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# Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation

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Bonn, March 2014

Jeannine Hausmann



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## Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı (Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party of Turkey)
AU	African Union
AusAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)
CV	Curriculum vitae
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DIE	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German Development Institute)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party of Germany)
G8	Group of 8
G20	Group of 20
G77	Group of 77
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross national income
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IHH	İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
LDC	Least developed country
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SlovakAid	Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation
TASAM	Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
TCDC	Technical cooperation among developing countries
TDV	Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation)

TİKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
UN LDC-IV	Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UN DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YTB	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler Ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities)

## Summary

In recent years Turkey has developed into being a significant foreign aid provider. In addition to the successful economic development of the country, the substantial expansion of its aid programme can be explained by the reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy. In particular since the Justice and Development Party of Turkey (AKP) took over the government, Turkey has given up its traditional Western orientation and is increasingly turning towards its neighbouring regions. By making use of its unique geopolitical position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, the new foreign policy aims at maintaining a leadership role in the region. Turkey considers itself to be a peaceful civil power and ultimately also wants to gain respect and influence on a global level through far-reaching cooperation with its neighbouring countries.

Against this backdrop, development cooperation serves as an instrument for pursuing overriding foreign policy goals. Most of all, it is intended to convey a positive image of the country to foreign audiences. In order to strengthen Turkey's *soft power*, its development cooperation is therefore often accompanied by other measures such as visa facilitation or the diffusion of Turkish television. In contrast to other emerging economies, Turkey does not primarily pursue foreign economic interests with its development cooperation, even if the interest in new export markets plays a certain role alongside humanitarian and foreign policy concerns.

A wide variety of government agencies are involved in the implementation of Turkish development cooperation. However, the key player is the development agency TİKA (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı/Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which operates Programme Coordination Offices in over 30 countries. It is institutionally under the direction of the Prime Ministry and is surely also *de facto* heavily dependent upon the Prime Minister's instructions. There are no formal criteria for the geographical allocation of aid and so far there are only drafts of country strategy papers for selected countries. Turkish aid is focused on South and Central Asia as well as the regions of the South Caucasus, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily concentrating on Muslim-majority countries that were within the area of influence of the Ottoman Empire and/or that exhibit ethno-cultural connections to Turkey. The sectoral priorities lie in the areas of education, peace and security, trade policy and health. To implement its projects, Turkey primarily makes use of experts from the respective specialised ministries and authorities who are given leave for short-term or medium-term assignments in the partner countries. This leads to Turkish activities being comparatively inexpensive. There is criticism, however, of the selection of the experts, as they do not always seem to be selected on the basis of their performance. In general, the lack of an overriding strategy and of medium- and long-term programme planning in Turkish development cooperation are also viewed as problematic.

Since 1991 Turkey has held observer status with the OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee), to which it reports the volume of its official development assistance (ODA) flows each year. From 2003 to 2012 aid volumes rose from 67 million to 2.53 billion US dollars, a nearly fortyfold increase. Turkey has thereby surpassed a series of established donor countries

and most other emerging economies as an aid provider. Turkey's almost exclusive focus on bilateral aid is noticeable.

In the international context, Turkey is emerging as a quite self-confident donor country and considers itself to be an alternative to both traditional as well as other new aid providers. Turkey shares the same underlying concepts of development cooperation as OECD-DAC donor countries; however it currently does not seem to be interested in being bound more closely to them. Direct cooperation has therefore only occurred to a limited extent so far.

Many OECD-DAC donors are very interested in implementing triangular cooperation projects together with Turkey. Germany also, the DAC member that is second only to Japan in the number of triangular cooperation projects it implements, would like to gain Turkey as a partner. Both countries are in principle compatible partners for triangular cooperation. There seems to be far-reaching consensus in terms of most of the goals pursued in triangular cooperation (intensifying bilateral relations, joint development agenda-setting, assumption of responsibility by emerging countries, increasing effectiveness). However, Turkey seems to be significantly more reticent when it comes to two other goals pursued by Germany with triangular cooperation: the transfer of knowledge in order to professionalise the Turkish development cooperation system, as well as the commitment to guiding standards and principles. It is also questionable whether Turkey has the political intent of working more intensively together with Western partners in the form of triangular cooperation.

German-Turkish triangular cooperation could offer numerous advantages. These primarily include reciprocal benefits from the reputation of the partner country in the third countries and the pressure that would be placed on Germany to implement cooperation programmes in which Turkey and the beneficiary country are actually on equal footing. The accumulated experiences of both donors in bilateral development cooperation, the improved cultural access that Turkey has to countries in neighbouring regions, the good training of the Turkish personnel, the relatively *fresh* experiences of Turkey with certain development problems and the widespread presence of both countries in developing countries would surely be helpful for the success of joint triangular cooperation projects.

The fact that a wide variety of goals that go beyond the benefits for the third country are being pursued with triangular cooperation makes it more difficult to evaluate the pros and cons of jointly implemented German-Turkish triangular cooperation initiatives. Turkey and Germany are compatible partners for jointly implemented triangular cooperation in principle. However, Turkey's current lack of political interest will make it much more difficult for joint projects to succeed and might even prevent them from succeeding entirely.

At the same time, there is the basic criticism of triangular cooperation that points *inter alia* to the potential increase in transaction costs, the fragmentation of the donor landscape, and the neglect of partner country ownership. The question therefore arises whether the common goals of Germany and Turkey could also be achieved by means of probably less expensive and time-consuming instruments (such as joint symposia or specialist exchange programmes).

## 1 Introduction

For some years now the development community has been intensively discussing the development assistance provided by large emerging countries. China, India and Brazil are normally the focus of this interest. But what is Turkey doing? Located in a geopolitical hotspot, in a regional neighbourhood no one is envious of (2013 interviews) and rejected by their traditional European partners, Turkey has recently undertaken a charm offensive in its foreign policy that includes, in addition to mediation in regional conflicts, the massive expansion of its development assistance programme. In the past decade the country has developed in the shadows of other large emerging economies into a significant international aid provider.

Turkey's rise as a foreign aid provider went largely unnoticed by the scientific community and the public, even though the country now provides nearly 40 times as much ODA (official development assistance) funding than just ten years ago. The funds provided by Turkey are now far above those of other emerging economies such as India and Russia and even exceed those provided by a whole series of established donor countries such as Belgium and Spain. At the same time, however, the country continues to receive a significant amount of aid from abroad just as before, primarily due to its status as a candidate for joining the European Union (EU).

The fact that little attention has been given to the expansion of Turkish development cooperation among researchers and in the international press, is presumably also related to the comparatively low-key presence of Turkey as a donor country. Its development cooperation does not differ fundamentally from that of traditional donors and has therefore not drawn the same negative reactions as the aid activities of other emerging economies (most of all China) have in certain circles.

The West was initially at a loss and reacted cautiously to the appearance of new donor countries (e. g. Naím 2007) but then made efforts to integrate them into the international development architecture (e. g. OECD 2011a). Within this context, triangular cooperation is viewed as an instrument for promoting convergence in aid approaches. Germany already introduced triangular cooperation agreements as a mechanism for expanding cooperation with emerging economies on development issues several years ago. However, this form of cooperation has not yet been used with Turkey.

This paper addresses the question of the extent to which Turkey and Germany would be compatible triangular cooperation partners. To answer this question, it is first necessary to get a better understanding of Turkish development cooperation. This paper therefore also examines Turkey's identity as a donor country and the main characteristics of its development policy.

In addition to the significance that Turkey has acquired as a development cooperation actor, the relevance of the issue is also due to the reciprocal importance that Germany and Turkey have to one another that spans the areas of foreign policy, economics and security. While the potential of triangular cooperation with other emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa has already been the subject of research (Altenburg / Weikert 2006; Zilla / Wagner / Berger 2011), this has still not yet been systematically studied for Turkey. A few articles and studies on Turkish development

cooperation and some of its elements have recently appeared (Murphy / Sazak 2012; Sey 2013; Kardaş 2013a). However, none of these papers have provided a comprehensive overview of the background factors and implementation of Turkish development policy from a Western perspective.

The findings in this paper are based on a series of interviews with representatives of Turkish and German research and governmental institutions, non-governmental organisations and German implementing organisations.<sup>1</sup> At the request of some interviewees, all of their statements were anonymised in this paper. In addition, numerous documents and studies as well as data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were also evaluated.

The following section (Section 2) will contextualise Turkey's profile as an aid provider. To do this, the background of its engagement and its significance to Turkish foreign policy as well as the goals and principles associated with development cooperation will be illuminated. The scope of Turkish activities and the dominant modalities will also receive special attention.

Section 3 is devoted to the implementation of Turkish development cooperation. In order to answer the question of "Who is doing what where and with whom?", the most important actors in the area of Turkey's development policy will be presented and the geographic distribution of Turkish ODA funds will be shown and related to the priorities of Turkish foreign policy before finally turning to the sectoral focal points and the most important partners involved in Turkish development cooperation. In addition to this, Section 3.5 will touch on the role of Turkish non-governmental organisations in the area of international development cooperation and will examine their cooperation with the Turkish state.

Section 4 will finally address the issue of a possible partnership between Turkey and Germany within the framework of triangular cooperation. For this purpose, the section will first outline the basic characteristics of triangular cooperation programmes and explain the opportunities and limitations with which they are associated. Following this, the importance and utilisation of the instrument in German development cooperation will be described and a comparison will then be made between German and Turkish interests with regard to triangular cooperation. The study of the extent to which the two states fulfil the pre-requisites for successful cooperation will be concluded by an evaluation of the potential of instances of Turkish-German trilateral cooperation. This will be accompanied by the formulation of key recommendations.

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1 Representatives from six different Turkish research institutions/universities, three Turkish and two German governmental institutions, two German implementing organisations, an international organisation, four Turkish non-governmental organisations and one German political foundation were interviewed.

## 2 Turkey as a donor country: its classification and self-conception

### 2.1 Background: economic development and foreign policy framework

#### *Economic development in the past decade*

The massive expansion of Turkey's involvement in development policy in recent years was made possible through the improvement of the country's economic performance. Turkey was still a classic example of a country of emigration in the 1960s and numerous political crises and military interventions hindered a stable development of the Turkish economy for a long time, but in recent years Turkey has achieved solid economic growth.

With a few fluctuations, the Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of five percent per year over the past ten years (2003–2012), making Turkey one of the world's 20 largest national economies since 2004. At the same time, the percentage of the Turkish population that lives on two US dollars or less per day dropped from ten percent in 2003 to just under five percent in 2010. With an average annual *per capita* income of 10,666 US dollars, Turkey has meanwhile reached the upper level of the World Bank category Upper Middle Income Countries (World Bank 2013).

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GDP growth (in % per year)	5.3	9.4	8.4	6.9	4.7	0.7	-4.8	9.2	8.8	2.2
GDP (in billions of current US dollars)	303	392	483	531	647	730	615	731	745	789
GDP <i>per capita</i> (in current US dollars)	4.595	5.867	7.130	7.736	9.312	10.379	8.626	10.135	10.605	10.666
Source: World Bank 2013										

#### *The Doctrine of Strategic Depth: the theoretical foundation of the new Turkish foreign policy*

Following the end of the Ottoman Empire, the foreign policy of the newly founded Republic of Turkey was reserved, reactive and characterised by a strong Western orientation for most of the 20th century.

Under Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal (1983–1993), Turkey slowly began opening up and pursuing a more pro-active foreign policy. Its primary aim was to improve the bilateral relations between Turkey and its neighbouring states through economic interdependence (Ünay 2012, 18). However, the implementation of this new approach did not fully come to fruition until after the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party of Turkey or AKP) government came to power under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002.

In 2001, Turkey's current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu formulated the country's new foreign policy strategy in his highly regarded book "Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position"<sup>2</sup>. According to this viewpoint, Turkey due to its geographical location and its history considered itself to be a power with several regional identities at the intersection of Europe, Asia and Africa that should be accorded a leadership role in the various regions to which it belongs; the global strategic significance of the country would ultimately arise out of this regional leadership role.

Turkey was to exercise its influence by means of the *soft power* that results from both the successful democratic and economic development of the country as well as its historical and cultural connections to the various neighbouring regions. It is striving for a role as a *civil power*. A stronger focus on *public diplomacy* is to contribute to the new perception of Turkey in the international context (Davutoğlu 2010a).

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey's affiliation with various regions results in its capability and responsibility to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy (Davutoğlu, cited in Grigoriadis 2010, 5). In this self-conception, Turkey can no longer allow itself to focus on its Western allies only, as it did during the Cold War (Islam 2010, 8). Instead, due to its strategic significance to its neighbouring regions it should operate across a "360-degree horizon" (Davutoğlu 2010a).

The policy of *Zero Problems with Neighbours* became a key principle in the new Turkish foreign policy toward all of its neighbouring states. It is based on the view that Turkey profits more when it concentrates on the potential opportunities of closer cooperation with its neighbouring states and overcomes existing tensions instead of exclusively perceiving the states in the region as a potential threat (Sanberk 2012, 3). The goal is maximum cooperation with its neighbouring countries (Davutoğlu 2010b). Overcoming all of the existing conflicts with neighbouring states is viewed as the key prerequisite for achieving global strategic significance.

The demand for proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy is closely connected to the *Zero Problems Policy*. According to this, Turkey should search for opportunities to resolve conflicts and strengthen cooperation within its region. Its role as a mediator should in turn contribute to strengthening its own position in the region.

In addition, Davutoğlu envisions a stronger role for Turkey in international organisations and multilateral decision-making platforms. Using the term "*rhythmic diplomacy*", Davutoğlu urges Turkey to engage more actively in international organisations and to position itself more strongly on internationally significant issues (Davutoğlu 2010b). In doing so, Turkey will be striving towards a new international order that will be based among other things on dialogue, multilateralism and an economic order based on justice and equality (Davutoğlu 2012a, 5).

The new foreign policy orientation therefore envisages that Turkey should not be exclusively bound to individual partners but should rather seek a diversification of its alliances beyond the West and act autonomously. With regard to its relationship to Europe, Turkey considers its multidimensional foreign policy not to be an alternative to

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2 So far only published in Turkish: Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001): *Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu*, Istanbul: Küre Yayınları.

joining the European Union (EU) but rather as something additional from which Europe can also benefit. This is because Turkey could constitute an anchor of stability in the region for the EU by creating a zone of peace and prosperity in its own neighbourhood (Kaynak 2012, 85).

In recent years, Turkey has also cultivated relations to more distant regions beyond its immediate neighbours, such as Southern Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Davutoğlu views close relations with the rising global powers China, India, Brazil and Russia as essential to achieving a global strategic role (Grigoriadis 2010, 5 f.). Its relations to other global actors are to be conceived as far as possible in a complementary rather than competitive fashion (Davutoğlu 2008, 82).

In its foreign policy offensive towards the Balkans, the Caucasus region and the Middle East, the Turkish government repeatedly refers back to shared history during the Ottoman Empire, whose natural heir Turkey considers itself to be (Walker 2010, 1). This has brought about the criticism that the AKP government is pursuing a policy of *neo-Ottomanism*. However, the AKP disputes that it has any imperial ambitions. The goal is not the revival of the Ottoman Empire but rather “*Turkey’s historic reintegration into its immediate neighbourhoods, thereby correcting an anomaly of the Cold War*” (Kınıklıoğlu 2009). The reference to their shared past in the Ottoman Empire in this regard surely primarily serves as a connecting factor and starting point for establishing relations to countries in Northern Africa, the Middle East or the Balkans. In contrast to the positive image of the Ottomans as a protective power defending the Muslim population against Europe, as religiously conservative groups in Turkey tend to view it (Seufert 2012, 13), the past under the Ottoman Empire is actually viewed with criticism in some countries that were a part of the empire (including in Serbia and in the Middle East) (2013 interviews).

After the assumption of power by the AKP government, there was a fear primarily in the West and among the traditional Kemalist elite that the AKP, which is anchored in political Islam, would pursue an Islamic agenda with its orientation toward the Muslim world. Many of the countries that Turkey has turned its attention to in foreign policy in recent times are indeed Muslim societies. However, Turkish foreign policy experts disagree with the assessment that this is the most important reason for the AKP government’s interest in these countries. They view the religious dimension as a part of the AKP’s foreign policy but not as its defining element (2013 interviews). As with the reference to the Ottoman inheritance, the reference to Islam as a connecting element is often used for the purpose of suggesting closeness (Faath 2011, 268). Turkey can actually be given credit for the fact that, in contrast to other countries in the region, it is making efforts to create a balance between the various Islamic movements, even if there is a tendency to support Sunni Islam (2013 interviews). Despite its religious identity, the AKP government is led by a high degree of pragmatism, which is why its actions in general are also determined by national interests (Warning 2011a, 103; 2013 interviews).

