Titelaufnahme

Titel
Marriage market equilibrium, qualifications, and ability / Dan Anderberg (Royal Holloway, Institute for Fiscal Studies and CESifo), Jesper Bagger (Royal Holloway and Aarhus University), V. Bhaskar (University of Texas at Austin and CEPR), Tanya Wilson (University of Glasgow and IZA) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
VerfasserAnderberg, Dan ; Bagger, Jesper ; Bhaskar, V. ; Wilson, Tanya
KörperschaftForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
ErschienenBonn, Germany : IZA Institute of Labor Economics, March 2019
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (56 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieDiscussion paper ; no. 12210
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:5:2-184378 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Dokument ist öffentlich zugänglich im Rahmen des deutschen Urheberrechts.
Volltexte
Marriage market equilibrium, qualifications, and ability [0.64 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo and Siow (2006) model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability.