazać sprawę do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości na mocy art. 258 TFUE. Komisja zachęca Szanownego Pana Posła do zapoznania się z komunikatem prasowym z dnia 26 września 2013 r. ⁽²⁾.

Co się tyczy skutków finansowych dla szpitali – jakkolwiek stosowanie podstawowej stawki podatku w odniesieniu do sprzętu medycznego lub produktów farmaceutycznych może skutkować wyższymi kosztami dla szpitali, dodatkowe środki uzyskane z podatku VAT trafią do budżetu państwa i mogą zostać ponownie zainwestowane w ochronę zdrowia i budżet szpitali, jeśli taka będzie wola władz Polski.

⁽¹⁾ Dyrektywa Rady 2006/112/WE.

⁽²⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-870_pl.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010743/13
to the Commission**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Increasing VAT on medical devices in Poland

In January this year the Commission asked Poland to increase the rate of VAT on medical devices from the current 8% to 23%. In the extremely difficult financial situation currently facing hospitals in Poland, increasing the VAT rate on medical devices will quickly lead to a further deterioration in their economic situation, which in turn will limit patient access to medical services.

The Commission's action, which will restrict access to healthcare, is contrary to Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states: 'Everyone has the right of access to preventive healthcare and the right to benefit from medical treatment (...)'.

Given the crisis in Polish healthcare, and with reference to Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, will the Commission consider not forcing Poland to increase its VAT on medical devices?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(8 November 2013)

The Polish VAT Law provides for the application of a reduced 8% VAT rate to certain medical and pharmaceutical products which are not found in points 3 and 4 of Annex III of the VAT Directive ⁽¹⁾.

Rules on VAT reduced rates — being exceptions from the general principle that the standard rate applies to the supply of goods and services — have to be strictly observed and interpreted. This principle is established and has been confirmed by the Court many times and recently in a judgment of the EU Court in Case C-360/11 against Spain.

The Commission, as guardian of the treaties, requires all Member States to respect the VAT rules they themselves unanimously approved.

The Polish rules deviate from this strict approach and are thus in breach of EC law. Therefore, the Commission decided on 26 September 2013 to refer the matter to the Court of Justice under Article 258 TFEU. The Commission invites the Honourable Member to see the press release of 26 September 2013 ⁽²⁾.

As for the financial consequences for hospitals, even though the application of the standard rate to medical equipment or pharmaceutical products may make the costs for hospitals higher, the additional VAT will go to the national budget and may be reinvested in healthcare and the hospital budget, if that is the will of the Polish authorities.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 2006/112/EC.

⁽²⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-870_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010744/13
to the Commission**

Emma McClarkin (ECR)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Azodicarbonamide

I have been made aware that the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) proposes to make azodicarbonamide (ADCA) subject to 'authorisation' under REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) regulations. It is my understanding that this is because the ECHA wants to target respiratory sensitisers which can cause industrial asthma.

A constituent company informs me that ADCA is the perfect foaming agent for plastics and rubbers, and is ideal for wall coverings. Making this chemical subject to 'authorisation' has the potential of damaging a number of small and medium-sized enterprises within the UK that have neither the capacity nor the resources immediately to develop alternative foaming compounds.

Can the Commission tell me why ADCA is facing this action, given that adequate risk management measures can ensure that risks in handling it can be minimised, and that when compounded into PVC it presents no risk to consumers? What advice does the Commission have for businesses which will be badly affected by such measures? What is the exact timetable for implementing this decision? What are the estimated costs for companies applying to use ADCA?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(16 October 2013)

Azodicarbonamide ⁽¹⁾ (ADCA) was identified as a SVHC ⁽²⁾ following a proposal by Austria and included in the Candidate List in December 2012 on the basis of Article 57(f) of REACH ⁽³⁾ due to its respiratory sensitisation properties.

The public consultation in accordance with Article 58(4) of REACH on ECHA's draft recommendation suggesting to include ADCA and 5 other substances in the list of substances subject to authorisation (Annex XIV of REACH) ended on 23 September 2013. The final recommendation is expected by early 2014. The Commission will then consider the recommendation with a view to amend Annex XIV in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.

If ADCA is included in Annex XIV, authorisation may be granted for specific uses ⁽⁴⁾ subject to the conditions set out in Article 60 of REACH. Information on the risks arising from the specific use, the technical and economic suitability and availability of alternatives and the socioeconomic consequences of not granting an authorisation will be considered at that stage of the process.

REACH does not require each company to apply individually for authorisation. A downstream user may be covered by an authorisation granted to an actor up his supply chain for that use. Moreover, companies may set up consortia to coordinate and facilitate preparation of applications. Such possibilities reduce the impacts on downstream users and may be particularly advantageous for SMEs.

It is difficult to estimate the costs of an application for authorisation for ADCA at this stage. The final costs very much depend on the level in the supply chain of the applicant and on the number of different uses for which an authorisation will be applied for.

⁽¹⁾ Other name of this substance : azodiformamide.

⁽²⁾ Substance of Very High Concern.

⁽³⁾ Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency.

⁽⁴⁾ For example, the use as foaming agent for plastics, rubbers and wall covering.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010745/13
a la Comisión**

María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)

(19 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Retraso de las autoridades regionales en el pago de las contribuciones financieras aportadas desde la Comisión Europea a las autoridades locales

Al igual que algunas pequeñas y medianas empresas sufren problemas financieros debido al retraso en el pago de facturas de autoridades públicas y grandes compañías, algunos municipios sufren el impago sistemático de los compromisos económicos asumidos con las autoridades regionales. Se trata de compromisos derivados de las contribuciones financieras aportadas desde la Comisión Europea a través de los fondos estructurales (Fondo Social Europeo y Fondo de Desarrollo Regional).

Si en el primer caso la morosidad de las autoridades públicas y grandes compañías provoca el impago a proveedores y trabajadores —y en algunos casos la quiebra de las pequeñas y medianas empresas—, en el caso de los municipios los retrasos en el pago de los compromisos provocan el endeudamiento de los municipios y problemas financieros y de tesorería que van en detrimento de la calidad de vida de los ciudadanos.

En algún caso concreto, como el del Ayuntamiento de Tembleque (Toledo) y otros casi 400 ayuntamientos castellano-manchegos, estos retrasos han producido irregularidades graves al infringir varios aspectos de la normativa comunitaria, como el principio de integridad de los pagos a los beneficiarios previsto en el artículo 80 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1083/2006. Este artículo exige que los Estados miembros velen por que los beneficiarios reciban el importe total de la contribución pública cuanto antes.

¿Qué tipo de actuación puede llevar a cabo la Comisión para garantizar que las ayudas percibidas por la Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla— La Mancha con cargo a los fondos estructurales lleguen a las administraciones locales cuanto antes?

¿Se plantea la Comisión crear una normativa específica para luchar contra la demora de los pagos a los beneficiarios en los proyectos financiados con cargo a fondos europeos y evitar la asfixia que sufren muchos pequeños municipios?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión

(8 de noviembre de 2013)

El artículo 78, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) n° 1083/2006 del Consejo, de 11 de julio de 2006, establece que en todas las declaraciones de gastos que se presenten a la Comisión debe constar el importe total de los gastos subvencionables que hayan abonado los beneficiarios al ejecutar las operaciones, así como la contribución pública correspondiente que se haya abonado o se deba abonar a los beneficiarios en las condiciones que regulen la contribución pública ⁽¹⁾.

La Comisión ha abonado dentro del plazo establecido todas las solicitudes de pago recibidas en relación con el programa operativo del FSE y del FEDER en Castilla-La Mancha, con respecto al cual no existe ninguna declaración de gastos pendiente de pago.

La Comisión no tiene constancia de que se haya producido ningún retraso en los pagos a los beneficiarios de las operaciones del FSE o del FEDER en dicha Comunidad. La Comisión ruega a Su Señoría que facilite cualquier información adicional de la que disponga en relación con el municipio de Tembleque para que así pueda consultarse el caso con las autoridades nacionales. De hecho, tal y como establece el artículo 80 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1083/2006 mencionado por Su Señoría, «Los Estados miembros se cerciorarán de que los organismos responsables de efectuar los pagos velen por que los beneficiarios reciban el importe total de la contribución pública cuanto antes y en su integridad».

La Comisión destacó el efecto negativo del retraso en los pagos en su análisis de los avances sociales y económicos en España durante el Semestre Europeo de 2013. Una de las recomendaciones específicas del Consejo a España fue la de «adoptar medidas para reducir los atrasos pendientes de la Administración, evitar que se vuelvan a acumular y publicar regularmente datos sobre las cantidades pendientes» ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Artículo 78, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) n° 1083/2006 del Consejo, de 11 de julio de 2006, por el que se establecen las disposiciones generales relativas al Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, al Fondo Social Europeo y al Fondo de Cohesión y se deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 1260/1999, DO L 210 de 31.7.2006.

⁽²⁾ Recomendación 1, disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/csr2013_spain_es.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010745/13
to the Commission**

María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Delays in regional authority payments of Commission funding for local authorities

Just as some small and medium-sized businesses are experiencing financial problems as a result of late payments on the part of public authorities and major companies, some local councils are suffering as a consequence of persistent failures on the part of regional authorities to fulfil their economic commitments — in this case involving Commission funding under the structural funds (the European Social Fund and the Regional Development Fund).

Late payments on the part of public authorities and major companies mean that suppliers and staff are not paid, and sometimes drive small and medium-sized firms out of business. Where local authorities are concerned, delays in funding payments plunge those authorities into debt, causing financial and cashflow problems that have a negative effect on the quality of life of the general public.

To give a specific example, for the local council in Tembleque, near Toledo, along with nearly 400 other councils in Castilla-La Mancha, such delays have resulted in major irregularities, infringing various EU rules, such as the principle of the wholeness of payment to beneficiaries as referred to in Article 80 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. That article stipulates that Member States are to satisfy themselves that the beneficiaries receive the total amount of the public contribution as quickly as possible.

What action can the Commission take to ensure that the aid received by the Autonomous Community of Castilla-La Mancha under the structural funds gets to the local authorities as soon as possible?

Is the Commission intending to draw up specific rules to address the problem of late payments to beneficiaries in the context of EU-funded projects and alleviate the severe financial pressure under which many small local councils find themselves?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(8 November 2013)

Article 78(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 provides that all statements of expenditure presented to the Commission must include the total amount of eligible expenditure paid by beneficiaries in implementing the operations and the corresponding public contribution paid or due to be paid to the beneficiaries in accordance with the conditions governing the public contribution ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission has paid in due time all payment claims received concerning the ESF and ERDF Castilla-la Mancha operational programme, for which no statement of expenditure is outstanding.

The Commission is not aware of any delay in payments to beneficiaries of ESF or ERDF operations in the Region. It invites the Honourable Member to provide any further details in her possession regarding the Municipality of Tembleque so it can ask the national authorities about the case. Indeed, as provided for in Article 80 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, referred to by the Honourable Member, 'Member States shall satisfy themselves that the bodies responsible for making the payments ensure that the beneficiaries receive the total amount of the public contribution as quickly as possible and in full'.

The Commission analysis of social and economic developments in Spain during the 2013 European Semester stressed the negative impact of delays in payments. The Council's country-specific recommendations advised Spain to 'take measures to reduce the outstanding amount of government arrears, avoid their further accumulation and regularly publish data on outstanding amounts.' ⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Article 78(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006.

⁽²⁾ Recommendation 1 at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/csr2013_spain_en.pdf

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010746/13
til Kommissionen
Dan Jørgensen (S&D)
(19. september 2013)

Om: Totalforbud mod produktion af »Sødmælkskalve« i EU

Produktion af sødmælkskalve finder trods indførelsen af en række direktiver, der skal forhindre mishandling af slagtekvæg, stadig reelt sted indenfor EU's grænser. Produktionen af sødmælkskalve medfører urimelige lidelser for kalvene og er reelt en form for organiseret dyremishandling.

1. Finder Kommissionen, at de nuværende bestemmelser for beskyttelse af dyr, som udtrykt i Rådets direktiv 98/58/EF af 20. juli 1998 om beskyttelse af dyr, der holdes til landbrugsformål, bilag, pkt. 11, om foder, reelt er overholdt i produktionen af sødmælkskalve, som den finder sted i bl.a. Nederlandene?
2. Mener Kommissionen, at de minimumskrav til sammensætningen af kalves foder, som defineres i Rådets direktiv 2008/119/EF om fastsættelse af mindstekrav med hensyn til beskyttelse af kalve, bilag I, pkt. 11, reelt dækker kalvenes behov for nærings- og fiberrig kost?
3. Vil Kommissionen arbejde for en generel indførelse af nye skærpede minimumskrav til foder til kalve, som reelt opfylder de ernæringsmæssige behov, som en kalv har, f.eks. som udtrykt i den danske lovgivning i form af bekendtgørelse om ændring af bekendtgørelse om beskyttelse af kalve BEK nr. 1075 af 22.12.1997 (gældende) pkt. 10, jf. ændring af § 15, stk. 3?
4. Vil Kommissionen arbejde for et egentligt forbud mod produktionen af sødmælkskalve i EU?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg
(11. november 2013)

Kommissionen ligger ikke inde med oplysninger, der tyder på manglende opfyldelse af dyrevelfærdskravene for foder ⁽¹⁾ i EU's kalveproduktion.

De specifikke foderkrav, som er fastsat i bilag I til direktiv 2008/119/EF ⁽²⁾, sikrer, at kalvene får fiberholdigt foder, og udgør en forbedring af deres velfærd.

På nuværende tidspunkt overvejer Kommissionen ikke at ændre foderkravene for kalve eller at forbyde opdræt af sødmælkskalve i EU.

⁽¹⁾ Rådets direktiv 98/58 (EFT L 221 af 8.8.1998, s. 23).

⁽²⁾ Rådets direktiv 2008/119/EF om fastsættelse af mindstekrav med hensyn til beskyttelse af kalve (EUT L 10 af 15.1.2009, s. 11).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010746/13
to the Commission**

Dan Jørgensen (S&D)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Total ban on the rearing of milk-fed calves

Rearing of milk-fed calves is taking place within the EU in spite of the enactment of a number of directives intended to prevent the mistreatment of animals for slaughter. The production of milk-reared calves involves unreasonable suffering for the calves and is in fact a form of organised animal cruelty.

1. Does the Commission consider that the current animal protection provisions as set out in Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (Annex, point 14, on feed), is really being complied with in the rearing of milk-fed calves as practised in the Netherlands, for example?
2. Does the Commission consider that the minimum requirements for the composition of calf feed as defined in Council Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves (Annex, point 11), really cover the calves' need for a nutritious and fibre-rich diet?
3. Will the Commission work towards the comprehensive adoption of new, stricter minimum requirements for calf feed which really meet a calf's dietary needs as set out, for example, in the Danish implementing order amending the (current) Calf Protection Order BEK 1075 of 22 December 1998, point 10, amendment to para. 15(3)?
4. Will the Commission work towards a genuine ban on the rearing of milk-fed calves in the EU?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

The Commission does not have any indication of non-compliance with the animal welfare requirements for feed ⁽¹⁾ in the EU veal production.

The specific feed requirements as laid down in Directive 2008/119/EC, Annex I ⁽²⁾, ensure that some fibrous feed is given to the calves and represents an improvement for their welfare.

The Commission is currently not considering to amend the feed requirements for calves or to ban the rearing of milk-fed calves in the EU.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 98/58, OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 23.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2008/119/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves, OJ L 10, 15.1.2009, p. 11.

(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010747/13
til Kommissionen**

Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

(19. september 2013)

Om: Maksimumsgrænser for vitaminer og mineraler i kosttilskud

Direktiv 2002/46/EF om indbyrdes tilnærmelse af medlemsstaternes lovgivninger om kosttilskud indeholder bestemmelser om vitaminer og mineraler og om, i hvilke former de må anvendes til fremstilling af kosttilskud. I henhold til artikel 5 i direktivet skal Kommissionen foreslå maksimumsgrænser for vitaminer og mineraler, der kan anvendes i kosttilskud i EU. Elleve år senere venter vi stadig på, at Kommissionen foreslår sådanne maksimumsværdier. De værdier, som producenter og forbrugere skal håndtere, er derfor forskellige fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat.

Kan Kommissionen præcisere, om det er en prioritet at foreslå maksimumsgrænser for vitaminer og mineraler, der anvendes i kosttilskud, og om den har medtaget et sådant forslag i sit arbejdsprogram? I bekræftende fald, hvad er den skønnede tidsplan? I benægtende fald, kan Kommissionen forklare, hvad der bremser processen?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg

(29. oktober 2013)

De omfattende høringer, som Kommissionen har foretaget for at fastsætte de maksimale mængder af vitaminer og mineraler i kosttilskud, har understreget, at emnet stadig er meget kontroversielt. Medlemsstaterne og alle andre berørte parter har givet udtryk for mange divergerende holdninger til sagen.

Derfor er det forberedende arbejde om fastsættelsen af sådanne maksimumsmængder endnu ikke afsluttet, og Kommissionen er ikke i stand til på nuværende tidspunkt at specificere en lovgivningsmæssig tidsplan for de relevante foranstaltninger, der skal gennemføres.

Kommissionen skal henvise det ærede medlem til sine svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-007985/2013 og E-007867/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010747/13
to the Commission**

Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

(19 September 2013)

Subject: Maximum amounts of vitamins and minerals in food supplements

Directive 2002/46/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements defines vitamins and minerals and the forms in which they may be used in the manufacture of food supplements. Article 5 of the directive requires the Commission to propose maximum amounts of vitamins and minerals that may be used in food supplements within the EU. Eleven years later we are still waiting for the Commission to propose such maximum values. As a consequence, the values that producers and consumers have to deal with differ from Member State to Member State.

Could the Commission clarify whether proposing maximum amounts for vitamins and minerals used in food supplements is a priority and whether such a proposal is included in its Work Programme? If so, what is the estimated timeline? If not, could the Commission explain what is halting the process?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(29 October 2013)

The extensive consultation carried out by the Commission in view of setting maximum amounts for vitamins and minerals in food supplements has emphasised that the issue is still highly controversial and many divergent opinions have been expressed by Member States, and all interested stakeholders, in that context.

Therefore, the preparatory work on setting such maximum amounts is still ongoing, and the Commission is not in a position, at this stage, to detail the legislative timetable for the relevant measure to be completed.

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to Written Questions E-007985/2013 and E-007867/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010748/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Caccia ai globicefali nelle isole Fær Øer in Danimarca

Nelle isole Fær Øer, arcipelago situato nell'Oceano Atlantico appartenente alla Danimarca, ogni anno si svolge la Grindadráp, ossia la caccia ai globicefali (denominati anche balene pilota), che comporta, secondo le stime, la morte di circa 950 balene all'anno in nome delle tradizioni.

I fatti sono noti: le barche formano un semicerchio intorno alle balene per condurle a riva costringendole ad arenarsi. È a questo punto che i cacciatori tagliano il dorso delle prede lungo la spina dorsale con uno speciale coltello. Le immagini del mare completamente rosso presso Hvalba sono state ampiamente diffuse.

Il sottoscritto si era già occupato di tale tematica presentando le interrogazioni parlamentari E-006671/2010 ed E-002577/2011. L'opinione pubblica, alcune associazioni ambientaliste e anche altri deputati al Parlamento europeo hanno più volte richiamato l'attenzione su questa situazione con risultati nulli: il 22 luglio di quest'anno circa 400 globicefali sono stati uccisi.

Si è consapevoli che alle isole Fær Øer, in quanto isole semi indipendenti, non si applica la Convenzione di Berna (che proibisce la vendita e lo scambio di cetacei), né la direttiva 92/43/CEE del Consiglio che vieta la caccia di tutte le specie di cetacei.

Tuttavia, considerato che:

- la motivazione alla base della caccia è esclusivamente il rispetto di una tradizione;
- è stato appurato che la carne della balena pilota contiene alti livelli di mercurio estremamente dannosi per la salute umana;

può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. intende assumere una presa di posizione forte nei confronti del premier delle isole Fær Øer;
2. ritiene sia opportuno esercitare pressioni sul governo danese;
3. prevede di sensibilizzare l'opinione pubblica europea e in particolar modo danese sulla protezione di questa specie animale?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(7 novembre 2013)

La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputato alla risposta fornita all'interrogazione scritta E-009528/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html>.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010748/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Hunting of pilot whales in the Danish Faeroe Islands

Every year in the Faeroe Islands, an archipelago in the Atlantic belonging to Denmark, pilot whales are hunted and killed during the 'Grindadráp'. On these occasions, an estimated 950 whales per year die in the name of tradition.

The sequence of events is well known: the boats form a semicircle around the whales to lead them towards the shore, forcing them to beach. At this point, the hunters cut into their preys' backs along the spine with a special knife. Pictures of the sea off Hvalba stained completely red have been widely published.

I have raised this issue previously, in parliamentary questions E-006671/2010 and E-002577/2011. Members of the public, several environmental protection organisations and other members of the European Parliament have drawn attention to this situation on many occasions, but to no avail: on 22 July this year, around 400 pilot whales were killed.

I am aware that, since the Faeroe Islands are semi-autonomous, the Berne Convention (which bans whale trading or selling) does not apply, nor does Council Directive 92/43/EEC, which bans the hunting of all whale species.

The sole motivation for the slaughter is to continue a tradition. It has also been established that pilot whale flesh contains high levels of mercury which are extremely harmful to human health.

1. Does the Commission intend to adopt a strong stance with respect to the premier of the Faeroe Islands?
2. Does it think it should exert pressure on the Danish Government?
3. Does it plan to raise public awareness in Europe, and especially in Denmark, about the protection of this species?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(7 November 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to the recent Written Question E-009528/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010750/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Diffusione delle pratiche di telemedicina e di monitoraggio a distanza del paziente

La telemedicina è una pratica che consente al medico di effettuare la diagnosi di un paziente a distanza, attraverso la trasmissione di dati prodotti da strumenti diagnostici. Un'applicazione molto comune della telemedicina è la «second opinion» medica che consiste nel richiedere una seconda valutazione clinica per un paziente semplicemente inviando a un altro medico i dati acquisiti.

I servizi di telemedicina e di monitoraggio a distanza possono e dovrebbero essere inquadrati nel ridisegno strutturale e organizzativo della rete di assistenza di ogni Stato membro. Infatti, questa tecnologia può apportare diversi benefici quali il miglioramento dell'assistenza sanitaria, consentire servizi di diagnosi e di consulenza medica a distanza, rendere possibile il monitoraggio di parametri vitali, oltre che ridurre il rischio d'insorgenza di complicazioni in persone a rischio o affette da patologie croniche. Occorre anche rilevare che la telemedicina permette di usufruire di un sistema d'interdisciplinarietà sanitaria specialistica, consentendo di accrescere la qualità e tempestività delle decisioni del medico. Il monitoraggio a distanza può consentire di ridistribuire in modo ottimale le risorse umane e tecnologiche tra diversi presidi, consentendo di assicurare la continuità dell'assistenza sul territorio.

Considerato che:

- da numerosi studi emerge che la popolazione sta invecchiando e a tutt'oggi molti servizi rivolti a questa fascia di soggetti devono essere migliorati e tarati sulle loro effettive necessità e possibilità;
- si è registrato un incremento di patologie croniche, come il diabete e le malattie cardiocircolatorie, che necessitano un costante monitoraggio;

può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se intende incoraggiare tale pratica e la sua diffusione nei centri ospedalieri;
2. se ritiene opportuno investire sullo sviluppo di una rete di telemedicina diffusa a livello europeo;
3. quali saranno le indicazioni future per una best practice di questa tecnologia in campo sanitario?

Risposta di Neelie Kroes a nome della Commissione

(4 novembre 2013)

Mediante l'azione 75, l'Agenda digitale europea mira a conseguire un'ampia diffusione dei servizi di telemedicina entro il 2020. Tali servizi sono fondamentali per la cura dei pazienti affetti da malattie croniche, come i pazienti anziani. L'azione 75 dell'Agenda digitale europea contribuirà inoltre al partenariato europeo per l'innovazione nel quadro dell'invecchiamento attivo e in buona salute (EIP AHA), proposto nell'ambito dell'iniziativa faro «Unione dell'innovazione». I gruppi d'azione e i siti di riferimento dell'EIP AHA stanno lavorando per la diffusione delle migliori pratiche. Inoltre, tramite il programma per la competitività e l'innovazione, la Commissione sta finanziando progetti pilota che mirano a dimostrare l'efficacia, l'efficienza e gli aspetti organizzativi per sostenere l'ampia diffusione dei servizi suddetti e la creazione di reti tematiche al fine di promuovere l'accettazione e la conoscenza dei loro benefici tra i professionisti della sanità. Il piano d'azione eHealth (COM(2012)736 e SWD(2012)413) è volto all'elaborazione di azioni strategiche per facilitare la diffusione ed eliminare le barriere allo sviluppo di tali servizi.

La condivisione delle buone pratiche e delle analisi comparative è essenziale per garantire il successo della diffusione della telemedicina e per creare un quadro più uniforme nell'Unione europea per tali servizi.

L'incremento graduale di servizi efficienti di telemedicina potrebbe contribuire a rendere più sostenibili i servizi di assistenza sanitaria, migliorando la qualità della vita e la salute dei cittadini. Tuttavia, l'attuazione di nuovi servizi sanitari deve affrontare alcuni ostacoli (giuridici, di interoperabilità, accettazione professionale, ecc.). Confidiamo nel fatto che la condivisione delle buone pratiche e di altre misure condurrà all'eliminazione di gran parte degli ostacoli entro il 2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010750/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Disseminating telemedicine and remote patient monitoring practices

Telemedicine is a practice which allows doctors to diagnose patients remotely, on the basis of data transmitted by diagnostic instruments. One very common application of telemedicine is in obtaining second opinions. This consists of requesting a second clinical assessment of a patient simply by sending the data acquired to another doctor.

Telemedicine and remote monitoring services can and ought to be incorporated into each Member State's structural and administrative reorganisation of its patient care system. This technology can bring various benefits, such as improvements in patient care, remote diagnosis and consultation services, monitoring of vital signs and a reduction in the risk of complications in vulnerable individuals or those with chronic illnesses. It is also important to highlight the fact that telemedicine provides an opportunity for cross-disciplinary consultation between different medical specialists, thus increasing the quality and speed of doctors' decisions. Remote monitoring can provide an opportunity for a more streamlined distribution of human and technological resources across different hospitals, thus helping to secure continuity of care within the local area.

Numerous studies have shown that the population is ageing and that at present many of the services aimed at this patient group need to be improved and adapted to their actual needs and capabilities.

There has been an increase in chronic illnesses such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease, which require continuous monitoring.

1. Does the Commission intend to encourage these practices and their dissemination among hospitals?
2. Does it believe that investing in the development of an EU-wide telemedicine network would be beneficial?
3. What are the future prospects for establishing best practice for this technology in the healthcare field?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(4 November 2013)

Through action 75, the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) aims to achieve by 2020 widespread deployment of telemedicine services. Telemedicine services are crucial to taking better care of chronic diseases patients, including elderly patients. The DAE action 75 will also contribute to the delivery of the European Innovation Partnership in the field of active and healthy ageing (EIP AHA), proposed under the Innovation Union flagship. Action groups and reference sites of EIP AHA are working on the dissemination of best practice. In addition, the Commission is funding, through the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme, pilots which aim at reporting evidence on effectiveness, efficiency and organisational aspects to support wide deployment and thematic networks in order to increase acceptance and awareness of benefits among health professionals. The eHealth Action Plan (COM(2012) 736 and SWD(2012) 413) aim to provide strategic actions to facilitate its up-taking and breaking barriers to deployment.

Sharing good practices and benchmarking activities are essential to ensure a successful deployment and to provide a more equal telemedicine framework in the European Union.

Scaling up efficient telemedicine services could contribute to more sustainable healthcare services, providing better quality of life and healthier citizens. However, implementing new health services needs addressing certain barriers (legal, interoperability, professional acceptance, etc). We are confident that sharing best practices and other measures will break down most barriers by 2020.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010751/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (PPE)

(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Inquinamento del Mar Mediterraneo causato dai rifiuti plastici

Recentemente è stato realizzato uno studio per cui sono state analizzate oltre 3000 km di tratte marine nel Mediterraneo, osservando i rifiuti in mare per 136 ore. I risultati indicano che la plastica costituisce il 95 % del totale dei rifiuti, di questi i sacchetti e i frammenti rappresentano la percentuale più consistente (41 %). Il dato più allarmante riguarda il Tirreno centro-meridionale con 13,3 detriti ogni chilometro quadrato. Tuttavia non si tratta di un problema solo italiano in quanto l'UNEP, il Programma ambientale delle Nazioni Unite, stima che la plastica rappresenti il 60-80 % del totale dei rifiuti in mare, con punte del 90-95 % in alcune regioni.

Con il passare del tempo si formano dei coriandoli di plastica che vengono scambiati per cibo dalla fauna marina per cui si danneggia l'intera catena alimentare. L'Italia fino al 2010 era il primo paese europeo per consumo di sacchetti plastica (25 % del consumo totale in Europa), ma a seguito dell'entrata in vigore dei sacchetti compostabili ha ridotto sensibilmente tale percentuale.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, la Commissione :

1. intende promuovere presso tutti gli Stati membri il modello italiano della messa al bando dei sacchetti non compostabili;
2. ritiene sia opportuno rafforzare le misure a livello comunitario sulla corretta gestione dei rifiuti;
3. pensa di promuovere progetti o campagne che possano essere mirate alla conoscenza e salvaguardia dei mari, la tutela della biodiversità e la fauna marina?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(21 novembre 2013)

L'impatto più ampio dell'uso e dello smaltimento della plastica è stato oggetto di un Libro verde e di una consultazione pubblica ⁽¹⁾. In risposta a tali iniziative il Parlamento sta elaborando una relazione che dovrebbe essere presentata alla sessione plenaria di dicembre ⁽²⁾.