Turkey’s change of course in terms of foreign policy can be explained by many causes that can be found not only in the changed international framework conditions (most of all the greater freedom of action provided by the end of the Cold War) but also in Turkey’s domestic policy. In recent years, economic considerations have gained increasing influence in shaping the country’s foreign policy, which has now been recognised as important for generating prosperity and employment within Turkey (Kirişçi 2009, 39).

This includes securing energy supplies and the search for foreign investors and investment opportunities in addition to opening up new export markets.

The fact that, with the rise of the AKP, formerly marginalised economic and social actors have been able to gain influence in shaping Turkey's foreign policy (Seufert 2012, 6) has contributed to this development. This primarily includes the *Anatolian Tigers*, a group of conservative businesspersons from Anatolia who pressed for Turkey to open up to its neighbouring countries to the east.

Another reason for Turkey's change of course in its foreign policy was the disappointment over the EU not allowing the country any prospects for joining in the foreseeable future. In addition, from the Turkish perspective, the security concerns of the country were ignored by its Western allies after the invasion of Iraq. Both sources of frustration contributed to an increased Turkish interest in its immediate neighbourhood (Kaynak 2012, 86).

In its new self-perception, Turkey is thus pursuing a pro-active, peace-oriented and multi-dimensional foreign policy that allows it to play a more influential role beyond its neighbouring regions to even a global level and to thereby become a "*regional, European and global power*" (Davutoğlu 2011a). However, the extent to which Turkey will actually realise this ambitious aspiration is questionable. Observers attest that Turkey is overestimating its own capabilities (Islam 2010, 13) and judge the foreign policy goals to be "*over-ambitious*" (2013 interviews).

Turkey's foreign policy has actually achieved several notable successes in recent years: Its relations to Greece, Russia and Georgia have improved significantly. The relations between Turkey and Syria even improved for a time, though they have stayed at a low point since Erdoğan's renunciation of the Assad regime at the end of 2011. Turkey's *Zero Problems Policy* came under pressure with the beginning of the Arab Spring. In light of the currently tense relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq and Israel as well as the further damaged relations to Armenia, there is discussion that Turkey finds itself "*in the centre of a cluster of conflicts*" (translated; Herzinger 2012, 3) instead of in the foreign policy harmony it has been striving for.

Nevertheless, it can still be stated that Turkey has significantly expanded its presence in its neighbouring regions as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa and in emerging economies in other regions in recent years. In particular, trade with the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia as well as Africa has increased significantly.

Turkey's foreign policy and foreign economic policy are closely connected to one another. The intensification of trade with a specific country or region, for instance, often involves an expansion of diplomatic presence, the hosting of high-level bilateral conferences, the conclusion of preferential trade agreements, the waiving of visa requirements and the establishment of a flight connection through Turkish Airlines. These measures serve to facilitate trade and thereby in the end serve the country's own domestic economy. At the same time, they enable the country to increase its own *soft power*. Kirişçi (2009, 33 f.) goes so far as to claim that in recent years Turkey has transformed itself into a "*trading state*" in which the national interest is no longer considered to mean national security alone. Rather, economic considerations are just as important.

With regard to the stronger positioning of Turkey within the multilateral framework as promoted by Davutoğlu it is noticeable that in the years 2009/2010 Turkey held a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the first time since 1961 and is once again running as a candidate for a seat in the 2015/2016 period. Turkey has also been hosting more conferences of various international organisations (including NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations, among others) in recent years. In addition to this, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has been led by a Turkish General Secretary since 2005. However, there are differing opinions on whether Turkey's involvement in international organisations and forums will fulfil the ambitious aspirations that it has set for itself (2013 interviews).

## 2.2 The role and goals of Turkish development cooperation<sup>3</sup>

Turkey's increased development assistance should be understood within the context of its new foreign policy approach. Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls Turkey's official development assistance an increasingly integral part of Turkey's pro-active foreign policy (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a). Development cooperation represents an instrument for expanding Turkey's *soft power*. It is one of many instruments in Turkish foreign policy (alongside peace missions, conflict mediation and economic interdependence, as examples) that is not actually given a central role but is nevertheless increasingly and intensively used by the Turkish government in order to position itself as a civil power. The country's increased development assistance thereby corresponds to the foreign policy principle of *public diplomacy* as formulated by Davutoğlu that is intended to convey a positive image of the country to the foreign public (Davutoğlu 2010a).

As a foreign policy instrument, the Turkish government's development cooperation is intended to contribute to achieving the foreign policy goals specified in the previous section. Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly sets the creation of a more peaceful and more stable environment in its neighbouring regions as an over-arching goal of its own development cooperation (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a), meaning that development cooperation directly serves the implementation of the *Zero Problems Policy*. Poverty reduction and the promotion of sustainable development are viewed as a means for moving closer to the goals of peace and stability.

Yet development cooperation not only serves the realisation of the *Zero Problems Policy*. Turkey also provides aid to more distant regions such as Southern Africa. There, the country's ambitions to make a name for itself as a global actor also play a role. According to the President of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency TİKA (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı*), Serdar Çam, Turkish development assistance is intended to promote the international visibility of the country (Afronline 2012). Turkey has therefore also lately committed itself to the needs of developing countries at the international level. One example is the hosting of the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul in 2011 (UN LDC-IV), a conference that is held every ten years. There the government promised a total of 200 million US dollars a year to the least developed countries (LDCs). Turkey itself justifies its support of the LDCs with a "*moral and ethical imperative*" (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a) and with the importance of the LDCs for global peace

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3 See also Hausmann 2013, for more on this.

and security. However, Turkey's commitment to developing countries at the UN level can also be viewed in light of its foreign policy goal to play a more active role in international forums. According to Davutoğlu, this includes active participation in all international organisations and in all debates of global or international significance (Davutoğlu 2010b).

However, Turkey's active presence on the international stage has been limited so far. In light of the ambitions Turkey has expressed, critics rate Turkey's involvement in international development forums as "*grotesquely minimal*" (2013 interviews). Its interest and involvement clearly varies, depending on the forum and process. Turkey is minimally involved in the post-Busan process; there are varied perceptions on the character of Turkish involvement in the Development Working Group of the Group of 20 (G20). However, as demonstrated by its active participation in the preparatory meetings, the country appears to be thoroughly interested in the process for the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

Just as with other donor countries, it is fair to assume that Turkish development cooperation is based on a mixture of self-interested and altruistic or idealistic motives: in contrast to other emerging economies, Turkey does not seem to be primarily pursuing foreign economic interests with its development cooperation, even if they are not neglected entirely. In particular, the expansion of Turkish aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years also occurred against the backdrop of opening up new export markets and securing alternative resources for the future sustainable growth of Turkey itself (Apaydin 2012, 277). In terms of the *Zero Problems Policy* towards its neighbouring regions, it must be taken into consideration that this policy is also based on economic interests as described in the previous section (Kirişci 2009, 48). However, it is in no way apparent that Turkey is explicitly focusing its development cooperation on countries rich in raw materials or that its development projects were directly aimed at promoting its own economic development.

Turkish development cooperation is normally accompanied by other *public diplomacy* measures. These include the diffusion of Turkish television, the expansion of airline routes, visa facilitations and the establishment of institutional religious connections. The public policy is flanked by private initiatives such as the Hizmet movement that maintains schools as well as investments from the private sector.

### 2.3 Self-conception, strategy and principles

Turkey's self-conception as an emerging regional and global power is leading it to assume a relatively self-confident role as a new donor country. In contrast to other emerging economies with substantial aid programmes which however do not consider themselves to be *donors*, at least in public rhetoric, Turkey does not shy away from calling itself a donor. For instance, in its public documents from the years 2004 to 2007 the Turkish government explicitly refers to the fact that it is a net donor, meaning that it contributes more funds for development assistance than it receives.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, Turkey (as well as other new donor countries) continues to consider itself to be a developing country and emphasises the fact that its cooperation with other developing countries takes place on an equal footing and leads to a win-win situation for both partners (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2010). The country perceives itself as having a particular credibility in addressing inequality and

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4 Since 2007 Turkey has once again been receiving more aid than it has been providing.

extreme poverty due to its cultural, historical and political background (Davutoğlu 2012b, 8). Turkey's emphasis on its status as a developing country can presumably be explained by the fact that, on the one hand, it desires to distinguish itself from the traditional donors (in order to not be evaluated according to their benchmarks) and, on the other hand, it facilitates access to other developing and emerging countries.

Turkey's relationship to the traditional donor countries seems ambivalent. On the one hand there are polemic attempts at dissociation, such as when the former President of TİKA, Musa Kulaklıkaya, talked about the fact that the Turkish approach is fundamentally different from the colonialism of Chinese aid and the approach of donors such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany or the Netherlands, which are trying to compensate for their colonial past by means of development assistance (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2010). As a founding member of the OECD (1961), on the other hand, Turkey has held observer status with the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) since 1991. It regularly participates in the committee meetings and reports to the DAC on its official development assistance flows. The DAC is currently hoping that Turkey will apply for membership. It already fulfils the membership criteria, meaning that it is now solely a political decision (2013 interviews). However, Turkey currently seems to have no political desire for membership.

In its latest progress report within the framework of the accession negotiations to the European Union, the European Commission has certified that Turkey is showing "*some progress*" in the area of development policy and humanitarian aid. The degree of alignment is considered to be satisfactory (European Commission 2012, 87). Over the course of the accession negotiations, Turkey has pledged to increase its ODA stepwise to 0.33 percent of its gross national income by 2015. On the one hand, the impression is given that Turkey is indeed interested in a certain amount of exchange with the DAC donors and is striving for the international prestige that is involved in the role of an emerging donor country. On the other hand, Turkey clearly does not wish to be tied too closely to the traditional Western donors in order to gain the freedom of action resulting from the fact that it is not tied to the principles and obligations that the DAC members have set.

Turkey's proximity to the OECD DAC and the European Commission differentiates Turkey significantly from most other new donors who normally place importance on dissociating themselves from the established donors. Turkey's conception of development cooperation also seems to be generally covered by the conception of the Western donors. While China, India and Brazil constantly emphasise that their cooperation is South-South cooperation that differs fundamentally from OECD DAC development cooperation, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers South-South cooperation to be merely one important aspect of Turkish development cooperation (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a). Turkey has apparently never been able to reconcile itself with the discourse and the logic of South-South cooperation, whose origins lie within the context of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (G77) (2013 interviews). The principles of South-South cooperation (solidarity between developing countries, mutual benefit of the cooperation, no political conditions, etc.) are therefore stressed significantly less in the Turkish presentation of its development policy than among the other new donor countries.

In practice, though, the mutual benefit and the complete waiving of political conditionalities actually play an important role in Turkey's development policy. The HIPC

(heavily indebted poor countries) Capacity Building Programme views the waiving of political conditionalities as the reason why the Turkish programmes are usually able to be implemented without delay (HIPC Capacity Building Programme 2009, 6). Within this context, TİKA President Serdar Çam explains that Turkey does not address human rights violations in its dialogue with its partner countries because there would otherwise be the risk of punishing the population of the country in need of aid (Afronline 2012). However, Turkey certainly does champion human rights at a higher political level. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, called on Muslim countries to do so during his speech at the summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in May 2004, for instance (Warning 2011b, 42). The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu, also emphasises that Turkey is promoting human rights as well as democracy, good governance, transparency and rule of law (Davutoğlu 2012a, 3). The degree to which this is actually implemented is unclear. After all, it is not entirely unproblematic for Turkey to decry others for human rights violations in view of the country's own failings with regard to the protection of human rights.

The role of Turkey as a democratic model for other Muslim-majority countries has been continuously discussed, but Prime Minister Erdoğan rejects this idea. He views Turkey's experiences as a source of inspiration rather than a model to be imitated (Marcou 2013, 4).

A series of similarities can be found when comparing Turkey with other new donor countries: its status as an emerging economy; its experience as a recipient of development aid; the relatively minimal strategic foundation of its own development cooperation; the aforementioned waiving of political conditionalities; and the focus on isolated projects (no comprehensive programmes). Turkey differs from other new donor countries particularly due to its proximity to the OECD DAC. Turkey is pursuing a similar concept of development cooperation and shares the basic values of the DAC donors.

In general it is barely possible to make a comparison with *the* new donor countries, as these are an extremely heterogeneous group of countries characterised mainly by the fact that they have experience as a recipient country and are not members of the OECD DAC. The fundamental concepts of development cooperation and its implementation vary relatively widely among these donors. Turkey could presumably be most easily compared with Mexico and Brazil. Mexico also holds observer status with the OECD DAC and, like Brazil, promotes values similar to those of the DAC donors. None of these three countries are subjected to the accusation of benefiting disproportionately *vis-à-vis* partner countries in their cooperation programmes (as is sometimes the case with China, for instance), capacity development measures make up a relatively large amount of their programmes, and all three countries refrain from financing prestigious infrastructure projects.

Turkish development cooperation representatives consider the fact that Turkey does not pursue any secondary agenda but rather has cooperation as its solitary aim to be a unique feature of Turkish development cooperation (2013 interviews). This is correct in the sense that Turkey does not link its development cooperation directly to any economic or political conditions. However, this does not mean that Turkey's development policy has a purely altruistic motivation. As explained in Section 2.1, the expansion and strengthening of its cooperation with other countries in various sectors plays a decisive role in the country's overriding foreign policy strategy. Cooperation is used as a means for promoting Turkey's interests in terms of security policy and foreign economic

policy. In this context, development assistance is also used as a foreign policy instrument in order to gain support for Turkish concerns in international forums and to flank the expansion of Turkey's foreign trade.

Turkey still does not have an overriding strategy for its development cooperation, which is why the decision on which project will be funded is primarily a political one and sometimes seems to be random. The Turkish government is currently working on such a strategy. It can be assumed that the gradual professionalisation of Turkish development policy will also lead to a more strategic approach in the near future. Limited predictability is one consequence of the lack of conceptual frameworks. There are still no Country Strategy Papers, for instance. However, three Country Strategy Papers (Tajikistan, Senegal, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) are currently being developed by TİKA in a pilot project with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

According to TİKA, decisive principles of Turkish development cooperation are a partner country-centred approach; the promotion of the partner country's ownership; the encouragement of participatory development; long-term commitments; sustainability; adaptation to economic, social and political changes; and coordination with the donor community (Nurdun 2010; Şahin 2009; Gazanfer 2011). Turkey is thus picking up the decisive principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, to which it feels committed (as a signatory of the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the Accra Action Plan of 2008). However, as with many other donors as well, the degree to which these principles will actually always be implemented is questionable.

Turkey does not seem to attribute any central strategic significance to the international discussions on the topic of aid effectiveness. The country does not play a defining proactive role in the post-Busan process. According to its own statements, it follows the discussions and attends the corresponding meetings (2013 interviews) but does not officially support any of the eight Building Blocks of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. In the Millennium Development Goals Report Turkey 2010 completed with the support of the UNDP, the government comes to the conclusion that the quantitative rise in Turkey's ODA has not sufficiently fostered aid effectiveness. The lack of medium and long-term programming as well as the capacity problems of TİKA and other relevant public institutions are offered as explanations for this (T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization 2010, 54). The implementation of the principle of donor harmonisation and coordination in particular seems limited. Turkey does not participate in regular donor coordination meetings in partner countries in many cases, for instance (2013 interviews). In TİKA's new strategy the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness are to be granted more attention than before (2013 interviews).

TİKA continuously emphasises the partner and demand orientation of its development cooperation. National development strategies are taken into account in programme planning, for instance (HIPC Capacity Building Programme 2009, 6 f.). As TİKA has not had any of its own Country Strategy Papers so far, the orientation of the projects indeed often seems to be focused on the desires and needs of the partner governments.

There are deficits in the areas of monitoring and evaluation. As a key player in Turkish development cooperation, TİKA is merely subject to the government's regular audit. No

evaluations of the projects are carried out. Turkey has been reporting its annual ODA flows to the OECD DAC since 1991, so there is a certain amount of transparency regarding the volumes and distribution of its ODA. Yet, little is known about the underlying decision-making processes and the strategic approach of the development cooperation. This is probably related to the fact that few mechanisms have yet been established and that the strategic foundation must first be developed in many cases. An inter-ministerial working group is currently working on a law on the reorganisation of Turkish development cooperation in which the responsibilities and decision-making processes will be clearly defined. The law is intended to contribute to a more systematic organisation of Turkish development cooperation (2013 interviews). This could lead to great progress in terms of transparency and effectiveness.

