Titelaufnahme

Titel
Owners, external managers, and industrial relations in German establishments / Arnd Kölling (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Claus Schnabel (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserKölling, Arnd ; Schnabel, Claus
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, November 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten)
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12767
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-204019 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Owners, external managers, and industrial relations in German establishments [0.43 mb]
Links
Nachweis
Verfügbarkeit In meiner Bibliothek
Zusammenfassung

Using data from the representative IAB Establishment Panel in Germany and estimating a panel probit model with fixed effects, this paper finds a negative relationship between the existence of owner-management in an establishment and the probabilities of having a works council or a collective bargaining agreement. We show that family firms which are solely, partially or not managed by the owners significantly differ in the presence of works councils and collective bargaining agreements. The probabilities of having works councils and collective agreements increase substantially if just some of the managers do not belong to the owner family. We argue that these differences cannot simply be attributed to an aversion of the owners against co-determination and unions but require taking account of the notion of socio-emotional wealth prevalent in family firms. In addition, our results support the idea that external managers mainly act as agents rather than stewards in family firms.