Il 4 novembre 2013 la Commissione ha proposto una modifica alla direttiva sugli imballaggi e i rifiuti di imballaggio ⁽³⁾, che richiederà agli Stati membri di adottare provvedimenti per ridurre il consumo di borse di plastica in materiale leggero, compresa la possibilità di imporre un divieto. Le modalità di attuazione specifiche di tali misure sono di competenza degli Stati membri, purché siano conformi al diritto dell'UE.

La Commissione ha adottato una serie di misure concrete per migliorare la gestione dei rifiuti a livello di UE, tra cui l'organizzazione di seminari di sensibilizzazione negli Stati membri, l'apertura, in ultima istanza, di procedure d'infrazione e, più di recente, lo svolgimento di seminari di promozione della conformità in materia di gestione dei rifiuti urbani, tenuti anche in Italia.

La Commissione sostiene attivamente numerosi progetti di sensibilizzazione sulla protezione dell'ambiente marino, in particolare tramite lo strumento di finanziamento LIFE ⁽⁴⁾. In tutta Europa il 10 maggio 2014 sarà un giorno dedicato alla pulizia del nostro ambiente. Si auspica che nel quadro di quest'iniziativa sia dato il giusto spazio alle spiagge ⁽⁵⁾. Quest'iniziativa fa seguito anche a una dichiarazione scritta del Parlamento ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/resource_efficiency/news/up-to-date_news/22102013-1_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Relazione di iniziativa di Romano Prodi:

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=COM\(2013\)0123](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=COM(2013)0123).

⁽³⁾ Direttiva 94/62/CEE, GU L 365 del 31.12.1994.

⁽⁴⁾ Per una rassegna dei progetti LIFE riguardanti l'ambiente marino nel precedente periodo di finanziamento, cfr. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/publications/lifepublications/lifefocus/documents/marine_lr.pdf
Un quadro d'insieme analogo è in preparazione per il periodo in corso.

⁽⁵⁾ Per ulteriori dettagli, cfr. <http://www.ewwr.eu/lets-clean-up-europe>.

⁽⁶⁾ PE457.600 del 14.2.2011.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010751/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by plastic waste

A study was recently carried out which examined over 3 000 km of stretches of the Mediterranean Sea, observing marine waste for 136 hours. According to the results, plastic accounts for 95% of all waste, the largest proportion of that being made up of bags and scraps (41%). The most alarming figure concerns the central-southern Tyrrhenian, with 13.3 items of rubbish per square kilometre. However, this is not an exclusively Italian problem since, according to United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates, plastic accounts for 60-80% of all marine waste, rising to as much as 90-95% in some regions.

Over time a kind of plastic confetti forms, which marine animals mistake for food, damaging the entire food chain. Until 2010, Italy was the biggest European consumer of plastic bags (25% of the total used in Europe), but since the introduction of compostable bags, this figure has fallen significantly.

1. Does the Commission plan to encourage all Member States to adopt the Italian model of banning non-compostable bags?
2. Does it think it should strengthen proper waste management measures at EU level?
3. Is it planning to promote projects or campaigns on awareness and protection of the seas, protecting biodiversity and marine fauna?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(21 November 2013)

The wider impacts of plastic waste use and disposal were addressed in a Green Paper on the issue and a public consultation. ⁽¹⁾ The Parliament is preparing a Report in reaction to this which is expected to be presented to the plenary in December. ⁽²⁾

The Commission proposed on 4th November 2013 an amendment to the directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste ⁽³⁾ that will require Member States to take measures to reduce the consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags, including the possibility of banning them. The precise design of such measures is a matter of Member States provided these measures comply with EC law.

The Commission has taken a number of concrete steps to strengthen waste management at EU level, including awareness raisings seminars in Member States, infringement action where this was the last resort and, most recently, the compliance promotion seminars in municipal waste management, including with Italy.

The Commission actively promotes numerous awareness-raising projects on marine protection, notably through the LIFE funding instrument. ⁽⁴⁾ A Europe-wide 'Clean-up day' is planned for 10 May, 2014 which is expected to have a strong beach clean-up element. ⁽⁵⁾ This also responds to a Written Declaration of the Parliament. ⁽⁶⁾

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/resource_efficiency/news/up-to-date_news/22102013-1_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Own initiative report of Mr Prodi:

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=COM\(2013\)0123](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=COM(2013)0123)

⁽³⁾ Directive 94/62/EC, OJ L 365, 31.12.1994.

⁽⁴⁾ For an overview of marine-related LIFE projects in the previous funding period, see:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/publications/lifepublications/lifefocus/documents/marine_lr.pdf
A similar overview is in preparation for the current period.

⁽⁵⁾ For further details, see <http://www.ewwr.eu/lets-clean-up-europe>

⁽⁶⁾ PE457.600 of 14.2.2011.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010752/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(19 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Campagna comunitaria per standardizzazione vaccini e informazione-promozione

In una recente conferenza stampa è stato lanciato un allarme dall'Associazione italiana medici pediatri riguardante l'inquietante propagarsi di propagande anti-vaccini sulla rete.

Visitando un campione di siti dedicati all'argomento, infatti, mediamente 95 siti su 100 risultano essere considerabili «anti-vaccini».

L'importanza dei vaccini come la più potente arma di prevenzione contro le infezioni non è messa in discussione da nessuna istituzione sanitaria nazionale dei paesi membri, ma la riduzione dei casi di malattie infettive dovuta proprio alle vaccinazioni ha fatto calare nella popolazione la percezione del rischio.

Questa percezione non viene certamente coadiuvata dalla mancanza di strategia comune a livello europeo: i vaccini proposti ai bambini nei 29 paesi europei (27 dell'Unione europea, più Islanda e Norvegia) sono 15: alcuni obbligatori per tutti, o solamente per i soggetti a rischio o per fasce di età, altri sono raccomandati o consigliati. In quindici nazioni non esistono vaccinazioni obbligatorie, mentre in altre quattordici ne esiste almeno una. Anche l'obbligatorietà del vaccino è stabilita con provvedimenti legislativi molto diversi da paese a paese (conseguenze penali per i genitori, sanzioni pecuniarie, o difficoltà a frequentare le scuole pubbliche) o può essere molto più mite, con sanzioni solo teoriche e mai applicate, permettendo in pratica l'obiezione e l'adozione di calendari vaccinali alternativi.

Anche i programmi di vaccinazione differiscono considerevolmente: sono diversi i vaccini, il tipo utilizzato, il numero totale di dosi, e la tempistica delle somministrazioni.

Considerata la sempre maggiore mobilità dei cittadini europei e delle loro famiglie, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è possibile intraprendere un'attività regolatoria per stabilire a livello comunitario degli standard minimi di vaccinazione da rispettare su tutto il territorio?
2. Non ritiene opportuno intraprendere una attività mediatica di promozione ed informazione sull'importanza e sicurezza delle vaccinazioni?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(11 novembre 2013)

Una sempre minore accettazione dell'immunizzazione da parte dell'opinione pubblica e l'infondatezza delle percezioni riguardanti rischi e benefici della vaccinazione sono fattori controproducenti per gli sforzi realizzati nell'ambito dei programmi nazionali di vaccinazione e delle attività di coordinamento a livello UE volte a migliorare il tasso di copertura delle vaccinazioni negli Stati membri dell'UE.

L'articolo 168 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea stabilisce che gli Stati membri, in collegamento con la Commissione, sono tenuti a coordinare tra loro le rispettive politiche e i rispettivi programmi nel settore della sanità pubblica. Questo significa che la competenza in materia di politiche e programmi di vaccinazione spetta agli Stati membri, mentre alla Commissione spetta il compito di contribuire al coordinamento dei programmi nazionali di vaccinazione.

Per questo motivo non è possibile intraprendere un'attività regolatoria per stabilire a livello dell'UE standard minimi di vaccinazione da rispettare in tutta l'Unione europea. Tuttavia, la decisione del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa alle gravi minacce per la salute a carattere transfrontaliero prevede la possibilità di coordinare le misure nazionali per far fronte a tali minacce, comprese le misure di vaccinazione come elemento di gestione del rischio. Tale decisione costituisce inoltre la base giuridica per un'aggiudicazione congiunta delle contromisure mediche.

La Commissione coopera inoltre in modo continuo con il Centro europeo per la prevenzione ed il controllo delle malattie su questioni attinenti alla vaccinazione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010752/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(19 September 2013)

Subject: EU campaign for the standardisation of vaccines and information and promotional activities

At a recent press conference, the Italian Association of Paediatricians sent out a warning about the worrying spread of anti-vaccination propaganda on the Internet.

Visiting a sample of websites on the subject reveals that 95% on average are distinctly 'anti-vaccination'.

None of the Member States' national health institutions has ever challenged the importance of vaccines as the most powerful preventive tool against infectious diseases; however, the fall in the number of cases of these diseases (precisely because of vaccination) has weakened the perception of risk among the population.

This perception is certainly not helped by the lack of a common strategy at European level. Across the 29 European countries (27 EU countries plus Iceland and Norway), 15 vaccines are available for children; some are compulsory for all children or only for vulnerable individuals or certain age groups, whilst others are recommended or advised. In 15 of the countries, there are no compulsory vaccines, whilst in the other 14 at least one is compulsory. The legislative provisions enforcing compulsory vaccination also differ widely from one country to the next (criminal sanctions for parents, fines, difficulty obtaining admission to state schools). Some provisions are much milder, with sanctions that exist in theory but are never applied, which means that, in practice, parents can object or adopt alternative vaccination schedules.

The vaccination programmes also differ considerably: there are differences in the vaccines themselves, the types of vaccine used, the total number of doses and the vaccination schedule.

In view of the increasing mobility of European citizens and their families:

1. Can a regulatory process be undertaken that will establish EU-level minimum vaccination standards to be adhered to throughout the European Union?
2. Does the Commission not think it should undertake an information and promotional media campaign on the importance and safety of vaccination?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(11 November 2013)

Declining public acceptance of immunisation and unfounded perceptions of the risks and benefits of vaccination are counter-productive to efforts of national vaccination policies and EU coordination activities to enhance vaccination coverage rates in the EU Member States.

Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves their policies and programmes in the area of public health. This means that the competence for vaccination policies and programmes is with the EU Member States and the Commission's role is to contribute to the coordination of national vaccination policies.

So, no regulatory process can be undertaken to establish an EU-level minimum vaccination standard to be adhered to throughout the European Union. However, the decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats provides the possibility of coordinating national responses to serious cross-border threats to health including vaccination measures as part of risk management. Furthermore, this decision provides a legal basis for a joint procurement of medical countermeasures.

The Commission is also continuously cooperating on vaccination issues with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-010753/13

aan de Commissie

Esther de Lange (PPE)

(19 september 2013)

Betreft: Brandveiligheid in Europa

Ongeveer een derde van de woningbranden in Europa wordt veroorzaakt door consumentenproducten. Door de toepassing van steeds meer kunststoffen in inventaris en het steeds beter isoleren van woningen kan al na drie minuten een niet-overleefbare situatie ontstaan die met een snelle opkomsttijd niet is te compenseren. De prestaties van de brandweer worden enkel afgemeten op basis van opkomsttijden, dus hoe snel de brandweer bij een incident ter plaatse is. Dit is belangrijk, maar enkel sturen op opkomsttijden draagt niet bij aan vergroting van de brandveiligheid. Een situatie waarbij een brand zich soms tientallen minuten kan ontwikkelen alvorens deze gemeld wordt, kan namelijk niet meer worden gecompenseerd met strakke opkomsttijden en snel ter plaatse zijn.

Is de Commissie ook van mening dat een flinke impuls op het gebied van preventie — dus mensen bewust maken wat zij zelf kunnen doen om te voorkomen dat brand uitbreekt — vele malen effectiever is? En waarom wel of niet?

Weet de Commissie welke lidstaten wetgeving hebben op het gebied van normering van brandweeroptreden c.q. effectmeting van de activiteiten van de brandweer?

Welke van deze lidstaten hebben specifieke wetgeving of richtlijnen voor opkomsttijden en voertuigbezetting?

Welke overwegingen liggen aan de betreffende wetgeving of richtlijnen ten grondslag?

Is de Commissie van plan geharmoniseerde brandveiligheidseisen voor in de EU verkochte consumentenproducten in te voeren om de brandveiligheid in alle Europese lidstaten te vergroten? Zo nee waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Mimica namens de Commissie

(13 november 2013)

Krachtens artikel 6 VWEU is de bevoegdheid van de Unie op het gebied van civiele bescherming ertoe beperkt het optreden van de lidstaten te ondersteunen, te coördineren of aan te vullen.

Op basis van deze bevoegdheid heeft de Commissie al in 1999 het communautair actieprogramma voor civiele bescherming ontwikkeld ⁽¹⁾. In het kader van dit programma is een verslag over de preventie van branden en andere ongevallen ⁽²⁾ gepubliceerd.

De Commissie beschikt niet over gedetailleerde informatie over de nationale voorschriften inzake het optreden van de brandweer (inclusief opkomsttijden en voertuigbezetting).

Krachtens Richtlijn 2001/95/EG inzake algemene productveiligheid ⁽³⁾ mogen alleen veilige consumentenproducten in de Unie in de handel worden gebracht. Wanneer de nationale autoriteiten voor markttoezicht brandonveilige producten opsporen, moeten ze de nodige maatregelen nemen en de Commissie en de andere lidstaten via het systeem voor snelle uitwisseling van informatie (Rapex) in kennis stellen ⁽⁴⁾ van de maatregelen om het in de handel brengen en het gebruik van producten die een ernstig risico voor de gezondheid en de veiligheid van de consumenten vormen, te beletten of te beperken ⁽⁵⁾.

De Commissie overweegt momenteel niet om naast de bestaande gezondheids- en veiligheidseisen voor consumentenproducten specifieke geharmoniseerde brandveiligheidseisen voor consumentenproducten in te voeren. De Commissie zal de gezondheids- en milieueffecten van brandvertragers echter blijven beoordelen en ze verwijst naar haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-11339/2012 ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Beschikking 1999/847/EG, PB L 327, blz. 53.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/pdfiles/fire_prevention.pdf

⁽³⁾ PB L 11 van 15.1.2002, blz. 4.

⁽⁴⁾ Overeenkomstig artikel 12 van Richtlijn 2001/95/EG of artikel 22 van Verordening (EG) nr. 765/2008 inzake accreditatie en markttoezicht (PB L 218 van 13.8.2008, blz. 30).

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010753/13
to the Commission
Esther de Lange (PPE)
(19 September 2013)**

Subject: Fire safety in Europe

Approximately one third of house fires in Europe are caused by consumer products. Because more and more plastics are being used in furniture and because homes are increasingly well insulated, it can take as little as three minutes to create a non-survivable situation, which cannot be compensated for by rapid callout times. The performance of fire brigades is measured only in terms of callout times, i.e. how quickly they arrive on the scene of a fire. This is important, but taking callout times as the only criterion does not help to improve fire safety. A situation in which a fire may sometimes develop for tens of minutes before being reported can no longer be compensated for by a swift response and arrival on the scene.

Does the Commission agree that strong action to promote prevention — i.e. to make people aware what they can do themselves to prevent fires from breaking out — is far more effective? And why/why not?

Does the Commission know which Member States have legislation in the field of standardisation of fire service operations or measurement of the impact of fire services' activities?

Which Member States have specific legislation or guidelines concerning response times and vehicle crewing?

What considerations are the legislation or guidelines concerned based on?

Does the Commission intend to introduce harmonised fire safety requirements for consumer products sold in the EU in order to improve fire safety in all European Member States? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mr Mimica on behalf of the Commission
(13 November 2013)**

According to Article 6 of the TFEU, the Union competence in the field of civil protection is limited to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement actions of the Member States.

Based on this competence, the Commission developed already in 1999 the Community action programme in the field of civil protection ⁽¹⁾. Within the programme, a report on the prevention of fires and other incidents ⁽²⁾ was published.

The Commission has no detailed information concerning Member States' rules regarding fire service operations, including fire department response times or vehicle crewing.

The Commission would like to point out that according to Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety ⁽³⁾ consumer products must be safe when placed on the Union market. Member States' market surveillance authorities that have identified, among others, products posing a risk of fire need to take appropriate measures and notify them ⁽⁴⁾ to the Commission and other Member States through the rapid information exchange system (RAPEX), on measures taken to prevent or restrict the marketing or use of products posing a serious risk to the health and safety of consumers ⁽⁵⁾.

Beyond the existing health and safety requirements applicable to consumer products, the Commission is not considering at present the introduction of specific harmonised fire safety requirements for consumer products. It will however continue assessing the health and environmental effects of flame retardants and would like to refer to its answer to Written Question E-11 339/2012 ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ 1999/847/EC OJ L327/53.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/pdfdocs/fire_prevention.pdf

⁽³⁾ OJ L 11, 15.1.2002, p. 4.

⁽⁴⁾ In accordance with Article 12 GPSD or Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 on accreditation and market surveillance, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30.

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-010754/13
till kommissionen (Vice-ordföranden / Höga representanten)
Olle Schmidt (ALDE)
(20 september 2013)

Angående: VP/HR – fallet Oswaldo Payá

Den kubanske politiske aktivisten Oswaldo Payá dog den 22 juli 2012. Enligt officiella rapporter omkom han i en bilolycka, men hans bror, Carlos Payá Sardinas, är övertygad om att han blev mördad. Oswaldo Payá var en stor förkämpe för demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter och yttrandefrihet i Kuba. Genom projektet Varela samlade han in underskrifter för yttrandefrihet och demokrati. Tusentals personer skrev på uppropet och utsatte sig därigenom för trakasserier från regimens sida. Han mottog Sacharovpriset 2002 och nominerades flera gånger till Nobels fredspris. Hans anseende skyddade honom från fängelse men inte från trakasserier. Det finns alltför många obesvarade frågor om omständigheterna kring Oswaldo Payás död. En internationell utredning av "olyckan" är därför nödvändig.

— Kommer vice ordföranden/den höga representanten, Catherine Ashton, att diskutera Oswaldo Payás död nästa gång hon träffar företrädare för den kubanska regimen?

— Stöder vice ordföranden/den höga representanten, Catherine Ashton, kravet på en internationell utredning av Oswaldo Payás död, och kommer hon att göra allt i sin makt för att se till att en sådan utredning utförs?

Svar från den höga representanten/vice ordföranden Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar
(25 oktober 2013)

EU följer människorättsaktivisternas situation på Kuba på nära håll och tar regelbundet upp därtill hörande frågor i sin politiska dialog med de kubanska myndigheterna på alla nivåer.

Krav på en internationell och oberoende utredning har överlämnats officiellt till FN:s råd för mänskliga rättigheter. Nu är det upp till FN:s råd för mänskliga rättigheter att avgöra hur relevant det är att inleda en utredning i ärendet. Den höga representanten/vice ordföranden upprepar sitt svar på fråga E-004347/2013 ⁽¹⁾: EU och dess institutioner förfogar inte över den sortens mekanismer som krävs för att inleda en sådan utredning, men kommer även fortsättningsvis att bevaka situationen på nära håll.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010754/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Olle Schmidt (ALDE)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — The case of Oswaldo Payá

Cuban political activist Oswaldo Payá died on 22 July 2012. According to official reports he died in a car accident, but his brother Carlos Payá Sardinas is convinced that he was murdered. Oswaldo Payá was a great fighter for democracy, human rights and freedom of speech in Cuba. Through the Varela Project he collected signatures calling for freedom of speech and democracy. Thousands of people signed the petition, subjecting themselves to harassment by the regime. He received the Sakharov Prize in 2002 and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize several times. His fame protected him from imprisonment but not from harassment. Too many questions regarding the circumstances of Oswaldo Payá's death are left unanswered. An international investigation of the 'accident' is therefore necessary.

— Will the Vice-President/High Representative Catherine Ashton discuss Oswaldo Payá's death the next time she meets with representatives from the Cuban regime?

— Does the Vice-President/High Representative Catherine Ashton support the call for an international investigation of Oswaldo Payá's death, and will the Vice-President/High Representative Catherine Ashton do everything in her power to ensure that such an investigation is carried out?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(25 October 2013)

The EU follows the situation of Human Rights Defenders in Cuba closely and regularly addresses related issues in its political dialogue with Cuban Authorities at all levels.

A demand for an international and independent investigation was officially submitted to the UN Human Rights Council. It is now up to the UN Human Rights Council to decide on the pertinence of launching an investigation into the matter. The HR/VP reiterates her reply to Question E-004347/2013 ⁽¹⁾, that the EU and its institutions do not have mechanisms at their disposal to launch such an investigation but will continue to monitor closely the situation.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010756/13
to the Commission
Julie Girling (ECR)
(20 September 2013)

Subject: Illegal hunting and trapping of birds in France

It has been brought to my attention that illegal hunting and trapping of the ortolan bunting bird species has been taking place recently in the French *département* of Landes. Volunteers in the region claim to have reported illegal activities to the police and yet no action has been taken.

Following previous correspondence on this issue, could the Commission look into national law enforcement practices in France relating to illegal trapping in order to ensure that adequate measures and penalties are in place?

Secondly, in its response to Written Question E-000347/2013 in March 2013, the Commission stated the following:

'Furthermore, acknowledging that illegal practices affecting bird populations occur in several countries in Europe, the Commission is developing, in consultation with Member States and stakeholders, a list of specific actions to address the problems, covering areas such as monitoring of illegal activities, information exchange and awareness-raising, prevention and enforcement improvements.'

Could the Commission please outline what progress has been made on this issue and what specific measures have been developed?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(6 November 2013)

Given persisting problems regarding illegal killing of the Ortolan Bunting in South-West France, the Commission identified a breach of Article 5 of Directive 2009/147/EC ⁽¹⁾ (Birds Directive), and has initiated an infringement procedure against France in January 2013. The Commission is following up closely this case.

The Commission has undertaken several actions to prevent the illegal hunting and trapping of birds in collaboration with the Bern Convention, BirdLife International and the European Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation. It drafted a Roadmap towards eliminating illegal killing, trapping and trade of birds in the EU ⁽²⁾ further to consultations with Member States and stakeholders. In that context it has asked the EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) to initiate a collaboration of enforcement officials across Member States on the specific issue of illegal killing of birds in the EU, it has organised information sessions for judges and prosecutors, it has gathered and exchanged good practices on measures to prevent poisoning, and it has funded several LIFE projects addressing the problem. Furthermore the Commission supports relevant international action under the Convention on Migratory Species and the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L20 of 26.1.2010.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/wildbirds/illegal_killing.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010757/13
to the Commission
Julie Girling (ECR)
(20 September 2013)

Subject: Commission action regarding bus fares in Malta

In its September 2012 reply to Written Question E-007506/2012, which concerned discrimination between residents and non-residents in Malta regarding bus fares, the Commission stated that it was in contact with the Maltese authorities and was awaiting information regarding Malta's bus fare scheme.

Earlier this year, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Malta, citing discrimination on grounds of nationality.

I understand that the Commission is currently assessing the reply sent by Malta to this formal notice. Can the Commission indicate the status of this assessment, and how and when it expects to see the situation resolved?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(6 November 2013)

The Commission is committed to ensuring that national fare schemes in bus transport do not discriminate against non-resident Union citizens based on their nationality in violation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport ⁽¹⁾.

In this context, the Commission confirms that the infringement proceedings that have been initiated against Malta on 24 January 2013 are still ongoing. The reply submitted by the national authorities is currently under assessment by the competent services. Should evidence of a breach of EC law emerge, the Commission would then take any action deemed appropriate.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p.1.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-010758/13
till kommissionen**

Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)

(20 september 2013)

Angående: Tekniska standarder och upphandling

I sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-007029/2013 säger kommissionen att den behöver ytterligare uppgifter för att fastställa om en valideringstjänst är en tjänst inom kategori A eller B. Den särskilda tekniska standard som kommer att genomföras (SAML2) specificerades dock i frågan, liksom ett klagomål från svenska Konkurrensverket om den felaktiga klassificeringen av SAML2-standardens som en kategori B-tjänst (specifikt "rättstjänst"), när den faktiskt visade många särdrag av en kategori A-tjänst ("teknisk tjänst").

Det framgick också av den skriftliga frågan att den tekniska standarden hänförde sig till valideringstjänsten i fråga.

I vilka fall, förutom tillhandahållandet av en e-autentiseringstjänst, anser kommissionen att genomförandet av en särskild teknisk standard är en kategori B-tjänst snarare än en kategori A-tjänst?

Svar från Michel Barnier på kommissionens vägnar

(11 november 2013)

Kommissionen har förstått att den svenska regeringen överväger att upprätta en nationell myndighet för samordning av statliga och lokala förvaltningsmetoder och tjänster för elektronisk identifiering och signatur. Den svenska regeringens avsikt är att lansera samordningssystemet genom tilldelning av en tjänstekoncession eller koncessioner av myndigheten.

Som kommissionen angav i sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-007029/2013 är tanken att klassificeringen av tjänster i kategorierna A och B ska tillämpas i enlighet med direktiv 2004/18/EG på offentliga kontrakt avseende tjänster, inte på tjänstekoncessioner. Svaret på frågan huruvida sådana autentiseringstjänstekoncessioner ska ses som en kategori A-tjänst eller en kategori B-tjänst är därför irrelevant. Dessutom omfattar klassificeringen A/B olika kategorier av tjänster, men inte tekniska standarder såsom SAML2, vilka kan genomföras på flera olika typer av tjänster. Det är därför inte möjligt för kommissionen att göra en bedömning av framtida avtal utan att känna till alla detaljer.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010758/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(20 September 2013)

Subject: Technical standards and procurement

In its response to Written Question E-007029/2013 the Commission says it needs more information to determine if a validation service is an A- or a B-service. However, the particular technical standard which will be implemented (SAML2) was specified in the question, and a complaint by the Swedish Competition Authorities as to the wrongful classification of the SAML2 standard as a B-service (specifically 'legal service'), when in fact it showed many characteristics of A-services ('technical services'), was also specified.

It was also evident in the Written Question that the technical standard referred to the validation service at hand.

In which cases, other than the provision of an authentication service online, does the Commission consider that the implementation of a particular technical standard is a B-service rather than an A-service?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(11 November 2013)

The Commission understands that the Swedish Government is currently considering establishing a national authority for the coordination of state and local management practices and services for electronic identification and signature. The Swedish Government's intention would be to launch the coordination system through the award of a service concession or concessions awarded by the authority.

As the Commission indicated in its reply to Written Question E-007029/2013, however the classification of services into categories A and B in accordance with Directive 2004/18/EC is foreseen to be applied to public service contracts only, not to service concessions. Answering the question on the status of such authentication service concessions as either A or B services would therefore be irrelevant. Furthermore, the classification A/B addresses different categories of services but not technical standards such as SAML2, the implementation of which may take place in a variety of service contracts. Under such circumstances, it is not possible for the Commission to give a qualification to future contracts of which it does not know all the details.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010759/13
to the Commission**

Stephen Hughes (S&D)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: Commission proposal for new rules to restrict air crews' Flight Time Limitations (FTL) (D028112/02) — safety enhancement clause/Recital 5

The current EU rules on flight time limitations (FTL) are subject to the principle of 'non-regression' or 'safety enhancement', allowing Member States to maintain national FTL provisions that are of a more protective nature.

In March 2013, the Commission shared with Parliament a paper entitled 'Questions and Answers on Air Crew Fatigue'. Question 4 asks: 'Are Member States allowed to apply more protective safety rules under the EASA proposal?' The answer is: 'Yes. According to [...] harmonised aviation safety Regulations replace national rules ... However, national specific deviations may be notified to the Commission or EASA in accordance with the prescribed procedures (Articles 14 and 22 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008)'.

Correspondingly, Recital 5 of the new proposal for a regulation on the subject states that 'Member States may derogate or deviate from this regulation or the related certification specifications respectively, by applying provisions of a level of safety which is at least equivalent to the provisions of this regulation, in order to better address particular national considerations or operational practices'.

Can the Commission confirm that this means Member States may apply, and enforce on all their national operators, provisions of a more protective nature than those of the regulation, where they consider it necessary and provided that all provisions of the regulation are complied with, their level of safety is met or exceeded, and that a Member State's request has been treated in accordance with the required procedures?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

As regards Recital 5 of the draft Commission regulation, Member States may apply and enforce on their operators provisions of a more protective nature than those in the regulation, provided that the Member State's request has been processed in accordance with the required procedures and that it is ascertained that an equivalent level of safety is met or exceeded.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010760/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Arrest of Khalil Almarzooq

Khalil Almarzooq, political assistant to the Secretary-General of Bahrain's Al-Wefaq party and former deputy speaker of the parliament, was arrested two days ago (17 September 2013) on charges of inciting terrorism. Only limited and circumstantial evidence has been presented to support the charges. It is believed he will be held in Riffa Detention Centre for a minimum of 30 days.

The arrest followed a speech he made during an opposition rally in Saar on 7 September 2013. During the speech Mr Almarzooq urged opposition activists to refrain from violence. Al-Wefaq, Bahrain's main opposition group, has continually condemned violence and is a signatory of the Non-Violence Declaration.

Khalil Almarzooq is the first leading opposition figure from Al-Wefaq to be arrested since the opposition crackdown in March 2011. If Mr Almarzooq is not released and if further arrests follow, the moderate opposition may be weakened to such an extent that it is unable to advocate a peaceful approach and dialogue, and hopes for reconciliation will be damaged.

Yesterday Al-Wefaq boycotted national reconciliation talks in protest against the arrest.