Like DAC donors, Turkey has pledged itself to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is taking efforts to align its projects with them (T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization 2010, 4). As there are no overriding strategies or programmes, though, it is not a simple matter for Turkey to address the MDGs directly. Due to their orientation towards basic needs, however, most of the Turkish projects can be attributed to at least one MDG.

#### 2.4 The scope of the development assistance effort

Turkey has been providing development assistance since the mid-1980s, although it was initially very minimal in scope. Its ODA has increased by leaps and bounds since 2003. In the past ten years (2003–2012) it has multiplied to thirty-eight times what it was (see Figure 1).<sup>5</sup> The sharp increase in funds between 2003 and 2005 (from 67 million US dollars to 601 million US dollars) can be explained for the most part by improvements in the area of data collection (Kulaklıkaya / Nurdun 2010, 138 f.), while the nearly 24-percent increase from 2009 (707 million US dollars) to 2010 (967 million US dollars) can be traced back to an expansion of the aid programme, according to the OECD (OECD 2011b).

Turkish ODA has also increased in the last two years. In 2012, Turkey nearly doubled its ODA in comparison to the previous year. This extreme increase can be primarily traced back to the massive amount of aid for refugees of the Syrian Civil War and the increased support provided to North African countries as a consequence of the Arab Spring (OECD 2013a). None of the other donor countries recorded by the OECD DAC has even come close to increasing its development assistance so greatly in the past year.


Turkey's ODA amounted to around 2.53 billion US dollars in 2012, which corresponds to 0.32 percent of Turkey's gross national income (GNI). This sum tops established donor countries such as Belgium, Spain and Finland and is only slightly behind the aid provided by Italy. If Turkey were a member of the DAC then the amount of aid it provides would be in the middle of the rankings: only 13 of the 24 bilateral DAC donors<sup>6</sup> provided more funds than Turkey in 2012 (see Figure 2) (OECD / DAC Statistics 2013b).

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5 Unless otherwise indicated, all of the data on the Turkish ODA are taken from OECD / DAC Statistics 2013a.


6 As of May 2013, the DAC had 25 member countries (in addition to the European Union as the sole multilateral member). However, the newest member, the Czech Republic, had not yet been recorded in the statistics for 2012.

**Figure 1: Turkish ODA 2000 – 2012**



Source: OECD / DAC Statistics 2013a (Author's own compilation)

**Figure 2: The ODA of the DAC countries and Turkey in 2012 (preliminary data)**



Source: OECD / DAC statistics 2013b (Author's own compilation)


A similar pattern can be seen when viewing the relationship between ODA and GNI. With 0.32 percent of its GNI being provided as ODA, Turkey ranks in the middle of the DAC countries and even a bit above the DAC average of 0.29 percent in this area as well (OECD / DAC Statistics 2013c). In addition to official Turkish assistance, there are also funds provided by the private sector and non-governmental organisations including grants totalling 200 million US dollars and direct investments amounting to 879 million US dollars in the year 2011 (OECD Stat 2013a). The official assistance provided by Turkey will presumably sink somewhat again once the crisis in Syria ends. Little is expected to

change in the near future overall, however, as the aid provided by the countries affected by the European financial crisis will probably continue to remain at a low level.

Turkey's ODA is also high in comparison to the assistance provided by other large emerging economies. Out of this group, only China provided higher amounts than Turkey in 2011. The comparison with Arab donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) shows that only Saudi Arabia contributed more funds than Turkey in 2011 (around 5.1 billion US dollars) (see Figure 3).

A large part of Turkish development assistance is provided bilaterally. The multilateral ODA amounted to 110.8 million US dollars in 2012, which corresponds to just under 4.4 percent of the total ODA. The percentage of bilateral ODA was similarly high in 2010 and 2011. Turkey's multilateral ODA has barely risen over the past ten years and has remained between 42 and 111 million US dollars. Hence, it has dropped sharply in relation to bilateral ODA (from 60 percent in 2003 to 4.4 percent in 2012). The reason for the intense focus on bilateral cooperation could be the visibility desired in the sense of the *public diplomacy* principle, which can be better achieved through direct cooperation with developing countries than through channelling the funds through multilateral organisations.

The main recipients of Turkish multilateral development funds are the World Bank Group and the United Nations. In 2011, Turkey provided around 24 million US dollars to the World Bank and just under 14 million US dollars to the various agencies of the United Nations. 6.2 million US dollars were channelled through regional development banks (OECD Stat 2013a).



7 Brazil has not published any comprehensive data on its ODA for 2011.

In recent years (with the exception of 2011 and 2012) the World Food Programme has received voluntary contributions, including 1 million US dollars in 2013. Turkey was able to increase its shares in the World Bank in 2010 and it is now striving to increase its capital with the International Monetary Fund. TİKA's annual report lists 34 international organisations to which Turkey has made contributions in 2011 (TİKA, s. a., 61).

Despite the substantial expansion of its own development assistance, Turkey continues to be a net recipient, meaning that it currently receives more ODA funds than it provides. The ODA it provided was only higher than the aid it received in the years 2004 to 2006. In 2011 the country received assistance in the amount of 3.19 billion US dollars, more than double as much as the ODA it provided itself (OECD Stat 2013b). The amount of ODA received can primarily be explained by the massive financial support of the European Union within the framework of the country's accession negotiations. In contrast, traditional bilateral assistance has dropped in recent years; in 2011 the country received ODA funds from nine DAC donors: the EU was by far the largest donor (2.80 billion US dollars), followed by France, Germany and Austria (OECD Stat 2013b). The bilateral aid Turkey receives consists primarily of concessional loans.

## 2.5 Modalities

Turkey's bilateral development assistance encompasses project and programme support, technical cooperation,<sup>8</sup> scholarships, support for refugees, and emergency relief. The most quantitatively significant form of support is project assistance, which in 2011 amounted to around 754 million US dollars, thus nearly 60 percent of total ODA (OECD Stat 2013a). Turkey hardly supports any programme-based approaches (HIPC Capacity Building Programme 2009, 5). Most of the undertakings involve small projects rather than comprehensive programmes, although the project size can vary widely. Many projects include the financing of infrastructure (particularly social infrastructure) (Kulaklıkaya / Aybey 2008, 264). Turkey generally expects its partner countries to provide some input to the projects, either financially or in kind, but this mostly makes up only a small part of the project budget (Kulaklıkaya / Aybey 2008, 264).

When describing its own development cooperation, Turkey emphasises its training and advisory services in the area of capacity building, the dispatching of experts, and donations of equipment (Kulaklıkaya / Aybey 2008, 264). According to the OECD, 112 million US dollars (just under 9 percent) of Turkish ODA went to experts and other technical assistance in 2011 (OECD Stat 2013a). Capacity building is often an accompanying measure in Turkish projects (2013 interviews).

Turkey spent 74 million US dollars (just under 6 percent) on scholarships and student costs in Turkey, 214 million US dollars (19 percent) for refugees in its own country, and 264 million US dollars on humanitarian aid grants (21 percent) (OECD Stat 2013a).

Turkey's ODA consists primarily of grants. Little is known about development loans, even if the loans provided are normally published in Turkey's official gazette *T.C. Resmî*

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8 Technical cooperation is understood here according to the OECD definition, which covers the following services: (a) training and educational grants to citizens of the partner country and (b) payments to consultants, advisers, teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, s. a.).

*Gazete*. In 2010, the Turkish State Planning Organization still describes the portion of Turkey's ODA that is used for financial assistance as small and names institutional deficits as the reason for this (T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization 2010, 54). Loans and grants are normally provided as part of a larger package that also includes technical cooperation. There are no criteria specifying which country can receive loans and on which terms. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis in which political and economic considerations play a decisive role. According to the Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury, country groups will not be formed, as with the World Bank, because the framework conditions quickly change (2013 interviews).

While the Undersecretariat of Treasury originally provided loans primarily to countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, for some time now the demand for loans has been increasing from countries in Northern Africa as well as other African countries (2013 interviews). Egypt received a support package worth 2 billion US dollars including a credit line in the amount of 1 billion US dollars in 2012 (Government of the Republic of Turkey / Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2012). This was increased by another 250 million US dollars in May 2013. Tunisia received a loan in the amount of 200 million US dollars at an interest rate of 1.5 percent as well as a grant in the amount of 50 million US dollars in 2012 (Government of the Republic of Turkey / Government of the Republic of Tunisia 2012). In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan received a loan in the amount of 100 million US dollars at an interest rate of 0.1 percent and a grant in the amount of 6 million US dollars in 2012 (Government of the Republic of Turkey / Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012a).

Budget support is only provided in exceptional cases (only in 2010 in the amount of 10 million US dollars; OECD Stat 2013a). Turkey's involvement in the HIPC debt relief initiative for the poorest and most indebted developing countries has been limited (2013 interviews). According to OECD data, the last time Turkey cancelled a debt was in 2006 (in the amount of 50 million US dollars) (OECD Stat 2013a). However, in 2011 an agreement was reached with Kyrgyzstan on the cancellation of debts to Türk Eximbank in the amount of 75 million US dollars (Government of the Republic of Turkey / Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012b) which is apparently not creditable as ODA.

According to statements from Turkey, the calls for tenders for the services to be provided within projects are made domestically and abroad because not all of the services are always available in partner countries. Some observers consider the portion of tied aid to be problematic and are calling for improvements in terms of procurement (2013 interviews). However, there are no reliable figures on the scope of the aid tying.

As mentioned in the previous section, Turkey provides most of its ODA bilaterally. Nevertheless, a portion of it is channelled through multilateral organisations. For instance, the country is a member of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), as well as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Upon request, Turkey shares its own experiences with the other member countries of the IDB within the framework of its cooperation with the bank (Kulaklıkaya / Aybey 2008, 267). Since 1991, Turkey has also been a non-regional member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and is represented along with Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom in one of the twelve ADB Executive Directorates.

### **3 The implementation of Turkish development cooperation**

#### **3.1 Structure and organisation**

Turkey has been active in development cooperation since the mid-1980s. Yet it was not until 1992 that it first institutionalised and subsequently expanded its engagement with the establishment of the development agency TİKA. While TİKA was initially under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1999 it received an autonomous status and has since then been attached directly to the Prime Ministry, which manages TİKA politically. Within the framework of the new foreign policy strategy, TİKA is supposed to promote a positive image of Turkey in developing countries and foster stable relations with them. In an interview, TİKA President Serdar Çam called it one of the “*most effective arms*” of Turkey’s foreign policy (Afronline 2012). The agency also plays the role of a *door opener* and is at the same time designed to increase the visibility and coherence of Turkey’s development policy efforts.

According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TİKA’s highest priority is to contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development in its partner countries (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a). Turkish development cooperation is anchored in the Statutory Decree on the Organization and Duties of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Directorate from 2011. According to this statutory decree, TİKA promotes economic, commercial, technical, social and cultural cooperation with developing countries. Its three main tasks are:

1. the implementation of Turkey’s development policy (development and execution of projects and programmes),
2. the coordination of all Turkish development cooperation measures (coordination with the various national stakeholders, international organisations, and bilateral donors) and
3. the compilation of Turkish ODA statistics and reporting to the DAC.

TİKA also handles tasks in the area of cultural policy that do not fall under the OECD DAC definition of ODA.

The adoption of the new Statutory Decree on the Organization and Duties of TİKA in 2011 (Government of the Republic of Turkey 2011) was accompanied by a restructuring of the agency, which is now organised according to regions and divided into eight departments. In addition to four regional departments<sup>9</sup>, there are also departments for external affairs and partnerships, legal counsel, and strategy development as well as for human resources and support services. TİKA had 275 permanent employees before its restructuring and the restructuring was supposed to involve a massive increase in hires as well, so the current number is presumably higher. In addition to its permanent employees, TİKA also has access to an unspecified number of experts from other governmental institutions who are utilised on a project-by-project basis.

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9 These are (a) Central Asia and Caucasus, (b) Balkans and Eastern Europe, (c) the Middle East and Africa and (d) East and South Asia, the Pacific and Latin America.

TİKA receives its funds from the Turkish national budget, meaning that the Turkish parliament decides upon its annual budget. The *current budget* primarily serves to cover administrative expenses, while the *investment budget* finances projects (such as building construction), in part. The agency also manages special project-based funds of the Prime Ministry, project-based funds of other governmental institutions, and also funds for the fulfilment of international commitments. Finally, TİKA also manages additional funds for the establishment of new Programme Coordination Offices in partner countries and multiple emergency budgets.

An Advisory Council consisting of high-ranking representatives of ministries and other governmental institutions meets once a year to formulate the strategic direction of Turkey's development policy. However, the council is actually more of an exchange platform that primarily serves to inform and coordinate the institutions involved. Decisions are not made there. Turkish development cooperation, particularly the definition of the principles and priorities of the work of TİKA, is in actual practice carried out by the Prime Ministry (2013 interviews). Bekir Bozdağ, currently one of four Deputy Prime Ministers, is responsible for TİKA. The Prime Minister or an authorised representative is responsible for nominating the members to the Advisory Council from among the relevant public institutions and organisations.<sup>10</sup>

The current TİKA President, Serdar Çam, was the Chief of Cabinet to Prime Minister Erdoğan from 2002 to 2009 and often accompanies him on trips abroad. TİKA's institutional and personal bonds to the Prime Minister give it great closeness to him personally, while the responsible Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ is hardly seen by observers (2013 interviews). However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the influence of Prime Minister Erdoğan shapes the work of TİKA. Many experts are of the opinion that TİKA is heavily dependent upon the direct instructions of the Prime Minister and that it does not pursue an independent approach. In actuality, Prime Minister Erdoğan often approves development projects during his trips abroad (2013 interviews). Critics accuse TİKA of merely functioning as a "travel agency" for the Prime Minister and of not pursuing any policy of its own (2013 interviews). In fact, institutionalised decision-making processes seem to be missing (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 1).

TİKA works closely with other governmental institutions (ministries and authorities) in the implementation of the projects. These institutions normally provide the experts for the execution of the projects while TİKA coordinates and also partially finances the work. The Ministry of Health, for instance, will grant doctors employed in state-run Turkish hospitals a leave of absence for certain projects. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not used for the implementation of the projects. Even consulting services are hardly ever obtained through tendered contracts but rather are normally performed by the specialised government agencies responsible. It has therefore not yet been possible for a community of development cooperation consultancy providers to develop in Turkey as is the case in many DAC donor countries.

There has been criticism of the way personnel has been selected: TİKA and other dispatching institutions are accused of not dispatching personnel according to expertise

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10 The only permanent members are the President of TİKA and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

but rather according to the *reward principle*, leading the quality of the projects to suffer (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 13; 2013 interviews).

Development cooperation at the country level goes through the Programme Coordination Offices of TİKA in the respective partner countries (34 offices in 31 countries at the start of 2013). These offices are run by Turkish Programme Coordinators who are supported by an assistant. The rest of the personnel in the partner countries consist of local employees as well as Turkish experts for the respective projects who work on location in the short or medium term. In countries without a Coordination Office, the office that is geographically nearest is often used as a liaison office, or the projects are managed by Turkish embassies and consulates.

New projects are normally either based on proposals from the Turkish Programme Coordinators in the respective countries communicated via TİKA to the responsible specialised ministries or are brought to TİKA's attention by the specialised ministries or the Prime Ministry. TİKA is therefore primarily ascribed a liaison and match-making function. Various formats are used in the agreements with the partner countries. In some cases, projects are part of bilateral cooperation agreements made at a higher level, while in other cases there are merely joint Memorandums of Understanding or (primarily in countries with a Programme Coordination Office) there are general cooperation agreements (2013 interviews).

In addition to TİKA a whole series of other governmental actors are involved in Turkish development cooperation, mainly in project implementation. TİKA's share of the Turkish ODA payments is currently only 15 percent, with the majority of the funds being contributed by the various specialised ministries and institutions. According to TİKA's 2011 Annual Report (TİKA, s. a., 88), the following other public institutions are of significance, among others: the Prime Ministry Housing Development Administration (15 percent), the Department of the Chief of Staff of the Turkish army (12 percent), the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (9 percent), the police (9 percent), the Ministry of Economy (8 percent), the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology (8 percent) the Ministry of National Education (7 percent) and the Ministry of Health (5 percent). Development cooperation activities of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs have also been identified. The latter finances stipends for the education of religious personnel in Turkish schools. In general, all governmental institutions can execute projects in development countries and often also have their own budgets, which makes TİKA's role as a coordinator more difficult. The Turkish specialised ministries are also often not conscious of the fact that their activities (such as professional exchange formats) can be counted as official development assistance. It is therefore probable that some Turkish development cooperation activities have not yet been recorded by TİKA (2013 interviews).

