Titelaufnahme

Titel
Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives / Anastasia Danilov (University of Cologne), Bernd Irlenbusch (University of Cologne and IZA), Christine Harbring (RWTH Aachen) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserDanilov, Anastasia ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Harbring, Christine
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (27 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12267
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-185678 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives [0.98 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rankorder tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.