The arrest also followed two responses from the international community to the situation in Bahrain — the statement released by the European Parliament last week, which called for 'the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Bahrain', and the joint statement by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Bahrain, which was signed by 47 countries.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this case?
2. Will the Vice-President/High Representative raise concerns about the case with the Bahraini authorities in order to guarantee respect for the fundamental right to a fair trial and an end to all repression of the opposition?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(31 October 2013)

The High Representative/Vice-President follows the situation in Bahrain very closely and will continue to do so.

In a statement of 19 September ⁽¹⁾, the EU expressed its concern over the arrest of Mr Al Marzooq and the subsequent decision of the opposition coalition to suspend its participation in the National Consensus Dialogue. The EU further urged the authorities to ensure that due legal process is fully respected. The HR/VP has consistently stressed that only significant and concrete confidence building steps, including the release of those arrested in the context of peaceful political activities, the respect for freedom of assembly and expression, and commitment to political reform and National Dialogue on both sides, have the potential to restore confidence leading up to genuine national reconciliation.

The EU will continue to advocate for constructive and inclusive dialogue that addresses the legitimate aspirations of all Bahrainis as the only way to promote peace and stability in the country.

⁽¹⁾ Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_cooperation/index_en.htm (in the 'latest news' section), or directly at <https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/statement-by-the-eu-is-following-the-latest-developments-in-bahrain>.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-010761/13

à la Commission

Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)

(20 septembre 2013)

Objet: Protection des paysans contre la répression étatique en Colombie

Depuis plusieurs semaines, des milliers de paysans manifestent dans l'ensemble de la Colombie pour protester contre les politiques menées et les accords de libre-échange conclus, notamment avec les États-Unis, ainsi que pour revendiquer de meilleures conditions sociales et le respect du droit du travail. De nombreux autres secteurs se sont joints à ces réclamations: le secteur de la santé, des transports, des mineurs artisanaux et traditionnels, etc. Selon la résolution du Parlement européen du 13 juin relative à la conclusion de l'accord commercial entre l'Union européenne et ses États membres, d'une part, et la Colombie et le Pérou, d'autre part, le non-respect des Droits de l'homme et des principes démocratiques constituerait une «violation substantielle» de l'accord, ce qui, conformément au droit international public, pourrait donner lieu à l'adoption de mesures appropriées.

Or, depuis le début des manifestations, les paysans ont été stigmatisés par les autorités, accusés d'être au service des FARC. Les manifestants ont été victimes de violations de leur liberté d'expression, et d'agressions et menaces directes de la part des forces de sécurité. La répression a été violente, au moins quatre paysans sont tombés sous les balles de l'armée colombienne et des centaines de manifestants ont été incarcérés — plus de 500 selon les chiffres du bureau du procureur général, sans aucune information sur leur état de santé, tant physique que mentale, et la progression de leur situation judiciaire.

— La Commission est-elle consciente des graves violations des droits des paysans, des peuples autochtones et des syndicalistes commises depuis le début des manifestations? Que compte-t-elle faire face à ces violations flagrantes de la liberté d'expression et de manifestation et face à la détention arbitraire de plus de 500 personnes?

— Dans le plan d'action pour 2010-2014 soumis à l'Union européenne le 26 octobre 2012, le gouvernement colombien mettait en avant l'importance d'enquêter sur les crimes contre les civils ainsi que la protection des citoyens colombiens et des secteurs vulnérables, à savoir les paysans, les syndicalistes et les peuples autochtones. Comment la Commission compte-t-elle réagir face aux demandes des paysans exprimées depuis le début des manifestations et à la violente répression menée par l'État colombien et ses forces armées?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission

(4 novembre 2013)

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante est informée de la récente vague de protestations sociales en Colombie à laquelle l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence et des arrestations qui ont eu lieu dans le cadre de certaines de ces manifestations. La délégation de l'Union européenne en Colombie et les ambassades des États membres suivent la situation avec attention. Dans le cadre du dialogue sur les Droits de l'homme avec les autorités colombiennes, l'Union européenne a déjà indiqué à plusieurs reprises l'importance qu'elle attache au respect de la liberté d'expression, y compris le droit de manifester et de protester pacifiquement. De plus, la délégation de l'UE en Colombie continue de suivre la situation des défenseurs des Droits de l'homme et met en œuvre plusieurs projets d'aide en leur faveur.

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante suit également avec intérêt les débats entre les organisations d'agriculteurs et les autorités et l'annonce d'un certain nombre de mesures qui devraient contribuer à résoudre certaines des demandes formulées par les manifestants («Pacte agricole»). À cet égard, elle souhaiterait rappeler à l'Honorable Parlementaire que le soutien en faveur du développement rural constitue l'un des principaux éléments de l'aide de l'UE à la Colombie. Plus particulièrement, un programme de 40 millions d'euros à financer au titre de l'instrument de coopération au développement (ICD) permettra à l'UE de soutenir la mise en œuvre de la politique de développement rural en mettant l'accent sur la portée territoriale et une approche participative. Ce programme devrait commencer au début de 2014.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010761/13
to the Commission**

Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: Protecting farmers against state repression in Colombia

For several weeks, thousands of farmers have been protesting throughout Colombia against policies implemented by the country's government and the free trade agreements concluded with, among others, the United States. They have also been calling for better living standards and for labour laws to be observed. A number of other sectors, such as healthcare, transport and mining (both artisanal and traditional), have lent their backing to these demands. According to Parliament's Resolution of 13 June 2013 on the conclusion of the Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia and Peru, 'failure to respect human rights and democratic principles would constitute a "material breach" of the TA which, under public international law, could give rise to the adoption of appropriate measures'.

Since the beginning of the protests, the farmers have been the subject of a smear campaign by the authorities and accused of acting on behalf of FARC. Protesters have seen their freedom of expression violated and been subjected to assaults by and direct threats from the security forces. In a violent crackdown at least four farmers were shot dead by the Colombian Army and hundreds of protesters were jailed — more than 500 according to the Prosecutor-General's office. No information has been released about their state of health — either physical or mental — or moves to charge them or put them on trial.

— Is the Commission aware of the serious violations of the human rights of farmers, indigenous peoples and trade unionists that have been committed since the protests started? How does it intend to respond to these blatant violations of freedom of expression and the freedom to protest, as well as the arbitrary detention of more than 500 people?

— In its action plan for the period 2010-2014, which was submitted to the EU on 26 October 2012, the Colombian Government stressed the importance of investigating crimes committed against civilians and of protecting ordinary Colombians and vulnerable groups, such as farmers, trade unionists and indigenous peoples. How does the Commission plan to respond to the demands made by the farmers since the protests started and to the violent crackdown unleashed by the Colombian State and its armed forces?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(4 November 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of the recent wave of social protests in Colombia to which the Honourable Member refers to and of the arrests that took place in the context of some of the demonstrations. The Delegation of the European Union in Colombia and Member States' Embassies are following the situation closely. In the framework of its dialogue on human rights with the Colombian authorities, the EU has already indicated on various occasions the importance it attaches to freedom of expression, including the right to demonstrate and protest peacefully. Moreover, the EU Delegation in Colombia continues to follow the situation of human rights defenders and runs several assistance projects supporting them.

The HR/VP has also been following with interest the discussions between farmers' organisations and the authorities and the announcement of a number of measures that should help answer some of the demands made by the protesters ('Agricultural Pact'). In this respect, they would like to remind the Honourable Member that support to rural development constitutes one of the main elements of EU assistance to Colombia. A EUR 40 million programme to be funded under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) will in particular allow the EU to support the implementation of rural development policy with a territorial focus and a participatory approach. It should start early in 2014.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010762/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(20 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Roma, impianto AMA-Salaria: ulteriori informazioni circa la possibilità di delocalizzazione dell'impianto e tutela dell'ambiente e della salute pubblica

Premesso che, nella risposta all'interrogazione E-001393/2013 relativa all'impianto di AMA — Salaria dell'8 aprile 2013, la Commissione affermava di voler procedere con la richiesta alle autorità italiane di informazioni relative all'applicazione della direttiva VIA (2011/92/UE) nella realizzazione dell'impianto AMA e ai relativi provvedimenti adottati o previsti per garantire che i miasmi provenienti da tale impianto non siano causa di disagi, così come previsto dalla direttiva quadro sui rifiuti (2008/98/CE).

Considerando che, a tutt'oggi, tali miasmi provenienti dall'impianto AMA rimangono persistenti e continuano a causare enormi disagi, con possibili rischi per la salute dei residenti e dei lavoratori dell'area interessata, può la stessa Commissione far sapere:

- quali informazioni ha ricevuto dalle autorità italiane e quali conclusioni ha dedotto dalle informazioni stesse;
- se è a conoscenza di iniziative intraprese dalle istituzioni regionali e comunali competenti, in particolare se sia stata formalmente avviata la procedura per la delocalizzazione tramite il reperimento di una nuova area e dei fondi utili al trasferimento dello stesso;
- quali misure urgenti intende adottare per salvaguardare la salute dei residenti e dei lavoratori dell'area interessata;
- un quadro generale della situazione.

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(6 novembre 2013)

La Commissione ha invitato le autorità italiane a fornire informazioni riguardanti l'applicazione delle direttive 2011/92/UE ⁽¹⁾ e 2008/98/CE ⁽²⁾ nella realizzazione dell'impianto di AMA Salaria.

Dopo aver analizzato le informazioni trasmesse dall'Italia nel maggio 2013, la Commissione ha chiesto alle autorità italiane di fornire ulteriori chiarimenti. La risposta delle autorità italiane è pervenuta il 16 ottobre 2013 ed è attualmente in corso di valutazione.

⁽¹⁾ Direttiva 2011/92/UE concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati (GUL 26 del 28.1.2012).

⁽²⁾ Direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti (GUL 312 del 22.11.2008).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010762/13
to the Commission**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: AMA Salaria plant in Rome: latest information on the plant's relocation; protection of the environment and public health

In its answer to Written Question E-001393/2013 of 8 April 2013 regarding the AMA Salaria plant, the Commission said that it would ask the Italian authorities to provide information to demonstrate compliance with the EIA Directive (2011/92/EU) during the planning and construction of the plant and any measures taken or planned with a view to ensuring that unpleasant odours from the plant do not cause inconvenience, in keeping with the requirements of the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC).

The persistent unpleasant odours from the AMA plant are still causing a great deal of discomfort and may be jeopardising the health of those living and working in the affected area.

— What information has the Commission received from the Italian authorities and what conclusions has it drawn?

— Does the Commission know whether any action has been taken by the regional or local authorities, and, in particular, whether steps have been taken to relocate the plant, by identifying an alternative site and earmarking the funds required?

— What urgent action does the Commission intend to take in order to protect the health of those living and working in the affected area?

— Please can the Commission provide a general overview of the situation.

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(6 November 2013)

The Commission has asked the Italian authorities to provide information regarding the application to the AMA Salaria plant of Directive 2011/92/EU ⁽¹⁾ and Directive 2008/98/EC ⁽²⁾.

Following assessment of the information provided by Italy in May 2013, the Commission has asked the Italian authorities to submit further clarifications. The reply of the Italian authorities has been received on 16 October 2013 and is currently under assessment.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 26, 28.1.2012).

⁽²⁾ Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-011052/13

alla Commissione

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(27 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Scarsa adesione all'UE dell'opinione pubblica turca

Secondo un recente sondaggio pubblicato dalla stampa turca, i turchi sono sempre più tiepidi sull'ipotesi di una futura adesione all'UE, con un 44 % a favore rispetto al 48 % dell'anno scorso e il 73 % nel 2004. Gli europei, tuttavia, sono ancora più freddi, con solo un 20 % dei cittadini UE che vede con favore un possibile ingresso di Ankara, mentre il 33 % lo ritiene negativo.

Visto lo scetticismo da parte tanto dei cittadini turchi quanto di quelli europei in merito all'adesione della Turchia all'UE, può la Commissione europea specificare che cosa in realtà spinge l'Unione, a parte gli aspetti puramente economici, a ostinarsi affinché la Turchia entri a far parte dell'UE?

Non ritiene che debba essere rispettata l'opinione dei cittadini, in primis europei, principio sul quale si dice fondarsi l'UE?

Si apprende inoltre che il negoziato dovrebbe essere rilanciato a breve con l'apertura di un nuovo capitolo.

Può la Commissione specificare quale capitolo sarà aperto?

Risposta congiunta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(19 novembre 2013)

La Commissione è al corrente del sondaggio e segue da vicino le prospezioni dell'opinione pubblica turca sulle relazioni tra l'UE e la Turchia.

Le fluttuazioni nell'orientamento dei cittadini a favore o contro l'adesione di un determinato paese all'UE sono un elemento ricorrente del processo negoziale, come lo è stato anche per altri paesi che hanno aderito all'Unione in passato.

La Commissione prende invece atto dell'impegno strategico delle autorità turche verso l'adesione all'UE, come ribadito di recente dal presidente Gul, che ha affermato, in un'intervista del settembre 2013 a margine della 68^a Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite a New York, che l'Unione europea è «un orientamento strategico» per la Turchia ⁽¹⁾. La Commissione riconosce inoltre che la legislazione dell'Unione europea è stata un punto di riferimento per la preparazione del recente pacchetto sulla democratizzazione, come affermato dal primo ministro Erdoğan e menzionato dalla Commissione nella relazione sui progressi della Turchia presentata il 16 ottobre 2013 ⁽²⁾.

Il 22 ottobre 2013 il Consiglio ha deciso di confermare la posizione comune dell'UE sull'apertura del capitolo 22 «Politica regionale e coordinamento degli strumenti strutturali» con la Turchia e di convocare il 5 novembre 2013 a Bruxelles una conferenza di adesione a livello ministeriale.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-abdullah-gul/p31490>.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-010763/13
aan de Commissie**

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(20 september 2013)

Betreft: Turken willen niet bij EU

Onder de Turkse bevolking neemt het enthousiasme voor toetreding tot de Europese Unie zienderogen af, zo blijkt uit onderzoek van „Transatlantic Trends”. Slechts 44 % van de Turken wil dat het land toetreedt tot de EU. Vorig jaar was dat 48 % en in 2004 nog 73 % ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het onderzoek van „Transatlantic Trends”, waaruit blijkt dat slechts nog 44 % van de Turken — een minderheid dus! — wil dat het land toetreedt tot de EU? Hoe ervaart de Commissie dit?

2. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat de wil van (de meerderheid van) het volk moet worden gerespecteerd en dienvolgens moet worden gehandeld? Is de Commissie er aldus toe bereid te concluderen dat Turkije *niet* tot de EU dient toe te treden en de toetredingsonderhandelingen moeten worden beëindigd? Zo neen, hoe serieus neemt de Commissie de wil van het Turkse volk dan?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie

(19 november 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van deze enquête en volgt de Turkse opiniepeilingen op het gebied van de betrekkingen tussen de EU en Turkije op de voet.

Schommelingen in de steun voor het EU-lidmaatschap van ieder land zijn een normaal verschijnsel dat de onderhandelingsprocessen in het verleden met landen die later tot de EU zijn toegetreden, ook kenmerkte.

De Commissie neemt echter nota van de strategische inzet van de Turkse autoriteiten voor de toetreding tot de EU, zoals onlangs andermaal door president Gül werd bevestigd, die in een interview in de marge van de 68e Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties in New York in september 2013 erkende dat de Europese Unie een „strategische oriëntatie” voor Turkije is ⁽²⁾. De Commissie neemt ook nota van premier Erdoğan's vermelding van de EU-wetgeving als een referentiepunt om het recente democratiseringspakket voor te bereiden, wat de Commissie in haar op 16 oktober 2013 gepubliceerde voortgangsverslag opnam ⁽³⁾.

Op 22 oktober 2013 besloot de Raad het gemeenschappelijk standpunt van de EU over de opening van hoofdstuk 22 (regionaal beleid en de coördinatie van structuurinstrumenten) met Turkije te bevestigen, en op 5 november 2013 in Brussel een toetredingsconferentie op ministerieel niveau te beleggen.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3512641/2013/09/19/Steeds-minder-Turken-willen-EU-lidmaatschap.dhtml>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-abdullah-gul/p31490>.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/strategy_paper_2012_nl.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010763/13
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)

(20 September 2013)

Subject: Reluctance of the Turks to join the EU

Research by Transatlantic Trends shows that enthusiasm for joining the European Union is perceptibly dwindling among the people of Turkey. Only 44% of Turks wish their country to join the EU. Last year the corresponding figure was 48% and in 2004 73% ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is the Commission aware of the research by Transatlantic Trends indicating that only 44% of Turks — a minority, therefore! — still wish their country to accede to the EU? What view does the Commission take of this?
2. Does the Commission agree that the will of the people (or of a majority of them) should be respected and that action should be taken accordingly? Will the Commission therefore conclude that Turkey should never join the EU and that the accession negotiations should be terminated? If not, how seriously does the Commission take the will of the Turkish people?

**Question for written answer E-011052/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(27 September 2013)

Subject: Low level of public support for the EU in Turkey

According to a recent poll published in the Turkish press, the Turks are increasingly unenthusiastic about the possibility of acceding to the EU in the future, with 44% in favour compared with 48% last year and 73% in 2004. Europeans, however, are less enthusiastic still, with just 20% of EU citizens having a favourable opinion of Turkey's possible entry, whereas 33% have a negative view.

Given that the Turks are just as sceptical as the Europeans with regard to Turkey's accession to the EU, can the Commission specify what is actually driving the EU, apart from purely economic factors, to insist on Turkey joining the EU?

Does it not agree that the opinion of citizens, primarily Europeans, should be respected, as a supposed founding principle of the EU?

It appears that negotiations are to be resumed shortly, with the opening of a new chapter.

Can the Commission specify which chapter will be opened?

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(19 November 2013)

The Commission is aware of the poll and follows Turkish public opinion surveys on EU-Turkey relations closely.

Fluctuations in the support for any country's EU membership are a regular feature in negotiation processes, as has been shown by other countries that have joined the EU in the past.

The Commission notes, however, the Turkish Authorities' strategic commitment to EU accession, as recently re-affirmed by President Gul, who acknowledged, in an interview on the margins of the 68th United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2013, that the European Union is a 'strategic orientation' for Turkey ⁽²⁾. The Commission also notes Prime Minister Erdoğan's mention of EU legislation as a reference point for preparing the recent democratisation package, which was mentioned by the Commission in its Progress Report released on 16 October 2013 ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3512641/2013/09/19/Steeds-minder-Turken-willen-EU-lidmaatschap.dhtml>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-abdullah-gul/p31490>

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

On 22 October 2013 the Council agreed to confirm the EU common position for the opening of Chapter 22 on regional policy and coordination of structural instruments with Turkey, and to convene an Accession Conference at Ministerial level on 5 November 2013 in Brussels.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-010764/13

an die Kommission

Gesine Meissner (ALDE)

(23. September 2013)

Betrifft: Unfairer Wettbewerb im Speditionsgewerbe durch Kraftfahrer aus EU-Drittstaaten

In vielen deutschen Zeitungsartikeln wurde in letzter Zeit über „philippinische Billig-Trucker“ berichtet. Hintergrund sind lettische Transportunternehmen, die gezielt philippinische Fahrer anwerben, denen ein geringerer Lohn gezahlt wird als einheimischen lettischen Kraftfahrern. Damit bauen diese Unternehmen ihren Wettbewerbsvorteil durch geringe Lohnkosten weiter aus und können im Rahmen der Kabotage-Regelungen auf dem deutschen Markt noch niedrigere Preise anbieten als bisher. Deutsche Speditionsunternehmen befürchten daher eine weitere Verdrängung aus dem Markt, da sie aufgrund der in Deutschland üblichen Lohnkosten gegenüber osteuropäischen Unternehmen immer weniger konkurrenzfähig sind.

Ist diese Praxis, nach der lettische Transportunternehmen asiatische Fahrer zu günstigeren Bedingungen einstellen als einheimische Fahrer, um auf dem europäischen Markt konkurrenzfähiger zu sein, mit dem EU-Recht vereinbar? Hat die Kommission Vorschläge, wie das deutsche Speditionsgewerbe vor allzu großer „Billig-Konkurrenz“ geschützt werden könnte?

Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission

(28. Oktober 2013)

Staatsangehörige von Nicht-EU-Ländern dürfen als Fahrer beschäftigt werden, sofern für sie eine Fahrerbescheinigung gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1072/2009 ⁽¹⁾ ausgestellt wurde. Diese Fahrerbescheinigung wird nur Verkehrsunternehmen erteilt, die Fahrer nach Maßgabe des Rechts des Mitgliedstaats, in dem das Unternehmen niedergelassen ist, beschäftigen oder einsetzen. Die Voraussetzungen, unter denen Staatsangehörige von Nicht-EU-Ländern in einem Mitgliedstaat arbeiten können, sind in den jeweiligen nationalen Rechtsvorschriften festgelegt ⁽²⁾. Für die wirksame Durchsetzung der Rechtsvorschriften sind vorrangig die nationalen, in diesem Fall die lettischen Behörden verantwortlich ⁽³⁾. Um beurteilen zu können, ob die Beschäftigungsbedingungen dieser Fahrer mit dem EU-Recht im Einklang stehen, sind weitere Informationen erforderlich. Die Frau Abgeordnete wird gebeten, der Kommission alle weiteren sachdienlichen Angaben zu übermitteln.

Sind die entsprechenden Voraussetzungen erfüllt, kann einem Verkehrsunternehmer, der Staatsangehörige von Nicht-EU-Ländern als Fahrer im grenzüberschreitenden Güterverkehr beschäftigt, gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1072/2009 eine Fahrerbescheinigung erteilt werden. Diese Fahrer müssen außerdem weitere Anforderungen erfüllen, die sich aus dem EU Besitzstand im Güterkraftverkehrsbereich ergeben (diese betreffen Lenk- und Ruhezeiten, Fahrtenschreiber, Gewichte und Abmessungen der Fahrzeuge usw.), können aber dann grenzüberschreitende Beförderungen in anderen MS, einschließlich der Kabotage durchführen.

Philippinische Fahrer können dazu beitragen, den Fahrermangel in Lettland zu kompensieren. Berichten zufolge fehlten 2008 ⁽⁴⁾ EU-weit in diesem Sektor rund 75 000 Fahrer.

Die Zahl der Fahrer aus Nicht-EU-Ländern ist nach wie vor unbedeutend. Die Mitgliedstaaten teilten der Kommission mit, dass sie 2012 27 979 Fahrerbescheinigungen erteilt haben (davon 1 130 in Lettland). Ende 2011 belief sich die Gesamtzahl der Fahrerbescheinigungen auf 44 332 (4 020 in Lettland). Da insgesamt rund 4,5 Millionen Lastkraftwagenfahrer in der EU beschäftigt sind, beläuft sich der Anteil der aus Nicht-EU-Ländern stammenden Fahrer auf ungefähr 1 %.

⁽¹⁾ Artikel 5 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1072/2009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 21. Oktober 2009 über gemeinsame Regeln für den Zugang zum Markt des grenzüberschreitenden Güterkraftverkehrs, ABl. L 300 vom 14.11.2009.

⁽²⁾ Artikel 45 und 153 AEUV.

⁽³⁾ Weitere Informationen siehe Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-002254-13:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BWQ%2bE-2013-002254_%2b0_%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2F%2FEN&language=DE

⁽⁴⁾ Mangel an qualifiziertem Personal im Straßengüterverkehr, Europäisches Parlament, 2009.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010764/13
to the Commission**

Gesine Meissner (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Unfair competition in the haulage sector from truckers from outside the EU

Many German newspapers have recently reported about 'low-cost Filipino truckers'. Latvian haulage companies specifically enlist Filipino drivers who they then pay lower wages than local Latvian drivers receive. These companies use the low wage costs to consolidate their competitive advantage and, under the cabotage rules, offer services on the German market at even lower prices than before. German hauliers thus fear that their market share will be squeezed even further, since they are becoming less and less competitive vis-à-vis East European firms as a result of higher average labour costs in Germany.

Are the actions of Latvian haulage companies who employ Asian drivers on more favourable terms than local drivers in order to boost their competitiveness in the EU compatible with EU legislation? What could be done in order to protect the German haulage sector from too much 'low-cost competition'?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(28 October 2013)

Nationals of non-EU countries may be employed as drivers subject to the issuing of a driver attestation in line with Regulation 1072/2009 ⁽¹⁾. These may only be issued to road haulage undertakings employing or using drivers in accordance with the law of the Member State (MS) of registration of the undertaking. The conditions under which non-EU nationals can work in an EU MS are laid down in the laws of that State ⁽²⁾. National authorities, here the Latvian authorities, have primary responsibility for enforcement ⁽³⁾. Further information on the employment conditions of these drivers would be necessary to assess the compatibility of their situation with EC law. The Honourable Member is invited to present any further relevant information to the Commission.

If the conditions are met, a driver attestation may be delivered to the road haulage undertaking employing a non-EU driver to carry out international transport according to Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009. Such drivers must also meet other requirements stemming from the EU road haulage acquis (driving time and rest periods, tachograph, or weights and dimensions of road vehicle etc), but can then carry out international transport operations in other MS, including cabotage.

Filipino drivers may contribute to alleviating a driver shortage in Latvia. Across the EU it was reported in 2008 ⁽⁴⁾ that the sector suffered a shortage of around 75,000 drivers.

Employment of non-EU drivers remains marginal. MS informed the Commission that they issued 27,979 driver attestations during 2012, (1,130 in Latvia). The total number of driver attestations in circulation at the end of 2012 was 44,332 (4,020 in Latvia). Based on this data, as there are some 4.5 million lorry drivers in the EU, the share of non-EU drivers is around 1%.

⁽¹⁾ Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market, OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

⁽²⁾ Articles 45 and 153 of TFEU.

⁽³⁾ For more information, see reply to Written Question E-002254-13 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-2013-002254%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

⁽⁴⁾ Shortage of Qualified Personnel in Road Freight Transport, European Parliament, 2009.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-010765/13

à la Commission

Gaston Franco (PPE)

(23 septembre 2013)

Objet: Liste des espèces exotiques envahissantes préoccupantes pour l'UE

La proposition de règlement relatif à la prévention et à la gestion de l'introduction et de la propagation des espèces exotiques envahissantes (COM(2013)0620), du 9 septembre 2013, s'articule autour d'une liste de 50 espèces exotiques envahissantes préoccupantes pour l'Union, qui sera établie en concertation avec les États membres sur la base d'évaluations des risques et de preuves scientifiques.

Afin d'éviter tout double emploi, il est indiqué à l'article 2 intitulé «champ d'application», que le présent règlement ne s'applique pas «aux organismes nuisibles aux végétaux figurant sur les listes dressées conformément à l'article 5, paragraphe 2, ou à l'article 32, paragraphe 3, ou soumis aux mesures prévues à l'article 29, paragraphe 1, du règlement relatif à la protection phytosanitaire (COM(2013) 267)».

1. Par lequel de ces deux règlements et par le biais de quelle liste la Commission européenne compte-t-elle couvrir la lutte contre le charançon rouge du palmier qui a colonisé l'Europe?
2. Le périmètre d'action et les cofinancements de l'Union liés à la lutte contre ce ravageur seront-ils équivalents dans le cadre de ces deux options réglementaires?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočník au nom de la Commission

(25 octobre 2013)

Le charançon rouge des palmiers est un organisme nuisible qui entre déjà dans le champ d'application du régime phytosanitaire de l'UE ⁽¹⁾. Le règlement proposé relatif aux espèces exotiques envahissantes ne s'appliquera pas aux organismes nuisibles aux végétaux, comme le charançon rouge des palmiers, qui sont soumis à des mesures spécifiques en vertu de la directive 2000/29/CE ⁽²⁾.

Contrairement au régime phytosanitaire de l'UE, le règlement proposé relatif aux espèces exotiques envahissantes n'inclut aucune disposition de cofinancement.

⁽¹⁾ Décision 2007/365/CE.

⁽²⁾ En référence à certaines zones protégées, exposées à des dangers phytosanitaires particuliers dans l'UE, JO L 77 du 20.3.2002.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-010765/13
to the Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: List of invasive alien species of concern to the EU

The proposal for a regulation on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species (COM(2013)0620) of 9 September 2013 centres around a list of 50 invasive alien species of concern to the EU which will be drawn up in cooperation with the Member States on the basis of risk assessments and scientific evidence.

In order to avoid any duplication, Article 2 ('Scope') states that the regulation does not apply to 'pests of plants listed pursuant to Article 5(2) or Article 32(3) or subject to measures pursuant to Article 29(1) of Regulation (EU) No XXX/XXXX [on plant health — COM(2013) 267 final] '.

1. Which of these two regulations and which list does the Commission plan to use in order to combat the red palm weevil, which has colonised Europe?
2. Do the two regulations offer the same scope and the same EU co-financing for action to counter this pest?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(25 October 2013)

The red palm weevil is a pest that is already addressed through the EU plant health regime ⁽¹⁾. The proposed regulation on invasive alien species will not apply to pests of plants which, like the red palm weevil, are subject to measures pursuant to Directive 2000/29/EC ⁽²⁾

Contrary to the EU plant health regime, the proposed regulation on invasive alien species does not include any co-financing provisions.

⁽¹⁾ Decision 2007/365/EC.