Even though the responsibility for TİKA was transferred from the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** to the Prime Ministry in 1999 and the former is therefore no longer responsible for it, there seems to be a close exchange between TİKA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, primarily in the partner countries. The reason for the change in responsibility that was accompanied by a great rise in TİKA's importance is unclear. It can be speculated that the Turkish Prime Minister wanted to create a means of direct access to TİKA in order to be

able to more easily implement projects (2013 interviews). However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still maintains responsibility for Turkish contributions to the United Nations.

The **Undersecretariat of Treasury** in particular plays an important role in financial assistance and is the central institution in the Turkish system for granting concessional and non-concessional loans to other countries. It has two budgets for concessional loans and grants: one extraordinary budget (for emergencies) and one regular budget for loans and grants, whereby the former is the larger budget. The Undersecretariat of Treasury works in close co-ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when processing the loan agreements. The Minister of Treasury has the right to grant loans and grants to other countries according to law, however nearly all of these must be approved *de facto* by the cabinet (2013 interviews). All agreements on loans and grants are published in the official gazette *T.C. Resmî Gazete*. In addition to issuing loans and grants, the Undersecretariat of Treasury is also involved in Turkish development cooperation in other ways. Firstly, it provides the Turkish contributions to the international financial institutions (development banks and funds, as well as the International Monetary Fund) and secondly it is also involved in technical cooperation. It offers, for instance, technical consulting in the area of debt and fiscal management. Employees are dispatched for short-term work in developing countries and representatives from developing countries are offered training courses in Ankara for this purpose. The Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Türk Eximbank) is not attributed any great significance in the area of concessional loans.

In addition, two authorities that answer to the Prime Ministry, the **T.C. Basbakanlik Yurt Disi Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Baskanligi** (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities) or YTB, and the **Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı** (Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) or AFAD, also play a role in Turkish development cooperation. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities grants scholarships on a large scale to foreign students to allow them to study in Turkey, whereby it is primarily students from Central Asia and an increasing amount from Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans who receive them. The AFAD coordinates the involvement of all government agencies in the area of emergency relief. Its focus is on emergency relief within Turkey, yet the AFAD is also active abroad in individual cases such as Somalia and the countries of the Arab Spring (and cooperates with TİKA there). Its importance to Turkey's ODA is currently primarily based on the fact that the AFAD is presently responsible for around 200,000 refugees from the Syrian Civil War living in Turkish refugee camps. TİKA also provides humanitarian aid to developing countries, yet the majority of Turkish emergency relief is processed through the Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay) (2013 interviews). This aid represented 7 percent of Turkey's ODA in 2011 (TİKA, s. a., 88).

The **Turkish Ministry of Development**, the country's central institution for its own development planning, is responsible for the development and coordination of high-priority strategies and principles. Its Technical Cooperation Division is primarily responsible for incoming ODA funds but theoretically also has a voice in the strategic planning of how Turkey's ODA is granted. However, in practice, the Ministry of Development makes little use of its potential influence in this area (2013 interviews).

In addition, the semi-governmental **Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation** (TDV) is also active in developing countries, yet only part of its involvement falls under the definition of development assistance as understood by the OECD DAC. The TDV primarily finances the education of imams, supports the establishment of Qur’anic schools and provides food aid in Muslim countries during Ramadan.

### 3.2 Partner countries

Over 100 countries worldwide received Turkish ODA funds in 2011. However, the absolute figures show that a whole series of countries (particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean) only received very meagre amounts (under 100,000 US dollars), while the majority of the funds flowed into a limited number of countries (see Table 2). It is noticeable in the distribution of the funds that Muslim-majority countries which were in the realm of influence of the Ottoman Empire and/or have close ethno-cultural connections to Turkey were key aid recipients.

	<b>Country</b>	<b>Turkish ODA in millions of US dollars in 2011</b>
1.	Pakistan	204.95
2.	Syria	162.03
3.	Afghanistan	130.89
4.	Somalia	93.39
5.	Kyrgyzstan	74.09
6.	Kazakhstan	53.32
7.	Libya	53.11
8.	Iraq	27.83
9.	Azerbaijan	26.48
10.	Palestinian territories	25.92

Source: OECD Stat 2013b


The countries receiving the most bilateral aid in 2011 were Pakistan, Syria and Afghanistan, which together received nearly 40 percent of Turkey’s ODA. There are no formal criteria for the geographical allocation of aid. Rather, the selection more often follows the priorities of the Prime Minister. This leads to the possibility of funds received by a specific country being subject to relatively strong fluctuations from year to year. In the meantime there are now drafts for Country Strategy Papers for certain individual countries while plans to develop corresponding strategies for all partner countries and regions exist. However, there still seems to be a lack of clarity in the Turkish government over who is responsible (2013 interviews).

There are also great differences in terms of the regional distribution of aid. In 2011, for instance, 46 percent of Turkey’s ODA went to South and Central Asia, nearly 24 percent to the Middle East, a good 17 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa, a good 6 percent to Europe

and just under 5 percent to North Africa, while the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Oceania together received less than 2 percent (figures according to OECD Stat 2013b).

The regional prioritisation is also reflected in the distribution of TİKA’s 34 Programme Coordination Offices in a total of 31 partner countries, most of which are located in the regions of South and Central Asia and Southeast Europe, and has been more intensively expanded in the northeast part of Africa in recent years.<sup>11</sup> The heavy concentration of offices in countries in neighbouring regions is consistent with Turkish foreign policy priorities.

**Figure 4: Regional distribution of Turkish ODA in 2011 (in millions of US dollars)**



Source: OECD Stat 2013b (Author’s own compilation)

The UN LDC-IV Conference hosted in Istanbul in 2011 led to a greater focus on LDCs in Turkish development cooperation. Turkish ODA funds for LDCs more than doubled between 2009 and 2011 to 280.16 million US dollars (OECD Stat 2013b). Nevertheless, Turkey is currently extending just short of one-third of its ODA to LDCs. In his speech at the LDC-IV Conference, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced plans to provide 200 million US dollars per year for technical cooperation and scholarships benefitting the LDCs starting from 2012 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2011, 1). The government also intends to increase the direct investments from Turkey’s private sector from a good 2 billion US dollars in 2011 to 10 billion in 2020. Accompanying government measures are intended to promote the involvement of the private sector.

11 TİKA maintains offices in the following countries: Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro; Eastern Europe: Ukraine (two offices); Central Asia and Caucasus: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (that is, all countries in the region except for Armenia); South Asia: Afghanistan (three offices), Bangladesh and Pakistan; Southeast Asia: Myanmar; Sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan; North Africa: Egypt, Libya and Tunisia; Middle East: Palestine, Syria and Yemen (as of: Spring 2013).

According to the statements of the Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu, Turkey considers itself to be a voice for the LDCs (Kart 2011) and has undertaken the responsibility of bringing topics relevant to the LDCs to the international agenda along with contributing to the efforts to find solutions for the problems of the LDCs by 2020. In actuality, however, Turkey is only assuming this role to a limited extent: experts repeatedly point to the passive behaviour of Turkey in various international forums (Section 2.2).

The beginnings of Turkish development cooperation lie in the mid-1980s in Africa, where Turkey performed a minimal amount of institutional capacity building in various countries (Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan). As a reaction to the geopolitical developments following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the high need for support of the new independent states, at the start of the 1990s Turkey began to expand, institutionally anchor (with the founding of TİKA in 1992) and make strategic use of its development cooperation. The new states in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus that are either located in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood and/or have cultural, historic, ethnic and linguistic ties to Turkey became the focal points of Turkish assistance. The first development projects were carried out in Uzbekistan in 1992, for instance, and TİKA had already opened a Coordination Office in Kyrgyzstan in 1993.

In addition to its linguistic, ethnic, historical and cultural ties to **Central Asia**, the strategic significance of the region also played a role from the very beginning of cooperation relationships there. Turkey had practically no relations to the Soviet Republics located in the region during the Cold War but saw the opportunity to increase its sphere of influence in the region following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Mutlu (2012, 123 f.) argues that the goals of Turkey's policy in Central Asia are the integration of the countries into the international system and the expansion of its own model of a secular state with a Muslim society, a parliamentary democracy, and a free market economy. It was hoped that new export markets could be opened up at the same time. Finally, the intention to drive back other countries with interests in obtaining regional power also surely played a role. Against this backdrop, the *Pan-Turkism* heavily emphasised in Turkish rhetoric is understood as an ideological justification for the country's regional ambitions (Warning 2011a, 90). The relations with the Central Asian countries needed to be intensified in order to realise the Turkish goals in the region. Civil society and the private sector also made a significant contribution to achieving these goals through trade and investment (Mutlu 2012, 134). The resource-rich Central Asian Republics have not yet held great significance for Turkey up to this point in terms of energy supply; only Turkmenistan plays a certain role with a share of 7 percent of the crude oil imported (2011) (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013). Turkey is a more important trade partner for the Central Asian republics (most of all for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) than the other way around.

For a long time, Central Asia was the main recipient of Turkish ODA, however the funds were *“disorganized, unpredictable, and not properly targeted”* (Mutlu 2012, 134). Development cooperation in the region did not follow any sort of strategic, coordinated plan, even if its goals could be clearly stated (Mutlu 2012, 135):

*“1) contributions made for the purpose of strengthening the governmental structures [...]; 2) protection of the political and economic stability of the region and reinforcement of regional cooperation; 3) support given to political and economic reforms; 4) assistance provided for the region's integration with world and*

*European-Atlantic institutions; 5) development of bilateral relations on the basis of mutual interests (...); and 6) support given for the unobstructed and profitable transfer of the region's energy resources”.*

For this purpose projects were and still are primarily financed in the areas of communications, transport, culture, education, economics and energy. The provision of scholarships for students from the Central Asian Turkic states played a special role for a long time. Within the framework of the Great Student Exchange Project, for instance, 38,407 stipends were granted to students from Turkic states and Turkic communities between 1992 and 2008 (Akçalı / Engin-Demir 2012, 13). In 2011, Turkey was the largest bilateral donor for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan and the second-largest donor for Kazakhstan after the United Arab Emirates (OECD, s. a.).

Turkey's primary interests in the **South Caucasus** are regional security and stability, as all of the conflicts in this region affect Turkey due to its geographical proximity. The lack of stability in the South Caucasus could lead to a loss of importance for Turkey in the region and at the international level. The oil and gas pipelines running through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have increased the strategic relevance of the South Caucasus even further. Turkey's interests in the region (conflict resolution, the reduction of security risks, energy security) correspond to those of Germany and the EU.

Due to its ethnic and cultural connections, Turkey maintains especially close relations in the South Caucasus with Azerbaijan. Turkish-Azeri relations are the “*backbone*” (Görgülü / Krikorian 2012, 1) of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. In addition to security policy interests, there are also close economic ties: Turkey is an important trade partner for Azerbaijan (the largest importer), while Azerbaijan supplies Turkey with natural gas.<sup>12</sup> Azerbaijan continues to be one of the largest recipient countries of Turkish ODA (see Table 2). Turkey was the country's third-largest bilateral donor in 2011.

Turkey also maintains good economic ties to Georgia. The country is primarily important to Turkey as a gateway to the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The areas of energy and transport play a crucial role. Turkey is an important trade partner (the largest importer) and investor for Georgia. Turkey was Georgia's fourth-largest bilateral donor in 2011. The relations between Turkey and Armenia continue to be strained, which is why Turkish ODA for Armenia only amounted to 1.3 million US dollars in 2011.

With the emergence of the new **Balkan** states in the 1990s, Turkey expanded its development cooperation to this region. Due to their geographical proximity, trade opportunities and historical, ethnic and cultural ties to Turkey, the Balkans is a high priority in Turkey's foreign policy (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 6). The ties are also close because ethnic Turks live in many of the Balkan states, while many people with Balkan roots also live in Turkey. Turkey has supported the new Balkan states at the political level since they declared their independence, particularly by helping them obtain membership in international organisations. The main recipients of Turkish ODA in the Balkans are Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 million and 18 million US dollars respectively in

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12 9 percent of Turkey's imported natural gas originated in Azerbaijan in 2011 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013).

2011). Macedonia (6.8 million US dollars), Moldova (4.4 million US dollars), Serbia (3.9 million US dollars), Albania (3.6 million US dollars) and Montenegro (2.9 million US dollars) received lower amounts of Turkish ODA (OECD Stat 2013b). Turkey is one of the largest bilateral donors in some of these countries (Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro). Turkish development cooperation in the Balkans covers a broad spectrum. In addition to traditional development cooperation, projects for cultural and religious cooperation are also promoted (particularly the [re-]construction of mosques and the restoration of cultural heritage sites from the Ottoman Empire).

In compliance with Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP administration that also aims to exercise global influence beyond its neighbouring regions, Turkey has in recent years expanded its development cooperation to Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Its assistance has been increasingly directed at **Africa** for nearly ten years now.<sup>13</sup> Turkey's geostrategic interests in Africa are in actual fact negligible. Even the country's interest in Africa's natural resources is not a decisive factor (Erdmann / Herzog 2012, 1). Its motive is rather trade interests (opening up new markets) and the goal of cooperating with African countries in international forums. Turkey's growing interest in Africa was driven by its efforts to mobilise the support of African countries for its application to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2009–2010 (Kirişci 2009, 50; Özkan / Akgün 2010, 536). In addition, the private sector and the commitment of Turkey's civil society to Africa also contributed significantly to generating Turkish interest in the continent (2013 interviews). Turkey's charm offensive in Africa was a comprehensive interaction of traditional foreign policy, development policy, economic and civilian involvement. In 2002 Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union and declared 2005 as the *Year of Africa*, following which the first TİKA Programme Coordination Office on the continent was opened in Ethiopia. Since then, TİKA has opened additional offices that it now maintains in Kenya, Senegal and Sudan as well as the North African countries of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. These offices are responsible for regions beyond the national borders.

In 2008, Turkey hosted the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit that was attended by representatives from 50 African countries. At the same time, two trade associations organised a Turkish-African Business Forum together with the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade. In the same year, the African Union made Turkey a *strategic partner* and it was accepted as a non-regional member by the African Development Fund, resulting in further opportunities for Turkish investors. At the same time, the government authorised TİKA to increase ODA for certain African countries such as Sudan and Togo (Apaydin 2012, 269) and granted 2,500 scholarships to African university students (Davutoğlu 2011b).

Turkey has opened 22 new embassies in Africa since the start of 2009 and thereby currently maintains 34 embassies on the continent. The partially government-owned airline Turkish Airlines now offers direct flights to 26 African countries. The Gülen

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13 After a period of decades in which there were hardly any relations between Africa and Turkey following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey was already beginning to slowly open up toward Africa at the end of the 1990s. In 1998 the African Action Plan was adopted, which provided for far-reaching measures for the expansion of Turkish-African relations in the political, economic and cultural sphere. It was, however, not implemented.

movement had already opened up 60 Turkish schools in 30 African countries in 2010 (*The Economist* 2010, 30), while the largest Turkish NGO, the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), carries out projects in around 40 African countries (IHH 2013). Turkey provides a limited number of troops and police for the UN peace missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Liberia, South Sudan and the Côte d'Ivoire (United Nations 2013, 36 f.). The ODA for Africa is expected to increase further in the coming years (it amounted to 270 million US dollars in 2011) (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a).

The majority of Turkey's African assistance goes to **Sub-Saharan Africa** (2011: 211 million US dollars). All 51 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of five island countries received ODA funds in 2011; however most of these countries received a low amount of aid (under 500,000 US dollars). The only significant recipient countries were Somalia (receiving 93 million US dollars) and Sudan (receiving 21 million US dollars), while all of the other countries received assistance of less than 5 million US dollars. Turkey also provided a significant amount of support (75 million US dollars) for regional initiatives for the first time in 2011 (OECD Stat 2013b).

Turkey has especially increased its involvement in the Horn of Africa, presumably due to its geographical proximity, its high Muslim population, and historical ties from the times of the Ottoman Empire. Somalia is an interesting example. In August 2011, at the height of the most recent hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa, Prime Minister Erdoğan was the first non-African Head of State to visit Somalia in nearly 20 years. Following the visit, the embassy in Mogadishu was opened again, 250 million US dollars in emergency aid were pledged, support in the military sector (for the training of military personnel) was approved, various development projects (primarily in the infrastructure sector) were launched and a TİKA Coordination Office was opened (Aynte 2012). In his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2011, Erdoğan emphatically pointed out the failure of the international community in Somalia and called for stronger international efforts. An amount of over 365 million US dollars was collected in Turkish private donations for Somalia in the same year; in 2012 the government gave over 1,200 full scholarships to Somalis to study in Turkey (Harte 2012, 28). Turkey then held the II Istanbul Somalia Conference in mid-2012. Turkish Airlines now has direct flights to Mogadishu several times per week and the Nile Foundation has opened the first Turkish secondary school in Somalia. Somalia is a clear example of how development cooperation fits into the larger framework of Turkey's foreign policy, which comprises economic, military and cultural cooperation as well as political support.

While development cooperation was initially concentrated on Sub-Saharan Africa, **North Africa** also became a focus of Turkish aid with the start of the Arab Spring. Turkey has opened three new TİKA offices in the region (in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia) since 2011 and increased its ODA from 4 million US dollars (2010) to 58 million US dollars (2011). The lion's share (53 million US dollars) went to Libya (OECD Stat 2013b), with which Turkey already had relatively close relations even before the Arab Spring. Turkish companies had made large-scale investments there and brought over 20,000 Turkish citizens into the country.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are the focus of Turkey's interest in **South Asia**. Turkey has had bilateral relations with Afghanistan for many years; from the Turkish perspective,

Afghanistan's stability is connected to the stability and security of the wider region (Kardaş 2013b, 15). As a member of NATO, Turkey is involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. As Turkey refuses to use force in other Muslim countries, it does not participate in combat missions in Afghanistan but rather limits its contributions to the training of the Afghan police and military, to military aid, and to the provision of equipment. Initially it also conducted patrols (Kardaş 2013b, 5 f.). Just as with other NATO countries, Turkey's involvement in Afghanistan has a strong civilian component reflected in Turkey's development cooperation. Afghanistan was the largest recipient of Turkish ODA from 2007 to 2010 (OECD Stat 2013b) and is the only country to have three TİKA offices (in Kabul, Wardak and Mazar-i Sharif). The development cooperation is concentrated on providing the population with basic supplies and services (health, education, water and sanitation) as well as capacity building and infrastructure (TİKA 2009, 95). In addition, Turkey has also been working to promote regional cooperation for several years. The intensification of international trade as well as energy and transport relations is viewed as a means of facilitating economic prosperity and security (Kardaş 2013b, 9 ff.). Turkey initiated a trilateral process that involves Pakistan. Pakistan, with which Turkey maintains excellent relations according to statements made by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is viewed as an important actor in promoting the security and stability of the region (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., b). The country has been one of the largest recipients of Turkish ODA for years and replaced Afghanistan as the primary recipient country in 2011. The only other country in the region of South Asia to receive any noticeable Turkish ODA funds apart from Pakistan and Afghanistan is Myanmar (15 million US dollars in 2011). Myanmar did not become a notable recipient of Turkish emergency aid and development assistance until following the devastating Cyclone Nargis in 2008. TİKA still does not maintain an office in Myanmar.

Apart from Mongolia, countries in the **Far East** do not play a prominent role in Turkish development assistance. This contrasts to the **Middle East**, where Turkey has been providing development assistance to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories since the start of the millennium. Turkey also maintains a TİKA office in Yemen, however the amount of the assistance is low (450,000 US dollars in 2011).

Turkey's *Zero Problems Policy* pursues the aims of stabilising and generating peace in the Middle East region. According to Davutoğlu (2008, 84 f.), Turkey's Middle East Policy is based on four fundamental principles: security for the entire region; dialogue as the preferred means for solving crises; economic interdependence; and, finally, cultural co-existence and plurality. Against the backdrop of the dynamic development of Turkey's involvement in the Middle East within the last decade, however, there are still deficits related to the in-depth understanding of country-specific conditions as well as a shortage of personnel with a profound expertise on the language, society and culture of the Arabic countries (Kardaş 2012, 7).

Due to shared borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria, conflicts in these countries have direct effects on Turkey. In addition to the stability aspect, Turkey's original foreign policy interest in the Middle East, as well as in other regions, was naturally also a desire for the expansion of its economic ties.

This is particularly apparent with the examples of Iraq and Iran. Iraq is of great importance to Turkey for reasons of both domestic policy and security policy, not least due to the issue of the Kurds. The country is also very interesting from an economic viewpoint: Iraq has the potential to become one of the world's most important energy producers and offers a broad field of activity for Turkish construction companies in light of the destruction due to the war. Turkey is working on getting well-positioned Turkish companies involved in the reconstruction of the country and exporting Iraqi oil and gas through Turkish territory to Europe (Steinberg 2011, 172). It is therefore not surprising that Iraq has been one of the biggest recipients of Turkish ODA for years despite wavering relations at the political level. Turkey provides both humanitarian aid as well as technical cooperation, and finances infrastructure and other construction projects (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 8).

The economic interdependence between Turkey and Iran increases Turkey's interest in its political stability (Ekmekçi / Yildirim 2012, 46). Turkey imported over half of its oil from Iran in 2011 (US Energy Information Administration 2013). Davutoğlu (2008, 91) explained that access to Iranian energy resources is a vital Turkish interest. Against this backdrop, it is understandable that Turkey was Iran's largest ODA provider in 2011 with 11.3 million US dollars.

Despite its political and economic importance to Turkey (free trade zone starting from 2007; visa facilitations starting from 2009; transit country to other markets in the Middle East) and the dramatically improved bilateral relations under the AKP administration, Syria – Turkey's second-biggest recipient country in 2011 – did not attract a particularly high amount of ODA from Turkey for many years. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and the stream of 600,000 Syrian refugees into Turkey so far, however, the ODA figures have jumped significantly (from 10 million to 162 million US dollars between 2010 and 2011). In the meantime the TİKA office in Damascus had to close.

Since 2004, Turkey has significantly increased its political involvement in Lebanon, which Turkey feels plays a decisive role in the stability of the Middle East (Rieck 2011, 201). Lebanon has also received substantial ODA funds from Turkey since 2006, although the amount fluctuates significantly from year to year. Turkey was one of the country's biggest donors in 2006, 2008 and 2010. Its support of the reconstruction and development of the country was primarily carried out through the financing of important infrastructure and other construction projects (particularly hospitals) (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 9).

Economic and security policy interests do not play a big role in the Palestinian territories from the Turkish perspective. Rather, there are existing cultural, social and historical bonds (Murphy / Sazak 2012, 7) allowing humanitarian considerations to take precedence. Turkish assistance is primarily focused on providing the population with basic supplies and services.

In summary, the regional distribution of Turkish ODA is to a large extent consistent with the country's foreign policy priorities. The assistance is primarily concentrated on countries and regions in which it has a strong interest in stability and/or strengthened economic ties. In the 1990s there was a strong focus on the regions of Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Balkans. In compliance with the new foreign policy of the AKP administration and its efforts to become a regional power, obtain global influence and

open up new markets, Turkey following the turn of the millennium has gradually expanded its development cooperation to South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The Far East, Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean play only a very minor role in Turkey's development assistance.

### 3.3 Sectors

TİKA has not formulated any sector concepts so far. The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) reported the following sectoral distribution for the year 2011: 62 percent went to social infrastructure and services; 5 percent to economic infrastructure and services; and 12 percent to production sectors. 21 percent of the funds were used for multi-sectoral support or for cross-cutting issues (information according to OECD Stat 2013c).

Over half of the funds for social infrastructure and services were used in the education sector, just under one-fourth in the government and civil-society sector (primarily for projects with a focus on conflict, peace and security) and around one-eighth in the health sector. The funds in the economic infrastructure and services sector are distributed almost equally between the sectors of transport/storage and communications. Within the production sectors, 96 percent of the funds went to projects related to trade policies and regulations. In absolute figures, the sectors that stand out are therefore education; conflict/peace/security; trade policies/regulations; and health.

Humanitarian aid represents a relatively large share of Turkish assistance. Roughly one-fifth of Turkey's ODA for the year 2011 (264.35 million US dollars) was provided for this.

In its presentation of development cooperation priorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises the sectors of education, health, water and sanitation as well as economic and social infrastructure. It explains its selection of these sectors with the strongly demand-driven orientation of Turkish development policy that focuses primarily on addressing the basic needs of local populations (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., a). In actuality, the areas of peace and security as well as trade policies and regulations correspond with Turkey's interests in its surrounding regions.

Concrete measures of Turkey's development cooperation include the construction and equipping of schools and hospitals, the granting of scholarships to foreign students and researchers, the training of security forces and medical personnel, and the construction of wells and water pipes.

The sectoral distribution of the aid hardly varies across different regions. Social infrastructure represents the highest priority in all regions. Agricultural promotion plays a certain role in Africa, as does environmental protection in Central Asia and in the Caucasus (TİKA 2009, 93,145; Erdmann / Herzog 2012, 5). Davutoğlu has called for the sustainable development of the agricultural sector in LDCs so that these countries can achieve a maximum "*food sovereignty*" (Davutoğlu 2012b, 10). However, the amount Turkey spends in the agricultural sector has been marginal so far (2.6 million US dollars in 2011).

In addition to traditional development cooperation activities, TİKA also supports the preservation of the cultural heritage and implements projects for the promotion of the Turkish language and culture. This occurred especially from 1999 to 2011 within the

framework of the Turcology Project. A total of 29 institutes for Turcology or Turkish language and literature were created at universities in 21 countries (primarily in Southeast Europe and Central Asia). In particular, this was intended to promote the learning of the Turkish language and to simplify transnational communication. TİKA handed the project over to Yunus Emre Enstitüsü (an institute for the promotion of the country's own culture abroad, similarly to the German Goethe Institute) in 2011. The restoration of mosques and Ottoman cultural heritage sites is also financed by TİKA in many countries.

### 3.4 Partners

Turkey works with a series of bilateral and multilateral as well as non-governmental partner institutions at different levels in the planning and implementation of its projects as well as within the framework of international coordination processes.

Against the backdrop of international donor coordination efforts, Turkey has made use of its observer status in the DAC to perform a bridging function between DAC donors and other donor countries. In this role, Turkey hosted a political dialogue with non-DAC members of the OECD in Istanbul in 2006 and attended the dialogue meetings that followed (including the Joint Meeting with the institutions of the Arab Coordination Group in Kuwait in 2009). As an observer, it took part in two DAC Peer Reviews (Germany 2005, Norway 2008) and was one of the reviewing countries in the Special Peer Review of Poland (before its acceptance into the DAC). The country was also a member of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness<sup>14</sup> and signed the outcome document of the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 (Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation).

The African Union (AU) is an important multilateral partner for Turkey. As previously mentioned, the AU made Turkey a *strategic partner* in 2008. Building on the foundation of the results of the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit (2008), the government developed an *Africa Strategy* that was made public by the Prime Ministry in 2010 and is intended to strengthen the partnership with the African Union. The first High Level Officials Meeting of the Turkish-Africa Partnership at which the 2010–2014 Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Implementation Plan was adopted took place in Istanbul in the same year.

Turkey was declared a key country for UNDP's "Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC)" mechanism. The Turkish Country Office of UNDP and Turkey (1988–2007 State Planning Organization, 2008–2013 TİKA) have been implementing the three-phase TCDC programme since 1988. The UNDP bases its selection of Turkey on the country's role as a driving force in the region. By supporting Turkey in developing national institutions for technical cooperation with other countries, UNDP first wanted to promote and popularise South-South cooperation as a modality. Regional South-South cooperation was then to be promoted in the second phase of the programme (2013 interviews).

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14 The secretariat was located in the OECD DCD.

The third phase of the programme (2008–2013)<sup>15</sup> takes Turkey's role as a new donor country into account and aims to strengthen the national capacities of the country to plan and implement development assistance in line with aid effectiveness principles. TİKA's capacity in the elaboration and implementation of a development assistance strategy as well as the elaboration of an action plan on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness are to be expanded, for instance. The programme also proposed to create a database with the CVs of Turkish experts (talent bank mechanism) and a funding pool. The talent bank has already been set up and a few hundred Turkish experts are registered in it. The third phase also includes the planning and hosting of development knowledge events in order to strengthen Turkey's profile as a new donor. At the same time, the country is to be supported in contributing more intensively to global development forums and networks. The International Conferences on Women and Governance as well as on E-Governance in 2008/2009 were part of this programme (UNDP 2013, 1, 4; Şahin 2009). One additional aspect of the programme is the promotion of triangular cooperation (2013 interviews).

Within the framework of the programme, UNDP developed a Capacity Development Action Plan in 2009 that is intended to support TİKA in strategic development at the organisational level across three dimensions: in the overriding strategy of Turkish development cooperation, in the institutional strategic plan of TİKA, and in the strategies for the partner countries. Beyond these areas, TİKA also receives support for improving its operational efficiency and effectiveness and educating its employees in results-based management, product cycle management, and communications.

TİKA named USAID, the UK's DFID, Japan's JICA, Australia's AusAID, Slovakia's SlovakAid and Germany's GTZ as its bilateral partners for the year 2007. However, it is not explained in further detail what the respective partnerships involved (HIPC Capacity Building Programme 2009, 7). What is known is that Turkey carries out triangular cooperation with JICA (including in the Caucasus and in Central Asia in the area of geosciences) (General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration, s. a.). The projects have apparently been very small and TİKA has only played a limited role in them so far (2013 interviews). In February 2012, TİKA and JICA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that provided for an expansion of triangular cooperation in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Africa. There is a particular focus placed on Afghanistan. The MoU also aims at strengthening the partnership between JICA and TİKA in the design and implementation of technical cooperation. The potential for joint development cooperation is to be explored, the collaboration in capacity development is to be intensified, and the exchange of information and experience is to be strengthened (JICA 2012; Kodama 2012).

Several years ago, TİKA carried out an agricultural project (the development of modern cotton cultivation systems) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with Sweden's SIDA (Gazanfer 2011). Agreements have been reached with the Korean development agency KOICA and USAID but no joint projects have been carried out yet. Meanwhile, a triangular cooperation project is being prepared with the IDB and Burkina Faso in the area of

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15 It is entitled "Bridging South-South Cooperation and Emerging Donor Roles: Strengthening Turkey's Participation in International Development Cooperation" and has a budget of just under 2 million US dollars.

irrigation. A series of DAC donors have expressed interest in triangular cooperation with Turkey in the meantime, but Turkey seems to have a preference for Eastern development agencies and international organisations as its partners (2013 interviews). The reasons for this are not known.

Davutoğlu seems to have taken a rather critical position with regard to cooperation with the private sector. In his strategy paper “A New Vision for Least Developed Countries”, he urges the careful evaluation and monitoring of public-private partnerships, particularly in relation to the provision of essential services, as the profit interest of companies can often take precedence over the aim of reducing poverty and injustice (Davutoğlu 2012b, 9 f.). However, TİKA’s new Statutory Decree provides for the agency to realise programmes and projects in cooperation with NGOs and the private sector (Government of the Republic of Turkey 2011, §3d).

### 3.5 Non-governmental organisations

NGOs play an increasingly important role in Turkish development assistance. According to the OECD DAC, they contributed just under 200 million US dollars and received an additional 15 million US dollars in state subsidies in 2011. Private funds thereby nearly doubled in comparison to the previous year (OECD Stat 2013a).

For a long time, the opportunities for Turkish NGOs to become involved abroad were very limited. Over the course of Turkey’s democratisation process, the activities of Turkish NGOs abroad were facilitated by a change in the law in 2004. Before that, the cabinet had to approve NGO activities abroad (2013 interviews). Even today, however, Turkish NGOs still have to inform the government before they make use of funds supplied from abroad and if they receive a grant from international organisations (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2013).

Out of the 92,670 associations and 4,634 foundations existing in Turkey in 2012 (Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) 2013, 10), only a fraction have been active in developing countries. The number is estimated to be around 50 organisations (2013 interviews). The biggest Turkish NGO in the area of development cooperation is the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), which had revenues in the amount of around 54 million euros and spent over 50 million euros on its goals in 2012 (IHH, s. a.). In 2011 it provided over one-fourth of all development assistance funds contributed by Turkish NGOs (TİKA, s. a., 71). Other NGOs that are important in terms of development assistance are Kimse Yok Mu, Türk Dünyası Asaştirmalari Vakfi, Yeryüzü Doktorlari (Doctors Worldwide) and Cansuyu Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği (Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Organisation). The ten largest NGOs contributed 98 percent of the private funds for development assistance in 2011 (TİKA, s. a., 71).