⁽²⁾ As regards certain protected zones exposed to particular plant health risks in the Community.
OJ L 77, 20.3.2002.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-010766/13
till kommissionen
Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL)
(23 september 2013)**

Angående: Ojämlika krav på provfordon och körprov för A-behörigheter i EU

Möjligheten att ta körkort ska vara lika för alla, oavsett kön. En svensk undersökning visar att kvinnor satsar mer tid och resurser på körkortsutbildning vid trafikskola och privat övningskörning. Svensk statistik från körprov för MC 2004–2013 visar att kvinnor underkänns i betydligt större omfattning än män. Både antalet och andelen kvinnor som tar MC-körkort i Sverige har sjunkit sedan 2007. Många kvinnor avslutar körkortsutbildningen då de inte klarar av att genomföra körprov på de provfordon som krävs. Samtidigt visar olycksstatistik att det främst är män som dödas på motorcykel.

Under 2012 dök ett förslag upp från EU-kommissionen med nya skärpta krav på provfordon för A (175 kilo och 50 kW), utöver dem som redan finns i det tredje körkortsdirektivet. De nya kraven på provfordon kommer att medföra ännu större problem för kvinnor som är kortare än män. Svenska kvinnor är i genomsnitt 1,64 cm långa och män är i snitt 1,80.

Den nya regeln medför att många lägre motorcyklar med låg tyngdpunkt inte längre duger som provfordon då effekten är under 50 kW. Detta drabbar dem som är korta och får därmed problem att nå ner till marken, till styret och svänga med fullt styrutslag. Sverige hade tidigare viktkrav på motorcyklar (200 kilo) vilket slopats. Det har inte lett till fler MC-olyckor, tvärtom.

Det finns ingen statistisk undersökning som visar att liv kommer att räddas om man kör upp på en mer effektstark motorcykel som väger 175 kilo. Ingen har någonsin sett på frågan ur ett könsperspektiv. Ingen konsekvensanalys har genomförts av förslaget.

Var finns kommissionens beslutsunderlag och konsekvensanalys i frågan?

Vad avser kommissionen att göra åt könsskillnaden för att få A-behörighet?

**Svar från Siim Kallas på kommissionens vägnar
(29 oktober 2013)**

På grundval av kommissionens förslag beslöt Europaparlamentet och rådet 2006 att införa en gradvis tillgång till tunga motorcyklar, inbegripet de vars effekt överstiger 35 kW.

Eftersom provfordon bör vara representativa för den typ av fordon som man har rätt att köra inom en viss körkortskategori utarbetade kommissionen tillsammans med experter från medlemsstaterna kriterier för provfordon i fråga om sådana motorcyklar som parlamentsledamoten avser. Medlemsstaterna röstade för dessa ändringar, som sedan antogs och offentliggjordes 2012. ⁽¹⁾

Dessa tekniska kriterier är objektiva och könsneutrala. Kommissionen känner inte till att motorcyklar i kategori A med en låg tyngdpunkt och en låg sittposition inte skulle kunna uppfylla dessa kriterier.

⁽¹⁾ EUT L 321, 20.11.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010766/13
to the Commission**

Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Unequal requirements for test vehicles and driving tests for A-class licences in the EU

Opportunities to obtain a driving licence should be the same for all, irrespective of gender. Research in Sweden shows that women devote more time and resources to training for driving tests, both with driving schools and in the form of private driving practice. Swedish statistics on motorcycle driving tests between 2004 and 2013 show that significantly more women than men are failed. Both the numbers and the proportion of women obtaining a motorcycle licence in Sweden have fallen since 2007. Many women abandon their driving training because they cannot manage to take their driving test on the required test vehicle. At the same time, accident statistics show that it is mainly men who are killed in motorcycling accidents.

In 2012, a Commission proposal emerged containing new, more stringent requirements for test vehicles for the A category (175 kg and 50 kW), over and above those already contained in the third Driving Licences Directive. The new requirements concerning test vehicles will create even greater problems for women who are shorter than men. On average, Swedish women are 1.64 m tall, while men are 1.80 m.

The new rule will mean that many lower motorcycles with a low centre of gravity are no longer suitable as test vehicles, as they have a power of less than 50 kW. This will create a problem for short people, who have difficulty in reaching the ground or the handlebars and in turning with a full lock. Sweden used to have a weight requirement for motorcycles (200 kg), which was abolished. It did not lead to more motorcycle accidents: on the contrary.

There has been no statistical research demonstrating that lives will be saved if people take their driving tests on more powerful motorcycles, weighing 175 kg. No one has ever considered the matter from a gender perspective. No impact analysis of the proposal has been performed.

Where can the basis for the Commission decision be found, and where is its impact analysis of the proposal?

What will the Commission do about gender differences affecting those who wish to obtain an A-class licence?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(29 October 2013)

On the basis of the Commission's proposal the European Parliament and the Council have decided in 2006 to introduce gradual access to heavy motorcycles, including those that exceed 35 kW.

Since testing vehicles should represent the type of vehicles that one would be entitled to drive under a specific driving licence category, the Commission, together with experts from the Member States elaborated on the criteria of testing vehicles of motorcycles, the honourable Member referred to. Member States voted in favour of these amendments, which were then adopted and published in 2012 ⁽¹⁾.

These technical criteria are objective and gender-neutral. The Commission is not aware that motorcycles of category A with a low center of gravity and a low seating position could not fulfill these criteria.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 321, 20.11.2012.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-010767/13
à Comissão
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(23 de setembro de 2013)

Assunto: Pacote duplo para Portugal

Na sua resposta à pergunta escrita E-008405/2013, sobre «Declarações da Comissão Europeia sobre um possível segundo programa para Portugal», a Comissão Europeia refere:

«Várias são as opções possíveis no que toca à fase pós-programa. Embora seja prematuro especular com qual seria o esquema mais adequado para Portugal, neste momento parece provável que Portugal possa solicitar algum tipo de apoio para facilitar o seu regresso aos mercados. Os instrumentos disponíveis são bem conhecidos. A versão mais leve consistiria numa LCCP concedida pelo MEE. Se Portugal for elegível para um programa TMD do BCE e quiser aproveitar essa oportunidade, terá de optar por uma LCCR pelo MEE. Ambos os tipos de programas implicam uma certa forma de condicionalidade que, no entanto, não seria muito diferente de uma mera supervisão pós-programa, que de qualquer forma será aplicável a Portugal em conformidade com o pacote duplo».

Atendendo a que, até ao presente momento, a troika nunca se referiu a um «pacote duplo», solicito à Comissão informações sobre o referido pacote e as suas implicações em termos de compromissos que eventualmente lhe estarão associados.

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(29 de novembro de 2013)

O pacote de dois atos legislativos («Two-Pack»), que entrou em vigor em 30 de maio de 2013, é aplicável a todos os Estados-Membros da área do euro em conformidade com o artigo 136.º do TFUE. O «Two-Pack» é composto por dois regulamentos, um dos quais (Regulamento (UE) n.º 472/2013) incide na supervisão económica e orçamental dos Estados-Membros afetados ou ameaçados por graves dificuldades no que diz respeito à sua estabilidade financeira, e por conseguinte, dos Estados-Membros que solicitam ou que recebem assistência financeira.

Este regulamento destina-se a alinhar os princípios que regem a concessão de assistência financeira aos Estados-Membros pelo âmbito do Tratado da UE e inclui três pilares principais: disposições relativas à aplicação de uma supervisão reforçada; disposições relativas aos casos de Estados-Membros sujeitos a um programa de ajustamento macroeconómico; e princípios de supervisão pós-programa, por forma a assegurar que os países que tenham estado sujeitos a um programa possam manter uma trajetória que lhes permita voltar a uma posição financeira e orçamental sustentável. O regulamento enumera, nomeadamente, vários cenários possíveis nos quais os Estados-Membros ficariam sujeitos a um desses tipos de «supervisão», os princípios que regem a concessão e a fiscalização da assistência financeira, bem como as condições associadas.

Entretanto, o Regulamento (UE) n.º 473/2013 estabelece disposições comuns para o acompanhamento e a avaliação dos projetos de planos de orçamento e para a correção do défice excessivo dos Estados-Membros da área do euro.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010767/13
to the Commission
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Two-pack for Portugal

In its response to Written Question E-008405/2013 on 'Statements by the European Commission on a possible second aid programme for Portugal', the Commission states:

'There are a number of options that can be envisaged for post-programme arrangements. Although it is premature to speculate which scheme will be the most suitable for Portugal, at the present stage it seems likely that Portugal may require some kind of backstop to facilitate its return to markets. The tools available are well known. The lightest version would be a PCCL by the ESM. If Portugal qualifies for an OMT programme by the ECB and wants to avail itself of this opportunity it would have to choose an ECCL by the ESM. Both types of programmes come with some form of conditionality which would, however, not be very different from post-programme surveillance that will apply to Portugal in any case in accordance with the provisions of the Two-Pack.'

Given that the troika has made no mention to date of a 'Two-Pack', could the Commission provide information on this pack and the commitments that might be associated with it?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(29 November 2013)

The 'Two-Pack' entered into force on 30th May 2013, and is applicable to all euro area Member States pursuant to Article 136 TFEU. The 'Two Pack' comprises two Regulations, one of which (EU No 472/2013) focuses on economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability and, thus, Member States requesting or receiving financial assistance.

That regulation intends to align principles used in providing financial assistance to Member States with the EU Treaty framework and comprises three critical pillars: provisions related to the application of enhanced surveillance; provisions related relevant to cases in which a Member State is under a macroeconomic adjustment programme; and principles of post-programme surveillance to ensure that countries which have been subject to a programme can maintain a path that brings them back to a sustainable financial and fiscal position. Among other elements, the regulation enumerates scenarios under which Member States would be placed under one of these types of 'surveillance', principles related to the provision and monitoring of financial assistance, and accompanying conditionality.

Meanwhile, Regulation EU No 473/2013 contains common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010768/13
προς το Συμβούλιο
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Οικονομική κατάσταση στην Κύπρο και τρόποι αντιμετώπισής της

Σε πρόσφατη συνέντευξη στα ΜΜΕ, ο πρόεδρος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου Μάρτιν Σουλτς, μίλησε για την οικονομική κατάσταση στην Κύπρο, αναφέροντας μεταξύ άλλων:

«Η Κύπρος έχει κυριολεκτικά γονατίσει μετά την απόφαση του Eurogroup για κούρεμα των καταθέσεων και βρίσκεται σε δύσκολη διαπραγματευτική θέση λόγω των οικονομικών προβλημάτων ... στην Κύπρο υπάρχει το εξής πρόβλημα: οι μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις και οι ιδιώτες έχουν αυτήν τη στιγμή αδυναμία πρόσβασης σε δάνεια. Επομένως, οι επενδύσεις στη χώρα δεν είναι δυνατές, εκτός κι αν έρθουν από έξω ... αυτό είναι καταστροφικό, γιατί οδηγεί σε πλήρη αδράνεια της οικονομίας. Θα πρέπει να συζητήσουμε με την Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων γιατί δεν νομίζω ότι υπάρχει καμία άλλη χώρα που να χρειάζεται τόσο πολύ επενδύσεις όσο η Κύπρος».

Επιπρόσθετα, σύμφωνα με εκτιμήσεις της ΠΟΒΕΚ (Παγκύπρια Ομοσπονδία Βιοτεχνών και Επαγγελματιών Καταστηματαρχών), πλείστες επιχειρήσεις αντιμετωπίζουν ανυπέρβλητα χρηματοδοτικά και άλλα προβλήματα, με αποτέλεσμα να έχουν κλείσει άνω του 25% των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων το τελευταίο διάστημα, συμβάλλοντας σε παραπέρα αλματώδη αύξηση της ανεργίας.

Ερωτάται η Συμβούλιο:

1. Συμφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω εκτιμήσεις αλλά και τις ανησυχίες του Προέδρου του Κοινοβουλίου και της ΠΟΒΕΚ;
2. Οι αρνητικές αυτές εξελίξεις ήταν προβλέψιμες και σε ποιο βαθμό λήφθηκαν υπόψη στις αποφάσεις του Eurogroup για την Κύπρο;
3. Έχει η ΕΕ τρόπους να βοηθήσει να αποκατασταθεί η ομαλή ροή χρηματοδότησης στην κυπριακή οικονομία και ιδιαίτερα προς τις μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις;
4. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει η ΕΕ, πέρα από τα όσα περιέχονται στο Μνημόνιο Συναντίληψης (MoU), για να αναστραφεί η καταστροφική αυτή πορεία για την Κύπρο και το λαό της;

Απάντηση
(2 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Στις 25 Μαρτίου 2013, η Ευρωομάδα εξέφρασε ικανοποίηση για τα σχέδια πολιτικής που παρουσίασαν οι κυπριακές αρχές και συμφώνησε με τα μέτρα για την αναδιάρθρωση του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα όπως αναφέρονται στο παράρτημα της δήλωσης της Ευρωομάδας της 25ης Μαρτίου 2013⁽¹⁾. Στο πρόγραμμα αυτό εξετάζονται οι εξαιρετικές προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η Κύπρος προκειμένου να αποκατασταθεί η βιωσιμότητα του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα ώστε να αποκατασταθεί η βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και τα υγιή δημόσια οικονομικά τα επόμενα έτη.

Στη δήλωσή της στις 13 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013, η ευρωομάδα εξέφρασε την ικανοποίησή της για το ότι οι κυπριακές αρχές επρόκειτο να συνεχίσουν να ελαφρύνουν σταδιακά τα διοικητικά μέτρα που είχαν τεθεί σε ισχύ για την μοναδική και εξαιρετική συγκυρία του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα της Κύπρου, και έκρινε ότι η περαιτέρω ελάφρυνση θα ευθυγραμμίζεται με το χάρτη πορείας των εργασιών της 8ης Αυγούστου 2013.

Σύμφωνα με την εκτελεστική απόφαση του Συμβουλίου 2013/463/ΕΕ της 13ης Σεπτεμβρίου 2013 για την έγκριση προγράμματος μακροοικονομικής σταθερότητας για την Κύπρο και την κατάργηση της απόφασης 2013/236/ΕΕ⁽²⁾, η Κύπρος «συνεχίζει την ορδή εφαρμογή των διαρθρωτικών ταμείων και άλλων ταμείων της ΕΕ, τηρώντας τους δημοσιονομικούς στόχους του προγράμματος. Για να εξασφαλισθεί η αποτελεσματική χρήση των ταμείων της ΕΕ, η κυπριακή κυβέρνηση εξασφαλίζει ότι εξακολουθούν να είναι διαθέσιμα τα αναγκαία εθνικά κεφάλαια για την κάλυψη των εθνικών συνεισφορών, περιλαμβανομένων των μη επιλέξιμων δαπανών, στο πλαίσιο των ευρωπαϊκών διαρθρωτικών και επενδυτικών ταμείων (ΕΤΠΑ, ΕΚΤ, Ταμείο Συνοχής, ΕΓΤΑΑ και ΕΤΑ/ΕΤΘΑ) για τις περιόδους προγραμματισμού 2007-2013 και 2014-2020, λαμβάνοντας παράλληλα υπόψη τη διαθέσιμη χρηματοδότηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Τράπεζας Επενδύσεων (ΕΤΕπ)».

⁽¹⁾ Οι δηλώσεις της Ευρωομάδας είναι διαθέσιμες στην ηλεκτρονική διεύθυνση: <http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/eurogroup>

⁽²⁾ ΕΕ L 250 της 20.9.2013, σ. 40.

Η ΕΤΕπ αξιολογεί, από κοινού με τις αρχές της Κύπρου, λύσεις προς υποστήριξη των επενδύσεων προτεραιότητας που θα συγχρηματοδοτηθούν από τα Ευρωπαϊκά διαρθρωτικά και επενδυτικά ταμεία τα επόμενα έτη.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010768/13
to the Council**

Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Economic situation in Cyprus and ways of addressing it

In a recent press conference, European Parliament President Martin Schulz spoke of the economic situation in Cyprus and said, among other things:

'Cyprus has literally been brought to its knees by the Eurogroup bail-in decision and is in a difficult negotiating position as a result of its economic problems. The following problems exist in Cyprus: small and medium-sized enterprises and private individuals have no access to loans at the moment. Thus investment in the country is not possible, unless it comes from outside ... this is catastrophic, because it causes the economy to come to a complete halt. We must talk with the European Investment Bank, because I do not think there is any other country that needs investments as badly as Cyprus'.

Furthermore, according to an assessment by the Cypriot Federation of Craftsmen and Retailers (POBEK), many businesses face insurmountable borrowing and other problems and, as a result, more than 25% of small and medium-sized enterprises have recently gone out of business, thereby making a further contribution to spiralling unemployment.

In view of the above, will the Council say:

1. Does it agree with the above assessment and the concerns of the President of the European Parliament and POBEK?
2. Were these negative developments foreseeable and to what extent were they taken into account in the Eurogroup decisions on Cyprus?
3. Does the EU have ways to help restore the flow of money into the Cypriot economy, especially to small and medium-sized businesses?
4. What does the EU intend to do, other than what is included in the memorandum of understanding (MoU), to reverse this catastrophic development for Cyprus and its people?

Reply

(2 December 2013)

On 25 March 2013, the Eurogroup welcomed the policy plans presented by the Cyprus authorities and agreed to the measures for restructuring the financial sector as specified in the annex to its statement of 25 March 2013 ⁽¹⁾. The programme addresses the exceptional challenges that Cyprus is facing and restores the viability of the financial sector with the view of restoring sustainable growth and sound public finances over the coming years.

In its statement of 13 September 2013, the Eurogroup welcomed the fact that the Cyprus authorities would continue to gradually relax the administrative measures that had been put in place in view of the unique and exceptional situation of Cyprus' financial sector, and considered that further relaxation would be in line with the roadmap of 8 August 2013.

According to Council Implementing Decision 2013/463/EU of 13 September 2013 on approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus and repealing Decision 2013/236/EU ⁽²⁾, Cyprus 'shall preserve the good implementation of Structural and other EU Funds, in respect of the programme's budgetary targets. In order to ensure the effective implementation of EU funds, the Cypriot Government shall ensure that the necessary national funds remain available to cover national contributions, including non-eligible expenditure, under the European Structural and Investment Funds in the framework of the 2007-13 and 2014-20 programme periods, while taking into account available European Investment Bank (EIB) funding'.

The EIB is evaluating, jointly with the Cyprus authorities, solutions to support priority investments to be co-financed by European Structural and Investment Funds over the coming years.

⁽¹⁾ Eurogroup statements can be found at <http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/eurogroup>

⁽²⁾ OJ L 250, 20.9.2013, p. 40.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010769/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)

(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Οικονομική κατάσταση στην Κύπρο και τρόποι αντιμετώπισής της

Σε πρόσφατη συνέντευξη στα ΜΜΕ, ο πρόεδρος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου Μάρτιν Σουλτς, μίλησε για την οικονομική κατάσταση στην Κύπρο, αναφέροντας μεταξύ άλλων:

«Η Κύπρος έχει κυριολεκτικά γονατίσει μετά την απόφαση του Eurogroup για κούρεμα των καταθέσεων και βρίσκεται σε δύσκολη διαπραγματευτική θέση λόγω των οικονομικών προβλημάτων ... στην Κύπρο υπάρχει το εξής πρόβλημα: οι μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις και οι ιδιώτες έχουν αυτήν τη στιγμή αδυναμία πρόσβασης σε δάνεια. Επομένως, οι επενδύσεις στη χώρα δεν είναι δυνατές, εκτός κι αν έρθουν από έξω ... αυτό είναι καταστροφικό, γιατί οδηγεί σε πλήρη αδράνεια της οικονομίας. Θα πρέπει να συζητήσουμε με την Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων γιατί δεν νομίζω ότι υπάρχει καμία άλλη χώρα που να χρειάζεται τόσο πολύ επενδύσεις όσο η Κύπρος.»

Επιπρόσθετα, σύμφωνα με εκτιμήσεις της ΠΟΒΕΚ (Παγκύπρια Ομοσπονδία Βιοτεχνών και Επαγγελματιών Καταστηματαρχών), πλείστες επιχειρήσεις αντιμετωπίζουν ανυπέρβλητα χρηματοδοτικά και άλλα προβλήματα, με αποτέλεσμα να έχουν κλείσει άνω του 25% των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων το τελευταίο διάστημα, συμβάλλοντας σε παραπέρα αλματώδη αύξηση της ανεργίας.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Συμφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω εκτιμήσεις αλλά και τις ανησυχίες του Προέδρου του Κοινοβουλίου και της ΠΟΒΕΚ;
2. Οι αρνητικές αυτές εξελίξεις ήταν προβλέψιμες και σε ποιο βαθμό λήφθηκαν υπόψη στις αποφάσεις του Eurogroup για την Κύπρο;
3. Έχει η ΕΕ τρόπους να βοηθήσει να αποκατασταθεί η ομαλή ροή χρηματοδότησης στην κυπριακή οικονομία και ιδιαίτερα προς τις μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις;
4. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει η ΕΕ, πέρα από τα όσα περιέχονται στο Μνημόνιο Συναντίληψης (MoU), για να αναστραφεί η καταστροφική αυτή πορεία για την Κύπρο και το λαό της;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(12 Νοεμβρίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή είναι ενήμερη σχετικά με τη φθίνουσα οικονομική δραστηριότητα στην Κύπρο.

Προκειμένου να ανταποκριθούν στις οικονομικές προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η χώρα, οι κυπριακές αρχές έχουν προτείνει ένα πολυετές πρόγραμμα μεταρρυθμίσεων. Στόχοι του εν λόγω προγράμματος είναι η σταθεροποίηση του χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος και η επίτευξη δημοσιονομικής διατηρησιμότητας ώστε να τεθούν τα θεμέλια της οικονομικής ανάπτυξης.

Η Επιτροπή είναι στο πλευρό της Κύπρου και του κυπριακού λαού, παρέχοντας βοήθεια για την αποκατάσταση της χρηματοπιστωτικής σταθερότητας, της δημοσιονομικής διατηρησιμότητας, της ανάπτυξης της χώρας και της ευημερίας των πολιτών της. Τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της ΕΕ (συμπεριλαμβανομένου του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινωνικού Ταμείου, του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης και του Ταμείου Συνοχής) έχουν επίσης ενεργοποιηθεί για τον σκοπό αυτό.

Για την τρέχουσα περίοδο προγραμματισμού 2007-2013, χορηγήθηκε προσαύξηση της τάξεως του 10% με την οποία το ποσοστό συγχρηματοδότησης αυξάνεται από 85% σε 95%. Για την επόμενη περίοδο προγραμματισμού, οι τριμερείς συζητήσεις συνεχίζονται. Αναγνωρίζοντας την κρίσιμη κατάσταση στην Κύπρο, το Συμβούλιο της ΕΕ αποφάσισε να προβλέψει συμπληρωματικό ποσό 100 εκατ. ευρώ στον προϋπολογισμό του 2014. Αντίστοιχο ποσό θα περιλαμβάνεται στον προϋπολογισμό του 2015.

Η Κύπρος λαμβάνει επίσης στήριξη από την ΕΤΕπ ιδίως στους τομείς της ενέργειας, της ύδρευσης/αποχέτευσης και της χρηματοδότησης των ΜΜΕ. Το 2013 η ΕΤΕπ υπέγραψε δάνειο ύψους 100 εκατ. ευρώ για τη στήριξη διαφόρων προγραμμάτων που συγχρηματοδοτούνται από τα ταμεία της ΕΕ. Η τράπεζα ετοιμάζει επίσης την δρομολόγηση ενός προγράμματος χρηματοδοτικής διευκόλυνσης εμπορίου, ύψους 150 εκατ. ευρώ, που θα επικεντρώνεται στις ΜΜΕ και τις εταιρίες μεσαίας κεφαλαιοποίησης.

Στο πλαίσιο της επόμενης περιόδου προγραμματισμού, η ΕΤΕπ αξιολογεί, από κοινού με τις κυπριακές αρχές, λύσεις για τη στήριξη επενδύσεων προτεραιότητας που συγχρηματοδοτούνται από τα ταμεία της ΕΕ.

Η Επιτροπή έχει συγκροτήσει ομάδα στήριξης για την Κύπρο, η οποία συνεργάζεται στενά με τις κυπριακές αρχές και παρέχει τεχνική εμπειρογνωσία.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010769/13
to the Commission**

Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Economic situation in Cyprus and ways of addressing it

In a recent press conference, European Parliament President Martin Schulz spoke of the economic situation in Cyprus and said, among other things:

‘Cyprus has literally been brought to its knees by the Eurogroup bail-in decision and is in a difficult negotiating position as a result of its economic problems. The following problems exist in Cyprus: small and medium-sized enterprises and private individuals have no access to loans at the moment. Thus investment in the country is not possible, unless it comes from outside ... this is catastrophic, because it causes the economy to come to a complete halt. We must talk with the European Investment Bank, because I do not think there is any other country that needs investments as badly as Cyprus’.

Furthermore, according to an assessment by the Cypriot Federation of Craftsmen and Retailers (POBEK), many businesses face insurmountable borrowing and other problems and, as a result, more than 25% of small and medium-sized enterprises have recently gone out of business, thereby making a further contribution to spiralling unemployment.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with the above assessment and the concerns of the President of the European Parliament and POBEK?
2. Were these negative developments foreseeable and to what extent were they taken into account in the Eurogroup decisions on Cyprus?
3. Does the EU have ways to help restore the flow of money into the Cypriot economy, especially to small and medium-sized businesses?
4. What does the EU intend to do, other than what is included in the memorandum of understanding (MoU), to reverse this catastrophic development for Cyprus and its people?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(12 November 2013)

The Commission is aware of the declining economic activity in Cyprus.

To address the economic challenges facing the country, the Cypriot authorities have put forward a multi-annual reform programme. Its goals are to stabilise the financial system and achieve fiscal sustainability to lay foundations for economic growth.

The Commission stands by Cyprus and the Cypriot people in helping to restore financial stability, fiscal sustainability and growth to the country and its people. The EU Structural Funds (including the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund) are also mobilised to this end.

For the current programming period 2007-2013, the 10% top-up was granted, raising the co-financing rate from 85% to 95%. For the next programming period, the dialogue discussions are still going on. Recognising the critical situation in Cyprus, the EU Council has decided to allocate an additional amount of EUR 100 million in 2014 budget. A similar amount would be included in 2015 budget.

Cyprus benefits also from the EIB support in particular in the sectors of energy, water/sewage and SMEs financing. In 2013 to date, the EIB signed a EUR 100 million loan to support a variety of schemes co-financed by EU Funds. The Bank is also working on the launch of a EUR 150 million Trade Finance Facility programme focused on SMEs and Mid-Caps.

In the context of the next programming period, the EIB is evaluating, jointly with the Cypriot authorities, solutions to support priority investments co-financed by EU Funds.

The Commission has set up a Support Group for Cyprus that works closely with the Cypriot authorities by providing technical expertise.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010770/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Comisión de investigación del accidente del vuelo JK5022 Spanair

En otro orden de cosas, el Reglamento (UE) n° 996/2010 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 20 de octubre de 2010, sobre investigación y prevención de accidentes e incidentes en la aviación civil y por el que se deroga la Directiva 94/56/CE dice lo siguiente en su artículo 4.1: «Cada Estado miembro garantizará la realización o supervisión sin interferencias externas, de investigaciones de seguridad por una autoridad nacional permanente encargada de las investigaciones de seguridad en la aviación civil, capaz de realizar de forma independiente una investigación completa sobre la seguridad, bien por cuenta propia o mediante acuerdos con otras autoridades encargadas de las investigaciones de seguridad.».

En su artículo 4.2 concluye: «La autoridad encargada de las investigaciones de seguridad será independiente desde el punto de vista funcional, especialmente de las autoridades aeronáuticas nacionales responsables en materia de navegabilidad, certificación, operaciones de vuelo, mantenimiento, concesión de licencias, control del tránsito aéreo o de la explotación de los aeródromos, y, en general, de cualquier otra parte o entidad cuyos intereses o misiones pudieran entrar en conflicto con la función que se haya confiado a la autoridad encargada de las investigaciones de seguridad, o que pudieran influir en su objetividad.».

Al hilo de este precepto, me gustaría saber lo siguiente:

1. ¿La Comisión va a adoptar o ha adoptado medidas para que la independencia de la que hablan los artículos citados respecto a dichas Comisiones de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil esté realmente garantizada?
2. ¿Ha analizado la Comisión si la Comisión de Investigación establecida para el vuelo JK5022 en el Estado español ha sido independiente?

Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión

(14 de noviembre de 2013)

La independencia de las autoridades encargadas de la investigación de la seguridad en la aviación civil está garantizada por el Reglamento (UE) n° 996/2010 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 20 de octubre de 2010, sobre investigación y prevención de accidentes e incidentes en la aviación civil y por el que se deroga la Directiva 94/56/CE ⁽¹⁾.

La Comisión ha examinado la legislación que regula en los Estados miembros las investigaciones de seguridad en caso de accidentes e incidentes en la aviación civil, particularmente las disposiciones sobre la independencia de la autoridad nacional permanente que debe encargarse de esas investigaciones.

En lo que atañe a la legislación española, el contenido del artículo 13, apartados 1 y 2, de la Ley 21/2003, de 7 de julio, no contradice lo dispuesto en la normativa de la UE.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010R0996:EN:NOT>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010770/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Commission of investigation into the Spanair flight JK5022 accident

In addition, Article 4.1 of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC states: 'Each Member State shall ensure that safety investigations are conducted or supervised, without external interference, by a permanent national civil aviation safety investigation authority capable of independently conducting a full safety investigation, either on its own or through agreements with other safety investigation authorities'.

Article 4.2 concludes: 'The safety investigation authority shall be functionally independent in particular of aviation authorities responsible for airworthiness, certification, flight operation, maintenance, licensing, air traffic control or aerodrome operation and, in general, of any other party or entity the interests or missions of which could conflict with the task entrusted to the safety investigation authority or influence its objectivity'.

Guided by this principle, I would like to know the following:

1. Will the Commission adopt, or has it adopted, measures to ensure that the independence of these civil aviation accident and incident investigation commissions, referred to in the abovementioned articles, is in fact guaranteed?
2. Has the Commission examined the independence of the investigation commission set up in Spain to look into flight JK5022?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(14 November 2013)

The independence of civil aviation safety investigation authorities is guaranteed by Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 ⁽¹⁾ of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC.

The Commission has examined the Member States' national legislation related to the safety investigation of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, in particular the provisions on the independence of the permanent national civil aviation safety investigation authority.

Regarding Spanish legislation, the content of Article 13 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Act 21/2003, of 7th July does not contradict EU legislation.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010R0996:EN:NOT>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010771/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Indemnizaciones por el accidente del vuelo JK5022 de Spanair

Cinco años después del accidente del vuelo JK5022, su asociación de afectados ha denunciado la falta de asunción de las responsabilidades indemnizatorias en el accidente por parte de la compañía aérea y su aseguradora, puesto que, a día de hoy, muchos de los afectados no han cobrado indemnizaciones de ningún tipo.

Según el artículo 10 del TCE, los Estados miembros deben adoptar todas las medidas generales o particulares apropiadas para asegurar el cumplimiento del Derecho comunitario y para eliminar las consecuencias ilícitas de una violación del mismo.

¿Podría indicar la Comisión si va a adoptar medidas contra el Estado español por no asegurar el cumplimiento del Derecho comunitario y, en concreto, legislar bajo el marco de lo preceptuado en el Reglamento (CE) n° 2027/97 del Consejo, de 9 de octubre de 1997, sobre la responsabilidad «ilimitada» de las compañías aéreas en caso de accidente, lo que hace que exista en este contexto un vacío legal en España?

Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de noviembre de 2013)

La Comisión está interesada en que se garantice que las personas afectadas por accidentes aéreos, como en el caso del vuelo JK5022, reciban las adecuadas indemnizaciones. El Reglamento (CE) n° 2927/97 del Consejo, de 9 de octubre de 1997, relativo a la responsabilidad de las compañías aéreas respecto al transporte aéreo de los pasajeros y su equipaje ⁽¹⁾ establece el marco jurídico que permite exigir una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios derivados. Este Reglamento es directamente aplicable en todos los Estados miembros e incluye, en particular, el régimen de indemnizaciones establecido en el Convenio de Montreal ⁽²⁾ en caso de muerte o lesión corporal de los pasajeros como consecuencia de un accidente aéreo.

La Comisión no tiene competencias en lo que respecta a procedimientos judiciales o procedimientos de solución extrajudicial de conflictos relacionados con un accidente aéreo. En este contexto, los tribunales nacionales son competentes para evaluar las circunstancias específicas de cada caso teniendo en cuenta el régimen de responsabilidad antes citado. A este respecto, la forma en que se resuelva el conflicto en cuanto al fondo con arreglo a la legislación vigente, incluida la evaluación del nivel de responsabilidad de la compañía, no podrá constituir en sí misma una infracción del Convenio de Montreal y del Reglamento (CE) n° 2027/97 por parte de las autoridades españolas, ya que ambos prevén el mencionado examen caso por caso.

Sobre la base de estos elementos, la Comisión no considera que exista en este momento ningún incumplimiento por parte de las autoridades españolas de las disposiciones mencionadas por Su Señoría.

⁽¹⁾ DO L 285 de 17.10.1997.

⁽²⁾ Convenio para la unificación de ciertas reglas para el transporte aéreo internacional, firmado en Montreal el 28 de mayo de 1999, incorporado al Derecho de la UE por medio del Reglamento (CE) n° 2027/97 del Consejo, de 9 de octubre de 1998, sobre la responsabilidad de las compañías aéreas en caso de accidente, DO L285/1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010771/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Indemnifications for the Spanair flight JK5022 accident

Five years after the flight JK5022 accident, the Association of Those Affected by Spanair Flight JK5022 has complained about the failure to accept compensatory liability for the accident by the airline and its insurer, since, to date, many of those affected have not received indemnification of any kind.

According to Article 10 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of Community law and to eliminate the unlawful consequences of a violation of this law.

Can the Commission state whether it will take measures against Spain for failing to ensure fulfilment of Community law and, more specifically for failing to legislate under the framework of the provisions in Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on 'unlimited' air carrier liability in the event of accidents, resulting in the existence of a legal vacuum in Spain in this context?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

The Commission is concerned about the need for an appropriate indemnisation of persons affected by an accident in air transport, such as flight JK5022. Regulation (EC) No 2927/97 of the Council of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air ⁽¹⁾ provides the legal framework allowing them to claim compensation for the subsequent damages. The regulation is directly applicable in each Member State and includes notably the compensation rules laid down in the Montreal Convention ⁽²⁾ in case of death or bodily injury of passengers caused by an air transport accident.

The Commission has no competence with regard to judicial proceedings or out-of court settlements procedures linked to an air accident. Under this framework, national courts are competent to assess the merits of each case in light of the abovementioned liability regime. In this regard, the way the dispute may be settled in substance under the applicable legislation, including the assessment of the level of liability of the carrier, may not constitute in itself a breach of the Montreal Convention and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 by the Spanish authorities, as they both allow for such case-by-case assessment.

Based on these elements, the Commission does not find at this stage any breach by the Spanish authorities of the provisions mentioned by the Honourable Member.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 285, 17.10.1997.

⁽²⁾ Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules For International Carriage by Air; signed in Montreal 28 May 1999, transposed in EC law by Council Regulation (EC) 2027/97 of 9 October 1998 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents, OJ L285/1.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010772/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Accidente del vuelo JK5022 Spanair

El 21 de julio de 2008, la Dirección General de Aviación Civil (DGAC), dependiente del Ministerio de Fomento del Reino de España, emitió la «Prórroga» del Certificado de Aeronavegabilidad y Licencia de Estación de la aeronave siniestrada correspondiente al vuelo JK5022 hasta el día 22 de agosto del mismo año, al parecer sin inspeccionar ni tener en cuenta el estado de la aeronave y los graves fallos en el sistema que se venían produciendo, como así advierten los documentos e informes y la ampliación remitida a esa Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil.

Al parecer, dicha Comisión concluyó que «la aeronave disponía del certificado de aeronavegabilidad número 4516, emitido el 4 de febrero de 2005, cuya validez expira el 22 de julio de 2008. La solicitud de renovación del certificado fue presentada con poca antelación a su fecha de vencimiento. Como, de acuerdo a los procedimientos de la DGAC, ese año correspondía hacer una renovación completa del certificado, no fue posible llevar a cabo la inspección antes de que finalizara la validez del certificado, estando prevista su realización para el 22 de agosto de 2008, motivo por el cual el certificado fue prorrogado hasta dicha fecha, aplicando la Instrucción circular 1119-B (IC 11-19B)».

Dicha instrucción debe de aparecer como un borrador y no está firmada por el órgano competente. Por lo tanto,

¿Podría mediar la Comisión para que el Reino de España y, en concreto, la DGAC, aportara la Instrucción Circular 1119-B y corroborar que dicha Instrucción estaba redactada conforme a la normativa europea en vigor en el momento del accidente?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010773/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Prórroga del certificado de aeronavegabilidad para la aeronave del vuelo JK5022 Spanair

El 21 de julio de 2008, la Dirección General de Aviación Civil (DGAC), dependiente del Ministerio de Fomento del Reino de España, emitió la «prórroga» del certificado de aeronavegabilidad y licencia de estación de la aeronave siniestrada correspondiente al vuelo JK5022 hasta el día 22 de agosto del mismo año, al parecer sin inspeccionar ni tener en cuenta el estado de la aeronave y los graves fallos en el sistema que se venían produciendo, como así advierten los documentos e informes y la ampliación remitida a la Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil.

Al parecer, dicha Comisión concluyó que «la aeronave disponía del certificado de aeronavegabilidad número 4516, emitido el 4 de febrero de 2005, cuya validez expira el 22 de julio de 2008. La solicitud de renovación del certificado fue presentada con poca antelación a su fecha de vencimiento. Como, de acuerdo a los procedimientos de la DGAC, ese año correspondía hacer una renovación completa del certificado, no fue posible llevar a cabo la inspección antes de que finalizara la validez del certificado, estando prevista su realización para el 22 de agosto de 2008, motivo por el cual el certificado fue prorrogado hasta dicha fecha, aplicando la Instrucción Circular 1119-B».

Teniendo en cuenta dicha conclusión y que, al parecer, el concepto de «prórroga» no aparece en la normativa europea de seguridad aérea,

¿Va a pedir explicaciones la Comisión al Reino de España (Dirección General de Aviación Civil) respecto al uso de este concepto de «prórroga», cuando dicho concepto no se encuentra en la normativa europea aplicable y, a todas luces, no casa con el principio general de seguridad aérea?

¿Por qué se recurre a él sin ninguna garantía de inspección? Ya que la Instrucción Circular 11-19B no recoge nada al respecto, ¿cuál es el protocolo de actuación para «prorrogar» un certificado de aeronavegabilidad y licencia de estación? ¿Qué requisitos han de darse para una «prórroga»?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión*(18 de noviembre de 2013)*

El concepto de la validez de un certificado de aeronavegabilidad aparece en los puntos M.A.901 (Revisión de la aeronavegabilidad de aeronaves) y M.A.902 (Validez del certificado de revisión de aeronavegabilidad) del anexo I (parte M) del Reglamento (CE) n° 2042/2003 ⁽¹⁾, sobre el mantenimiento de la aeronavegabilidad de las aeronaves y productos aeronáuticos, componentes y equipos y sobre la aprobación de las organizaciones y personal que participan en dichas tareas.

Tal como se autoriza en el artículo 7, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) n° 2042/2003, las autoridades españolas de aviación civil, antes de la prórroga del certificado de aeronavegabilidad de la aeronave implicada en el accidente, habían optado por establecer excepciones a las disposiciones de la subparte I del anexo I del citado Reglamento. Como consecuencia, la prórroga del certificado de aeronavegabilidad se regía por la normativa española.

En la medida en que España ha actuado dentro de los límites del artículo 7, apartado 3, este asunto compete a las autoridades nacionales responsables.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R2042:ES:NOT>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010772/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Spanair flight JK5022 accident

On 21 July 2008, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC), which reports to Spain's Ministry of Public Works, issued an 'Extension' until 22 August of that year to the Certificate of Airworthiness and Aircraft Radio Licence for the aircraft involved in the JK5022 flight accident. Apparently this extension was given without inspecting, or taking into account, the aircraft's condition and serious failures that were occurring in the system, as warned of in the documents and reports, and the annex, sent to the Commission for the Investigation of Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents (CIAIAC).

Apparently, this Commission concluded that 'the aircraft held Airworthiness Certificate Number 4516, issued on 4 February 2005 and expiring on 22 July 2008. The application to renew the certificate was submitted very shortly before its expiry date. In accordance with DGAC procedures, the certificate was due to be completely renewed that year, so it was not possible to carry out the inspection before the certificate expired. As this inspection was planned for 22 August 2008, the certificate was extended to this date, in application of Circular Instruction 1119-B (IC 11-19B)'.

This instruction must have appeared in draft form and is not signed by the competent body. Therefore,

Could the Commission intercede with the Kingdom of Spain and, more specifically, the DGAC, for them to furnish Circular Instruction 1119-B, and could it verify that the instruction was drawn up in accordance with the EU regulations in force at the time of the accident?

**Question for written answer E-010773/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Extension to the airworthiness certificate for the aircraft used on Spanair flight JK5022

On 21 July 2008, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC), which reports to Spain's Ministry of Public Works, issued an 'Extension' until 22 August of that year to the Certificate of Airworthiness and Aircraft Radio Licence for the aircraft involved in the JK5022 flight accident. Apparently this extension was given without inspecting, or taking into account, the aircraft's condition and serious failures that were occurring in the system, as warned of in the documents and reports, and the annex, sent to the Commission for the Investigation of Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents (CIAIAC).

Apparently, this Committee concluded that 'the aircraft held Airworthiness Certificate Number 4516, issued on 4 February 2005 and expiring on 22 July 2008. The application to renew the certificate was submitted very shortly before its expiry date. In accordance with DGAC procedures, the certificate was due to be completely renewed that year, so it was not possible to carry out the inspection before the certificate expired. As this inspection was planned for 22 August 2008, the certificate was extended to this date, in application of Circular Instruction 1119-B'.

Given this conclusion and that, apparently, the concept of an 'extension' does not appear in EU air safety regulations,

Is the Commission going to ask for explanations from the Kingdom of Spain (Directorate General of Civil Aviation) regarding the use of this concept of 'extension', given that this concept is not found in the applicable EU regulations and clearly does not fit with the general principle of air safety?

Why it is used without any inspection guarantee? Given that Circular Instruction 11-19B says nothing in this regard, what is the protocol of action for 'extending' a Certificate of Airworthiness and Aircraft Radio Licence? What requirements must be met for an 'extension' to be given?

Joint answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission*(18 November 2013)*

The concept of validity of an airworthiness certificate appears in points M.A. 901 (Aircraft airworthiness review) and M.A. 902 (Validity of the airworthiness review certificate), of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 ⁽¹⁾ on continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks.

As authorised by Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003, the Spanish civil aviation authorities had chosen, before the extension of the certificate of airworthiness of the aircraft involved in the accident, to derogate from the provisions of Annex I(l) to the aforementioned Regulation. As a consequence, the extension of the certificate of airworthiness was governed by the Spanish Regulations.

Insofar as Spain has acted within the limits of Article 7(3), it is a matter for the national authorities concerned.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R2042:EN:NOT>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010774/13
a la Comisión**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Prórroga del certificado de aeronavegabilidad de la aeronave del vuelo JK5022 Spanair

El 21 de julio de 2008, la Dirección General de Aviación Civil (DGAC), dependiente del Ministerio de Fomento del Reino de España, emitió la «Prórroga» del Certificado de Aeronavegabilidad y Licencia de Estación de la aeronave siniestrada correspondiente al vuelo JK5022 hasta el día 22 de agosto del mismo año, al parecer sin inspeccionar ni tener en cuenta el estado de la aeronave y los graves fallos en el sistema que se venían produciendo, como así advierten los documentos e informes y la ampliación remitida a esa Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil.

Al parecer dicha Comisión concluyó que «la aeronave disponía del certificado de aeronavegabilidad número 4516, emitido el 4 de febrero de 2005, cuya validez expira el 22 de julio de 2008. La solicitud de renovación del certificado fue presentada con poca antelación a su fecha de vencimiento. Como, de acuerdo a los procedimientos de la DGAC, ese año correspondía hacer una renovación completa del certificado, no fue posible llevar a cabo la inspección antes de que finalizara la validez del certificado, estando prevista su realización para el 22 de agosto de 2008, motivo por el cual el certificado fue prorrogado hasta dicha fecha, aplicando la Instrucción circular 1119-B».

Teniendo en cuenta dicha conclusión y que al parecer el concepto de «prórroga» no aparece en la normativa europea de seguridad aérea,

¿tiene la Comisión previsto adoptar medidas en relación al incumplimiento absoluto por parte de la Autoridad española de no llevar a cabo las suficientes actividades de investigación sobre cada solicitante o titular de un certificado de aeronavegabilidad como para justificar la concesión, renovación, modificación, suspensión o revocación del certificado o autorización? O, en el caso de la no suspensión o revocación del certificado cuando haya pruebas de que no se ha cumplido alguna de las condiciones especificadas del apartado 21A.181 a) del Reglamento (CE) n° 1702/2003, ¿deberá la autoridad competente del Estado miembro de matrícula suspender o revocar el certificado de aeronavegabilidad?

Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión

(18 de noviembre de 2013)

La Comisión remite a Su Señoría a la respuesta dada a la pregunta escrita E-010772/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

Mientras que las condiciones relativas a la duración y continuidad de la validez se recogen en el punto 21A.181, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) n° 1702/2003 ⁽²⁾, los procedimientos de ejecución se definen en el Reglamento (CE) n° 2042/2003 ⁽³⁾. Como se indica en la respuesta a la antes citada pregunta escrita, la prórroga del certificado de aeronavegabilidad de la aeronave implicada en el accidente se regía por la normativa española.

Por tanto, la Comisión no tiene intención de iniciar un procedimiento de infracción contra España.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1702:ES:NOT>

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R2042:ES:NOT>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010774/13
to the Commission**

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Extension to the airworthiness certificate for the aircraft used on Spanair flight JK5022

On 21 July 2008, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC), which reports to Spain's Ministry of Public Works, issued an 'Extension' until 22 August of that year to the Certificate of Airworthiness and Aircraft Radio Licence for the aircraft involved in the JK5022 flight accident. Apparently this extension was given without inspecting, or taking into account, the aircraft's condition and serious failures that were occurring in the system, as warned of in the documents and reports, and the annex, sent to the Commission for the Investigation of Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents (CIAIAC).

Apparently, this Commission concluded that 'the aircraft held Airworthiness Certificate Number 4516, issued on 4 February 2005 and expiring on 22 July 2008. The application to renew the certificate was submitted very shortly before its expiry date. In accordance with DGAC procedures, the certificate was due to be completely renewed that year, so it was not possible to carry out the inspection before the certificate expired. As this inspection was planned for 22 August 2008, the certificate was extended to this date, in application of Circular Instruction 1119-B'.

Given this conclusion and that, apparently, the concept of an 'extension' does not appear in EU air safety regulations,

Does the Commission intend to take action regarding the complete failure of the Spanish Authority to carry out sufficient investigation into each applicant for, or holder of, an airworthiness certificate to justify the issue, renewal, amendment, suspension or revocation of the certificate or authorisation? Or, in the event of failure to suspend or revoke the certificate on evidence that any of the conditions specified in paragraph 21A.181(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003 have not been met, should the competent authority of the Member State that registers the aircraft suspend or revoke the airworthiness certificate?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(18 November 2013)

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its answer in the Written Question E-010772/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

While the conditions related to the duration and continued validity are specified in point 21A.181(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003 ⁽²⁾, the implementing procedures are defined in Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 ⁽³⁾. As specified in the answer to the aforementioned written question, the extension of the airworthiness certificate of the aircraft involved in the accident was governed by Spanish regulations.

Therefore, the Commission does not intend to start an infringement procedure against Spain.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1702:EN:NOT>

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R2042:EN:NOT>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010775/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Cielo Único Europeo IV

La situación actual entre autoridades y proveedores en el Estado español es la siguiente:

- la autoridad de supervisión meteorológica es Ansmet, que depende de la Subsecretaría de Estado de Medio Ambiente y es la entidad que certifica a los proveedores meteorológicos;
- la autoridad meteorológica ante la OACI es la Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (AEMet), que también depende de la Subsecretaría de Estado de Medio Ambiente;
- el proveedor meteorológico exclusivo es la propia Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (AEMet), que, como se ha dicho, depende de la Subsecretaría de Estado de Medio Ambiente.

En referencia a las respuestas a las preguntas E-008966/2013, E-008967/2013 y E-008968/2013, ¿podría aclarar la Comisión las cuestiones siguientes?

— En la respuesta a la pregunta E-008966/2013 se habla de la separación completa de la autoridad de supervisión y de los proveedores sometidos a supervisión. Se entiende que la Comisión se refiere a Ansmet y a AEMet en su función de proveedor; ¿es eso correcto?

— ¿En qué situación queda la autoridad meteorológica, que actualmente coincide con el proveedor exclusivo? Tiene que estar separada del proveedor; imaginamos que es así. ¿Debería ser el mismo organismo que la autoridad de supervisión?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-010776/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(23 de septiembre de 2013)

Asunto: Cielo único europeo V

En referencia a las preguntas E-008966/2013, E-008967/2013 y E-008968/2013, la Comisión destaca en las respuestas la importancia del tercer paquete legislativo SES2+. Entendiendo que en junio de 2013 se presentó este paquete en el Parlamento Europeo, ¿se dispone de una previsión de calendario de aprobación, de periodo de adaptación y de aplicación definitiva en los Estados miembros?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de noviembre de 2013)

La normativa sobre cielo único europeo distingue entre dos entidades distintas: los proveedores de servicios de navegación aérea y las autoridades nacionales de supervisión de los proveedores. En el caso de España, esta ha comunicado que, en lo relativo a los servicios meteorológicos, Ansmet es la autoridad de supervisión y AEMet es el proveedor de servicios. En lo que respecta a servicios distintos de la meteorología, la autoridad de supervisión es la AESA y el proveedor de servicios es AENA.

La reciente propuesta de la Comisión para la aplicación del cielo único europeo (CUE 2 +) exigiría una separación organizativa entre las dos entidades, como entendió correctamente Su Señoría. A tal fin, la autoridad de supervisión de servicios meteorológicos (Ansmet) tendría que estar separada en el aspecto organizativo de AEMet, a la que supervisa, pero podría integrarse en otra entidad estatal, como por ejemplo la autoridad supervisora de otros servicios de navegación aérea (AESA) o el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente.

Por último, en relación con la pregunta E-010776/2013, sobre el calendario de trabajo, los ponentes del Parlamento se han comprometido a trabajar con vistas a realizar una primera lectura en el próximo pleno del mes de marzo. En el Consejo, el calendario está en manos de la Presidencia pero la Comisión espera que los debates en el Grupo «Aviación» del Consejo se inicien antes de que acabe el año.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010775/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Single European Sky IV

The current situation between authorities and suppliers in Spain is as follows:

- the Meteorological Supervisory Authority is Ansmet, which reports to the State Sub-Secretariat for the Environment and is responsible for certifying meteorological suppliers;
- the meteorological authority serving the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the State Meteorology Agency (AEMet), which also reports to the State Sub-Secretariat for the Environment;
- the exclusive meteorological supplier is the State Meteorology Agency (AEMet) itself, which, as already stated, reports to the State Sub-Secretariat for the Environment.

With reference to the answers to Questions E-008966/2013, E-008967/2013 and E-008968/2013, could the Commission provide clarification on the following matters?

The answer to Question E-008966/2013 talks of full separation of the supervisory authority from the suppliers being supervised. The Commission is understood to refer to Ansmet and AEMet in their role as suppliers. Is that incorrect?

In what situation does the meteorological authority, which is currently the exclusive supplier, find itself? We imagine that it must be separated from the supplier. Should it be the same body as the supervisory authority?

**Question for written answer E-010776/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Single European Sky V

In its answers to Questions E-008966/2013, E-008967/2013 and E-008968/2013, the Commission emphasises the importance of the third legislative package SES2+. Given that this package was presented in Parliament in June 2013, is there an estimated timetable for its adoption, its adaptation period and its final implementation in the Member States?

Joint answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(7 November 2013)

The Single European Sky regulations distinguish between two separate entities; the providers of Air Navigation Services and the National Supervisory Authorities overseeing the providers. In the case of Spain, Spain has reported that for meteorological services, ANS-MET is the supervisory authority and AEMet is the service provider. For services other than meteorology, the supervisory authority is AESA and the service provider is AENA.

The recent Commission proposal for the implementation of the Single European Sky (SES2+) would require an organisational separation between the two entities, as correctly understood by the Honourable Member. To this end the supervisory authority for meteorological services (ANS-MET) would need to be organisationally separate from AEMet, which it oversees, but could be part of another State entity, such as the supervisory authority for other air navigation services (AESA) or the Ministry of Environment.

Finally concerning Question E-010776/2013, on the timetable of work, the Parliament Rapporteurs have committed to work towards reaching a first reading by the next March Plenary. In the Council, the timing is in the hands of the Presidency but the Commission expects discussions in the Council Aviation Working Party to begin later this year.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010777/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Φέτα και Gorgonzola, θύματα της εμπορικής συμφωνίας με τον Καναδά

Το ελληνικό τυρί «φέτα», και το ιταλικό «gorgonzola» περιλαμβάνονται στη λίστα των Προϊόντων Ονομασίας Προέλευσης (ΠΟΠ), όπως αυτά ορίζονται στον Κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1107/96/ΕΚ.

Παρ' όλα αυτά, στο πλαίσιο της επικείμενης διμερούς εμπορικής συμφωνίας της ΕΕ με τον Καναδά, το Σώμα των Επιτρόπων αποφάσισε να δεχθεί να κάνουν χρήση των ονομασιών «φέτα» και «gorgonzola» οι канаδοί παραγωγοί, οι οποίοι επιπλέον θα έχουν τη δυνατότητα να προωθούν και να διακινούν τα τυριά αυτά και εντός της ΕΕ, κάνοντας χρήση αυτών των ονομασιών, χωρίς να υφίστανται μάλιστα τις υποχρεώσεις και τους περιορισμούς που υφίστανται οι παραγωγοί ΠΟΠ των συγκεκριμένων προϊόντων εντός της ΕΕ.

Με δεδομένα τα ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Επιβεβαιώνει τις ανωτέρω πληροφορίες; Ποια είναι τα οφέλη που προσδοκά η Επιτροπή ότι θα προκύψουν από τη «θυσία» των δύο αυτών προϊόντων; Συνάδει η πρακτική της στην επικείμενη συμφωνία με την κυβέρνηση του Καναδά με τα οριζόμενα στον Κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2081/92 του Συμβουλίου «για την προστασία των γεωγραφικών ενδείξεων και των ονομασιών προέλευσης των προϊόντων και των τροφίμων»;
2. Όσον αφορά στη «φέτα», οι Έλληνες παραγωγοί ζητούν να δεσμευθεί η Επιτροπή ότι δεν θα παραχωρήσει το δικαίωμα χρήσης της ονομασίας «φέτα» στους παραγωγούς τόσο του Καναδά όσο και οποιασδήποτε άλλης χώρας, εντός ή εκτός Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, καθώς και ότι θα απαγορευθεί η διακίνηση οποιουδήποτε τέτοιου προϊόντος εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Πώς απαντάει η Επιτροπή;

Απάντηση του κ. De Gucht εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Νοεμβρίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή αποδίδει μεγάλη σημασία στην προστασία του συστήματος των ευρωπαϊκών γεωγραφικών ενδείξεων (ΓΕ) σε ευρωπαϊκό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Έχει καταβάλει πολλές προσπάθειες για την επίτευξη του καλύτερου δυνατού αποτελέσματος στο πλαίσιο της συνολικής οικονομικής και εμπορικής συμφωνίας ΕΕ-Καναδά (ΣΟΕΣ) για την οποία επετεύχθη πολιτική συμφωνία στις 18 Οκτωβρίου 2013.

Για πρώτη φορά, ο Καναδάς δέχτηκε να προστατεύσει όλα τα είδη τροφίμων σε επίπεδο συγκρίσιμο με εκείνο του δικαίου της ΕΕ. Οι περισσότερες από τις 145 ΓΕ της ΕΕ που έχουν προτεραιότητα θα έχουν το υψηλότερο επίπεδο προστασίας ενώ στο μέλλον και άλλες ΓΕ της ΕΕ ενδέχεται να προστεθούν σε αυτόν τον κατάλογο.

Για λίγα ονόματα, συμπεριλαμβανομένων της φέτας και της Gorgonzola που έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί ευρέως στον Καναδά για μεγάλη χρονική περίοδο και ανεξάρτητα από την καταγωγή τους, η λύση που βρέθηκε θα επιτρέψει στους канаδούς καταναλωτές να κάνουν διάκριση μεταξύ πρωτότυπων ΓΕ και άλλων τύπων προϊόντων που φέρουν ίδια ή παρόμοια ονόματα και θα έχει θετικές οικονομικές συνέπειες για τους παραγωγούς των ΓΕ της ΕΕ:

- Στην αγορά του Καναδά, μόνο οι υπάρχοντες χρήστες με αποδεδειγμένα προηγούμενα νόμιμα δικαιώματα θα μπορούν να εξακολουθήσουν να χρησιμοποιούν τις εν λόγω ονομασίες. Όλοι οι άλλοι χρήστες που δεν συμμορφώνονται με τις τεχνικές προδιαγραφές των ΓΕ της ΕΕ θα πρέπει να συνοδεύουν τα εν λόγω ονόματα από εκφράσεις όπως «μορφή», «τύπος», «απομιμήσεις» ή «είδος» και θα απαιτείται να έχουν σαφή και ορατή ένδειξη της πραγματικής καταγωγής.
- Όλοι οι κάτοχοι δικαιωμάτων ΓΕ της ΕΕ θα επωφεληθούν από τους διοικητικούς πόρους κατά των προϊόντων που παραπλανούν το κοινό χρησιμοποιώντας σύμβολα από τις χώρες της πρωτότυπης γεωγραφικής ένδειξης.

Η προστασία που χορηγείται στην αγορά της ΕΕ για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων στις ΓΕ της ΕΕ ⁽¹⁾ και των τροφίμων δεν θα αποδυναμωθεί ως συνέπεια της ΣΟΕΣ. Προϊόντα που φέρουν τα ονόματα φέτα και Gorgonzola και δεν τηρούν τις σχετικές προδιαγραφές προϊόντων δεν θα μπορούν να διατεθούν στην αγορά της ΕΕ.

(1) Κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012, ΕΕ L 55 της 27.02.2013, σ. 27.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010777/13
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Feta and Gorgonzola, victims of the trade agreement with Canada

Greek feta and Italian gorgonzola are Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) products, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 1107/96/EC.