Most of the NGOs active abroad are working in the area of humanitarian aid with a particular focus on emergency relief. This applies particularly to the smaller NGOs that work with volunteers and do not have the ability or desire to set up long-term structures in partner countries. Only a few NGOs implement long-term development projects or programmes (2013 interviews). There are various different sources of funding. The IHH, for instance, is funded exclusively through private donations (primarily small individual

donations), while other NGOs such as Support to Life have only institutional donations (from international non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and the private sector) as a source for funding (Interviews 2013).

The NGOs sometimes work together with local NGOs but most of them are not well networked internationally. According to their own statements, their work is inexpensive because they often work with volunteers. One NGO reported that its Turkish origin facilitated its work in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, making it easier to gain access to the local population and to the target groups. Although certain other NGOs did not share this assessment, none of them saw their Turkish origin as a disadvantage (2013 interviews).

Many of the Turkish organisations are faith-based and a slew of them can be attributed to the Islamic Gülen movement. If they are focusing on Muslim countries then there is also a practical reason for this: these countries are relatively close, and a Turkish infrastructure is often present (2013 interviews). NGOs played a large role in Turkey opening up to Africa. In particular, they have contributed to Somalia, holding a high priority in Turkey's foreign policy agenda since 2011 (2013 interviews).

Özkan and Akgün (2010, 529) attribute an increasing influence on the shape of Turkey's foreign policy to NGOs. Nevertheless, Turkish NGOs describe their abilities to influence the government as mostly very limited (2013 interviews). There are no established mechanisms for exchange between the government and NGOs in the area of development cooperation. Thus, coordination is very limited and only occurs in select cases (2013 interviews).<sup>16</sup>

Most Turkish NGOs concentrate their humanitarian efforts on projects in the beneficiary country. Many of them find awareness-raising and advocacy activities with regard to the Turkish government and the public to be difficult due to the political framework conditions (NGOs are banned from political activities) (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2013; 2013 interviews). However, some observers are of the opinion that the government appears to be slowly opening up to the ideas and concerns of the NGOs and is increasingly recognising them as legitimate political actors (2013 interviews). The applicable laws provide for the NGO activities to be monitored by the state. However, the government normally does not attempt to directly influence the NGOs.

The cooperation between NGOs and TİKA is still at a very early stage. Only a few NGOs have cooperated with TİKA so far and there are no established mechanisms for cooperation (Bikmen 2013, 2). The cooperation between TİKA and Islamic NGOs varies greatly according to partner country. Apaydin (2012) shows that this depends upon the official ideology (secular *versus* pro-Islamic) as well as on the regime type of the recipient country.<sup>17</sup>

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16 There is a certain amount of coordination with the activities in Somalia, for instance. Another example is the International Turkish-African Congress, which has been held by the think-tank TASAM (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies) every year since 2005. In addition to government representatives, research institutions and civil organisations also participate in it.

17 According to Apaydin (2012, 262), personalistic authoritarian regimes cooperate with NGOs more often than clan-based authoritarian regimes do.

In general, NGOs are not directly financially supported by the Turkish government and there is no special programme for the promotion of NGO development cooperation. TİKA does not utilise NGOs for the implementation of its own projects either. Turkish NGOs can, however, submit project proposals to TİKA and apply for support for them. TİKA contributes its share of this exclusively in kind.<sup>18</sup> These contributions often involve logistical support or human resources (2013 interviews). Relief supplies can be sent on state-owned ships and state-appointed doctors can be given a leave of absence to work in NGO projects in the healthcare sector, for instance.

TİKA still does not have any strategy for how to engage with local NGOs of the beneficiary country as partners in development projects.

## 4 Turkey as a partner for Germany in triangular cooperation

### 4.1 Triangular cooperation in international development cooperation

With the increasing presence of new donor countries in international development cooperation, the modality of triangular cooperation has aroused the interest of the donor community. The OECD DAC initially considered triangular cooperation to involve *“partnerships between DAC donors and pivotal countries (providers of South-South Cooperation) to implement development cooperation programmes/projects in beneficiary countries (recipients of development aid)”* (OECD 2010, 4). The meaning of the term has been developed further in the meantime: triangular cooperation is described by the OECD DAC as *“a partnership where one or more providers of development cooperation support South-South cooperation, joining forces with developing countries to facilitate a sharing of knowledge and experience among all partners involved”* (OECD 2012a, 1). However, so far there have not been any internationally recognised definitions of the term.

Among other things, the core characteristics of triangular cooperation include a focus on the exchange of knowledge, the participation of all three partners in every step of the initiative (from its design to its evaluation) and the linking of goals at different levels. In addition to development goals, goals related to the partnership itself may also be set, for example (OECD 2012b, 1).

Triangular cooperation can take various forms. The starting point is often a cooperation initiative between a traditional and a new donor that is viewed as successful and is expanded into a third country; it therefore involves the expansion of a bilateral programme. In other cases, emerging economies have collected specific positive experiences in a certain area during their own development process and transfer knowledge from these experiences to third countries with the support of traditional donors. This therefore involves South-South cooperation initiatives that a traditional donor promotes through consulting, networking or financing. A third starting point can be the traditional bilateral cooperation between a traditional donor and a developing country that is supported by a new donor country through consulting and financing services.

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18 The transfer of funds is possible in principle but has not been used so far because the extraordinarily high amount of time and administrative effort in Turkey’s case is not suitably proportional to the benefit in terms of development policy.

The number of new and traditional donor countries that implement triangular cooperation has increased in recent years (Chaturvedi 2012, 7). Presently the most active countries in this area are Brazil, Chile, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and the United States. In terms of DAC donors, Japan and Germany are by far the most active partners. Various international organisations play a role, particularly a series of UN agencies (the World Food Programme, UNDP, FAO, UNEP, UNAIDS and UNICEF), though regional development banks and the World Bank also do so. Most triangular cooperation takes place within one region and between countries with certain common features (geographical proximity, language, cultural heritage) (OECD 2012c, 3 f.). According to a study carried out for the UN DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat), many triangular cooperation projects have focused on administrative capacity building. In addition, a particularly high amount of triangular cooperation projects are implemented in the sectors of health and agriculture (Chaturvedi 2012, 12 f.).

Figures on the total amount of funds contributed for triangular cooperation are not available. However, individual donors appear to invest less than 10 million US dollars per year in most cases (OECD 2012c, 4). It is still very difficult to evaluate triangular cooperation in general and the effectiveness of specific projects, as there is a lack of systematic evaluations.

An assessment of triangular cooperation is also complicated by the fact that initiatives are based on diverse goals: the more efficient promotion of development in recipient countries by combining the strengths of both donors; the strengthening of relations between southern and northern partners; the development of *donor expertise* in emerging countries; the strengthening of relations between southern partners; and the enhancement of regional integration (OECD 2010, 7 f.).<sup>19</sup>

Triangular cooperation is viewed as a complement to bilateral cooperation by both DAC donors and the new donor countries (OECD 2012c, 1; OECD 2012a, 1, among others). In the Bogota Statement (Steering Committee of the Bogota High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development 2010)<sup>20</sup> it is described as a “*bridge*” between North-South and South-South cooperation.

The following aspects are identified as potential benefits of triangular cooperation over traditional bilateral cooperation (OECD 2010, 8; Ashoff 2010, 23):

- Synergy effects can be achieved through the combination of the comparative advantages of the various donors. In particular, this involves the potential of new donors to be able to offer solutions better adapted to developing countries due to their development experience.
- As the aid provided by the new donor countries (experts, services and technologies) is normally less expensive than that provided by DAC donors, the costs can be reduced for the entire project/programme.

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19 Naturally triangular cooperation can only improve regional integration and cooperation if it takes place in the region of the new donor country.

20 This statement presented the results of the High-Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development in Bogotá in March 2010.

- If the project/programme being promoted is a measure that is based on a successful bilateral project between the new donor country and the DAC donor country (replication) then the effectiveness of the aid can be increased through economies of scale.
- The improvement of the capacity of the development agencies of the new donor countries fosters an overall increase in the capacity of the international development cooperation system.

For DAC donors, triangular cooperation also offers the advantage that these donors can allow the development cooperation with the new donor countries to be phased out in an orderly manner (and can retain their contacts) by these means. Finally, triangular cooperation can provide an opportunity to sensitise new donors to the aid effectiveness principles agreed upon in the Paris Declaration and in the Accra Action Plan and foster a shared understanding of development cooperation. According to a survey carried out for the UNDP Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (2009, 143), traditional donor countries see an advantage in triangular cooperation in the fact that they contribute to coordination (primarily at the strategic level) and harmonisation. However, the focus of triangular cooperation on bilateral projects at the same time contributes to the fragmentation of the donor landscape.

In addition, increasing the effectiveness of DAC donors' own development cooperation by replicating bilateral cooperation projects in third countries is viewed as an advantage by the DAC donors. But there are, under certain circumstances, also additional benefits of triangular cooperation for new donors: it can offer new donors the opportunity to mobilise additional funds for their projects; they can profit from many years of DAC donor development cooperation experience (via the improvement of project quality and the expertise of the new donor's own development agencies); and it can improve their visibility as donors. For partner countries, triangular cooperation can offer the aforementioned advantages of cost-efficiency (less expensive services from the donor country lead to an improved price/performance ratio) and potentially better adapted solutions (Ashoff 2010, 23).

If the new donor country and the partner country are located in the same region then both can profit from the strengthening of regional cooperation and integration through triangular cooperation. Historical, linguistic and cultural similarities can have a positive effect on the success of the project. However, geographic proximity can become a disadvantage if the recipient country is critical of hegemonic regional ambitions of the new donor country (as is the case with some of the countries neighbouring China and India).

Other potential risks include (Ashoff 2010, 23 f.; OECD 2010, 9):

- the lowering of quality standards if the new donor country is lacking the experience and capacity needed to be able to meet the quality demands of the DAC donor;
- insufficient alignment with the needs, priorities, strategies and structures of the recipient country;

- the increasing fragmentation of the international aid architecture due to the increased number of actors; the limitation of donor harmonisation due to the increased bilateralisation of development cooperation;
- the rising transaction costs resulting from the fact that three instead of two actors must agree upon a common approach as well as common standards and procedures (meaning longer negotiation processes and an increased risk that the distribution of roles and responsibilities is unclear).

The potential additional burden on the recipient country is also worth mentioning if small, isolated projects (rather than comprehensive programmes) are selected for triangular cooperation, as it is currently common.

So far, there is still no reliable data on how much transaction costs increase in comparison to bilateral cooperation projects. It is difficult to make this comparison, not least because triangular cooperation can involve goals on multiple levels. In addition to the goal of contributing to development in the recipient country, there is also the goal of improving the areas of expertise of the new donor country. It is to be assumed that the transaction costs vary greatly from case to case and are reduced if it is not the first cooperation of this type for the actors involved.

The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (2013b, 2) specifies the following conditions as prerequisites for the success and the effectiveness of triangular cooperation:

- There are shared development objectives (even if the partners have differing interests).
- The contributions of the partners are complementary and take advantage of their existing comparative advantages.
- Knowledge and experience are adapted to the context of the recipient country.
- All of the partners feel committed and are actively involved in all steps from the design to the implementation of the project.
- All of the partners bring sustained political buy-in.
- The partnership is driven by the needs of the recipient country.
- The partnership is based on reciprocal respect and trust.
- The roles and areas of responsibility reflect the strengths of the individual partners.
- There is a common agreement on planning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and funding mechanisms.
- The partners have the flexibility to adapt to the different procedures of the other partners.
- There is open and clear communication between all of the partners.

In addition, triangular cooperation can naturally also be simplified through cultural, linguistic and institutional similarities between the partners and through existing bilateral relations.

## 4.2 Triangular cooperation as an instrument of German development cooperation

Germany has been involved as a partner in triangular cooperation in the area of development cooperation since the mid-1980s. However, the instrument has only gained substantial political significance since the turn of the millennium. The coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP in 2009 proposed the enhancement of cooperation with emerging economies to promote a sustainable form of globalisation based on mutual responsibility, advocating triangular cooperation in this context (CDU / CSU / FDP 2009, 128). The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) published a strategy paper in 2011 in which the framework for development cooperation with *global development partners*<sup>21</sup> within the period from 2010 to 2015 is sketched out. Triangular cooperation is described there as an instrument for cooperation with global development partners in the three central fields of action of climate/environment; sustainable economic development; and the shaping of global development agendas (BMZ 2011, 20).

The strategy paper on expanding partnerships with the *shaping powers (Gestaltungsmächte)*<sup>22</sup> published by the German Federal Government in 2012 also mentions triangular cooperation. The concept envisages recruiting the shaping powers as partners and working together with them “to promote rule-based multilateral global governance” (Bundesregierung 2012, 8). The German Government intends to integrate the shaping powers more intensively into the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and to push them toward stronger observance of the principles agreed upon in it. Against this backdrop, triangular cooperation is viewed as a “promising mechanism” (Bundesregierung 2012, 52) for collaboration between DAC and non-DAC countries.

At the start of 2013, the BMZ published a position paper on triangular cooperation in German development cooperation in which the increased reliance on triangular cooperation is once again named as a goal. It adopts a significantly stricter definition of triangular cooperation than the OECD DAC, limiting the concept to:

“a cooperation project that is jointly planned, financed and implemented by an established DAC donor (industrialised country), an emerging economy and a beneficiary country” (BMZ 2013, 5).

The BMZ therefore places a double restriction: with regard to the partners involved, who absolutely must belong to the three categories of a traditional donor country (DAC donor), a new donor country (emerging economy) and a developing country (beneficiary country) as well as through the specification of the substance of the initiative. Due to the focus on

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21 The *global development partners* are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. Argentina, China and Turkey indeed also fulfil the criteria of *global development partners* (the ability to shape global processes; a significant role in achieving the MDGs and protecting global public goods; an economy large enough to be of regional and global importance; and a key role in regional integration processes) but they are no longer partner countries for Germany’s development cooperation and therefore remain left out.

22 The German Federal Government considers *shaping powers* to be states with which it does not already cooperate within the EU, G8 or NATO and which are characterized by a clear determination to shape various policy fields, a significant economic clout or a strong economic growth, and the potential to assume a key role in steering regional processes and shaping international and/or global governance due to their influential role or their domestic circumstances (Bundesregierung 2012, 5).

jointly planned, financed and implemented projects, the financing of a simple exchange of experts between the new donor and the developing country is not considered to be triangular cooperation, for instance. The decisive factor for the BMZ is the joint aid mobilisation (personnel, specialist sectoral knowledge and knowledge of methodology, and/or financial resources) by the DAC donor and the new donor to benefit a third country as well as the accompanying mutual learning process among the two aid providers. The new donor country is therefore also always a co-financer and source of know-how.

The position paper names five goals that German development cooperation pursues with triangular cooperation within the political framework created by the strategies on global development partners and shaping powers (BMZ 2013, 7):

- *“Improving the effectiveness of development measures in the beneficiary countries through the complementary use and dovetailing of knowledge, experience and financial resources (...).*
- *Establishing worldwide development partnerships (...).*
- *Jointly setting global development agendas and promoting the sharing of learning and experiences on the principles of development cooperation and the ways in which it can impact.*
- *Replicating/disseminating experience jointly gained through bilateral development cooperation (...).*
- *Fostering South-South co-operation, regional development, dialogue and networking.”*

To date, Germany has implemented most of its triangular cooperation initiatives in Latin America. The most important partners there are Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The BMZ is also interested in initiating and expanding triangular cooperation with new donor countries in other regions but there has been less interest in many emerging economies in Asia and Africa than in Latin America up to now (2013 interviews). However, there are also triangular cooperation projects involving South Africa, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The BMZ is also strongly interested in triangular cooperation with Turkey. A triangular cooperation office was therefore established with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ankara for the period from 2009 to 2014, which is intended to initiate cooperation projects and to advise TİKA on instruments and methods of development cooperation. However, no cooperation has materialised so far.

The BMZ generally pursues triangular cooperation with emerging economies and developing countries that are also partners in bilateral development cooperation (within the framework of country programmes or regional/thematic programmes). However, exceptions can be made in the case of an emerging economy willing to cooperate in the role of a new donor. There are no sectoral restrictions, and existing triangular cooperation projects actually cover a variety of sectors (environmental protection, health, and agriculture, among others).

With one exception, so far all triangular cooperation projects implemented by Germany have been technical in nature and are almost exclusively handled by the GIZ.<sup>23</sup> Most triangular cooperation initiatives involving Germany are financed through the Regional Fund for Triangular Cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is used to promote projects in the region and in Africa with new donor countries from Latin America. In addition, triangular cooperation projects are also agreed upon in bilateral governmental negotiations. In the case of South Africa, there is a triangular cooperation fund that finances triangular cooperation with South Africa and African recipient countries. There is a separate triangular cooperation programme with Brazil. Other measures are financed from the *Studien und Fachkräftefonds* (Studies and Experts Funds).