Nonetheless, the College of Commissioners has decided in the forthcoming bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Canada that Canadian producers will be allowed to use the names 'feta' and 'gorgonzola' and, furthermore, will be able to promote and market these cheeses within the EU under those names, without being subject to the obligations and restrictions which apply to PDO producers of those particular products within the EU.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Can it confirm the above information? What benefits does the Commission expect from the 'sacrifice' of these two products? Is its approach in the forthcoming agreement with the Canadian government in keeping with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 2081/92 of the Council on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agriculture products and foodstuffs?
2. As regards feta, Greek producers are calling for an undertaking from the Commission that it will not grant the right to use the name 'feta' to producers in Canada or in any other country inside or outside the European Union and that it will prevent the distribution of any such products inside the European Union? What does the Commission have to say?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(12 November 2013)

The Commission attaches great importance to the protection of European Geographical Indications (GIs) in the EU and internationally. It has made all efforts to achieve the best possible outcome in the context of the EU- Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) for which a political agreement was reached on 18 October 2013.

For the first time, Canada accepted to protect all types of food products at a level comparable to EC law. Most of the EU's 145 priority GIs will be protected at the highest level and, in future, other EU GIs might be added to this list.

For a few names, including Feta and Gorgonzola, that have been widely used in Canada for a long period and irrespective of their origin, the solution found will allow Canadian consumers to distinguish between original GIs and other types of products bearing same or similar names and will have a positive economic impact for producers of the EU GIs at stake:

- In the Canadian market, only existing users with proved legitimate prior rights will be able to continue using these names. All other users not in compliance with the EU GIs technical specifications will need to accompany these names by expressions such as 'style', 'type', 'imitation' or 'kind' and will be required to have a clear and visible indication of their actual origin.
- All EU GI right holders will benefit from administrative recourses against products which would be misleading the public by means of using symbols from the countries of the original GI.

The protection granted in the EU market to the EU GIs ⁽¹⁾ quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs will not be weakened as an effect of CETA. Products bearing the names Feta and Gorgonzola that do not respect the relevant product specifications cannot be marketed in the EU.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, OJ L 55, 27.2. 2013, p. 27.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010778/13

προς το Συμβούλιο

Sylvana Rapti (S&D), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE), Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE), Anni Podimata (S&D), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D), Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE), Chrysoula Paliadeli (S&D), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Georgios Stavrakakis (S&D) και Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Άνοδος ναζιστικών φαινομένων στην Ευρώπη — δολοφονία νέου στην Ελλάδα

Στις 17.9.2013, ένα μέλος του νεοναζιστικού κόμματος «Χρυσή Αυγή» δολοφόνησε εν ψυχρώ έναν 34χρονο εξαιτίας των πολιτικών του πεποιθήσεων. Πρόκειται για το αποκορύφωμα σειράς βίαιων ενεργειών (όπως στο Μελιγαλά, στα Γιαννιτσά και στο Πέραμα) από μέλη της Χρυσής Αυγής που γνώρισε εντυπωσιακή άνοδο στο περιβάλλον της πρωτοφανούς οικονομικής κρίσης που πλήττει την Ελλάδα και αναπτύσσεται ραγδαία, καθώς το εφαρμοζόμενο πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής σταθερότητας — έκτος χρόνος ύφεσης και τέταρτος χρόνος σκληρής λιτότητας — έχει εξαντλήσει και τις τελευταίες αντοχές των Ελλήνων πολιτών.

Είναι προφανές ότι η ελληνική κυβέρνηση και οι αρμόδιες αρχές θα δράσουν άμεσα για την αντιμετώπιση τέτοιων φαινομένων στο πλαίσιο του συντάγματος και της εθνικής νομοθεσίας. Η εξάπλωση όμως φιλοναζιστικών, ρατσιστικών φορέων και κινήσεων δεν αφορά μόνο στην Ελλάδα. Έχει καταγραφεί ήδη σε προηγούμενες εθνικές και ευρωπαϊκές εκλογές σε πολλά κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και καταγράφεται εντονότερα στις μετρήσεις που γίνονται σε όλη την Ευρώπη.

Διαπιστώνεται καθημερινά ότι οι ομάδες αυτές επωφελούνται από τις πολιτικές δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη, κυρίως όμως σ' εκείνα όπου οι κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις των μέτρων που λαμβάνονται έρχονται σε αντίθεση με το κοινωνικό μοντέλο επί του οποίου δομήθηκε η ΕΕ και το οποίο η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή χαρακτηρίζει «αναγκαίο» για την επιτυχή εφαρμογή προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής και την έξοδο από την κρίση. Όσο τα προγράμματα λιτότητας συμπίεζουν το εισόδημα των πολιτών και περιθωριοποιούν, κοινωνικά και εργασιακά, μεγάλες ομάδες, κυρίως νέων ανθρώπων, τόσο βρίσκουν έδαφος εγκληματικές συμπεριφορές με άλλοθι τη φτώχεια και την παράνομη μετανάστευση.

Επειδή τέτοια φαινόμενα που προαναφέρθηκαν πιθανόν να επιδεινωθούν, και όχι μόνο στην Ελλάδα, ερωτώνται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και το Συμβούλιο:

1. Συνειδητοποιούν ότι εξαντλούνται οι δημοκρατικές αντοχές των κοινωνιών, κυρίως σε κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ με προγράμματα προσαρμογής και πλήττονται καίρια οι αρχές και οι αξίες επί των οποίων οικοδομήθηκε η ΕΕ;
2. Θα συνυπολογίσουν τις κοινωνικές και πολιτικές παραμέτρους των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής;
3. Στο βαθμό που τους αναλογεί, ποιες πολιτικές προτίθενται να εφαρμόσουν ώστε ν' αμβλυνθούν οι επιπτώσεις από την ύφεση και τη λιτότητα στις χώρες που εφαρμόζουν προγράμματα προσαρμογής, ν' αποφευχθεί η επιδείνωση φαινομένων βίας και διάρρηξης της κοινωνικής συνοχής, που τραυματίζουν βαρύτατα το ευρωπαϊκό εγχείρημα, κλονίζουν συθέμελα την εμπιστοσύνη των πολιτών στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και επαναφέρουν στο προσκήνιο τη ναζιστική απειλή;

Απάντηση

(16 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Κατόπιν της επιδείνωσης της μακροοικονομικής και της δημοσιονομικής κατάστασης στην Ελλάδα το 2010, το Συμβούλιο εξέδωσε στις 10 Μαΐου 2010 την απόφαση 2010/320/ΕΕ η οποία απευθύνεται στην Ελλάδα, για την ενίσχυση της δημοσιονομικής επιτήρησης, και η οποία επιβάλλει στην Ελλάδα να λάβει μέτρα για τη μείωση του ελλείμματος που κρίνεται αναγκαία προκειμένου να αντιμετωπιστεί η κατάσταση του υπερβολικού ελλείμματος ⁽¹⁾. Η απόφαση τροποποιήθηκε ορισμένες φορές και, εν συνεχεία, αναδιατυπώθηκε για λόγους σαφήνειας ως απόφαση του Συμβουλίου 2011/734/ΕΕ της 12ης Ιουλίου 2011 ⁽²⁾. Στις αποφάσεις αυτές αποτυπώνονται οι βασικοί όροι της χρηματοδοτικής ενίσχυσης που χορηγήθηκε αρχικά από το χρηματοδοτικό ταμείο για τη στήριξη της Ελλάδας και το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Χρηματοδοτικής Σταθερότητας (ΕΤΧΣ). Στις αποφάσεις περιγράφονται τα κύρια σημεία του οικονομικού προγράμματος που καλείται να εφαρμόσει η Ελλάδα.

⁽¹⁾ ΕΕ L 145 της 11.6.2010, σ. 6.

⁽²⁾ ΕΕ L 296 της 15.11.2011, σ. 38. Απόφαση που τροποποιήθηκε από την απόφαση 2013/6/ΕΕ του Συμβουλίου της 4ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 (ΕΕ L 4 της 9.1.2013, σ. 40).

Η εφαρμογή των συμφωνηθεισών μεταρρυθμίσεων είναι ευθύνη της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης και υπόκειται στους εθνικούς νόμους και διαδικασίες, μεταξύ των οποίων είναι η αξιολόγηση του αντικτύπου των μεταρρυθμίσεων και η εκτίμηση κόστους-οφέλους.

Η Ευρωομάδα εξέφρασε ικανοποίηση για τις προσπάθειες του ελληνικού λαού και συνεχάρη την ελληνική κυβέρνηση για τις συνεχιζόμενες προσπάθειές της να εφαρμόσει τις απαιτούμενες μεταρρυθμίσεις. Αυτές οι μεταρρυθμίσεις είναι απαραίτητες για να επιτευχθεί βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και απασχόληση ⁽³⁾.

Η Ευρωομάδα δεσμεύεται να παρέχει τη δέουσα στήριξη στην Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια του προγράμματος και μετά, μέχρις ότου ανακτήσει πρόσβαση στις αγορές, υπό τον όρον ότι η Ελλάδα θα συμμορφωθεί πλήρως με τις απαιτήσεις και τους στόχους του προγράμματος προσαρμογής ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽³⁾ Βλ. Δήλωση της Ευρωομάδας για την Ελλάδα στις 8 Ιουλίου 2013.

⁽⁴⁾ Βλ. Δήλωση της Ευρωομάδας για την Ελλάδα στις 27 Νοεμβρίου 2012. Οι δηλώσεις της Ευρωομάδας βρίσκονται στη διεύθυνση <http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/?group=statement&source=eurogroup&q=&dateFrom=&dateTo=>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010778/13
to the Council**

**Sylvana Rapti (S&D), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE),
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE), Anni Podimata (S&D), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D),
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D), Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE), Chrysoula Paliadeli
(S&D), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Georgios Stavrakakis (S&D) and Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Rise of Nazism in Europe — murder of a young man in Greece

On 17 September 2013, a member of the 'Golden Dawn' neo-Nazi party cold-bloodedly murdered a 34-year old man because of his political persuasions. This was the worst in a series of violent actions by Golden Dawn members (in Meligala, Giannitsa, Perama and elsewhere), which have increased exponentially against the backdrop of the unprecedented economic crisis which has damaged Greece and is spiralling out of control, bearing in mind that the stability programme — now in its sixth year of recession and fourth year of harsh austerity measures — has pushed the Greek people over the edge.

Obviously the Greek Government and the competent authorities will act immediately within the framework of the Constitution and national legislation in order to address these problems. However, the spread of neo-Nazi, racist parties and movements goes beyond Greece. They have already made their mark in national and European elections in numerous Member States of the European Union and, according to surveys throughout Europe, they are gaining support.

There is evidence on a daily basis that these groups are taking advantage of economic adjustment policies in all the Member States, especially where the social impact of the measures being applied conflicts with the social model on which the EU is founded, policies which the European Commission refers to as 'necessary' to the successful application of adjustment programmes and a way out of the crisis. The austerity programmes depressing people's income and pushing large groups, especially young people, to the margins of society and the job market are providing fertile ground for using poverty and illegal immigration as an excuse for criminal behaviour.

In view of the fact that the above problems may get worse, and not only in Greece, will the European Commission and the Council say:

1. Are they aware that society, especially in Member States with adjustment programmes, is at the end of its democratic tether and that the principles and values on which the EU are founded are being seriously damaged?
2. Will they take account of the social and political parameters of adjustment programmes?
3. Insofar as they are able, what policies do they propose to apply in order to mitigate the impact of the recession and austerity in countries under adjustment programmes, in order to prevent any worsening of the violence and breakdown of social cohesion which are seriously damaging the European endeavour, totally undermining public confidence in the European Union and bringing back the threat of Nazism?

Reply

(16 December 2013)

Following the deterioration of the macroeconomic and budgetary situation in Greece in 2010, on 10 May 2010 the Council issued Decision 2010/320/EU addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit ⁽¹⁾. This decision was amended several times and then recast in the interests of clarity by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 ⁽²⁾. These Decisions reflect the main conditions of the financial assistance initially provided by the Greek support facility and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). They outline the cornerstones of the economic programme to be implemented by Greece.

Implementation of the agreed reforms is the responsibility of the Greek authorities and is subject to national laws and procedures, including assessment of the impact of the reforms and cost-benefit evaluation.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p. 6.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 296, 15.11.2011, p. 38. Decision last amended by Council Decision 2013/6/EU of 4 December 2012 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 40).

The Eurogroup expressed appreciation for the efforts made by the Greek population and commended the Greek authorities on their continued commitment to implementing the required reforms. Such reforms are key to bringing about sustained growth and employment ⁽³⁾.

The Eurogroup is committed to providing adequate support to Greece during the lifetime of the programme and beyond until it has regained market access, provided that Greece fully complies with the requirements and objectives of the adjustment programme ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽³⁾ See Eurogroup Statement on Greece of 8 July 2013.

⁽⁴⁾ See Eurogroup Statement on Greece of 27 November 2012. Eurogroup statements can be read at <http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/?group=statement&source=eurogroup&q=&dateFrom=&dateTo=>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010779/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Sylvana Rapti (S&D), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE), Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE), Anni Podimata (S&D), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D), Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE), Chrysoula Paliadeli (S&D), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Georgios Stavrakakis (S&D) και Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Άνοδος ναζιστικών φαινομένων στην Ευρώπη — δολοφονία νέου στην Ελλάδα

Στις 17.9.2013, ένα μέλος του νεοναζιστικού κόμματος «Χρυσή Αυγή» δολοφόνησε εν ψυχρώ έναν 34χρονο εξαιτίας των πολιτικών του πεποιθήσεων. Πρόκειται για το αποκορύφωμα σειράς βίαιων ενεργειών (όπως στο Μελιγαλά, στα Γιαννιτσά και στο Πέραμα) από μέλη της Χρυσής Αυγής που γνώρισε εντυπωσιακή άνοδο στο περιβάλλον της πρωτοφανούς οικονομικής κρίσης που πλήττει την Ελλάδα και αναπτύσσεται ραγδαία, καθώς το εφαρμοζόμενο πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής σταθερότητας — έκτος χρόνος ύφεσης και τέταρτος χρόνος σκληρής λιτότητας — έχει εξαντλήσει και τις τελευταίες αντοχές των Ελλήνων πολιτών.

Είναι προφανές ότι η ελληνική κυβέρνηση και οι αρμόδιες αρχές θα δράσουν άμεσα για την αντιμετώπιση τέτοιων φαινομένων στο πλαίσιο του συντάγματος και της εθνικής νομοθεσίας. Η εξάπλωση όμως φιλοναζιστικών, ρατσιστικών φορέων και κινήσεων δεν αφορά μόνο στην Ελλάδα. Έχει καταγραφεί ήδη σε προηγούμενες εθνικές και ευρωπαϊκές εκλογές σε πολλά κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και καταγράφεται εντονότερα στις μετρήσεις που γίνονται σε όλη την Ευρώπη.

Διαπιστώνεται καθημερινά ότι οι ομάδες αυτές επωφελούνται από τις πολιτικές δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη, κυρίως όμως σ' εκείνα όπου οι κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις των μέτρων που λαμβάνονται έρχονται σε αντίθεση με το κοινωνικό μοντέλο επί του οποίου δομήθηκε η ΕΕ και το οποίο η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή χαρακτηρίζει «αναγκαίο» για την επιτυχή εφαρμογή προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής και την έξοδο από την κρίση. Όσο τα προγράμματα λιτότητας συμπίεζουν το εισόδημα των πολιτών και περιθωριοποιούν, κοινωνικά και εργασιακά, μεγάλες ομάδες, κυρίως νέων ανθρώπων, τόσο βρίσκουν έδαφος εγκληματικές συμπεριφορές με άλλοθι τη φτώχεια και την παράνομη μετανάστευση.

Επειδή τέτοια φαινόμενα που προαναφέρθηκαν πιθανόν να επιδεινωθούν, και όχι μόνο στην Ελλάδα, ερωτώνται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και το Συμβούλιο:

1. Συνειδητοποιούν ότι εξαντλούνται οι δημοκρατικές αντοχές των κοινωνιών, κυρίως σε κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ με προγράμματα προσαρμογής και πλήττονται καίρια οι αρχές και οι αξίες επί των οποίων οικοδομήθηκε η ΕΕ;
2. Θα συνυπολογίσουν τις κοινωνικές και πολιτικές παραμέτρους των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής;
3. Στο βαθμό που τους αναλογεί, ποιες πολιτικές προτίθενται να εφαρμόσουν ώστε ν' αμβλυνθούν οι επιπτώσεις από την ύφεση και τη λιτότητα στις χώρες που εφαρμόζουν προγράμματα προσαρμογής, ν' αποφευχθεί η επιδείνωση φαινομένων βίας και διάρρηξης της κοινωνικής συνοχής, που τραυματίζουν βαρύτατα το ευρωπαϊκό εγχείρημα, κλονίζουν συθέμελα την εμπιστοσύνη των πολιτών στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και επαναφέρουν στο προσκήνιο τη ναζιστική απειλή;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(6 Νοεμβρίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει στη δήλωσή της της 9ης Οκτωβρίου προς το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο σχετικά με την άνοδο του ακροδεξιού εξτρεμισμού στην Ευρώπη. Η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι η άνοδος του εξτρεμισμού και του λαϊκισμού είναι σοβαρό ζήτημα και αποτελεί αντικείμενο κοινού προβληματισμού για την ΕΕ στο σύνολό της. Τροφοδοτεί τον ρατσισμό, τη ξενοφοβία, την ομοφοβία και όλες τις μορφές μισαλλοδοξίας. Θίγει τα δικαιώματα του ανθρώπου και απειλεί την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία στην ΕΕ. Η Επιτροπή έχει ανέκαθεν καταδικάσει κάθε εκδήλωση ρατσισμού και ξενοφοβίας, καθώς και κάθε άλλη μορφή μισαλλοδοξίας ως ασυμβίβαστες με τις αξίες και τις αρχές στις οποίες θεμελιώνεται η Ένωση. Προτίθεται να δημοσιεύσει έκθεση σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της απόφασης πλαισίου 2008/913/ΔΕΥ για την καταπολέμηση του ρατσισμού και της ξενοφοβίας στα τέλη του 2013.

Στόχος των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής είναι να δημιουργηθεί μια πιο σταθερή βάση για την ανάπτυξη και τη δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας, που θα βασίζεται σε βιώσιμα δημόσια οικονομικά, σταθερό χρηματοπιστωτικό σύστημα και πιο ανταγωνιστική και δυναμική οικονομία. Τα προγράμματα θα πρέπει επίσης να κρίνονται λαμβανομένου υπόψη του ότι έχουν αποσοβήσει πολύ δριμύτερη προσαρμογή με καταστροφικές οικονομικές και κοινωνικές συνέπειες.

Τα προγράμματα έχουν σχεδιαστεί με ιδιαίτερο γνώμονα την ανάγκη να διασφαλιστεί δίκαιη μεταχείριση. Καταβάλλονται προσπάθειες προκειμένου να διασφαλιστεί ότι το βάρος της προσαρμογής θα το μοιραστεί εξίσου όλος ο πληθυσμός. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις εφαρμόζονται σταδιακά και τα προγράμματα εστιάζονται ιδιαίτερα στην καταπολέμηση της φοροδιαφυγής και της διαφθοράς. Επίσης, περιλαμβάνουν μέτρα για την αντιμετώπιση της ανεργίας και της φτώχειας. Για παράδειγμα, το ελληνικό πρόγραμμα απαιτεί την κατάρτιση σχεδίου δράσης για την απασχόληση που θα περιλαμβάνει ένα πρόγραμμα δημοσίων έργων το οποίο με στόχο τους μακροχρόνια ανέργους, μέτρα για τη βελτίωση του δικτύου κοινωνικής ασφάλισης της Ελλάδας μέσω ενός καθεστώτος βοήθειας για τους μακροχρόνια ανέργους που απευθύνεται στους φτωχούς, καθώς και ένα καθεστώς ελάχιστου εισοδήματος που θα δημιουργηθεί σε πιλοτική βάση.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010779/13
to the Commission**

**Sylvana Rapti (S&D), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE),
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE), Anni Podimata (S&D), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D),
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D), Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE), Chrysoula Paliadeli
(S&D), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Georgios Stavrakakis (S&D) and Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Rise of Nazism in Europe — murder of a young man in Greece

On 17 September 2013, a member of the 'Golden Dawn' neo-Nazi party cold-bloodedly murdered a 34-year old man because of his political persuasions. This was the worst in a series of violent actions by Golden Dawn members (in Meligala, Giannitsa, Perama and elsewhere), which have increased exponentially against the backdrop of the unprecedented economic crisis which has damaged Greece and is spiralling out of control, bearing in mind that the stability programme — now in its sixth year of recession and fourth year of harsh austerity measures — has pushed the Greek people over the edge.

Obviously the Greek Government and the competent authorities will act immediately within the framework of the Constitution and national legislation in order to address these problems. However, the spread of neo-Nazi, racist parties and movements goes beyond Greece. They have already made their mark in national and European elections in numerous Member States of the European Union and, according to surveys throughout Europe, they are gaining support.

There is evidence on a daily basis that these groups are taking advantage of economic adjustment policies in all the Member States, especially where the social impact of the measures being applied conflicts with the social model on which the EU is founded, policies which the European Commission refers to as 'necessary' to the successful application of adjustment programmes and a way out of the crisis. The austerity programmes depressing people's income and pushing large groups, especially young people, to the margins of society and the job market are providing fertile ground for using poverty and illegal immigration as an excuse for criminal behaviour.

In view of the fact that the above problems may get worse, and not only in Greece, will the European Commission and the Council say:

1. Are they aware that society, especially in Member States with adjustment programmes, is at the end of its democratic tether and that the principles and values on which the EU are founded are being seriously damaged?
2. Will they take account of the social and political parameters of adjustment programmes?
3. Insofar as they are able, what policies do they propose to apply in order to mitigate the impact of the recession and austerity in countries under adjustment programmes, in order to prevent any worsening of the violence and breakdown of social cohesion which are seriously damaging the European endeavour, totally undermining public confidence in the European Union and bringing back the threat of Nazism?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(6 November 2013)

The Commission refers to its statement of 9 October 2013 to the European Parliament about the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe. The Commission recalls that the rise of extremism and populism is a critical and common concern for the EU as a whole. It fuels racism, xenophobia, homophobia and all forms of intolerance. It affects human rights and it endangers the freedom of movement within the EU. The Commission has always condemned any manifestation of racism and xenophobia as well as any other form of intolerance, because they are incompatible with the values and principles on which the Union is founded. It plans to publish a report on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia at the end of 2013.

The objective of adjustment programmes is to build a more solid basis for growth and job creation, based on sustainable public finances, a stable financial system, and a more competitive and dynamic economy. The programmes should also be judged keeping in mind that they have prevented a much sharper adjustment with devastating economic and social consequences.

Programmes are designed keeping very much in mind the need to ensure fairness. Efforts are being made to ensure that the burden of the adjustment is shared equally across the population. Reforms are being applied progressively, and programmes have a strong focus on the fight against tax evasion and corruption. They also include measures to tackle unemployment and poverty. For example, the Greek programme requires an employment action plan including a public works scheme targeted to the long term unemployed, and measures to improve Greece's social safety net through an assistance scheme for the long term unemployed targeted to the poor and a pilot minimum income scheme.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010781/13
προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)**

Θέμα: VP/HR — Η ετοιμότητα του προέδρου Hollande να εξοπλίσει τους Σύρους αντάρτες

Ο Γάλλος πρόεδρος Francois Hollande αναφέρθηκε πρόσφατα στο Παρίσι στην ετοιμότητα της Γαλλίας να εξοπλίσει τους αντάρτες στη Συρία, διευκρινίζοντας ότι αυτό θα πρέπει να γίνει εντός «ελεγχόμενου πλαισίου».

Η πρόταση του προέδρου Hollande έρχεται σε μια στιγμή κατά την οποία η Γαλλία θεωρεί ότι «οι αντάρτες είναι εγκλωβισμένοι ανάμεσα στα στρατεύματα της κυβέρνησης του Bashar al-Assad από τη μία πλευρά και τους ριζοσπάστες ισλαμιστές από την άλλη».

Κατά τη διάρκεια συνέντευξης τύπου στην πρωτεύουσα του Μάλι, Μπαμάκο, ο πρόεδρος Hollande κατηγόρησε τη Ρωσία ότι αποστέλλει σε τακτική βάση όπλα στη Συρία. Επιπλέον, δήλωσε ότι η Γαλλία θα κάνει το ίδιο, αλλά σε ευρύτερο πλαίσιο και με τη συμμετοχή μιας σειράς χωρών, εξασφαλίζοντας παράλληλα ότι κάθε τέτοια προσπάθεια θα παραμείνει εντός ελεγχόμενου πλαισίου, ώστε ο διατιθέμενος οπλισμός να μην πέσει στα χέρια τζιχαντιστών.

Στην περίπτωση της Συρίας, η διπλωματία, η οποία αποτελεί μία από τις θεμελιώδεις αρχές της ΕΕ, φαίνεται να έχει εξαφανιστεί, καθώς οι προσπάθειες της κ. Ashton ήταν ιδιαίτερα ασαφείς.

Με βάση τα ανωτέρω, καλείται η Αντιπρόεδρος της Επιτροπής/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος της Ένωσης για Θέματα Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής να απαντήσει στα ακόλουθα:

1. Θα μπορούσε η ΑΠ/ΥΕ να εκφράσει τη γνώμη της σχετικά με τις πρόσφατες εξελίξεις στη Συρία και, συγκεκριμένα, σχετικά με τις προθέσεις του προέδρου Hollande;
2. Θα μπορούσε η ΑΠ/ΥΕ να ενημερώσει το Κοινοβούλιο σχετικά με τα περαιτέρω μέτρα που προτίθεται να λάβει προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσει το πρόβλημα της Συρίας με ειρηνικό τρόπο, μέσω διπλωματικής δράσης, αποφεύγοντας έτσι περαιτέρω επιθέσεις και θανάτους αμάχων; Ποιες εναλλακτικές λύσεις προβλέπονται από την ΕΕ προκειμένου να αποφευχθεί η στρατιωτική δράση από την πλευρά των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και της Γαλλίας;

**Απάντηση της Υπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(29 Νοεμβρίου 2013)**

1. Το εμπάργκο όπλων όσον αφορά τη Συρία έληξε στις 31 Μαΐου 2013. Ενδεχόμενες εξαγωγές όπλων στη Συρία είναι πλέον ζήτημα των εθνικών πολιτικών των κρατών μελών.

Στις 27 Μαΐου 2013, τα κράτη μέλη προέβησαν σε δήλωση του Συμβουλίου για τη Συρία, σύμφωνα με την οποία προτίθενται να ακολουθήσουν τις οικείες εθνικές πολιτικές με βάση αυστηρά κριτήρια, και μάλιστα ότι όπλα πρέπει να παρέχονται μόνο στον συριακό αντιπολιτευτικό συνασπισμό, για την προστασία των αμάχων, και με εγγυήσεις σχετικά με το ποιοι είναι θα είναι οι τελικοί χρήστες. Εναπόκειται στα κράτη μέλη να εξασφαλίζουν ότι πληρούνται τα κριτήρια αυτά σε περίπτωση πρόθεσης αποστολής όπλων στη Συρία.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, τα κράτη μέλη δήλωσαν επίσης, στις 27 Μαΐου 2013, ότι σε αυτό το στάδιο δεν θα εφοδιάσουν με όπλα τη Συρία. Επιπλέον, ορισμένα κράτη μέλη δήλωσαν διμερώς ότι θα συνεχίσουν να μην παραδίδουν καθόλου όπλα στη Συρία.

2. Η ΕΕ συνεχίζει να καλεί όλα τα μέρη που εμπλέκονται στη σύγκρουση να ανταποκριθούν θετικά στην έκκληση του Γενικού Γραμματέα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για τη διενέργεια ειρηνευτικής διάσκεψης στη Γενεύη και να προσχωρήσουν δημοσίως σε μια αξιόπιστη πολιτική μετάβαση με βάση την πλήρη εφαρμογή του ανακοινωθέντος της Γενεύης. Προς τούτο, τα μέρη πρέπει να συμφωνήσουν κατά τη διάρκεια της διάσκεψης σε σαφή και μη αναστρέψιμα στάδια, καθώς και σε ένα σύντομο χρονοδιάγραμμα για την πολιτική μετάβαση. Η ΕΕ καλεί την αντιπολίτευση να συσπειρωθεί και να συμμετάσχει ενεργά στη διάσκεψη και ενθαρρύνει τον Εθνικό συνασπισμό των Συρίων επαναστατών και δυνάμεων της αντιπολίτευσης (SOC) να αναλάβει ηγετικό ρόλο κατά τις διαπραγματεύσεις.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010781/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — President Hollande ready to give weapons to Syrian rebels

French President François Hollande suggested recently in Paris that France is ready to arm rebels in Syria, suggesting that this should be done within a 'controlled framework'.

President Hollande's proposal comes at a time when France considers that 'rebels are trapped between the troops of the Bashar al-Assad government on the one hand, and radical Islamists on the other'.

During a press conference in Mali's capital Bamako, President Hollande accused Russia of sending weapons to Syrians on a regular basis. Moreover, he stated that France will do the same but in a broader sense by involving a number of countries and by making sure that any such effort will remain within a framework that can be controlled, so that weapons provided will not fall into the hands of jihadists.

In the case of Syria, diplomacy, which is one of the fundamental principles of the EU, seems to have disappeared, as efforts by Mrs Ashton have been very vague.

In the light of the above, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs is invited to answer the following:

1. Could the VP/HR express her opinion on the recent developments in Syria and, specifically, on President Hollande's intentions?
2. Could the VP/HR inform Parliament what further steps she intends to take in order to tackle the Syrian problem in a peaceful way through diplomatic action, thus avoiding further attacks and killings of civilians? What alternative ways forward are foreseen by the EU in order to avoid military actions by the United States and France?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(29 November 2013)

1. The EU arms embargo against Syria expired on 31 May 2013. Possible export of arms to Syria is now a matter of Member States' national policies.

Member States have declared in a Council Declaration on Syria on 27 May 2013 that they are to proceed in their national policies on the basis of strict criteria, notably that arms would be supplied only to the Syrian Opposition Coalition, for the protection of civilians, and with guarantees about who the end-users will be. It is for Member States to ensure that these criteria are fulfilled in case delivery of arms to Syria would be considered.

In this respect Member States have also declared on 27 May 2013 that they would not deliver arms to Syria at that stage. In addition, a number of Member States have bilaterally declared that they would continue not to deliver arms to Syria at all.

2. The EU continues urging all sides of the conflict to respond positively to the call made by the UN Secretary-General for a peace conference in Geneva and to adhere publicly to a credible political transition based on the full implementation of the Geneva communiqué. To this end, the parties will have to agree during the Conference on clear and irreversible steps and a short timeframe for the political transition. The EU calls on the opposition to come together and participate actively at the conference and encourages the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) to take a leading role during negotiations.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-010782/13
till kommissionen**

Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)

(23 september 2013)

Angående: Förordningen om den digitala inre marknaden: fastställda hinder

Kommissionen lade nyligen fram ett förslag till förordning om åtgärder för att fullborda den europeiska inre marknaden för elektronisk kommunikation och upprätta en uppkopplad kontinent. I avsnitt A i sammanfattningen av konsekvensbedömningen anges det att fragmenteringen av regelverket har fastställts som ett hinder för följande sektorsspecifika regler: auktorisation att verka enligt enhetliga regler, tillgång till viktiga produktionsfaktorer för verksamhet inom fast eller mobil kommunikation och regler om konsumentskydd.

Kan kommissionen uppge i exakt vilka rapporter eller källor dessa hinder har fastställts?

Kan kommissionen förklara varför man föredragit en förordning i stället för ett direktiv som metod för att ta itu med de hinder som påstås ha fastställts?

Svar från Neelie Kroes på kommissionens vägnar

(6 november 2013)

Detaljerad information om källorna finns att hämta i den fullständiga konsekvensbedömningen ⁽¹⁾. Vad gäller auktorisation att verka enligt enhetliga regler har källor bland annat hämtats från "Report on the impact of administrative requirements on the provision of transnational business electronic communications services" ⁽²⁾ från organet för tillsynsmyndigheter inom elektronisk kommunikation (Berec) samt slutsatser från Berecs undersökning "Report on the public call for contributions on possible existing legal and administrative barriers with reference to the provision of electronic communications services for the business segment" ⁽³⁾. Undersökningen "Cost of Non-Europe" ⁽⁴⁾ nämner dessutom bristen på enhetliga regler i allmänhet som ett stort hinder. Vad gäller tillgång till viktiga insatsvaror för fast eller mobil affärsverksamhet hänvisas till slutsatserna från rundabordssamtalet för verkställande direktörer i juli 2011, undersökningen "Cost of Non-Europe" som nämnts ovan, en undersökning som utförts av WIK ⁽⁵⁾ och en rad bilaterala möten med berörda parter. Vad gäller konsumentskydd finns en stor mängd källor, därför hänvisas till konsekvensbedömningens underavdelningar 2.2 (Consultation and Expertise) och 4.2 (Single Market fragmentation affecting European consumers) samt rapportens bilaga II ⁽⁶⁾.

Man har föredragit en förordning, eftersom de förslagens syften inte skulle kunna uppnås i rimlig tid med hjälp av en fullständig översyn av de befintliga direktiven. Förslaget bemöter frågor som uppkommer i en snabbt föränderlig värld och det är viktigt att agera skyndsamt. Kommissionen föreslår en förordning eftersom en sådan avlägsnar hindren för ett fullbordande av den inre marknaden med hjälp av konkreta och direkt tillämpliga rättigheter och skyldigheter för leverantörer och slutanvändare, och en verkligt gemensam strategi för att undvika avvikande nationella lösningar.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=2736

⁽²⁾ (BoR (11) 56, 8 december 2011), http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/download/0/120-berec-report-on-the-impact-of-administra_0.pdf

⁽³⁾ (BoR (11) 55, 8 december 2011), http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/download/0/120-berec-report-on-the-impact-of-administra_0.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ "Steps towards a truly Internal Market for e-communications", ECORYS, särskilt kapitel 5, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=2648

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.ectaportal.com/en/PRESS/ECTA-Press-Releases/2013/ECTA-INTUG-Untapped-potential-of-digital-single-market/>

⁽⁶⁾ Bilaga II i konsekvensbedömningen innehåller de operativa rekommendationerna från den rådgivande europeiska konsumentgruppens (ECCG) möte den 11–12 juni 2013 (undergrupp för internettjänster).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010782/13
to the Commission**

Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Digital Single Market Regulation: identified obstacles

The Commission recently proposed a regulation laying down measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to achieve a 'Connected Continent'. In section A of the executive summary of the impact assessment it is stated that the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks has been identified as an obstacle for the following sector-specific rules: authorisation to operate under consistent rules, access to key inputs for fixed or mobile business, and rules on end-user protection.

Can the Commission point to the exact reports or sources where these obstacles have been identified?

Can the Commission explain why a regulation, rather than a directive, was chosen as the preferred method of dealing with these obstacles that it claims to have identified?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(6 November 2013)

Detailed information on the sources of information can be found in the full Impact Assessment document ⁽¹⁾. Concerning the authorisation to operate under consistent rules, among the sources are the BEREC 'Report on the impact of administrative requirements on the provision of transnational business electronic communications services' ⁽²⁾ along with the findings of the BEREC survey 'Report on the public call for contributions on possible existing legal and administrative barriers with reference to the provision of electronic communications services for the business segment' ⁽³⁾. In addition, the study on the 'Cost of non-Europe' ⁽⁴⁾ refers to the lack of consistency of rules in general as a major obstacle. With regards to access to key inputs for fixed or mobile business, the evidence includes the conclusions of the CEO Round Table of July 2011, the study on the 'Cost of non-Europe' cited above, a study by WIK ⁽⁵⁾ and a series of bilateral meetings with stakeholders. On end-user protection, as the number of sources is very large it is suggested to consult sub-chapters 2.2 (Consultation and Expertise) and 4.2 (Single Market fragmentation affecting European consumers) of the impact assessment report as well as to Annex II ⁽⁶⁾ of the report.

A Regulation was chosen because the objectives underpinning this proposal would not be achieved in a timely manner through a full review of the existing Directives. The proposal addresses issues in a fast changing world, and it is essential to act rapidly. The Commission proposes a regulation as it ensures the removal of single market barriers, with specific, directly-applicable rights and obligations for providers and end users, and a truly common approach to avoid divergent national solutions.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=2736

⁽²⁾ (BoR (11) 56, 8 December 2011), http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/download/0/120-berec-report-on-the-impact-of-administra_0.pdf

⁽³⁾ BoR (11) 55, 08 December 2011, http://berec.europa.eu/files/doc/berec/bor/bor11_55_input_businessservices.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ 'Steps towards a truly Internal Market for e-communications', Ecorys, in particular Chapter 5.

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=2648

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.ectportal.com/en/PRESS/ECTA-Press-Releases/2013/ECTA-INTUG-Untapped-potential-of-digital-single-market/>

⁽⁹⁾ Annex II of the Impact assessment includes the operational recommendations of the European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) meeting on 11-12 June 2013 (Sub-Group on the Provision of Internet Services).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010783/13
to the Commission**

Catherine Stihler (S&D)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Zero hour contracts

With the growing use in certain Member States of zero hour contracts, can the Commission inform us as to how this impacts on European health and safety rules? Furthermore, how do these contracts ensure the health and safety of EU workers?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

There are no rules at EU level specifically regulating 'zero-hour contracts'.

In principle, EC law does not preclude zero-hour contracts, since neither of the two most relevant labour law Directives (the Working Time Directive ⁽¹⁾ and the Part-Time Work Directive ⁽²⁾) lays down a right to a minimum number of working hours. The Court of Justice confirmed this in its judgment in Case C-313/02 ⁽³⁾, in which it held a type of zero-hour contract to be compatible with the Part-Time Work Directive and EU gender equality rules.

Zero-hour contracts must, however, comply with EC law requirements regarding working conditions. In particular, zero-hour workers are entitled to paid annual leave on a proportional basis in accordance with Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7 of the Working Time Directive. Their health and safety at work must be guaranteed in accordance with EC law.

The Commission raised the issues of precarious work and zero-hour employment in a Green Paper ⁽⁴⁾, but there was insufficient support among the Member States for the Commission to propose new legislation at EU level to address these issues. The Labour law conference, organised by the Commission on 21 October addressed the segmentation of the labour market and touched upon zero-hour contracts ⁽⁵⁾.

The Commission services will continue to follow developments in the Member States involving this type of contract, including its impact in terms of workers' health and safety.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 9.

⁽³⁾ Case C-313/02 Nicole Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-09483.

⁽⁴⁾ 'Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century' (COM(2006) 708 final of 22 November 2006).

⁽⁵⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=898&furtherEvents=yes>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010784/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Events to mark 60th anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights

Members of the Scottish Parliament recently supported a motion to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the coming into force of the European Convention on Human Rights. What arrangements were organised by the European Union to increase public awareness of this event?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(9 December 2013)

The Commission focuses on formally celebrating the key dates in the history of European Union integration such as Treaty ratifications or the Schuman Declaration. The European Convention of Human Rights, although of paramount importance for the EU, is an instrument of the Council of Europe and not of the European Union.

That being said, the Commission has many other ways to recognise the historical importance of the Convention, for example speeches or articles dedicated to the anniversary (see, for example, the article by Vice-President Reding in 'Vom Recht auf Menschenwürde, 60 Jahre Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention' — Herausgegeben von Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger ⁽¹⁾).

It should also be kept in mind that the formal status of the Convention in the EU legal system may change in the foreseeable future. The EU is obliged to become a member of the Convention (see Article 6(2) TEU), and the process of accession is under way with an agreement on draft accession instruments having been reached at negotiators' level in April 2013.

⁽¹⁾ ISBN 978-3-16-152628-2.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010786/13
to the Commission**

Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Commission involvement in Offshore Europe event in Aberdeen

Aberdeen recently hosted the Offshore Europe Conference and Exhibition, an event that hosts 1 500 exhibitors involved in the global energy industry.

Did the Commission have any involvement in this event, which is key to oil and gas companies in Scotland and across Europe?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(11 November 2013)

The Commission was indeed represented at this year's Offshore Europe event in Aberdeen, UK. The Commission's representative presented the recently adopted EU Directive 2013/30/EU aimed at improving the safety of offshore oil and gas operations during a panel session attended by the UK energy minister (Michael Fallon, MP) and representatives of regulators and industry.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-010787/13

an die Kommission

**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
und Brian Simpson (S&D)**

(23. September 2013)

Betrifft: Ermittlungen der Artikel 29-Arbeitsgruppe im Zusammenhang mit dem neuen Ticketvertriebssystem des Internationalen Luftverkehrsverbands (IATA)

Am 29. Mai 2013 äußerten die Verfasser dieser Schriftlichen Anfrage an die Kommission ihre Bedenken im Zusammenhang mit der vom Internationalen Luftverkehrsverband IATA angenommenen Resolution 787, laut der Vorkehrungen zur Entwicklung eines neuen Vertriebssystems für Flugtickets (new distribution capability — NDC) getroffen werden sollen und das möglicherweise Verstößen gegen die Persönlichkeits- und die Datenschutzrechte von EU-Bürgern Vorschub leistet.

In ihrer Antwort bestätigt die Kommission, sie habe in ihrem Schreiben an die IATA auf den geltenden Rechtsrahmen nach dem Wettbewerbsrecht, dem Datenschutzrecht und dem Flugverkehrsrecht hingewiesen und sei derzeit mit der Prüfung der Resolution befasst, um nachvollziehen zu können, worum es sich bei diesem neuen System NDC handelt und welche Auswirkungen es haben könnte.

Die Verfasser haben sich zudem an Kommissarin Reding gewandt, um die potenziellen Auswirkungen dieser Initiative der IATA auf den Datenschutz deutlich zu machen. In ihrer Antwort erläuterte Frau Reding, dass die Artikel 29-Arbeitsgruppe als unabhängiges Beratungsgremium der Kommission in dieser Angelegenheit fungiert, und fügte hinzu, dass die Arbeitsgruppe auf ihrer letzten Vollversammlung Ende Februar beschlossen habe, sich mit dieser Angelegenheit zu befassen und gründlich zu untersuchen, wie sie sich auf den Datenschutz auswirken werde. Anhand der Ergebnisse dieser Ermittlungen werde dann in angemessener Form über Mittel und Wege diskutiert werden können, wie die von uns geäußerten Bedenken der IATA vermittelt werden können.

Kann die Kommission Angaben dazu machen, wie weit die Untersuchung, mit der die Artikel 29-Arbeitsgruppe befasst ist, inzwischen gediehen ist und wie der diesbezügliche Zeitplan aussieht, und kann sie auch klipp und klar beantworten, ob das Ergebnis dieser Untersuchung und die daraus gezogenen Schlussfolgerungen dem Parlament mitgeteilt werden, sobald diese abgeschlossen ist?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission

(7. November 2013)

Die Datenschutzgruppe nach Artikel 29 untersucht weiterhin die datenschutzrechtlichen Aspekte, die mit der vom Internationalen Luftverkehrsverband (IATA) geplanten Entwicklung eines neuen Vertriebssystems für Flugtickets (NDC) verbunden sind.

Ob in dieser Sache weitere Schritte unternommen werden oder ob das Ergebnis und Schlussfolgerungen der Untersuchung dem Europäischen Parlament mitgeteilt werden, wird allein von der Artikel 29-Datenschutzgruppe entschieden, die die Kommission als unabhängiges Gremium berät.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-010787/13

προς την Επιτροπή

**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
και Brian Simpson (S&D)
(23 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)**

Θέμα: Έρευνα της ομάδας εργασίας του άρθρου 29 στη Διεθνή Ένωση Αερομεταφορών (IATA) και η νέα ικανότητα διανομής

Στις 29 Μαΐου 2013 οι συντάκτες της παρούσας γραπτής ερώτησης απηύθυναν επιστολή στην Επιτροπή με την οποία εξέφραζαν την ανησυχία τους σχετικά με το Ψήφισμα 787 της Διεθνούς Ένωσης Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (IATA) που περιλαμβάνει διατάξεις για την ανάπτυξη μιας νέας ικανότητας διανομής (NID) και σχετικά με την πιθανότητα να οδηγήσει σε παραβιάσεις των προσωπικών δικαιωμάτων και των δικαιωμάτων προστασίας των δεδομένων των πολιτών της ΕΕ.

Στην απάντησή της η Επιτροπή επιβεβαίωσε ότι έχει «απευθύνει επιστολή στην Διεθνή Ένωση Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (IATA) προκειμένου να υπενθυμίσει το ισχύον νομικό πλαίσιο σύμφωνα με την νομοθεσία περί ανταγωνισμού, τη νομοθεσία περί προστασίας των δεδομένων και την νομοθεσία περί αερομεταφορών» και ότι «σε αυτό το στάδιο αναλύει το ψήφισμα προκειμένου να κατανοήσει τη φύση και τις επιπτώσεις της NID».

Οι συντάκτες της ερώτησης απηύθυναν επίσης επιστολή στην επίτροπο Reding με στόχο να επισημάνουν τις πιθανές επιπτώσεις της πρωτοβουλίας της IATA στην προστασία των δεδομένων. Στην απάντησή της, η επίτροπος Reding επεσήμανε ότι η ομάδα εργασίας του άρθρου 29 είναι ο ανεξάρτητος σύμβουλος της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά το θέμα αυτό, και προσέθεσε ότι η ομάδα εργασίας «αποφάσισε στην τελευταία συνεδρίαση της ολομέλειας των μελών της στα τέλη Φεβρουαρίου να εξετάσει το εν λόγω θέμα και τις επιπτώσεις του στην προστασία των δεδομένων. Τα αποτελέσματα της εν λόγω έρευνας θα αποτελέσουν την κατάλληλη βάση για συζήτηση όσον αφορά τον τρόπο με τον οποίο θα εκφράσουμε τις ανησυχίες μας στην IATA».

Θα μπορούσε η Επιτροπή να παράσχει επικαιροποιημένα στοιχεία σχετικά με την έρευνα που διενήργησε η ομάδα του άρθρου 29 και το χρονοδιάγραμμα της έρευνας, και θα μπορούσε, εκτός αυτού, να διευκρινίσει εάν το αποτέλεσμα και τα συμπεράσματα της έρευνας αυτής θα κοινοποιηθούν στο Κοινοβούλιο όταν αυτή ολοκληρωθεί;

Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(7 Νοεμβρίου 2013)

Η ομάδα του άρθρου 29 για την προστασία των προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα, συνεχίζει να μελετά τις επιπτώσεις που θα μπορούσε να έχει στην προστασία των δεδομένων το σχέδιο της Διεθνούς Ένωσης Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (IATA) σχετικά με την ανάπτυξη μιας νέας ικανότητας διανομής (NID) για τα αεροπορικά εισιτήρια.

Εναπόκειται στην ομάδα εργασίας του άρθρου 29, ως ανεξάρτητης συμβουλευτικής ομάδας της Επιτροπής, να αποφασίσει για τυχόν περαιτέρω μέτρα που θα λάβει σχετικά με το θέμα αυτό, όπως και για το κατά πόσον τα αποτελέσματα και τα συμπεράσματα της έρευνας θα κοινοποιηθούν στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-010787/13

aan de Commissie

**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
en Brian Simpson (S&D)**
(23 september 2013)

Betreft: Door de Groep artikel 29 ingesteld onderzoek naar de Internationale Luchtvaartorganisatie (IATA) en de nieuwe distributiec capaciteit

Op 29 mei 2013 hebben de indieners van deze schriftelijke vraag bij de Commissie uiting gegeven aan hun bezorgdheid omtrent het door de Internationale Luchtvaartorganisatie (IATA) aangenomen Besluit 787, dat voorziet in bepalingen ter ontwikkeling van nieuwe distributiec capaciteit (NDC), en omtrent de potentiële inbreuken die daarmee kunnen worden gepleegd op de persoonlijke en gegevensbeschermingsrechten van EU-burgers.

In haar antwoord heeft de Commissie bevestigd dat zij „de Internationale Luchtvaartorganisatie (IATA) schriftelijk heeft herinnerd aan het uit hoofde van de concurrentie-, de gegevensbeschermings- en de luchtvaartwetgeving in de EU geldende rechtsstelsel”, en dat zij „het bewuste besluit momenteel analyseert om inzicht te krijgen in de aard en implicaties van de NDC”.

De indieners van de vraag hebben ook commissaris Reding schriftelijk gewezen op de mogelijke implicaties van het IATA-initiatief in termen van gegevensbescherming. In haar antwoord heeft commissaris Reding uitgelegd dat de Groep artikel 29 fungeert als onafhankelijk adviseur van de Commissie over dit onderwerp, en voegde zij daaraan toe dat de Groep „op zijn laatste plenaire bijeenkomst eind februari heeft besloten deze kwestie nader te bestuderen en de gegevensbeschermingsimplicaties ervan te onderzoeken. De uitkomst van dit onderzoek vormt een geschikt uitgangspunt voor een discussie over de middelen en methoden om jegens de IATA uiting te geven aan onze bedenkingen daaromtrent”.

Kan de Commissie een overzicht geven van de stand van zaken met betrekking tot het door de Groep artikel 29 ingestelde onderzoek en het daarbij gevolgde tijdschema, en kan zij nader aangeven of de resultaten en conclusies van dit onderzoek, zodra het is voltooid, ook aan het Parlement zullen worden meegedeeld?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie

(7 november 2013)

De Groep gegevensbescherming artikel 29 blijft verder onderzoek verrichten naar de gegevensbeschermingsimplicaties van de plannen van de Internationale Luchtvaartorganisatie (IATA) om een nieuwe distributiec capaciteit (NDC) voor vliegtickets te ontwikkelen.

De Groep gegevensbescherming artikel 29, een onafhankelijk adviesorgaan van de Commissie, beslist zelf welke verdere stappen zij over dit onderwerp zal ondernemen, met inbegrip van de vraag of de resultaten en conclusies van het onderzoek zullen worden gedeeld met het Europees Parlement.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010787/13
to the Commission**

**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
and Brian Simpson (S&D)**
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Article 29 Working Party investigation of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the new distribution capability

On 29 May 2013 the authors of this Written Question wrote to the Commission expressing concern about Resolution 787 adopted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which includes provisions to develop a new distribution capability (NDC), and the potential it has for infringements on the personal and data protection rights of EU citizens.

In its response, the Commission confirming that its '[has] written to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to recall the EU applicable legal framework under competition law, data protection law and aviation law' and that it is 'currently analysing the Resolution to understand the nature and implications of the NDC'.

The authors also wrote to Commissioner Reding to highlight the possible implications of the IATA initiative in terms of data protection. In response, Commissioner Reding explained that the article 29 Working Party is the independent advisor to the Commission on this issue, adding that the Working Party 'decided at its last plenary in late February to take this issue up and investigate the data protection implications. The outcome of this investigation will be the appropriate basis for a discussion on the ways and means of addressing our concerns to IATA'.

Could the Commission provide an update on the investigation conducted by the article 29 Working Party and the timetable for the investigation, and can it clarify whether the outcome and conclusions of this investigation will be shared with Parliament as soon as it is completed?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(7 November 2013)

The article 29 Data Protection Working Party is continuing to investigate the data protection implications of the International Air Transport Association's (IATA) plans to develop a new distribution capability (NDC) for flight tickets.

It is up to the article 29 Data Protection Working Party, being an independent advisory body to the Commission, to decide on any further steps it will take on this issue, including whether the outcome and conclusions of the investigation will be shared with the European Parliament.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-010789/13
à la Commission
Michèle Striffler (PPE)
(23 septembre 2013)

Objet: Financement de la corrida par la PAC

La corrida est une pratique exclusivement répandue dans certaines régions européennes (Espagne, Portugal, Sud de la France) et qui nécessite l'élevage de taureaux uniquement destinés à cette activité.

De nombreux rapports et études font état d'un financement en provenance de la politique agricole commune (PAC) bénéficiant à des exploitations dont le seul but est l'élevage de taureaux de combat.

Or, un tel financement ne correspond absolument pas aux objectifs de la PAC tels que définis par l'article 39 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne.

Aussi, la Commission compte-t-elle prendre des mesures à l'encontre des États membres qui détournent les subventions agricoles européennes pour financer des élevages de taureaux de combats destinés à la corrida?

Réponse donnée par M. Ciolos au nom de la Commission
(7 novembre 2013)

La Commission invite l'Honorable Parlementaire à se reporter à la réponse commune aux questions écrites E-010205/2012 et E-010589/2012 posées respectivement par M. Dan Jørgensen et M. Raül Romeva i Rueda ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010789/13
to the Commission
Michèle Striffler (PPE)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: CAP funding for bullfighting

The practice of bullfighting is confined to a few parts of Europe, namely Spain, Portugal and southern France. The bulls involved are specially raised for the purpose of fighting.

Many reports and studies show that farms devoted exclusively to the breeding of fighting bulls receive funding under the common agricultural policy (CAP).

Providing funding for such purposes is completely at odds with the objectives of the CAP, as laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Does the Commission, therefore, plan to take steps against Member States that misuse EU agricultural subsidies in order to fund the breeding of fighting bulls?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission
(7 November 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the joint answer to written questions E-010205/2012 by Mr Dan Jørgensen and E-010589/2012 by Mr Raül Romeva i Rueda ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-010791/13
à la Commission**

Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE)

(23 septembre 2013)

Objet: Représentation des États membres au Conseil européen

L'article 15 du traité sur l'Union européenne (traité UE) stipule, en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux institutions, que: «*Le Conseil européen est composé des chefs d'État ou de gouvernement des États membres, ainsi que de son président et du président de la Commission*».

Pour sa part, l'article 10, paragraphe 2, alinéa 2, du même traité UE précise, en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux principes démocratiques, que: «*Les États membres sont représentés au Conseil européen par leur chef d'État ou de gouvernement et au Conseil par leurs gouvernements, eux-mêmes démocratiquement responsables, soit devant leurs parlements nationaux, soit devant leurs citoyens*».

Le député soussigné a l'honneur de demander à qui de droit au sein de la Commission en sa qualité de gardienne des traités si, pour l'application des principes démocratiques prévus à l'article 10, paragraphe 2, alinéa 2, la bribe de phrase «*eux-mêmes démocratiquement responsables, soit devant leurs parlements nationaux, soit devant leurs citoyens*» s'applique seulement aux gouvernements qui représentent les États membres au Conseil ou s'applique également aux chefs d'État ou de gouvernement qui représentent les États membres au Conseil européen?

Réponse donnée par M. Barroso au nom de la Commission

(12 novembre 2013)

Il n'incombe pas à la Commission, mais à la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne de statuer sur l'interprétation des traités. L'expression «gardienne des traités» vise la tâche de la Commission de surveiller l'application du droit de l'Union, à laquelle se réfère l'article 17(1) TUE.

Pour ce qui concerne la signification de l'article 10, paragraphe 2, deuxième alinéa du TUE, la Commission note que, si les versions linguistiques des traités ne sont pas toutes grammaticalement identiques sur la question de savoir à qui la partie de phrase commençant par «eux-mêmes démocratiquement responsables» se réfère, il résulte d'un nombre important de versions que cette partie de phrase vise non seulement les gouvernements mais également les Chefs d'État ou de gouvernement siégeant au Conseil européen. La plupart des versions permettent cette lecture, ce qui semble bien correspondre à l'objectif de cette disposition et sa place dans le traité.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010791/13
to the Commission**

Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Representation of Member States in the European Council

With regard to provisions on the institutions, Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) states the following: 'The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission'.

With regard to provisions on democratic principles, the second subparagraph of Article 10(2), of the same EU Treaty states the following: 'Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens'.

The undersigned Member of the European Parliament has the honour of asking the Commission in its capacity as guardian of the treaties, whether, in terms of the application of the democratic principles provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 10(2), the phrase 'themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens' only applies to governments which represent Member States in the Council or whether it also applies to the Heads of State or Government which represent Member States in the European Council?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(12 November 2013)

It is the Court of Justice of the European Union, and not the Commission, that has jurisdiction to give rulings on the interpretation of the Treaties. The expression 'guardian of the Treaties' refers to the Commission's task of overseeing the application of Union law, as provided for in Article 17(1) TEU.

As for the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 10(2) TEU, the Commission would observe that, although the language versions of the Treaties are not all grammatically identical on the question of to whom the clause beginning with 'themselves democratically accountable' refers, it is apparent from a significant number of versions that this clause refers not only to governments, but also to the Heads of State or Government in the European Council. Most versions allow this reading, which seems to correspond to the purpose of the provision and its place in the Treaty.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010793/13

alla Commissione

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(23 settembre 2013)

Oggetto: Aumento dei casi di lebbra in India

Secondo le stime dell'Organizzazione mondiale della sanità (OMS), in India sta tornando a diffondersi il morbo della lebbra: infatti, mentre nel 2005 i malati erano in rapporto di 1 a 10.000 persone, attualmente si è passati a 2 persone su 10.000.

Fonti locali come gli operatori dell'*ashram* e centro di riabilitazione «*Swarga Dwar*», fondato nel 1983 dal Pontificio istituto per le missioni estere, rilevano che ogni settimana arrivano due o tre persone contagiate bisognose di cure ed assistenza, un numero di nuovi casi decisamente superiore al passato.

Le cause di tale aumento sono da ravvisarsi soprattutto nell'ondata migratoria che dalle campagne si riversa nelle grandi città per cercare lavoro, unitamente alle condizioni di povertà e scarsa igiene nelle quali queste persone sono costrette a vivere.

Può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra descritti?
2. visto il *Country Strategy Paper* 2007-2013 con cui vengono stanziati circa 470 000 000 di euro, può indicare quale cifra è stata destinata al campo della salute e in particolare alla cura o prevenzione della lebbra?
3. come ritiene che il governo indiano abbia utilizzato tali risorse per far fronte alla diffusione di questo morbo sul suo territorio?

Risposta di Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione

(13 novembre 2013)

1. La diffusione della lebbra in India è diminuita nel 2005 a meno di 1 caso su 10 000 persone, il che ha permesso al paese di dichiarare l'eliminazione della malattia. Quest'anno 36 distretti, ossia 9 distretti in più dell'anno scorso, hanno registrato più di 2 casi su 10 000 persone. Il più colpito è stato il distretto di Tapi, nello Stato occidentale di Gujarat, in cui si sono registrati nel mese di marzo 6,55 casi su 10 000 persone rispetto ai 4,03 casi su 10 000 persone dell'anno scorso.
2. I fondi stanziati nell'ambito del Documento di strategia nazionale 2007-2013 per l'India sono stati ridotti a 365 milioni, di cui 110 milioni destinati alla sanità. In quest'ambito, i settori a cui è destinata l'assistenza (tramite il sostegno al bilancio settoriale e il rafforzamento delle capacità generali) sono la salute riproduttiva e la salute dei bambini. La Commissione non ha programmi che riguardino specificamente la lebbra.
3. L'Unione europea continua a fornire sostegno indiretto alle autorità indiane nonché ai privati, alla società civile o ad organizzazioni religiose, tramite il Fondo globale. La delegazione dell'UE in India ha consigliato alle organizzazioni della società civile competenti, che hanno un'ottima tradizione di collaborazione con il Ministero della Sanità, di elaborare collettivamente una proposta «tubercolosi e lebbra» da presentare al Fondo globale. Combinare tubercolosi e lebbra, invece di proporre un intervento specifico per la lebbra, servirebbe ad aumentare le possibilità di ricevere finanziamenti dal Fondo globale. Inoltre, quasi tutte le organizzazioni della società civile che lavorano sulla lebbra si occupano anche di tubercolosi e, in entrambi i casi, collaborano molto strettamente con i servizi sanitari governativi.