Germany places value on contributing its expertise and not only money in all of its projects. Even though Germany is the second biggest donor in triangular cooperation after Japan, the volume is currently comparatively low (around 20 to 30 million euros per year). This can be traced back to the fact that the promoted projects have to date consisted of small measures; the German contribution is normally less than 300,000 euros. The funds provided by the BMZ are normally doubled or tripled by the partners involved.

#### 4.3 Turkish and German interests: congruencies and divergences

If Germany wishes to expand triangular cooperation, the question of which new donor countries should be taken into consideration as partners merits reflection. Although there have been studies assessing China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa as partners (Altenburg / Weikert 2006; Zilla et al. 2011), the opportunities and risks of triangular cooperation with Turkey have not yet been systematically analysed.

Whether there is potential for such a partnership is not only determined on the basis of mutual interests but also on the basis of the compatibility of the respective objectives as well as the procedures and standards. The objectives can be distinguished on different levels, reflecting: a) foreign policy, b) structural development policy and c) a project-specific development policy level.

From a **foreign policy** perspective, triangular cooperation can contribute to strengthening the bilateral relations between the traditional donor and the new donor country. In the words of Germany's Federal Foreign Office, Germany is "*particularly keen to strengthen mutual relations*" with Turkey (Auswärtiges Amt 2013). Geographically, Turkey lies at the intersection of the sensitive regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East; it is considered to be an anchor of stability in the region that is geo-strategically important to Europe. It also maintains close relations to many countries bordering the EU. Economically, Turkey has developed into a "*key player*" (IMF 2012) in the world economy in recent years. The country reported one of the world's strongest economic growth rates in 2010 and 2011 and, despite the cooling of the boom in 2012, is an important trade partner and investment location for Germany. If nothing else, relations with Turkey are important to Germany due to the size of the population with Turkish origins living in Germany (around three million people). It is therefore in the interest of

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23 The exception is a financial-cooperation project with Brazil handled by the KfW Development Bank. The BMZ has a general interest in implementing triangular cooperation in this sector with other countries as well.

Germany to link itself more closely with this rising economic and political power, in particular against the backdrop of the expected further dynamic development of Turkey and a foreseeable drop in Germany's relative importance in political and economic issues. If Germany wishes to have influence over the substance of international debates, it needs support for its positions and will need to cultivate good relations not only with its traditional Western partners but also rising emerging economies such as Turkey.

Despite the diversification of its foreign policy, Turkey is also interested in good and close relations with Germany, which is described by Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs as "*one of our most important allies*" (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s. a., c). In addition to its important role in the EU and the associated importance for Turkey's acceptance into the EU, Germany's importance for Turkey is also based on the close economic relations between both countries. Germany was still one of Turkey's most important trade partners in 2012 and is also the biggest foreign investor in Turkey. For good international relations it is helpful to make the exchange and cooperation as broad as possible. Triangular cooperation can contribute to this. It can be used to maintain the existing relations and networks on which the bilateral development cooperation has been based so far. At the same time, it can also contribute to the development of new networks in different sectors (politics, science, economics, technology) as they exist between industrialised countries. From an overriding strategic perspective, triangular cooperation can therefore be viewed as one of many instruments for deepening bilateral exchange.

Triangular cooperation involving Turkey and Germany can also serve the interests of both countries at the **structural level of international development policy**. Germany seeks to shape global development agendas and promotes the involvement of important emerging economies to achieve this. As described in Section 2.1, Turkey is making efforts to contribute more to international processes and has a particular interest in humanitarian issues. Both countries need allies in order to strengthen their own positions in international forums. As Germany and Turkey stem from different *camps* (a traditional donor country *versus* a new donor country), they might complement each other well. The gap left behind in the German-Turkish cooperation landscape when the development cooperation came to an end in 2008 could be partially filled through triangular cooperation. It could contribute to maintaining relations and networks in the area of development cooperation. In addition to this, triangular cooperation with DAC countries can be a means for Turkey to establish itself in the international donor landscape more easily.

From a structural policy viewpoint, Germany supports emerging economies' acceptance of regional responsibility. Due to its economic and political significance, Turkey is increasingly capable of influencing regional development processes. Turkey was therefore identified as an *anchor country*<sup>24</sup> as early as 2004. Even in the sense of the strategy on global structural policy (Bundesregierung 2012), it is in Germany's interest to encourage Turkey to assume regional responsibility. Special opportunities for influence may potentially result through the model of a Muslim-majority secular democracy. There is a heated discussion on whether Turkey can be a role model for other Muslim-majority countries in the region. If the Turkish model ends up having an effect on other countries in

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24 The BMZ defines *anchor countries* as countries that play an important role in their region (and increasingly globally as well) due to their economic importance and their political influence. A particular importance is attributed to cooperation with them (BMZ 2004, 5 ff.).

the region then this would be in the security and development policy interests of Germany and would at the same time accommodate Turkey's ambitions to assume a leadership role in the region.

Regardless of these overriding foreign policy and structural policy considerations, **development policy interests** also play a role. The improvement of the international development assistance system is repeatedly named as a benefit of triangular cooperation, as the exchange of know-how and experience between the DAC donor and the new donor country can contribute to the professionalisation of development cooperation. The exchange of learning experiences represents a constitutive element of triangular cooperation for Germany (BMZ 2013, 5). However, in the case of a German-Turkish triangular cooperation it is not clear whether Turkey actually has an interest in and a need for German expertise. On the one hand, according to Turkey's own statements, it is interested in partnering in triangular cooperation with any countries that have a developmental edge in specific sectors, that is, have a specific sectoral expertise and, unlike Turkey itself, have the legal prerequisites in place to directly transfer funds (2013 interviews). On the other hand, the interest is limited because UNDP has already been advising TİKA since 2008 with the explicit aim of strengthening the country's capabilities in the planning and implementation of development cooperation projects (Section 3.4). TİKA therefore currently has little demand for this type of know-how from DAC donors.

Like other DAC donors, Germany also originally used triangular cooperation to pursue the goal of familiarising new donor countries with established standards and principles for effectiveness and thereby integrating them into the existing international aid architecture (Altenburg / Weikert 2006, 5). This evoked a certain degree of mistrust among the new donor countries: triangular cooperation was suspected to be a Trojan Horse. The BMZ now uses more neutral language and speaks of "*promoting the sharing of learning and experience on the principles of development cooperation*" (BMZ 2013, 7). However, the underlying idea continues to be to sensitise the new donor countries, particularly with regard to donor best practices and the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The goal is to prevent the new donor's development cooperation from being primarily used as an instrument for pursuing political interests without creating added value for partner countries. Turkey is familiar with the principles through its observer status with the OECD DAC and its participation in OECD Peer Reviews. Nevertheless, there are some deficits in the implementation of Turkish aid, particularly in terms of aid tying.<sup>25</sup> Triangular cooperation with Turkey would therefore also be interesting for Germany from this perspective. However, compliance with these types of standards is not currently attractive to Turkey because it does not provide any advantages to the country.

At the project or programme level, both sides are interested in making the most efficient use possible of their own funds. Under certain circumstances, German-Turkish development cooperation programmes that have already had a successful run can be replicated in third countries at comparatively low costs within the framework of a triangular cooperation. The reach of the German development cooperation could thereby be extended. The use of Turkish experts who tend to be less expensive can play a special role in this. Both sides could also profit from the mobilisation of additional funds for

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25 However, the OECD DAC also criticised Germany for deficits regarding aid tying in the 2010 Peer Review.

projects in third countries. Turkey could thereby implement more projects or projects with a larger scope. In addition, Germany could also assess to what extent the new donors procedures that are “*generally regarded as rapid and flexible*” (BMZ 2013, 6), and their development policy experiences can be drawn on for German development cooperation. However, it is questionable whether Turkey’s procedures are actually more flexible and faster. The transfer of funds in particular is very elaborate and time-consuming for the Turkish bureaucracy (2013 interviews). The centralised and hierarchical Turkish bureaucracy often leads to delayed decisions. Nevertheless, Germany considers Turkey to be a cooperative, reliable and pragmatic partner that is capable of providing better-adapted solutions for developing countries due to its own still recent experience with development challenges (2013 interviews).

At this point, the GIZ’s own entrepreneurial interest as an implementing organisation must be mentioned as a specific German interest in triangular cooperation. The (federal) organisation is currently on a path of growth and is therefore interested in implementing as many projects and programmes as possible for the BMZ, whereby there is particular interest in cooperation with financially powerful emerging countries that can also be viewed as the source of potential future contracts.

The comparison of Turkish and German interests shows that there are a series of convergences in the area of foreign policy: the intensification of bilateral relations at different levels; the search for allies in international forums along with the desire to maintain existing networks; the promotion of multilateral global governance (Germany); and striving for regional and global importance (Turkey). There is also the desire on both sides to make the most efficient use possible of existing development assistance funds or to leverage them, if possible. Divergences exist with regard to the integration into the international development architecture dominated by the OECD DAC, a course which Turkey is not currently actively pursuing. The transfer of knowledge strived for by Germany in order to build more effective development cooperation structures is presumably not currently viewed as a high priority by Turkey. In summary, it can be noted that there are a comparatively high number of intersecting common interests. This is indeed a necessary condition for successful triangular cooperation, yet not a sufficient one. The prerequisites for Turkish-German triangular cooperation and the risks and opportunities associated with this form of cooperation will therefore be illuminated in further detail in the following section.

#### 4.4 German-Turkish triangular cooperation: prerequisites, risks and opportunities

It is decisive for successful triangular cooperation that it brings added value to all of the partners involved. Section 4.1 contains a list of prerequisite factors for the effectiveness of triangular cooperation. These include common development goals; alignment to the development priorities and context of the recipient country; the ownership of the recipient country; the complementarity of the services and capabilities; as well as the political buy-in of all of the partners. There are other factors affecting success in addition to this, such as the cultural proximity between the new donor and the recipient country; as well as the existence of bilateral relations between the new and traditional donor based on trust.

A German-Turkish partnership can generally fulfil the majority of these **pre-requisites**. The individual factors are described in more precise detail in the following:

There are similarities between the development goals of German and Turkish development cooperation. Even if foreign policy and foreign economic interests have a certain influence on the development policy of both countries, their development cooperation is nevertheless primarily geared toward creating added value in terms of development in partner countries. It is not directly tied to foreign policy or economic conditions by either of the countries. However, some critics feel that Turkey uses its development cooperation in order to pursue national interests significantly more intensively than Germany does. According to these critics, Turkey is making use of an embracement tactic. Turkish “*muscle games*” involving the profiling of Turkey as a regional and global player have been criticised in particular (2013 interviews). However, both sides basically have a similar understanding and concept of development cooperation and share the corresponding values. The fact that Turkey has already held observer status in the OECD DAC for a long time and is therefore familiar with the fundamental concepts and principles agreed upon there promotes this consensus.

Turkish development cooperation works in a very demand-oriented way, which can be traced back to the lack of its own strategy, among other things. Within the framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Germany has pledged to focus more intensively on the needs and processes of its partner countries. There should therefore not be any inherent differences between the two countries in terms of the fundamental orientation of triangular cooperation. The adaptation to the partner country contexts should also not pose great difficulties to joint development cooperation, particularly when it involves countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus or the Balkans. Both countries have comprehensive cooperation experience with these regions.

Ensuring that ownership remains with the partner country is normally viewed as one of the greatest challenges of triangular cooperation. The BMZ is aware of this risk and explicitly comments on it in its triangular cooperation position paper. In practice, in German development cooperation, there is apparently variation from case to case concerning whether the partner countries will (be able to) take ownership of the respective projects. With its strong demand orientation, Turkey might accomplish this more easily than Germany.

In addition to the compatibility of the underlying concepts and principles, the compatibility of the processes and contents of triangular cooperation is also a decisive factor for their success. The partners should complement each other with their skills in a way that an added value results in comparison to bilateral cooperation. Whether the processes used by Germany and Turkey are compatible is difficult to evaluate at this point. Development cooperation is less formalised in Turkey than in Germany, and processes and responsibilities are sometimes not conclusively clarified. A judgement could therefore presumably only be made by first putting it to the test. There is a relatively high intersection among the potential contents of cooperation. These overlaps relate to the thematic emphases of many years of German-Turkish development cooperation (e. g. in the areas of community environmental infrastructure, vocational training, standardisation, sustainable forestry) as well as to areas in which Turkey has achieved great development successes on its own yet which are also of interest for Germany (e. g. e-governance).

Turkey is attempting to make these development successes replicable but it has not yet systematically recorded them (2013 interviews). Numerous Turkish projects involve capacity building, an instrument with which German technical cooperation is also very familiar.

The situation concerning the political backing of the partners is more problematic. While in Germany there is the desire to promote triangular cooperation, as described in Section 4.1, there are few indications of this in Turkey. At the political level, the country actually seems rather sceptical of the expansion of triangular cooperation with Western DAC donors at present. Attempts by the GIZ to initiate triangular cooperation with TİKA have been thwarted on the part of Turkey in recent months (2013 interviews). However, there appears to be more interest on the part of the line ministries.

The proximity of the new donor country to the recipient country in terms of language and culture as well as a shared history as bilateral development partners between the new donor and the traditional donor country are often listed as factors facilitating the successful implementation of triangular cooperation.

With regard to its proximity in terms of language and culture, Turkey has a clear comparative advantage in its neighbouring regions. There are linguistic and cultural ties to a series of Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, while ethnic ties abound in the Balkans; in addition, the shared religion is a binding factor in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and parts of the Balkans and the South Caucasus. Risks resulting from cultural or religious differences could be minimised when cooperating in these regions. These connections can facilitate access to partner regions and project implementation itself. Turkey is a trustworthy partner for many countries to which Germany does not have equally good access. In addition, there is also the fact that Turkey is easy to reach for many countries – firstly due to its geographical location and secondly due to its comparatively uncomplicated visa-granting policy. This is an advantage for Turkey in acting as a host for international conferences.

Bilateral German-Turkish development cooperation ceased in 2008 after around 50 years of existence. Nevertheless, there continue to be numerous informal networks between both countries.

The fact that, compared to other emerging economies, Turkey has an unusually broad presence in partner countries in the form of TİKA Coordination Offices as well as generally well-trained experts can also be judged as a positive prerequisite for triangular cooperation.

However, even if Turkey and Germany fulfil many prerequisites for effective triangular cooperation, there are still some **risks**. In this regard, the literature primarily lists high transaction costs due to the higher amount of coordination efforts; the reduction of quality standards; insufficient orientation to the needs, priorities, strategies and structures of the recipient country; the further fragmentation of the donor landscape; and resentment in the beneficiary country due to a new donor country's policy being perceived as hegemonic (Section 4.1).

There are hardly any empirical studies on the possibly increased transaction costs. However, it can be assumed that triangular cooperation generally involves higher transaction costs, as the complexity of the relations increases in comparison to bilateral

cooperation. Coordination processes, for instance, are normally more complicated, which leads to an increase in management costs. Added to this is the fact that Turkish development cooperation has not yet been professionalised to the degree normal in DAC donor countries. This can cause the transaction costs to rise even further, for instance if turf wars arise with other government agencies or bottlenecks develop due to limited personnel. However, whether the transaction costs will increase, and how much they will increase, always depends heavily on the individual case. The boundary conditions that influence the transaction costs include the financial volume of the project; shared previous experiences with the handling of triangular cooperation; and the personal relations of the actors involved, among others.

German-Turkish cooperation would not necessarily imply a reduction in quality standards. However, the different stage of development of the two aid systems could become an issue. In some areas, at least, Turkey operates development cooperation as the Western donors did in the 1960s with compartmentalised technical projects producing isolated effects. Even if its potential for structural change is doubtful, Turkey is strongly convinced by the effectiveness of its projects in some cases. The implementation of complex joint programmes within the framework of triangular cooperation could therefore be difficult (2013 interviews). There may thus be different conceptions of how a joint project should best be set up and integrated. Turkey has a certain need to make up ground in the area of monitoring and evaluation. The country is nevertheless aware of these deficits, meaning that overhauling them could be part of shared learning experiences.

The risk of a lack of orientation to the needs and priorities of the recipient country is presumably comparatively low due to the demand-driven nature of Turkish development cooperation. However, the perceived danger of increasing fragmentation is justified. As each new bilateral programme contributes to the further fragmentation of the aid landscape, this would also apply to German-Turkish initiatives. As Turkey is generally reticent to coordinate with other donor countries, however, joint trilateral cooperation could also be used to integrate the country into international coordination processes and thereby to contribute to harmonisation.