Si invita l'onorevole parlamentare a fare riferimento anche alla risposta all'interrogazione E-006969/13 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010793/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Increase in the incidence of leprosy in India

According to World Health Organisation estimates, leprosy is starting to spread once again in India. In 2005, 1 in 10 000 of the population had the disease, whereas the number is now 2 in 10 000.

Local sources such as the Swarga Dwar ashram and rehabilitation centre, founded in 1983 by the Papal Institute for Foreign Missions, say that every week, two or three people who have contracted the illness come to them for treatment and help. This is a significant increase compared with previous years.

The main reasons for this increase seem to be the wave of migrants pouring into big cities from the countryside in search of work, coupled with the poverty and poor hygiene conditions in which these people have to live.

1. Is the Commission aware of these facts?
2. In the light of the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, which earmarked funds of approximately EUR 470 000 000, can the Commission state what sum was set aside for health, and in particular for the treatment or prevention of leprosy?
3. How does the Commission think the Indian Government has used these funds to tackle the spread of this disease in the country?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(13 November 2013)

1. India's leprosy prevalence dropped below 1 case for every 10,000 people in 2005, allowing the country to claim elimination. This year, 36 districts reported a prevalence of more than 2 cases per 10,000 people, nine more districts than last year. The worst-affected was Tapi, in the western state of Gujarat, where there were 6.55 cases per 10,000 people in March, compared to 4.03 per 10,000 people last year.
2. The funds allocated under the India Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 were reduced to 365 million out of which 110 million was earmarked for health. The health related target areas are reproductive and child health (assistance given through sector budget support and general capacity building). The Commission has no programmes specifically targeting leprosy.
3. The EU continues to provide support indirectly to Indian authorities and to private, civil society or faith-based organisations, through the Global Fund. The EU Delegation in India has advised competent Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) which have a very good partnership record with the Ministry of Health, to work collectively towards a 'tuberculosis and leprosy' proposal to the Global Fund. The interest of combining tuberculosis with leprosy is to increase chances of being funded by the Global Fund compared to a standalone 'leprosy' intervention. Also, almost all CSOs working on leprosy work also on tuberculosis, and in both cases, they work very closely with government health services.

The Honourable Member is also referred to the answer to the Question E-006969/13. ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010794/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 settembre 2013)**

Oggetto: Gruppo Pai-Ilta (Vicenza): licenziati 110 lavoratori

Nell'agosto scorso il gruppo Ilta-Pai-Abm ha avviato la procedura per il licenziamento di 110 lavoratori. Nonostante il gruppo sia stato leader e punto di riferimento per tutto il settore avicolo sino al 2011, le aziende ad esso facenti capo sono state fortemente colpite dalla crisi finanziaria, che ha portato al tracollo del fatturato, al conseguente ricorso agli ammortizzatori sociali per il 2012 e, infine, all'avvio dei licenziamenti.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra descritti;
2. se ritiene che i lavoratori licenziati potranno usufruire del sostegno del Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG);
3. quali misure intende attuare per sostenere il comparto avicolo del Veneto e il tessuto sociale che da esso dipende?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione
(18 novembre 2013)**

1. Pur non essendo a conoscenza delle circostanze menzionate dall'onorevole deputata, la Commissione è preoccupata per le conseguenze socioeconomiche che gli esuberi presso il Gruppo Ilta-Pai-Abm possono comportare.
2. Come l'onorevole deputata saprà, il criterio «crisi» del FEG è scaduto alla fine del 2011 e non può essere usato per richieste di sostegno presentate nel 2013. Per il periodo 2014-2020 i colegislatori hanno raggiunto recentemente un accordo preliminare per reintrodurre il criterio di crisi tra quelli stabiliti per poter fruire del sostegno del FEG. L'appoggio del Parlamento sarà essenziale nel processo legislativo per assicurare l'adozione finale di questo elemento. Si invita l'onorevole deputata a rivolgersi alla persona di contatto del FEG responsabile per l'Italia ⁽¹⁾ per chiedere se è prevista la presentazione di una domanda di sostegno per i lavoratori in questione.
3. La Commissione non interviene direttamente e non sostiene direttamente gli eventuali progetti sociali condotti nelle regioni italiane. Di fatto, sulla base del principio di sussidiarietà, i programmi operativi cofinanziati dai fondi strutturali e, in questo caso dal FSE, sono attuati dagli Stati membri e dalle loro regioni. Le informazioni sulle opportunità di finanziamento vanno chieste all'autorità di gestione regionale del programma operativo del FSE in Veneto. La Commissione non interviene nella selezione, nel monitoraggio e nella valutazione dei progetti.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/egf>.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010794/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Pai-Ilta Group (Vicenza): 110 workers made redundant

In August, the Ilta-Pai-Abm Group began the process of making 110 workers redundant. Although the group was a major player and a benchmark in the poultry sector until 2011, its main companies were heavily hit by the financial crisis, leading to a huge drop in its turnover. The group was obliged to seek government aid in 2012 and has now had to make redundancies.

1. Is the Commission aware of these facts?
2. Does it believe that the workers made redundant will receive any support from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)?
3. What measures does it intend to take to support the poultry sector in the Veneto region and the social infrastructure that relies on it?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 November 2013)

1. Without being aware of all the circumstances to which the Honourable Member refers, the Commission is concerned about the social and economic consequences that the redundancies in the Ilta-Pai-Abm Group may bring with them.
2. As the Honourable Members know, the crisis criterion of the EGF lapsed at the end of 2011 and cannot be used for applications presented in 2013. For the period of 2014 to 2020, the co-legislators recently reached a preliminary agreement to reintroduce the crisis criterion as one of the criteria for potential EGF support. Parliament's support will be critical in the legislative process to ensure the final adoption of this element. The Honourable Member is advised to get in touch with the EGF Contact Person for Italy ⁽¹⁾ to enquire whether an application is being planned for the workers concerned.
3. The Commission does not intervene directly nor supports directly any social project in Italian Regions. In fact, according to the subsidiarity principle, the operational programmes co-financed by the structural funds, and by the ESF in this case, are implemented by the Member States and their regions. Information on funding opportunities should be asked to the regional managing authority of the ESF operational programme in Veneto. The Commission does not intervene in the selection, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/egf>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010795/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 settembre 2013)**

Oggetto: Licenziamento di 1 500 dipendenti da parte del gruppo Riva in seguito al sequestro cautelativo di beni da parte della magistratura: tutela per i lavoratori

Lo scorso 9 settembre 2013 la Procura di Taranto, nell'ambito delle indagini sul caso ILVA, ha disposto il sequestro cautelativo dei beni della società Riva Forni Elettrici per un ammontare pari a 916 milioni di euro.

L'azienda ha successivamente comunicato la decisione di sospendere le attività di sette stabilimenti, ossia Verona (429 dipendenti), Malegno, Sellero e Cervo (65, 232 e 137 dipendenti), Caronno Pertusella (162 dipendenti), Lesegno (257 dipendenti) e Annone Brianza (41 dipendenti), e di due società, Muzzana Trasporti e Riva Energia. Infatti, secondo i portavoce della Riva, il sequestro preventivo «sottrae all'azienda ogni disponibilità degli impianti e determina il blocco delle attività bancarie, impedendo la normale prosecuzione operativa della società: ciò fa sì che non esistano più le normali condizioni operative ed economiche per la prosecuzione della normale attività».

Nella direttiva 2010/75/UE relativa alle emissioni industriali (prevenzione e riduzione integrate dell'inquinamento) viene sottolineata l'esigenza di tutelare l'applicazione del principio «chi inquina paga», e che l'impianto industriale di Verona, come quelli di Brescia, Varese, Cuneo e Lecco, ha sempre operato nel rispetto dell'ambiente e della sicurezza dei lavoratori. Preso atto che a fronte di questa misura cautelare circa 1 500 lavoratori e le rispettive famiglie si trovano senza lavoro, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. è a conoscenza dei fatti?
2. intende attivare il FEG per intervenire ed evitare la catastrofe sociale ed economica che colpirà i lavoratori?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione
(10 dicembre 2013)**

La Commissione è pienamente consapevole delle circostanze cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare ed esprime la sua preoccupazione per le conseguenze economiche e sociali degli esuberi nel Gruppo Riva.

Nel quadro dell'attuale regolamento FEG sono ammessi agli aiuti solo i lavoratori in esubero per cause connesse alla globalizzazione; sembra che, nella fattispecie, la globalizzazione non abbia a che fare con gli esuberi. I co-legislatori hanno tuttavia raggiunto un accordo sulla proposta della Commissione per un nuovo regolamento FEG per il periodo 2014-2020, che comprende la possibilità di utilizzare ancora il criterio della crisi economica per mobilitare questo strumento. Se ciò sarà confermato al momento dell'adozione formale del progetto di regolamento, a decorrere dal gennaio 2014 l'Italia potrà invocare la crisi economica al momento di richiedere il sostegno del FEG per i lavoratori interessati.

Se l'onorevole parlamentare intende mettersi in comunicazione con la persona di contatto per il FEG in Italia per sapere se si prevede di presentare una domanda di sostegno per i lavoratori in esubero del Gruppo Riva, può trovare le informazioni necessarie sul sito web del FEG ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=it>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010795/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 September 2013)**

Subject: 1 500 employees made redundant by the Riva Group following the precautionary seizure of assets by the courts: protection of workers

On 9 September 2013, the Taranto Public Prosecutor's Office, as part of its investigations into the ILVA steel works case, issued a seizure order on the assets of Riva Forni Elettrici, for the amount of EUR 916 million.

The company subsequently announced its decision to suspend operations in seven of its plants: Verona (429 employees), Malegno, Sellero and Cervenò (65, 232 and 137 employees respectively), Caronno Pertusella (162 employees), Lesegno (257 employees) and Annone Brianza (41 employees), and in the two companies Muzzana Trasporti and Riva Energia. According to Riva's spokespersons, the seizure order 'completely stops the company from using the plants and blocks any activity on its bank accounts, thus preventing it from operating as normal. This means that the operating and economic conditions for continuing work as normal no longer exist.'

Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) stipulates the requirement to uphold the 'polluter pays' principle. The Verona factory has always complied with environmental and worker safety requirements, as have those of Brescia, Varese, Cuneo and Lecco. However, as a result of the court's precautionary measure, around 1 500 workers and their families are now jobless.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following questions:

1. Is it aware of these facts?
2. Will it activate the EGF in order to take action to prevent the social and economic disaster that is about to hit these workers?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(10 December 2013)**

The Commission is aware of the circumstances to which the Honourable Member refers and is concerned about the economic and social consequences of the redundancies in the Riva Group.

Under the current EGF Regulation, only workers made redundant because of trade related globalisation are eligible for support, and it would seem here that globalisation is not the cause of the redundancies. However, co-legislators have reached an agreement on the Commission proposal on a new EGF regulation for 2014-2020 which includes the possibility to use again the economic crisis criterion to mobilise the EGF. If this is confirmed when the draft regulation is formally adopted, as from January 2014 Italy may be able to invoke the economic crisis when applying for EGF support for the workers concerned.

The Honourable Member may wish to communicate with the EGF Contact Person in Italy, should she wish to know whether an application is being planned in support of workers made redundant by Riva Group. The relevant contact details can be found on the EGF website ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=it>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-010796/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 settembre 2013)**

Oggetto: Spose bambine in Bangladesh: un caso nella provincia di Padova

Una ragazza di 15 anni residente nella provincia di Padova, nata in Bangladesh, ma che ha vissuto in Italia fin dai primi mesi di vita, è stata vittima di abusi per oltre un anno: nel gennaio 2012, rientrata nel paese natale con la famiglia, è stata costretta a sposare un cugino di 35 anni e poi a vivere con lui nel nostro paese. Nell'aprile scorso, dopo aver denunciato la sua condizione di sposa bambina, le forze dell'ordine hanno interrotto i soprusi perpetrati ed affidato la ragazza a una comunità.

Può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è al corrente dei fatti descritti?
2. è a conoscenza di eventi di cronaca simili negli altri Stati membri?
3. visti documenti come il *Coordination Agreement* stipulato nel 2001 e il *Country Strategy Paper* 2007-2013 fra UE e Bangladesh, nei quali si fanno espliciti riferimenti al rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo, come valuta i fatti oggetto dell'interrogazione e il fenomeno delle spose bambine in questo paese?
4. come intende muoversi per persuadere le autorità del Bangladesh a fissare come soglia minima per contrarre matrimonio, l'età di 18 anni?
5. ha già sollevato la questione in passato e, in caso di risposta affermativa, con quale esito?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(18 novembre 2013)**

Sebbene la Commissione non abbia ricevuto informazioni particolari su questo caso specifico menzionato dall'onorevole parlamentare, la Commissione continua a porre la questione dei diritti dei minori al centro del dialogo periodico con il Bangladesh sul buon governo e sui diritti umani. L'UE ha ripetutamente sollevato con le autorità competenti il problema dei matrimoni forzati, che in Bangladesh sono vietati per legge.

Negli ultimi anni si è registrato un miglioramento della situazione in Bangladesh, ma vi sono ancora problemi a far rispettare la legge. Un dato incoraggiante è che sia stato istituito un piano di azione nazionale sui minori e che il Primo ministro stesso presieda il Consiglio nazionale per lo sviluppo delle donne e dei bambini responsabile del piano. Il Bangladesh è membro della convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo e di alcune delle più importanti convenzioni dell'OIL.

L'Unione europea e, a livello bilaterale, gli Stati membri hanno finanziato diversi progetti che riguardano i diritti dei minori in Bangladesh e, nel corso della programmazione del prossimo periodo di assistenza (2014-2020), sia il sistema giudiziario che i diritti delle donne e dei minori continueranno ad essere al centro dell'interesse.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010796/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: Child brides in Bangladesh: a case in the province of Padua

A 15-year-old girl living in the province of Padua, who was born in Bangladesh but has lived in Italy since she was a few months old, has been the victim of abuse for over a year. In January 2012 she returned to her country of birth with her family and was forced to marry a 35-year-old cousin and then live with him in Italy. In April this year, after the girl reported her situation as a child bride, the police put an end to this abuse and placed her in local authority care.

1. Is the Commission aware of these facts?
2. Does it know of any reports of similar events in other Member States?
3. In the light of documents such as the Coordination Agreement signed in 2001 and the EU-Bangladesh Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, which refer explicitly to respect for human rights, what is the Commission's assessment of the facts described above and the problem of child brides in that country?
4. What action does the Commission intend to take to persuade the Bangladeshi authorities to set the minimum legal age for marriage at 18?
5. Has the Commission already raised this issue in the past and if so, what was the outcome?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 November 2013)

Although the Commission has no particular information about the specific case in Italy referred to by the Honourable Member, children's rights continue to be among the most important issues the EU raises in its regular dialogue with Bangladesh on governance and human rights. The EU has consistently raised questions such as underage marriage, which is illegal in Bangladesh, with the relevant authorities.

Some important progress has been made in recent years in Bangladesh, but enforcement of justice continues to be a problem. It is positive that a National Plan of Action for Children has been drawn up and that the Prime Minister herself chairs the National Council for Women's and Children's Development which oversees it. Bangladesh is party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and to some of the most relevant ILO Conventions.

A number of projects funded by the EU and bilaterally by Member States have targeted children's rights in Bangladesh, and both the justice system and women's and children's rights are expected to continue to be addressed during programming under the next phase of assistance (2014-20).

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-010797/13
aan de Commissie**

Patricia van der Kammen (NI)

(23 september 2013)

Betreft: Subsidiariteit in het geding!/Maritieme ruimtelijke ordening en geïntegreerd kustbeheer

In maart 2013 heeft de Europese Commissie een voorstel gedaan voor een richtlijn in het kader van geïntegreerd maritiem beleid en kustbeheer. Zij is van mening dat de EU een leidersrol moet spelen om marien en maritiem onderzoek en innovatie te versterken en de groei van de maritieme sectoren te bevorderen. Parlementen uit vele lidstaten hebben aangegeven dat het ontwerp niet strookt met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel. De Europese Commissie lijkt de bezwaren te negeren.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de subsidiariteitsbezwaren die zijn ingediend namens de parlementen uit Polen, Zweden, Duitsland, Ierland, Roemenië, België, Finland, Litouwen en Nederland ⁽¹⁾?
2. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie deze veelheid aan ingediende subsidiariteitsbezwaren en de daarin aangedragen argumenten?
3. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat het negeren van de vele bezwaren de indruk wekt dat de vraagtekens die door verschillende parlementen bij de voorgestelde wetgeving worden geplaatst niet serieus worden genomen? Zo nee, waarom niet?
4. Ruimtelijke ordening valt onder de bevoegdheid van de lidstaten. Kan de Commissie aangeven wat haar beweegredenen zijn het voorstel er koste wat het kost toch doorheen te drukken?
5. Is de Commissie bereid het voorstel alsnog per direct in te trekken wegens strijdigheid met het Verdrag? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Antwoord van mevrouw Damanaki namens de Commissie

(25 november 2013)

De Commissie heeft het met redenen omkleed advies van de nationale parlementen bestudeerd en heeft aan de gesignaleerde problemen alle aandacht geschonken. Krachtens het Protocol nr. 2 bij het Verdrag van Lissabon heeft elk Parlement een antwoord ontvangen dat voor het publiek toegankelijk is gemaakt ⁽²⁾. Het aantal ontvangen bezwaren overschreed de drempel niet die in dit protocol is vastgesteld om de Commissie te verplichten haar voorstel te herzien of in te trekken.

Het doel van het voorstel is meer samenhang tussen de sectorale beleidsgebieden onder het VWEU, zoals visserij, vervoer, milieu en energie. De keuze van de rechtsgrond is vastgesteld in overeenstemming met de vereisten in de rechtspraak van het Europees Hof van Justitie ⁽³⁾.

De tenuitvoerlegging van de richtlijn zal een duurzame „blauwe groei” van de maritieme en kust economieën bevorderen, waarbij investeerders de rechtszekerheid verkrijgen van welke economische ontwikkeling mogelijk zal zijn en waar. Zo wordt een duurzaam gebruik van de zee- en kust hulpbronnen verzekerd. De uitvoering van de richtlijn zal voor exploitanten voor samenhang zorgen om maritieme activiteiten te ontwikkelen ten behoeve van de werkgelegenheid in kustgemeenschappen.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/935/935106/935106nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/935/935502/935502nl.pdf
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936172/936172nl.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_nl.htm

⁽³⁾ Arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 11 juni 1991, Zaak C-300/89, Jurispr., punten 13 en 17. Arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 30 januari 2001, Zaak C-36/98, Jurispr., punten 51 tot 53.

De bepalingen van de voorgestelde richtlijn zijn van procedurele aard en specificeren niet concreet wat de lidstaten in verband met maritieme activiteiten in hun wateren moeten doen. Er is geen specifieke verplichting voor de lidstaten om de gemaakte keuzes in hun plannen te bepalen. Het voorstel is derhalve in overeenstemming met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel.

De Commissie verheugt zich over de steun die haar voorstel in de verschillende commissies van het Europees Parlement heeft verkregen. Zij is niet voornemens haar voorstel in te trekken en kijkt uit naar de resultaten van het onderzoek door de medewetgevers.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-010797/13
to the Commission**

Patricia van der Kammen (NI)

(23 September 2013)

Subject: Subsidiarity at stake!/Maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management

In March 2013 the European Commission proposed a Framework Directive on Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal Management. The Commission is of the view that the EU should be playing a leading role in strengthening marine and maritime research and innovation and promoting growth in maritime sectors. The national parliaments in many Member States have declared the draft bill out of keeping with the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission, however, appears to be ignoring the objections raised.

1. Is the Commission aware of the subsidiarity objections raised on behalf of the parliaments of Poland, Sweden, Germany, Ireland, Romania, Belgium, Finland, Lithuania and the Netherlands? ⁽¹⁾
2. What is the Commission's reaction to this large number of subsidiarity objections raised and the arguments put forward therein?
3. Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) that the way in which all these objections are being ignored is giving rise to the impression that the question marks raised by various national parliaments with regard to the proposed legislation are not being taken seriously? If not, why not?
4. Spatial planning is the responsibility of the Member States. Can the Commission explain its motives for pushing through with the proposed legislation at all costs?
5. Is the Commission prepared to withdraw the proposed legislation with immediate effect, because it runs counter to the Treaty on European Union? If not, why not?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(25 November 2013)

The Commission has examined the Reasoned Opinion sent by National Parliaments and has given full consideration to the concerns expressed. As stipulated in the Protocol no.2 to the Lisbon Treaty, each Parliament has received an answer, made publicly available ⁽²⁾. The number of objections received did not surpass the threshold laid down in this Protocol for the Commission to be obliged to review or withdraw its proposal.

The objective of the proposal is to ensure better coherence between the sector policies of the TFEU, such as fisheries, transport, environment and energy. The choice of the legal bases has been determined in accordance with the requirements in the case-law of the European Court of Justice ⁽³⁾.

The implementation of the directive will boost sustainable 'blue growth' of maritime and coastal economies by giving investors the legal certainty of what economic development will be possible and where it may take place, thus ensuring sustainable use of marine and coastal resources. It will provide coherence for operators to develop maritime activities to the benefit of jobs in coastal communities.

The provisions of the proposed Directive are of procedural nature and do not set out concretely what the Member States must do in relation to maritime activities in their waters. There is no specific obligation to determine the choices made by Member States in their plans. The proposal therefore respects the subsidiarity principle.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/935/935106/935106nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/935/935502/935502nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/935/935996/935996nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936273/936273nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936194/936194nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936420/936420nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936424/936424nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936407/936407nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936422/936422nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936032/936032nl.pdf
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/936/936172/936172nl.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/

⁽³⁾ Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 June 1991 in Case C-300/89, paragraphs 13 and 17. Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 January 2001 in Case C-36/98, points 51-53.

The Commission welcomes the support its proposal has received in the various committees of the European Parliament. It does not intend to withdraw its proposal and looks forward to the outcome of the examination by the co-legislators.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-010798/13
à Comissão
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(23 de setembro de 2013)

Assunto: Efeitos para a saúde das radiações eletromagnéticas

Os produtos eletrónicos, embora tornem a nossa vida mais confortável, geram diversos campos eletromagnéticos associados ao seu funcionamento, os quais não são isentos de causar problemas para a saúde.

A exposição contínua pode facilmente ultrapassar em milhões de vezes a intensidade dos campos naturais, como é o caso da radiação de microondas provenientes das antenas de telemóveis, WiFi, etc, em comparação com a radiação natural emitida pelo Sol.

Este eletromagnetismo artificial gera um fenómeno de poluição — o eletro-smog ou poluição eletromagnética.

1. Quais as medidas que a Comissão tem previstas para lidar com esta situação?
2. De que informações atualizadas dispõe sobre os efeitos da poluição eletromagnética na saúde humana?
3. Dispõe de informações atualizadas sobre a dimensão deste problema em cada um dos 28 Estados-Membros?

Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão
(15 de novembro de 2013)

Uma Recomendação do Conselho ⁽¹⁾ de 1999 estabelece restrições e níveis de referência relativos à exposição da população aos campos eletromagnéticos (CEM), como um meio para estabelecer um quadro de proteção comum e contribuir para a coerência entre as abordagens nacionais. O último relatório sobre a aplicação ⁽²⁾ da Recomendação apresenta uma panorâmica das ações adotadas pelos Estados-Membros da UE a este respeito.

O Comité Científico dos Riscos para a Saúde Emergentes e Recentemente Identificados (Ccrseri), independente, tem um mandato permanente para avaliar os riscos resultantes da exposição a campos eletromagnéticos com base em novas tecnologias e novos dados científicos, bem como para verificar se as provas sustentam os limites de exposição estabelecidos na Recomendação do Conselho. De acordo com a sua revisão mais recente (2009) ⁽³⁾, três elementos de prova independentes (estudos epidemiológicos, *in vivo* e *in vitro*) mostram que a exposição aos campos eletromagnéticos de radiofrequência é pouco suscetível de conduzir a um aumento da incidência de cancro no ser humano. Está em curso uma nova revisão que se prevê estar concluída até ao final de 2013.

Além disso, a Comissão apoia ativamente a investigação neste domínio no sentido de apurar se a exposição às radiações provenientes de qualquer que seja a fonte constitui um risco para saúde.

No que diz respeito às medidas de execução, os artigos 168.º e 169.º do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia não conferem competência à UE para legislar em matéria de proteção do público em geral contra os efeitos potenciais dos CEM e atribui a responsabilidade primária aos Estados-Membros. Todavia, foi estabelecida legislação específica no que se refere à exposição no local de trabalho ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Recomendação do Conselho, de 12 de julho de 1999, relativa à limitação da exposição da população aos campos eletromagnéticos (0 Hz — 300 GHz), JO L 199 de 30.7.1999, p. 59.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/documents/risk_rd03_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_022.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:179:0001:0021:PT:PDF>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-010798/13
to the Commission
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(23 September 2013)

Subject: The effects of electromagnetic radiation on health

Although electronic products make our lives easier, their use generates electromagnetic fields which are not harmless to health.

The microwave radiation associated with continuous exposure to the antennae of mobile telephones, WiFi etc. can be millions of times more intense than the natural radiation emitted by the sun.

This artificial electromagnetism creates a form of pollution known as electro-smog, or electromagnetic pollution.

1. What steps has the Commission considered taking to tackle this situation?
2. What up-to-date information does it have on the effects of electromagnetic pollution on human health?
3. Does it have up-to-date information on the scale of this problem in each of the 28 Member States?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(15 November 2013)

A Council Recommendation ⁽¹⁾ of 1999 sets up restrictions and reference levels for the exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (EMFs), as a means to establish a common protective framework and contribute to consistency between national approaches. The latest report on the implementation ⁽²⁾ of the recommendation provides an overview of actions taken by the EU Member States in this regard.

The independent Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) has a standing mandate to evaluate the risks arising from exposure to electromagnetic fields based on new technologies and new scientific evidence and to check whether evidence supports the exposure limits set out in the Council Recommendation. According to its latest review in 2009 ⁽³⁾, three independent lines of evidence (epidemiological, *in vivo* and *in vitro* studies) show that exposure to radiofrequency EMF is unlikely to lead to an increase of cancer incidence in humans. A new review is ongoing and it is expected to be finalised by the end of 2013.

In addition the Commission actively supports research in this area with a view to discovering whether exposure to radiation from any source poses a risk to health.

Regarding implementing measures, Articles 168 and 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union do not confer the EU competence to legislate in the area of protection of the general public from the potential effects of EMF and leaves the primary responsibility with the Member States. Specific legislation has been established, however, in respect of exposure in the workplace. ⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ Council Recommendation of 12 July 1999 on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz), OJ L 199/59, 30.7.1999.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/documents/risk_rd03_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_022.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:179:0001:0021:EN:PDF>

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení P-010799/13

Komisi

Ivo Strejček (ECR)

(24. září 2013)

Předmět: Sledovací systém INDECT

Podle mnoha evropských médií má být koncem roku 2013 spuštěn sledovací systém INDECT. Obracím se v této souvislosti na Evropskou komisi s následujícími dotazy:

1. Kde se lze o detailech připravovaného projektu INDECT dozvědět?
2. Je tento systém připravován se souhlasem členských států Evropské unie?
3. V jaké fázi přípravy se projekt INDECT nachází a kdy je plánováno jeho spuštění?
4. Nelze považovat systém INDECT za projekt omezující základní lidská práva občanů Evropské unie?
5. Zveřejní Komise informace o projektu INDECT a vysvětlí občanům Evropské unie účel tohoto projektu?

Odpověď komisaře Tajaniho jménem Komise

(23. října 2013)

Komise by chtěla váženého pana poslance informovat o tom, že projekt INDECT byl ve skutečnosti zahájen dne 1. ledna 2009. Veškeré informace o projektu INDECT lze nalézt na internetových stránkách tohoto projektu: <http://www.indect-project.eu/> a záložce s často kladenými otázkami (FAQ) na stránkách o projektu INDECT http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/indect/index_en.htm.

Další informace o projektu INDECT jsou obsaženy v těchto odpovědích na otázky k písemnému zodpovězení: E-6084/09, E-1004/10, E-1332/10, E-1385/10, E-2186/10, E-3190/10, E-3191/10, E-4739/10, E-6842/10, E-6912/10, E-7521/10, E-5080/12, E-5371/2012 a E-9778/12.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-010799/13
to the Commission
Ivo Strejček (ECR)
(24 September 2013)**

Subject: INDECT research project

According to many European media sources, the INDECT research project is to be launched by the end of 2013. In this connection, I should like to put the following questions to the Commission:

1. Where is it possible to find out more about the planned INDECT project?
2. Is the project being developed with the agreement of the Member States?
3. What stage have preparations for the INDECT project reached and when is the planned launch?
4. Should INDECT not be viewed as a project that restricts the basic human rights of EU citizens?
3. Will the Commission publish information on INDECT and explain the purpose of the project to EU citizens?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(23 October 2013)**

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that the INDECT project in fact started on 1 January 2009. All the relevant information on INDECT can be found on the website of the project:

<http://www.indect-project.eu/> and the Frequently Asked Questions site on INDECT

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/indect/index_en.htm

Further information on INDECT can be taken from the answers given to written questions E-6084/09, E-1004/10, E-1332/10, E-1385/10, E-2186/10, E-3190/10, E-3191/10, E-4739/10, E-6842/10, E-6912/10, E-7521/10, E-5080/12, E-5371/2012 and E-9778/12.