The partner countries' concerns that the new donor country could act as a hegemonic power is repeatedly specified as a risk with triangular cooperation with emerging economies (Altenburg / Weikert 2006, 12, among others). As mentioned in Section 2.1, Turkey's increased involvement in its region is perceived by some as *neo-Ottomanism* or Ottoman imperialism. However, this viewpoint is clearly not shared by broad sections of the population in the neighbouring regions. The little data that is available indicates that Turkey enjoys wide popularity in many areas in the South Caucasus, with the exception of Armenia (2013 interviews).<sup>26</sup> Turkey received the highest popularity ratings in a 2011 survey in the Middle East (Akgün / Senyücel Gündoğar 2012, 9), even if there is a certain amount of mistrust with regard to the long-term goals of Turkey's foreign policy which are alleged to contain regional power ambitions (Faath 2011, 262). According to a survey of politicians and the population in Afghanistan, Turkey is the most popular donor country there (Sey 2013, 24) and the African press consistently publishes positive reports on

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26 Another indication of this is the fact that the Caucasus Barometer 2011 of the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRRC) shows comparatively high rates of approval for Turkey in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Turkey's involvement on the continent (and particularly in Somalia). However, the people in Africa and Turkey generally tend to know little about each other (Islam 2010, 51; 2013 interviews). In the aforementioned regions there is therefore little sign of reservations against Turkish development cooperation. Turkish foreign policy experts have differing estimations of the perception of Turkey in the Balkans and Central Asia (2013 interviews), with the result that it is not possible to make a definitive statement about it here.

Conflicting goals result in triangular cooperation due to the fact that, on the one hand, the capacity of the new donor country is to be increased and it is to be integrated into the international aid architecture and, on the other hand, the highest possible development benefit is to be achieved for the beneficiary country. Zilla (2011, 4) speaks of "*goal perversion*" (translated): the implementation of a triangular project becomes all the more complicated, the more intensively the focus is set on political-strategic goals, as this involves politically sensitive areas. So the greater benefit of triangular cooperation over the benefit of a bilateral project for the beneficiary country can be called into question (Altenburg / Weikert 2006, 18). It is also often unclear what the frequently invoked *shared learning process* of the two donor countries is precisely intended to mean (2013 interviews).

Even if Turkey's foreign policy is very pragmatic in its main features, observers feel that it is sometimes unpredictable and guided by gut instincts. The policy toward Israel in recent years is given as an example. Disagreements at the highest political level would occasionally carry through to cooperation at the professional level (2013 interviews). Such a circumstance can also have a negative impact on the implementation of triangular cooperation. This risk is intensified due to the fact that Turkey has generally not clearly formulated its interests in the respective countries and does not have any country or sector strategies. This can make it difficult for Germany and for third countries to assess Turkey.

In addition to these risks, however, German-Turkish cooperation also presents a series of potential **opportunities** and benefits. Triangular cooperation can contribute to deepening and diversifying bilateral relations and intensifying the exchange on global development agendas. A new multilateral global governance can be promoted through triangular cooperation and it might lead to the more efficient use of development assistance funds. The frequently invoked prospect that a new donor country will allow itself to be integrated into the international development architecture as a result of triangular cooperation seems rather low in the case of Turkey and it is doubtful whether Turkey has sufficient interest in a joint learning process aimed at the professionalisation of its own development cooperation institutions.

In addition, triangular cooperation can also be a potential element of a phasing out strategy at the end of a bilateral development cooperation relationship (Altenburg / Weikert 2006, 5). In this case, this form of cooperation can enable the new donor country to extend successful elements of bilateral cooperation programmes within its own development cooperation or to transfer knowledge to other developing countries. German-Turkish development cooperation was discontinued in 2008; the remaining funds are currently still being disbursed in the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energies as well as community infrastructure (potable water supply, sewage and garbage disposal). Even if it can be assumed that there were a series of successful projects in approximately 50 years of cooperation, it is presumably too late for triangular

cooperation to follow directly on these initiatives. It would therefore be necessary to examine whether there are successful projects in the remaining areas of energy efficiency, renewable energies and community infrastructure that can be replicated in third countries.

Both countries could potentially profit from each other's reputation. As a Muslim-majority country with great economic success, Turkey has a particular credibility within its region that can benefit German development cooperation. In light of the good reputation of Turkish development assistance, Germany does not have to fear that triangular cooperation with Turkey would damage its own reputation. For its part, Turkey can achieve greater credibility in third countries as well as in the donor community through cooperation with a large established donor country. Triangular cooperation would politically signal that Turkey is now a partner on equal footing and has left its status as a recipient country behind.

At a fundamental level, triangular cooperation can also lead to a loosening of rigid donor/recipient relations. More than with bilateral projects, with triangular cooperation Germany would be forced to practice "*horizontal behaviour*" and to actually conduct a dialogue based on partnership on a level playing field beyond all rhetoric (2013 interviews).

There can also be advantages and disadvantages for the respective third partner of a German-Turkish triangular cooperation. On the one hand, the transaction costs may increase due to increased management and administrative efforts. On the other hand, well-adapted solutions may potentially be transferred into the beneficiary country at comparatively low costs. The recipient country may also be able to profit from the complementary services and capabilities of the two donors. What specific advantages and disadvantages result depends heavily on the individual case.

#### 4.5 Potentials and perspectives of Turkish-German triangular cooperation

In order to determine the potential of Turkish-German triangular cooperation, it is necessary to weigh up the opportunities and risks. To a great extent the development cooperation approaches of Turkey and Germany are compatible. There are no great differences with regard to the development goals and the understanding of development cooperation as well as its fundamental concepts, principles and contents. Even the goals associated with triangular cooperation are congruent to a large extent. The experiences from many years of bilateral development cooperation between both countries as well as the fact that both of them have a broad external structure in partner countries could also promote triangular cooperation. From the German perspective there are therefore favourable prerequisites for triangular cooperation with Turkey similar to those for cooperation with Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

However, the fact that there is currently no strong political interest in joint triangular cooperation on the part of Turkey makes the initiation and the success of corresponding projects very doubtful. Other arguments against triangular cooperation include the likely increasing transaction costs, the additional fragmentation of the donor landscape, and the decreased ownership of the beneficiary country that is to be feared. However, the extent to which these factors would have an effect would depend heavily on the individual case.

The cost/benefit considerations are made more difficult by the fact that a series of goals are being pursued with the cooperation that go beyond the purely development effects in the third country.

If Germany holds firm to the expansion of triangular cooperation and Turkey shows more interest in cooperation then presumably little stands in the way of joint triangular cooperation. In such a case, a few aspects should be taken into consideration when shaping the cooperation in order to enhance its effectiveness:

In order to achieve an appropriate cost/benefit ratio it must be ensured that the transaction costs do not get out of hand. For this reason simple forms of cooperation below the level of trilateral intergovernmental negotiations should be used.

The first triangular cooperation initiatives should be as technical as possible in nature, concentrate on the areas of training and knowledge exchange and not include any politically sensitive issues. When dealing with development policy standards, it is recommended that both sides refer to specific standards and not to a fundamental normative position.

The cooperation initiatives should be designed in such a way that they lead to a solidification of the partner relations with Turkish institutions. It could therefore be sensible to implement projects in sectors that were a part of German-Turkish development cooperation where corresponding networks have already been established. In other sectors it can be difficult to evaluate the expertise of the partners. If possible, an initial pilot project should be docked onto a German-Turkish project that is still ongoing in the area of energy efficiency, renewable energies or community infrastructure in order to keep the transaction costs low.

The beneficiary country selected should preferably be one that has experience of cooperation with Germany and Turkey. Ideally TİKA and the GIZ would have a country office there in order to facilitate the coordination.

In order to contribute to strengthening regional cooperation, the project should preferably be implemented with countries from neighbouring regions (the South Caucasus or the Middle East).

Projects in which the partners can contribute complementary areas of expertise should be selected when possible. Germany should primarily concentrate on imparting the know-how explicitly requested by Turkey. In doing so, it should ensure in advance that the German contribution does not overlap with the activities of the other actors that partner with Turkey in triangular cooperation projects.<sup>27</sup>

In order to ensure the ownership on both sides, both countries should make a significant financial contribution that goes beyond the provision of personnel.

Germany should pay increased attention to conducting a dialogue on equal footing and not to falling back into old cooperation models.

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27 This particularly applies to activities within the framework of the UNDP project "Bridging South-South Cooperation" and instances of trilateral cooperation of other DAC donor countries with Turkey.

## 5 Conclusions

The examination of Turkish development assistance and the potential of German-Turkish triangular cooperation in this paper points to the following conclusions:

As a foreign policy instrument, Turkish development cooperation can be considered to be a type of “*trust-building measure*” (translated; Sey 2013, 23) that serves the overriding goals of developing good relations with the neighbouring regions and enabling the country to profile itself as a regional and global power. Development policy is therefore not an independent policy field but rather is always dependent on foreign policy priorities. This is reflected in both the institutional anchoring of the development agency TİKA in the Prime Ministry as well as in the geographical distribution of the Turkish ODA (the LDCs received only about one-third of Turkey’s ODA in 2011). The lack of a clear strategic orientation and the strong focus on bilateral assistance can be viewed as the greatest deficits in Turkish development cooperation.

However, development cooperation is normally not used by the Turkish government to directly pursue specific foreign policy concerns, to extort political support or to enforce economic interests but rather has a humanitarian component in addition to the intent to create a positive image of Turkey. In principle Turkey’s development policy seems rather low-key and is not directly tied to political conditionalities.

Turkey’s role in the international donor community is ambivalent. On the one hand, the country considers itself to be a rising power and donor country. On the other hand, it would like to be perceived by developing countries as their mouthpiece and a representative of their interests. Unlike with other new donor countries (such as China, India and Brazil), Turkey’s understanding of development cooperation is not based on the concept of South-South cooperation. The basic conception of development policy resembles the understanding of the DAC donors. Due to its many years holding observer status in the OECD DAC, Turkey is closer to them than many other new donors; at most, Mexico is also comparable here.

In contradiction to its own claims, so far Turkey has actually been acting in a low-key manner and hardly proactively in most international development policy forums and processes. The country is also still reluctant to join the OECD DAC. Turkey apparently currently sees an advantage in not clearly defining its own role. Turkey basically considers itself to be an alternative to traditional donor countries and other new donor countries.

Turkish development cooperation is implemented by numerous governmental actors, with TİKA playing a crucial role as a coordinating institution. It is sometimes difficult for outsiders to discern which actors are responsible for what, which is also due to the fact that these responsibilities are not always clearly defined. Some decision-making processes have not even yet been established. One central element of Turkey’s development cooperation is the dispatching of Turkish experts from the respective responsible governmental institutions to work on short-term and medium-term assignments in development projects in partner countries. This lowers the costs of the projects in comparison to those of traditional donor countries who often work with long-term experts. However, it is conceivable that this model will reach its limits with the expansion of the aid programme.

Similarly to the areas of interest in terms of foreign policy, the geographical priorities of Turkish development cooperation stretch from Central Asia to the Caucasus and the Balkans and meanwhile to South Asia, the Middle East and – outside of the traditional sphere of influence – to Africa. The amount of funds provided varies significantly among many recipients, which can presumably be traced back to the lack of a strategic basis for the cooperation and which has a negative effect on the long-term planning reliability of the countries benefitting. A large part of the projects in all of the regions falls in the area of social infrastructure and often includes the renovation or the construction and equipping of schools and hospitals as well as the qualification of experts through capacity building measures. Many projects are reminiscent of those of European donors in the early stages of their development assistance programmes: rather small, isolated projects that are not integrated into higher-level programmes and are not aimed at systematic changes either. A considerable part of Turkey's ODA is spent on scholarships for students from developing countries as well as for the care of refugees in Turkey, particularly in 2012.

Cooperation with Turkish NGOs is still in its initial stages and there are hardly any established cooperation mechanisms. The public side is only slowly beginning to recognise NGOs as relevant and legitimate actors in development cooperation; financial and political support is still very limited. Sometimes the government even competes with the NGOs in appeals for donations (on the occasion of the famine in Somalia, for instance).

In summary, it can be determined that the fundamental orientation of Turkish development cooperation corresponds to the development policy of DAC donors and is presumably superior to many of them in some areas such as its demand-orientation and in terms of labour costs. However, it is not yet state-of-the-art in its setup. Its effectiveness suffers from the fact that internal processes and structures have not yet been fully established; there is still no clear strategy in which the sectoral and geographical priorities are defined; and – as noted above – it mostly involves comparatively isolated, small projects. Likewise there are no agreements on the division of labour with other countries. To its credit, however, one must not forget that Turkey's development cooperation is still comparatively young and is going through a professionalisation process. The same standards cannot be imposed as with donor countries that have over 30 more years of experience in this area.

The AKP administration has summarised its foreign policy goals for the next ten years in its "Vision 2023". In addition to acceptance into the EU, this administration is also striving to expand integration and cooperation with its neighbouring countries, to create a zone of stability, security and prosperity in the neighbouring regions (particularly in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans) and to strengthen its own role as a global player (Davutoğlu 2011a). Even if there is still a certain discrepancy between its claimed roles and its actual capabilities, it is to be expected that Turkey will further expand its development assistance in its pursuit of foreign policy goals and that the country will hold a firm place in the international aid architecture in the future.

There are basically no reservations against joint triangular cooperation between Turkey and Germany. The interests of both countries and the way in which they implement their development cooperation show necessary points of convergence, even if the insufficient political backing for the instrument on the part of Turkey is a point of concern. For

Germany, Turkey is an interesting partner for triangular cooperation, similarly to Brazil or Mexico, not least due to its potential to exert regional influence.

Rather, there are concerns over whether triangular cooperation is the appropriate instrument in principle to realise the goals of both donors. Triangular cooperation projects are normally not implemented because the partners seek impact in the third country at lower costs. They are primarily guided by the wish that the new donor should be accompanied on its path toward permanent and high-quality development cooperation. Both Turkey and Germany have a fundamental interest in intensifying their bilateral relations. However, there is the question of whether less complex and expensive and more effective instruments are available. In order to create a common understanding, exchange could first be promoted at the technical level within the framework of exchange programmes and joint conferences. In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Action Plan, donor countries should preferably be animated to contribute to joint funding mechanisms or to channel their development assistance through regional or UN institutions instead of contributing to the further fragmentation of the aid landscape through bilateral or triangular projects. From this perspective, joint German-Turkish triangular cooperation only seems sensible if it creates a clear added value for the beneficiary country in comparison to a multilateral or bilateral project on the part of either Turkey or Germany.

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## Interviewees

All interviews were conducted between 22 May and 3 June 2013 unless otherwise stated.

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Anonymous	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkınma Bakanlığı (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development)
Anonymous	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury)
Iris Ahr*	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
Engin Akçay	Turgut Özal Üniversitesi (Turgut Özal University)
Farkhad Alimukhamedov	Turgut Özal Üniversitesi (Turgut Özal University)
Mehmet Arda	Galatrasay Üniversitesi (Galatrasay University) / Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırma Merkezi (EDAM) (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies)
Ibrahim Betil**	Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yaşamda Nitelikli Değişim ve Gelişime Destek Derneği (SenDeGel) (Support for Improvement in Social and Economic Living)
Belgin Çağdaş	Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı (TİKA) (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
Eckhard Deutscher	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Esin Acar Ergin	Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı (TİKA) (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
Frank Flasche	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Ankara Office
Sema Genel	Support to Life
Aybars Görgülü	Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV) (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
Şaban Kardaş	TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)
Gülây Kılıç	Uluslararası Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu (USAK) (International Strategic Research Organisation)
Kerem Kınık	Doctors Worldwide (DWW)
Marion Kneesch	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) Entwicklungsbank (KfW Development Bank), Ankara Office
Michael Meier	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Istanbul Office

<b>Name</b>	<b>Institution</b>
Coralie Nicolao	Doctors Worldwide (DWW)
Hüseyin Oruç	İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH) (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief)
Hasan Öztürk	Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (BILGESAM) (Wise Men Centre For Strategic Studies)
Ebru Saner	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Turkey
Andrea Taugher	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Dirk Tröndle	Deutsche Botschaft Ankara (German Embassy Ankara)
Gülây Yaşın	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Ankara Office

\* Interview on 10 Oct. 2013

\*\* Telephone interview on 18 Jul. 2013

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